Application of Law 6836 Incentives to Veterinary Physicians as University ProfessorsAplicación de incentivos de la Ley 6836 a médicos veterinarios docentes universitarios

**IV.- ON THE APPLICATION OF THE BENEFITS CONTEMPLATED IN LAW 6836, TO THE PLAINTIFFS:** The fundamental issue, the discussion of which underlies this litigation (litis), is the application to the plaintiffs of the benefits contemplated in Law 6836, called the Law of Incentives for Professionals in Medical Sciences (Ley de incentivos a los profesionales en ciencias médicas). That regulation, as verified in the legislative project that preceded its enactment, was the result of a commitment made by representatives of the Government, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), with representatives of the unions of professionals in medical sciences, on July 7, 1982. Fundamentally, the law created a salary scale with eleven categories, each with a base salary (salario base), a hiring salary (salario de contratación), and an annual increase on the base salary, up to a maximum of thirty seniority increases (anualidades). Article 2° expressly provided for the application of that category scale to *all public institutions contracting physicians*, a criterion that is also reiterated in Articles 3° and 14. In Article 3°, it expressly reads: *“The professionals in medical sciences of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), of the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros)* *and of other public institutions employing professionals in medical sciences, shall receive the recognition for incentives specified herein, after a salary equalization (equiparación salarial), if necessary, and according to the categories established by this law”*. For its part, Article 14 states: *“The salary increases or incentives established in this law shall be recognized retroactively to June 7, 1982, and are of mandatory compliance* *for all public institutions contracting professionals in medical sciences”*. Clause 22 provides: *“This Law is a matter of Public Order and Mandatory Compliance for all public institutions employing the professional individuals to which it refers”*. As can be readily observed, the rules provide no criterion to establish that only professionals in medical sciences assigned to institutions dedicated to the provision of health services are the recipients of its benefits. Furthermore, the law also provided for salary equalization (equiparación salarial), in cases where it was necessary when the category system and the salary proposed for the different categories was a different one. In relation to veterinary physicians, Law number 7064 (Law for the Promotion of Agricultural and Livestock Production FODEA and Organic Law of the MAG (Ley de Fomento a la Producción Agropecuaria FODEA y Orgánica del MAG), of May 5, 1987), in Article 61 establishes: *“…All the duties and rights of Law No. 6836 of December 22, 1982 are granted to professionals in veterinary medicine.* *For these purposes, it shall be understood that the professionals in Veterinary Medicine of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería), of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), and of other public institutions employing veterinary physicians, shall receive the recognitions for incentives established by Law No. 6836 of December 22, 1982, after a salary equalization (equiparación salarial) with the professionals in Medicine, according to the categories, basic salaries, and incentives, just as they are recognized to date. To this end, each public institution employing veterinary physicians shall adapt its categories, salaries, and salary recognition mechanisms to the conditions established in said law, through its personnel or human resources departments, applying the percentages and salary readjustment amounts, as soon as the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social does so on each occasion for physicians, to whose categories and salaries the veterinary physician is assimilated for these purposes. Each institution employing veterinary physicians shall adapt the systems and make the necessary readjustments so that this rule becomes effective…”*. (Thus added by Article 23, subsection 24) of Law No. 7108 of November 8, 1988). In accordance with the foregoing, it must be concluded that the plaintiffs, as the defendant acknowledges, professionals in medical sciences serving the School of Zootechnics (Escuela de Zootecnia) of that university center, are entitled to the application of the category and salary scale, as well as the annual increase on salary, contemplated in Law 6836, since, as stated, in the cited articles there is no express mention excluding veterinary physicians working as teachers for institutions such as the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica). It is important to note that, in addition to a salary scale according to their category, the law also contemplated other benefits, including a percentage of total salary for dedication (dedicación) to the hospital and/or administrative career, and a percentage for each hour of external consultation (consulta externa), starting from the fifth hour, of the total salary, provided they perform it. From the very provisions of that law, it follows that these other benefits are not general for all professionals in medical sciences, but are granted to the extent that they meet the conditions required for the granting of the respective benefit. In this sense, Article 13 expressly provides: *“The total salary shall be the base salary plus supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), incentives, raises, seniority increases (anualidades) or steps (pasos), and the other amounts that are legally considered salaries.* *The incentives referred to in this law shall be recognized to the professional as long as they remain in the conditions required for the granting of the respective benefit”.* (the highlighting is supplied).

The plaintiffs seek the granting of such incentives, because they assert that the defendant university has denied them, although they have neither alleged nor demonstrated that they perform administrative or hospital dedication (dedicación administrativa u hospitalaria) duties, nor that they have external consultation hours (horas de consulta externa). It follows from the foregoing that, since the performance of these duties is the factual basis for granting or recognizing these benefits in this venue, the plaintiffs had the procedural burden of proving the effective performance of those functions, as provided by Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) and by virtue of the law itself, as it establishes the granting of benefits only when the professional meets the required conditions. With the documentary evidence provided (the administrative files (expediente administrativos) of the plaintiffs), it is not possible to demonstrate that Messrs. [Name1] and [Name2] are in the performance of said functions, such that the incentives granted by clause 5 of Law 6836 cannot be recognized as was done in the prior instances. The plaintiffs seek the granting of such incentives, because they assert that the defendant university has denied them, even though the law makes no distinction for their granting. However, the appellant considers that clause 13 mentioned was interpreted incorrectly, because in its view, the incentives of Law 6836 can only be granted if and when the employees meet the requirements set by the law, a situation that does not apply to the plaintiffs. In this sense, the defendant is correct, because in the present case, it has not been demonstrated that the plaintiffs perform administrative or hospital dedication (dedicación administrativa u hospitalaria) duties, nor that they perform external consultation hours (horas de consulta externa). Even upon reviewing the list of proven facts in the first-instance judgment, it was not accredited or treated as a proven fact that the plaintiffs performed those functions. The first-instance ruling recognizes in favor of the plaintiffs all the incentives derived from Law number 6836, and bases its decision, among other aspects, on vote number 358, of 10:10 a.m. on November 17, 1999, of this Chamber; however, in that case, it was demonstrated that those workers, all veterinary physicians, did indeed perform administrative and hospital dedication (dedicación administrativa y hospitalaria) duties within their functions, unlike the present case, in which it was not demonstrated. On the other hand, through judgment No. 192 of 7:30 a.m. on September 22, 1993, this Chamber upheld the claim brought by veterinary physicians serving the National University (Universidad Nacional). Fundamentally, those plaintiffs requested salary equalization (equiparación salarial) with professionals in medical sciences serving the State, an 11% additional amount for hospital or administrative dedication (dedicación hospitalaria o administrativa) “regardless of the denomination given to it”; the application of the general raises for the public sector; a percentage for area bonus (zonaje), and in general, all the incentives created by that law. The claim was upheld and the defense raised by the defendant institution was denied. In that vote, it was considered that by virtue of the principle of university autonomy (autonomía universitaria), Law 6836 was not applicable to it. What was resolved in that other ruling is correct. Indeed, this Chamber in previous resolutions has affirmed the full independence and legal capacity granted by Article 84 of the Constitution to higher university education institutions for the performance of their functions as well as to establish their own organization and governance. However, it has also been reiterated that, even in those public institutions of maximum decentralization and full autonomy, such as municipalities, that self-organizational and self-governance power does not exempt them from compliance with those legal provisions issued generally for all public officials. In this regard, in vote No. 167 of 9:10 a.m., on August 8, 1997, it was decided: “…III.- In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that the employees under a service relationship with the Municipality of San José (Municipalidad de San José) are part of the so-called Public Sector; a concept even broader than that of the Public Administration, as embodied in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and in the Law Regulating the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa). On the other hand, considering its status as a Public Law legal entity, notwithstanding its functional independence, with powers for its self-governance, Law No. 6835 is applicable to it, based on the fact that the lack of coverage regarding the Civil Service System (Régimen de Servicio Civil) cannot be an obstacle to recognizing the accumulated seniority in service to the State (doctrine and jurisprudence of the single employer (patrono único)); because it is not directly from that statutory regulation that the incentive of annual increases originates. Further, it must be understood that the autonomy enjoyed by municipal corporations relates to the exercise of their public powers, both governmental and functional, for the fulfillment of their own purposes; in addition to a normative power, referred to those aspects subject to their exclusive competence. Those powers and their scope, granted to the Municipalities, are in a strict sense, and consist of being able to dictate administrative rules to develop the objective and to achieve the specialized purposes assigned to them, in the specific case, by the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and its related laws. It involves an organic specialty, by function and by subject matter, which delimits the degree of autonomy of those other territorial entities, in this case minor ones, and determines a space of action within which they are autonomous, but not beyond. This sphere may be more or less broad, depending on the nature of the service and the real patrimonial possibilities of the entity. Outside of it, it is incapable of self-regulation and its regulation must yield to the ordinary legal regulations of the State—the major entity—which are always of general scope and application (erga omnes).- This concerns legislation and not administration: that is, laws and not general administrative provisions.- IV.- The foregoing has special relevance regarding the public employment system (régimen de empleo público) in force with the defendant. It must be taken into account that the employees it contracts, in public service relationships, are part of the human resources it uses to fulfill, within its competencies, its purposes, through the exercise of the respective powers; and, for this reason, they are covered by the power of self-governance; but also, when it comes to ordinary rules, issued by the Legislative Assembly, which do not regulate, expressly and typically, that exclusive competence, but rather, differently, abstract and general situations that affect the municipal corporation in the same way as they do with respect to any other similar legal subject, who finds itself in the factual assumptions that the rule determines, that administrative autonomy cannot relieve it from respecting, and having to comply with, the requirements of that general legal order. Therefore, for the provisions emanating from the Council or, as applicable, the Municipal Executive, to be valid, it is essential that they respect the minimum content of the rights and benefits that state legislation has established, with a broad, albeit sectoral, scope—Articles 11 and 74 of the Political Constitution and 2, 11, 14, 19, 20, and 586 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)—; thus, in the case of municipal servants, as part of a global public employment relationship, if Law No. 6835 came to grant them rights, taking into account their essential, indisputable condition of also being public servants, as human resources subject to fulfilling the purposes and functions constitutionally and legally imposed on the Municipal Corporation, those statutory advantageous legal situations must be fully recognized to them, by virtue of their current service relationship, which is of Public Law…”. Also, the reasoning considered in vote 192, of 7:30 a.m., on September 22, 1993, remains fully applicable, insofar as it held that: "To the extent that Article 68 of the Political Constitution, with which the rule of university autonomy (autonomía universitaria) must be harmonized in this matter, delegitimizes any discrimination on a salary basis to the detriment of a specific group of workers, it must necessarily be concluded that, if the legislator establishes salary bases of a “general” order, applicable to all public institutions and, for that reason, oriented to granting an equal minimum scheme for the professionals or workers of the same guild, such provisions are binding even for universities, as institutions of that nature; a conclusion reached without entering into an analysis of the legislative competence or procedure for setting that type of minimum limitations, as this is not the proper subject matter to be aired in this venue, nor through this procedural path. It is not possible to endorse the interpretation sought by the National University (Universidad Nacional), that the degree of autonomy it enjoys empowers it to determine, as a matter of its own governance, the salary system of its employees, to the detriment of the minimums established in ordinary legislation, to the extreme that it can create, in its sphere, working conditions inferior to those of the rest of the public servants, because that would amount to illegitimately authorizing it to breach, to the detriment of its workers, the cited constitutional principle; and, hence, its autonomy must always be recognized without prejudice to such rights, which are also fundamental (doctrine and jurisprudence informing Articles 16, 17, and 19 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo))". (Along the same lines, see vote No. 123, of 9:10 a.m., on August 7, 1991; and No. 209 of 10:20 a.m., on September 17, 1997). But in that vote, there was no discussion about the nature of the functions performed by the plaintiffs to access each of the incentives contained in the law, a different situation than that which arises in this case, because the defendant institution, from its response, has argued that the plaintiffs do not perform functions in the field of medical sciences, but rather as teachers, and in that condition they are not entitled to the incentives stated in the law. According to the considerations set forth in this considering clause (Considerando), this Chamber maintains its thesis regarding the application to the plaintiffs of the benefits stipulated by the Law of Incentives for Professionals in Medical Sciences (Ley de incentivos a los profesionales en ciencias médicas); however, what cannot be accepted is the indiscriminate application of all the benefits stated in its articles, because these depend on whether or not the professional is in the required condition. Article 13, last paragraph, of the law cited so many times, provides for the validity of the benefits only while the professional meets the conditions required for them, which was not demonstrated in the case before us. For that reason, and given the opposition shown by the defendant in this trial, and having verified that the plaintiffs were not performing dedication to the administrative career (dedicación a la carrera administrativa), they are not entitled to receive the 11% incentive established by Article 5 of Law 6836, such that the appeal must be upheld in that sense.” On the other hand, through judgment no. 192 of 7:30 a.m. on September 22, 1993, this Chamber upheld the claim brought by veterinary doctors serving the Universidad Nacional. Fundamentally, these plaintiffs requested salary equalization with professionals in medical sciences serving the State, an 11% allowance for hospital or administrative dedication “regardless of the name given to it”; the application of general public sector increases; a percentage for location allowance (zonaje) and, in general, all the incentives created by that law. The lawsuit was upheld and the defense presented by the respondent institution was denied. In that vote, it was considered that by virtue of the principle of university autonomy, Law 6836 was not applicable to it. What was decided in that other ruling is correct. Indeed, this Chamber has already affirmed in previous resolutions the full independence and legal capacity that Article 84 of the Constitution grants to university higher education institutions for the performance of their functions as well as to establish their own organization and governance. However, it has also been reiterated that, even in those public institutions with maximum decentralization and full autonomy, such as municipal ones, this power of self-organization and self-governance does not exempt them from compliance with those legal provisions issued generally for all public officials. In this regard, in vote no. 167 of 9:10 a.m., on August 8, 1997, it was ordered: “…III.- In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that the servants under a service relationship with the Municipalidad de San José form part of the so-called Public Sector; a concept even broader than that of the Public Administration, as set forth in the Ley General de la Administración Pública and in the Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa. On the other hand, taking into account its condition as a legal person under Public Law, its functional independence does not hinder it, with powers for its self-governance, Law No. 6835 is applicable to it, based on the fact that the lack of coverage, regarding the Civil Service Regime, cannot signify an obstacle to recognizing the seniority accumulated in the service of the State (doctrine and jurisprudence of the single employer); because the incentive of annual increases does not directly derive from that statutory regulation. To further clarify, it must be understood that the autonomy enjoyed by municipal corporations relates to the exercise of their public powers, both governmental and functional, for the fulfillment of their own purposes; in addition to a normative order power, referring to those aspects subject to their exclusive competence. Those powers and their scope, granted to the Municipalities, are in the strict sense, and consist of being able to issue administrative norms to develop the object and to achieve the specialized purposes assigned to them, in the specific case, by the Código Municipal and its related laws. It involves an organic specialty, by function and by subject matter, which delimits the degree of autonomy of those other territorial entities, in this case minor ones, determining a space of action within which they are autonomous, but not beyond. That sphere can be more or less broad, depending on the nature of the service and the entity's real patrimonial possibilities. Outside of it, it is incapable of self-regulating, and its regulation must yield to the ordinary legal regulations of the State - the major entity - which are always of general scope and application (erga omnes).- It is a matter of legislation and not of administration: that is, of laws and not of general administrative provisions.-IV.- The foregoing has special relevance regarding the public employment regime in force in the respondent entity. It must be taken into account that the employees it contracts, in public service relationships, form part of the human resources it uses to fulfill, within its competencies, its purposes, through the exercise of the respective powers; and, for this reason, they are covered by that of self-governance; but also, when it involves ordinary norms, issued by the Legislative Assembly, that do not regulate, expressly and typically, that exclusive competence, but rather, diversely, abstract and general situations, which affect the municipal corporation in the same way they do regarding any other similar legal subject, who finds themselves in the factual conditions that it determines, that administrative autonomy cannot relieve it from respecting, and from having to comply with, the requirements of that general ordering. Therefore, for the provisions emanating from the Council or, as the case may be, from the Municipal Executive, to be valid, it is essential that, in them, the minimum content of the rights and benefits established by state legislation is respected, with a broad, albeit sectoral, scope - Articles 11 and 74 of the Constitución Política and 2, 11, 14, 19, 20, and 586 of the Código de Trabajo -; therefore, in the case of municipal servants, part of a global public employment relationship, if Law No. 6835 came to grant them rights, taking into account their essential, indisputable condition of also being public servants, as human resources subject to the fulfillment of the purposes and functions, constitutionally and legally imposed on the Municipal Corporation, those advantageous legal situations, statutory, must be fully recognized, due to their current service relationship, which is governed by Public Law…”. What was considered in vote 192, of 7:30 a.m., on September 22, 1993, is also fully valid, as it stated: "To the extent that Article 68 of the Constitución Política, with which the rule of university autonomy must be harmonized in this matter, delegitimizes all discrimination on a salary basis, to the detriment of a specific group of workers, it must necessarily be concluded that, if the legislator establishes 'general' salary bases, applicable to all public institutions and, for this reason, oriented to grant an equal minimum regime for professionals or workers of the same trade, such provisions are binding even for universities, as institutions of that nature; a conclusion reached without analyzing the problem of legislative competence or procedure for setting that type of minimum limitations, as this is not appropriate matter to be aired in this forum, nor in this proceeding. It is not possible to endorse the interpretation sought by the Universidad Nacional, that the degree of autonomy it enjoys empowers it to determine, as a matter of its own governance, the salary regime of its servants, to the detriment of the minimums established in ordinary legislation, to the extreme that it can create, within its sphere, labor conditions inferior to those of the rest of the public servants, because that would be equivalent to illegitimately authorizing it to breach, to the detriment of its workers, the cited constitutional principle; and, hence, that its autonomy must always be recognized without detriment to such rights, also fundamental (doctrine and jurisprudence that inform Articles 16, 17, and 19 of the Código de Trabajo)" (Along the same lines, see vote no. 123, of 9:10 a.m., on August 7, 1991; and no. 209 of 10:20 a.m., on September 17, 1997). But in that vote, there was no discussion about the nature of the functions performed by the plaintiffs to access each of the incentives contained in the law, a different situation from the one in this case, since the respondent institution, from its response, has argued that the plaintiffs do not perform functions in the field of medical sciences, but rather as teachers, and in that condition, the incentives stated in the law do not correspond to them. According to the considerations expressed in this recital, this Chamber maintains its thesis of the application to the plaintiffs of the benefits stipulated by the Ley de incentivos profesionales en ciencias médicas; however, what cannot be admitted is the indiscriminate application of all the benefits stated in its articles, as these depend on whether the professional is, or is not, in the required condition. The last paragraph of Article 13 of the law so often cited provides for the validity of the benefits only when the professional meets the conditions required for them, which was not demonstrated in the case at hand. For this reason, and given the opposition shown by the respondent in this trial, and having verified that the plaintiffs did not pursue dedication to the administrative career, they are not entitled to receive the 11% incentive established by Article 5 of Law 6836, such that the appeal must be upheld in that sense." It follows from the foregoing that, since the performance of those duties constitutes the factual basis for granting or recognizing those benefits in this venue, the plaintiffs had the procedural burden of proving the effective performance of those functions, as provided by Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code and by virtue of the law itself, insofar as it establishes the granting of benefits only when the professional meets the required conditions. With the documentary evidence submitted (the plaintiffs’ administrative personnel files), it is not possible to demonstrate that Messrs. [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] are performing the aforementioned functions, such that the incentives granted by section 5 of Law 6836 cannot be recognized as was done in the prior instances. The plaintiffs seek the granting of such incentives because they assert that the defendant university has denied them, despite the law making no distinction for their granting. However, the appellant considers that section 13 was interpreted incorrectly, because in its view, the incentives under Law 6836 may only be granted provided the workers meet the requirements established by the law, a situation that does not apply to the plaintiffs. In this regard, the defendant is correct, because in the present case, it has not been demonstrated that the plaintiffs perform administrative or hospital dedication duties, nor that they perform outpatient consultation hours. Even after reviewing the list of proven facts in the first-instance judgment, it was not established as proven, or as a proven fact, that the plaintiffs performed those functions.

In the first-instance ruling, all the incentives derived from Law No. 6836 were recognized in favor of the plaintiffs, and its decision was based, among other aspects, on vote number 358, of 10:10 a.m. on November 17, 1999, from this Chamber; however, in that case, it was demonstrated that those workers, all veterinary doctors, did indeed perform administrative and hospital dedication duties as part of their functions, unlike the present case, in which it was not demonstrated. On the other hand, through judgment No. 192 of 7:30 a.m. on September 22, 1993, this Chamber upheld the claim filed by veterinary doctors in the service of the Universidad Nacional. Fundamentally, those plaintiffs requested salary equalization with medical science professionals in the service of the State, an 11% increase for hospital or administrative dedication “regardless of the denomination given to it”; the application of general public sector increases; a percentage for location (zonaje) and, generally, all the incentives created by that law. The claim was upheld and the defense raised by the defendant institution was denied. In that vote, it was considered that by virtue of the principle of university autonomy, Law 6836 was not applicable to it. What was decided in that other ruling is correct. Indeed, this Chamber has previously affirmed, in prior resolutions, the full independence and legal capacity granted by Article 84 of the Constitution to institutions of higher university education for the performance of their functions, as well as to establish their own organization and government. However, it has also been reiterated that, even in those public institutions of maximum decentralization and full autonomy, such as municipal ones, that self-organizing and self-governing power does not exempt them from compliance with those legal provisions enacted generally for all public officials. In this regard, vote No. 167 of 9:10 a.m., on August 8, 1997, held: “…III.- In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that, the servants under an employment relationship with the Municipality of San José, form part of the so-called Public Sector; an even broader concept than that of the Public Administration, as embodied in the General Public Administration Law and the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. On the other hand, taking into account their status as a legal entity under Public Law, regardless of their functional independence, with powers of self-government, they are subject to the application of Law No. 6835, based on the fact that the lack of coverage, with respect to the Civil Service System, cannot mean an obstacle to recognizing the accumulated seniority in the service of the State (doctrine and jurisprudence of the single employer); because the incentive of annual increases does not directly originate from that statutory regulation. Furthermore, it must be understood that the autonomy enjoyed by municipal corporations concerns the exercise of their public powers, both governmental and functional, for the fulfillment of their own purposes; in addition to a normative power, referring to those matters subject to their exclusive competence. Those powers and their scope, granted to the Municipalities, are in the strict sense, and consist of the ability to issue administrative regulations to develop their objective and to achieve the specialized purposes assigned to them, in this specific case, by the Municipal Code and its related laws. It is an organic specialty, by function and by subject matter, which defines the degree of autonomy of those other territorial entities—in this case, minor ones—and determines a sphere of action within which they are autonomous, but not beyond. That sphere may be more or less broad, depending on the nature of the service and the real financial possibilities of the entity. Outside of it, it is incapable of self-regulation, and its regulation must yield to the ordinary legal rules of the State—the larger entity—which are always of general scope and application (erga omnes). It concerns legislation and not administration: that is, laws and not general administrative provisions. IV.- The foregoing holds special relevance regarding the public employment system in force at the defendant entity. It must be taken into account that the employees it hires, in public service relationships, form part of the human resources it uses to fulfill, within its competencies, its purposes, through the exercise of the respective powers; and, for that reason, they are covered by the self-governing power; but also, when it concerns ordinary rules, issued by the Legislative Assembly, which do not expressly and typically regulate that exclusive competence, but rather, diversely, abstract and general situations, which affect the municipal corporation in the same way as they do any other similar legal subject that finds itself in the factual assumptions determined by it, that administrative autonomy cannot relieve it from respecting, and having to comply with, the requirements of that general legal order. Therefore, for the provisions issued by the Council or, where appropriate, by the Municipal Executive, to be valid, it is essential that they respect the minimum content of the rights and benefits that state legislation has established, with a broad, albeit sectoral, scope—Articles 11 and 74 of the Political Constitution and 2, 11, 14, 19, 20, and 586 of the Labor Code—; therefore, in the case of municipal servants, as part of a global public employment relationship, if Law No. 6835 came to grant them rights, taking into account their essential, indisputable condition of also being public servants, as human resources subject to fulfilling the purposes and functions constitutionally and legally imposed on the Municipal Corporation, those favorable statutory legal situations must be fully recognized to them, by reason of their current service relationship, which is governed by Public Law…”. Also fully in force is what was considered in vote 192, of 7:30 a.m., on September 22, 1993, which stated: “To the extent that Article 68 of the Political Constitution, with which the rule of university autonomy must be harmonized in this matter, delegitimizes all discrimination on a salary basis, to the detriment of a specific group of workers, it must necessarily be concluded that, if the legislator establishes salary bases of a ‘general’ nature, applicable to all public institutions and, for that reason, aimed at granting an equal minimum regime for professionals or workers of the same guild, such provisions are binding even on universities, as institutions of that nature; a conclusion reached without entering into an analysis of the problem of legislative competence or procedure for setting that type of minimum limitations, as that is not a proper matter to be ventilated in this venue, nor in this proceeding. It is not possible to endorse the interpretation sought by the Universidad Nacional, that the degree of autonomy it enjoys empowers it to determine, as a matter of its own government, the salary regime of its employees, to the detriment of the minimums established in ordinary legislation, to the extreme that it can create, in its sphere, working conditions inferior to those of the rest of the public servants, as that would be equivalent to illegitimately authorizing it to breach, to the detriment of its workers, the cited constitutional principle; and, hence, its autonomy must always be recognized without prejudice to such rights, also fundamental (doctrine and jurisprudence informing Articles 16, 17, and 19 of the Labor Code)”. (Along the same lines, see vote No. 123, of 9:10 a.m., on August 7, 1991; and No. 209 of 10:20 a.m. on September 17, 1997). But in that vote, there was no discussion about the nature of the functions performed by the plaintiffs to access each of the incentives contained in the law, a different situation than the one in this case, because the defendant institution, since its response to the complaint, has argued that the plaintiffs do not perform functions in the field of medical sciences, but rather as teachers, and in that capacity they are not entitled to the incentives listed in the law. According to the considerations set forth in this Whereas Clause, this Chamber upholds its thesis regarding the applicability to the plaintiffs of the benefits stipulated by the Law on professional incentives in medical sciences; however, what cannot be admitted is the undifferentiated application of all the benefits listed in its articles, because these depend on whether or not the professional meets the required condition. The last paragraph of Article 13, of the law so often cited, provides that the benefits are in force only when the professional meets the required conditions for them, which was not demonstrated in the case before us. For that reason, and given the opposition shown by the defendant in this trial, and having verified that the plaintiffs did not perform administrative career dedication, they are not entitled to receive the 11% incentive established by Article 5 of Law 6836, such that the appeal must be upheld in that regard.”

“IV.- SOBRE LA APLICACIÓN DE LOS BENEFICIOS CONTEMPLADOS EN LA LEY 6836, A LOS ACTORES: El tema fundamental, cuya discusión subyace en esta litis, es la aplicación a los actores, de los beneficios contemplados en la ley 6836, denominada Ley de incentivos a los profesionales en ciencias médicas. Esa normativa según se constata en el proyecto legislativo que precedió su promulgación, fue el resultado de un compromiso adquirido por representantes del Gobierno, de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y del Ministerio de Salud, con representantes de los sindicatos de profesionales en ciencias médicas, el 7 de julio de 1982. En lo fundamental, la ley creó una escala de salarios con once categorías, cada una con un salario base, un salario de contratación y un incremento anual sobre el salario base, hasta un máximo de treinta anualidades. El artículo 2°, expresamente dispuso la aplicación de esa escala de categorías, para todas las instituciones públicas contratantes de médicos, criterio que es además reiterado en los artículos 3° y 14. En el 3°, expresamente se lee: “Los profesionales en ciencias médicas del Ministerio de Salud, del Instituto Nacional de Seguros y de otras instituciones públicas empleadoras de profesionales en ciencias médicas, recibirán el reconocimiento por incentivos aquí señalados, previa equiparación salarial, si fuera necesario, y según las categorías que por esta ley se establecen”. Por su parte, el artículo 14, dice: “Los incrementos salariales o incentivos que se establecen en esta ley serán reconocidos en forma retroactiva al 7 de junio de 1982, y son de obligatorio acatamiento para todas las instituciones públicas contratantes de profesionales en ciencias médicas”. En el ordinal 22 dispone: “Esta Ley es de Orden Público y acatamiento Obligatorio para todas las instituciones públicas empleadoras de las personas profesionales a que ella se refiere”. Como bien se logra advertir, las normas no dan criterio para establecer que únicamente los profesionales en ciencias médicas, adscritos a instituciones dedicadas a la prestación de servicios en salud, sean los destinatarios de sus beneficios. Además, la ley también previó la equiparación salarial, en los casos en los que fuera necesario cuando el sistema de categorías y el salario propuesto para las distintas categorías fuera uno distinto. En relación a los médicos veterinarios, la Ley número 7064 (Ley de Fomento a la Producción Agropecuaria FODEA y Orgánica del MAG, del 5 de mayo de 1987), en el artículo 61 establece: “…Se otorga a los profesionales en medicina veterinaria, todos los deberes y derechos de la ley Nº 6836 del 22 de diciembre de 1982.

Para esos efectos, se entenderá que los profesionales en Medicina Veterinaria, del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, del Ministerio de Salud y de otras instituciones públicas empleadoras de médicos veterinarios, recibirán los reconocimientos por incentivos que establece la ley Nº 6836 del 22 de diciembre 1982, previa equiparación salarial con los profesionales en Medicina, según las categorías, los salarios básicos y los incentivos, tal y como son reconocidos a esta fecha. Con tal objeto, cada institución pública empleadora de médicos veterinarios adaptará sus categorías, salarios y mecanismos de reconocimientos salariales a las condiciones establecidas en dicha ley, por medio de sus departamentos de personal o de recursos humanos, aplicando los porcentajes y los montos de reajuste salariales, tan pronto como lo haga en cada oportunidad la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para los médicos, a cuyas categorías y salarios se asimila el médico veterinario para estos efectos. Cada institución empleadora de médicos veterinarios adaptará los sistemas y hará los reajustes necesarios para que la presente norma se haga efectiva…”. (Así adicionada por el artículo 23 inciso 24) de la Ley nº 7108 de 8 de noviembre de 1988). Conforme lo expuesto, ha de concluirse, que los actores, según lo reconoce la demandada, profesionales en ciencias médicas al servicio de la Escuela de Zootecnia de ese centro universitario, tienen derecho a la aplicación de la escala de categorías y de sueldos, así como al incremento anual sobre el salario, contemplado en la Ley 6836, pues como se dijo, en los artículos citados no hay mención expresa para que se excluya a los médicos veterinarios que laboran como docentes para instituciones como la Universidad de Costa Rica. Es importante acotar que, además de una escala de sueldos según su categoría, la ley también contempló, otros beneficios, dentro de los cuales se incluye un porcentaje sobre el salario total por dedicación a la carrera hospitalaria y/o administrativa, y un porcentaje por cada hora de consulta externa, a partir de la quinta hora, sobre el salario total, siempre que la desempeñen. De las propias disposiciones de esa ley se desprende que esos otros beneficios no son generales para todos los profesionales en ciencias médicas, sino que se otorgan en la medida en que se ubiquen en las condiciones requeridas para el otorgamiento del beneficio respectivo. En este sentido, el artículo 13 expresamente dispone: “El salario total será el salario base más los sobresueldos, incentivos, aumentos, anualidades o pasos y las demás sumas que legalmente se tienen como salarios.

Los incentivos a que se refiere esta ley, se reconocerán al profesional mientras se mantenga en las condiciones requeridas para el otorgamiento del beneficio respectivo”. (el resaltado es suplido).

Los actores pretenden el otorgamiento de tales incentivos, porque aseveran que la universidad demandada se los ha negado, no obstante no han alegado, ni demostrado que realicen labores de dedicación administrativa u hospitalaria, ni que tengan horas de consulta externa. De lo anterior resulta que, siendo el ejercicio de esas labores el fundamento fáctico para otorgar o bien reconocer en esta sede esos beneficios, los actores tenían la carga procesal de demostrar el ejercicio efectivo de esas funciones, por así disponerlo el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil y por virtud de la propia ley, en tanto establece el otorgamiento de los beneficios únicamente cuando el profesional se encuentre en las condiciones requeridas. Con la prueba documental aportada (los expediente administrativos de los demandantes) no se logra demostrar que los señores [Nombre1] y [Nombre2], estén en ejercicio de las funciones dichas, de manera tal, que no puede reconocerse como se hizo en las instancias precedentes, los incentivos otorgados por el ordinal 5 de la Ley 6836. Los actores pretenden el otorgamiento de tales incentivos, porque aseveran que la universidad demandada se los ha negado, pese a que la ley no hace ninguna diferencia para su otorgamiento. No obstante, la recurrente considera que se interpretó de manera incorrecta el ordinal 13 mencionado, pues a su criterio, los incentivos de la Ley 6836, sólo pueden ser otorgados siempre y cuando los trabajadores cumplan con los requisitos fijados por la ley, situación que no se da con los actores. En este sentido lleva razón la accionada, pues en el presente caso, no se ha demostrado que los actores cumplan con labores de dedicación administrativa u hospitalaria, ni que realicen horas de consulta externa. Incluso revisado el elenco de hechos probados de la sentencia de primera instancia, no se tuvo por acreditado o como un hecho probado, que los actores ejecutaran esas funciones. En el fallo de primera instancia se reconoce a favor de los actores todos los incentivos derivados de la Ley número 6836, y fundamenta su decisión entre otros aspectos, en el voto número 358, de 10:10 horas del 17 de noviembre de 1999 de esta Sala, no obstante en ese caso, quedó demostrado que aquellos trabajadores, médicos veterinarios todos, sí ejecutaban dentro de sus funciones labores de dedicación administrativa y hospitalaria, diferente al presente caso, en el que no se demostró. Por otro lado, mediante sentencia n° 192 de las 7:30 horas del 22 de setiembre de 1993, esta Sala acogió la pretensión planteada por médicos veterinarios al servicio de la Universidad Nacional. En lo fundamental, dichos actores solicitaron la equiparación salarial con los profesionales en ciencias médicas al servicio del Estado, un 11% por dedicación hospitalaria o administrativa “independientemente de la denominación que se le dé”; la aplicación de los aumentos generales del sector público; un porcentaje por zonaje y de manera general, todos los incentivos creados por esa ley. La demanda fue acogida y denegó la defensa expuesta por la institución accionada. En ese voto se consideró que por virtud del principio de autonomía universitaria, la Ley 6836, no le era aplicable. Lo resuelto en ese otro fallo resulta correcto. En efecto, ya esta Sala en resoluciones anteriores ha afirmado, la plena independencia y capacidad jurídica que otorga el artículo 84 Constitucional, a las instituciones de educación superior universitaria para el desempeño de sus funciones así como para darse su organización y gobierno propios. Sin embargo, también se ha reiterado que, aún en aquellas instituciones públicas de máxima descentralización y de plena autonomía como son las municipales, esa potestad autoorganizativa y de autogobierno, no les exime del cumplimiento de aquellas disposiciones legales dictadas de manera general para todos los funcionarios públicos. Al respecto en el voto nº 167 de 9:10 horas, del 8 de agosto de 1997 se dispuso: “…III.- De conformidad con todo lo expuesto, jurídicamente es innegable que, los servidores bajo una relación de servicio con la Municipalidad de San José, forman parte del denominado Sector Público; concepto aún más amplio que el de la Administración Pública, tal y como está plasmado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública y en la Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa. Por otro lado, tomando en cuenta su condición de persona jurídica de Derecho Público, no empece su independencia funcional, con potestades para su autogobierno, le resulta aplicable la Ley Nº 6835, partiendo del hecho de que, la falta de cobertura, respecto del Régimen de Servicio Civil, no puede significar un obstáculo para poder reconocer la antigüedad acumulada al servicio del Estado (doctrina y jurisprudencia del patrono único); porque no es directamente de esa normativa estatutaria, de donde proviene el incentivo de los aumentos anuales. A mayor abundamiento, debe comprenderse que la autonomía de que gozan las corporaciones municipales, tiene que ver con el ejercicio de sus potestades públicas, tanto gubernativas cuanto funcionales, para el cumplimiento de los fines que les son propios; amén de una potestad de orden normativo, referida a aquellos aspectos sometidos a su exclusiva competencia. Esas potestades y sus alcances, otorgadas a las Municipalidades, lo son en sentido estricto, y consisten en poder dictar normas administrativas para desarrollar el objeto y para alcanzar los fines especializados que les fueron asignados, en el caso concreto, por el Código Municipal y por sus leyes conexas. Se trata de una especialidad orgánica, por la función y por la materia, que delimita el grado de la autonomía de esos otros entes territoriales, en este caso menores, determina un espacio de acción dentro del cual son autónomos, pero no más allá. Esa esfera puede ser, más o menos amplia, según la naturaleza del servicio y las posibilidades patrimoniales reales del ente. Fuera de la misma, es incapaz de autonormarse y su regulación debe ceder frente a la normativa legal ordinaria del Estado - ente mayor- que es siempre de alcances y de aplicación generales (erga omnes).- Se trata de legislación y no de administración: sea, de leyes y no de disposiciones generales administrativas.-IV.- Lo anterior tiene especial relevancia, en cuanto al régimen de empleo público, vigente en la demandada. Ha de tomarse en cuenta que, los empleados que contrata, en relaciones de servicio público, forman parte de los recursos humanos de que se sirve, para dar cumplimiento, dentro de sus competencias, a sus fines, con el ejercicio de las respectivas potestades; y, por tal razón, se encuentran cubiertos por la de autogobierno; pero también, cuando se trata de normas ordinarias, emitidas por la Asamblea Legislativa, que no regulan, de manera expresa y típica, aquella competencia exclusiva, sino, diversamente, situaciones abstractas y generales, que inciden sobre la corporación municipal de igual modo que lo hacen respecto de cualquier otro sujeto jurídico similar, que se encuentra en los presupuestos de hecho que la misma determina, esa autonomía administrativa no puede relevarla de respetar, y de tener que dar cumplimiento, a las exigencias de ese ordenamiento general. Por eso, para que las disposiciones emanadas del Concejo o, en su caso, del Ejecutivo Municipal, sean válidas, es indispensable que, en ellas, se respete el contenido mínimo de los derechos y de los beneficios que la legislación estatal ha establecido, con un alcance amplio, si bien sectorial, -artículos 11 y 74 de la Constitución Política y 2, 11, 14, 19, 20 y 586 del Código de Trabajo-; por lo que, en el caso de los servidores municipales, parte de una global relación de empleo público, si la Ley Nº 6835, les vino a conceder derechos, tomando en cuenta su condición esencial, indiscutible, de ser también servidores públicos, como recursos humanos sometidos al cumplimiento de los fines y de las funciones, constitucional y legalmente impuestos a la Corporación Municipal, esas situaciones jurídicas de ventaja, estatutarias, deben serles plenamente reconocidas, por su relación de servicio vigente, que es de Derecho Público…”. También resulta plenamente vigente lo considerado en el voto 192, de 7:30 horas, del 22 de setiembre de 1993, en tanto expuso que: "En la medida en que el artículo 68 de la Constitución Política, con el que debe armonizarse en la materia, la regla de la autonomía universitaria, deslegitima toda discriminación sobre la base salarial, en perjuicio de un determinado grupo de trabajadores, debe necesariamente concluirse que, si el legislador establece bases salariales de orden "general", aplicables a todas las instituciones públicas y, por tal motivo, orientadas a otorgar un régimen mínimo igual para los profesionales o los trabajadores de un mismo gremio, tales disposiciones son vinculantes hasta para las universidades, como instituciones de ese carácter; conclusión a la que se arriba sin entrarse a analizar el problema de la competencia ni el procedimiento legislativos, para fijar ese tipo de limitaciones mínimas, al no ser ello materia propia para ventilarse en esta sede, ni en esta vía. No es posible avalar la interpretación que se pretende por parte de la Universidad Nacional, de que el grado de autonomía de que goza la faculta para determinar, como cuestión de gobierno propio, el régimen de salarios de sus servidores, con detrimento de los mínimos establecidos en la legislación ordinaria, al extremo de que puede crear, en su ámbito, condiciones laborales inferiores a las del resto de los servidores públicos, pues ello equivaldría a autorizarla ilegítimamente para quebrantar, en perjuicio de sus trabajadores, el citado principio constitucional; y, de ahí, que su autonomía debe ser siempre reconocida sin menoscabo de tales derechos, también fundamentales (doctrina y jurisprudencia que informan los artículos 16, 17 y 19 del Código de Trabajo)". (En la misma línea ver el voto nº 123, de las 9:10 horas, del 7 de agosto de 1991; y el n° 209 de las 10:20 horas del 17 de setiembre de 1997). Pero en ese voto, no hubo ninguna discusión sobre la naturaleza de las funciones desempeñadas por los actores para acceder a cada uno de los incentivos contenidos en la ley, distinta situación que se da en este caso, pues la institución accionada, desde su contestación, ha argumentado que los actores no realizan funciones en el campo de las ciencias médicas, sino como docentes y en esa condición no les corresponde los incentivos enunciados en la ley. Según las consideraciones vertidas en este considerando, esta Sala mantiene su tesis de la aplicación a los actores, de los beneficios estipulados por la Ley de incentivos profesionales en ciencias médicas; sin embargo, lo que no es posible admitir es la aplicación indistinta de todos los beneficios enunciados en su articulado, pues estos dependen de que el profesional, se encuentre o no, en la condición requerida. El artículo 13 último párrafo, de la ley tantas veces citada, dispone la vigencia de los beneficios únicamente cuando el profesional se encuentre en las condiciones requeridas para ello, lo cual no se demostró en el caso que nos ocupa. Por esa razón, y ante la oposición mostrada por la accionada en este juicio, y habiéndose verificado que los actores no desarrollaban dedicación a la carrera administrativa, no les corresponde percibir el incentivo del 11% que establece el artículo 5 de la ley 6836, de manera tal que en ese sentido debe acogerse el recurso.”