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Res. 00116-2009 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 2009
OutcomeResultado
The sanitary orders that declared the dwelling uninhabitable and ordered its eviction are upheld, but the State and IMAS are ordered to coordinate decent housing for the affected person and to pay moral damages caused by the unjustified procedural delay.Se declaran válidas las órdenes sanitarias que dispusieron la inhabitabilidad y desalojo de la vivienda ubicada en zona de protección del río Tiribí, pero se condena al Estado y al IMAS a coordinar una vivienda digna para la afectada y a indemnizarla por el daño moral causado por la dilación injustificada del procedimiento.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Litigation Tribunal reviews three sanitary orders issued by the Ministry of Health that declared a rented house in Hatillo uninhabitable and ordered the tenant's eviction, on the grounds that the house lies within the 10-meter protection zone of the Tiribí River (Articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law) and exhibits hazardous and unsanitary conditions. The ruling upholds the validity of the sanitary orders, finding they were issued by a competent authority, that the location in a protection zone makes any repair impossible, and that the nearly two‑year delay in deciding the administrative appeals does not cause absolute nullity because it did not change the substance of the case. However, the Court declares that the Ministry of Health violated the constitutional principle of prompt justice (Article 41) and that the State's failure to coordinate social‑assistance measures prior to the eviction breached the rights to decent housing and a healthy environment. Consequently, it orders the State to pay one million colones in moral damages, directs the Mixed Institute of Social Assistance (IMAS) to provide a supplementary income for six months, and gives the State the same period to coordinate with the housing‑sector institutions to find a permanent housing solution for the affected person.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo analiza la legalidad de tres órdenes sanitarias del Ministerio de Salud que declararon inhabitable una vivienda ocupada en arriendo en Hatillo y ordenaron el desalojo de su inquilina, por estar ubicada dentro del área de protección de 10 metros del río Tiribí (artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal) y por presentar condiciones de peligrosidad e insalubridad. La sentencia confirma la validez de las órdenes sanitarias al encontrar que fueron emitidas por autoridad competente, que la ubicación en zona de protección torna imposible cualquier reparación, y que la dilación de casi dos años en resolver los recursos administrativos no acarrea nulidad absoluta porque no varió el fondo del asunto. No obstante, el Tribunal declara que el Ministerio de Salud violó el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 constitucional) y que la omisión estatal de coordinar medidas de asistencia social previas al desalojo vulnera los derechos a una vivienda digna y a un ambiente sano. Como consecuencia, condena al Estado al pago de un millón de colones por daño moral subjetivo, ordena al IMAS otorgar un ingreso económico complementario por seis meses, y fija un plazo de igual duración para que el Estado coordine con las instituciones del sector vivienda una opción habitacional permanente para la afectada.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Notwithstanding the above, this Court considers that Sanitary Orders 105153, 105154 and 105155 are indeed technically grounded as to the declaration of hazardousness and unhealthiness of the dwelling, for the following reasons: The house is located within the protection area of the Tiribí River, specifically seven meters from the riverbanks, which is contrary to Article 33 of the Forestry Law, establishing a ten‑meter protection zone along riverbanks. […] they constitute a hazardousness element not only for the property but mainly for the plaintiff and those living with her, given the flood risk that must be avoided in application of the precautionary principle (Article 11.2 of the Biodiversity Law and Principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration). […] In this regard, the timely and efficient exercise of the powers granted by the legal system for the State to protect, preserve, defend and guarantee those fundamental rights and hence the public interest, is not conditioned on the existence of a request by a party; quite the opposite, precisely to safeguard the public interest the State must exercise those powers even preventively in order to achieve the goal that justified the granting of those duties-powers, namely the satisfaction of the public interest and therefore the protection of fundamental rights.No obstante lo anterior, este Tribunal considera que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, sí están fundamentadas desde un punto de vista técnico, en cuanto a la declaratoria de peligrosidad e insalubridad de la vivienda, por las siguientes razones: La casa está situada en el área de protección del Río Tiribí, específicamente a siete metros de las márgenes de dicho río, lo cual resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, que establece un área de protección de diez metros de las riberas de los ríos. […] constituyen un elemento de peligrosidad no sólo para el inmueble, sino principalmente para la actora y las personas que viven con ella en dicha vivienda, ya que existe un riesgo de inundación que en aplicación del principio precautorio debe ser evitado (artículo 11.2 de la Ley de Biodiversidad y principio 15 de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, Declaración de Río) […] En ese sentido, el ejercicio oportuno y eficiente de las potestades otorgadas por el Ordenamiento Jurídico para que el Estado proteja, preserve, defienda y garantice esos derechos fundamentales y por ende, el interés público, no están condicionadas a que exista gestión de parte para ejercerlas, todo lo contrario, ya que precisamente en aras de tutelar el interés público el Estado deberá ejercer dichas potestades incluso de manera preventiva para cumplir el objetivo que justificó el otorgamiento de dichos poderes deberes, cual es, la satisfacción del interés público y por ende, la protección de los derechos fundamentales.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"las autoridades de salud "... podrán dictar resoluciones ordenando medidas de carácter general o particular, según corresponda, para la mejor aplicación y cumplimiento..." del ordenamiento jurídico."
"the health authorities "... may issue resolutions ordering measures of a general or particular nature, as appropriate, for the better application and enforcement..." of the legal system."
Considerando IV
"las autoridades de salud "... podrán dictar resoluciones ordenando medidas de carácter general o particular, según corresponda, para la mejor aplicación y cumplimiento..." del ordenamiento jurídico."
Considerando IV
"La casa está situada en el área de protección del Río Tiribí, específicamente a siete metros de las márgenes de dicho río, lo cual resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, que establece un área de protección de diez metros de las riberas de los ríos."
"The house is located within the protection area of the Tiribí River, specifically seven meters from the riverbanks, which is contrary to Article 33 of the Forestry Law, establishing a ten‑meter protection zone along riverbanks."
Considerando IV
"La casa está situada en el área de protección del Río Tiribí, específicamente a siete metros de las márgenes de dicho río, lo cual resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, que establece un área de protección de diez metros de las riberas de los ríos."
Considerando IV
"resultaría paradógico que en aras de tutelar la vida, la salud, la seguridad y la integridad personales, se pretenda desalojar a una persona de escasos recursos económicos -como la actora- que ocupa una vivienda declarada inhabitable [...] sin que de previo se adopten de manera coordinada por parte del Estado -entendido en su concepto unitario- las medidas alternas o paliativas que garanticen que esos derechos fundamentales no sufrirán un mayor menoscabo."
"it would be paradoxical that in order to protect life, health, security and personal integrity, the eviction of a person of scarce economic resources –such as the plaintiff– who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable is sought [...] without first adopting, in a coordinated manner by the State –understood in its unitary concept– alternative or palliative measures that guarantee those fundamental rights will not suffer further harm."
Considerando III
"resultaría paradógico que en aras de tutelar la vida, la salud, la seguridad y la integridad personales, se pretenda desalojar a una persona de escasos recursos económicos -como la actora- que ocupa una vivienda declarada inhabitable [...] sin que de previo se adopten de manera coordinada por parte del Estado -entendido en su concepto unitario- las medidas alternas o paliativas que garanticen que esos derechos fundamentales no sufrirán un mayor menoscabo."
Considerando III
Full documentDocumento completo
III.- THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL SITUATION. Article 49 of the Political Constitution establishes that the essential function of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is to effectively protect, at a minimum, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of individuals against the arbitrariness of public power. This is a framework that protects the legal situations of persons, whether of power, duty, advantage, or mixed. This constitutional norm is the basis for the major contentious-administrative procedural reform that led to the approval of the current Law 8508, whose axis is based—as can be deduced from Article 1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code—on the one hand, on the full and effective protection of the person, that is, the effective protection of the legal situations of every person (subjective legality), among which are, without a doubt, their fundamental rights. On the other hand, it establishes objective control of the legality of the administrative function, seeking the restoration of legality, most of the time, for the purpose of avoiding injuries to the aforementioned legal situations. In that sense, if this Tribunal has deemed it proven that at least since the year nineteen ninety-nine, the plaintiff has occupied, as a lessee, a dwelling located in Colonia Quince de Setiembre, from the Alajuelita bridge, 15 meters north and 25 meters east, on the banks of the Tiribí River (see documents at folios 103 and 104, 109 and 110 of the judicial file; 29, 88 to 89 bis, 96 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health) and that by health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area of the Ministry of Health declared the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff in her capacity as lessee uninhabitable and ordered its eviction (see documents at folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), we consider that the plaintiff is the holder of a legal situation that can be protected through the contentious-administrative channel, since the issuance of the health order whose conformity with the legal system is being discussed in this proceeding generates a direct effect on her vital sphere of interests, because it affects one of the minimum, essential, and necessary elements to make effective the fundamental rights and guarantees inherent to the condition of a person, such as: life, dignity, health, the environment, and human development, in such a way that it deserves special protection and consideration. The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared uninhabitable is not an obstacle for her to resort to this channel in protection of her rights or interests, not only because Articles 49 of the Political Constitution and 1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code are clear in establishing that the purpose of this Jurisdiction is to protect the legal situations of every person, but also because the plaintiff is the one directly affected by the content of the health orders that she challenges here, since, although it is true that the Representation of the State and Doctor Arguedas Barquero have maintained in the hearings for interim measures, preliminary, and oral and public trial, that they have exercised their powers in safeguarding the right to health of the plaintiff and her family, by declaring the uninhabitability and the subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the individuals (Article 113, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration) and that the Administrative Legal System has the purpose of achieving a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of persons (Article 8 General Law of Public Administration), it would be paradoxical that for the sake of protecting life, health, personal safety, and integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of scarce economic resources—like the plaintiff—who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable (a condition that emerges from the documents at folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwest Regional Manager of the Mixed Institute of Social Aid declares the plaintiff as "IMAS Population"; from the plaintiff's statement and the testimonial statement of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which are recorded in the audiovisual record of the interim measures hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Tribunal on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, which is recorded in the digital record of that proceeding), without previously adopting, in a coordinated manner by the State—understood in its unitary concept—alternative or palliative measures that guarantee that these fundamental rights will not suffer greater impairment, rights that the State is obligated to protect in direct application of Articles 21, 33 (for human dignity), 50, 65, and 74 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented towards protecting the plaintiff’s legal situation, not only with the declaration of uninhabitability, but also with the taking of positive actions directed at the effective protection of the rights that the Public Administration is called upon to protect, such as a dignified home or a housing option consistent with her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after this Tribunal ordered, as an interim measure, the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting, through judgment number 692-2008 at eighteen hours on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, the request for interim measures that was filed (see documents at folios 70, 71, 267 to 271 of the judicial file).
IV.- THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY DEFECTS IN THE CHALLENGED HEALTH ORDERS. The plaintiff considers that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, issued by the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area, in which the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and its eviction is ordered, suffer from defects of absolute nullity because they are contrary to the guarantee of due process, on the grounds that in her judgment: 1) They were issued by an incompetent official; 2) There was undue delay on the part of the competent authorities in issuing the resolutions by which the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal were resolved; 3) The plaintiff was not given the possibility to make repairs to the dwelling. This Tribunal considers that although it is true that the challenged health orders suffer from certain defects, these are not of a substantial nature and therefore do not have the capacity to cause the absolute nullity of the challenged acts, in accordance with the following analysis of each of the points alleged: 1) The plaintiff considers that the Environmental Manager of the Health Area was not competent to issue the challenged health orders, since in her judgment, the competent authority to do so is Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero in his capacity as Director of the Hatillo Health Area. In accordance with the documents found at folios 64 to 66, 70 to 72, and 76 to 81 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health and from the expert witness statement given by Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena before this Tribunal, which is recorded in the audiovisual records of the interim measures hearings and the oral and public trial, it emerges that Lawson Marchena works as an Environmental Manager in the Hatillo Health Area and that among the functions she is responsible for performing in that position is that of carrying out inspections or visits to conduct health operations, collect samples or gather background information or evidence in buildings, dwellings, and industrial or commercial establishments, and in any place where violations of health laws and regulations could be perpetrated (see Article 346 of the General Health Law and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health). Now, in accordance with the provisions of Article 338 of the General Health Law, the health authorities are responsible for applying said normative body, as well as other laws or regulations related to that subject, thus being considered health authorities not only those provided for in Article 338 of the General Health Law, but also the officials of the Ministry of Health who perform inspection duties and have been especially commissioned for the verification of infractions to the General Health Law or its regulations, according to the provisions of Article 349 of that same normative body. Now, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 340 and 341 of the General Health Law, the health authorities "... may issue resolutions ordering measures of a general or particular nature, as appropriate, for the better application and compliance..." with the legal system. Likewise, the health authorities "... may order and take the special measures authorized by this law to prevent risk or damage to people's health or to prevent these from spreading or worsening, and to inhibit the continuation or recurrence of the infraction by individuals" (see Article 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health). Within those special measures, Articles 320 and 321 of the General Health Law establish that: "... rooms and buildings that, due to their ruinous state or because there exists in them a permanent source of infection, constitute a danger to the health and safety of their occupants or neighbors, shall be declared uninhabitable by the health authority...", and therefore, once "... a room or building has been classified as uninhabitable or unhealthy, the owner or person in charge shall be notified, setting a period within which they must proceed with the eviction, demolition, or repair, as the case may be...". In view of the evidence indicated and the legal norms partially transcribed, this Tribunal considers that the health orders were issued by a competent authority, since Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area, constitutes a health authority who is empowered to issue and order special measures such as the declaration of uninhabitability and subsequent eviction—if applicable—of a property, for the purpose not only of enforcing the environmental health legal system, but also of preventing risk or harm to the health of the persons involved. Therefore, regarding this aspect, the challenged acts do not suffer from a defect of absolute nullity. 2) Regarding the alleged undue delay on the part of the South Central Regional Director and the Minister of Health in resolving the appeals for reconsideration and subsidiary appeal that the plaintiff filed against health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, this Tribunal has deemed it proven: a) That on November twenty-first, two thousand six, the plaintiff filed before the Hatillo Health Area an appeal for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal and an incident of nullity against health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155; b) That by official letter number ASH-179-06 of November twenty-third, two thousand eight, the Director of the Hatillo Health Area and the Environmental Manager sent the appeals filed by the plaintiff to the South Central Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, for the purpose of proceeding as appropriate, appeals that were received by the South Central Regional Directorate on November twenty-fourth, two thousand eight; c) That the appeal for reconsideration was declared without merit by resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 issued by the Director of the South Central Region of the Ministry of Health, at twelve hours thirty minutes on December fourth, two thousand six, and that said official, by official letter number DRCS-4667-006 of December fourth, two thousand six, forwarded the case file to the Minister of Health so that she could resolve the subsidiary appeal filed, appeals that were received by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Health on December sixth, two thousand six; d) That by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, the subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff against health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 was declared without merit (see folios 36 to 40, 51 to 55, 56 to 58, 62, and 63 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health). Now, this Tribunal considers that even though Article 52, subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health only indicates that the appeal for reconsideration shall be resolved "... within the three business days following its filing...", omitting the period for the Head of the Ministry of Health to resolve the appeal (Article 52, subsection h of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health), the one-month period provided for in Article 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration is applied supplementarily, which is based on the principles of legal certainty; prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Political Constitution); efficiency (Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration); and the self-sufficiency and self-integration of the administrative legal system (Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration). This Tribunal is not unaware that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly held in its jurisprudence that the health order constitutes the initial act of the administrative procedure that the Ministry of Health processes for that purpose; however, we consider that due to the characteristics of said act, the technical support it carries, and for the sake of the effective protection of the guarantee of due process—which the same jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber affirms is safeguarded during the appeals phase of said procedure—we consider that the eight-day period provided for in Article 352, subsection 2 of the General Law of Public Administration is not applicable, but rather the one-month period contained in Article 261, subsection 2 of that same law, so that the person affected by the issuance of the health order has an effective, reasonable, and proportionate opportunity for adversarial proceedings and, therefore, to provide for their defense at the administrative level, in the event they chose that route to do so. Based on the factual and legal elements cited above, this Tribunal considers that the Ministry of Health did incur a violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice at the administrative level, by failing to observe the periods provided for in the legal system to resolve the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal filed against a health order, for the following reasons: a) Although it is true that the Director of the Hatillo Health Area sent, by official letter number ASH-179-06 of November twenty-third, two thousand six, the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal, so that the South Central Regional Director of the Ministry of Health would resolve the appeal for reconsideration in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (folios 56 to 58 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), it was not until resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 at twelve hours thirty minutes on December fourth, two thousand six, that the South Central Regional Director of the Ministry of Health resolved the appeal for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff, who was notified of that pronouncement only on December nineteenth, two thousand six (folios 53 to 55 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), this despite the fact that said Regional Directorate received the appeals on November twenty-fourth, two thousand six (folio 56 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); b) That despite the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Health having received, on December sixth, two thousand six, the subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff (folios 51 and 52 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), it was not until resolution DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight (folios 36 to 40 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), that said appeal was declared without merit; c) That this delay was noted not only by the complainant himself, Mario Tulio also known as Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (see copy of note of June thirtieth, two thousand seven and of official letter of March twenty-eighth, two thousand seven at folios 49 and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), but also by the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who participated in the procedure, namely: General Directorate of Health, South Central Regional Directorate, and Directorate of the Hatillo Health Area, who repeatedly requested information on the status of the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff, through official letters number 2355-08 of June fourth, two thousand eight; DARH-252-2008 of May twenty-seventh, two thousand eight; DRSC-2846 of July seventeenth, two thousand seven; ASH-137-07 of July sixteenth, two thousand seven; DGS-1299-07 of July second, two thousand seven (folios 42 to 46 and 48 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); d) That the delay not only covers the appeals phase of the administrative procedure but also the stage prior to the issuance of the health orders, since as has been deemed proven: 1) by official letter number DGS-2470-06 of August fifteenth, two thousand six, the General Director of Health of the Ministry of Health sent to the Director of the South Central Region of that same Ministry, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio C.C. Marco Ferlini Barrantes before that General Directorate, through which he requested that the uninhabitability of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff be declared (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 2) by official letter number DRCS-3211-06 of August eighteenth, two thousand six, the Director of the South Central Region of the Ministry of Health sent to Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero, in his capacity as Director of the Hatillo Health Area, a copy of the official letter signed by the General Director of Health through which she attached a copy of the complaint filed by Mario Tulio, also known as Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, by which he requests the declaration of uninhabitability of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff (see folios 70 to 72 and 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 3) that on October tenth, two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area, conducted the inspection visit to the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff (see folios 70 to 72, 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 4) That on November seventh, two thousand six, the Director of the Hatillo Health Area and the Environmental Manager of that Area signed the Report on the Request for Declaration of Uninhabitability of the Property filed by Mario Tulio, also known as Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 5) that at twelve hours twenty minutes on November fourteenth, two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena—in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area—notified the plaintiff of health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, which that same official signed and according to which the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and she is granted a period of thirty business days to voluntarily vacate the property (see folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); e) That consequently, from the time the General Director of Health sent to the South Central Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health, by official letter of August fifteenth, two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio, also known as Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, until by official letter number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, the Director of the Hatillo Health Area and the Environmental Manager of said Area requested the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Health to proceed to execute the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a result of the declaration of uninhabitability ordered by health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 at nine hours thirty minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, almost two years elapsed, despite the fact that Article 261.1 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that the administrative procedure must be concluded by a final act within two months after its initiation, and may be extended for two more months if the exceptional causes established for that purpose in Article 263, subsection 1 of the same Law occur, periods that the Ministry of Health exceeded, despite the fact that the reason underpinning its actions—as the Representation of the State, as well as the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who have participated in this proceeding, have reiterated—is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff. Now, although this Tribunal has deemed it proven that the Ministry of Health incurred a violation of Article 41 of the Political Constitution—the principle of prompt and complete justice—it also considers that this circumstance does not have the capacity to cause the absolute nullity of health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, in accordance with the provisions of Article 223, subsection 1 in relation to subsections 2 and 3 of Article 158 of the General Law of Public Administration, since although it is true that the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal were resolved outside the periods provided for in the legal system—three business days for the reconsideration and one month for the appeal (Articles 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration)—it is also true that the defendant Public Administration did not fail to resolve the appeals filed by the plaintiff, in addition to the fact that—as will be developed below—the timely issuance of the resolutions in which the South Central Regional Director and the Minister of Health ruled on the appeals filed by the plaintiff would not have had the capacity to change or prevent the content of the challenged health orders, given that the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is in a situation of danger, since it is located in the 10-meter protection area of the Tiribí River (Article 33 of the Forestry Law), and therefore, the health orders are not substantially inconsistent with the legal system in that regard. In conclusion, although the administrative procedure took almost two years to conclude and the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal were resolved outside the periods of three business days and one month established by Articles 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, this unjustified delay on the part of the defendant does not have the capacity to cause the absolute nullity of the health orders, because substantial formalities that would have prevented or would have varied their content in important aspects were not omitted, since they are not inconsistent with the legal system, as they are based on the provisions of Article 33 of the Forestry Law—regarding the fact that the house is located in the 10-meter protection area of the bank of the Tiribí River—; 313, subsections 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the General Health Law—regarding the non-compliance with the sanitary requirements indicated therein—319 and 320 of that same law, as emerges from the documents found at folios 64 to 66, 70 and 71, 77 to 80 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, 152 to 156, 198, 199 of the judicial file, and the statement of expert witness Alaín León Careaga, which is recorded in the audiovisual record of the oral and public trial hearing, as will be analyzed below. The foregoing, without prejudice to any potential disciplinary and civil liabilities for the unjustified delay.
NON-EXISTENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF DOCTOR EDUARDO ARGUEDAS IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL. The plaintiff considers that Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero—both in his personal capacity and as Director of the Hatillo Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo)—has engaged in conduct contrary to the legal system, as he has adopted and executed decisions that are harmful to her rights. This Court considers that the defendant Arguedas Barquero has not incurred responsibility, for the following reasons: a) In accordance with the provisions of Articles 338, 340, 341, 355, and 357 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero, in his capacity as Director of the Hatillo Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo), is a health authority and, as such, must ensure compliance with the legal system in that matter, for the purpose of avoiding the risk or damage to the health of individuals, or that these spread or worsen, or the continuation or recurrence of the violation of norms that threaten that fundamental right; b) That, in that capacity, the defendant Arguedas Barquero received, by official letter number DRCS-3211-06 of August eighteenth, two thousand six (folio 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Maarco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes and proceeded to process it accordingly, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 320, 321, and 346 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) and 29 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), consisted of Licenciada Lawson Marchena conducting an inspection visit to the property on October tenth, two thousand six (folios 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health and statement of Licenciada Lawson Marchena contained in the audiovisual records of the hearings for the precautionary measure and the oral and public trial); rendering the technical report of November 7, two thousand six, which served as the basis for the challenged health orders and which was signed by both Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Doctor Arguedas Barquero (folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); Licenciada Lawson Marchena, in exercise of the powers granted to her by the legal system, issuing and notifying the plaintiff and the complainant of health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 (folios 64 to 69 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); forwarding, by official letter ASH- of November twenty-third, two thousand six, signed by both Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena (folios 56 to 58 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), the appeals for reversal with subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff against said orders, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 52 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud) and 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), are to be resolved by the Regional Director and the Minister of Health, respectively; and finally, requesting from the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Security, by means of official letter number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, signed by both Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Doctor Arguedas Barquero (folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), that the eviction ordered in the health orders that were confirmed by the Minister of Health be executed; c) That while it is true, as this Court analyzed in Considerando IV of this judgment, that Licenciada Lawson Valverde—who serves as Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) in the Hatillo Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo)—is also a health authority and, consequently, may issue health orders as mechanisms to safeguard the right to health, life, the environment, and the development of individuals (see Articles 338, 346, and 349 in relation to 340, 341, 320, and 321, all of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), specifically the last paragraph relating to the Internal Organization of the Directorates of the Health Areas (Áreas Rectoras de Salud)), Doctor Arguedas Barquero, as the hierarchical superior of Licenciada Lawson Marchena, has the duty to supervise the actions of his subordinates to verify their legality and advisability, as well as to exercise disciplinary power when necessary (Article 102 subsections b and c of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), especially considering the transcendence of the legal rights protected by the Ministry of Health. In that sense, it should be noted that, notwithstanding that this Court declared in Considerando IV of this judgment that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by Licenciada Lawson Marchena are not contrary to the legal system, since they do not lack a technical basis regarding the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) of the residential house occupied by the plaintiff for reasons of hazardousness (peligrosidad) and unsanitary conditions (insalubridad)—mainly because its location contravenes the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)—it is also true that, in the case of the declaration for ruinous state (ruinosidad), this Court found that, in accordance with the technical evidence presented during the oral and public trial hearing, the criterion expressed and endorsed by Doctor Arguedas Barquero in the report of November seventh, two thousand six, which serves as support for the challenged health orders (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), lacks technical support. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to remind the defendant Arguedas Barquero that, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 subsection b) and 213 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), if he had any doubt about the content of a report rendered to him by a subordinate and that could serve as the basis for a health order or other special measures to safeguard people's health, he must, prior to issuing the corresponding act, request support from the Directorates at the regional or central level (see Article 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud)), to ensure that the measures adopted are not contrary to the principle of legality, and not as in this case, where it was not until after this lawsuit was filed and when the procedure had already concluded that he requested technical support from the Human Environment Protection Unit of the Central South Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health (see copy of official letter UPAH-1078-2008 of October second, two thousand eight, from folio 152 to 155 of the judicial file); d) That while it is true, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), the competent authority to resolve appeals for reversal and the subsidiary appeals filed against a health order issued by a Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud) is the corresponding Regional Directorate and the Minister of Health, it is also true that the Director of the Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud), in application of the provisions of Articles 4 (fundamental principles of public service) and 11 (principle of legality) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), must request information on the outcome thereof, not only to inform the complainant about the processing and stage of the procedure, but also, in order to take the necessary measures to execute the content of the health orders, whose challenge through administrative channels does not have a suspensive effect, except in very qualified cases and to avoid an irreparable result (Article 53 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud)). In this case, from the documents contained in folios 43, 46, and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, it is clear that Doctor Arguedas Barquero not only informed the complainant about the status of the procedure as of March twenty-eighth, two thousand seven, but also requested information on the status of the appeals filed by the plaintiff against the health orders issued by the Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) of the Hatillo Health Area (Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo). It should also be noted that, despite the fact that the filing of appeals for reversal and subsidiary appeal has no suspensive effects, and that the Minister of Health—in this case—did not order the suspension of the challenged act while these were being resolved, Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena did not request the Ministry of Public Security to execute the eviction order issued against the plaintiff until after the Minister of Health had resolved the appeal filed subsidiarily (see document on folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); e) In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that, under the administrative responsibility regime for public officials, in their individual sphere, it is subject to the convergence of the subjective elements that configure a link to the harmful effect.
The objectivized dimension of the administrative liability regime, in this line, is characteristic of the Public Administration as an organization; however, in the case of public agents, in order to attribute the damage to them, it is necessary to prove the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). This is so either through a direct criterion in the exercise of the position or through causal occasionality, understood as the use of means and opportunities that the Administration offers by virtue of the position and that have allowed the agent to detach harmful conduct from the legal sphere of a third party, causing damage that there is no duty to bear. This is indeed inferred from numeral 199 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Therefore, to attribute liability to the servant, the moving party must prove the official's willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), except in cases of issuing openly illegal acts or obeying them, or when deviating from opinions that evidence illegality, if the act is later declared invalid for those stated reasons, cases in which that same norm establishes that liability as a mediate effect. In the present case, on one hand, it has not been proven that there exists manifest illegality or the execution of spurious acts in the performance of Mr. Arguedas Barquero. On the contrary, having established the validity of the conduct in which he concurred with his signature, that eventuality is eliminated. On the other hand, the plaintiff has in no way established to what extent the participation of Mr. Arguedas Barquero can be considered as a manifestation of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). Therefore, it would not be viable to attribute liability to the co-defendant.
VI.- ON SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: In compliance with the provisions of article 122 subsection m) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and given that the plaintiff requests as part of her claims, to be compensated for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), which she estimates at one million colones, given that she and her children have suffered existential anguish since the administrative procedure began, which has been prolonged due to its length and tediousness, where humanism is absent, creating in them great uncertainty regarding the threat of being left without a home (folio 13 of the judicial file and audiovisual record of the preliminary hearing), this Tribunal considers it necessary to clarify that in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) "...are produced when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured without repercussion on the patrimony, normally supposing an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (...) In summary, moral damage consists of physical, psychic, or moral affection pain or suffering inflicted by an illicit act. Normally the fertile field of moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated..." (Judgment number 1002-0112). Regarding the mechanisms for proving moral damages, jurisprudence states that: "...IV.- The moral damage claimed here allows a broad margin of discretion to the judge. However, said margin is delimited by certain unavoidable parameters. For example, the former Sala de Casación, in judgment #114 at 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 1979, advocates in this regard the prudent appreciation of the judges '... when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence'. The prudent discretion alluded to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are priceless goods, but about fixing a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy, to establish exorbitant compensations, as happens in other legal systems, since that would entail the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit with one's own honor and dignity. Included in the fundamental postulates of law, are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles. Applying them to situations like the present one, it is essential, when fixing the obligations arising from indemnifying legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages could not give rise to excessive compensations. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims. These, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment. Thus, such compensation, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, causing it to fall before eminently economic values." (See judgment number 114-F-98 issued by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia at two twenty in the afternoon on November 11, 1998). Taking into account the circumstances of the particular case, this Tribunal considers that there is indeed merit to recognize the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) alleged by the plaintiff, for the following reasons: a) the claimant alleges that she and her children have "...been suffering an existential anguish that has been prolonged by the long and tedious process, where humanism is absent, creating in us great uncertainty regarding the threat of being left without a home...". In that sense, if this Tribunal has held as proven that at least since the year nineteen ninety-nine, the plaintiff occupies as a tenant a dwelling house located in Colonia Quince de Setiembre, from the Alajuelita bridge, 15 meters north and 25 meters east, on the banks of the Río Tiribí (see documents at folios 103 and 104, 109 and 110 of the judicial file; 29, 88 to 89 bis, 96 of the administrative file provided by the Ministerio de Salud) and that by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Governing Area of the Ministerio de Salud, declared the dwelling that the plaintiff occupies in her capacity as a tenant inhabitable and ordered her eviction (see documents at folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministerio de Salud), we consider that the claimant is the holder of a legal situation susceptible to being protected in the administrative contentious jurisdiction, since the issuance of the sanitary order whose conformity with the legal system is discussed in this process, generates a direct effect on her vital sphere of interests, given that it affects one of the minimum, essential, and necessary elements (housing) to make effective fundamental rights and guarantees inherent to the condition of being human, such as: life, dignity, health, the environment, and development. The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared inhabitable is not an obstacle for her to come to this avenue in safeguard of her rights or interests, not only because articles 49 of the Constitución Política and 1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo are clear in establishing that the object of this Jurisdiction is to protect the legal situations of every person, but also because the plaintiff is the one directly affected by the content of the sanitary orders she now challenges; for that reason, the arguments given by the State's Representation in indicating that the plaintiff could not have been caused uncertainty about being left without a home, because she is not the owner but the tenant of that property, are unfounded; b) Because in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, namely: articles 21, 33, 46 fifth paragraph, 50 first and second paragraphs, 51, 65, 74 of the Constitución Política; 22, 25.1 of the Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 11.1 and 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; 10.1 and 11.1 of the Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), as well as the provisions in articles 1 and 2 of the Ley General de Salud, 1 and 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the plaintiff has a fundamental right to live with dignity in sanitary-environmental conditions that allow her to develop integrally and freely as a person; rights that derive from the principle of social justice and that are inalienable for being inherent to the condition of being human and that therefore, the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the Legal System confers upon it for such effect, through programs that guarantee access to the factors that determine the essential content of those rights, such as: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (potable water, sanitary, electrical, telematic, waste collection, among others) and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment, which is achieved through coordination of the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, in order that within the framework of their competencies, they may take the necessary measures to guarantee and make effective the full enjoyment of the indicated fundamental rights; c) Because while it is true that the State's Representation and Doctor Arguedas Barquero have maintained in the precautionary measure, preliminary, and oral and public trial hearings that they have exercised their powers in safeguarding the right to health of the plaintiff and her family, by declaring the uninhabitability and subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered (article 113, subsection 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) and that the Administrative Legal System has the purpose of achieving a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of persons (article 8 Ley General de la Administración Pública), it is paradoxical that for the sake of protecting life, health, safety, and personal integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of scarce economic resources—like the plaintiff—who occupies a dwelling declared inhabitable (a condition inferred from the documents at folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwest Regional Manager of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social declared the plaintiff as "IMAS Population"; from the plaintiff's statement and the testimonial statement of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which are recorded in the audiovisual record of the precautionary measure hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Tribunal on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, which is recorded in the digital record of that proceeding), without the State—understood in its unitary concept—having previously adopted, in a coordinated manner, alternate or palliative measures that guarantee that these fundamental rights will not suffer greater detriment, rights that the State is obligated to protect in direct application of articles 21, 33 (due to human dignity), 50, 51, 65, and 74 of the Constitución Política. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented towards protecting the legal situation of the plaintiff, not only with the declaration of uninhabitability, but also with the taking of positive actions directed at the effective protection of the rights that the Public Administration is called upon to protect, such as dignified housing or a housing option according to her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after this Tribunal ordered as a precautionary measure the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting through judgment number 692-2008 at six in the afternoon on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, the precautionary measure request that was raised (see documents at folios 70, 71, 267 to 271 of the judicial file); d) That it is contradictory that the defendants allege that the challenged sanitary orders aim to protect the right to health, the environment, and the safety of the plaintiff and her family, when this Tribunal in considerando IV of this judgment, has held as proven that from the time the Directora General de Salud referred to the Dirección Regional Central Sur of the Ministerio de Salud by official letter dated August fifteenth, two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes regarding the alleged uninhabitability of the house he rents to the plaintiff, until the Director of the Hatillo Health Governing Area and the Environmental Manager of said Managing Area, by official letter number DARH-337-08 dated August fourth, two thousand eight, requested the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministerio de Salud to proceed with executing the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a result of the declaration of uninhabitability ordered by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 at nine thirty on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, almost two years elapsed, even though article 261.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that the administrative procedure must be concluded by a final act within the two months following its initiation, with the possibility of being extended for two more months if the exceptional causes established for that purpose by article 263 subsection 1 of the same Law occur, deadlines that the Ministerio de Salud exceeded, despite the fact that the reason underpinning its actions—as reiterated by the State's Representation, as well as by the different authorities of the Ministerio de Salud who have participated in this process—is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff, added to the fact that the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal were also resolved outside the deadlines of three business days and one month established by article 52 subsection b of the Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud and 261.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, an inactivity that ultimately, in the judgment of this Tribunal, is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice provided for in article 41 of the Constitución Política; d) In that sense, the arguments given by the State's Representation, regarding that the plaintiff has known about the state of the dwelling since nineteen ninety-nine as a result of the note sent to her by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (folio 103 of the judicial file) and the expert report that in the year two thousand five was rendered before the Juzgado Civil de Menor Cuantía de Hatillo in the rent increase proceeding that Ferlini Barrantes filed against Levis Alvarez Velásquez and that was processed in file number 05-100019-0239-CI (folios 93 to 95 of the administrative file provided by the Ministerio de Salud), are unfounded, not only because the proceeding processed in the Juzgado Civil de Menor Cuantía de Hatillo did not have the purpose of declaring the uninhabitability of the dwelling that the plaintiff occupies, but rather determining whether there was or was not merit to increase the rent quota that Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes charged Levis Alvarez Velásquez for that concept (see folios 88 to 89 bis of the administrative file provided by the Ministerio de Salud), but also because—as has been held as proven—the plaintiff was subjected, unjustifiably, for almost two years, in accordance with the provisions of article 41 of the Constitución Política, 261.2 and 263.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 52 of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, to an administrative procedure initiated at the request of an interested party, in order to determine whether or not her dwelling was inhabitable; e) In summary, this Tribunal has held as proven that there exists a causal link between the unjustified delay incurred by the Ministerio de Salud in processing and concluding by a final act the administrative procedure that it initiated at the request of a party to determine whether the dwelling that the plaintiff occupies is inhabitable, and the feelings of anguish and uncertainty that the plaintiff has suffered from not knowing whether or not she will have a house to live in and develop as a person with her family, which were generated as a consequence not only of being subjected to that administrative procedure for almost two years, due to an unjustified delay that is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice, but also due to the fact that the defendant Public Administration did not adopt throughout that entire procedure the actions in coordination with other organs or entities of the State to safeguard the fundamental rights of the protected party provided for in articles 21, 33, 46 last paragraph, 50 first and second paragraphs, 51, 65, and 74 of the Constitución Política; therefore, the State is sentenced to pay one million colones for the concept of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), the effective liquidation and due adjustment of which will be carried out in the judgment enforcement phase, in accordance with the provisions in subsection 1) in fine of article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.
VII.- HOUSING AS A PREREQUISITE OF THE ESSENTIAL CONTENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO HEALTH AND A DIGNIFIED LIFE. In accordance with the provisions of article 22 of the Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, "...everyone, as a member of society, has the right (...) to the satisfaction of the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality...". In that sense, article 25.1 of that same Universal Declaration establishes that: "...everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services...". Moreover, the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales establishes in article 11.1 that: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right...", a provision related to article 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of that same international human rights instrument, according to which, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health is recognized, and among the necessary measures to realize this right, the States Parties must adopt the improvement of the environment. Now, article 10.1 of the Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), understands the right to health not only as "...the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being...", but also as "...a public good...", and whose effective guarantee depends on the adoption of a series of measures, among which stand out "...the satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and those that are most vulnerable due to their conditions of poverty..."; a right that in turn is complemented by everyone's right to live in a healthy environment and to have basic public services (article 11.1 of that same Pact). Finally, the Constitución Política of our country establishes that human life is inviolable (article 21), that all persons are equal before the law and that no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be made (article 33); that consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests (article 46 fifth paragraph); that the State shall strive for the greatest well-being of all the country's inhabitants, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (article 50 first paragraph); that everyone has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (article 50 second paragraph); that the family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State, as also do the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick (article 51); that the State shall promote the construction of affordable housing (article 65); that the social rights and benefits contained in the sole chapter of Title V of the Constitución Política are inalienable and derive from the principle of social justice on which the Social and Democratic State of Law is based (article 74). As a development of what is provided for by the Law of the Constitution, the Ley General de Salud in articles 1 and 2, establishes that the "...health of the population is a good of public interest protected by the State..." and that "...it is an essential function of the State to ensure the health of the population...". Based on the aforementioned regulations, this Tribunal considers that the essential content of the right to health is determined by a series of factors that constitute the basic minimum, both for a person to live with dignity and to develop freely. Consequently, the right to health and to the environment thus constitute an essential prerequisite for making effective the right to a dignified life, without discrimination based on factors such as: gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic position, birth, or any other condition (see among others articles 2.1 of the Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 24 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 26 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 2.2 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, 14 of the Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Fundamentales). Now, among those factors that determine the essential content of the right to health and that the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the Legal System confers upon it for such effect, are: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (potable water, sanitary, electrical, telematic, waste collection, among others), and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment. In that sense, the right to health not only includes preventive or non-preventive treatment of diseases that affect or may affect the population, but rather is aimed essentially at guaranteeing that through effective access to the previously indicated factors—housing, education, food, clothing, public services, environmental protection—people may live with dignity in an environment that is conducive to their development in the diverse fields of human endeavor, which is achieved through coordination of the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, in order that within the framework of their competencies, they may take the necessary measures to guarantee the fundamental rights indicated. From that perspective and regarding the specific case, actions aimed at preventing a person or family group from abandoning a settlement that may turn out to be unhealthy, dangerous, or ruinous, would not be complete if they are not complemented by a series of behaviors aimed at solving preventively or definitively the deficiencies that are intended to be resolved through the application of certain special measures, since—as in this case—it would be contradictory to evict a person from the dwelling they occupy, for the sake of protecting their right to health, if ultimately the State does not exercise the powers granted to it by the Legal System to protect in an integral manner that fundamental right, which in this case would be determined by behaviors aimed at providing the social assistance or aid that the plaintiff requires, so that she has the real possibility of accessing the mechanisms provided for in the applicable regulations, to manage dignified housing in which she can reside and develop together with her family.
VIII.- THE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE INSPECTION POWERS GRANTED BY THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE MINISTERIO DE SALUD FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. As developed in considerandos III and VII of this judgment, the recognition and effective protection of the fundamental rights to health, to the environment, to live with dignity, to access basic domiciliary public services, and to development in freedom of all persons without distinctions based on gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic position, birth, or any other condition, constitute legal assets that are transcendental for the satisfaction of the public interest, considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered (article 113 subsection 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). From that perspective, to achieve the effective protection of these fundamental rights, the Legal System grants the State—understood in its unitary concept—a series of powers that must be exercised based on those legal assets that ultimately constitute a manifestation of the public interest (articles 11 of the Constitución Política and of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Two fundamental consequences are extracted from this assertion: one of a negative nature, in the sense that Public Administrations cannot exercise the powers conferred upon them by the legal system except based on the public interest for whose protection and satisfaction they were granted, otherwise they would incur a misuse of power (article 49 of the Constitución Política), which ultimately implies that this public interest will prevail over the interest of the Administration when they may come into conflict (article 113 subsection 2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), and another of a positive nature, regarding that due to the nature and transcendence of the protected legal assets, the State has the duty to exercise its powers in a timely and efficient manner as an essential and determining means for the protection and effective satisfaction of the public interest (article 66 subsection 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which manifests itself unequivocally in legal assets such as health and the environment, given that they constitute essential prerequisites of the right to live with dignity and in minimum conditions that allow every person to develop freely, conditions among which stand out: food, clothing, housing, effective and timely access to basic domiciliary public services, as well as to public health and education services.
While it is true that this power must be granted to the State in matters of health and the environment is grounded in sub-constitutional norms such as articles 1, 2, and 7 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), 1 and 2 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), 1, 33, and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) —among others—, it is also true that these powers derive from Constitutional Law itself, specifically from articles 21, 33, 46 paragraph five, 50 paragraphs one and two, 51, 65, 74 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); 22, 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.1 and 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 10.1 and 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador); therefore, they constitute norms of direct and immediate application, by reason of the nature and significance of the legal interests they protect; consequently, in the absence of written sub-constitutional norms that develop them —when so necessary— legal operators must resort to unwritten norms to interpret, integrate, or delimit them (articles 7 and 8 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)). In this sense, the timely and efficient exercise of the powers granted by the Legal System for the State to protect, preserve, defend, and guarantee those fundamental rights, and thus, the public interest, is not conditioned upon the existence of a petition (gestión de parte) to exercise them; on the contrary, precisely to safeguard the public interest, the State must exercise these powers even preventively to fulfill the objective that justified the granting of these duties-powers, which is the satisfaction of the public interest and, therefore, the protection of fundamental rights. In this specific case, the legal system grants the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) a series of oversight powers to safeguard the life, the environment, and the health of people regarding the homes or structures in which they live. In this regard, it not only establishes the minimum requirements that such homes or structures must meet to guarantee the essential content of those fundamental rights (for example: articles 313 of the General Health Law or 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law), but it also imposes upon it the duty to carry out inspection and control functions regarding those minimum requirements, as well as to adopt the special measures required to comply with the legal system in this matter and, consequently, to safeguard the fundamental rights of all affected persons (see articles 1, 2, 7, 318 to 321, 338 to 341, 346 to 349, 355 to 357 of the General Health Law).
Now, based on all of the foregoing, this Court considers that if the main reason that sustained the declaration of uninhabitability of the home occupied by the plaintiff is its dangerousness, by virtue of the property being located within the ten-meter protection area of the Tiribí River, which contravenes the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law, it is paradoxical, contradictory, and in violation of the provisions of articles 21, 33, 50 paragraphs 1 and 2, 51, 65, and 74 of the Political Constitution, for the State not to exercise the oversight powers granted by the legal system with respect to the other homes that are in that same situation and thus maintain not only a situation contrary to the legal system but also contrary to the safety and dignity of the people who live there. This is a circumstance that this Court was able to determine both through the statements made by Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga during the oral and public hearing and through the judicial inspection it conducted on September sixteenth, two thousand eight (see the audiovisual record of that proceeding and of the oral and public hearing), with the argument that they only exercise these oversight powers upon petition (a gestión de parte), despite this being a real problem affecting a large number of people living not only in the protection area of the Tiribí River but also along other rivers throughout the national territory, with the disastrous consequences that this situation could not only provoke, but that it has unfortunately already provoked. In that sense, it is improper for the Director of the Hatillo Health Management Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo) and the Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) of said Health Management Area to have responded to the questions posed by this Court during the oral and public hearing, that they lack resources to carry out ex officio inspections and that they only handle cases similar to the plaintiff's upon complaint (denuncia) by an interested party (see statements by Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena appearing in the audiovisual record of the oral and public hearing), not only because this implies a waiver of exercising the sovereign powers (potestades de imperio) granted by the legal system for the satisfaction of a public interest (see the provisions of articles 1, 2, 313, 320, 340, 346, 355, and 357 of the General Health Law), which in this case translates into the effective and timely protection of the fundamental rights to the environment, to health, to life, to human dignity, to non-discrimination, to protection of the family, to access to decent housing, to development in freedom, but also because, conversely (a contrario sensu), this administrative inaction results in the violation of the fundamental rights that the Legal System entrusted it to guarantee, protect, and preserve through the exercise of those powers, despite the fact that article 355 of the General Health Law itself provides that, in order to effectively protect the right to health, the competent authorities "...may decree on their own authority measures whose purpose is to prevent the appearance of dangers and the aggravation or spread of harm, or the continuation or repetition of legal or regulatory infractions that threaten the health of persons...", which also responds to the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance established in article 11.2 of the Biodiversity Law and in Principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration. It is also worth highlighting that there is reiterated constitutional jurisprudence to the effect that the State cannot validly rely on a scarcity of human, technical, or economic resources as a justification for failing to exercise the powers granted by the Legal System for the satisfaction of the public interest and for the effective and timely protection of the fundamental rights of persons (see, among others, judgments 1995-00915 at sixteen hours six minutes on February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five; 1996-000695 at fifteen hours forty-two minutes on February seventh, nineteen ninety-six). By virtue of the foregoing and given the significance of the legal interests protected, this Court grants the State a period of six months from the date this judgment becomes final to submit a detailed report on both the concrete measures to be taken to solve the dangerousness problem affecting the families living in the protection area of the Tiribí River, and the timeline for implementing and executing such actions, aspects that will be monitored in the judgment enforcement phase.
IX.- REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE JOINT INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL WELFARE (INSTITUTO MIXTO DE AYUDA SOCIAL). It is now appropriate to make some considerations regarding the participation and potential liability of the Joint Institute of Social Welfare (IMAS) in this proceeding. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall that by resolution No. 124-F-TC-2008, at nine hours on October third, two thousand eight, the Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Court (Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) resolved to join this Institute as an interested third party in this proceeding. To that effect, it considered that "...the eviction of the plaintiff and her family without a palliative or alternative plan has pernicious effects on their legal sphere, which is why the intervention of the Joint Institute of Social Welfare is ordered, for the purpose of immediately ensuring decent housing for the petitioner and her family...". Thus, both in the written hearing and in the sole oral hearing held, IMAS has opposed the ruling of the Appeals Court, as it considers that, in application of the Principle of Legality and in accordance with the competencies that the legal system grants to that entity, this institute does not have programs for the purchase of farms for housing developments, loans for lot purchase or home construction, and does not have programs for granting housing bonds (bono de vivienda). Therefore, that entity's Institutional Operating Plan (Plan Operativo Institucional) does not include any benefit related to programs that allow providing housing to IMAS's target population, this problem being the primary responsibility of other public entities and bodies such as the Mortgage Housing Bank (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda, BANHVI), the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, INVU), and the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements (Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos). They also indicated that the only assistance that said entity could grant was the payment of rent for a dwelling for three months. They insist that this help was offered to the plaintiff and she rejected it; therefore, they consider they can offer nothing more. To decide whether IMAS is responsible for adopting any palliative measure for the situation the plaintiff is experiencing, it is necessary to analyze the powers that the body of legality imposes on said institute. In this sense, the following norms are of interest. Ley 4760, of May 4, 1971. This law creates the cited institute and indicates in Article 2 its purpose, which is "...to solve the problem of extreme poverty in the country, for which it must plan, direct, execute, and control a national plan aimed at that end." Likewise, in accordance with numeral 4, this institutional action must include social assistance (asistencia) and promotion actions for the most needy sectors of society. Ley 5662, of December 23, 1974. Through this law, a Social Development and Family Allowances Fund (Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiales) is created, which will be administered by the General Directorate of Social Development and Family Allowances (Dirección General de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiales), and everything related to this fund is declared of public interest. Article 2 indicates that the beneficiaries of this fund will be Costa Ricans with limited economic resources, in accordance with the requirements established in this law and its regulations. The purpose of the cited fund will be to allocate resources to pay for programs and services to State institutions responsible for supplementary social aid for the income of low-income families. Ley 7769, of April 24, 1998. Regulates the care of women in conditions of poverty. Article 2 establishes that the objective of the care is to guarantee the improvement of the living conditions of women, through a process of comprehensive training that includes, at least and in what is relevant, access to decent housing. For its part, numeral 3 indicates that it is the responsibility of the Joint Institute of Social Welfare to coordinate actions aimed at caring for women in conditions of poverty. Furthermore, among the functions that Article 5 entrusts to the Inter-Institutional Commission for the Care of Women in Conditions of Poverty (Comisión Interinstitucional para atender a las mujeres en condiciones de pobreza), the definition of policies and programs for effective attention to the aforementioned problem stands out, with priority to female heads of household. Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia). A harmonious interpretation of articles 13, 31, 38, 51, and 56 of the cited normative body allows for reaffirming the right of minors to State protection that safeguards and fosters the development of their potential, which evidently includes the right to decent housing and State aid or subsidies for the achievement of these ends. For this Court, it is clear that an interpretation based on Constitutional Law allows for affirming that in our Social and Democratic Rule of Law State, there exists an entire State policy to combat poverty and a commitment aimed at the inclusion of the most economically vulnerable sectors within Costa Rican society, which includes priority care programs, economic benefits, and even facilitating access to decent housing. Nothing else follows from articles 50 and 65 of the Political Constitution and the cited norms. It is also clear that IMAS is part of the State institutions entrusted with this task. In the case at hand, there are several aspects that deserve to be highlighted. For this Court, the evidence brought to the record allows for deducing that both Mrs. Álvarez Velázquez and her family live in a state of poverty. The foregoing follows from the documents appearing on folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file, in which the Southwest Regional Manager of the Joint Institute of Social Welfare declares the plaintiff as the "IMAS Population," from the judicial inspection carried out by this collegiate body, from the statements of the witnesses Miriam Espinoza Álvarez and José Marino Badilla, and from the plaintiff's own statements during the precautionary measure when she indicated to this Court the average monthly income she earned from washing and ironing work in which she occasionally engaged. The economic and housing conditions surrounding the plaintiff's family place them in a socially vulnerable situation, which undoubtedly requires greater State protection aimed at preventing their exclusion from society. It is for this reason that the Joint Institute of Social Welfare becomes one of the State entities that must participate in this protection. Now, it is also true that its intervention must occur within the framework of its competencies, that is, the eradication of extreme poverty. From this perspective, some specific programs that this institute has and that are described in the Institutional Operating Plan for the year 2009, which that institute provided as evidence, call attention. Thus, the Strategic Line Social Assistance for Development (Línea Estratégica Asistencia Social para el Desarrollo) allows for contributing supplementary economic income to the family income for families with women heads of household with dependents, families with unprotected and economically dependent minors, and families in a situation of temporary poverty. This Court considers that both the plaintiff and her family are eligible to receive this social assistance from IMAS. This would allow the applicant to have monetary aid that would provide immediate economic well-being to that family group and resolve, at least temporarily, one of the pressing basic needs at this moment: access to decent housing. It must not be lost sight of that in the family group headed by Mrs. Levis, there are minors, who, according to current regulations, have the right to access various alternatives that foster favorable environments for their comprehensive development. Undoubtedly, facing the eviction that the plaintiff faces for safety reasons by virtue of the danger of inhabiting a home within the river's protection zone, the payment of rent for a house becomes, at least, an immediate palliative measure that will alleviate the conditions of social vulnerability that the plaintiff already faces. In compliance with the duties-powers that our Social and Democratic Rule of Law State has entrusted to IMAS, this type of assistance is imperative. This Court does not share the argument made by both the State and the institute to the effect that, at the time, the aid was offered and the plaintiff rejected it, for which reason it is not appropriate to now grant it. As appears in the record, the applicant momentarily declined the help offered, given that she was under a precautionary ruling that allowed her to remain in the home she occupied. The circumstances have changed; the plaintiff and her family must vacate their house and require State action to find another one they can inhabit while they manage to definitively solve their housing problem. Under this assumption, the assistance that the institute must provide is imperative. In any case, it is reiterated, these are normative authorizations that must be exercised and for which excuses for their omission are not justified. During the oral hearing, the institute's representatives insisted that all they could grant was three months' rent; however, having analyzed the Operating Plan for this year, this Court considers that the eviction that the plaintiff and her family will suffer implies a change in living conditions related to the satisfaction of one of their basic needs, such as having decent housing. Under this view, it is the criterion of this jurisdictional body that what is appropriate is for the supplementary income to be granted for six months, from the date the judgment becomes final, as indicated on page 90 of the cited Operating Plan. In another vein, IMAS is correct in arguing its lack of jurisdiction to provide the plaintiff and her family with decent housing. This power belongs to other State bodies and entities that make up the Housing Sector, among which the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements, the Mortgage Housing Bank, and the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism stand out. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, by virtue of the principle of the unity of the State and the conditions of vulnerability that characterize the plaintiff and her family group, it is evident that the priority attention to which the institute is obligated also entails coordinating with the competent bodies and entities the possibility of seeking a permanent housing solution, provided, of course, that the plaintiff qualifies as a beneficiary and meets the requirements that the legal system demands in such cases.
X.- REGARDING THE STATE'S DUTY TO GRANT HOUSING OPTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS. As has been demonstrated in Considerando VII, Constitutional Law enshrines health as a fundamental right of the person, but at the same time, imposes on the State the duty to provide individuals with decent housing options, as a derivation of the doctrine emerging from precepts 21 and 65 of the Magna Carta. The foregoing implies a broad framework of coordination among the various State institutions to promote programs for granting housing options to individuals who, by virtue of their economic situation, require this type of public action. In terms of administrative organization, it is clear that there are several institutions in the country with competencies and functions that are directly or indirectly related to this public utility purpose. Within the framework of this case, the State's obligation to seek the granting of housing options to needy individuals must be made concrete in the mandate to establish due coordination actions among all the institutions related to this field, in order to analyze the options that allow for establishing the possibility of granting the plaintiff one of the decent housing alternatives according to the programs that the housing sector has in that regard. Given that the State is represented in this case through the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the duty to coordinate with the other institutions is established to achieve the proper concretion of what is ordered here. For such purposes, a period of six months is granted from the date the judgment becomes final to the State —which coincides with the period in which the Joint Institute of Social Welfare will grant the supplementary economic income to the plaintiff, based on the Strategic Line Social Assistance for Development, contained in the 2009 Operating Plan—, so that it may analyze the possibility of granting a housing benefit to Mrs. Álvarez Velásquez, under the terms established in each of the programs of this sector. It must render a report to this Court once said period has expired, an aspect that will be monitored in the judgment enforcement phase." On the other hand, it establishes an objective control of the legality of the administrative function, seeking the restoration of legality, in most cases, in order to avoid injuries to the aforementioned legal situations. In that sense, if this Court has had it proven that at least since the year nineteen ninety-nine, the plaintiff occupies as a tenant a dwelling house located in Colonia Quince de Setiembre, from the bridge of Alajuelita, 15 meters north and 25 meters east, on the banks of the Río Tiribí (see documents at folios 103 and 104, 109 and 110 of the judicial file; 29, 88 to 89 bis, 96 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health) and that by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155 the Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo of the Ministry of Health, declared the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff in her capacity as tenant uninhabitable and ordered her eviction (see documents at folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), we consider that the plaintiff is the holder of a legal situation (situación jurídica) susceptible to being protected in the administrative litigation jurisdiction (vía contencioso administrativa), since the issuance of the sanitary order whose conformity with the legal system is discussed in this process, generates a direct effect on her vital sphere of interests, because it affects one of the minimum, essential and necessary elements to make effective fundamental rights and guarantees inherent to the condition of a person, such as: life, dignity, health, the environment and human development, in such a way that it deserves special protection and weighting. The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared uninhabitable is not an obstacle for her to resort to this jurisdiction in protection of her rights or interests, not only because articles 49 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 1 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) are clear in establishing that the purpose of this Jurisdiction is to protect the legal situations of every person, but also because the plaintiff is the one directly affected by the content of the sanitary orders that she challenges herein, since while it is true that the Representation of the State and Doctor Arguedas Barquero have maintained in the precautionary measure, preliminary and oral and public trial hearings that they have exercised their powers in safeguarding the right to health of the plaintiff and her family, by declaring the uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) and the subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered parties (article 113, subsection 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública) and that the Administrative Legal System has the purpose of achieving a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom and other fundamental rights of persons (article 8 General Law of the Public Administration), it would be paradoxical that for the sake of protecting life, health, personal security and integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of scarce economic resources -like the plaintiff- who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable (a condition that emerges from the documents at folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwestern Regional Manager, Gerente Regional Suroeste, of the Mixed Institute of Social Aid, Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, declares the plaintiff as "IMAS Population"; from the plaintiff's statement and the testimonial statement of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which are recorded in the audiovisual backup of the precautionary measure hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Court on the sixteenth of September two thousand eight, which is recorded in the digital backup of that proceeding), without the State -understood in its unitary concept- previously adopting in a coordinated manner the alternative or palliative measures that guarantee that those fundamental rights will not suffer greater impairment, rights that the State is obliged to protect in direct application of articles 21, 33 (for human dignity), 50, 65 and 74 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented to protect the plaintiff's legal situation, not only with the declaration of uninhabitability, but also with the taking of positive actions directed at the effective protection of the rights that the Public Administration is called to protect, such as a decent dwelling or a housing option in accordance with her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and this Court ordered as a precautionary measure the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting through judgment number 692-2008 at eighteen hours on the sixteenth of September two thousand eight, the request for a precautionary measure that was filed (see documents at folios 70, 71, 267 to 271 of the judicial file).
IV.- THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY DEFECTS (Vicios de Nulidad Absoluta) IN THE CHALLENGED SANITARY ORDERS. The plaintiff considers that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155 issued by the Environmental Manager of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, in which the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and her eviction is ordered, suffer from absolute nullity defects because they are contrary to the guarantee of due process, on the grounds that in her judgment: 1) They were issued by an incompetent official; 2) There was an undue delay on the part of the competent authorities in issuing the resolutions by which the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) were resolved; 3) The plaintiff was not given the possibility of making repairs to the dwelling. This Court considers that while it is true that the challenged sanitary orders suffer from certain defects, these are not of a substantial nature and therefore, do not have the virtue of causing the absolute nullity of the challenged acts, in accordance with the following analysis of each of the alleged points: 1) The plaintiff considers that the Environmental Manager of the Rector Health Area was not competent to issue the challenged sanitary orders, since in her judgment, the competent authority to do so is Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero in his capacity as Director of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo. In accordance with the documents that appear at folios 64 to 66, 70 to 72 and 76 to 81 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health and from the expert witness statement given by Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena before this Court, which is recorded in the audiovisual backups of the precautionary measure hearings and the oral and public trial, it emerges that Lawson Marchena serves as Environmental Manager in the Rector Health Area of Hatillo and that within the functions she is responsible for performing in that position, is that of carrying out inspections or visits to practice sanitary operations, collect samples or gather background information or evidence in buildings, dwellings and industrial and commercial establishments and in any place where infractions of health laws and regulations could be perpetrated (see article 346 of the General Health Law, Ley General de Salud, and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud). Now then, in accordance with the provisions of article 338 of the General Health Law, the health authorities are those in charge of applying said normative body, as well as the other laws or regulations relating to that topic, therefore considering as health authorities, not only those provided for in article 338 of the General Health Law, but also the officials of the Ministry of Health who perform inspection positions who have been specially commissioned for the verification of infractions to the General Health Law or its regulations, according to the provisions of article 349 of that same normative body. Now then, in accordance with the provisions of articles 340 and 341 of the General Health Law, the health authorities "... may issue resolutions ordering measures of a general or particular nature, as appropriate, for the better application and compliance..." of the legal system. Likewise, the health authorities, "... may order and take the special measures enabled by this law to avoid risk or damage to the health of persons or that these are spread or aggravated and to inhibit the continuation or recidivism in the infraction by private individuals" (see article 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health). Within those special measures, articles 320 and 321 of the General Health Law establish that: "... rooms and buildings that due to their ruinous state or because there exists in them a source of permanent infection constitute a danger to the health and safety of their inhabitants or neighbors shall be declared uninhabitable by the health authority...", therefore, once "... a room or building has been qualified as uninhabitable or unhealthy, the owner or manager shall be notified, setting a period within which they must proceed with the eviction, demolition or repair, as the case may be...". In view of the indicated evidence and the partially transcribed legal norms, this Court considers that the sanitary orders were issued by a competent authority, since Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, constitutes a health authority that is empowered to issue and order special measures such as the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) and subsequent eviction -if appropriate- of a property, in order not only to enforce the environmental health legal system, but also to avoid the risk or damage to the health of the persons involved, therefore, regarding this aspect, the challenged acts do not suffer from an absolute nullity defect. 2) Regarding the alleged undue delay on the part of the Central South Regional Director and the Minister of Health in resolving the appeals for revocation and subsidiary appeal, that the plaintiff filed against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155, this Court has had it proven: a) That on the twenty-first of November two thousand six, the plaintiff filed before the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, an appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal and an incident of nullity against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155; b) That by official communication number ASH-179-06 of the twenty-third of November two thousand eight, the Director of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo and the Environmental Manager referred the appeals filed by the plaintiff to the Central South Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, in order to proceed as appropriate, appeals that were received by the Central South Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional Central Sur) on the twenty-fourth of November two thousand eight; c) That the appeal for revocation was declared without merit, by resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 issued by the Director of the Central South Region (Región Central Sur) of the Ministry of Health, at twelve hours thirty minutes on the fourth of December two thousand six, and that said official, by official communication number DRCS-4667-006 of the fourth of December two thousand six, elevated the proceedings to the Minister of Health for her to resolve the appeal for subsidiary appeal filed, appeals that were received by the Directorate of Legal Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) of the Ministry of Health on the sixth of December two thousand six; d) That by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on the twenty-fifth of June two thousand eight, the appeal for subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155 was declared without merit (see folios 36 to 40, 51 to 55, 56 to 58, 62 and 63 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health). Now then, this Court considers that even though article 52 subsection b) of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud) only limits itself to indicating that the appeal for revocation will be resolved "... in the course of the three business days following its presentation...", omitting the period for the Head (Jerarca) of the Ministry of Health to resolve the appeal for appeal (article 52 subsection h of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health), the one-month period provided for in article 261.2 of the General Law of the Public Administration applies supplementarily, which finds its basis in the principles of legal certainty; prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution); efficiency (article 4 of the General Law of the Public Administration); and, self-sufficiency and self-integration (autointegración) of the administrative legal system (article 9 of the General Law of the Public Administration). This Court is not unaware that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly held in its jurisprudence that the sanitary order constitutes the initial act of the administrative procedure processed for that purpose by the Ministry of Health, however, we consider that due to the characteristics of said act, the technical support it possesses and for the sake of the effective protection of the guarantee of due process -which the same jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber affirms is safeguarded during the appeal phase of said procedure-, we consider that the eight-day period provided for in article 352 subsection 2 of the General Law of the Public Administration is not applicable, but rather the one-month period contained in article 261 subsection 2 of that same law, so that the person affected by the issuance of the sanitary order has an effective, reasonable and proportionate possibility for contradiction and therefore, to provide for their defense in administrative venue, in the event that they should choose that route to do so. Based on the factual and legal elements cited above, this Court considers that the Ministry of Health did incur in a violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice in administrative venue, by not observing the periods provided for in the legal system to resolve the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal filed against a sanitary order, for the following reasons: a) While it is true that the Director of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo referred, by official communication number ASH-179-06 of the twenty-third of November two thousand six, the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal, so that the Central South Regional Director of the Ministry of Health would resolve the appeal for revocation in accordance with the provisions of article 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (folios 56 to 58 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), it is not until by resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 at twelve hours thirty minutes on the fourth of December two thousand six, that the Central South Regional Director of the Ministry of Health resolves the appeal for revocation filed by the plaintiff, who was notified of that ruling only until the nineteenth of December two thousand six (folios 53 to 55 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), this despite the fact that said Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional) received the appeals since the twenty-fourth of November two thousand six (folio 56 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); b) That notwithstanding that the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Health received, since the sixth of December two thousand six, the appeal for subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff (folios 51 and 52 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), it is not until by resolution DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on the twenty-fifth of June two thousand eight (folios 36 to 40 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), that said appeal was declared without merit; c) That this delay was noted not only by the complainant himself Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (see copy of note of the thirtieth of June two thousand seven and of official communication of the twenty-eighth of March two thousand seven at folio 49 and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), but also by the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who participated in the procedure, namely: General Directorate of Health (Dirección General de Salud), Central South Regional Directorate and Directorate of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, who repeatedly requested information on the status of the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff, through official communications number 2355-08 of the fourth of June two thousand eight; DARH-252-2008 of the twenty-seventh of May two thousand eight; DRSC-2846 of the seventeenth of July two thousand seven; ASH-137-07 of the sixteenth of July two thousand seven; DGS-1299-07 of the second of July two thousand seven (folios 42 to 46 and 48 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); d) That the tardiness not only covers the appeal phase of the administrative procedure, but also the stage prior to the issuance of the sanitary orders, since as has been had it proven: 1) by official communication number DGS-2470-06 of the fifteenth of August two thousand six, the General Director of Health (Directora General de Salud) of the Ministry of Health, referred to the Director of the Central South Region of that same Ministry, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio C.C. Marco Ferlini Barrantes before that General Directorate, by which he requests that the uninhabitability of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff be declared (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 2) by official communication number DRCS-3211-06 of the eighteenth of August two thousand six, the Director of the Central South Region of the Ministry of Health, referred to Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero in his capacity as Director of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, a copy of the official communication signed by the General Director of Health by which she attaches a copy of the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, by which he requests the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff (see folios 70 to 72 and 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 3) that on the tenth of October two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo, carried out the inspection visit to the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff (see folios 70 to 72, 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 4) That on the seventh of November two thousand six, the Director of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo and the Environmental Manager of that Area, signed the Report on the Request for Declaration of Uninhabitability of the Property filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); 5) that at twelve hours twenty minutes on the fourteenth of November two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena -in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Rector Health Area of Hatillo-, notified the plaintiff of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155, which that same official signed and according to which, the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and she is granted a period of thirty business days to voluntarily vacate the property (see folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); e) That consequently, from the time the General Director of Health referred to the Central South Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health, by official communication of the fifteenth of August two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c.
Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, until by official communication number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, the Director of the Hatillo Health Area (Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo) and the Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) of said Area Director, request the Chief of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Health to proceed with the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a result of the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) ordered by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 of nine thirty hours on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, almost two years elapsed, despite the fact that article 261.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) establishes that the administrative procedure must be concluded by a final act within two months following its initiation, and may be extended for two more months if the exceptional causes established for this purpose in article 263, subsection 1 of the same Law arise, deadlines which the Ministry of Health exceeded, despite the fact that the reason underlying its actions—as both the State Representation and the various Ministry of Health authorities who have participated in this process have reiterated—is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff. Now then, although this Court has found it proven that the Ministry of Health incurred a violation of article 41 of the Constitution (Constitución Política)—principle of swift and complete justice—it also considers that this circumstance does not have the power to cause the absolute nullity of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, in accordance with the provisions of articles 223, subsection 1 in relation to subsections 2 and 3 of article 158 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), since, while it is true that the appeals for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) were resolved outside the deadlines provided for in the legal system—three business days for the reversal and one month for the appeal (articles 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública))—it is also true that the defendant Public Administration (Administración Pública) did not fail to resolve the appeals filed by the plaintiff, coupled with the fact that—as will be developed below—the timely issuance of the resolutions in which the Central South Regional Director and the Minister of Health ruled on the appeals filed by the plaintiff would not have had the power to change or prevent the content of the challenged sanitary orders, given that the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is in a dangerous situation, since it is located in the ten-meter protection area of the Tiribí River (article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)), meaning that the sanitary orders are not substantially inconsistent with the legal system regarding that aspect. In conclusion, although the administrative procedure took almost two years to conclude and the appeals for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) were resolved outside the deadlines of three business days and one month established by articles 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), that unjustified delay by the defendant does not have the power to cause the absolute nullity of the sanitary orders, because substantial formalities that would have prevented or varied their content in important aspects were not omitted, since they are not inconsistent with the legal system, as they are based on the provisions of articles 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)—insofar as the house is located in the 10-meter protection area of the bank of the Tiribí River—; 313, subsections 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud)—regarding non-compliance with the sanitary requirements indicated therein—, 319 and 320 of that same law, as is evident from the documents found on folios 64 to 66, 70 and 71, 77 to 80 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, 152 to 156, 198, 199 of the judicial file, and the statement of the expert witness Alaín León Careaga, which is recorded in the audiovisual backup of the oral and public trial hearing, as will be analyzed below. The foregoing, without prejudice to any potential disciplinary and civil liabilities for the unjustified delay. 3) Regarding the technical basis of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, this Court considers that in accordance with the statements made by the expert Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal MBA and by the expert witnesses Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena and Engineer Alaín León Careaga—the latter two, in their capacity as officials of the Ministry of Health—which are recorded in the audiovisual backup of both the precautionary measure—only in the case of Lawson Marchena—and the oral and public trial, as well as the documents found on folios 152 to 155, 189 to 204 of the judicial file, 64 to 66, 70 to 72, and 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, and the judicial inspection carried out on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, and recorded in audiovisual backup, the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is technically based in accordance with the provisions of article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), regarding the dangerousness and unhealthiness of the dwelling, but not regarding its ruinousness, because: a) While it is true that Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena stated during the oral and public trial hearing that, as an Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental), she has advanced knowledge of Sanitary Engineering, which allowed her to verify or confirm from a structural point of view that the wood with which the house is built has exhausted its useful life and is in poor physical sanitary condition (walls, floors, and ceiling); that the dwelling is mounted on very thin bases at a height of approximately 120 meters, which have termites; that the house is leaning to one side (west); that the conditions of the land on which it is located are irregular, with possibilities of slippage; it is also true that the expert Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal stated that, due to the experience and knowledge he has as a Civil Engineer, it was possible for him to detect whether or not there were structural damages in the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff based on a visual test, since it is only and in cases of doubt that Engineers must perform engineering or material resistance tests—for example: ultrasound or chemical studies—, a criterion also supported by Engineer Alaín León Careaga, an official of the Human Environment Protection Unit of the Central South Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health (see statements made by the expert Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal MBA and by the expert witnesses Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena and Engineer Alaín León Careaga—the latter two, in their capacity as officials of the Ministry of Health—which are recorded in the audiovisual backup of both the precautionary measure—only in the case of Lawson Marchena—and the oral and public trial); so much so, that Engineer Centeno Madrigal stated that from a structural point of view, the house has no faults that endanger the lives of the people who live there, so much so that the aspects that are deteriorated, according to the Report issued and the sanitary orders issued by Licenciada Lawson Centeno, can be easily repaired—including the leaning the dwelling presents—a criterion—the latter—that Engineer Alaín León Careaga also concurs with; that there is no danger of slippage not only because the dwelling is on clayey silt, but also because the piles that support the structure are not only mostly in good condition, but are also excessive in relation to the load they support, which is very light—according to the statement of Engineer Centeno Madrigal, every two meters there is a pile in good condition, which according to him is the recommended spacing in this type of construction, while Engineer León Careaga cannot specify how many are in poor condition—; coupled with the fact that the house is not on the limit of the slope's failure influence zone, not only because of the distance at which it is located, but also because the bamboo that grows at the river's edge helps dissipate the negative energy in the river's protection area. In accordance with the criteria of the two Civil Engineers who were called to testify in the oral and public trial as an expert or expert witness—respectively—, this Court concludes that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, lack technical basis regarding the state of ruinousness that serves—in part—as a basis for having declared the house occupied by the plaintiff uninhabitable, since that dwelling has no faults of a structural nature that endanger the life or physical integrity of the plaintiff or her family, given that the problems detected regarding walls, floors, gutters, leaning, among others, can be repaired, aspects which in this case do not have the power to annul the challenged act, given that in accordance with the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) and the last paragraph of article 320 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), it is impossible to repair the dwelling, since it is located in the protection area of the Tiribí River; b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court considers that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, are technically based regarding the declaration of dangerousness and unhealthiness of the dwelling, for the following reasons: The house is situated in the protection area of the Tiribí River, specifically seven meters from the margins of said river, which is contrary to the provisions of article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), which establishes a protection area of ten meters from the banks of rivers. While it is true that the dwelling is raised on wooden pillars at a height of two meters above ground level, both this Court and the Civil Engineers who conducted the corresponding inspection visits could notice that there are traces that the river waters have entered not only the yard area, but also beneath the wooden structure that serves as a base or support for the dwelling. Now then, although the expert Engineer Centeno Madrigal stated both in the written and oral report he submitted to this Court that these constitute normal floods, the truth is that in both the written and oral reports he submitted to this Court, he indicated that he does not know what the maximum flood avenue that the Tiribí River's flow can reach when it floods is, and consequently, whether or not it is greater than the two meters of height of the structure that supports the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, situations which, together with the non-compliance with the ten-meter distance established as a protection area for the margins of the Tiribí River, constitute an element of dangerousness not only for the property, but mainly for the plaintiff and the people who live with her in said dwelling, since there is a risk of flooding which, in application of the precautionary principle, must be avoided (article 11.2 of the Biodiversity Law and principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration), an aspect that is contrary to the requirements established in subsection 1 of article 313 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), in relation to the provisions of articles 320 of that same law and 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). Regarding the electrical system, both from what this Court could observe during the judicial inspection proceeding carried out on September sixteenth, two thousand eight—which is recorded in the respective audiovisual backup—and from the reports issued by Licenciada Lawson Valverde and by Engineer León Careaga (folios 65, 71, 80 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health; 154, 199, and 200 of the judicial file), as well as from the statement made during the oral and public trial by Engineers Centeno Madrigal—who indicates he is not an electrical engineer—and León Careaga, it is evident that the electrical system is of the "chayotera" type, is not in conduit, and is very deteriorated, which represents another element of dangerousness of the dwelling, since there is a risk of fire, especially if one considers that the material used for its construction is wood, an aspect that is contrary to the requirements provided for in subsection 3 of article 313 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), in relation to the provisions of article 320 of that same Law. The dwelling is unhealthy because both from the judicial inspection, the challenged sanitary orders (folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), the written reports issued by Licenciada Lawson Marchena (folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health) and the Civil Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga (see folios 153, 155, and 200 of the judicial file), as well as from the statements made before this Court by the aforementioned engineering professionals (which are recorded in the audiovisual backup of the oral and public trial hearing), it is evident that the dwelling lacks adequate natural or artificial lighting and ventilation, since mainly in the bedroom area and laundry room, the windows are very small or are closed; the blackwater "...is discharged directly into the channel of the Tiribí River, through a 100 mm PVC pipe, to which the greywater from the kitchen is joined without any type of connection, causing leaks and filtrations of blackwater and greywater in the yard and the basement of the dwelling..."; regarding the sanitary systems, "...the bathroom of the dwelling is not built with impermeable materials on its walls, preventing its correct cleaning; the washbasin does not have a siphon in the discharge pipe and also discharges its water directly into the shower area, creating a situation of unhealthiness on the site...", aspects that are contrary to the fundamental rights to live with dignity in adequate environmental and sanitary conditions, and to the requirements provided for in subsections 3, 6, 7, and 8, points b and c of article 313 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud). In conclusion, this Court considers that from all the evidence submitted to the file, it is evident that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 do have technical basis in accordance with the provisions of article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), regarding the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for being dangerous and unhealthy, not only because the property does not meet the requirements established in subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, points 2 and 3 of article 313 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), in relation to the provisions of articles 319 and 320 of that same Law, but also because the permanence of the plaintiff and her family in that dwelling is contrary to their fundamental rights to a dignified life, to health, and to the environment. 4) Regarding the impossibility of making repairs to the property where the plaintiff lives, this Court wishes to emphasize that it derives from the provisions of articles 33, subsection b and 34, last paragraph of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), in the sense that in urban zones, the strips of ten meters measured horizontally on both sides of the banks of rivers, streams, or creeks constitute protection areas, if the terrain is flat, and of fifty horizontal meters if the terrain is broken, areas in which dwelling houses may not be built, given that there is a latent condition of risk or dangerousness in the face of possible floods that may occur when the rivers' flow rises. Contrary to what the plaintiff's attorney affirms, the fact that the dwelling occupied by Levis Alvarez Velásquez was built before the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) came into force does not constitute a valid argument for this Court to disapply the indicated norms in this specific case, in contravention not only of the principle of legality contained in articles 11 of the Constitution (Constitución Política) and of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), but also of the singular non-derogability of the legal system contained in article 13, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), even more so if one takes into account that by reason of the legal interests protected through articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), such as the environment, health, life, and safety—which ultimately are fundamental rights recognized and guaranteed by Constitutional Law—, said norms constitute public policy (article 73 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)) and therefore, must be applied from the date on which Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) number 7575 of February fifth, nineteen ninety-six came into force, in order not only to safeguard the environment, but also the health and safety of people who, for different reasons, live in dwellings that do not maintain the alignment established in article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). In that sense, even if from a technical point of view, Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga agree that many of the deficiencies presented by the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff and her family can be repaired (see statements made before this Court that are recorded in the audiovisual backup of the oral and public trial), the fact that it is located in the protection area of the Tiribí River makes it impossible for said repairs to be carried out, not only because there is a latent risk of floods that endangers the life and physical integrity of the plaintiff, her family, and all those people who occupy the neighboring houses that are in a situation similar to the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff—as was confirmed in the judicial inspection, as well as from the statements made by Licenciada Lawson Valverde and Engineer Centeno Madrigal, which are recorded in the respective audiovisual backups—, but also because precisely due to that circumstance, the competent authorities could not grant the permits to carry out such repairs, as they would be contrary to the legal system. Consequently, this Court concludes that repairing the deficiencies detected in the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 21, 33, and 50 of the Constitution (Constitución Política); 11, 13.1, and 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal); 1, 2, 7, 313, 319, 320, and 321 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), since it is located in the protection area of the Tiribí River and therefore, both the property and its occupants are in a condition of risk that endangers their safety, their life, and their integrity.
**5)** In sum, this Court finds that **health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by the Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) of the Hatillo Health Governing Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo) do not suffer from defects of absolute nullity, as they are not substantially contrary to the legal system,** because: **a)** the health orders were issued by a competent authority, since Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Governing Area, constitutes a health authority that is empowered to issue and order special measures such as the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) and subsequent eviction—if appropriate—of a property, not only to enforce the environmental health legal system, but also to prevent risk or harm to the health of the persons involved; **b)** although the administrative proceeding took almost two years to conclude and the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) were resolved outside the three-business-day and one-month deadlines established by Article 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud) and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), that unjustified delay by the defendant does not have the effect of causing the absolute nullity of the health orders, because no substantial formalities were omitted that would have prevented or would have changed the content of the same in important aspects, since these are not contrary to the legal system, as they are based on the provisions of Articles 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal)—insofar as the house is located in the 10-meter protection area of the Tiribí riverbank—; 313, subsections 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud)—regarding the non-compliance with the health requirements indicated therein—, 319 and 320 of that same law. The foregoing is without prejudice to any potential disciplinary and civil liabilities for the unjustified delay; **c)** In accordance with the opinion of the two Civil Engineers who were called to testify at the oral and public trial as an expert or expert witness—respectively—, this Court concludes that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, **lack technical basis regarding the state of dilapidation (ruinosidad) that serves—in part—as the basis for declaring the house occupied by the plaintiff uninhabitable,** since that dwelling does not have structural failures that endanger the life or physical integrity of the plaintiff or her family, given that the problems detected regarding walls, floors, gutters, inclinations, among others, can be repaired, <u>aspects which in this case do not have the effect of annulling the challenged act, given that pursuant to the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law and 320, last paragraph of the General Health Law, it is impossible to repair the dwelling, because it is located in the protection area of the Tiribí River;</u> **d)** That from all the evidentiary elements submitted to the case file, it is clear that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 do have a technical basis pursuant to the provisions of Article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, **regarding the declaration of uninhabitability of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for being dangerous and unhealthy,** not only because the property does not meet the requirements established in subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 points 2 and 3 of Article 313 of the General Health Law, in relation to the provisions of Articles 319 and 320 of that same Law, but because the continued presence of the plaintiff and her family in that dwelling is contrary to their fundamental rights to a dignified life, to health, and to the environment; **e)** that it is contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 11, 13.1, and 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, 33 and 34 of the Forest Law, 1, 2, 7, 313, 319, 320, and 321 of the General Health Law, to repair the deficiencies detected in the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, because it is located in the protection area of the Tiribí River and therefore, both the property and its occupants are in a condition of risk that endangers their safety, their lives, and their integrity.
**VIo.- NON-EXISTENCE OF LIABILITY OF DOCTOR EDUARDO ARGUEDAS IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL.** The plaintiff considers that Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero—both in his personal capacity and as Director of the Hatillo Health Governing Area—has engaged in conduct contrary to the legal system, as he has adopted and executed decisions that are harmful to her rights. This Court considers that the defendant Arguedas Barquero has not incurred liability, for the following reasons: **a)** Pursuant to the provisions of Articles 338, 340, 341, 355, and 357 of the General Health Law, and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero, in his capacity as Director of the Hatillo Health Governing Area, is a health authority and as such, must ensure compliance with the legal system in that matter, to prevent risk or harm to people's health, or that these spread or worsen, or the continuation or recidivism in the violation of norms that threaten that fundamental right; **b)** That in this capacity, the defendant Arguedas Barquero received, via official communication number DRCS-3211-06 of August eighteenth, two thousand six (folio 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Maarco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, and proceeded to give it the respective processing, which, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 320, 321, and 346 of the General Health Law and 29 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, consisted of: Licenciada Lawson Marchena conducting an inspection visit to the property on October tenth, two thousand six (*folios 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health and testimony of Licenciada Lawson Marchena recorded in the audiovisual backups of the interim measure and oral and public trial hearings*); rendering the technical report of November 7, two thousand six, which served as the basis for the challenged health orders and was signed by both Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Doctor Arguedas Barquero *(folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health)*; Licenciada Lawson Marchena, in exercise of the powers granted to her by the legal system, issuing and notifying the plaintiff and the complainant of health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 (folios 64 to 69 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); referring, via official communication ASH- of November twenty-third, two thousand six, signed by both Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena *(folios 56 to 58 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health)*, the appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff against said orders, which, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 52 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud) and 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, correspond to the Regional Director and the Minister of Health to resolve, respectively; and finally, managing before the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Security, through official communication number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, signed by both Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Doctor Arguedas Barquero *(folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* the execution of the eviction ordered in the health orders that were confirmed by the Minister of Health; **c)** That while it is true, as this Court analyzed in Considerando IV of this judgment, that Licenciada Lawson Valverde—who serves as Environmental Manager in the Hatillo Health Governing Area—is also a health authority and consequently, may issue health orders as mechanisms to safeguard the right to health, to life, to the environment, and to development of people *(see Articles 338, 346, and 349 in relation to 340, 341, 320, and 321, all of the General Health Law, and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, specifically the last paragraph regarding the Internal Organization (Organización Interna) of the Directorates of the Health Governing Areas)*, Doctor Arguedas Barquero, as the hierarchical superior of Licenciada Lawson Marchena, has the duty to supervise the actions of his subordinates to verify their legality and suitability, as well as to exercise disciplinary authority when necessary *(Article 102, subsections b and c of the General Law of Public Administration),* especially taking into consideration the significance of the legal interests protected by the Ministry of Health*.* In that sense, it should be noted that although this Court declared in Considerando IV of this judgment that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by Licenciada Lawson Marchena are not contrary to the legal system, since they do not lack a technical basis regarding the declaration of uninhabitability of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for reasons of dangerousness and unhealthiness—principally because its location contravenes the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law—, it is also true that in the case of the declaration due to dilapidation, this Court found that in accordance with the technical evidence presented during the oral and public trial hearing, the opinion rendered and endorsed by Doctor Arguedas Barquero in the report of November seven, two thousand six, which supports the challenged health orders (see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), lacks technical support. It is for this reason that it is worth reminding the defendant Arguedas Barquero that pursuant to the provisions of Articles 102, subsection b) and 213 of the General Law of Public Administration, in the event that he had any doubt about the content of a report rendered to him by a subordinate that may serve as the basis for a health order or other type of special measures to safeguard people's health, he must, prior to issuing the corresponding act, request the support of the Directorates at the regional or central level (see Article 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health), to ensure that the measures adopted are not contrary to the principle of legality, and not as in this case, where it was not until after this lawsuit was filed and the proceeding had already concluded, that he requested technical support from the Human Environment Protection Unit (Unidad de Protección del Ambiente Humano) of the Central South Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional Central Sur) of the Ministry of Health *(see copy of official communication UPAH-1078-2008 of October second, two thousand eight, from folio 152 to 155 of the judicial file)*; **d)** That while it is true, pursuant to the provisions of Article 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, that the competent authority to resolve appeals for revocation and subsidiary appeal filed against a health order issued by a Health Governing Area is the corresponding Regional Directorate and the Minister of Health, it is also true that the Director of the Health Governing Area, in application of the provisions of Articles 4 (fundamental principles of public service) and 11 (principle of legality) of the General Law of Public Administration, must request information on the result of the same, not only to inform the complainant about the process and stage of the proceeding, but also, to take the necessary measures to execute the content of the health orders, whose challenge through administrative channels does not have a suspensive effect, except in very specific cases and to prevent an irreparable result *(Article 53 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health)*. In this case, from the documents found at folios 43, 46, and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, it is evident that Doctor Arguedas Barquero not only informed the complainant about the status of the proceeding as of March twenty-eighth, two thousand seven, but also requested information on the status of the appeals filed by the plaintiff against the health orders issued by the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Governing Area. It should also be noted that despite the fact that the filing of appeals for revocation and subsidiary appeal does not have suspensive effects, and that the Minister of Health—in this case—did not order the suspension of the challenged act while these were being resolved, Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena did not manage before the Ministry of Public Security the execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, until the Minister of Health had resolved the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal filed subsidiarily *(see document at folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **e)** In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that in the regime of administrative liability of public officials, in their individual sphere, it is subject to the convergence of subjective elements that configure a link with the harmful effect. The objectified dimension of the administrative liability regime, in this line, is characteristic of the Public Administration as an organization, however, in the case of public agents, to be able to attribute the damage to them, it is necessary to prove the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). This is either by a direct criterion in the exercise of the position or by causal occasion, understood as the use of means and opportunities that the Administration offers by virtue of the position and which have allowed them to detach harmful conduct from the legal sphere of a third party, causing damage that one does not have the duty to bear. This indeed derives from numeral 199 of the General Law of Public Administration. Therefore, to attribute liability to the servant, the promoting party must prove the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the official, except in cases of issuing openly illegal acts or obeying the same, or when departing from opinions that evidence illegality, if the act is later declared invalid for these reasons, assumptions in which that same norm establishes that liability as a mediate effect. In the present case, on one hand, it has not been proven that there was manifest illegality or execution of spurious acts in the performance of Mr. Arguedas Barquero. On the contrary, having established the validity of the conduct in which he concurred with his signature, that eventuality is eliminated. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not established in any way how Mr. Arguedas Barquero's participation can be considered a manifestation of willful misconduct or gross negligence. Therefore, it would not be feasible to attribute liability to the co-defendant. **f)** <u>In accordance with the foregoing and given that this Court declared that health orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 are not contrary to the legal system, since they are supported by the provisions of Articles 11, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution; 11, 13.1, and 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration; 1, 2, 7, 313 subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 points b and c, 319, 320, and 321 of the General Health Law; 33 and 34 of the Forest Law, this Court declares that the actions of Doctor Arguedas Barquero—both in his capacity as a public official and personally—are not contrary to the legal system and therefore, do not generate liability for him under the terms of the provisions of Article 213 of the General Law of Public Administration.</u> **VIo.- ON SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES:** In compliance with the provisions of Article 122, subsection m) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) and given that the plaintiff requests, as part of her claims, to be compensated for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), which she estimates at one million colones, given that she and her children have suffered existential distress since the administrative proceeding began, which has been prolonged by its length and tediousness, where humanism is absent, creating great uncertainty in them due to the threat of being left without a house *(folio 13 of the judicial file and audiovisual backup of the preliminary hearing),* this Court considers it necessary to clarify that in accordance with the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), subjective moral damages *"...occur when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured without affecting the patrimony, normally involving an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (...) In sum, moral damages consist of physical or psychological pain or suffering, of moral affliction inflicted by an unlawful act. Normally the fertile field for moral damages is that of personality rights when they are violated..."* **(Judgment number 1002-0112).** Regarding the mechanisms for proving moral damages, the jurisprudence indicates that*:* *"*...IV.- The moral damages claimed here, allow a wide margin of discretion to the judge. However, said margin is delimited by certain unavoidable parameters. For example, the former Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación), in judgment #114 of 4 p.m. on November 2, 1979, advocates in this regard the prudent assessment of the judges "... when it is permissible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence (prueba de indicios)". The prudent discretion alluded to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, since these are invaluable assets, but about setting monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant indemnifications, as occurs in other legal systems, as that would entail the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Included in the fundamental postulates of law are those of reasonability and proportionality, which have been recognized in our environment with the rank of constitutional principles. Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from indemnifying legal situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages could not give rise to excessive indemnifications. This would open an inconvenient loophole, giving way to disproportionate claims. These, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment. Thus, such compensation, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations, causing it to fall before eminently economic values."* **(See judgment number 114-F-98 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at fourteen hours twenty minutes on November 11, 1998).** Taking into account the circumstances of the particular case, this Tribunal considers that there is merit in recognizing the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) claimed by the plaintiff, for the following reasons: **a)** the plaintiff alleges that she and her children have *"...been suffering an existential anguish that has been prolonged by the length and tediousness of the process, where humanism is absent, creating in us great uncertainty due to the threat of being left without a home..."*. In this sense, if this Tribunal has deemed it proven that at least since the year nineteen ninety-nine, the plaintiff has occupied, as a lessee, a dwelling house located in Colonia Quince de Setiembre, from the Alajuelita bridge, 15 meters north and 25 meters east, on the banks of the Río Tiribí *(see documents at folios 103 and 104, 109 and 110 of the judicial file; 29, 88 a 89 bis, 96 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health)* and that by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155 the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Governing Area of the Ministry of Health declared the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff in her capacity as lessee uninhabitable and ordered its eviction *(see documents at folios 64 a 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* we consider that **the plaintiff is the holder of a legal situation susceptible to being protected in the administrative contentious jurisdiction, since the issuance of the sanitary order, whose conformity with the legal system is discussed in this process, generates a direct effect on her vital sphere of interests,** because it affects one of the minimum, essential, and necessary elements (housing) to make effective the fundamental rights and guarantees inherent to the condition of being human, such as: life, dignity, health, the environment, and development. The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared uninhabitable is not an obstacle for her to resort to this avenue in protection of her rights or interests, not only because articles 49 of the Political Constitution and 1 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code are clear in establishing that the purpose of this Jurisdiction is to protect the legal situations of every person, but also because the plaintiff is the one directly affected by the content of the sanitary orders that she challenges here; for that reason, the arguments given by the State Representation indicating that the plaintiff could not be caused uncertainty about being left without a home, because she is not the owner but the lessee of that property, are improper; **b)** Because in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, namely: articles 21, 33, 46 fifth paragraph, 50 first and second paragraphs, 51, 65, 74 of the Political Constitution; 22, 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.1 and 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 10. 1 and 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), as well as the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), **the plaintiff has a fundamental right to live with dignity in sanitary-environmental conditions that allow her to develop fully and freely as a person;** rights that derive from the principle of social justice and that are inalienable because they are inherent to the condition of being human and that, therefore, the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the Legal System confers upon it for that purpose, through programs that guarantee access to the factors that determine the essential content of those rights, such as: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (drinking water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, waste collection, among others) and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment, which is achieved through coordination of the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, so that within the framework of their competencies, they can take the necessary measures to guarantee and make effective the full enjoyment of the indicated fundamental rights; **c)** Because although it is true that the State Representation and Doctor Arguedas Barquero have maintained in the precautionary measure, preliminary, and oral and public trial hearings that they have exercised their powers in safeguarding the right to health of the plaintiff and her family, by declaring the uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) and the subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties (article 113, subsection 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration) and that the Administrative Legal System aims to achieve a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of individuals (article 8 General Law of the Public Administration), **it is paradoxical that in the interest of protecting life, health, safety, and personal integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of limited economic resources -like the plaintiff- who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable** *(a condition that is evident from the documents at folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwestern Regional Manager of the Joint Institute of Social Assistance declared the plaintiff as "IMAS Population"; from the plaintiff's declaration and the testimonial declaration of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which appear in the audiovisual record of the precautionary measure hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Tribunal on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, which appears in the digital record of that proceeding)* **, without the State -understood in its unitary concept- having previously adopted, in a coordinated manner, the alternative or palliative measures that guarantee that those fundamental rights will not suffer greater impairment,** rights that the State is obligated to protect in direct application of articles 21, 33 (for human dignity), 50, 51, 65 and 74 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented towards protecting the legal situation of the plaintiff, not only with the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad), but also with the taking of positive actions aimed at the effective protection of the rights that the Public Administration is called upon to protect, such as decent housing or a housing option according to her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after this Tribunal ordered as a precautionary measure the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting, through judgment number 692-2008 at eighteen hours on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, the request for the precautionary measure that was filed *(see documents at folios 70, 71, 267 a 271 of the judicial file);* **d)** That it is contradictory for the defendants to allege that the challenged sanitary orders aim to protect the right to health, the environment, and the safety of the plaintiff and her family, when this Tribunal in Considerando IV of this judgment has deemed it proven that from the time the Director General of Health referred to the South Central Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health by official letter of August fifteenth, two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes regarding the alleged uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) of the house he rents to the plaintiff, until by official letter number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, the Director of the Hatillo Health Governing Area and the Environmental Manager of said Governing Area, request the Head of the Department of Evictions of the Ministry of Health to proceed with the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a consequence of the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) ordered by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154 and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 at nine hours thirty minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, almost two years elapsed, despite the fact that article 261.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that the administrative procedure must be concluded by a final act within two months after its initiation, and may be extended for two more months, if the causes of exception established for that purpose by article 263 subsection 1 of the same Law occur, deadlines that the Ministry of Health exceeded, despite the fact that the reason grounding its actions -as reiterated by the State Representation, as well as the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who have participated in this process- is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff, coupled with the fact that the revocation appeals with subsidiary appeal were also resolved outside the deadlines of three business days and one month established by article 52 subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of the Public Administration, an inactivity that ultimately, in the judgment of this Tribunal, is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice provided for in article 41 of the Political Constitution; **d)** In this sense, the arguments given by the State Representation are improper, regarding that the plaintiff has known about the condition of the dwelling since nineteen ninety-nine as a consequence of the note sent to her by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes *(folio 103 of the judicial file)* and the expert report that in the year two thousand five was rendered before the Small Claims Civil Court of Hatillo in the process of rent increase that Ferlini Barrantes filed against Levis Alvarez Velásquez and which was processed in file number 05-100019-0239-CI *(folios 93 a 95 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* **not only because the process processed in the Small Claims Civil Court of Hatillo did not have the purpose of declaring the uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff,** but rather to determine whether or not there was merit in increasing the rental fee that Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes charged Levis Alvarez Velásquez for that concept *(see folios 88 a 89 bis of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* but also because -as has been proven- the plaintiff was unjustifiably subjected for almost two years, in accordance with the provisions of article 41 of the Political Constitution, 261.2 and 263.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration and 52 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, to an administrative procedure initiated at the request of an interested party, in order to determine whether her dwelling was uninhabitable or not; **e)** In summary, this Tribunal has deemed it proven that there is a causal link between the unjustified delay incurred by the Ministry of Health in processing and concluding by a final act the administrative procedure that it initiated at the request of a party to determine if the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is uninhabitable and the feelings of anguish and uncertainty that the plaintiff has suffered from not knowing whether or not she will have a house to live in and develop as a person together with her family, which were generated as a consequence not only of being subjected to that administrative procedure for almost two years, due to an unjustified delay that is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice, but also by the fact that the defendant Public Administration did not adopt throughout that entire procedure the actions in coordination with other organs or entities of the State to safeguard the fundamental rights of the protected party provided for in articles 21, 33, 46 last paragraph, 50 first and second paragraphs, 51, 65 and 74 of the Political Constitution, therefore, **the State is ordered to pay one million colones for the concept of subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo), the effective settlement and its due adjustment of which will be carried out in the judgment execution phase, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 1) in fine of article 123 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code.** **VIIo.- HOUSING AS A PRESUPPOSITION OF THE ESSENTIAL CONTENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO HEALTH AND TO A DIGNIFIED LIFE.** In accordance with the provisions of article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, *"...everyone, as a member of society, has the right (...) to the realization of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality..."*. In this sense, article 25.1 of that same Universal Declaration establishes that: *"...everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services..."*. For its part, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights establishes in article 11. 1 that: *"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right..."*, a provision that relates to article 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of that same international human rights instrument, pursuant to which the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health is recognized, and the States Parties must adopt among the necessary measures to make that right effective, the improvement of the environment. Now then, article 10. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), understands the right to health not only as *"...the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being..."*, but also as *"...a public good...", and* whose effective guarantee depends on the adoption of a series of measures, among which stand out *"...the satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and those who, due to their conditions of poverty, are more vulnerable...";* a right that in turn is complemented by the right of everyone to live in a healthy environment and to have basic public services (article 11.1 of that same Pact). Finally, the Political Constitution of our country establishes that human life is inviolable (article 21), that everyone is equal before the law and that no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be made (article 33); that consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests (article 46 fifth paragraph); that the State shall seek the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (article 50 first paragraph); that everyone has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (article 50 second paragraph); that the family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State, as well as the mother, child, elderly person, and the helpless sick (article 51); that the State shall promote the construction of popular housing (article 65); that the social rights and benefits contained in the sole chapter of Title V of the Political Constitution are inalienable and derive from the principle of social justice on which the Social and Democratic State of Law is based (article 74). As a development of what is provided for by the Law of the Constitution, the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) in articles 1 and 2, establishes that the *"...health of the population is a public interest good protected by the State..."* and that *"...it is an essential function of the State to watch over the health of the population..."*. Based on the aforementioned regulations, this Tribunal considers that the essential content of the right to health is determined by a series of factors that constitute the basic minimum, both for a person to live with dignity and to develop freely. Consequently, the right to health and to the environment thus constitute an essential presupposition to make effective the right to a dignified life, without discrimination based on factors such as: gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political or any other opinion, national or social origin, economic position, birth or any other condition (see among others articles 2.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Now then, among those factors that determine the essential content of the right to health and that the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the Legal System confers upon it for that purpose are: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (drinking water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, waste collection, among others) and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment. In this sense, the right to health not only comprises the preventive or non-preventive treatment of diseases that affect or may affect the population, but rather is essentially aimed at guaranteeing that through effective access to the factors indicated above -housing, education, food, clothing, public services, environmental protection-, people can live with dignity in an environment that is conducive to their development in the various fields of human endeavor, which is achieved through coordination of the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, so that within the framework of their competencies, they can take the necessary measures to guarantee the indicated fundamental rights. From that perspective and with regard to the specific case, the actions aimed at preventing a person or a family group from abandoning a settlement that may be unhealthy, dangerous, or ruinous would not be complete if they are not complemented by a series of behaviors aimed at solving in a preventive or definitive manner the deficiencies that are intended to be resolved through the application of certain special measures, since -as in this case- it would be contradictory to evict a person from the dwelling they occupy in the interest of protecting their right to health, if ultimately the State does not exercise the powers granted to it by the Legal System to comprehensively protect that fundamental right, which in this case would be determined by the behaviors aimed at providing the social assistance or aid that the plaintiff requires, so that she has the real possibility of accessing the mechanisms provided for in the applicable regulations to manage decent housing in which she can live and develop together with her family.
**VIIIo.- THE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE SUPERVISORY POWERS GRANTED BY THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT.** As developed in Considerandos III and VII of this judgment, the recognition and effective protection of the fundamental rights to health, to the environment, to live with dignity, to access basic domiciliary public services, and to free development of all persons without distinctions based on gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political or any other opinion, national or social origin, economic position, birth or any other condition, constitute legal interests that are transcendental for the satisfaction of the public interest, considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties (article 113 subsection 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration). From that perspective, to achieve the effective protection of those fundamental rights, the Legal System grants the State -understood in its unitary concept- a series of powers that must be exercised based on those legal interests that ultimately constitute a manifestation of the public interest (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and of the General Law of the Public Administration).
Two fundamental consequences are drawn from this statement: <b>one of a negative nature,</b> meaning that Public Administrations cannot exercise the powers conferred upon them by the legal system except in furtherance of the public interest for whose protection and satisfaction they were granted, otherwise they would incur a misuse of power (article 49 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">la Constitución Política</st1:PersonName>), which ultimately implies that this public interest will prevail over the Administration's interest when they might conflict (article 113, subsection 2, of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName>), and <b>another of a positive nature,</b> regarding the fact that, due to the nature and importance of the legal rights protected, the State has the duty to exercise its powers in a timely and efficient manner as an essential and determining means for the effective protection and satisfaction of the public interest (article 66, subsection 1, of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName>), which is unequivocally manifested in legal rights such as health and the environment, given that they constitute essential prerequisites of the right to live with dignity and in minimum conditions that allow every person to develop in freedom, conditions among which the following stand out: food, clothing, housing, effective and timely access to basic domiciliary public services, as well as to public health and education services. While it is true that this power-duty granted to the State in matters of health and the environment is grounded in infra-constitutional norms such as articles 1, 2, and 7 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de Salud, 1 and 2 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Ambiente, 1 and 2 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, 1, 33, and 34 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Forestal" w:st="on">la Ley Forestal</st1:PersonName> -among others-, it is also true that said powers derive from Constitutional Law itself, specifically from articles 21, 33, 46 fifth paragraph, 50 first and second paragraphs, 51, 65, 74 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">la Constitución Política</st1:PersonName>; 22, 25.1 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Declaración Universal" w:st="on">la Declaración Universal</st1:PersonName> de Derechos Humanos; 11.1 and 12 subsections 1 and 2.b of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; 10. 1 and 11.1 of the Protocolo Adicional a <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Convención Americana" w:st="on">la Convención Americana</st1:PersonName> sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), and therefore, constitute norms of direct and immediate application, given the nature and importance of the legal rights they protect, meaning that, in the absence of written infra-constitutional norms that develop them -when necessary- legal operators must resort to unwritten norms to interpret, integrate, or delimit them (articles 7 and 8 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName>). In this sense, the timely and efficient exercise of the powers granted by the Legal System for the State to protect, preserve, defend, and guarantee these fundamental rights and, therefore, the public interest, is not conditional upon there being a party motion to exercise them; on the contrary, precisely in order to protect the public interest, the State must exercise said powers even in a preventive manner to fulfill the objective that justified the granting of these powers-duties, which is the satisfaction of the public interest and, therefore, the protection of fundamental rights. In the specific case, the legal system grants the Ministerio de Salud a series of oversight powers in order to safeguard the life, environment, and health of persons regarding the dwellings or structures they inhabit; in this sense, not only are the minimum requirements that these dwellings or structures must meet to guarantee the essential content of those fundamental rights established (for example: articles 313 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de Salud or 33 and 34 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Forestal" w:st="on">la Ley Forestal</st1:PersonName>), but it is also mandated to perform inspection and control functions for these minimum requirements, as well as to adopt the special measures required to comply with the legal system in this matter and, therefore, to safeguard the fundamental rights of all affected persons (see articles 1, 2, 7, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="318 a" w:st="on">318 a</st1:metricconverter> 321, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="338 a" w:st="on">338 a</st1:metricconverter> 341, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="346 a" w:st="on">346 a</st1:metricconverter> 349, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="355 a" w:st="on">355 a</st1:metricconverter> 357 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de Salud). Now then, based on all of the above, this Court considers that if the main reason that supported the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is its dangerousness, by virtue of the property being located within the ten-meter protection area of the río Tiribí, which contravenes the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Forestal" w:st="on">la Ley Forestal</st1:PersonName>, it is paradoxical, contradictory, and violative of the provisions of articles 21, 33, 50 paragraphs 1 and 2, 51, 65, and 74 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">la Constitución Política</st1:PersonName>, that the State does not exercise the oversight powers granted to it by the legal system with respect to the other dwellings that are in the same situation and, therefore, maintains not only a situation contrary to the legal system, but also contrary to the safety and dignity of the people who live there, a circumstance that this Court was able to determine both through the statements given by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">la Licenciada Lawson Marchena</st1:PersonName> and the Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga during the oral and public trial hearing, as well as through the judicial inspection carried out on the sixteenth of September two thousand eight <i>(see audiovisual record of that diligence and of the oral and public trial hearing)</i>, with the argument that they only exercise said oversight powers upon party motion, despite this being a real problem that affects a large number of people who live not only in the protection area of the río Tiribí, but of other rivers throughout the national territory, with the devastating consequences that said situation could not only cause, but has unfortunately already caused<i>.</i> In this sense, it is inappropriate that the Director of the Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo and la Gestora Ambiental of said Área Rectora, answered in response to questions posed by this Court during the oral and public trial hearing, that they lack resources to perform ex officio inspections and that they only attend cases similar to the plaintiff's based on complaints from interested parties <i>(see statements of Doctor Arguedas Barquero and <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">la Licenciada Lawson Marchena</st1:PersonName> that are on the audiovisual record of the oral and public trial hearing),</i> not only because this implies a renunciation of the exercise of the sovereign powers granted to them by the legal system for the satisfaction of a public interest (see the provisions of articles 1, 2, 313, 320, 340, 346, 355, and 357 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de Salud), which in this case, translates into the effective and timely protection of fundamental rights to the environment, to health, to life, to human dignity, to non-discrimination, to the protection of the family, to have access to decent housing, to development in freedom, but also because, conversely (a contrario sensu), said administrative inactivity results in the violation of the fundamental rights that the Legal System entrusted them to guarantee, protect, and preserve through the exercise of said powers, despite the fact that article 355 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de Salud itself establishes that in order to effectively protect the right to health, the competent authorities <i>“…may decree, on their own authority, measures whose purpose is to prevent the appearance of dangers and the aggravation or spread of harm, or the continuation or recurrence in the perpetration of legal or regulatory infractions that threaten people's health...”, </i>which also responds to the precautionary or prudent avoidance principle established in article 11.2 of the Ley de Biodiversidad and in principle 15 of the Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, Declaración de Río. It is also worth noting that constitutional case law is reiterated in the sense that the State cannot validly rely on the scarcity of human, technical, or economic resources as a justification for not exercising the powers granted by the Legal System for the satisfaction of the public interest, and for the effective and timely protection of people's fundamental rights <i>(see, among others, rulings 1995-00915 at sixteen hours six minutes on February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five; 1996-000695 at fifteen hours forty-two minutes on February seventh, nineteen ninety-six)</i>. <u>By virtue of the foregoing and given the importance of the legal rights protected, this Court grants the State a period of six months from the finality of this judgment to render a detailed report on both the concrete measures that will be taken to solve the problem of dangerousness affecting the families living in the protection area of the río Tiribí, as well as the timeline in which said actions will be applied and executed, aspects that will be monitored in the judgment execution phase.</u></span> <b>IX.- ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE INSTITUTO MIXTO DE AYUDA SOCIAL.</b> It is now appropriate to make some considerations regarding the participation and eventual liability of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (hereinafter IMAS) in this proceeding. In this sense, it is worth recalling that by resolution No. 124-F-TC-2008, at nine hours on October third, two thousand eight, the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolved to join that Institute as a third party in this proceeding. To this effect, it considered that <i>"...the eviction of the plaintiff and her family without a palliative or alternative plan has pernicious effects on their legal sphere, which is why the intervention of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social is ordered, for the purpose of immediately ensuring decent housing for the petitioner and her family...".</i> Thus, both in the written hearing and in the sole oral hearing held, IMAS has opposed the ruling of the Tribunal de Casación, since it considers that, in application of the Principle of Legality and in accordance with the powers the legal system grants that entity, that institute does not have programs for purchasing farms for housing developments, credits for lot purchase or home construction, and does not have programs for granting housing bonds. Therefore, the Plan Operativo Institucional of that entity does not contemplate any benefit related to programs that allow providing housing to the target population of IMAS, this problem being of primary attention by other public entities and bodies such as the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda, the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, and the Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos. They also noted that the only assistance said entity could grant was that corresponding to the payment of rent for a dwelling for three months. They insist this assistance was offered to the plaintiff and she rejected it, so they consider they can offer nothing more. In order to resolve whether IMAS must adopt any palliative action for the situation the plaintiff is experiencing, it is necessary to analyze the powers that the legality framework imposes on said institute. In this sense, the following norms are of interest. Ley No. 4760, of May 4, 1971. This regulation creates the cited institute and indicates in article 2 its purpose, that is <i>“…to solve the problem of extreme poverty in the country, for which it must plan, direct, execute, and control a national plan destined for that end.”</i> Likewise, in accordance with numeral 4, that institutional action must contemplate assistance and social promotion actions for the neediest sectors of society. Ley No. 5662, of December 23, 1974. Through this regulation, a Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares is created, which will be administered by la Dirección General de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares, and everything related to this fund is declared of public interest. Article 2 indicates that the beneficiaries of this fund will be Costa Ricans of scarce economic resources, in accordance with the requirements established in this law and its regulations. The purpose of the cited fund will be to allocate resources to pay for programs and services to the State institutions that are in charge of supplementary social assistance to the income of low-income families. Ley No. 7769, of April 24, 1998. It regulates the care of women in conditions of poverty. Article 2 establishes that the objective of the care is to guarantee the improvement of women's living conditions, through a comprehensive training process that includes, at least and as relevant, access to decent housing. For its part, numeral 3 indicates that it is the responsibility of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social to coordinate the actions aimed at the care of women in conditions of poverty. Furthermore, among the functions that article 5 entrusts to la Comisión Interinstitucional for the care of women in conditions of poverty, the definition of policies and programs for effective attention to the aforementioned problem stands out, prioritizing female heads of household. Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. <u>A harmonious interpretation of articles 13, 31, 38, 51, and 56 of the cited normative body allows reaffirming the right of minors to State protection that protects and fosters the development of their potential, which evidently includes the right to decent housing and the aid or subsidy of the State for the achievement of these ends. For this Court, it is clear that an interpretation based on Constitutional Law allows affirming that there exists in our Democratic and Social State of Law an entire State policy for combating poverty and a commitment aimed at the inclusion of the economically most vulnerable sectors within Costa Rican society, which includes priority care programs, economic benefits, and even facilitating access to decent housing.</u> Nothing else follows from articles 50 and 65 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">la Constitución Política</st1:PersonName> and the cited norms. It is also clear that IMAS is among the State institutions entrusted with this task. In the case at hand (subiúdice), there are several aspects that deserve to be highlighted. For this Court, the evidence brought to the case file allows deducing that both Mrs. Álvarez Velázquez and her family live in a state of poverty. The foregoing follows from the documents appearing on folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which la Gerente Regional Suroeste of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social declares the plaintiff as "Población IMAS", from the judicial inspection carried out by this collegiate body, from the statements of witnesses Miriam Espinoza Álvarez and José Marino Badilla, and from the plaintiff's own statements in the interim measure when she indicated to this Court the average monthly income she earned from washing and ironing work she occasionally performed. The economic and housing conditions surrounding the plaintiff's family place them in a socially vulnerable situation, which undoubtedly requires greater State protection aimed at preventing their exclusion from society. It is for this reason that the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social becomes one of the State entities that must participate in this protection. </span><u>Now then, it is also true that its intervention must occur within the framework of its powers, that is, the eradication of extreme poverty.</u> From this perspective, some specific programs that this institute has and that are described in the Plan Operativo Institucional for the year 2009, which that institute submitted as evidence, are noteworthy. <u>Thus, la Línea Estratégica Asistencia Social para el Desarrollo allows contributing a complementary economic income to the family income for families with women heads of household with dependents in their care, families with unprotected and economically dependent minors, and families that are in a situation of circumstantial poverty. This Court considers that both the plaintiff and her family are eligible to receive this social assistance from IMAS</u>. This would allow the claimant to have monetary aid that would provide immediate economic well-being to that family group and solve, at least temporarily, one of the pressing basic needs at this moment: access to decent housing. It must not be overlooked that in the family group headed by Doña Levis, there are minors, who, according to current regulations, have the right to have access to various alternatives that foster favorable environments for their comprehensive development. Without a doubt, faced with the eviction that the plaintiff faces for safety reasons, by virtue of the danger involved in inhabiting a dwelling within the protection zone of the river, the payment of rent for a house becomes, at the very least, an immediate palliative measure that will alleviate the conditions of social vulnerability that the plaintiff already faces. In compliance with the powers-duties that our Democratic and Social State of Law has entrusted to IMAS, this type of assistance is mandatory. <b>This Court does not share what was alleged by both the State and the institute in the sense that, at the time, the aid was offered and the plaintiff rejected it, and that, for that reason, granting it now is not appropriate. As recorded in the case file, the claimant temporarily declined the offered aid, given that she was under interim protection that allowed her to remain inside the dwelling she occupied.</b> The circumstances have changed; the plaintiff and her family must vacate their house and require State action to find another that they can inhabit while they manage to definitively solve their housing problem. Under this premise, the assistance that the institute must provide is mandatory. In any case, it is reiterated, these are normative authorizations that must be exercised and for which excuses for their omission are not justified. Already during the oral hearing, the institute's representatives insisted that the only thing they could grant was three months of rent; however, having analyzed the Plan Operativo for this year, this Court considers that the eviction that the plaintiff and her family will suffer implies a change in the living conditions related to the satisfaction of one of their basic needs, such as having decent housing. <u>Under this reasoning, it is the criterion of this jurisdictional body that the appropriate course is for the complementary income to be granted for six months, starting from the finality of the judgment, as indicated on page 90 of the cited Plan Operativo.</u> In another vein, IMAS is correct in what pertains to its lack of jurisdiction to provide the plaintiff and her family with decent housing. This power belongs to other State bodies and entities that make up the Housing Sector, among which stand out the Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos, the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda, and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, by virtue of the principle of unity of the State and the conditions of vulnerability that characterize the plaintiff and her family group, it is evident that the priority care to which the institute is obligated also entails coordinating with the competent bodies and entities the possibility of seeking a permanent housing solution, provided, of course, that the plaintiff qualifies as a beneficiary and meets the requirements that the legal system demands in these cases.
<b>X.- ON THE STATE'S DUTY TO GRANT HOUSING OPTIONS TO PERSONS.</b> As has been made evident in Considerando VII, Constitutional Law enshrines health as a fundamental right of the person, but at the same time, imposes on the State the duty to provide persons with options for decent housing, as a derivation of the doctrine that emerges from precepts 21 and 65 of the Carta Magna. The foregoing presupposes a broad framework of coordination among the various State institutions to promote programs for granting housing options to persons who, by virtue of their economic condition, require this type of public action. In terms of administrative organization, it is clear that there are several institutions in the country that have powers and functions directly or indirectly related to this public utility purpose. <u>Within the framework of this case, the State's obligation to seek the granting of housing options to needy persons must be realized in the mandate to establish the proper coordination actions among all the institutions related to this field, in order to analyze the options that allow establishing the possibility of granting the plaintiff one of the decent housing alternatives according to the programs that the housing sector has in that sense. Being that the State is represented in this species through la Procuraduría General de la República, the duty to coordinate with the other institutions is established to achieve the proper implementation of what is ordered herein.</u> For such purposes, as of the date the judgment becomes final, a period of six months is granted to the State—which coincides with the period in which the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social will grant the plaintiff the complementary economic income, based on the Línea Estratégica Asistencia Social para el Desarrollo, contained in the 2009 Annual Operational Plan—to analyze the possibility of granting a housing benefit (beneficio de vivienda) to Mrs. Álvarez Velásquez, under the terms established in each of the programs of this sector. It must render a report to this Court once said period has expired, an aspect that will be supervised during the judgment execution phase." The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared uninhabitable is not an obstacle for her to resort to this forum in protection of her rights or interests, not only because Article 49 of the Constitución Política and Article 1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo are clear in establishing that the object of this Jurisdiction is to safeguard the legal situations of every person, but also because the plaintiff is the party directly affected by the content of the sanitary orders she challenges here, given that, while it is true that the State Representation and Doctor Arguedas Barquero have maintained in the precautionary measure, preliminary, and oral and public trial hearings that they have exercised their powers in safeguarding the right to health of the plaintiff and her family, by declaring the inhabitability (inhabitabilidad) and the subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties (Article 113, subsection 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) and that the Administrative Legal System has the purpose of achieving a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of individuals (Article 8 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), it would be paradoxical that in the name of safeguarding life, health, security, and personal integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of scarce economic resources —like the plaintiff— who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable *(a condition that arises from the documents at folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Gerente Regional Suroeste of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social declares the plaintiff as "Población IMAS"; from the plaintiff's statement and the testimonial statement of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which are recorded in the audiovisual backup of the precautionary measure hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Court on September 16, two thousand eight, which is recorded in the digital backup of that proceeding)*, without the State —understood in its unitary concept— having previously adopted, in a coordinated manner, alternative or palliative measures that guarantee that those fundamental rights will not suffer greater impairment, rights that the State is obligated to protect in direct application of Articles 21, 33 (by human dignity), 50, 65, and 74 of the Constitución Política. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented toward protecting the plaintiff's legal situation, not only through the declaration of inhabitability (inhabitabilidad), but also through the taking of positive actions directed at the effective protection of the rights that the Administración Pública is called upon to protect, such as a dignified dwelling or a housing option consistent with her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after this Court ordered, as a precautionary measure, the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting, through judgment number 692-2008 at eighteen hours on September 16, two thousand eight, the precautionary measure request that was filed *(see documents at folios 70, 71, 267 to 271 of the judicial file)*.
**IV.- THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY DEFECTS IN THE CHALLENGED SANITARY ORDERS.** The plaintiff considers that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by the Gestora Ambiental of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo, in which the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and its eviction ordered, suffer from absolute nullity defects because they are contrary to the guarantee of due process, based on her opinion that: **1)** They were issued by an incompetent official; **2)** There was an undue delay on the part of the competent authorities in issuing the resolutions through which the revocation appeals with subsidiary appeal were resolved; **3)** The plaintiff was not granted the possibility of making repairs to the dwelling. This Court considers that while it is true that the challenged sanitary orders suffer from certain defects, these are not of a substantial nature and therefore do not have the power to cause the absolute nullity of the challenged acts, in accordance with the following analysis of each of the alleged points: **1) The plaintiff considers that the Gestora Ambiental of the Área Rectora de Salud was not the competent authority to issue the challenged sanitary orders,** since, in her opinion, the competent authority to do so is Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero in his capacity as Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo. In accordance with the documents appearing at folios 64 to 66, 70 to 72, and 76 to 81 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, and from the expert witness statement given by Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena before this Court, which appears in the audiovisual backups of the precautionary measure and oral and public trial hearings, it arises that Lawson Marchena serves as Gestora Ambiental in the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo and that among the functions she is responsible for performing in that position is that of carrying out inspections or visits to conduct sanitary operations, collect samples, or gather background information or evidence in buildings, dwellings, and industrial or commercial establishments and in any place where infractions of sanitary laws and regulations could be perpetrated (see Article 346 of the Ley General de Salud and Article 20 of the Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud). Now, in accordance with the provisions of Article 338 of the Ley General de Salud, the health authorities are responsible for applying said normative body, as well as other laws or regulations relating to that subject; thus, considered as health authorities are not only those provided for in Article 338 of the Ley General de Salud, but also the officials of the Ministry of Health who perform inspection duties and have been specially commissioned for the verification of infractions of the Ley General de Salud or its regulations, according to the provisions of Article 349 of that same normative body. Now, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 340 and 341 of the Ley General de Salud, the health authorities *"... may issue resolutions ordering measures of a general or particular nature, as appropriate, for the better application and compliance..."* of the legal system. Likewise, the health authorities, *"... may order and take the special measures enabled by this law to prevent risk or harm to the health of persons or to prevent them from spreading or worsening and to inhibit the continuation or recurrence of the infraction by private parties"* (see Article 20 of the Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud). Within these special measures, Articles 320 and 321 of the Ley General de Salud establish that: *"... shall be declared uninhabitable by the health authority, the rooms and buildings that, due to their ruinous state or because there exists in them a permanent source of infection, constitute a danger to the health and security of their occupants or neighbors..."*; therefore, once *"... a room or building is classified as uninhabitable or unsanitary, the owner or person in charge shall be notified, setting a period within which they must proceed with the eviction, demolition, or repair, as the case may be...".* In view of the indicated evidence and the partially transcribed legal norms, *this Court considers that the sanitary orders were issued by a competent authority, since Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Gestora Ambiental of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo, constitutes a health authority that is empowered to issue and order special measures such as the declaration of inhabitability (inhabitabilidad) and subsequent eviction —if applicable— of a property, not only to enforce the environmental sanitary legal system, but also to prevent risk or harm to the health of the persons involved; therefore, regarding this aspect, the challenged acts do not suffer from an absolute nullity defect.* **2) Regarding the alleged undue delay on the part of the Director Regional Central Sur and the Minister of Health in resolving the revocation and subsidiary appeal** that the plaintiff filed against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, this Court has deemed it proven: **a)** That on November 21, two thousand six, the plaintiff filed before the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo a revocation appeal with subsidiary appeal and a nullity incident against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155; **b)** That by official letter number ASH-179-06 of November 23, two thousand six, the Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo and the Gestora Ambiental referred the appeals filed by the plaintiff to the Director Regional Central Sur of the Ministry of Health, so that they could proceed as appropriate, appeals that were received by the Dirección Regional Central Sur on November 24, two thousand six; **c)** That the revocation appeal was declared without merit by resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 issued by the Director of the Región Central Sur of the Ministry of Health, at twelve hours thirty minutes on December 4, two thousand six, and that said official, by official letter number DRCS-4667-006 of December 4, two thousand six, elevated the proceedings to the Minister of Health for resolution of the subsidiary appeal, appeals that were received by the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos of the Ministry of Health on December 6, two thousand six; **d)** That by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on June 25, two thousand eight, the subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff against sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 was declared without merit *(see folios 36 to 40, 51 to 55, 56 to 58, 62, and 63 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health).* Now, this Court considers that even though Article 52, subsection b) of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud merely limits itself to indicating that the revocation appeal shall be resolved *"... within the three business days following its presentation...",* omitting the timeframe for the Head of the Ministry of Health to resolve the appeal (Article 52, subsection h of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud), *the one-month period provided for in Article 261.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública applies supplementarily,* which finds its basis in the principles of legal certainty; prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitución Política); efficiency (Article 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública); and self-sufficiency and self-integration of the administrative legal system (Article 9 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). This Court is not unaware that the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has repeatedly held in its jurisprudence that the sanitary order constitutes the initial act of the administrative procedure processed for this purpose by the Ministry of Health; however, we consider that due to the characteristics of said act, the technical support it holds, and for the sake of effective protection of the due process guarantee *—which the same jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional affirms is safeguarded during the appeal phase of said procedure—*, we consider that the eight-day period provided for in Article 352, subsection 2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is not applicable, but rather the one-month period contained in Article 261, subsection 2 of that same law, so that the person affected by the issuance of the sanitary order has an effective, reasonable, and proportionate opportunity for contradiction and, therefore, to prepare their defense in the administrative forum, in the event they choose that avenue to do so. Based on the factual and legal elements cited above, this Court considers that the Ministry of Health *did incur in a violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice in the administrative forum, by failing to observe the timeframes provided in the legal system for resolving the revocation and subsidiary appeals filed against a sanitary order*, for the following reasons: **a)** While it is true that the Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo referred, by official letter number ASH-179-06 of November 23, two thousand six, the revocation appeals with subsidiary appeal so that the Director Regional Central Sur of the Ministry of Health could resolve the revocation appeal in accordance with Article 19 bis of the Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud *(folios 56 to 58 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* it was not until resolution number AJRCS-I-4664-06 at twelve hours thirty minutes on December 4, two thousand six, that the Director Regional Central Sur of the Ministry of Health resolved the revocation appeal filed by the plaintiff, who was notified of that ruling only on December 19, two thousand six *(folios 53 to 55 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* despite the fact that said Regional Directorate received the appeals as of November 24, two thousand six *(folio 56 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **b)** That despite the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos of the Ministry of Health having received the subsidiary appeal filed by the plaintiff as of December 6, two thousand six (folios 51 and 52 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), it was not until resolution DM-JB-3367-08 issued by the Minister of Health at nine hours thirty minutes on June 25, two thousand eight (folios 36 to 40 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), that said appeal was declared without merit; **c)** That this delay was noted not only by the complainant himself, Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes *(see copy of note of June 30, two thousand seven, and of official letter of March 28, two thousand seven, at folios 49 and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* but also by the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who participated in the procedure, namely: Dirección General de Salud, Dirección Regional Central Sur, and Dirección of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo, who repeatedly requested information on the status of the revocation and subsidiary appeals filed by the plaintiff through official letters number 2355-08 of June 4, two thousand eight; DARH-252-2008 of May 27, two thousand eight; DRSC-2846 of July 17, two thousand seven; ASH-137-07 of July 16, two thousand seven; DGS-1299-07 of July 2, two thousand seven *(folios 42 to 46 and 48 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **d)** That the delay not only covers the appeal phase of the administrative procedure, but also the stage prior to the issuance of the sanitary orders, since, as has been deemed proven: **1)** by official letter number DGS-2470-06 of August 15, two thousand six, the Directora General de Salud of the Ministry of Health referred to the Director of the Región Central Sur of that same Ministry the complaint filed by Mario Tulio C.C. Marco Ferlini Barrantes before that General Directorate, through which he requested the declaration of inhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff *(see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **2)** by official letter number DRCS-3211-06 of August 18, two thousand six, the Director of the Región Central Sur of the Ministry of Health referred to Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero, in his capacity as Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo, a copy of the official letter signed by the Directora General de Salud attaching a copy of the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, requesting the declaration of inhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling he rents to the plaintiff *(see folios 70 to 72 and 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **3)** that on October 10, two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, in her capacity as Gestora Ambiental of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo, carried out the inspection visit to the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff *(see folios 70 to 72, 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **4)** that on November 7, two thousand six, the Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo and the Gestora Ambiental of that Area signed the Report on the Request for Declaration of Uninhabitability (Inhabitabilidad) of the Property presented by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes *(see folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **5)** that at twelve hours twenty minutes on November 14, two thousand six, Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena —in her capacity as Gestora Ambiental of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo— notified the plaintiff of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, which that same official signed and according to which the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is declared uninhabitable and she is granted a period of thirty business days to voluntarily vacate the property *(see folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health);* **e)** That consequently, from the time the Directora General de Salud referred to the Dirección Regional Central Sur of the Ministry of Health, by official letter of August 15, two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, until by official letter number DARH-337-08 of August 4, two thousand eight, the Director of the Área Rectora de Salud of Hatillo and the Gestora Ambiental of said Area requested the Head of the Department of Evictions of the Ministry of Health to proceed with the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a consequence of the declaration of inhabitability (inhabitabilidad) ordered by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 at nine hours thirty minutes on June 25, two thousand eight, nearly two years elapsed, despite the fact that Article 261.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that the administrative procedure must be concluded by a final act within two months of its initiation, being extendable for two more months if the exceptional causes established for this purpose in Article 263, subsection 1 of the same Law occur, timeframes that the Ministry of Health exceeded, despite the fact that the reason underlying its actions —as the State Representation and the different Ministry of Health authorities that have participated in this process have reiterated— is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff. Now.
Now, although this Court has found it proven that the Ministry of Health incurred a violation of Article 41 of the Political Constitution—the principle of prompt and complete justice—it also considers that this circumstance does not have the ability to cause the absolute nullity of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, in accordance with the provisions of Article 223, subsection 1, in relation to subsections 2 and 3 of Article 158 of the General Law of Public Administration. While it is true that the motions for revocation with subsidiary appeal were resolved outside the deadlines provided in the legal system—three business days for the revocation and one month for the appeal (Article 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration)—it is also true that the defendant Public Administration did not omit to resolve the remedies filed by the plaintiff, in addition to the fact that—as will be developed below—had the resolutions in which the South Central Regional Director and the Minister of Health ruled on the remedies filed by the plaintiff been issued on time, they would not have had the ability to change or prevent the content of the challenged sanitary orders, given that the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is in a situation of danger, since it is located in the ten-meter protection area (área de protección) of the Tiribí River (Article 33 of the Forestry Law). Therefore, the sanitary orders are not substantially inconsistent with the legal system regarding that aspect. In conclusion, although the administrative proceeding took almost two years to conclude and the motions for revocation with subsidiary appeal were resolved outside the deadlines of three business days and one month established by Article 52, subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, that unjustified delay by the defendant does not have the ability to cause the absolute nullity of the sanitary orders, because substantial formalities that would have prevented or would have changed their content in important aspects were not omitted, since they are not inconsistent with the legal system, as they are based on the provisions of Article 33 of the Forestry Law—in that the house is located in the 10-meter protection area (área de protección) of the bank of the Tiribí River—; Article 313, subsections 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the General Health Law—regarding the non-compliance with the sanitary requirements indicated therein—, 319 and 320 of that same law, as is evident from the documents appearing at folios 64 to 66, 70 and 71, 77 to 80 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, 152 to 156, 198, 199 of the judicial file, and the testimony of the expert witness Alaín León Careaga, which appears in the audiovisual recording of the oral and public trial hearing, as will be analyzed below. The foregoing, without prejudice to any potential disciplinary and civil liabilities for the unjustified delay. 3) Regarding the technical basis of sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, this Court considers that, in accordance with the statements given by the expert Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal, MBA, and by the expert witnesses Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena and Engineer Alaín León Careaga—the latter two, in their capacity as officials of the Ministry of Health—which appear in the audiovisual recording of both the precautionary measure—only in the case of Lawson Marchena—and the oral and public trial, as well as from the documents appearing at folios 152 to 155, 189 to 204 of the judicial file, 64 to 66, 70 to 72, and 76 to 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, and from the judicial inspection carried out on September sixteenth, two thousand eight and appearing in the audiovisual recording, the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is technically grounded in accordance with the provisions of Article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, regarding the dangerousness (peligrosidad) and unsanitary conditions (insalubridad) of the dwelling, but not regarding the ruinous state (ruinosidad) thereof, since:
So much so, that Engineer Centeno Madrigal stated that from a structural standpoint, the house has no faults that endanger the lives of the people living there; so much so, that the aspects that are deteriorated according to the Report rendered and the sanitary orders issued by Licenciada Lawson Centeno can be easily repaired—including the tilt that the dwelling presents—, a criterion—the latter—with which Engineer Alaín León Careaga also agrees; that there is no danger of landslides not only because the dwelling is located on clayey silt, but also because the piles that support the structure are not only mostly in good condition, but also because they are excessive in relation to the load they support, which is very light—according to the statement of Engineer Centeno Madrigal, every two meters there is a pile in good condition, which according to him, is the recommended spacing for this type of construction, while Engineer León Careaga cannot specify how many are in poor condition—; coupled with the fact that the house is not located at the limit of influence of the slope fault, not only due to the distance at which it is located, but because the bamboo growing on the riverbank helps dissipate the negative energy in the river's protection area (área de protección). In accordance with the criteria of the two Civil Engineers who were called to testify in the oral and public trial as an expert or expert witness—respectively—, this Court concludes that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, lack technical basis regarding the ruinous state (ruinosidad) that serves—in part—as grounds for declaring the house occupied by the plaintiff uninhabitable, since that dwelling has no structural faults that endanger the life or physical integrity of the plaintiff or her family, because the problems detected regarding walls, floors, canoes, tilts, among others, can be repaired, aspects that in this case do not have the ability to annul the challenged act, given that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Forestry Law and the last paragraph of Article 320 of the General Health Law, it is impossible to repair the dwelling, as it is located in the protection area (área de protección) of the Tiribí River.
Regarding the electrical system, both from what this Court could observe in the judicial inspection proceeding carried out on September sixteenth, two thousand eight—which appears in the respective audiovisual recording—, and from the reports rendered by Licenciada Lawson Valverde and by Engineer León Careaga (folios 65, 71, 80 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health; 154, 199, and 200 of the judicial file), as well as from the statement given in the oral and public trial by Engineers Centeno Madrigal—he indicates that he is not an electrical engineer—and León Careaga, it is evident that the electrical system is of the "chayotera" type, it is not in conduit and is very deteriorated, which represents another element of dangerousness (peligrosidad) of the dwelling, as there is a risk of fire, even more so considering that the material used for its construction is wood, an aspect that is contrary to the requirements provided in subsection 3 of Article 313 of the General Health Law, in relation to the provisions of Article 320 of that same Law.
The dwelling is unsanitary (insalubre) since, both from the judicial inspection and from the challenged sanitary orders (folios 64 to 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), from the written reports rendered by Licenciada Lawson Marchena (folios 70 to 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health) and the Civil Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga (see folios 153, 155, and 200 of the judicial file), as well as from the statements given before this Court by the aforementioned engineering professionals (which appear in the audiovisual recording of the oral and public trial hearing), it is evident that the dwelling lacks adequate natural or artificial lighting and ventilation, since mainly in the bedroom and laundry room area, the windows are very small or are closed; the black water "...is discharged directly into the channel of the Tiribí River, through a 100 mm PVC pipe, to which the greywater from the kitchen is joined without any type of connection, causing leaks and infiltrations of black water and greywater in the yard and the basement of the dwelling..."; regarding the sanitary systems, "... the bathroom of the dwelling is not built with impermeable materials on its walls, preventing proper cleaning thereof; the washbasin does not have a siphon in the discharge pipe and also discharges its water directly to the shower area, creating an unsanitary situation on the site...", aspects that are contrary to the fundamental rights to live with dignity in adequate environmental and sanitary conditions, and to the requirements provided in subsections 3, 6, 7, and 8, points b and c of Article 313 of the General Health Law.
In conclusion, this Court considers that from all the probative elements brought to the file, it is evident that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 do have a technical basis in accordance with the provisions of Article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, regarding the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for being dangerous and unsanitary (insalubre), not only because the property does not meet the requirements established in subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, points 2 and 3 of Article 313 of the General Health Law, in relation to the provisions of Articles 319 and 320 of that same Law, but also because the permanence of the plaintiff and her family in that dwelling is contrary to their fundamental rights to a dignified life, health, and the environment.
The foregoing is without prejudice to any potential disciplinary and civil liabilities for unjustified delay; <b>c)</b> In accordance with the opinion of the two Civil Engineers who were called to testify in the oral and public trial as expert witness or expert witness witness—respectively—this Court concludes that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Eliette Lawson" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Eliette</span> <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span></st1:PersonName> Marchena, <b>lack technical basis regarding the state of ruinousness that serves—in part—as the basis for declaring the house occupied by the plaintiff uninhabitable,</b> since that dwelling has no structural faults that endanger the life or physical integrity of the plaintiff or her family, as the problems detected in walls, floors, gutters (canoas), inclinations, among others, can be repaired, <u>aspects that in this case do not have the virtue of annulling the challenged act, given that pursuant to the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) and 320, last paragraph of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), it is impossible to repair the dwelling, because it is located in the protection area of the <span class=SpellE>Tiribí</span> River;</u> <b>d)</b> That from all the evidentiary elements adduced to the file, it is clear that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 do have a technical basis pursuant to the provisions of article 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), <b>with respect to the declaration of uninhabitability of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for being dangerous and unhealthy,</b> not only because the property does not meet the requirements established in subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 points 2 and 3 of article 313 of the General Health Law, in relation to the provisions of articles 319 and 320 of that same Law, but also because the continued stay of the plaintiff and her family in that dwelling is contrary to their fundamental rights to a dignified life, to health, and to the environment; <b>e)</b> that it is contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 11, 13.1, and 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration, 33 and 34 of the Forest Law, 1, 2, 7, 313, 319, 320, and 321 of the General Health Law, to repair the deficiencies detected in the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, since it is located in the protection area of the <span class=SpellE>Tiribí</span> River and therefore, both the property and its occupants are in a risky condition that endangers their safety, their life, and their integrity.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='text-align:justify;line-height:150%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan'><b><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"'><span style='mso-tab-count:1'> </span><span class=SpellE>Vo</span>.- NON-EXISTENCE OF LIABILITY OF DOCTOR EDUARDO <span class=SpellE>ARGUEDAS</span> IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL.</span></b><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"'> The plaintiff considers that Doctor Eduardo <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero—both in his personal capacity and as Director of the Hatillo Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo)—has engaged in conduct contrary to the legal system, since he has adopted and executed decisions that are harmful to her rights. This Court considers that the defendant <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero has not incurred liability, for the following reasons: <b>a)</b> Pursuant to the provisions of articles 338, 340, 341, 355, and 357 of the General Health Law, and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health (Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), Doctor Eduardo <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero, in his capacity as Director of the Hatillo Health Area, is a health authority and as such, must ensure compliance with the legal system in that matter, in order to avoid risk or harm to the health of persons, or the spread or aggravation thereof, or the continuation or recidivism in the infringement of norms that threaten that fundamental right; <b>b)</b> That in that capacity, the defendant <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero received, via official letter number <span class=SpellE>DRCS</span>-3211-06 of August eighteenth, two thousand six (folio 84 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), the complaint filed by Mario Tulio <span class=SpellE>c.c</span>. <span class=SpellE>Maarco</span> Tulio <span class=SpellE>Ferlini</span> <span class=SpellE>Barrantes</span> and proceeded to give it the respective processing, which, pursuant to the provisions of articles 320, 321, and 346 of the General Health Law and 29 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, consisted of: <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> conducting an inspection visit to the property on October tenth, two thousand six (<i>folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="76 a" w:st="on">76 a</st1:metricconverter> 82 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health and the statement of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> contained in the audiovisual records of the precautionary measure hearing and the oral and public trial hearing)</i>; issuing the technical report of November 7, two thousand six, which served as the basis for the challenged sanitary orders and was signed both by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> and by Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero <i>(folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="70 a" w:st="on">70 a</st1:metricconverter> 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health)</i>; <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> issuing and notifying, in exercise of the powers granted to her by the legal system, sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 to the plaintiff and the complainant (folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="64 a" w:st="on">64 a</st1:metricconverter> 69 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); referring, via official letter <span class=SpellE>ASH</span>- of November twenty-third, two thousand six, signed both by Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero and by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><i>(folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="56 a" w:st="on">56 a</st1:metricconverter> 58<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health)</i>, the revocation appeals with subsidiary hierarchical appeal (recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) filed by the plaintiff against said orders, which, pursuant to the provisions of articles 52 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud) and 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, fall to the Regional Director and the Minister of Health to resolve, respectively; and finally, processing with the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Security, via official letter number <span class=SpellE>DARH</span>-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, signed both by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licnciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> and by Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero <i>(folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),</i> the execution of the eviction ordered in the sanitary orders that were confirmed by the Minister of Health; <b>c)</b> That while it is true, as this Court analyzed in considerando <span class=SpellE>IV</span> of this judgment, that <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Valverde" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Valverde</st1:PersonName>—who serves as Environmental Manager (Gestora Ambiental) in the Hatillo Health Area—is also a health authority and, consequently, may issue sanitary orders as mechanisms to safeguard the right to health, life, the environment, and the development of persons <i>(see articles 338, 346, and 349 in relation to 340, 341, 320, and 321, all of the General Health Law, and 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, specifically the last paragraph relating to the Internal Organization (Organización Interna) of the Directorates of Health Areas),</i> Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero, as the hierarchical superior of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName>, has the duty to oversee the actions of his subordinates to verify their legality and appropriateness, as well as to exercise disciplinary power when necessary <i>(article 102, subsections b and c of the General Law of Public Administration),</i> especially taking into consideration the transcendence of the legal interests protected by the Ministry of Health<i>.</i> In that sense, it is worth noting that although this Court declared in considerando <span class=SpellE>IV</span> of this judgment that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 issued by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> are not contrary to the legal system, since they do not lack a technical basis regarding the declaration of uninhabitability of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, for reasons of dangerousness and unhealthiness—principally because its location contravenes the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law—it is also true that, in the case of the declaration for ruinousness, this Court considered that, in accordance with the technical evidence adduced during the oral and public trial hearing, the opinion rendered and endorsed by Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero in the report of November 7, two thousand six, which serves as support for the challenged sanitary orders (see folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="70 a" w:st="on">70 a</st1:metricconverter> 72 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), lacks technical support. For this reason, it is worth reminding the defendant <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero that, pursuant to the provisions of articles 102 subsection b) and 213 of the General Law of Public Administration, in the event that he has any doubt about the content of a report rendered by a subordinate that could serve as the basis for a sanitary order or other special measures to safeguard people’s health, he must, prior to issuing the corresponding act, request the support of the Directorates at the regional or central level (see article 20 of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health), in order to guarantee that the measures adopted are not contrary to the principle of legality, and not as in this case, where it was not until after this lawsuit was filed and when the procedure had already concluded, that he requested technical support from the Human Environment Protection Unit (Unidad de Protección del Ambiente Humano) of the Central South Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional Central Sur) of the Ministry of Health <i>(see copy of official letter <span class=SpellE>UPAH</span>-1078-2008 of October second, two thousand eight, from folio <st1:metricconverter ProductID="152 a" w:st="on">152 a</st1:metricconverter> 155 of the judicial file)</i>; <b>d)</b> That while it is true, pursuant to the provisions of article 19 bis of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health, that the authority competent to resolve the revocation appeals and subsidiary hierarchical appeals filed against a sanitary order issued by a Health Area is the corresponding Regional Directorate and the Minister of Health, it is also true that the Director of the Health Area, in application of the provisions of articles 4 (fundamental principles of public service) and 11 (principle of legality) of the General Law of Public Administration, must request information on the outcome of the same, not only to inform the complainant about the processing and stage of the procedure, but also in order to take the necessary measures to execute the content of the sanitary orders, whose challenge through administrative channels has no suspensive effect, except in highly qualified cases and to avoid an irreparable outcome <i>(article 53 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health)</i>. In this case, from the documents found at folios 43, 46, and 50 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health, it is evident that Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero not only informed the complainant about the status of the procedure as of March twenty-eighth, two thousand seven, but also requested information on the status of the appeals filed by the plaintiff against the sanitary orders issued by the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area. It should also be noted that, despite the fact that the filing of the revocation appeals and subsidiary hierarchical appeals does not have suspensive effects, and that the Minister of Health—in this case—did not order the suspension of the challenged act while they were being resolved, Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero and <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Licenciada Lawson Marchena" w:st="on">Licenciada <span class=SpellE>Lawson</span> Marchena</st1:PersonName> did not process the execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff with the Ministry of Public Security until the Minister of Health had resolved the hierarchical appeal filed subsidiarily <i>(see document at folio 29 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health); </i><b>e) </b>In addition to the foregoing, it is worth noting that in the regime of administrative liability of public officials, in its individual sphere, it is subject to the convergence of subjective elements that form a link with the harmful effect. The objectivized dimension of the administrative liability regime, along these lines, is proper to Public Administration as an organization; however, in the case of public agents, in order to impute the harm to them, it is necessary to prove the existence of willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). This is either by a direct criterion in the exercise of the position or by causal occasionality, understood as the use of means and opportunities that, by virtue of the position, the Administration offers them and that have allowed them to detach a harmful conduct from the legal sphere of a third party, causing a harm that there is no duty to bear. This indeed follows from number 199 of the General Law of Public Administration. Therefore, to attribute liability to the public servant, the moving party must prove the willful intent or gross negligence of the official, except in cases of the issuance of openly illegal acts or obedience to them, or when departing from opinions that evince illegality, if the act is later declared invalid on those stated grounds, cases in which that same norm establishes such liability as an immediate effect. In the case at hand, on one hand, it has not been proven that there exists manifest illegality or the execution of spurious acts in the performance of Mr. <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero. On the contrary, having established the validity of the conduct in which he concurred with his signature, that eventuality is eliminated. Furthermore, the plaintiff has in no way established to what extent the participation of Mr. <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero can be regarded as a manifestation of willful intent or gross negligence. Therefore, it would not be viable to attribute liability to the co-defendant. <b>f)<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span></b><u>Pursuant to the foregoing and given that this Court declared that sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 are not contrary to the legal system, since they are supported by the provisions of articles 11, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution; 11, 13.1, and 16.1 of the General Law of Public Administration; 1, 2, 7, 313 subsections 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 points b and c, 319, 320, and 321 of the General Health Law; 33 and 34 of the Forest Law, this Court declares that the actions of Doctor <span class=SpellE>Arguedas</span> Barquero—both in his capacity as a public official and personally—are not contrary to the legal system and, therefore, do not generate liability for him under the terms set forth in article 213 of the General Law of Public Administration.</u></span><span style='mso-hansi-font-family:"Arial Unicode MS"'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='text-align:justify;line-height:150%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan'><b><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"'><span style='mso-tab-count:1'> </span><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><span class=SpellE>VIo</span>.- ON SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES: </span></b><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"'>In compliance with the provisions of article 122 subsection m) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) and given that the plaintiff requests as part of her claims that she be compensated for subjective moral damages, which<i> </i>she estimates at one million colones, given that she<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>and her children have suffered existential anguish since the administrative procedure began, which has been prolonged by its length and tediousness, where humanism is absent, creating in them great uncertainty in the face of the threat of being left without a home <i>(folio 13 of the judicial file and audiovisual record of the preliminary hearing),</i> this Court considers it necessary to clarify that, pursuant to the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), subjective moral damages <i>"...occur when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured without affecting the patrimony, usually assuming an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (...) In short, moral damages consist of physical, psychological, or moral affliction pain or suffering inflicted by an unlawful act. Normally the fertile field of moral damages is that of personality rights when they are violated..."</i> <b>(Judgment number 1002-0112).</b> Regarding the mechanisms to prove moral damages, the jurisprudence indicates that<span class=GramE>:<i>"</i></span><i>...<span class=SpellE>IV</span>.- The moral damages claimed here allow a wide margin of discretion to the judge. However, said margin is delimited by certain unavoidable parameters. For example, the former Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación), in judgment #114 at 16:00 hours on November 2, 1979, advocates in this regard the prudent assessment of judges "...when it is possible for them to infer the harm based on circumstantial evidence (prueba de indicios)". The prudent discretion referred to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. It is not a matter, then, of quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless goods, but of setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, the offense. It would not fit within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant indemnities, as occurs in other legal systems, as this would entail the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through moral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Included in the fundamental postulates of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our milieu with the status of constitutional principles. Applying them to situations like the present one, it is indispensable, when establishing obligations arising from indemnifying legal situations, to attend to the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damages could not give rise to excessive indemnities. This would open an inconvenient loophole, paving the way for excessive claims. These, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to unjustified enrichment. Thus, such compensation, far from repairing tarnished dignity, would undermine its foundations, causing it to fall before eminently economic values". </i><b>(See judgment number 114-F-98 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at fourteen hours twenty minutes on November 11, 1998).</b> Taking into account the circumstances of the particular case, this Court considers that there is merit in recognizing the subjective moral damages claimed by the plaintiff, for the following reasons: <b>a)</b> the plaintiff claims that she and her children have <i>“…been suffering an existential anguish that has been prolonged by the lengthy and tedious process, where humanism is absent, creating in us great uncertainty in the face of the threat of being left without a home…”</i> In that sense, if this Court has found it proven that at least since the year nineteen ninety-nine, the plaintiff has occupied, as a tenant (arrendataria), a dwelling located in Colonia Quince de <span class=SpellE>Setiembre</span>, from the <span class=SpellE>Alajuelita</span> bridge, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="15 metros" w:st="on">15 meters</st1:metricconverter> north and <st1:metricconverter ProductID="25 metros" w:st="on">25 meters</st1:metricconverter> east, on the banks of the <span class=SpellE>Tiribí</span> River <i>(see documents at folios 103 and 104, 109 and 110 of the judicial file; 29, 88 a89 bis, 96 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health</i>) and that, through sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155, the Environmental Manager of the Hatillo Health Area of the Ministry of Health declared the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff in her capacity as tenant uninhabitable and ordered her eviction <i>(see documents at folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="64 a" w:st="on">64 a</st1:metricconverter> 66 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health), </i>we consider that <b>the plaintiff is the holder of a legal situation susceptible to being protected through the administrative-contentious channel, since the issuance of the sanitary order whose conformity with the legal system is disputed in this proceeding has a direct effect on her vital sphere of interests,</b> as it affects one of the minimal, essential, and necessary elements (housing)<b> </b>for making effective fundamental rights and guarantees inherent to the human condition, such as: life, dignity, health, environment, and development.
The fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property that was declared uninhabitable is not an impediment to her seeking recourse through this avenue to protect her rights or interests, not only because Article 49 of the Political Constitution and Article 1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code are clear in establishing that the purpose of this Jurisdiction is to protect the legal situations of all persons, but also because the plaintiff is the party directly affected by the content of the sanitary orders she challenges here. For that reason, the arguments provided by the State's Representation are unfounded when they indicate that the plaintiff could not be left uncertain about losing her home because she is not the owner but the tenant of that property; **b)** Because in accordance with Constitutional Law, namely: Articles 21, 33, 46 paragraph five, 50 paragraphs one and two, 51, 65, 74 of the Political Constitution; 22, 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.1 and 12 sections 1 and 2.b of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 10.1 and 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), as well as the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the General Health Law, 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the Environment, **the plaintiff has a fundamental right to live with dignity in sanitary-environmental conditions that allow her to develop fully and freely as a person;** rights that derive from the principle of social justice and are inalienable because they are inherent to the human condition and that, therefore, the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the legal system confers upon it for that purpose, through programs that guarantee access to the factors that determine the essential content of those rights, such as: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (potable water, sanitary services, electricity, telematics, waste collection, among others) and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment, which is achieved through coordination among the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, so that within the framework of their powers, they can take the necessary measures to guarantee and make effective the full enjoyment of the aforementioned fundamental rights; **c)** Because while it is true that the State's Representation and Dr. Arguedas Barquero have argued in the precautionary measure, preliminary, and oral and public trial hearings that they exercised their powers to safeguard the right to health of the plaintiff and her family by declaring the uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) and the subsequent eviction of the plaintiff from the house she rents, it is also true that if the public interest is considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered persons (Article 113, section 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration) and that the purpose of the Administrative Legal System is to achieve a balance between the efficiency of the Administration and the dignity, freedom, and other fundamental rights of persons (Article 8 General Law of the Public Administration), **it is paradoxical that in the interest of protecting life, health, safety, and personal integrity, an attempt is made to evict a person of scarce economic resources—like the plaintiff—who occupies a dwelling declared uninhabitable** *(a condition that is evident from the documents on folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwestern Regional Manager of the Joint Institute of Social Assistance declared the plaintiff as "IMAS Population"; from the plaintiff's statement and the testimonial statement of Miriam Espinoza Alvarez and José Marino Badilla, which appear in the audiovisual support of the precautionary measure hearing, as well as from the judicial inspection carried out by this Court on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, which appears in the digital support of that proceeding)* **, without the State—understood in its unitary concept—previously adopting, in a coordinated manner, the alternative or palliative measures that guarantee that those fundamental rights will not suffer greater impairment,** rights that the State is obligated to protect in direct application of Articles 21, 33 (for human dignity), 50, 51, 65, and 74 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, the satisfaction of the public interest, in this case, must be oriented toward protecting the plaintiff's legal situation, not only with the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad), but also with the taking of positive actions directed at the effective protection of the rights that the Public Administration is called upon to protect, such as adequate housing or a housing option according to her human condition, actions that were adopted after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after this Court issued, as a precautionary measure, the non-execution of the eviction order issued against the plaintiff, by granting in judgment number 692-2008 at eighteen hours on September sixteenth, two thousand eight, the request for a precautionary measure that was filed *(see documents on folios 70, 71, 267 to 271 of the judicial file);* **d)** That it is contradictory for the defendants to allege that the contested sanitary orders are intended to protect the right to health, the environment, and the safety of the plaintiff and her family, when this Court in Considerando IV of this judgment, has taken as demonstrated that from the time the General Director of Health referred to the Central South Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Health, by official communication of August fifteenth, two thousand six, the complaint filed by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes regarding the alleged uninhabitability (inhabilitabilidad) of the house he rents to the plaintiff, until by official communication number DARH-337-08 of August fourth, two thousand eight, the Director of the Health Governing Area of Hatillo and the Environmental Manager of said Governing Area, requested the Head of the Evictions Department of the Ministry of Health to proceed with the eviction of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff, as a result of the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) ordered by sanitary orders number 105153, 105154, and 105155 and confirmed by resolution number DM-JB-3367-08 at nine hours thirty minutes on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, almost two years elapsed, despite the fact that Article 261.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that the administrative procedure must conclude by final act within two months following its initiation, with the possibility of being extended for two more months if the exceptional causes established for this purpose in Article 263 section 1 of the same Law occur, deadlines that the Ministry of Health exceeded, despite the fact that the reason underpinning its actions—as reiterated by the State's Representation, as well as by the different authorities of the Ministry of Health who have participated in this process—is to safeguard the health and physical integrity of the plaintiff, coupled with the fact that the appeals for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal were also resolved outside the deadlines of three working days and one month established by Article 52 subsection b of the Organic Regulation of the Ministry of Health and 261.2 of the General Law of the Public Administration, an inactivity that ultimately, in the opinion of this Court, is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice provided for in Article 41 of the Political Constitution; **d)** In that sense, the arguments given by the State's Representation are unfounded, regarding that the plaintiff has been aware of the state of the dwelling since nineteen ninety-nine as a result of the note sent to her by Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes *(folio 103 of the judicial file)* and the expert report that in two thousand five was submitted before the Small Claims Civil Court of Hatillo in the proceeding for rent increase that Ferlini Barrantes initiated against Levis Alvarez Velásquez and that was processed in file number 05-100019-0239-CI *(folios 93 to 95 of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* **not only because the proceeding processed in the Small Claims Civil Court of Hatillo did not have as its purpose to declare the uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff,** but rather to determine whether or not there was merit to increase the rent quota that Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes charged Levis Alvarez Velásquez for that concept *(see folios 88 to 89 bis of the administrative file provided by the Ministry of Health),* but also because—as has been taken as demonstrated—the plaintiff was unjustifiably subjected for almost two years, in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the Political Constitution, 261.2 and 263.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration, and 52 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, to an administrative procedure initiated at the request of an interested party to determine whether or not her dwelling was uninhabitable; **e)** In summary, this Court has taken as demonstrated that there is a causal link between the unjustified delay incurred by the Ministry of Health in processing and concluding by final act the administrative procedure initiated at the request of a party to determine whether the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is uninhabitable and the feelings of anguish and uncertainty suffered by the plaintiff in not knowing whether she would have a home in which to live and develop as a person together with her family, which were generated as a consequence not only of being subjected to that administrative procedure for almost two years, due to an unjustified delay that is contrary to the principle of prompt and complete justice, but also due to the fact that throughout that entire procedure, the defendant Public Administration did not adopt, in coordination with other organs or entities of the State, actions to safeguard the fundamental rights of the protected party provided for in Articles 21, 33, 46 last paragraph, 50 paragraphs one and two, 51, 65, and 74 of the Political Constitution, therefore, **the State is condemned to pay one million colones for subjective moral damages, the effective liquidation and due adjustment of which shall be carried out in the judgment execution phase, in accordance with the provisions of section 1) in fine of Article 123 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.** **VIIo.- HOUSING AS A PREREQUISITE OF THE ESSENTIAL CONTENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO HEALTH AND TO A DIGNIFIED LIFE.** In accordance with the provisions of Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, *"...everyone, as a member of society, has the right (...) to the satisfaction of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality..."*. In that sense, Article 25.1 of that same Universal Declaration establishes that: *"...everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services..."*. For its part, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights establishes in Article 11.1 that: *"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right..."*, a provision that relates to Article 12 sections 1 and 2.b of that same international human rights instrument, according to which, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health is recognized, and the States Parties must adopt among the necessary measures to ensure the realization of this right, the improvement of the environment. Now, Article 10.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), understands the right to health not only as *"...the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical, mental and social well-being..."*, but also as *"...a public good..."*, and whose effective guarantee depends on the adoption of a series of measures, among which stand out *"...the satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and those whose poverty makes them most vulnerable..."*; a right that in turn is complemented by the right of every person to live in a healthy environment and to have basic public services (Article 11.1 of that same Pact). Finally, the Political Constitution of our country establishes that human life is inviolable (Article 21), that every person is equal before the law and that no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be made (Article 33); that consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests (Article 46 paragraph five); that the State shall seek the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (Article 50 paragraph one); that every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (Article 50 paragraph two); that the family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to special protection from the State, as well as the mother, the child, the elderly, and the destitute sick (Article 51); that the State shall promote the construction of popular housing (Article 65); that the social rights and benefits contained in the single chapter of Title V of the Political Constitution are inalienable and derive from the principle of social justice on which the Social and Democratic Rule of Law is based (Article 74). As a development of what is provided by Constitutional Law, the General Health Law in Articles 1 and 2 establishes that *"...the health of the population is a public interest good protected by the State..."* and that *"...it is an essential function of the State to watch over the health of the population..."*. Based on the aforementioned regulations, this Court considers that the essential content of the right to health is determined by a series of factors that constitute the basic minimum, both for a person to live with dignity and to develop in freedom. Consequently, the right to health and to the environment thus constitute an essential prerequisite for making effective the right to a dignified life, without discrimination based on factors such as: gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political opinion or any other nature, national or social origin, economic position, birth, or any other condition (see among others Articles 2.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Now, among those factors that determine the essential content of the right to health and that the State must guarantee through the timely and effective exercise of the powers that the Legal System confers upon it for that purpose, are: housing, education, food, clothing, access to basic domiciliary public services (potable water, sanitary services, electricity, telematics, waste collection, among others) and the guarantee, defense, and preservation of the environment. In that sense, the right to health not only encompasses the preventive or non-preventive treatment of diseases that affect or may affect the population, but rather is essentially directed at guaranteeing that through effective access to the aforementioned factors—housing, education, food, clothing, public services, environmental protection—people can live with dignity in an environment that is conducive to their development in the various fields of human endeavor, which is achieved through coordination among the different organs and entities of the Public Administration, so that within the framework of their powers, they can take the necessary measures to guarantee the indicated fundamental rights. From that perspective and with regard to the specific case, actions aimed at preventing a person or a family group from leaving a settlement that may be unhealthy, dangerous, or ruinous would not be complete if they are not complemented by a series of conducts aimed at solving, in a preventive or definitive manner, the deficiencies that are intended to be resolved through the application of certain special measures, since—as in this case—it would be contradictory to evict a person from the dwelling they occupy in the interest of protecting their right to health, if the State ultimately does not exercise the powers granted to it by the Legal System to comprehensively protect that fundamental right, which in this scenario would be determined by conducts aimed at providing the social assistance or help required by the plaintiff, so that she has the real possibility of accessing the mechanisms provided in the applicable regulations to secure adequate housing in which she can live and develop with her family.
**VIIIo.- THE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE SUPERVISORY POWERS GRANTED BY THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND TO THE ENVIRONMENT.** As developed in Considerandos III and VII of this judgment, the recognition and effective protection of the fundamental rights to health, to the environment, to live with dignity, to access to basic domiciliary public services, and to the development in freedom of all persons without distinctions based on gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, health status, language, political opinion or any other nature, national or social origin, economic position, birth, or any other condition, constitute legal interests that are transcendental for the satisfaction of the public interest, considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered persons (Article 113 section 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration). From that perspective, to achieve the effective protection of those fundamental rights, the Legal System grants the State—understood in its unitary concept—a series of powers that must be exercised based on those legal interests that ultimately constitute a manifestation of the public interest (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and of the General Law of the Public Administration). From this affirmation, two fundamental consequences are drawn: **one of a negative nature,** in the sense that Public Administrations cannot exercise the powers conferred upon them by the legal system except based on the public interest for whose protection and satisfaction they were granted, as otherwise they would incur a misuse of power (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), which ultimately implies that this public interest will prevail over the Administration's interest when they may conflict (Article 113 section 2 of the General Law of the Public Administration), and **another of a positive nature,** regarding the fact that due to the nature and transcendence of the protected legal interests, the State has the duty to exercise in a timely and efficient manner the powers as an essential and determining means for the protection and effective satisfaction of the public interest (Article 66 section 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration), which unequivocally manifests in legal interests such as health and the environment, given that they constitute essential prerequisites of the right to live with dignity and in minimum conditions that allow every person to develop in freedom, conditions among which stand out: food, clothing, housing, effective and timely access to basic domiciliary public services, as well as to public health and education services. While it is true that this power-duty granted to the State in matters of health and environment is based on infra-constitutional norms such as Articles 1, 2, and 7 of the General Health Law, 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the Environment, 1 and 2 of the Biodiversity Law, 1, 33, and 34 of the Forestry Law—among others—, it is also true that said powers derive from Constitutional Law itself, specifically from Articles 21, 33, 46 paragraph five, 50 paragraphs one and two, 51, 65, 74 of the Political Constitution; 22, 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.1 and 12 sections 1 and 2.b of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 10.
1 and 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), therefore, they constitute norms of direct and immediate application, given the nature and transcendence of the legal interests they protect. Consequently, in the absence of written infra-constitutional norms that develop them—when necessary—legal operators must resort to unwritten norms to interpret, integrate, or delimit them (articles 7 and 8 of the General Law of Public Administration). In this sense, the timely and efficient exercise of the powers granted by the Legal System for the State to protect, preserve, defend, and guarantee those fundamental rights, and therefore the public interest, are not conditioned upon the existence of a party's petition to exercise them; quite the contrary, precisely for the sake of protecting the public interest, the State must exercise said powers even in a preventive manner to fulfill the objective that justified the granting of those powers-duties, which is the satisfaction of the public interest and, therefore, the protection of fundamental rights. In the specific case, the legal system grants the Ministry of Health a series of oversight (fiscalización) powers to safeguard the life, environment, and health of individuals with respect to the dwellings or structures in which they live. In this regard, not only are the minimum requirements that such dwellings or structures must meet established to guarantee the essential content of those fundamental rights (for example: articles 313 of the General Health Law or 33 and 34 of the Forest Law), but also, it requires the exercise of inspection and control functions over those minimum requirements, as well as the adoption of the special measures necessary to comply with the legal system in this matter and, therefore, to safeguard the fundamental rights of all affected persons (see articles 1, 2, 7, 318 to 321, 338 to 341, 346 to 349, 355 to 357 of the General Health Law). Now, based on all that has been stated, this Court considers that if the main reason that supported the declaration of uninhabitability (inhabitabilidad) of the dwelling occupied by the plaintiff is its dangerousness, by virtue of the property being located within the ten-meter protection area of the Tiribí River, which contravenes the provisions of articles 33 and 34 of the Forest Law, it is paradoxical, contradictory, and violative of the provisions of articles 21, 33, 50 paragraphs 1 and 2, 51, 65, and 74 of the Political Constitution, that the State does not exercise the oversight powers granted by the legal system with respect to the other dwellings that are in that same situation and, therefore, maintains not only a situation contrary to the legal system, but also contrary to the safety and dignity of the people who live there—a circumstance that this Court was able to determine both through the statements made by Licenciada Lawson Marchena and Engineers Centeno Madrigal and León Careaga during the oral and public trial hearing, and through the judicial inspection conducted on the sixteenth of September, two thousand eight (see the audiovisual record of that proceeding and of the oral and public trial hearing)—arguing that they only exercise said oversight powers upon party petition, even though it constitutes a real problem affecting a large number of people who live not only in the protection area of the Tiribí River but also along other rivers throughout the national territory, with the disastrous consequences that this situation not only could cause, but unfortunately has already caused. In this sense, it is improper that the Director of the Hatillo Health Area (Área Rectora de Salud) and the Environmental Manager of said Health Area answered the questions posed by this Court during the oral and public trial hearing by stating that they lack the resources to conduct ex officio inspections and that they only attend to cases similar to that of the plaintiff based on complaints from interested parties (see the statements of Doctor Arguedas Barquero and Licenciada Lawson Marchena contained in the audiovisual record of the oral and public trial hearing), not only because this implies a waiver of the exercise of the sovereign powers that the Legal System granted them for the satisfaction of a public interest (see the provisions of articles 1, 2, 313, 320, 340, 346, 355, and 357 of the General Health Law), which, in this case, translates into the effective and timely protection of the fundamental rights to the environment, to health, to life, to human dignity, to non-discrimination, to the protection of the family, to access to decent housing, to development in liberty, but also because, conversely (a contrario sensu), said administrative inactivity results in the violation of the fundamental rights that the Legal System entrusted them to guarantee, protect, and preserve through the exercise of said powers, despite the fact that article 355 of the General Health Law itself establishes that for the sake of effectively protecting the right to health, the competent authorities “...may decree, on their own authority, measures whose purpose is to prevent the emergence of dangers and the aggravation or spread of harm, or the continuation or recurrence in the perpetration of legal or regulatory infractions that threaten the health of individuals...”, which also responds to the precautionary principle (principio precautorio) or principle of prudent avoidance established in article 11.2 of the Biodiversity Law and in Principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration. It is also worth highlighting that constitutional jurisprudence is reiterated in the sense that the State cannot validly rely on the scarcity of human, technical, or economic resources as a justification for not exercising the powers granted by the Legal System for the satisfaction of the public interest and for the effective and timely protection of the fundamental rights of individuals (see, among others, rulings 1995-00915 at sixteen hours six minutes on February fifteen, nineteen ninety-five; 1996-000695 at fifteen hours forty-two minutes on February seven, nineteen ninety-six). By virtue of the foregoing and given the transcendence of the protected legal interests, this Court grants the State a period of six months from the date this judgment becomes final (firmeza) to submit a detailed report on both the concrete measures to be taken to solve the problem of dangerousness affecting the families living in the protection area of the Tiribí River, as well as the timetable in which such actions will be applied and executed, aspects that will be supervised (fiscalizados) in the judgment execution phase.
IXo.- REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE JOINT INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE (INSTITUTO MIXTO DE AYUDA SOCIAL). It is now appropriate to make some considerations regarding the participation and eventual responsibility of the Joint Institute for Social Welfare (IMAS) in this proceeding. In this regard, it is worth recalling that by Resolution No. 124-F-TC-2008, at nine hours on October three, two thousand eight, the Cassation Court of Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation resolved to have that Institute considered as an interested third party (tercero interesado) in this proceeding. To that effect, it considered that “...the eviction of the plaintiff and her family without a palliative or alternative plan has pernicious effects on their legal sphere, which is why the intervention of the Joint Institute for Social Welfare is ordered, for the purpose of immediately ensuring decent housing for the petitioner (promovente) and her family...”. Thus, both in the written hearing and in the sole oral hearing held, IMAS opposed the provisions of the ruling of the Cassation Court, considering that in application of the Principle of Legality and in accordance with the competencies that the legal system grants to that entity, this institute does not have farm purchase programs for housing developments, credits for lot purchases, or housing construction, nor do they have programs for granting a housing voucher (bono de vivienda). Therefore, the Institutional Operational Plan of that entity does not contemplate any benefit related to programs that allow endowing the target population of IMAS with housing, this problem being the primary attention of other public entities and bodies such as the Mortgage Housing Bank (Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda), the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU), and the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements. They also indicated that the only assistance that said entity could grant was the payment of rent for a dwelling for three months. They insist that this aid was offered to the plaintiff and she rejected it, therefore, they consider they can offer nothing more. In order to resolve whether IMAS is responsible for adopting any palliative action regarding the situation the plaintiff is experiencing, it is necessary to analyze the powers that the legality framework imposes on said institute. In this sense, the following norms are of interest. Law No. 4760, of May 4, 1971. This norm creates the cited institute and indicates in article 2 its purpose, that is, “...to solve the problem of extreme poverty in the country, for which it must plan, direct, execute, and control a national plan destined for that purpose.” Likewise, in accordance with numeral 4, that institutional action must contemplate assistance and social promotion actions for the most needy sectors of society. Law No. 5662, of December 23, 1974. By means of this norm, a Social Development and Family Allowances Fund is created, which will be administered by the General Directorate of Social Development and Family Allowances, and everything related to this fund is declared of public interest. Article 2 indicates that Costa Ricans of scarce economic resources, in accordance with the requirements established in this law and its regulation, shall be beneficiaries of this fund. The purpose of the cited fund shall be to allocate resources to pay for programs and services to the State institutions responsible for complementary social assistance to the income of low-income families. Law No. 7769, of April 24, 1998. Regulates the attention to women in conditions of poverty. Article 2 establishes that the objective of the attention is to guarantee the improvement in the living conditions of women, through a comprehensive training process that comprises, at least and of interest here, access to decent housing. For its part, numeral 3 indicates that the Joint Institute for Social Welfare is responsible for coordinating the actions aimed at the attention of women in conditions of poverty. Furthermore, among the functions that article 5 entrusts to the Inter-Institutional Commission for attending to women in conditions of poverty, the definition of policies and programs for an effective attention to the aforementioned problem stands out, with priority given to female heads of household. Childhood and Adolescence Code. A harmonious interpretation of articles 13, 31, 38, 51, and 56 of the cited normative body allows reaffirming the right of minors to State protection that safeguards and fosters the development of their potential, which evidently includes the right to decent housing and the assistance or subsidy from the State for the achievement of these ends. For this Court, it is clear that an interpretation based on Constitutional Law allows affirming the existence in our Democratic and Social State of Law of an entire state policy to fight poverty and a commitment aimed at the inclusion of the most economically vulnerable sectors within Costa Rican society, which includes priority attention programs, economic benefits, and even facilitating access to decent housing. Nothing else follows from articles 50 and 65 of the Political Constitution and the cited norms. It is also clear that IMAS forms part of the state institutions entrusted with this task. In the sub judice (subiúdice), there are several aspects that deserve to be highlighted. For this Court, the evidence brought to the case file allows deducing that both Mrs. Álvarez Velázquez and her family live in a state of poverty. The foregoing follows from the documents on folios 270 and 271 of the judicial file in which the Southwest Regional Manager of the Joint Institute for Social Welfare declares the plaintiff as “IMAS Population”, from the judicial inspection carried out by this collegiate body, from the statements of witnesses Miriam Espinoza Álvarez and José Marino Badilla, and from the plaintiff’s own statements in the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) when she indicated to this Court the average monthly income earned from washing and ironing jobs she occasionally performed. The economic and housing conditions surrounding the plaintiff’s family place her in a socially vulnerable situation, which undoubtedly requires greater State protection aimed at preventing her exclusion from society. It is for this reason that the Joint Institute for Social Welfare becomes one of the state entities that must participate in this protection. Now, it is also true that its intervention must take place within the framework of its competencies, that is, the eradication of extreme poverty. From this perspective, certain specific programs that this institute has and that are described in the Institutional Operational Plan for the year 2009, which that institute provided as evidence, are noteworthy. Thus, the Strategic Line of Social Assistance for Development allows contributing a complementary economic income to the family income for families with female heads of household with dependents in charge, families with unprotected and economically dependent minors, and families in a situation of cyclical poverty. This Court considers that both the plaintiff and her family are susceptible to receiving this social assistance from IMAS. This would allow the petitioner (accionante) to have monetary aid that would provide immediate economic well-being to that family group and resolve, at least temporarily, one of the pressing basic needs at this moment: access to decent housing. It should not be lost sight of that in the family group headed by Doña Levis, there are minors, who, according to current regulations, have the right to access diverse alternatives that foster favorable environments for their comprehensive development. Without a doubt, given the eviction that the plaintiff faces for safety reasons by virtue of the danger of inhabiting a dwelling within the river protection zone, the payment of rent for a house becomes, at least, an immediate palliative measure that will alleviate the conditions of social vulnerability that the plaintiff already faces. In fulfillment of the powers-duties that our Democratic and Social State of Law has entrusted to IMAS, this type of assistance is imperative. This Court does not share the argument put forth by both the State and the institute that the aid was offered at the time and the plaintiff rejected it, for which reason it is not appropriate to grant it now. As the case file reflects, the petitioner (accionante) momentarily declined the offered assistance given that she was under a precautionary guardianship (tutela cautelar) that allowed her to remain in the dwelling she occupied. Circumstances have changed; the plaintiff and her family must vacate their house and require state action to find another where they can live while they manage to definitively solve their housing problem. Under this premise, the assistance that the institute must provide is required. In any case, it is reiterated, these are normative authorizations that must be exercised and for which excuses for their omission are not justified. During the oral hearing, the institute’s representatives insisted that the only thing they could grant was three months of rent; however, after analyzing the Operational Plan for this year, this Court considers that the eviction that the plaintiff and her family will suffer implies a change in living conditions related to the satisfaction of one of their basic needs, which is having decent housing. Under this position, it is the criterion of this jurisdictional body that the appropriate course is for the complementary income to be granted for six months, from the date this judgment becomes final (firmeza), as indicated on page 90 of the cited Operational Plan. In another vein, IMAS is correct regarding its lack of competence to endow the plaintiff and her family with decent housing. This power is proper to other state bodies and entities that make up the Housing Sector, among which the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements, the Mortgage Housing Bank, and the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism stand out. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, by virtue of the principle of unity of the State and the conditions of vulnerability that characterize the plaintiff and her family group, it is evident that the priority attention to which the institute is obliged also entails coordinating with the competent bodies and entities the possibility of seeking a permanent housing solution, provided, of course, that the plaintiff qualifies as a beneficiary and meets the requirements that the legal system demands in these situations.
Xo.- REGARDING THE STATE'S DUTY TO PROVIDE HOUSING OPTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS. As set forth in Consideration VII, Constitutional Law enshrines health as a fundamental right of the individual, but at the same time imposes on the State the duty to provide individuals with decent housing options, as a derivation of the doctrine that emerges from precepts 21 and 65 of the Magna Carta. The foregoing supposes a broad framework of coordination among the various State institutions to foster programs for granting housing options to individuals who, by virtue of their economic condition, require this type of public action. In terms of administrative organization, it is clear that there are several institutions in the country that have competencies and functions that relate directly or indirectly to this purpose of public utility. Within the framework of this case, the State's obligation to seek the granting of housing options to persons in need must be concretized in the mandate to establish the due coordination actions among all the institutions related to this field, in order to analyze the options that allow determining the possibility of granting the plaintiff one of the decent housing alternatives according to the programs that the housing sector has in that sense. Given that in this case the State is represented through the General Attorney's Office (Procuraduría General) of the Republic, the duty to coordinate with the other institutions to achieve the proper concretion of what is ordered here is established. For such purposes, a period of six months is granted to the State from the date this judgment becomes final (firmeza)—which coincides with the period during which the Joint Institute for Social Welfare will grant the complementary economic income to the plaintiff, based on the Strategic Line of Social Assistance for Development, contained in the 2009 Operational Plan—to analyze the possibility of granting a housing benefit to Mrs. Álvarez Velásquez, under the terms established in each of the programs of this sector. It must render a report on this to this Court once said period has expired, an aspect that will be supervised (fiscalizado) in the judgment execution phase.”
“IIIo.- LA TUTELA EFECTIVA DE LA SITUACIÓN JURÍDICA DE LA ACTORA. El artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, establece que la función esencial de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, es proteger de manera efectiva, al menos, los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de los administrados frente a las arbitrariedades del poder público. Se trata de un marco que protege las situaciones jurídicas de las personas, sean de poder, deber, de ventaja o mixtas. Esta norma constitucional es la que sirve de base a la gran reforma procesal contencioso administrativa que desembocó en la aprobación de la vigente Ley 8508, cuyo eje se basa -tal y como se desprende del artículo 1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo- por un lado, en la protección plena y efectiva de la persona, sea, la tutela efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona (legalidad subjetiva), entre las que se encuentran, sin duda alguna, sus derechos fundamentales. Por otro, establece un control objetivo de la legalidad de la función administrativa, buscando el restablecimiento de la legalidad, la mayor de las ocasiones, a efectos de evitar lesiones a las situaciones jurídicas mencionadas. En ese sentido, si este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que al menos desde el año mil novecientos noventa y nueve, la actora ocupa en calidad de arrendataria una casa de habitación localizada en Colonia Quince de Setiembre, del puente de Alajuelita, 15 metros al norte y 25 metros al este, en las márgenes del Río Tiribí (ver documentos a folios 103 y 104, 109 y 110 del expediente judicial; 29, 88 a89 bis, 96 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud) y que por órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 la Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo del Ministerio de Salud, declaró inhabitable la vivienda que ocupa la actora en su condición de arrendataria y ordenó su desalojo (ver documentos a folios 64 a 66 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), consideramos que la demandante es titular de una situación jurídica susceptible de ser tutelada en vía contencioso administrativa, toda vez que el dictado de la orden sanitaria cuya conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico se discute en este proceso, le genera un efecto directo en su esfera vital de intereses, puesto que incide en uno de los elementos mínimos, esenciales y necesarios para hacer efectivos derechos y garantías fundamentales inherentes a la condición de persona, tales como: la vida, la dignidad, la salud, el ambiente y el desarrollo humano, de manera tal que merece una tutela y ponderación especial. El hecho de que la actora no sea la propietaria del inmueble que fue declarado inhabitable, no es óbice para que acuda a esta vía en resguardo de sus derechos o intereses, no sólo porque los artículos 49 de la Constitución Política y el 1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, son claros al establecer que el objeto de esta Jurisdicción es tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona, sino también, porque la demandante es la afectada directa con el contenido de las órdenes sanitarias que aquí impugna, puesto que si bien es cierto, la Representación del Estado y del Doctor Arguedas Barquero han sostenido en las audiencias de medida cautelar, preliminar y de juicio oral y público, que han ejercido sus potestades en salvaguarda del derecho a la salud de la actora y de su familia, al declarar la inhabitabilidad y el posterior desalojo de la actora de la casa que alquila, también lo es, que si el interés público esta considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados (artículo 113, inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) y que el Ordenamiento Jurídico Administrativo tiene como finalidad lograr un equilibrio entre la eficiencia de la Administración y la dignidad, la libertad y los otros derechos fundamentales de las personas (artículo 8 Ley General de la Administración Pública), resultaría paradógico que en aras de tutelar la vida, la salud, la seguridad y la integridad personales, se pretenda desalojar a una persona de escasos recursos económicos -como la actora- que ocupa una vivienda declarada inhabitable (condición que se desprende de los documentos a folios 270 y 271 del expediente judicial en que la Gerente Regional Suroeste del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, declara a la actora como "Población IMAS"; de la declaración de la actora y declaración testimonial de Miriam Espinoza Alvarez y José Marino Badilla, las que constan en el respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia de medida cautelar, así como, del reconocimiento judicial efectuado por este Tribunal el dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil ocho, que consta en el respaldo digital de esa diligencia), sin que de previo se adopten de manera coordinada por parte del Estado -entendido en su concepto unitario- las medidas alternas o paliativas que garanticen que esos derechos fundamentales no sufrirán un mayor menoscabo, derechos que el Estado está obligado a proteger en aplicación directa de los artículos 21, 33 (por dignidad humana), 50, 65 y 74 de la Constitución Política. Por lo tanto, la satisfacción del interés público, en este caso, debe orientarse a proteger la situación jurídica de la actora, no sólo con la declaratoria de inhabitabilidad, sino también, con la toma de acciones positivas dirigidas a la tutela efectiva de los derechos que la Administración Pública está llamada a proteger como una vivienda digna o una opción habitacional acorde a su condición humana, acciones que fueron adoptadas con posterioridad a que la actora interpusiera la demanda y que este Tribunal dictara como medida cautelar la no ejecución de la orden de desalojo dictada en contra de la demandante, al acoger mediante sentencia número 692-2008 de las dieciocho horas del dieciséis de setiembre del dos mi ocho, la solicitud de medida cautelar que fue planteada (ver documentos a folios 70, 71, 267 a 271 del expediente judicial).
IVo.- LA INEXISTENCIA DE VICIOS DE NULIDAD ABSOLUTA DE LAS ORDENES SANITARIAS IMPUGNADAS. La actora considera que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 dictadas por la Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, en las que se declara inhabitable la vivienda que ocupa la actora y se ordena su desalojo, adolecen de vicios de nulidad absoluta porque resultan contrarias a la garantía del debido proceso, en razón de que a su juicio: 1) Fueron dictadas por una funcionaria incompetente; 2) Hubo una dilación indebida por parte de las autoridades competentes, en el dictado de las resoluciones mediante las cuales, se resolvieron los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio; 3) No se le otorgó a la actora la posibilidad de hacerle reparaciones a la vivienda. Este Tribunal estima que si bien es cierto, las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas adolecen de ciertos vicios, éstos no son de carácter sustancial y por ende, no tienen la virtud de causar la nulidad absoluta de los actos impugnados, de conformidad con el siguiente análisis de cada uno de los puntos alegados: 1) La actora estima que la Gestora Ambiental del Área Rectora de Salud no era la competente para dictar la órdenes sanitarias impugnadas, ya que a su juicio, la autoridad competente para hacerlo es el Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero en su condición de Director del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo. De conformidad con los documentos que constan a folios 64 a 66, 70 a 72 y 76 a 81 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud y de la declaración como testigo perito rendida por la Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena ante este Tribunal, que consta en los respaldos audiovisuales de las audiencias de medida cautelar y del juicio oral y público, se desprende que Lawson Marchena se desempeña como Gestora Ambiental en el Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y que dentro de las funciones que le corresponde realizar en ese cargo, está la de realizar inspecciones o visitas para practicar operaciones sanitarias, recoger muestras o recolectar antecedentes o pruebas en edificios, viviendas y establecimientos industriales, de comercio y en cualquier lugar en el pudieran perpetrarse infracciones las leyes y reglamentos sanitarios (ver artículo 346 de la Ley General de Salud y 20 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud). Ahora bien, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 338 de la Ley General de Salud, las autoridades de salud son las encargadas de aplicar dicho cuerpo normativo, así como las demás leyes o reglamentos relativos a ese tema, considerándose entonces como autoridades de salud, no sólo las previstas en el artículo 338 de la Ley General de Salud, sino también, los funcionarios del Ministerio de Salud que desempeñen cargos de inspección que hayan sido especialmente comisionados para la comprobación de infracciones a la Ley General de Salud o a sus reglamentos, de acuerdo a lo establecido en el artículo 349 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Ahora bien, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 340 y 341 de la Ley General de Salud, las autoridades de salud "... podrán dictar resoluciones ordenando medidas de carácter general o particular, según corresponda, para la mejor aplicación y cumplimiento..." del ordenamiento jurídico. Asimismo, la autoridades de salud, "... podrán ordenar y tomar las medidas especiales que habilita esta ley para evitar el riesgo o daño a la salud de las personas o que éstos se difundan o se agraven y para inhibir la continuación o reincidencia en la infracción de los particulares" (ver artículo 20 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud). Dentro de esas medidas especiales, los artículos 320 y 321 de la Ley General de Salud, establecen que: "...serán declarados inhabitables por la autoridad de salud, las habitaciones y edificios que por su estado ruinoso o que por existir en ellos una fuente de infección permanente constituyan un peligro para la salud y la seguridad de sus moradores o vecinos...", por lo que, una vez "... calificada de inhabitable o de insalubre una habitación o edificio, se comunicará al propietario o encargado, fijándole un plazo dentro del cual debe proceder al desalojamiento, demolición o reparación, según sea el caso...". Con vista en las pruebas indicadas y en las normas jurídicas parcialmente transcritas, este Tribunal considera que las órdenes sanitarias fueron dictadas por autoridad competente, ya que la Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, en su condición de Gestora Ambiental del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, constituye una autoridad de salud que está legitimada para dictar y ordenar medidas especiales como la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad y posterior desalojo -si fuera procedente- de un inmueble, a efecto no sólo de hacer cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico sanitario ambiental, sino de evitar el riesgo o el daño a la salud de las personas involucradas, por lo que, en cuanto a este aspecto, los actos impugnados no adolecen de un vicio de nulidad absoluta. 2) Respecto a la alegada dilación indebida por parte del Director Regional Central Sur y de la Ministra de Salud en resolver los recursos revocatoria y apelación en subsidio, que la actora interpuso contra las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado: a) Que el veintiuno de noviembre del dos mil seis, la actora presentó ante el Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio e incidente de nulidad contra las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155; b) Que por oficio número ASH-179-06 del veintitrés de noviembre del dos mil ocho, el Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y la Gestora Ambiental remitieron los recursos interpuestos por la actora al Director Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, a efecto de procediera como corresponda, recursos que fueron recibidos por la Dirección Regional Central Sur, el veinticuatro de noviembre del dos mil ocho; c) Que el recurso de revocatoria fue declarado sin lugar, por resolución número AJRCS-I-4664-06 dictada por el Director de la Región Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, a las doce horas treinta minutos del cuatro de diciembre del dos mil seis, y que dicho funcionario por oficio número DRCS-4667-006 del cuatro de diciembre del dos mil seis, elevó los autos ante la Ministra de Salud para que resolviera el recurso de apelación interpuesto de manera subsidiaria, recursos que fueron recibidos por la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Salud el seis de diciembre del dos mil seis; d) Que por resolución número DM-JB-3367-08 dictada por la Ministra de Salud a las nueve horas treinta minutos del veinticinco de junio del dos mil ocho, se declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación en subsidio interpuesto por la demandante contra las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 (ver folios 36 a 40, 51 a 55, 56 a 58, 62 y 63 del este Tribunal considera que aún y cuando el artículo 52 inciso b) de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, únicamente se limita a indicar que el recurso de revocatoria será resuelto “...en el curso de los tres días hábiles siguientes al de la presentación...”, omitiendo el plazo para que el o la Jerarca del Ministerio de Salud resuelva el recurso de apelación (artículo 52 inciso h de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud), se aplica de manera supletoria el plazo de un mes previsto en el artículo 261.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, lo cual, encuentra fundamento en los principios de seguridad jurídica; justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política; eficiencia (artículo 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) y, de autosuficiencia y autointegración del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo (artículo 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). No desconoce este Tribunal que la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha sostenido de manera reiterada en su jurisprudencia, que la orden sanitaria constituye el acto inicial del procedimiento administrativo que tramita al efecto el Ministerio de Salud, sin embargo, consideramos que por las características que tiene dicho acto, por el sustento técnico que reviste y en aras de la tutela efectiva de la garantía del debido proceso -que la misma jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional afirma que se resguarda durante la fase recursiva de dicho procedimiento-, consideramos que no es aplicable el plazo de ocho días previsto en el artículo 352 inciso 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sino el plazo de un mes contenido en el artículo 261 inciso 2 de esa misma ley, a fin de que la persona afectada con el dictado de la orden sanitaria, tenga una posibilidad efectiva, razonable y proporcionada para el contradictorio y por ende, para proveer a su defensa en sede administrativa, en el supuesto de que escogiera esa vía para hacerlo. Con base en los elementos fácticos y jurídicos antes citados, este Tribunal considera que el Ministerio de Salud si incurrió en una violación al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida en vía administrativa, al no observar los plazos previstos en el ordenamiento jurídico para resolver los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio interpuestos contra una orden sanitaria, por las siguientes razones: a) Si bien es cierto, el Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, remitió por oficio número ASH-179-06 del veintitrés de noviembre del dos mil seis, los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, a efecto de que el Director Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, resolviera el recurso de revocatoria conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 19 bis del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud (folios 56 a 58 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), no es sino hasta que por resolución número AJRCS-I-4664-06 de las doce horas treinta minutos del cuatro de diciembre de dos mil seis, que el Director Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, resuelve el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto por la actora, quién fue notificada de ese pronunciamiento hasta el diecinueve de diciembre del dos mil seis (folios 53 a 55 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), ello a pesar de que dicha Dirección Regional recibió los recursos desde el veinticuatro de noviembre del dos mil seis (folio 56 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); b) Que no obstante, la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Salud recibió desde el seis de diciembre del dos mil seis, el recurso de apelación en subsidio interpuesto por la actora (folios 51 y 52 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), no es sino hasta que por resolución DM-JB-3367-08 dictada por la Ministra de Salud a las nueve horas treinta minutos del veinticinco de junio del dos mil ocho (folios 36 a 40 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), que se declaró sin lugar dicho recurso; c) Que esa dilación fue advertida no sólo por el propio denunciante Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (ver copia de nota del treinta de junio del dos mil siete y de oficio del veintiocho de marzo del dos mil siete a folio 49 y 50 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), sino también por las diferentes autoridades del Ministerio de Salud que participaron en el procedimiento, a saber: Dirección General de Salud, Dirección Regional Central Sur y Dirección del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, que de manera reiterada solicitaron información sobre el estado de los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio interpuestos por la actora, mediante oficios número 2355-08 del cuatro de junio del dos mil ocho; DARH-252-2008 del veintisiete de mayo del dos mil ocho; DRSC-2846 del diecisiete de julio del dos mil siete; ASH-137-07 del dieciséis de julio del dos mil siete; DGS-1299-07 del dos de julio del dos mil siete (folios 42 a 46 y 48 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); d) Que la tardanza no sólo abarca la fase recursiva del procedimiento administrativo, sino también la etapa previa al dictado de las órdenes sanitarias, pues tal y como se ha tenido por demostrado: 1) por oficio número DGS-2470-06 del quince de agosto del dos mil seis, la Directora General de Salud del Ministerio de Salud, le remitió al Director de la Región Central Sur de ese mismo Ministerio, la denuncia que planteó Mario Tulio C.C. Marco Ferlini Barrantes ante esa Dirección General, mediante la cual, solicita que se declare la inhabitabilidad de la vivienda que le alquila a la actora (ver folios 70 a 72 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); 2) por oficio número DRCS-3211-06 del dieciocho de agosto del dos mil seis, el Director de la Región Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, remitió al Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero en su condición de Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, copia del oficio suscrito por la Directora General de Salud mediante el cual, adjunta copia de la denuncia que presentó Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, mediante la que solicita la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad de la vivienda que alquila a la actora (ver folios 70 a 72 y 84 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); 3) que el diez de octubre del dos mil seis, la Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, en su condición de Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, realizó la visita de inspección a la vivienda que ocupa la actora (ver folios 70 a 72, 76 al 82 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); 4) Que el siete de noviembre del dos mil seis, el Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y la Gestora Ambiental de esa Area, suscribieron el Informe sobre Solicitud de Declaratoria de Inhabilitabilidad del Inmueble presentada por Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (ver folios 70 a 72 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); 5) que a las doce horas veinte minutos del catorce de noviembre del dos mil seis, la Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena -en su condición de Gestora Ambiental del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo-, notificó a la actora las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, que esa misma funcionaria suscribió y conforme a las cuales, se declara inhabitable la vivienda que ocupa la demandante y se le otorga el plazo de treinta días hábiles para que voluntariamente desaloje el inmueble (ver folios 64 a 66 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); e) Que en consecuencia, desde que la Directora General de Salud remitió a la Dirección Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud, por oficio del quince de agosto del dos mil seis, la denuncia planteada por Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes, hasta que por oficio número DARH-337-08 del cuatro de agosto del dos mil ocho, el Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y la Gestora Ambiental de dicha Area Directora, solicitan al Jefe del Departamento de Desalojos del Ministerio de Salud, que proceda a ejecutar el desalojo de la vivienda ocupada por la actora, a consecuencia de la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad dispuesta por las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 y confirmada por resolución número DM-JB-3367-08 de las nueve horas treinta minutos del veinticinco de junio del dos mil ocho, transcurrieron casi dos años, a pesar de que el artículo 261.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, establece que el procedimiento administrativo debe concluirse por acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación, pudiéndose prorrogar por dos meses más, si se dieran las cusas de excepción que establece al efecto el artículo 263 inciso 1 de la misma Ley, plazos que el Ministerio de Salud excedió, a pesar de que el motivo que fundamenta sus actuaciones -tal y como han reiterado la Representación del Estado, así como, las diferentes autoridades del Ministerio de Salud que han participado en este proceso-, es salvaguardar la salud y la integridad física de la actora. Ahora bien, aunque este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que el Ministerio de Salud incurrió en una violación al artículo 41 de la Constitución Política -principio de justicia pronta y cumplida-, también considera que esa circunstancia no tiene la virtud de provocar la nulidad absoluta de las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 223 inciso 1 en relación con los incisos 2 y 3 del artículo158 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, ya que si bien es cierto, los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio fueron resueltos fuera de los plazos previstos en el ordenamiento jurídico -tres días hábiles respecto a la revocatoria y un mes respecto de la apelación (artículos 52 inciso b del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud y 261.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública)-, también lo es, que la Administración Pública demandada no omitió resolver los recursos interpuestos por la parte actora, aunado a que -tal y como se desarrollará de seguido- el dictado en tiempo de las resoluciones en que el Director Regional Central Sur y la Ministra de Salud se pronunciaran sobre los recursos interpuestos por la actora, no hubieran tenido la virtud de cambiar o impedir el contenido de las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas, dado que la vivienda que ocupa la actora se encuentra en una situación de peligro, puesto que está localizada en el área de protección de diez metros del río Tiribí (artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal), por lo que, las órdenes sanitarias no resultan sustancialmente disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico en cuanto a ese aspecto. En conclusión, aunque el procedimiento administrativo tardó casi dos años en concluirse y los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio fueron resueltos fuera de los plazos de tres días hábiles y un mes que establecen los artículos 52 inciso b del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud y 261.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, esa tardanza injustificada por parte del demandado, no tiene la virtud de causar la nulidad absoluta de las órdenes sanitarias, porque no se omitieron formalidades sustanciales que hubieran impedido o hubieran variado el contenido de las mismas en aspectos importantes, pues éstas no resultan disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico, ya que se basan en lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 de la Ley Forestal -en cuanto a que la casa se ubica en el área de protección de 10 metros de la ribera del río Tiribí-; 313 incisos 1, 6, 7 y 8 de la Ley General de Salud -respecto al no cumplimiento de los requisitos sanitarios que allí se indican-, 319 y 320 de esa misma ley, tal y como se desprende de los documentos que constan a folios 64 a 66, 70 y 71, 77 a 80 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud, 152 a 156, 198, 199 del León Careaga, que consta en el respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia de juicio oral y público, tal y como se analizará de seguido. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de las eventuales responsabilidades disciplinarias y civiles por la tardanza injustificada. 3) En cuanto al fundamento técnico de las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, este Tribunal estima que de conformidad con las declaraciones rendidas por el perito Ingeniero Leonel Centeno Madrigal MBA y por los testigos peritos Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena e Ingeniero Alaín León Careaga -estos dos últimos, en su condición de funcionarios de Ministerio de Salud- que constan en el respaldo audiovisual tanto de la medida cautelar -sólo en el caso de Lawson Marchena- como del juicio oral y público, así como, de los documentos que constan de folios 152 a 155, 189 a 204 del expediente judicial, 64 a 66, 70 a 72 y 76 a 82 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud y del reconocimiento judicial realizado el dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil ocho y que consta en respaldo audiovisual, la declaratoria de inhabitabilidad de la vivienda que ocupa la actora, está fundamentada desde un punto de vista técnico conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, respecto a la peligrosidad e insalubridad de la vivienda, más no en cuanto a la ruinosidad de aquélla, ya que: a) Si bien es cierto, la Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena manifestó durante la audiencia del juicio oral y público, que como Gestora Ambiental, tiene conocimientos avanzados de Ingeniería Sanitaria, lo cual, le permitió verificar o constatar desde un punto de vista estructural que la madera con la que está construida la casa agotó su vida útil y se encuentra en mal estado físico sanitario (paredes, pisos y cielo raso); que la vivienda está montada sobre bases muy delgadas a una altura de 120 metros aproximadamente, las cuales tienen comején; que la casa se encuentra inclinada hacia un lado (oeste); que las condiciones del terreno en que se encuentra es irregular, con posibilidades de deslizamiento; también lo es, que el perito Ingeniero Leonel Centeno Madrigal, manifestó que por la experiencia y conocimientos que tiene como Ingeniero Civil, le fue posible detectar si había o no daños estructurales en la vivienda que ocupa la actora, a partir de una prueba visual, pues únicamente y en caso de duda, es que los Ingenieros deben realizar pruebas de ingeniería o resistencia de materiales -por ejemplo: estudios de ultrasonido o de químicos-, criterio que también sostuvo el Ingeniero Alaín León Careaga, funcionario de la Unidad de Protección al Ambiente Humano de la Dirección Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud (ver declaraciones rendidas por el perito Ingeniero Leonel Centeno Madrigal MBA y por los testigos peritos Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena e Ingeniero Alaín León Careaga -estos dos últimos, en su condición de funcionarios de Ministerio de Salud- que constan en el respaldo audiovisual tanto de la medida cautelar -sólo en el caso de Lawson Marchena- como del juicio oral y público); tan es así, que el Ingeniero Centeno Madrigal manifestó que desde un punto de vista estructural, la casa no tiene fallas que pongan en peligro la vida de las personas que allí habitan, tan es así, que los aspectos que se encuentran deteriorados conforme al Informe rendido y a las órdenes sanitarias dictadas por la Licenciada Lawson Centeno, pueden ser fácilmente reparados -inclusive la inclinación que presenta la vivienda-, criterio -éste último- en el que también coincide el Ingeniero Alaín León Careaga; que no hay peligro de deslizamiento no sólo porque la vivienda se encuentra sobre un limo arcilloso, sino también porque los pilotes que sostienen la estructura no sólo en su mayoría se encuentran en buen estado, sino también porque son excesivos con relación a la carga que soportan que es muy liviana -según la declaración del Ingeniero Centeno Madrigal, a cada dos metros hay un pilote en buen estado, que según su dicho, es la recomendada en este tipo de construcciones, mientras que el Ingeniero León Careaga no puede precisar cuántos están en mal estado-; aunado a que la casa no se encuentra en el límite de influencia de falla del talud, no sólo por la distancia a la que se encuentra, sino porque el bambú que crece al margen del río, ayuda a que se disipe la energía negativa en el área de protección del río. De conformidad con el criterio de los dos Ingenieros Civiles que fueron llamados a declarar en el juicio oral y público como perito o testigo perito -respectivamente-, este Tribunal concluye que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 dictadas por la Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, carecen de fundamento técnico respecto al estado de ruinosidad que sirve -en parte- como fundamento para que se haya declarado inhabitable la casa que ocupa la actora, puesto que esa vivienda no tiene fallas de índole estructural que pongan en peligro la vida o integridad física de la demandante o su familia, ya que los problemas detectados en cuanto a paredes, pisos, canoas, inclinaciones, entre otros, pueden ser reparados, aspectos que en este caso no tienen la virtud de anular el acto impugnado, dado que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal y 320 párrafo último de la Ley General de Salud, es imposible reparar la vivienda, pues ésta se encuentra ubicada en el área de protección del río Tiribí; b) No obstante lo anterior, este Tribunal considera que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155, sí están fundamentadas desde un punto de vista técnico, en cuanto a la declaratoria de peligrosidad e insalubridad de la vivienda, por las siguientes razones: La casa está situada en el área de protección del Río Tiribí, específicamente a siete metros de las márgenes de dicho río, lo cual resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal, que establece un área de protección de diez metros de las riberas de los ríos. Si bien es cierto, la vivienda está levantada sobre pilones de madera a una altura de dos metros sobre el nivel del suelo, tanto este Tribunal como los Ingenieros Civiles que realizaron las visitas de inspección correspondientes, pudieron notar que hay rastros de que las aguas del río han ingresado no sólo al área del patio, sino también, debajo de la estructura de madera que sirve de base o soporte a la vivienda. Ahora bien, aunque el perito Ingeniero Centeno Madrigal manifestó tanto en el informe escrito y oral que rindió ante este Tribunal, que éstas constituyen inundaciones normales, lo cierto es que tanto en el informe escrito como oral que rindió ante este Tribunal, indicó que desconoce cuál es la avenida máxima que puede alcanzar el caudal del río Tiribí cuando se inunda y en consecuencia, si es o no mayor a los dos metros de altura que tiene la estructura que sostiene la vivienda que ocupa la demandante, situaciones que junto al incumplimiento de la distancia de diez metros establecida como área de protección de las márgenes del río Tiribí, constituyen un elemento de peligrosidad no sólo para el inmueble, sino principalmente para la actora y las personas que viven con ella en dicha vivienda, ya que existe un riesgo de inundación que en aplicación del principio precautorio debe ser evitado (artículo 11.2 de la Ley de Biodiversidad y principio 15 de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, Declaración de Río), aspecto que resulta contrario a los requisitos establecidos en el inciso 1 del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud, en relación a lo dispuesto en los artículos 320 de esa misma ley y 33 de la Ley Forestal. En cuanto al sistema eléctrico, tanto de lo que este Tribunal pudo observar en la diligencia de reconocimiento judicial que se practicó el dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil ocho -que consta en el respaldo audiovisual respectivo-, como de los informes rendidos por la Licenciada Lawson Valverde y por el Ingeniero León Careaga (folios 65, 71, 80 del del expediente judicial), así como, de la declaración rendida en el juicio oral y público, por los Ingenieros Centeno Madrigal -éste indica que no es ingeniero eléctrico- y León Careaga, se desprende que el sistema eléctrico es del tipo “chayotera”, no está entubado y está muy deteriorado, lo cual, representa otro elemento de peligrosidad de la vivienda, pues existe riesgo de incendio, más si se toma en consideración que el material utilizado para su construcción es la madera, aspecto que resulta contrario a los requisitos previstos en el inciso 3 del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud, en relación a lo dispuesto en el artículo 320 de esa misma Ley. La vivienda es insalubre pues tanto del reconocimiento judicial, como de las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas (folios 64 a 66 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), de los informes escritos rendidos por la Licenciada Lawson Marchena (folios 70 a 72 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud) y los Ingenieros Civiles Centeno Madrigal y León Careaga (ver folios 153, 155 y 200 del expediente judicial), así como, de las declaraciones rendidas ante este Tribunal por los profesionales en ingeniería antes citados (que constan en el respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia de juicio oral y público), se desprende que la vivienda carece de iluminación y ventilación natural o artificial adecuadas, ya que principalmente en el área de dormitorios y cuarto de pilas, las ventanas son muy pequeñas o bien se encuentran cerradas; las aguas negras “...se vierten directamente al cauce del río Tiribí, mediante una tubería de PVC de 100 mm, a la que se le unen las aguas servidas de la cocina sin ningún tipo de conexión, originándose salideros y filtraciones de aguas negras y servidas en el patio y el sótano de la vivienda...”; en cuanto a los sistemas sanitarios, “... el baño de la vivienda no está construido con materiales impermeables en sus paredes impidiéndose una correcta limpieza del mismo; el lavatorio no dispone de un sifón en la tubería de descarga y además vierte sus aguas directamente al área de las duchas, creándose una situación de insalubridad en el sitio...”, aspectos que resultan contrarios a los derechos fundamentales a vivir dignamente en condiciones ambientales y sanitarias adecuadas, y a los requisitos previstos en los incisos 3, 6, 7 y 8 puntos b y c del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud . En conclusión, este Tribunal estima que de todos los elementos probatorios allegados al expediente, se desprende que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 si tienen fundamento técnico conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, respeto a la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad de la vivienda que ocupa la actora, por ser peligrosa e insalubre, no sólo porque el inmueble no cumple los requisitos establecidos en los incisos 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 puntos 2 y 3 del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud, en relación con lo dispuesto en los artículos 319 y 320 de esa misma Ley, sino porque la permanencia de la actora y su familia en esa vivienda, resulta contraria a sus derechos fundamentales a una vida digna, a la salud y al ambiente. 4) En cuanto a la imposibilidad de hacer reparaciones al inmueble que habita la actora, este Tribunal desea enfatizar que se deriva de lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 inciso b y 34 párrafo último de la Ley Forestal, en el sentido de que en zonas urbanas constituyen áreas de protección, las franjas de diez metros medidas horizontalmente a ambos lados en las riberas de los ríos, quebradas o arroyos, si el terreno es plano, y de cincuenta metros horizontales si el terreno es quebrado, áreas en las que no se podrán construir casas de habitación, dado que existe una condición de riesgo o peligrosidad latente ante las posibles inundaciones que puedan presentarse al subir el caudal de los ríos. A contrario de lo que afirma el abogado de la parte actora, el hecho de que la vivienda que ocupa Levis Alvarez Velásquez se haya construido con anterioridad a que entrara en vigencia la Ley Forestal, no es constituye un argumento válido para que este Tribunal desaplique las normas indicadas en el caso concreto, en contravención no sólo al principio de legalidad contenido en los artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sino al de inderogabilidad singular del ordenamiento jurídico contenido en el artículo 13 inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, más aún si se toma en cuenta que en razón de los bienes jurídicos tutelados a través de los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, como lo son, el ambiente, la salud, la vida y la seguridad -que en definitiva son derechos fundamentales reconocidos y garantizados por el Derecho de la Constitución-, dichas normas constituyen de orden público (artículo 73 de la Ley Forestal) y por ende, deben ser aplicadas a partir de la fecha en que entró en vigencia la Ley Forestal número 7575 del cinco de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis, a efecto no sólo de salvaguardar el ambiente, sino la salud y la seguridad de las personas que por diferentes razones, habitan en viviendas que no guardan el alineamiento establecido en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal. En ese sentido, aún y cuando desde un punto de vista técnico los Ingenieros Centeno Madrigal y León Careaga coinciden en que muchas de las deficiencias que presenta la vivienda que ocupa la actora y su familia pueden ser reparadas (ver declaraciones rendidas ante este Tribunal que constan en el respaldo audiovisual del juicio oral y público), el hecho de que se encuentre en el área de protección del Río Tiribí, imposibilita que dichas reparaciones sean efectuadas, no sólo porque existe un riesgo latente de inundaciones que pone en peligro la vida e integridad física de la actora, de su familia y de todas aquellas personas que ocupan las casas vecinas que se encuentran en una situación similar a la vivienda que ocupa la demandante -según se constató en el reconocimiento judicial, así como, de las declaraciones rendidas por la Licenciada Lawson Valverde y el Ingeniero Centeno Madrigal, que constan en los respaldos audiovisuales respectivos-, sino porque precisamente por esa circunstancia, las autoridades competentes no podrían otorgar los permisos para realizar dichas reparaciones, ya que resultarían contrarios al ordenamiento jurídico. En consecuencia, este Tribunal concluye que resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 21, 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política, 11, 13.1 y 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, 1, 2, 7, 313, 319, 320 y 321 de la Ley General de Salud, que se reparen las deficiencias detectadas en la vivienda que ocupa la actora, pues ésta se encuentra ubicada en el área de protección del río Tiribí y por ende, tanto el inmueble como sus ocupantes se encuentran en una condición de riesgo que pone en peligro su seguridad, su vida y su integridad. 5) En síntesis, este Tribunal estima que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 dictadas por la Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, no adolecen de vicios de nulidad absoluta, pues no resultan sustancialmente contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, porque: a) las órdenes sanitarias fueron dictadas por autoridad competente, ya que la Licenciada Elieth Lawson Marchena, en su condición de Gestora Ambiental del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, constituye una autoridad de salud que está legitimada para dictar y ordenar medidas especiales como la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad y posterior desalojo -si fuera procedente- de un inmueble, a efecto no sólo de hacer cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico sanitario ambiental, sino de evitar el riesgo o el daño a la salud de las personas involucrada; b) aunque el procedimiento administrativo tardó casi dos años en concluirse y los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio fueron resueltos fuera de los plazos de tres días hábiles y un mes que establecen los artículo 52 inciso b del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud y 261.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, esa tardanza injustificada por parte del demandado, no tiene la virtud de causar la nulidad absoluta de las órdenes sanitarias, porque no se omitieron formalidades sustanciales que hubieran impedido o hubieran variado el contenido de las mismas en aspectos importantes, pues éstas no resultan disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico, ya que se basan en lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 de la Ley Forestal -en cuanto a que la casa se ubica en el área de protección de 10 metros de la ribera del río Tiribí-; 313 incisos 1, 6, 7 y 8 de la Ley General de Salud -respecto al no cumplimiento de los requisitos sanitarios que allí se indican-, 319 y 320 de esa misma ley. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de las eventuales responsabilidades disciplinarias y civiles por la tardanza injustificada; c) De conformidad con el criterio de los dos Ingenieros Civiles que fueron llamados a declarar en el juicio oral y público como perito o testigo perito -respectivamente-, este Tribunal concluye que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 dictadas por la Licenciada Eliette Lawson Marchena, carecen de fundamento técnico respecto al estado de ruinosidad que sirve -en parte- como fundamento para que se haya declarado inhabitable la casa que ocupa la actora, puesto que esa vivienda no tiene fallas de índole estructural que pongan en peligro la vida o integridad física de la demandante o su familia, ya que los problemas detectados en cuanto a paredes, pisos, canoas, inclinaciones, entre otros, pueden ser reparados, aspectos que en este caso no tienen la virtud de anular el acto impugnado, dado que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal y 320 párrafo último de la Ley General de Salud, es imposible reparar la vivienda, pues ésta se encuentra ubicada en el área de protección del río Tiribí; d) Que de todos los elementos probatorios allegados al expediente, se desprende que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 si tienen fundamento técnico conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, respeto a la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad de la vivienda que ocupa la actora, por ser peligrosa e insalubre, no sólo porque el inmueble no cumple los requisitos establecidos en los incisos 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 puntos 2 y 3 del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud, en relación con lo dispuesto en los artículos 319 y 320 de esa misma Ley, sino porque la permanencia de la actora y su familia en esa vivienda, resulta contraria a sus derechos fundamentales a una vida digna, a la salud y al ambiente; e) que resulta contrario a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 21, 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política, 11, 13.1 y 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, 1, 2, 7, 313, 319, 320 y 321 de la Ley General de Salud, que se reparen las deficiencias detectadas en la vivienda que ocupa la actora, pues ésta se encuentra ubicada en el área de protección del río Tiribí y por ende, tanto el inmueble como sus ocupantes se encuentran en una condición de riesgo que pone en peligro su seguridad, su vida y su integridad.
Vo.- INEXISTENCIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD DEL DOCTOR EDUARDO ARGUEDAS EN SU CONDICIÓN PERSONAL Y DE FUNCIONARIO PÚBLICO. La actora estima que el Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero -tanto en su condición personal como de Director del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo- ha incurrido en conductas contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, ya que ha adoptado y ejecutado decisiones que son lesivas de sus derechos. Este Tribunal considera que el demandado Arguedas Barquero no ha incurrido en responsabilidad, por las siguientes razones: a) De conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 338, 340, 341, 355 y 357 de la Ley General de Salud , y 20 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud, el Doctor Eduardo Arguedas Barquero en su condición de Director del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo, es una autoridad de salud y como tal, debe velar por el cumplimiento del ordenamiento jurídico en esa materia, a efecto de evitar el riesgo o daño a la salud de las personas, o que éstos se difundan o se agraven, o la continuación o reincidencia en la infracción de las normas que atenten contra ese derecho fundamental; b) Que en esa condición el demandado Arguedas Barquero recibió por oficio número DRCS-3211-06 del dieciocho de agosto del dos mil seis (folio 84 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud) la denuncia interpuesta por Mario Tulio c.c. Maarco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes y se procedió a darle el trámite respectivo que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 320, 321 y 346 de la Ley General de Salud y 29 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud, consistió en que la Licenciada Lawson Marchena realizara una visita de inspección al inmueble el diez de octubre del dos mil seis (folios 76 a 82 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud y declaración de la Licenciada Lawson Marchena que consta en los respaldos audiovisuales de las audiencias de medida cautelar y de juicio oral y público); en rendir el informe técnico del 7 de noviembre del dos mil seis, que sirvió de base para las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas y que fue suscrito tanto por la Licenciada Lawson Marchena como por el Doctor Arguedas Barquero (folios 70 a 72 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); en que la Licenciada Lawson Marchena en ejercicio de las competencias que le otorga el ordenamiento jurídico, dictara y notificara a la actora y al denunciante las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 (folios 64 a 69 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); en remitir por oficio ASH- del veintitrés de noviembre del dos mil seis, suscrito tanto por el Doctor Arguedas Barquero como por la Licenciada Lawson Marchena (folios 56 a 58 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio que interpuso la actora contra dichas órdenes y que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 52 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud y 19 bis del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud, les corresponde resolver al Director Regional y a la Ministra de Salud, respectivamente; y por último, gestionar ante el Jefe del Departamento de Desalojos del Ministerio de Seguridad, por medio del oficio número DARH-337-08 del cuatro de agosto del dos mil ocho, suscrito tanto por la Licnciada Lawson Marchena como por el Doctor Arguedas Barquero (folio 29 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), que se ejecute el desalojo dispuesto en las órdenes sanitarias que fueron confirmadas por la Ministra de Salud; c) Que si bien es cierto, tal y como este Tribunal analizó en el considerando IV de esta sentencia, la Licenciada Lawson Valverde -quién se desempeña como Gestora Ambiental en el Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo-, también es una autoridad de salud y en consecuencia, puede dictar órdenes sanitarias como mecanismos para salvaguardar el derecho a la salud, a la vida, al ambiente y al desarrollo de las personas (ver artículos 338, 346 y 349 con relación al 340, 341, 320 y 321 todos de la Ley General de Salud y 20 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud, específicamente el párrafo último relativo a la Organización Interna de las Direcciones de las Áreas Rectoras de Salud), el Doctor Arguedas Barquero como superior jerárquico de la Licenciada Lawson Marchena tiene el deber de fiscalizar las acciones de sus inferiores para constatar su legalidad y conveniencia, así como ejercer la potestad disciplinaria cuando sea necesario (artículo 102 incisos b y c de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), más si se toma en consideración la trascendencia que revisten los bienes jurídicos que tutela el Ministerio de Salud. En ese sentido, cabe destacar que no obstante este Tribunal declaró en el considerando IV de esta sentencia que las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 dictadas por la Licenciada Lawson Marchena no resultan contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, puesto que no carecen de fundamento técnico respecto a la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad de la casa de habitación que ocupa la actora, por razones de peligrosidad e insalubridad -principalmente porque su ubicación contraviene lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal-, también lo es, que en el caso de la declaratoria por ruinosidad, este Tribunal estimó que de conformidad con las pruebas técnicas evacuadas durante la audiencia del juicio oral y público, el criterio vertido y avalado por el Doctor Arguedas Barquero en el informe del siete de noviembre del dos mil seis y que sirve de sustento a las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas (ver folios 70 a 72 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), carece de sustento técnico. Es por ello, que cabe recordar al demandado Arguedas Barquero que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 102 inciso b) y 213 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en el caso de que tuviera alguna duda sobre el contenido de un informe que le rinda un subalterno y que pueda servir de fundamento a una orden sanitaria o a otra clase de medidas especiales para salvaguardar la salud de las personas, deberá de previo a dictar el acto que corresponda, solicitar el apoyo de las Direcciones del nivel regional o central (ver artículo 20 del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud), a efecto de garantizar que las medidas que se adopten no sean contrarias al principio de legalidad, y no como en este caso, en que no es sino hasta con posterioridad a que se interpone esta demanda y cuando el procedimiento ya había concluido, que solicitó el apoyo técnico a la Unidad de Protección del Ambiente Humano de la Dirección Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud (ver copia del oficio UPAH-1078-2008 del dos de octubre del dos mil ocho, de folio 152 a 155 del expediente judicial); d) Que si bien es cierto, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 19 bis del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud, la autoridad competente para resolver los recursos de revocatoria y apelación en subsidio que se interpongan contra una orden sanitaria dictada por un Área Rectora de Salud, es la Dirección Regional correspondiente y la Ministra de Salud, también lo es, que el Director del Área Rectora de Salud, en aplicación de lo dispuesto en los artículos 4 (principios fundamentales del servicio público) y 11 (principio de legalidad) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, debe requerir información sobre el resultado de los mismos, no sólo a efecto de informar al denunciante sobre el trámite y estadio del procedimiento, sino también, con el fin de tomar las medidas necesarias para ejecutar el contenido de las órdenes sanitarias, cuya impugnación en vía administrativa no tiene efecto suspensivo, excepto en casos muy calificados y para evitar un resultado irreparable (artículo 53 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud). En este caso, de los documentos que constan a folios 43, 46 y 50 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud, se desprende que el Doctor Arguedas Barquero no sólo informó al denunciante sobre el estado del procedimiento al veintiocho de marzo del dos mil siete, sino también, requirió información sobre el estado en que se encontraban los recursos interpuestos por la actora contra las órdenes sanitarias dictadas por la Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo. Cabe también indicar que no obstante, la interposición de los recursos de revocatoria y apelación en subsidio no tiene efectos suspensivos, y que la Ministra de Salud -en este caso- no ordenó la suspensión del acto impugnado mientras éstos se resolvían, el Doctor Arguedas Barquero y la Licenciada Lawson Marchena no gestionaron ante el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública la ejecución de la orden de desalojo dictada en contra de la actora, hasta tanto la Ministra de Salud no hubiese resuelto el recurso de apelación interpuesto de manera subsidiaria (ver documento a folio 29 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud); e) Aunado a lo anterior, cabe indicar que en el régimen de responsabilidad administrativa de los funcionarios públicos, en su esfera individual, está sujeto a la convergencia de los elementos subjetivos que configuran un ligamen con el efecto lesivo. La dimensión objetivizada del régimen de responsabilidad administrativa, en esta línea, es propio de la Administración Pública como organización, empero, en el caso de los agentes públicos, para poder imputarles el daño es menester acreditar la existencia de dolo o culpa grave. Esto ya sea por un criterio directo en el ejercicio del cargo o bien por la ocasionalidad causal, comprendida como la utilización de medios y oportunidades que en virtud del cargo le ofrece la Administración y que le han permitido desprender una conducta lesiva de la esfera jurídica de un tercero, causando un daño que no se tiene el deber de soportar. Así en efecto se desprende del numeral 199 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Por ende, para atribuir la responsabilidad al servidor, debe la parte promovente acreditar el dolo o la culpa grave del funcionario, salvo los casos de emisión de actos abiertamente ilegales u obediencia de los mismos o bien, cuando se aparte de dictámenes que evidencien la ilegalidad, si luego el acto se declara inválido por esos motivos dichos, supuestos estos en que esa misma norma establece como efecto mediato, esa responsabilidad. En la especie, por un lado, no se ha acreditado que exista ilegalidad manifiesta o ejecución de actos espurios en el desempeño del señor Arguedas Barquero. Por el contrario, al haberse establecido la validez de las conductas en las cuales concurrió con su firma, se elimina esa eventualidad. Por otra parte, la actora no ha establecido en modo alguno en qué medida la participación del señor Arguedas Barquero puede tenerse como manifestación de dolo o culpa grave. Por ende, no sería viable atribuir responsabilidad al co-accionado. f) De conformidad con lo 105153, 105154 y 105155 no son contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, ya que tienen sustento en lo dispuesto por los artículos 11, 21, 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política; 11, 13.1 y 16.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 1, 2, 7, 313 incisos 1, 3, 6, 7 y 8 puntos b y c, 319, 320 y 321 de la Ley General de Salud; 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, este Tribunal declara que las actuaciones del Doctor Arguedas Barquero -tanto en su condición de funcionario público como en lo personal- no son contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico y por ende, no le generan responsabilidad en los términos de lo dispuesto por el artículo 213 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
VIo.- SOBRE EL DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO: En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 122 inciso m) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y dado que la parte actora solicita como parte de sus pretensiones, que se le indemnice el daño moral subjetivo, que estima en un millón de colones, dado que ella y sus hijos han sufrido una angustia existencial desde que inició el procedimiento administrativo, que se ha prolongado por lo largo y tedioso del mismo, donde el humanismo está ausente, creando en ellos una gran incertidumbre ante la amenaza de quedar sin casa (folio 13 del expediente judicial y respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia preliminar), este Tribunal considera necesario aclarar que de conformidad con la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el daño moral subjetivo "...se produce cuando se ha lesionado un derecho extrapatrimonial sin repercutir en el patrimonio, suponiendo normalmente una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas del individuo (...) En suma el daño moral consiste en dolor o sufrimiento físico, psíquico, de afección moral inflingido con un hecho ilícito. Normalmente el campo fértil del daño moral es el de los derechos de la personalidad cuando resultan conculcados..." (Sentencia número 1002-0112). En cuanto a los mecanismos para probar el daño moral, la jurisprudencia señala que::"...IV.- El daño moral aquí reclamado, permite un amplio margen de discrecionalidad al juzgador. Sin embargo, dicho margen está delimitado por ciertos parámetros insoslayables. Por ejemplo, la antigua Sala de Casación, en sentencia #114 de las 16 horas del 2 de noviembre de 1979 propugna al respecto la prudente apreciación de los jueces "... cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios". El prudente arbitrio aludido, ha de tener en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad. No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte, su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello aparejaría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Comprendidos en los postulados fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales. Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones extralimitadas. Ello abriría un portillo inconveniente, para dar paso a pretensiones desmedidas. Estas, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado. Así, un resarcimiento tal, lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer ante valores eminentemente económicos". (Ver sentencia número 114-F-98 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia a las catorce horas veinte minutos del 11 de noviembre de 1998). Tomando en cuenta las circunstancias del caso particular, este Tribunal estima que si existe mérito para reconocer el daño moral subjetivo que alega la actora, por los siguientes motivos: a) la demandante alega que ella y sus hijos han “...venido sufriendo una angustia existencial que se ha prolongado por lo largo y tedioso del proceso, donde el humanismo está ausente, creando en nosotros una gran incertidumbre ante la amenaza de quedar sin casa...”. En ese sentido, si este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que al menos desde el año mil novecientos noventa y nueve, la actora ocupa en calidad de arrendataria una casa de habitación localizada en Colonia Quince de Setiembre, del puente de Alajuelita, 15 metros al norte y 25 metros al este, en las márgenes del Río Tiribí (ver documentos a folios 103 y 104, 109 y 110 del expediente judicial; 29, 88 a89 bis, 96 del órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 la Gestora Ambiental del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo del Ministerio de Salud, declaró inhabitable la vivienda que ocupa la actora en su condición de arrendataria y ordenó su desalojo (ver documentos a folios 64 a 66 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), consideramos que la demandante es titular de una situación jurídica susceptible de ser tutelada en vía contencioso administrativa, toda vez que el dictado de la orden sanitaria cuya conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico se discute en este proceso, le genera un efecto directo en su esfera vital de intereses, puesto que incide en uno de los elementos mínimos, esenciales y necesarios (la vivienda) para hacer efectivos derechos y garantías fundamentales inherentes a la condición de ser humano, tales como: la vida, la dignidad, la salud, el ambiente y el desarrollo. El hecho de que la actora no sea la propietaria del inmueble que fue declarado inhabitable, no es óbice para que acuda a esta vía en resguardo de sus derechos o intereses, no sólo porque los artículos 49 de la Constitución Política y el 1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, son claros al establecer que el objeto de esta Jurisdicción es tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona, sino también, porque la demandante es la afectada directa con el contenido de las órdenes sanitarias que aquí impugna, por esa razón, resultan improcedentes los argumentos dados por la Representación del Estado al indicar que a la actora no podía creársele incertidumbre de quedar sin casa, porque no es la propietaria sino la arrendataria de ese inmueble; b) Porque de conformidad con el Derecho de la Constitución, a saber: artículos 21, 33, 46 párrafo quinto, 50 párrafos primero y segundo, 51, 65, 74 de la Constitución Política; 22, 25.1 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 11.1 y 12 incisos 1 y 2.b del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; 10. 1 y 11.1 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), así como también, lo dispuesto en los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley General de Salud, 1 y 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, la actora tiene un derecho fundamental a vivir dignamente en condiciones sanitario-ambientales que le permitan desarrollarse integralmente y en libertad como persona; derechos que se derivan del principio de justicia social y que son irrenunciables por ser inherentes a la condición de ser humano y que por ende, el Estado debe garantizar a través del ejercicio oportuno y efectivo de las potestades que para tal efecto le confiere el Ordenamiento Jurídico, a través de programas que garanticen el acceso a los factores que determinan el contenido esencial de esos derechos, como lo son: la vivienda, la educación, la alimentación, el vestido, el acceso a los servicios públicos básicos domiciliarios (agua potable, sanitarios, eléctricos, telemáticos, recolección de desechos, entre otros) y la garantía, defensa y preservación del medio ambiente, lo cual, se logra a través de una coordinación de los diferentes órganos y entes de la Administración Pública, a efecto de que en el marco de sus competencias, puedan tomar las medidas necesarias para garantizar y hacer efectivo el disfrute pleno de los derechos fundamentales indicados; c) Porque si bien es cierto, la Representación del Estado y del Doctor Arguedas Barquero han sostenido en las audiencias de medida cautelar, preliminar y de juicio oral y público, que han ejercido sus potestades en salvaguarda del derecho a la salud de la actora y de su familia, al declarar la inhabitabilidad y el posterior desalojo de la actora de la casa que alquila, también lo es, que si el interés público esta considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados (artículo 113, inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) y que el Ordenamiento Jurídico Administrativo tiene como finalidad lograr un equilibrio entre la eficiencia de la Administración y la dignidad, la libertad y los otros derechos fundamentales de las personas (artículo 8 Ley General de la Administración Pública), resulta paradógico que en aras de tutelar la vida, la salud, la seguridad y la integridad personales, se pretenda desalojar a una persona de escasos recursos económicos -como la actora- que ocupa una vivienda declarada inhabitable (condición que se desprende de los documentos a folios 270 y 271 del expediente judicial en que la Gerente Regional Suroeste del Instituo Mixto de Ayuda Social, declarara a la actora como "Población IMAS"; de la declaración de la actora y declaración testimonial de Miriam Espinoza Alvarez y José Marino Badilla, las que constan en el respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia de medida cautelar, así como, del reconocimiento judicial efectuado por este Tribunal el dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil ocho, que consta en el respaldo digital de esa diligencia), sin que de previo se adopten de manera coordinada por parte del Estado -entendido en su concepto unitario- las medidas alternas o paliativas que garanticen que esos derechos fundamentales no sufrirán un mayor menoscabo, derechos que el Estado está obligado a proteger en aplicación directa de los artículos 21, 33 (por dignidad humana), 50, 51, 65 y 74 de la Constitución Política. Por lo tanto, la satisfacción del interés público, en este caso, debe orientarse a proteger la situación jurídica de la actora, no sólo con la declaratoria de inhabitabilidad, sino también, con la toma de acciones positivas dirigidas a la tutela efectiva de los derechos que la Administración Pública está llamada a proteger como una vivienda digna o una opción habitacional acorde a su condición humana, acciones que fueron adoptadas con posterioridad a que la actora interpusiera la demanda y a que este Tribunal dictara como medida cautelar la no ejecución de la orden de desalojo dictada en contra de la demandante, al acoger mediante sentencia número 692-2008 de las dieciocho horas del dieciséis de setiembre del dos mi ocho, la solicitud de medida cautelar que fue planteada (ver documentos a folios 70, 71, 267 a 271 del expediente judicial); d) Que resulta contradictorio que los demandados aleguen que mediante las órdenes sanitarias impugnadas se pretende tutelar el derecho a la salud, al ambiente y a la seguridad de la actora y de su familia, cuando este Tribunal en el considerando IV de esta sentencia, ha tenido por demostrado que desde que la Directora General de Salud remitió a la Dirección Regional Central Sur del Ministerio de Salud por oficio del quince de agosto del dos mil seis, la denuncia planteada por Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes respecto a la presunta inhabilitabilidad de la casa que arrienda a la actora, hasta que por oficio número DARH-337-08 del cuatro de agosto del dos mil ocho, el Director del Area Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y la Gestora Ambiental de dicha Area Directora, solicitan al Jefe del Departamento de Desalojos del Ministerio de Salud, que proceda a ejecutar el desalojo de la vivienda ocupada por la actora, a consecuencia de la declaratoria de inhabilitabilidad dispuesta por las órdenes sanitarias número 105153, 105154 y 105155 y confirmada por resolución número DM-JB-3367-08 de las nueve horas treinta minutos del veinticinco de junio del dos mil ocho, transcurrieron casi dos años, a pesar de que el artículo 261.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, establece que el procedimiento administrativo debe concluirse por acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación, pudiéndose prorrogar por dos meses más, si se dieran las causas de excepción que establece al efecto el artículo 263 inciso 1 de la misma Ley, plazos que el Ministerio de Salud excedió, a pesar de que el motivo que fundamenta sus actuaciones -tal y como han reiterado la Representación del Estado, así como, las diferentes autoridades del Ministerio de Salud que han participado en este proceso-, es salvaguardar la salud y la integridad física de la actora, aunado a que los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio también se resolvieron fuera de los plazos de tres días hábiles y un mes que establecen los artículo 52 inciso b del Reglamento Orgánico del Ministerio de Salud y 261.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, inactividad que en última instancia, resulta a juicio de este Tribunal, contraria al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida previsto en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política; d) En ese sentido, resultan improcedentes los argumentos dados por la Representación del Estado, en cuanto a que la actora conoce sobre el estado de la vivienda desde mil novecientos noventa y nueve a consecuencia de la nota que le envío Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes (folio 103 del expediente judicial) y del informe pericial que en el año dos mil cinco, se rindió ante el Juzgado Civil de Menor Cuantía de Hatillo en el proceso de aumento de alquileres que Ferlini Barrantes interpuso en contra de Levis Alvarez Velásquez y que se tramitó en expediente número 05-100019-0239-CI (folios 93 a 95 del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), no sólo porque el proceso tramitado en el Juzgado Civil de Menor Cuantía de Hatillo, no tenía por objeto declarar la inhabilitabilidad de la vivienda que ocupa la actora, sino determinar si existía o no mérito para aumentar la cuota de alquiler que Mario Tulio c.c. Marco Tulio Ferlini Barrantes le cobraba a Levis Alvarez Velásquez por ese concepto (ver folios 88 a 89 bis del expediente administrativo aportado por el Ministerio de Salud), sino también, porque -tal y como se ha tenido por demostrado- la actora estuvo sometida de manera injustificada por casi dos años, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, 261.2 y 263.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 52 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, a un procedimiento administrativo iniciado a solicitud de parte interesada, a efecto de determinar si su vivienda era o no inhabitable; e) En síntesis, Este Tribunal ha tenido por demostrado que existe un nexo causal entre la dilación injustificada en que incurrió el Ministerio de Salud para tramitar y concluir por acto final, el procedimiento administrativo que inició a solicitud de parte para determinar si la vivienda que ocupa la actora es inhabitable y, los sentimientos de angustia e incertidumbre que ha sufrido la actora al no saber si dispondrá o no de una casa dónde vivir y desarrollarse como persona junto con su familia, los cuales, se generaron como consecuencia no sólo de estar sometida a ese procedimiento administrativo durante casi dos años, por una tardanza injustificada que resulta contraria al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida, sino también, por el hecho de que la Administración Pública demandada no adoptó a lo largo de todo ese procedimiento, las acciones en coordinación con otros órganos o entes del Estado para salvaguardar los derechos fundamentales de la amparada previstos en los artículos 21, 33, 46 párrafo último, 50 párrafos primero y segundo, 51, 65 y 74 de la Constitución Política, por lo que, se condena al Estado al pago de un millón de colones por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, cuya liquidación efectiva y su debido reajuste, se realizará en la vía de ejecución de sentencias, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el inciso 1) in fine del artículo 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.
VIIo.- LA VIVIENDA COMO PRESUPUESTO DEL CONTENIDO ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES A LA SALUD Y A UNA VIDA DIGNA. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 22 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, "...toda persona, como miembro de la sociedad, tiene derecho (...) a la satisfacción de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, indispensables a su dignidad y al libre desarrollo de su personalidad...". En ese sentido, el artículo 25.1 de esa misma Declaración Universal, establece que: "...toda persona tiene derecho a un nivel de vida, adecuado que le asegure, así como a su familia, la salud, y el bienestar, y en especial, la alimentación, el vestido, la vivienda, la asistencia médica y los servicios sociales necesarios...". Por su parte, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, establece en el artículo 11. 1 que: "Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto reconocen el derecho de toda persona a un nivel de vida adecuado para sí y su familia, incluso alimentación, vestido y vivienda adecuados y a una mejora continua de las condiciones de existencia. Los Estados Partes tomarán medidas apropiadas para asegurar la efectividad de ese derecho...", disposición que se relaciona con el artículo 12 incisos 1 y 2.b de ese mismo instrumento internacional sobre derechos humanos, conforme al cual, se reconoce el derecho de toda persona al disfrute del más alto nivel posible de salud física y mental, debiendo los Estados Partes adoptar entre las medidas necesarias para hacer efectivo ese derecho, el mejoramiento del medio ambiente. Ahora bien, el artículo 10. 1 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), entiende el derecho a la salud, no sólo como "...el disfrute del más alto nivel de bienestar físico, mental y social...", sino también, como "... un bien público...", y cuya garantía efectiva depende de la adopción de una serie de medidas, entre las que destacan "...la satisfacción de las necesidades de salud de los grupos de más alto riesgo y que por sus condiciones de pobreza sean más vulnerables..."; derecho que a su vez, se complementa con el que tiene toda persona, a vivir en un ambiente sano y a contar con servicios públicos básicos (artículo 11.1 de ese mismo Pacto). Por último, la Constitución Política de nuestra país, establece que la vida humana es inviolable (artículo 21), que toda persona es igual ante la ley y que no puede hacerse discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana (artículo 33); que los consumidores y usuarios tiene derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos (artículo 46 párrafo quinto); que el Estado procurará el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza (artículo 50 párrafo primero); que toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (artículo 50 párrafo segundo); que la familia como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado, como también, la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido (artículo 51); que el Estado promoverá la construcción de vivienda populares (artículo 65); que los derechos y beneficios sociales contenidos en el capítulo único del Título V de la Constitución Política, son irrenunciables y que se derivan del principio de justicia social en que se basa el Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho (artículo 74). Como desarrollo de lo previsto por el Derecho a la Constitución, la Ley General de Salud en los artículos 1 y 2, establece que la “...salud de la población es un bien de interés público tutelado por el Estado...” y que “...es función esencial del Estado velar por la salud de la población...”. Con base en la normativa antes citada, este Tribunal considera que el contenido esencial del derecho a la salud está determinado por una serie de factores que constituyen el mínimo básico, tanto para que una persona pueda vivir dignamente, como para que pueda desarrollarse en libertad. En consecuencia, el derecho a la salud y al ambiente, constituyen entonces un presupuesto esencial para hacer efectivo el derecho a una vida digna, sin discriminaciones en razón de factores tales como: género, etnia, religión, sexualidad, edad, estado de salud, idioma, opinión política o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición (ver entre otros los artículos 2.1 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 26 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 2.2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, 14 del Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Fundamentales). Ahora bien, dentro de esos factores que determinan el contenido esencial del derecho a la salud y que el Estado debe garantizar a través del ejercicio oportuno y efectivo de las potestades que para tal efecto le confiere el Ordenamiento Jurídico, están: la vivienda, la educación, la alimentación, el vestido, el acceso a los servicios públicos básicos domiciliarios (agua potable, sanitarios, eléctricos, telemáticos, recolección de desechos, entre otros) y la garantía, defensa y preservación del medio ambiente. En ese sentido, el derecho a la salud no sólo comprende el tratamiento preventivo o no de las enfermedades que afectan o puedan afectar a la población, sino que más bien, va dirigido esencialmente a garantizar que a través del acceso efectivo a los factores antes indicados -vivienda, educación, alimentación, vestido, servicios públicos, protección del medio ambiente-, las personas puedan vivir dignamente en un ambiente que sea propicio para su desarrollo en los diversos campos del quehacer humano, lo cual, se logra a través de una coordinación de los diferentes órganos y entes de la Administración Pública, a efecto de que en el marco de sus competencias, puedan tomar las medidas necesarias para garantizar los derechos fundamentales indicados. Desde esa perspectiva y respecto del caso concreto, las acciones tendentes a evitar que una persona o un grupo familiar abandonen un asentamiento que pueda resultar insalubre, peligroso o ruinoso, no estarían completas, si no se complementan con una serie de conductas tendentes a solucionar de manera preventiva o definitiva, las deficiencias que se pretenden solventar mediante la aplicación de ciertas medidas especiales, ya que -como en este caso- resultaría contradictorio desalojar a una persona de la vivienda que ocupa, en aras de proteger su derecho a la salud, si en definitiva el Estado no ejerce las potestades que le fueron otorgadas por el Ordenamiento Jurídico para tutelar de forma integral ese derecho fundamental, que en este supuesto estarían determinadas por las conductas tendentes a brindar la asistencia o ayuda social que requiera la actora, a efecto de que tenga la posibilidad real de acceder a los mecanismos previstos en la normativa aplicable, para gestionar una vivienda digna en que pueda habitar y desarrollarse junto a su familia.
VIIIo.- EL EJERCICIO OPORTUNO Y EFECTIVO DE LAS POTESTADES DE FISCALIZACIÓN OTORGADAS POR EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO AL MINISTERIO DE SALUD PARA LA TUTELA DEL DERECHO A LA SALUD Y AL AMBIENTE. Tal y como se desarrolló en los considerandos III y VII de esta sentencia, el reconocimiento y la tutela efectiva de los derechos fundamentales a la salud, al ambiente, a vivir dignamente, al acceso a los servicios públicos básicos domiciliarios y al desarrollo en libertad de todas las personas sin distingos por género, etnia, religión, sexualidad, edad, estado de salud, idioma, opinión política o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición, constituyen bienes jurídicos que son trascendentales para la satisfacción del interés público, considerado como la (artículo 113 inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Desde esa perspectiva, para lograr la tutela efectiva de esos derechos fundamentales, el Ordenamiento Jurídico le otorga al Estado -entendido en su concepto unitario- una serie de potestades que deben ejercitarse en función de esos bienes jurídicos que constituyen en última instancia, una manifestación del interés público (artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). De esta afirmación se extraen dos consecuencias fundamentales: una de carácter negativo, en el sentido de que las Administraciones Públicas no pueden ejercer las potestades que les confiere el ordenamiento sino en función del interés público para cuya tutela y satisfacción le fueron otorgadas, pues de lo contrario incurrirían en una desviación de poder (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), lo que en definitiva implica, que ese interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración cuando pudieran entrar en conflicto (artículo 113 inciso 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y otra de carácter positivo, respecto a que por la naturaleza y trascendencia de los bienes jurídicos tutelados, el Estado tiene el deber de ejercer de manera oportuna y eficiente las potestades como medio esencial y determinante para la tutela y satisfacción efectiva del interés público (artículo 66 inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), que se manifiesta de manera inequívoca en bienes jurídicos tales como la salud y al ambiente, dado que constituyen presupuestos esenciales del derecho a vivir con dignidad y en condiciones mínimas que le permitan a toda persona desarrollarse en libertad, condiciones entre las que destacan: el alimento, el vestido, la vivienda, el acceso efectivo y oportuno a los servicios públicos básicos domiciliarios, así como, a los servicios públicos de salud y de educación. Si bien es cierto, ese poder deber otorgado al Estado en materia de salud y ambiente encuentra fundamento en normas infraconstitucionales tales como los artículos 1, 2 y 7 de la Ley General de Salud, 1 y 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 1 y 2 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, 1, 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal -entre otras-, también lo es, que dichas potestades devienen del propio Derecho de la Constitución, específicamente de los artículos 21, 33, 46 párrafo quinto, 50 párrafos primero y segundo, 51, 65, 74 de la Constitución Política; 22, 25.1 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 11.1 y 12 incisos 1 y 2.b del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; 10. 1 y 11.1 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), por lo que, constituyen normas de aplicación directa e inmediata, en razón de la naturaleza y trascendencia de los bienes jurídicos que tutelan, por lo que, en el caso de ausencia de normas infraconstitucionales escritas que las desarrollen -cuando así fuera necesario- los operadores del derecho deberán recurrir a las normas no escritas para interpretarlas, integrarlas o delimitarlas (artículo 7 y 8 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). En ese sentido, el ejercicio oportuno y eficiente de las potestades otorgadas por el Ordenamiento Jurídico para que el Estado proteja, preserve, defienda y garantice esos derechos fundamentales y por ende, el interés público, no están condicionadas a que exista gestión de parte para ejercerlas, todo lo contrario, ya que precisamente en aras de tutelar el interés público el Estado deberá ejercer dichas potestades incluso de manera preventiva para cumplir el objetivo que justificó el otorgamiento de dichos poderes deberes, cual es, la satisfacción del interés público y por ende, la protección de los derechos fundamentales. En el caso concreto, el ordenamiento jurídico le otorga al Ministerio de Salud una serie de potestades de fiscalización, a fin de salvaguardar la vida, el ambiente y la salud de las personas respecto de las viviendas o estructuras en las que habitan, en ese sentido, no sólo se establecen los requisitos que deben reunir como mínimo dichas viviendas o estructuras para garantizar el contenido esencial de esos derechos fundamentales (por ejemplo: artículos 313 de la Ley General de Salud o 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal), sino que además, le impone ejercer funciones de inspección y control de esos requisitos mínimos, así como, adoptar las medidas especiales que se requieran para cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico en esta materia y por ende, para salvaguardar los derechos fundamentales de todas las personas afectadas (ver artículos 1, 2, 7, 318 a 321, 338 a 341, 346 a 349, 355 a 357 de la Ley General de Salud). Ahora bien, con base en todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal considera que si el motivo principal que sustentó la declaratoria de inhabitabilidad de la vivienda que ocupa la actora, es su peligrosidad, en virtud de que el inmueble se encuentra ubicado dentro del área de protección de diez metros del río Tiribí, lo cual contraviene lo dispuesto en los artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, resulta paradójico, contradictorio y violatorio a lo dispuesto en los artículos 21, 33, 50 párrafos 1 y 2, 51, 65 y 74 de la Constitución Política, que el Estado no ejerza las potestades de fiscalización que le otorga el ordenamiento jurídico respecto a las demás viviendas que se encuentran en esa misma situación y por ende, mantenga no sólo una situación contraria al ordenamiento jurídico, sino contraria a la seguridad y a la dignidad de las personas que allí viven, circunstancia que este Tribunal pudo determinar tanto por las declaraciones rendidas por la Licenciada Lawson Marchena y, los Ingenieros Centeno Madrigal y León Careaga durante la audiencia de juicio oral y público, como por medio del reconocimiento judicial que practicó el dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil ocho (ver respaldo audiovisual de esa diligencia y de la audiencia de juicio oral y público), con el argumento de que sólo ejercen dichas potestades de fiscalización a gestión de parte, a pesar de que constituye un problema real que afecta a gran cantidad de personas que habitan no sólo en el área de protección del río Tiribí, sino de otros ríos en todo el territorio nacional, con las consecuencias funestas que dicha situación no sólo podría provocar, sino que lastimosamente ya ha provocado. En ese sentido, resulta improcedente que el Director del Área Rectora de Salud de Hatillo y la Gestora Ambiental de dicha Área Rectora, hayan contestado ante las preguntas realizadas por este Tribunal durante la audiencia del juicio oral y público, que carecen de recursos para realizar inspecciones de oficio y que sólo atienden casos similares al de la actora, por denuncia de parte interesada (ver declaraciones del Doctor Arguedas Barquero y la Licenciada Lawson Marchena que constan en el respaldo audiovisual de la audiencia de juicio oral y público), no sólo porque ello implica una renuncia al ejercicio de las potestades de imperio que le otorgó el ordenamiento jurídico para la satisfacción de un interés público (véase lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 2, 313, 320, 340, 346, 355 y 357 de la Ley General de Salud), que en este caso, se traduce en la tutela efectiva y oportuna de derechos fundamentales al ambiente, a la salud, a la vida, a la dignidad humana, a la no discriminación, a la protección de la familia, a tener acceso a una vivienda digna, al desarrollo en libertad, sino también, porque a contrario sensu, dicha inactividad administrativa trae como consecuencia la violación de los derechos fundamentales que el Ordenamiento Jurídico le encomendó garantizar, proteger y preservar a través del ejercicio de dichas potestades, a pesar de que el propio artículo 355 de la Ley General de Salud, establece que en aras de proteger de manera efectiva el derecho a la salud, las autoridades competentes “...podrán decretar por propia autoridad medidas cuya finalidad tiendan a evitar la aparición de peligros y la agravación o difusión del daño, o la continuación o reincidencia en la perpetración de infracciones legales o reglamentarias que atenten contra la salud de las personas...”, lo cual, también responde al principio precautorio o de evitación prudente establecido en el artículo 11.2 de la Ley de Biodiversidad y en el principio 15 de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, Declaración de Río. Cabe también resaltar, que es reiterada la jurisprudencia constitucional, en el sentido de que el Estado no puede ampararse válidamente en la escasez de recursos humanos, técnicos o económicos como justificación para no ejercer las potestades otorgadas por el Ordenamiento Jurídico para la satisfacción del interés público, y para la tutela efectiva y oportuna de los derechos fundamentales de las personas (ver entre otras, las sentencias 1995-00915 de las dieciséis horas seis minutos del quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco; 1996-000695 de las quince horas cuarenta y dos minutos del siete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis). En virtud de lo expuesto y dada la trascendencia de los bienes jurídicos tutelados, este Tribunal le otorga al Estado un plazo de seis meses contados a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia, a efecto de que rinda un informe detallado tanto de las medidas concretas que se tomarán para solucionar el problema de peligrosidad que afecta a las familias que viven en el área de protección del río Tiribí, como también, del cronograma en que se aplicarán y ejecutarán dichas acciones, aspectos que serán fiscalizados en la fase de ejecución de sentencia.
IXo.- SOBRE LA PARTICIPACIÓN DEL INSTITUTO MIXTO DE AYUDA SOCIAL. Corresponde ahora realizar algunas consideraciones respecto de la participación y la eventual responsabilidad del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (en adelante IMAS) en este proceso. En este sentido, conviene recordar que mediante resolución No. 124-F-TC-2008, de las nueve horas del tres de octubre del dos mil ocho, el Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda resolvió tener como tercero interesado en este proceso a ese Instituto. Al efecto consideró que "...el desalojo de la actora y su familia sin un plan paliativo o alternativo tiene efectos perniciosos en su esfera jurídica , es por esto que se ordena la intervención del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, a efectos de asegurar en forma inmediata una vivienda digna a la promovente y su familia...". Así, tanto en la audiencia escrita como en la única audiencia oral realizada, el IMAS se ha opuesto a lo dispuesto por el fallo del Tribunal de Casación, toda vez que considera que en aplicación del Principio de Legalidad y conforme las competencias que el ordenamiento jurídico otorga a esa entidad, no cuenta ese instituto con programas de compra de fincas para desarrollos habitacionales, créditos para compra de lote ni construcción de vivienda y no cuentan con programas de otorgamiento de bono de vivienda. Por ello, el Plan Operativo Institucional de esa entidad no contempla beneficio alguno referido a programas que permitan dotar de vivienda a la población objetivo del IMAS, siendo esta problemática de atención primaria por parte de otros entes y órganos públicos como lo serían el Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda, el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo y el Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos. Señalaron también, que la única asistencia que dicho ente podía conceder, era lo correspondiente al pago de alquiler de una vivienda por tres meses. Insisten, esa ayuda se ofreció a la actora y ella la rechazó, por lo que, consideran, no pueden ofrecer nada más. A efectos de resolver si al IMAS le corresponde adoptar alguna conducta paliativa a la situación que vive la actora, es menester analizar las potestades que el bloque de legalidad impone a dicho instituto. En este sentido, interesan las siguientes normas. Ley No. 4760, de 4 de mayo de 1971. Esta norma crea el citado instituto e indica en el artículo 2, su finalidad, esto es “…resolver el problema de la pobreza extrema en el país, para lo cual deberá planear, dirigir, ejecutar y controlar un plan nacional destinado a dicho fin.” Asimismo, de conformidad con el numeral 4 esa acción institucional debe contemplar acciones de asistencia y promoción social para con los sectores más necesitados de la sociedad. Ley No. 5662, de 23 de diciembre de 1974. Mediante esta norma se crea un Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares que será administrado por la Dirección General de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares y se declara de interés público todo lo relacionado en este fondo. Indica el artículo 2 que serán beneficiarios de este fondo, los costarricenses de escasos recursos económicos, de acuerdo con los requisitos que se establezcan en esta ley y su reglamento. La finalidad del fondo de cita será destinar recursos para pagar programas y servicios a las instituciones del Estado que tiene a su cargo la ayuda social complementaria del ingreso de las familias de pocos recursos. Ley No. 7769, de 24 de abril de 1998. Regula la atención a las mujeres en condiciones de pobreza. Establece el artículo 2 que el objetivo de la atención es garantizar el mejoramiento en las condiciones de vida de las mujeres, mediante un proceso de formación integral que comprenda, al menos y en lo que interesa, el acceso a vivienda digna. Por su parte, el numeral 3 señala que corresponde al Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social coordinar las acciones tendentes a la atención de las mujeres en condiciones de pobreza. Más aún, dentro de las funciones que el artículo 5 encomienda a la Comisión Interinstitucional para atender a las mujeres en condiciones de pobreza, destacan la definición de políticas y los programas para una efectiva atención de la problemática ya citada, con prioridad a las jefas de hogar. Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Una interpretación armónica de los artículos 13, 31, 38, 51 y 56 del citado cuerpo normativo permiten reafirmar el derecho de los menores de edad a una protección estatal que tutele y fomente el desarrollo de sus potencialidades, lo que incluye evidentemente el derecho a una vivienda digna y el auxilio o subsidio del Estado para la consecución de estos fines. Para este Tribunal resulta claro que una interpretación basada en el Derecho de la Constitución, permite afirmar que existe en nuestro Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho toda una política estatal de lucha contra la pobreza y un compromiso orientado a la inclusión de los sectores económicamente más vulnerables dentro de la sociedad costarricense, lo que incluye programas de atención prioritaria, beneficios económicos, e incluso facilitar el acceso a una vivienda digna. No otra cosa se desprende de los artículos 50 y 65 de la Constitución Política y las normas citadas. También es claro que el IMAS forma parte de las instituciones estatales a las que se le ha encomendado esta tarea. En el subiúdice, hay varios aspectos que merecen ser destacados. Para este Tribunal, las probanzas traídas a autos permiten deducir que tanto la señora Álvarez Velázquez como su familia viven en estado de pobreza. Lo anterior se desprende de los documentos que constan a folios 270 y 271 del del Instituo Mixto de Ayuda Social, declara a la actora como "Población IMAS", del reconocimiento judicial que realizara este órgano colegiado, de las declaraciones de los testigos Miriam Espinoza Álvarez y José Marino Badilla y de las propias manifestaciones de la actora en la medida cautelar cuando indicó a este Tribunal el ingreso promedio por mes que se ganaba de labores de lavado y planchado a las que ocasionalmente se dedicaba. Las condiciones económicas y de vivienda que rodean a la familia de la actora, la colocan en una situación socialmente vulnerable, que sin duda requiere de una mayor tutela estatal tendente a evitar su exclusión de la sociedad. Es por ello que, el Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, se convierte en uno de los entes estatales que deben participar de esta protección. Ahora bien, también es cierto que su intervención debe darse dentro del marco de sus competencias, esto es, la erradicación de la pobreza extrema. Desde esta perspectiva, llama la atención algunos programas específicos con que cuenta ese instituto y que se describen en Plan Operativo Institucional para el año 2009, que aportara ese instituto como prueba. Así, la Línea Estratégica Asistencia Social para el Desarrollo permite contribuir con un ingreso económico complementario al ingreso familiar para familias con mujeres jefas de hogar con dependientes a cargo, familias con menores de edad desprotegidos y económicamente dependientes y familias que se encuentren en situación de pobreza coyuntural. Considera este Tribunal que tanto la actora como su familia son susceptibles de recibir esta asistencia social por parte del IMAS. Ello le permitiría a la accionante contar con una ayuda monetaria que le permitiera un bienestar económico inmediato a ese grupo familiar y resolver, al menos de forma temporal, una de necesidades básicas apremiantes en este momento: el acceso a una vivienda digna. No debe perderse de vista que en el grupo familiar que encabeza Doña Levis tenemos menores de edad, los que conforme a la normativa vigente, tiene derecho a tener acceso a diversas alternativas que propicien ambientes favorables para su desarrollo integral. Sin duda, frente al desalojo que enfrenta la actora por razones de seguridad en virtud del peligro que conlleva habitar una vivienda dentro de la zona de protección del río, el pago de un alquiler de una casa se convierte, al menos, en una inmediata medida paliativa que aliviará las condiciones de vulnerabilidad social, que ya de por sí enfrenta la actora. En cumplimiento de los poderes deberes que nuestro Estado de Democrático y Social de Derecho ha encomendado al IMAS, se impone este tipo de asistencias. No comparte este Tribunal lo alegado tanto por el Estado como por el instituto en el sentido que, en su momento, el auxilio fue ofrecido y la actora lo rechazó, razón por la cual no resulta procedente, ahora, otorgarlo. Conforme consta en autos, la accionante declinó momentáneamente la ayuda ofrecida, toda vez que, se encontraba con tutela cautelar que le permitía mantenerse dentro de la vivienda que ocupaba. Las circunstancias han cambiado, la actora y su familia deberán desalojar su casa y requieren de la acción estatal para encontrar otra que puedan habitar mientras logran solucionar en forma definitiva, su problema habitacional. Bajo este supuesto, la asistencia que debe brindar el instituto se impone. En todo caso, se insiste, se trata de habilitaciones normativas que deben ejercerse y ante las cuales no se justifican excusas para su omisión. Ya durante la audiencia oral las representantes del instituto insistieron que lo único que podían conceder eran tres meses de alquiler, sin embargo, analizado que fuera el Plan Operativo para este año, este Tribunal considera que el desalojo que sufrirá la actora y su familia implica un cambio en las condiciones de vida relacionadas con la satisfacción de una de sus necesidades básicas, como lo es contar con una vivienda digna. Bajo esta tesitura, es criterio de este órgano jurisdiccional que lo procedente es que el ingreso complementario se otorgue por seis meses, a partir de a firmeza de a sentencia, tal y como lo indica la página 90 del Plan Operativo citado. En otro orden de ideas, en lo que si lleva razón el IMAS es en cuanto a su incompetencia para dotar a la actora y su familia de una vivienda digna. Esta potestad es propia de otros órganos y entes estatales que integran el Sector Vivienda, entre los que destacan el Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos, el Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda y el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. Sin embargo, a juicio de este órgano colegiado, en virtud del principio de unidad del Estado y de las condiciones de vulnerabilidad que caracterizan a la actora y su grupo familiar, es evidente que la atención prioritaria a que está obligado el instituto, conlleva también coordinar con los órganos y entes competentes la posibilidad de buscar una solución habitacional permanente, siempre que, claro está, la actora califique como beneficiaria y cumpla con los requisitos que el ordenamiento jurídico exige en estos supuestos.
Xo.- SOBRE EL DEBER DEL ESTADO DE OTORGAR OPCIONES DE VIVIENDA A LAS PERSONAS. Como se ha puesto de manifiesto en el considerando VII, el Derecho de la Constitución consagra como derechos fundamentales de la persona, la salud, pero a la vez, impone al Estado el deber de dotar a las personas de opciones de vivienda digna, como derivación de la doctrina que emerge de los preceptos 21 y 65 de la Carta Magna. Lo anterior supone, un marco amplio de coordinación entre las diversas instituciones del Estado, para fomentar programas de otorgamiento de opciones de vivienda a las personas que en virtud de su condición económica, requiera de este tipo de acciones públicas. En términos de organización administrativa, es claro que existen varias instituciones en el país que cuentan con competencias y funciones que se relacionan de manera directa o refleja con esta finalidad de utilidad pública. En el marco de este caso, la obligación del Estado de buscar el otorgamiento de opciones de vivienda a las personas necesitadas, se debe concretar en el mandamiento de establecer las acciones de coordinación debidas entre todas las instituciones relacionadas con este campo, a fin de que analizar las opciones que permitan establecer la posibilidad de conceder a la actora alguna de las alternativas de vivienda digna conforme a los programas que en ese sentido tiene el sector vivienda. Siendo que en la especie se encuentra representado el Estado a través de la Procuraduría General de la República, se establece el deber de coordinar con las demás instituciones para lograr la debida concreción de lo aquí dispuesto. Para tales efectos, se otorga a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, un plazo de seis meses al Estado, -que coincide con el plazo en que el Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social le otorgará el ingreso económico complementario a la actora, con base en la Línea Línea Estratégica Asistencia Social para el Desarrollo,contenida en el Plan Operativo del Año 2009-, para que analice la posibilidad de conceder un beneficio de vivienda a la señora Álvarez Velásquez, en los términos que en cada uno de los programas de este sector se encuentren establecidos. De ello deberá rendir informe a este Tribunal una vez vencido dicho plazo, aspecto que será fiscalizado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia.”
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