Inclusion of Discounts and Tax to the Municipality of Grecia in the Tax Base for Liquor Tax for IFAMInclusión de descuentos e impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia en base imponible de licores a favor del IFAM

**II.- ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE ITEMS EXPENSES, DISCOUNTS, AND TAX TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF GRECIA FROM THE TAXABLE BASE OF THE LIQUOR TAX IN FAVOR OF IFAM:** The plaintiff challenges the adjustment made by IFAM to the liquor tax, in which the charge for expenses or contributions to the CNP, discounts, and Taxes to the Municipality of Grecia was included. It considers such a charge to be improper and, to support its thesis, puts forth the following arguments: first, it refers to the legal nature of the liquor tax, noting that the position of I.F.A.M. and the Administrative Tax Tribunal is not in accordance with the law when defining the nature of the national liquor tax as if it were a general consumption tax, equating it to the sales tax, when, on the contrary, it is a levy that directly impacts the cost of the good and not the final price. The plaintiff indicates that numeral 37 of the Liquor Law (Ley de Licores) establishes as the taxable base the producer's sale price, excluding the sales tax, and that this regulation has been misinterpreted, by considering that the tax base is the retail price with the deduction of the sales tax –only–, which in its understanding is clearly improper, since "(...) the price before the sales tax will be the manufacturer's sale price (...)", in accordance with the authentic interpretation of Article 37 of the Liquor Law. The plaintiff points out that "the thesis that the taxable base referred to by the tax regulation in favor of IFAM is the producer's sale price or ex-factory price, has also been shared by the Administrative Tax Tribunal in similar cases such as that of the taxable base of the national beer tax (Article 10 of Law 5792 amended by Article 35 of Law 6735), and by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic in its opinion C-346-2002 of December 19, 2002, regarding the tax on soft drinks and carbonated beverages in favor of IDA (Article 6 of Law 5792 amended by Article 35 of Law 6735)", and that in Article 7 of Executive Decree number 29463-H of May 2, 2001, the parameters for defining the price structure of alcoholic beverages in the country are established, it follows from the foregoing that this is a specific consumption tax, which is located at the manufacturing stage and whose calculation base is not assimilated to that which serves the General Sales Tax, concluding that "neither the item called Expenses or Contribution to the CNP, nor the tax in favor of the Municipality of Grecia, nor the discounts form part of the calculation base of the tax in favor of IFAM, since they do not form part of the manufacturer's sale price, but rather are items that arise after that stage and are consolidated during the distribution and final sale stage of the product". In the plaintiff's opinion, the principle of equality of tax burdens should be applied, derived from a comparison between the tax on national and imported liquors in favor of IFAM, since, in the latter, the taxable base strictly includes the cost, expense, and tax items. Regarding the exclusion of the items called Expenses or Contributions to the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional de Producción), the plaintiff considers that they must also be excluded from the taxable base of the liquor tax based on Article 53 of the Organic Law of the National Production Council and on the jurisprudence of the Administrative Tax Tribunal. Regarding the item called "discounts," the plaintiff considers that in the very law creating the Tax, it is established that said discounts do not form part of the calculation structure, as they are located outside the producer's price, that is, outside the manufacturer's price, since they are applied in the last stage of commercialization to incentivize sales. Finally, regarding the exclusion of the Tax to Grecia, the plaintiff alleges that it is an independent tax that does not form part of the national liquor manufacturing stage, as established in Article 7 of Executive Decree No. 29463-H of May 2, 2001, and that its inclusion not only constitutes an illegality but also double taxation, by not originally appearing in the cost structure for manufacturing the good. On the other hand, the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory (Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal), argues that the criteria of the Administrative Tax Tribunal that support the exclusion of the "discounts" and "Tax to the Municipality of Grecia" items, in the determination of the tax in its favor, are grounded in the jurisprudence of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), which has established that these concepts must be considered in the calculation. Regarding the exclusion of expenses, it points out that "all the National Liquor Factory has done is exchange the names of the items and thereby attempt to evade the correct payment of taxes, by including within the 'Contributions' item the 'Expenses' part, and thus justifying its exclusion from the tax base of the tax in favor of IFAM". For its part, the State answers the suit and points out that Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquor, provides that only the sales tax may be excluded from the taxable base of the tax in favor of IFAM and that there are pronouncements from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that reinforce this position. This Administrative Litigation Court heard a case under identical conditions to the suit being addressed here, and what was resolved therein applies in its entirety to the present litigation. Regarding what is relevant, this Section resolved in vote No. 04-2008 the following: "IV).- ON DISCOUNTS AND THE TAX TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF GRECIA AS PART OF THE TAXABLE BASE IN THE LEVY IN FAVOR OF IFAM: In the case before us, the propriety of including in the taxable base of the tax levied on liquor and which must be paid to the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory, the discounts made by the National Liquor Factory and the Tax to the Municipality of Grecia is discussed. On this particular matter and in relation to the arguments put forth by the parties, in a similar case and which is of total application to the species, the Second Section of this Court has pronounced, through vote 438-2006, issued at fourteen hours thirty minutes on September twenty-second, two thousand six, indicating: ' ... The genesis of this proceeding occurs when the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory makes ex officio determinations to the National Production Council, and levies tax on three items, namely: 'discounts', 'tax to the Municipality of Grecia' and 'Surplus'. Consequently, to resolve the point submitted for debate, one must necessarily turn to the current Liquor Law, and its amendments, especially numerals 36 and 37. The first of them creates the tax on the sale of liquors, national and foreign, which must be paid by liquor licensees, not permitting its transfer to the consuming public. The following one establishes the percentage, at ten percent on the producer's sale price, excluding the corresponding sales tax. This numeral has an authentic interpretation by the Legislative Assembly through Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, in the sense that 'the authorized sale price to the producer of national liquors, shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final authorized sale price to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base'. Having seen the legal landscape that regulates this tax, and based on it, the commercial practice of the National Production Council through the National Liquor Factory must be analyzed to determine the propriety or not of its suit.- VII.- First, the discounts are examined. These are commercial practices freely used by merchants or producers and are understood as '(...) A reduction in the price of merchandise, when the operation is carried out from one merchant to another, for reasons of friendship, the product having become outdated, damaged, or for advertising and other causes (...)' (Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual. Guillermo Cabanellas. Volume III. Editorial Heliasta, Buenos Aires, Argentine Republic, 1989. p. 182). What the National Production Council is doing is that, from the producer's sale price – on which the ten percent tax established by the law is paid – it subtracts the different discounts it grants within its commercial practice. By doing this, it deflates the tax base by considering that it has the right to deduct those effectively granted from the taxable base, a practice that cannot be accepted to the detriment of the Tax Administration. This – taxable base – is determined, according to the regulation that governs it, 'on the producer's sale price', excluding only what relates to the sales tax, for which reason the decreases cannot be accepted as part of the 'producer's sale price', to deduct the amount on which the tax must be paid. In other types of levies, such as the selective consumption tax, the deduction of discounts is authorized, however, always provided they are usual and real and granted by the producer generally to all its buyers under similar conditions and when the corresponding law so authorizes. The Liquor Law does not contain any provision in this regard and, on the contrary, the cited article and its authentic interpretation only allow deducting the sales tax from the taxable base, which leads to the determination that the plaintiff's action is producing an undervaluation of that base for the calculation of the national liquor tax, by cutting from it the discounts not authorized by law; which is clearly unreal and exclusively for the computation of the tax, resulting in fiscal detriment, and therefore is unacceptable. This allows reaching the conclusion that what was done by the assessing instances in this aspect is in accordance with the law and must be maintained.- VIII.- Regarding the other reclassified extreme 'tax to the Municipality of Grecia', the plaintiff's arguments are also unacceptable. The challenger estimates that executive decree number 29463-H, in its Article 7, '(...) confirms the concept of "producer's sale price" contained in the norm creating the tax, which is the same as "the manufacturer's price" or "the ex-factory price", within which the tax to Grecia is not included, but only those items inherent to the first economic stage (...)'. It further states that traditionally, this charge was excluded from the taxable base for calculating the tax in favor of the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory. As can be seen from the transcribed text, it tries to indicate that it is a different levy and that, as such, it is included in the factory price and therefore, included in the taxable base. However, it must be reiterated that, in accordance with the authentic interpretation of the Legislative Assembly, through Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, in relation to numeral 37 of the Liquor Law, it provided that 'the authorized sale price to the producer of national liquors shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final authorized sale price to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base'. Before such a clear provision, it is evident that Article 37, equally applicable to elucidate this extreme, does not permit, in any way, deducting 'the tax to the Municipality of Grecia' from the taxable base, and for this reason, the charge made in this aspect also deserves to be maintained. Moreover, it is worth indicating to the plaintiff that the fact that its deduction had been previously permitted does not imply an obligation to accept it, given that error does not create a right, and on the contrary, the law must be applied in all its dimensions. Furthermore, this is a topic already defined previously. In relation to it, the First Section of this Court, in its judgment number 303-2003 of ten hours twenty-five minutes on August eighth, two thousand three, provided: '(...) V.- In relation to the inclusion in the tax base of interest to us of the levy in favor of the Municipality of Grecia (Law of Creation of the Alcohol Tax, number 6619 of November 25, 1981), the plaintiff puts forth two arguments: one, that it is a singular, independent tax, which when included in the final price implies a "pyramiding" of the tax, by charging a tax on the value that includes another levy, reasoning that is in accordance with the doctrine on this matter, but contrary to the specific law, since Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquor, (according to authentic interpretation by law 6796 of August 17, 1982) expressly indicates that the authorized sale price shall include any present or future taxes or other expenses, with the sole exception of the sales tax, a reason that obliges rejecting the allegation. The other argument is that until April nineteen ninety-eight it was not taken into account, which suffers from two defects, that this assertion is not demonstrated and that custom contrary to express law cannot be pleaded (...)'.- In the same sense and as the defendant Institute aptly points out, see judgments numbers 299-2001 of ten hours thirty minutes on September nineteenth, two thousand one, handed down by the Second Section of this Court, 303-2003 of ten hours twenty-five minutes on August eighth, two thousand three, issued by the First Section of this Court. / V.- For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also pronounced on the subject under analysis and through judgment 580-F-2007 of thirteen hours thirty minutes on August fourteenth, two thousand seven, indicated: '... The questions raised in the appeal have already been heard and resolved by this Chamber in another identical matter to the present one, raised in the same manner by the CNP against the State, only referring to a different period, from November 1998 to October 31, 1999, so what was said on that occasion fully applies to the case under study. On that occasion it was said: " III.- Principle of tax legality. Being of interest in the species, it is essential to analyze the scope of the so-called principle of tax legality, in order to establish the possibility of considering the non-incorporation of several items within the taxable base of the tax under examination. Taxes and their exceptions are covered by the principle of legal reserve, according to which their creation, modification, and extinction correspond to the legislator. This principle is called 'tax legality'. At the constitutional level, it finds its basis in the letter of numeral 121 subsection 13 of the Magna Carta which assigns to the Legislative Assembly the exclusive power to 'establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.' Said norm has been the object of legal development, to clearly and precisely establish the scope and coverage of the cited postulate. Thus, Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures clearly provides: 'In tax matters only the law may: a) Create, modify or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer; b) Grant exemptions, reductions or benefits; (...)' A precept that finds full harmony with canon 124 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it provides: 'General regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges.' For its part, numeral 4 ibidem defines the tax as the provisions of money, whether taxes, fees, or special contributions, that the State, in the exercise of its power of command, demands with the objective of obtaining resources for the fulfillment of its purposes. The characteristics of each of these types are developed by that same precept. This Chamber, moreover, in various pronouncements, supported by provisions 5 and 6 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, has been emphatic in respecting the principle of tax legality. For this reason, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions by means other than express law has been highlighted (among others, no. 5 at 15 hours 30 minutes on January 5, 2000). This postulate therefore implies not only the unity of the tax system in general but also, at the same time, security and legal certainty in tax matters, as the taxpayer can notice and know with due anticipation and with sufficient precision, the scope and content of fiscal obligations, which is relevant to know the regime of subjection, taxable event, calculation base, rate, among other elements of the levy. It is worth specifying that it also infers a material scope, within which the components of the tax are established that necessarily must be created by express law. These are the essential and determining components of the tax, which must necessarily be established by the legislator. Among these elements are, inevitably, the taxable event, the taxpayer, the taxable base, the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. The intervention of the law, therefore, is imperative in all those points that affect the rights and guarantees of the individual before the Tax Administration. Merely procedural components escape its rigor, such as collection mechanisms, processing, among others. However, regarding the rate, the Constitutional Court has established the possibility of a legislative delegation, of course, through a law that establishes beforehand the limits within which this exercise can be carried out. This is the case of the selective consumption tax. Hence, the legal reserve referred to can be qualified as 'relative', as that Chamber has ratified in several of its pronouncements, among others in resolutions nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. Within this conception, exemptions and tax benefits in general must likewise be created by means of law, in which the factual assumption or the taxable event of the fiscal benefit must be incorporated, for clarity of application. In this direction, the initial paragraph of ordinal 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures provides: 'The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established to grant them, the beneficiaries, the merchandise, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or in the course of said period the merchandise can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.' IV.- Purpose of norms providing exemptions. The tax exemption takes place when a norm contemplates that in certain expressly provided assumptions, despite the taxable event occurring, the obligation of the taxpayer to pay the tax obligation does not arise. It forms part of the so-called 'fiscal benefits', which usually respond to an extra-fiscal purpose, or to a stimulus for certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are sustained by the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or by other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax doctrine, they are constituted and should be considered, as mechanisms and tools typical of the tax environment. They constitute avenues that in essence seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the promotion, development, or advancement of a specific economic sector, certain areas of activity, social contexts, or the equalization of economic conditions to foster a state of equality in the distribution of contributive burdens, in the short, medium, or long term. At times, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they are unfeasible when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their para-fiscal purpose, or they depart from reasonable criteria and the value system inherent in the Political Constitution. Seen this way, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens that derive from numeral 18 of the Political Constitution, but rather they are elements that complement each other to achieve, in principle, a balance and stability in the country's fiscal situation in its integral dimension. That is, in essence they seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions aimed at constituting a system imbued with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new composition, this Chamber considers that, contrary to the criterion held up to now in this field, they do not constitute, stricto sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but parts of a system that provide for the exemption from payment of the tax, or other benefits, which, integrally considered, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. The above through the total or partial exemption from the payment of the tax or the reduction of its calculation base, ergo, they may fall upon the tax obligation in its fullness, or upon the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their handling must be careful and cautious, because their arbitrary application can lead to affectations of the principles of generality and equality, disrupting their own purpose. V.- Interpretation of tax norms and exemptions. Purpose. The hermeneutic work of the norms that regulate tax relationships must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a determined mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied in daily practice, fulfills its intrinsic task and the purpose that the legislator has provided for its issuance. In this sense, numeral 6 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures establishes: 'Tax norms must be interpreted according to all the methods admitted by Common Law. Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps but by virtue of it neither taxes nor exemptions can be created.' (The highlighting is not from the original) In this work, in tune with the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, among them, the nature of the provision, seeking that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that circumvents the very purpose of its content. The exegesis of tax norms cannot be restrictive. The tax is particularized by its coerciveness, as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which through this means imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic burdens on taxpayers. But in addition, it is identified by its contributive character as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with the adequate resources that allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework for the benefit of the community. This of course does not exclude that in certain cases, this type of burdens are born with a different objective, as would be the case of the criterion of para-fiscality. From this plane, tax norms cannot be considered exceptional or, indeed, restrictive of the rights of individuals, given that this character would lead to their application and therefore their interpretation being equally restrictive. Nor is that interpretive form correct within the context of provisions that establish exemptions or fiscal benefits. This Chamber, up to the present date, had sustained the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the referenced Code and the legal regime proper to exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, on the grounds that from the context of numerals 5, 6 in relation to the cited ordinal 62, all of that legal body, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is derived, through the impossibility of broadly interpreting the norms referring to them. In this sense among many, judgment no. 162, of 15 hours 22 minutes on September 25, 1991, no. 93 of 15 hours 30 minutes on August 28, 1996, no. 86 of 15 hours on August 19, 1998 and no. 318 of 9 hours on May 19, 2004. However, with its new composition, and after deep reflection on the point, it reaches a criterion different from the one referenced. The nature and object of norms of the mentioned type, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, neither imply nor justify that they must be interpreted with a prism different from that of other tax provisions, that is, with special criteria, since ultimately, it is reiterated, they are all components of the same system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in contributive burdens. For this, it is necessary, in some cases, to implement norms that in essence, seek the fulfillment of the various principles with which the constituent has imbued the fiscal system. As has been said, it is frequent that fiscal benefits respond to economic capacity, or to extra-fiscal criteria, which may equally be present in other components of the tax. A restrictive interpretation in this matter would suppose that this type of benefits are exceptional, being that they are only applicable when the law so provides. However, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject cannot become a valid conditioning factor that justifies a special (restrictive) interpretation, but rather must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the cited Code, and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence happens. Therefore, tax legality seen in this way is not a justification for a restrictive consideration of fiscal graces. It is worth clarifying however, that norms of this class are those known as mandates with an exclusive factual presupposition, which, in tune with what is provided by Articles 6 and 62 mentioned, prevent their analogical application, which is a situation distinct from the interpretation itself. In this context, just as taxes are subject to a principle of legal reserve, so too are exemptions and benefits, in whose source of creation the basic elements that delimit it must be enunciated. Within this approach then, norms that contain regulations of the referenced type must be weighed without subjection to any special or specific criterion.

In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed norm establishes in its final paragraph an objective limit to this exegetical work, namely, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions via analogy, a mechanism which, although useful for filling legal gaps, cannot, in these terms, supplant the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reserve (reserva legal). Thus seen, the field of creating tax burdens and benefits is forbidden through this means, being therefore figures that must be created by a formal legislative manifestation, under the terms already explained beforehand. Now then, this last alluded characteristic means that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the specific fact invoked corresponds to the factual assumption of the authorizing norm and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator at the source of its creation. Therefore, when the norm clearly and undoubtedly imposes specific conditions for the enjoyment or receipt of the benevolent effects of the tax regime, in its application these parameters cannot be circumvented as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Thus seen, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual assumptions stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with due care, whether the factual assumption proposed by the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) fits and coincides with the exempt fact provided by the norm that establishes the benefit, within its material content. In this comparison, as a matter of principle, it is improper to extend the effects of the norm to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices are equally unfeasible by legal mandate in this type of situation, since the risk arises of incorporating within the exempt fact assumptions that the law does not contemplate, which would violate the aforementioned principle of legal reserve (reserva legal) that prevails in these fields. The foregoing does not prejudge the correct or incorrect interpretation of the legal instruments applicable to the case, an issue that will be addressed later. This development applies to the entirety of the tax elements, including, of course, the taxable base (base imponible), which, defined by the legislator, constitutes the parameter upon which the rate will be applied to obtain the real contribution to the Treasury. From this perspective, the formula for establishing this calculation source must be as transparent as possible to avoid inaccuracies in its application. In any case, for deliberation on the extremes covered by this element, the interpretative rules mentioned above are fully applicable, which means that only aspects that have been expressly excluded by applicable legal norm will be excluded from its scope of coverage (calculation base).

VI.- On the specific case. Taxable base (Base imponible). Having clarified the foregoing, we proceed to the examination of the charges filed. The first, second, and third objections revolve around the possibility of extracting from the taxable base (base imponible) of the liquor tax the items claimed by the appellant (recurrente), which, he indicates, is derived from the fact that the basis of calculation for the tax is made up of the ex-factory price (precio ex fábrica). Hence, since they deal with the same thematic axis, they will be analyzed jointly. Violation is alleged of Articles 36 and 37 of the Ley de Licores, which establish a tax on national and foreign liquors, insofar as, the appellant (recurrente) argues, the exclusion has not been permitted of the discounts that frequently and as a commercial practice are offered to buyers, as well as the so-called Impuesto de Grecia and the surpluses. For these purposes, it is essential to bring up the text of the norms invoked by the appellant in cassation (casacionista), in order to specify the scope of the various tax elements of interest, with special emphasis on the one corresponding to the taxable event (hecho generador). In this sense, the direct creation of the tax is determined in Article 36 of the Ley de Licores, Number 10 of October 7, 1936, a regulation that also establishes, with great clarity, who will be the taxpayers (sujetos pasivos) of the tax obligation. The referenced precept provides: "A tax is hereby created on the sale of liquors, both national and foreign, and on foreign beer, which shall be paid by the liquor licensees referred to in this law, its transfer to the consuming public not being permitted in any way." For its part, Article 37 ibidem establishes the other components by stating: "The tax on national liquors shall be 10% on the producer's sale price, excluding the corresponding sales tax. Likewise, foreign liquors and beers shall pay as tax 10% on the total import cost. The income received by the municipalities, as provided in this article (second and third paragraphs), shall be used exclusively for the subdivision plan (plan de lotificación), referred to in subsection 4) of Article 4 of the Código Municipal." As can be observed, the indicated norms, in line with the principle of tax legality, establish all the elements of the tax. Only that concerning the taxable base (base imponible) is of interest here, as this is the debated aspect and the one on which the controversy focuses regarding the legality of the determination made by the Tax Administration. According to the last transcribed norm, the taxable base (base imponible) in the case of national liquors is constituted by the producer's sale price, a quantitative source from which, by express legal mandate, the corresponding sales tax must be excluded. Said reference allows, without much confusion, determining that the calculation base established by the legislator was the price authorized to the producer. However, this price, according to Law Number 6796 of August 17, 1982, which authentically interprets Article 37 of the Ley de Licores, "... shall be understood as inclusive of any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer." In this same sense, from this Chamber, consult Resolution No. 12 of 16 hours 3 minutes of January 5, 2000.

VII.- Incidence of applied discounts on the taxable base (base imponible). For the appellant in cassation (casacionista), according to applicable legislation, and even derived from the authentic interpretation of Article 37 of the Ley de Licores, the discounts granted in favor of clients, the Impuesto de Grecia, and the surpluses must be excluded from the calculation base of the tax. The charge lacks legal grounds and must be rejected. Indeed, an adequate analysis and interpretation of the norm in question allows inferring that the only element that is not part of that quantification source is the sales tax. Discounts are frequent practices in commercial traffic, as a market strategy to increase or ensure the capture of clients for a specific good or service. Although regarding the tax under analysis, there is no prohibition for FANAL to apply them, the norms regulating the tax do not expressly provide that the amounts discounted to clients can be deducted from the calculation base, an aspect that could only be established by law that expressly so provides. As already indicated in Considerando III, in accordance with the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley tributaria) and in light of Article 5 subsection b) in relation to Article 62, both of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, only by formal law (in the strict sense) can exemptions or, in general, tax benefits that entail a dispensation from the duty to contribute to public burdens be created. In fact, the creation of a tax benefit of this nature entails the clear establishment of the conditions under which it is granted. In the specific case, the appellant (recurrente) intends that the discounts made be exempted from the base, arguing for this purpose that the regulation of Article 11 subsection a) of the Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas is analogously applicable, as provided for by Article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. That precept excludes from the taxable base (base imponible) "Discounts accepted in commercial practices, provided they are usual and general and are stated separately from the sale price on the respective invoice." The appellant (recurrente) is correct that the aforementioned Article 6 establishes in its second paragraph that analogy is a legal mechanism that allows filling legal gaps; however, right after, that same provision sets forth that by virtue of it, neither exemptions nor taxes can be created. That is, the law itself has established that analogy cannot be transformed into a device to reduce the amount of tax obligations, or at least, a reduction in the taxable base (base imponible). Analogy is a valid method for filling legal gaps where no norm exists regulating the point; however, its application cannot give rise to the creation of taxes or exemptions, as is intended here, because that corresponds exclusively to the legislator (tax legality). It is a valid mechanism of legal integration, insofar as it presupposes the absence of an express norm directly applicable; however, that gap does not exist in this case, which makes its application improper in the proposed terms. In the sub-judice matter, that consequence is what the CNP seeks, by attempting to import from the Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas a provision that allows the effect it now pursues. However, that consequence becomes improper for this particular case, as it is a subterfuge that would lead to reducing the tax burden of a taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) under an assumption not authorized by the legal framework that delimits the elements of the tax. Indeed, from the analysis of the cited Article 37 of the Ley de Licores, it does not appear that any gap exists, because that legal body is sufficiently clear regarding the definition of the taxable base (base imponible), as well as the elements that are outside it, indicating that it will be made up of the producer's sale price without considering the sales tax. The regulation of the Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas that authorizes deducting discounts from the taxable base (base imponible) applies to that type of tax, but not to the tax on alcoholic beverages, whose internal aspects, as discussed, are clearly regulated by a special law, which makes the analogical application of Article 11 subsection a) of the referred legal set unfeasible, coupled with the fact of the non-existence of an enabling legal norm that permits making the alleged reduction on the taxable base (base imponible). From another angle, the topic at hand has already been analyzed on other occasions by this Chamber, namely, among others, in Judgment No. 12 of 16 hours 3 minutes of January 5, 2000, in which it was indicated: "In the specific case, it is about establishing the scope of Article 37 of the Ley de Licores, to determine whether the liquidations of the tax on the sale of liquors, made by the Consejo Nacional de Licores during the periods outlined above, conform or not, in the manner alleged in the appeal, to what is ordered in that article. Article 37 provides that the base for calculating the 10% tax is the sale price of the producer of national liquors, excluding the corresponding sales tax. This price, according to Law Number 6796 of August 17, 1982, which authentically interprets Article 37 of the law, '... shall be understood as inclusive of any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer.' It suffices to carefully read the above regulations and become imbued with their spirit for it to become evident that the legislator did establish the taxable base (base imponible) precisely: 'the price authorized to the producer.' It is clear that no regulation exists prohibiting the Fábrica Nacional de Licores from applying discounts on the prices of its products as a commercial practice. What it is forbidden from doing is deducting the discounts actually granted from the taxable base (base imponible), to the detriment of the Tax Administration, because the law does not contemplate that possibility for this specific tax, as it does for others, for example, the general sales tax. Nor can it be affirmed that the authorization for such a practice derives from the analogical application of Article 11 of the Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas. As established by Article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, analogy is not a method of normative interpretation, but of integration, admissible to 'fill legal gaps', which is obviously not the case." This criterion was subsequently reiterated in Resolution No. 559 of 15 hours 20 minutes of July 17, 2002, and in No. 696 of 16 hours 5 minutes of September 11, 2002. Hence then, due to the reasons indicated, the legal impossibility exists of deducting from the calculation base of the tax on national liquors the discounts that FANAL grants to its clients.

VIII.- On the Impuesto de Grecia. Regarding the issue of the Impuesto de Grecia, the objection is likewise not admissible for the same reasons expressed in the previous section. In the specifics of this aspect, it must be indicated again that Article 37 of the Ley de Licores excludes only the sales tax from the taxable base (base imponible), understanding as incorporated within its calculation source all other taxes that form part of the final sale price of the product, as was established in Law No. 6796, authentic interpretation of the mentioned Article 37, whose Precept 1 states: "Article 37 of the Ley Sobre la Venta de Licores, No. 10 of October 7, 1936, and its amendments, is authentically interpreted in the sense that the sale price authorized to the producer shall be understood as inclusive of any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base (base imponible)." (Highlighting is ours). From the foregoing, it is inferred that the intended deduction of the Impuesto de Grecia proves improper from a legal standpoint, as it was the legislator himself, through the powers granted to him by subsection 1) of Article 121 of the Constitución Política, who established undoubtedly that any other tax, other than the sales tax, cannot be excluded from the calculation platform of the liquor sale tax. For this reason, in accordance with the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley tributaria) and the same reasons developed in the preceding considerando, it is not possible to suppress the items corresponding to the Impuesto de Grecia from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax under examination. This Chamber has already pronounced itself in the same sense, among others in Judgment No. 194 of 10 hours 50 minutes of March 17, 2004, which established that: "In that regard, the Court, in Considerando V, considered that this specific law – Ley sobre la Venta de Licores – expressly indicates that the authorized sale price shall include any present or future tax or other expenses, except the sales tax, a criterion shared by this Chamber because the differences specific to the case, as indicated in the matter of discounts, and whose rejection has the same legal basis (Article 37 of the Ley sobre la Venta de Licores), the current regulations do not permit, as the appellant (recurrente) intends, deducting the 'Impuesto de Grecia' from the taxable base (base imponible). The fact that during some period the contrary had been acted upon is not a valid argument in a jurisdictional venue to supply the lack of a legal mandate that would allow it." Therefore, the aforementioned charge must be rejected.

IX.On double taxation. The appellant in cassation (casacionista) claims that by denying the application of the mentioned discounts, a violation of the principle of the prohibition of double taxation is incurred. Regarding this argument, it must be noted that on this topic, the Sala Constitucional itself has established that the Magna Carta does not provide for its prohibition; on the contrary, it has indicated that in certain cases, it is accepted by the domestic legal system. In this sense, in Judgment No. 3494-94 of 14 hours 54 minutes of July 12, 1994, it indicated: "III. The taxing power of the State is granted to the Asamblea Legislativa in accordance with Article 121 subsection 13.) of our Constitución Política 'In addition to the other powers conferred upon it by this Constitution, the Asamblea Legislativa is responsible for: ... 13.) Establishing national taxes and contributions, and authorizing municipal ones.' As observed, (...) no constitutional norm or principle whatsoever exists that prohibits establishing double tax imposition on the same taxable event (hecho generador), as alleged by the petitioner. Quite the contrary, it is the constitutional text itself that contemplates the possibility of establishing such double imposition, since, on one hand, it grants the Asamblea Legislativa the general power to impose taxes and other tax burdens, and on the other, it grants the Municipalities the same prerogatives in their territorial jurisdiction, with prior authorization from Congress." In the same direction from that same Chamber, see Resolution No. 7541 of 16 hours 45 minutes of December 21, 1994. However, it must be clear that aside from the fact that national legislation does not expressly prohibit double taxation on the same activity, the truth is that the taxing power encounters a series of substantial limits imposed by the constitutional text, which constitute the bases of the principles inherent to tax activity. Such is the case of the postulates of generality (Article 18 of the Constitution), principle of equality (supported by Article 33 ibidem), of contributory capacity (which is the result of all tax principles), and of non-confiscation (no confiscatoriedad). The latter is of particular interest. This axiom derives from Article 45 of the Magna Carta, which protects the right to property. From this perspective, it means that the taxing power cannot reach such quantitative levels that they empty the right to property, by exposing the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the contributory obligation to burdens that are above reasonable levels of their income. Hence, double taxation, even when viable, is forbidden when it implies an impact on the principle of non-confiscation (no confiscatoriedad). Although a duty to contribute to public burdens is established, the taxes imposed for such purposes must reasonably weigh the contributory capacity of the taxpayers (sujetos pasivos), so that they do not become tax measures that curtail their property and possibilities for economic development. However, the appellant in cassation (casacionista) merely alleges that supposed defect without providing substantive arguments that allow concluding on its confiscatory consequences; that is, he omits a clear explanation of the supposed excess, so the Chamber cannot address its examination (Article 596 of the civil procedural regulations). For this reason, the objection is not admissible, and the appeal on this reproach must be denied.

...

XI.- From this perspective, in this case, both the Impuesto de Grecia, as well as the discounts, form part of the parameters of the taxable base (base imponible), in the stated terms, so that in accordance with Article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, they can only be exempted by virtue of express law, which is not evidenced in the case under study; hence, those items must be considered to determine the tax base. This was indeed assessed by the Judges in the appealed ruling. In this way, there is no impact on the provisions that regulate the interpretative conduct of tax norms, specifically, those that define the tax on liquors, which, in the judgment of this Chamber, have been duly applied to the litigation; therefore, the charges filed shall be rejected...".

Thus things stand and in accordance with the above, there is not the slightest doubt that the arguments put forth by the plaintiff (actor) in this proceeding are not admissible, and consequently, it becomes improper to exclude the so-called discounts and the tax to the Municipalidad de Grecia from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax in favor of the defendant Institute. It remains to analyze the propriety of the requested exclusion regarding the expenses or contributions to the Consejo Nacional de Producción. On this particular, it is of interest to note that by Resolution Number 321-2005 of nine o'clock on August eleventh, two thousand five, the Sala Primera of the Tribunal Administrativo, in resolving the clarification and addition requested by the plaintiff (actor), ordered that the cited items must be excluded from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax to be paid in favor of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal. Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to address the point, as it was granted in the administrative venue. (...)".

Based on the foregoing, where all the arguments raised by the plaintiff party (parte actora) are analyzed regarding the items of "Descuentos" and "Impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia" in relation to the calculation base of the tax on national liquors in favor of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, and as the alleged nullity defects do not exist nor are there other elements capable of modifying what is established in jurisprudence, the rejection of the grievances raised is required. Regarding the issue of the "Aportes al CNP", it is verified that Resolution Number 312-2006 of eleven o'clock on July thirteenth, two thousand six, of the Sala Primera of the Tribunal Administrativo, ordered the partial revocation of the appealed administrative resolution concerning the cited item, and indicates that it is not appropriate to include it within the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax on national liquors. By virtue of the foregoing, as what was requested was granted in the administrative venue, it is unnecessary for a ruling to be issued in this judicial venue.

Consequently, the action filed by the plaintiff (actor) is declared without merit, upon determining that Resolution No. 312-2006 issued by the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo is lawful." The plaintiff indicates that numeral 37 of the Liquor Law establishes the taxable base as the producer's sale price, excluding the sales tax, and that this regulation has been misinterpreted by considering the tax base to be the retail price with only the sales tax deducted, which in their understanding is clearly improper, since "(...) <i>the price before the sales tax shall be the manufacturer's sale price (</i>...)," in accordance with the authentic interpretation of Article 37 of the Liquor Law. The plaintiff points out that <i>"the thesis that the taxable base referred to in the rule of the tax in favor of IFAM is the producer's sale price or ex-factory price, has also been shared by the Administrative Tax Tribunal in similar cases such as the taxable base of the tax on national beer (Article 10 of Law 5792, amended by Article 35 of Law 6735), and by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in its opinion C-346-2002 of December 19, 2002, regarding the tax on soft drinks and carbonated beverages in favor of the IDA (Article 6 of Law 5792, amended by Article 35 of Law 6735),"</i> and that in Article 7 of Executive Decree number 29463-H of May second, 2001, the parameters for defining the price structure of alcoholic beverages in the country are established; it follows from the foregoing that it is a specific consumption tax, located at the manufacturing stage, and that its calculation base is not assimilated to the one serving the General Sales Tax, concluding that <i>"neither the item denominated CNP Expenses or Contribution, nor the tax in favor of the Municipality of Grecia, nor the discounts form part of the calculation base of the tax in favor of IFAM, since they do not form part of the manufacturer's sale price, but rather are items that arise subsequent to that stage and are consolidated in the distribution and final sale stage of the product."</i> In the plaintiff's opinion, the principle of equality of tax burdens should be applied, derived from a comparison between the tax on national and imported liquors in favor of IFAM, since, for the latter, the taxable base strictly includes the items of costs, expenses, and duties. Regarding the exclusion of the items denominated <i>Expenses</i> or <i>Contributions to the National Production Council</i>, the plaintiff believes they must also be excluded from the taxable base of the tax on liquors, based on Article 53 of the Organic Law of the National Production Council and the jurisprudence of the Administrative Tax Tribunal. Regarding the item denominated <i>"discounts"</i>, the plaintiff considers that the very law creating the tax establishes that these discounts do not form part of the calculation structure, since they are located outside the producer's price, that is, outside the manufacturer's price, as they are applied in the last marketing stage to incentivize sales. Finally, regarding the exclusion of the <i>Tax to Grecia</i>, the plaintiff alleges that it is an independent tax that does not form part of the manufacturing stage of national liquors, as established by Article 7 of Executive Decree No. 29463-H of May 2, 2001, and that its inclusion not only constitutes an illegality but also double taxation, as it does not originally appear in the cost structure for the manufacture of the good. On the other hand, the Municipal Development and Advisory Institute argues that the criteria of the Administrative Tax Tribunal that support the exclusion of the items <i>"discounts"</i> and <i>"Tax to the Municipality of Grecia"</i> in determining the tax in its favor have a basis in the jurisprudence of the First Chamber, which has established that these concepts must be considered in the calculation. Regarding the exclusion of expenses, it points out that <i>"all the National Liquor Factory has done is exchange the names of the items, thereby attempting to evade the correct payment of taxes, by including the 'Expenses' portion within the 'Contributions' item, and thus justify their exclusion from the taxable base of the tax in favor of IFAM."</i> For its part, the State answers the complaint and notes that Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquors provides that only the sales tax may be excluded from the taxable base of the tax in favor of IFAM, and that there are decisions from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that reinforce this position. This <b><u>Contentious-Administrative Tribunal</u></b> heard a case under identical conditions to the complaint addressed here, and what was resolved there applies in its entirety to the present litigation. Of relevance, this Section resolved in ruling No. 04-2008 the following: <i>"</i><b><i>IV).- ON THE DISCOUNTS AND THE TAX TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF GRECIA AS PART OF THE TAXABLE BASE IN THE TAX IN FAVOR OF IFAM:</i></b><i> In the case at hand, the appropriateness of including in the taxable base of the tax levied on liquor and payable to the Municipal Development and Advisory Institute, the discounts made by the National Liquor Factory and the Tax to the Municipality of Grecia is discussed. In this regard, and in relation to the arguments put forth by the parties, in a similar case which is fully applicable to the matter at hand, the Second Section of this Tribunal has ruled, through ruling 438-2006, issued at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-second of September, two thousand six, stating: "... The genesis of this process arises when the Municipal Development and Advisory Institute made ex officio assessments to the National Production Council and taxed three items, namely: </i><i>“</i><i>discounts</i><i>”</i><i>, </i><i>“</i><i>tax to the Municipality of Grecia</i><i>”</i><i>, and </i><i>“</i><i>Surplus</i><i>”</i><i>. Consequently, to resolve the point under debate, one must necessarily refer to the current Liquor Law and its amendments, especially numerals 36 and 37. The first creates the tax on the sale of liquors, national and foreign, which must be paid by liquor licensees, and its transfer to the consuming public is not permitted. The next establishes the rate, at ten percent of the producer's sale price, excluding the corresponding sales tax. This numeral has an authentic interpretation by the Legislative Assembly through Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, in the sense that </i>" <i>the authorized sale price to the producer of national liquors shall be understood to be inclusive of any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base</i><i>.”</i><i> Having seen the legal panorama that regulates this tax, based on it, the commercial practice of the National Production Council through the National Liquor Factory must be analyzed to determine the appropriateness of its complaint.-</i><b><i> VII.- First, we examine the discounts. </i></b><i>These are commercial practices freely used by merchants or producers and are understood as </i>"<i> (</i><i>...) A reduction in the price of merchandise, when a transaction is made from one merchant to another, for reasons of friendship, the product having become outdated, having been damaged, or for advertising and other causes (...)</i><i>"</i><i> (Enciclopedic Dictionary of Common Law. Guillermo Cabanellas. Volume III. Editorial Heliasta, Buenos Aires, Argentine Republic, 1989. p. 182). What the National Production Council is doing is that, from the producer's sale price - on which the ten percent tax established by law is paid - it deducts the different discounts it grants within its commercial practice. By doing this, it deflates the tax base by considering that it has the right to deduct those effectively granted from the taxable base, a practice that cannot be accepted to the detriment of the Tax Administration. This - taxable base - is determined, according to the rule that regulates it, "</i><i>on the producer's sale price</i><i>,"</i><i> exclusively excluding what relates to the sales tax, so the reductions cannot be accepted as part of the "</i><i>producer's sale price</i><i>"</i><i> to discount the amount on which the tax must be paid. In other types of levies, such as the selective consumption tax, the deduction of rebates is authorized, however, provided they are standard and real and granted by the producer generally to all its buyers under similar conditions and when the corresponding law so authorizes. The Liquor Law contains no provision in this regard, and on the contrary, the cited article and its authentic interpretation only allow the deduction of the sales tax from the taxable base, which leads to the determination that the plaintiff's action is producing an undervaluation of that base for the calculation of the national liquors tax by cutting from it the discounts not authorized by law; this is clearly unreal and exclusively for the computation of the tax, which results in fiscal detriment, and is therefore unacceptable. This allows us to reach the conclusion that what the qualifying instances did in this aspect is in accordance with the law and must be upheld.- </i><i>VIII.</i><i>- Regarding the other reclassified extreme, "</i><i>tax to the Municipality of Grecia</i><i>"</i><i>, the plaintiff's arguments are also not admissible. The challenger believes that Executive Decree number 29463-H, in its Article 7, </i>"<i>(</i><i>…</i><i>) confirms the concept of </i><i>"</i><i>producer's sale price</i><i>"</i><i> contained in the rule creating the tax, which is the same as </i><i>"</i><i>the manufacturer's price</i><i>"</i><i> or </i><i>"</i><i>the ex-factory price</i><i>"</i><i>, within which the Grecia tax is not included, but only those items inherent to the first economic stage (</i><i>…</i><i>)</i><i>"</i><i>. It also states that traditionally, this charge was excluded from the taxable base for the calculation of the tax in favor of the Municipal Development and Advisory Institute. As can be seen from the transcribed text, it tries to indicate that it is a different levy, and as such, it is included in the factory price and therefore comprised within the taxable base. However, it must be reiterated that, in accordance with the authentic interpretation of the Legislative Assembly, through Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, in relation to numeral 37 of the Liquor Law, it provided that </i>"<i> the authorized sale price to the producer of national liquors shall be understood to be inclusive of any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base</i><i>.”</i><i> Before such a clear provision, it is evident that Article 37, equally applicable to elucidate this extreme, does not permit, in any way, the deduction from the taxable base of </i><i>"</i><i>the tax to the Municipality of Grecia</i><i>"</i><i>, and therefore, the charge made in this aspect also deserves to be upheld. Moreover, it is worth indicating to the plaintiff that the fact that its deduction had previously been allowed does not imply an obligation to accept it, given that error does not create a right, and on the contrary, the law must be applied in its full dimension. Furthermore, this is an issue already decided previously. In relation to it, the First Section of this Tribunal, in its judgment number 303-2003 of ten hours twenty-five minutes on the eighth of August, two thousand three, held: </i>"<i>(</i><i>…</i><i>) </i><i><u>V.</u></i><i>- Regarding the inclusion in the relevant taxable base of the tax in favor of the Municipality of Grecia (Law Creating the Tax on Alcohol, number 6619 of November 25, 1981), the plaintiff presents two arguments: first, that it is a singular, independent tax, which, when included in the final price, implies a "pyramiding" of the levy, by charging a tax on the value that includes another levy, a reasoning that is consistent with the doctrine on this matter but contrary to the specific law, since Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquors (according to its authentic interpretation by Law 6796 of August 17, 1982) expressly indicates that the authorized sale price shall include any present or future taxes or other expenses, with the sole exception of the sales tax, a reason that forces us to reject the argument. The other argument is that until April nineteen ninety-eight it was not taken into account, which suffers from two defects: that such assertion is not proven, and that one cannot claim custom against express law (</i><i>…</i><i>)</i><i>"</i><i>.- In the same vein, and as astutely indicated by the defendant Institute, one can see judgments numbers 299-2001 of ten hours thirty minutes on the nineteenth of September, two thousand one, issued by the Second Section of this Tribunal, 303-2003 of ten hours twenty-five minutes on the eighth of August, two thousand three, issued by the First Section of this Tribunal. / </i><b><i>V.- </i></b><i>For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also ruled on the topic under analysis, and through judgment 580-F-2007 of thirteen hours thirty minutes on the fourteenth of August, two thousand seven, stated: "... The issues raised in the appeal were already known and resolved by this Chamber in another matter identical to the present one, filed likewise by the CNP against the State, only referring to a different period, from November 1998 to October 31, 1999, so what was said on that occasion fully applies to the case under study. On that occasion, it was stated: </i>"<i> </i><b><i>III.- Principle of tax legality. </i></b><i>Since it is of interest in this matter, it is essential to analyze the scope of the so-called principle of tax legality, in order to establish the possibility of considering the non-incorporation of several items within the taxable base of the tax under examination. Taxes and their exceptions are covered by the principle of legal reserve, according to which their creation, modification, and extinction correspond to the legislator. This principle is known as </i><i>"</i><i>tax legality</i><i>"</i><i>. At the constitutional level, it finds its basis in the letter of numeral 121 subparagraph 13 of the Magna Carta, which assigns to the Legislative Assembly the exclusive power to </i><i>"</i><i>establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.</i><i>"</i><i> This norm has been the object of legislative development, to establish with clarity and precision the scope and coverage of the cited postulate.</i> Thus, article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures clearly provides: <i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>In tax matters, only the law may: </span></i><b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>a) </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their tax bases; and indicate the taxpayer; </span></i><b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>b) </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; (...)</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> A precept that is in full harmony with canon 124 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), as it provides: </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges.</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> For its part, numeral 4 ibidem defines tax as payments in money, whether taxes (impuestos), fees (tasas), or special contributions (contribuciones especiales), that the State, in the exercise of its sovereign power, demands for the purpose of obtaining resources to fulfill its objectives. The characteristics of each of these types are developed by that same precept. This Chamber, moreover, in various pronouncements, supported by provisions 5 and 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, has been emphatic in respecting the principle of tax legality. For this reason, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions through any means other than express law has been highlighted (among others, no. 5 of 15:30 on January 5, 2000). This postulate therefore implies not only the unity of the tax system in general, but also the security and legal certainty in tax matters, insofar as the taxpayer can observe and know, with due anticipation and sufficient precision, the scope and content of the tax obligations, which is relevant for knowing the system of subjection, taxable event, tax base, rate, among other elements of the levy. It should be noted that it also infers a material scope, within which the components of the tax that must necessarily be created by express law are established. These are the essential and determining components of the tax, which must imperatively be established by the legislator. Among these elements are, indispensably, the taxable event (hecho generador), the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), the tax base (base imponible), the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. The intervention of the law is therefore imperious in all those points that affect the rights and guarantees of the individual vis-à-vis the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). Merely procedural components, such as collection mechanisms, processing, among others, escape its rigor. However, regarding the rate, the Constitutional Chamber has established the possibility of a legislative delegation, of course, by means of a law that establishes in advance the limits within which this exercise can be carried out. This is the case with the selective consumption tax. Hence, the referred legal reserve may be qualified as </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>relative</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>, as ratified in several of said Chamber's pronouncements, among others in resolutions nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. Under this conception, exemptions and tax benefits in general must likewise be created by law, in which, for clarity of application, the factual scenario or the taxable event of the fiscal benefit must be incorporated. In this regard, the initial paragraph of ordinal 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures provides: </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes involved, whether it is total or partial, the period of its duration, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i> <b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>IV.- Purpose of the rules providing for exemptions. </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Tax exemption occurs when a rule provides that in certain expressly foreseen scenarios, despite the taxable event occurring, the obligation of the taxpayer to pay the tax obligation does not arise. It forms part of the so-called </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>fiscal benefits (beneficios fiscales)</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>, which usually respond to a non-fiscal purpose, or an incentive for certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are based on the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or on other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax doctrine, they are constituted and should thus be considered, as mechanisms and tools typical of the tax environment. They constitute avenues that, in essence, seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the promotion, development, or advancement of a particular economic sector, of certain areas of activity, social contexts, or the equalization of economic conditions to promote a state of equality in the distribution of contributory burdens, in the short, medium, or long term. On occasions, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they are unfeasible when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their parafiscal purpose or when they depart from reasonable criteria and the value system inherent to the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Thus seen, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens that derives from numeral 18 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), but rather they are complementary elements to achieve, in principle, a balance and stability in the country's fiscal situation in its integral dimension. That is to say, in essence, they seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions aimed at constituting a system vested with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new composition, this Chamber considers that contrary to the criterion held until now in this field, they do not constitute, stricto sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but rather parts of a system that provide for the remission from payment of the tax, or other benefits, which integrally considered, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. The foregoing through the total or partial remission from payment of the tax or the reduction of its tax base, ergo, they may apply to the tax obligation in its entirety, or to the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their management must be careful and cautious, as their arbitrary application can lead to impairments of the principles of generality and equality, disrupting their own purpose. </span></i> <b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>V.- Interpretation of tax and exemption rules. Purpose. </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>The hermeneutic task of the rules regulating tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of juridical interpretation common to all branches of law, resorting to their various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the objective that the legislator has provided for its issuance. In this sense, numeral 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes: </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Tax rules must be interpreted in accordance with all the methods admitted by Common Law. </span></i><i><u style='text-underline:black'><span style='font-family:Arial'>Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue of it, neither taxes nor <span class=GramE>exemptions <span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR;text-decoration:none;text-underline:none'>.</span><span lang=ES-TRAD style='mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD;text-decoration:none;text-underline:none'>”</span></span></span></u></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> (Highlighting is not from the original) In this task, in keeping with the constitutional principle of equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, including the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that evades the very purpose of its content. The exegesis of tax rules cannot be restrictive. The tax is characterized by its coerciveness, insofar as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which through this means imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic levies on taxpayers. But it is also identified by its contributory nature insofar as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with adequate resources to allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework for the benefit of the community. This, of course, does not exclude that in certain cases, this type of charge is born with a different objective, as would be the case with the criterion of parafiscalidad. From this plane, tax rules cannot be considered exceptional or limiting of the rights of individuals, given that this character would lead to their application, and therefore their interpretation, being equally restrictive. This interpretative form is also not correct within the context of provisions that establish tax exemptions or benefits. This Chamber, until now, had maintained the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the referred Code and the legal regime inherent to exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, on the grounds that from the context of numerals 5 and 6 in relation to the cited ordinal 62, all of that legal body, the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions is inferred, through the impossibility of interpretively expanding the rules referring to them. In this sense, among many, judgment no. 162, of 15:22 on September 25, 1991, no. 93 of 15:30 on August 28, 1996, no. 86 of 15:00 on August 19, 1998, and no. 318 of 9:00 on May 19, 2004. However, with its new composition, and after a profound reflection on the point, it arrives at a different criterion from the one referred to. The nature and object of the rules of the type alluded to, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, neither implies nor justifies that they must be interpreted with a different prism from that of other tax provisions, i.e., with special criteria, for after all, it is reiterated, they are all components of a single system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in contributory burdens. To this end, it is necessary, in some cases, to implement rules that in essence seek the fulfillment of the various principles with which the constituent power has vested the tax system. As has been said, it is common for fiscal benefits to respond to economic capacity or to non-fiscal criteria, which may equally be present in other components of the tax. A restrictive interpretation in this matter would suppose that this type of benefit is exceptional, being applicable only when the law so provides. However, the principle of tax legality to which they are subject cannot constitute a valid condition justifying a special (restrictive) interpretation, but must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the cited Code, and they only take effect if the fact that has been pre-established for their occurrence happens. Therefore, tax legality thus viewed does not justify a restrictive consideration of fiscal benefits. It is fitting to clarify, however, that rules of this kind are those known as mandates with an exclusive factual prerequisite, which, in keeping with the provisions of the aforementioned articles 6 and 62, prevent their analogous application, which is a different situation from interpretation itself. In this context, just as taxes are subject to a principle of legal reserve, so too are exemptions and benefits, in whose source of creation the basic elements that delimit them must be stated. Within this approach, then, rules containing regulations of the referred type must be weighed without subjection to any special or specific criterion. In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed rule establishes in its final paragraph an objective limit to this exegetical task, namely, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions through analogous means, a mechanism that, while useful for filling legal gaps, cannot in these terms substitute for the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reserve. Thus seen, the field of creating tax levies and benefits is forbidden by this means, these being therefore figures that must be created by a formal legislative manifestation, in the terms already explicitly set forth previously. Now then, this last mentioned characteristic supposes that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the specific fact invoked corresponds to the factual scenario of the authorizing rule and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator in the source of its creation. Therefore, when the rule clearly and unmistakably imposes specific conditions for the enjoyment or receipt of the beneficial effects of the tax regime, in its application these parameters cannot be evaded insofar as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Thus seen, the conditioned effect will be produced when those factual prerequisites stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with due diligence, whether the factual scenario proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempt fact provided by the rule that foresees the benefit, within its material content. In this comparison, in principle, it is inappropriate to extend the effects of the rule to extremes that it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogous practices are unfeasible by imperative of law in this type of situation, for the risk arises of incorporating scenarios not contemplated by the law within the exempt fact, which would violate the aforementioned principle of legal reserve that prevails in these fields. The foregoing does not prejudge the correct or incorrect interpretation of the legal instruments applicable to the case, a topic that will be addressed later. This development is applicable to the entirety of the elements of the tax, including, of course, the tax base, which, defined by the legislator, constitutes the parameter upon which the rate will be applied to obtain the real contribution to the Treasury. From this plane, the formula for recording this source of calculation must be as clear as possible to avoid imprecision in its application. In any case, for deliberation on the ends covered by this element, the interpretative rules mentioned supra are fully applicable, which means that only the aspects that have been expressly excluded by an applicable legal rule will be excluded from its scope of coverage (tax base). </span></i> <b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>VI.- On the specific case. Tax base. </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Having clarified the foregoing, the examination of the charges formulated is entered into. The first, second, and third objections revolve around the possibility of extracting from the tax base of the liquor tax the items alleged by the appellant, which derives, he indicates, from the fact that the tax base of the levy is made up of the ex-factory price. Hence, since they concern the same thematic axis, they will be analyzed jointly. Violation is alleged of numerals 36 and 37 of the Ley de Licores, which establish a tax on national and foreign liquors, insofar as, the appellant maintains, the exclusion has not been permitted of the discounts that frequently and as a commercial practice are offered to buyers, as well as the so-called Grecia Tax (Impuesto de Grecia) and surpluses (superávit). For such purposes, it is imperative to bring up the text of the rules invoked by the appellant, in order to specify the scope of the various elements of the tax of interest, with special emphasis on that corresponding to the taxable event. In this sense, the direct creation of the levy is determined in numeral 36 of the Ley de Licores, number 10 of October 7, 1936, legislation that simultaneously, establishes with great clarity who will be the taxpayers of the tax obligation. The precept under reference provides: </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>A tax is hereby created on the sale of liquors, both national and foreign, and on foreign beer, which shall be paid by the liquor patentees referred to in this law, its transfer to the consuming public not being permitted in any form whatsoever.</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> For its part, ordinal 37 ibidem establishes the other components by indicating: </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>The tax on national liquors shall be 10% of the producer's sale price, excluding the corresponding sales tax. Likewise, foreign liquors and beers shall pay, as tax, 10% of the total import cost. The income received by the municipalities, as provided in this article (second and third paragraphs), shall be allocated exclusively to the subdivision plan (plan de lotificación) referred to in subsection 4) of article 4 of the Municipal Code.</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> As can be observed, the indicated rules, in keeping with the principle of tax legality, establish all the elements of the tax. Exclusively what concerns the tax base is of interest, as this is the debated aspect, and on which the controversy is centered regarding the legality of the determination made by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). According to the last transcribed rule, the tax base in the case of national liquors is constituted by the producer's sale price, a quantitative source from which, by express mandate of law, the corresponding sales tax must be excluded. Said reference allows, without major confusion, determining that the tax base established by the legislator was the price authorized to the producer. However, this price, according to Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982 that authentically interprets article 37 of the Ley de Licores, “... shall be understood as encompassing any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer”. In this same sense, from this Chamber, consult resolution no. 12 of 16:03 on January 5, 2000. </span></i> <b><i><span style='font-family:Arial'>VII.- Incidence of applied discounts on the tax base. </span></i></b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>For the appellant, according to the applicable legislation, and even derived from the authentic interpretation of article 37 of the Ley de Licores, the discounts granted to clients, the Grecia Tax, and the surpluses, must be excluded from the tax base of the levy. The charge lacks legal basis and must be rejected. Indeed, a proper analysis and interpretation of the rule in question allows one to infer that the only element that does not form part of that source of quantification is the sales tax. Discounts are frequent practices in commercial traffic, as a market strategy to increase or secure the attraction of clients for a specific good or service. Although as regards the tax under analysis, there is no prohibition against FANAL applying them, the rules regulating the levy do not expressly provide that the amounts discounted to clients can be subtracted from the tax base, an aspect that could only be established by law expressly so providing. As already indicated in Considerando III, in accordance with the principle of tax legal reserve and by virtue of numerals 5 subsection b) in relation to 62, both of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, only by means of formal law (in the strict sense) can exemptions or, in general, tax benefits be created that import a remission from the duty to contribute to public burdens. In fact, the creation of a fiscal benefit of this nature supposes the clear establishment of the conditions under which it is granted. In this case, the appellant seeks to have the discounts made remitted from the base, alleging for this purpose that what is regulated by numeral 11 subsection a) of the General Law of the Sales Tax (Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas) is applicable analogically, as Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures so provides. Said precept excludes from the tax base </span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>“</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Discounts accepted in commercial practices, provided they are usual and general and are stated separately from the sale price on the respective invoice.</span></i><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>”</span></i><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> The appellant is correct in that the referred ordinal 6 establishes in its second paragraph that analogy is a legal mechanism that allows filling legal gaps, however, immediately thereafter, that same provision foresees that by virtue of it, neither exemptions nor taxes can be created. That is, the law itself has established that analogy cannot be transformed into a device to reduce the amount of tax obligations, or at least, a reduction in the tax base. Analogy is a valid method for filling legal gaps where there is no rule regulating the point, however, its application cannot give rise to the creation of taxes or exemptions, as is intended here, since that corresponds, exclusively, to the legislator (tax legality). It is a valid mechanism for integration of the Law, insofar as it supposes the lack of an express rule directly applicable; however, that gap does not exist in this case, which makes its application inappropriate in the proposed terms. In the sub-júdice, that is the consequence sought by the CNP, in attempting to import from the Sales Tax Law a provision that allows the effect it now seeks. However, that consequence becomes inappropriate for this particular case, as it is a subterfuge that would lead to reducing the tax burden of a taxpayer, under a scenario not authorized by the legal framework that defines the elements of the tax. Indeed, from the analysis of the cited ordinal 37 of the Ley de Licores, it does not appear that any gap exists, given that this legal body is sufficiently clear regarding the definition of the tax base, as well as the elements that are outside of it, indicating that it will be comprised of the producer's sale price without considering the sales tax.</span></i> The rules of the Sales Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas) that authorize deducting discounts from the taxable base (base imponible) are applicable to that type of tax, but not to the tax on alcoholic beverages, whose internal aspects, as has been discussed, are clearly regulated by a special law, which makes the analogous application of Article 11, subsection a) of the referred legal body unfeasible, coupled with the fact that there is no enabling (habilitante) legal norm that allows the alleged reduction to be made to the taxable base (base imponible). From another angle, the issue in question has already been analyzed on other occasions by this Chamber, namely, among others, in ruling no. 12 of 16 hours 3 minutes of January 5, 2000, in which it was indicated: “In this case, what is at issue is establishing the scope of Article 37 of the Liquor Law (Ley de licores), to determine whether the tax liquidations on the sale of liquors, carried out by the National Liquor Council (Consejo Nacional de Licores) during the periods cited above, conform or not, in the manner alleged in the appeal, to what is ordered in that numeral. Article 37 provides that the basis for calculating the 10% tax is the sale price of the national liquor producer, excluding the corresponding sales tax. This price, according to Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, which authentically interprets Article 37 of the law, '...shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer.' It is sufficient to carefully read the preceding regulations and become imbued with their spirit, for it to become evident that the legislator did precisely establish the taxable base (base imponible): 'the price authorized to the producer.' It is clear that there is no regulation prohibiting the National Liquor Factory (Fábrica Nacional de Licores) from applying discounts on the prices of its products, as a commercial practice. What it is barred from doing is deducting the discounts actually granted from the taxable base (base imponible), to the detriment of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), because the law does not contemplate that possibility for this specific tax, as is the case with others, for example the general sales tax. Nor can it be affirmed that the authorization for such practice derives from the analogous application of Article 11 of the General Sales Tax Law (Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas). As established by Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), analogy is not a method of regulatory interpretation, but of integration, admissible to 'fill legal gaps,' which is obviously not the case here.” This criterion was later reiterated in resolution no. 559 of 15 hours 20 minutes of July 17, 2002, and in no. 696 of 16 hours 5 minutes of September 11, 2002. Hence, then, due to the reasons indicated, the legal impossibility exists of deducting from the calculation basis of the tax on national liquors the discounts that FANAL grants to its clients.

**VIII.- Regarding the Grecia Tax (Impuesto de Grecia).** As for the issue of the Grecia tax (Impuesto de Grecia), the objection is also inadmissible for the same reasons expressed in the previous section. In the specificity of this aspect, it must be stated again that Article 37 of the Liquor Law (Ley de Licores) excludes from the taxable base (base imponible) only the sales tax, it being understood that all other taxes that form part of the final sale price of the product are incorporated into its calculation source, as was ordered in Law No. 6796, authentic interpretation of the mentioned Article 37, whose precept 1 indicates: "Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquors (Ley Sobre la Venta de Licores), No. 10 of October 7, 1936, and its reforms, is authentically interpreted to mean that the sale price authorized to the producer **shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future,** as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. **Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base (base imponible).**" (The highlighting is our own). From the foregoing, it is inferred that the intended deduction of the Grecia Tax (Impuesto de Grecia) is improper from a legal standpoint, as it was the legislator himself, through the powers granted by subsection 1) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), who established unequivocally that any other tax, other than the sales tax, cannot be excluded from the calculation platform for the tax on the sale of liquors. For this reason, in accordance with the principle of tax law reservation and the same reasons developed in the preceding recital (considerando), it is not feasible to remove the items corresponding to the Grecia Tax (Impuesto de Grecia) from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax under examination. This Chamber has already ruled in the same sense, among others in ruling no. 194 of 10 hours 50 minutes of March 17, 2004, which established: "In that regard, the Tribunal, in Recital V, considered that this specific law – the Law on the Sale of Liquors (Ley sobre la Venta de Licores) - expressly indicates that the authorized sale price shall include any present, future, or other tax expenses, except for the sales tax, a criterion this Chamber shares because the specific differences of the case, as indicated in the issue of discounts, and whose rejection has the same legal basis (Article 37 of the Law on the Sale of Liquors (Ley sobre la Venta de Licores)), the current regulations do not allow, as the appellant intends, the deduction from the taxable base (base imponible) of the 'Grecia Tax' (Impuesto de Grecia). The fact that during some period the opposite was done is not a valid argument in a jurisdictional venue to supply the lack of a legal mandate permitting it." Therefore, the alleged charge must be rejected.

**IX. Regarding double taxation.** The appellant (casacionista) claims that by denying the application of the mentioned discounts, the principle of prohibition of double taxation is violated. Regarding this argument, it must be stated that on the subject, the Constitutional Chamber itself (Sala Constitucional) has established that the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) does not provide for its prohibition; on the contrary, it has indicated that in certain cases, it is accepted by the national legal system. In this sense, judgment no. 3494-94 of 14 hours 54 minutes of July 12, 1994, indicated: "III. The taxing power of the State is granted to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) in accordance with Article 121, subsection 13.) of our Political Constitution (Constitución Política) 'In addition to the other attributions conferred by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is responsible for: ... 13.) Establishing national taxes and contributions, and authorizing municipal ones.' As can be observed, (...) there is no constitutional rule or principle that prohibits establishing a double tax imposition on the same taxable event, as alleged by the plaintiff (accionante). Quite the contrary, it is the constitutional text itself that contemplates the possibility of establishing that double taxation, since, on one hand, it grants the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) the general power to impose taxes and other tax burdens, and on the other, it grants the Municipalities the same prerogatives within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to prior authorization from Congress." In the same direction from that same Chamber, see resolution no. 7541 of 16 hours 45 minutes of December 21, 1994. Nevertheless, it must be clear that irrespective of the fact that national legislation does not expressly prohibit double levying on the same activity, the truth is that the taxing power encounters a series of substantial limits imposed by the constitutional text, which constitute the bases of the principles inherent to the tax activity. Such is the case of the postulates of generality (Article 18 of the Constitution), the principle of equality (based on Article 33 ibidem), of ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) (which is the result of all the tax principles), and of non-confiscation (no confiscatoriedad). This last axiom is of particular interest. This axiom derives from Article 45 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna), which protects the right to property. From this plane, it implies that the taxing power cannot reach such quantitative levels that they empty the right to property, by exposing the taxable person of the tax obligation to burdens that are above the reasonable levels of their income. Hence, double taxation, although viable, is barred when it implies an impact on the principle of non-confiscation (no confiscatoriedad). While a duty to contribute to public burdens is established, the levies imposed for such purposes must reasonably weigh the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) of the taxable persons, so that they do not become tax means that cut off their property and possibilities for economic development. However, the appellant (casacionista) merely accuses this supposed defect without providing substantive arguments that allow a conclusion about its confiscatory consequences, that is to say, they omit the clear explanation of the supposed excess, so the Chamber cannot address its examination (Article 596 of the civil procedural rules). For this reason, the objection is not admissible, and the appeal must be denied regarding this reproach. ...

**XI.-** From this perspective, in this case, both the Grecia Tax (Impuesto de Grecia), as well as the discounts, form part of the parameters of the taxable base (base imponible), in the stated terms, so that in accordance with Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), they can only be exempted by virtue of an express law, which is not evidenced in the case under study, hence those items must be considered to determine the tax basis. This was effectively assessed by the Judges in the contested judgment. In this way, there is no impact on the provisions that regulate the interpretive proceeding of tax rules, specifically, those that define the tax on liquors, which, in the opinion of this Chamber, have been properly applied to the litigation, therefore, the charges made must be rejected...". Thus, and in accordance with the above, there is not the slightest doubt that the arguments set forth by the plaintiff in this proceeding are not admissible and consequently it is improper to exclude from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax in favor of the defendant Institute the so-called discounts and the tax to the Municipality of Grecia. It remains to analyze the appropriateness of the requested exclusion, regarding the expenses or contributions to the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional de Producción). On this particular point, it is of interest to note that through resolution number 321-2005 of nine hours on August eleventh, two thousand five, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Administrative Tribunal, upon resolving the clarification and addition requested by the plaintiff, ordered that the cited items must be excluded from the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax that must be paid in favor of the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory Services (Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal). Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to refer to this point, since it was granted in administrative venue. (...) ". Based on the foregoing, where all the arguments presented by the plaintiff regarding the items of "Discounts" and "Tax to the Municipality of Grecia" in relation to the calculation basis of the tax on national liquors in favor of the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory Services are analyzed, and the alleged nullity defects or other elements capable of modifying what is established in the jurisprudence do not exist, the rejection of the grievances raised is required.

Regarding the issue of the *"Aportes al CNP"* (Contributions to the CNP), it is verified that resolution number 312-2006 of eleven o'clock on the thirteenth of July of two thousand six of the First Chamber of the Administrative Tribunal, ordered the partial revocation of the challenged administrative resolution concerning the cited item, and indicates that it is not appropriate to include it within the taxable base (base imponible) of the tax on national liquors. By virtue of the foregoing, as what was petitioned in the administrative venue was granted, it is unnecessary for a ruling to be issued in this judicial venue. Consequently, the action filed by the plaintiff is declared without merit, as it is determined that resolution N° 312-2006 issued by the Administrative Tax Tribunal is in accordance with the law." What the Consejo Nacional de Producción is doing is that, from the sale price to the producer—on which the ten percent tax established by law is paid—it deducts the various discounts it grants within its commercial practice. By doing so, it deflates the tax base by considering that it has the right to deduct the discounts actually granted from the taxable base, a practice that cannot be accepted to the detriment of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). This taxable base (base imponible) is determined, according to the rule that regulates it, “on the producer's sale price (precio de venta del productor),” excluding solely the sales tax, and therefore the decreases cannot be accepted as part of the “producer’s sale price (precio de venta del productor)” in order to discount the amount on which the tax must be paid. In other types of levies, such as the selective consumption tax, the deduction of rebates is authorized, however, only as long as they are customary and real and granted by the producer generally to all its buyers under similar conditions and when the corresponding law so authorizes. The Ley de Licores contains no provision in this regard and, on the contrary, the cited article and its authentic interpretation only allow the deduction of the sales tax from the taxable base, which leads to the determination that the plaintiff's action is producing an undervaluation of that base for calculating the national liquors tax, by cutting from it the discounts not authorized by law; which is clearly unreal and exclusively for the computation of the tax, resulting in fiscal detriment, and is therefore unacceptable. This allows the conclusion that the actions of the reviewing instances in this regard are in accordance with the law and must be upheld.- VIII.- Regarding the other reclassified point “tax for the Municipality of Grecia (impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia),” the plaintiff's arguments are also inadmissible. The challenger considers that Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 29463-H, in its Article 7, “(…) confirms the concept of ‘producer’s sale price (precio de venta del productor)’ contained in the tax-creating norm, which is the same as ‘the manufacturer's price’ or ‘the ex-factory price (precio exfábrica),’ within which the tax for Grecia is not included, but only those items inherent to the first economic stage (…).” It also states that, traditionally, this charge was excluded from the taxable base for calculating the tax in favor of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal. As can be seen from the foregoing, it tries to indicate that it is a different levy and that, as such, it is included in the factory price and therefore, comprised within the taxable base. However, it must be reiterated that, in accordance with the authentic interpretation of the Asamblea Legislativa, through Law (Ley) number 6796 of August 17, 1982, in relation to numeral 37 of the Ley de Licores, it provided that “the authorized sale price to the producer of national liquors shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base.” Given such a clear provision, it is evident that Article 37, equally applicable to elucidate this point, does not allow, in any way, the deduction of “the tax for the Municipality of Grecia” from the taxable base, and therefore, the charge made in this regard also deserves to be upheld. Moreover, it is worth noting to the plaintiff that the fact that its deduction was previously permitted does not imply an obligation to accept it, since error does not create right, and on the contrary, the law must be applied to its full extent. Furthermore, this is a matter already defined previously. In relation to it, the Sección Primera of this Tribunal, in its judgment number 303-2003 of ten hours twenty-five minutes of August eight, two thousand three, held: “(…) V.- Regarding the inclusion in the tax base that concerns us of the levy in favor of the Municipality of Grecia (Ley de Creación del Impuesto al Alcohol, number 6619 of November 25, 1981), the plaintiff presents two arguments: one, that it is a singular, independent tax, which when included in the final price implies a ‘pyramiding (piramidación)’ of the tax, by charging a tax on the value that includes another levy, reasoning that is consistent with the doctrine on this matter, but contrary to the specific law, since Article 37 of the Ley de Venta de Licores, (according to authentic interpretation by Law 6796 of August 17, 1982) expressly indicates that the authorized sale price shall include any present or future taxes or other expenses, with the sole exception of the sales tax, a reason that forces the rejection of the argument. The other argument is that until April nineteen ninety-eight it was not taken into account, which suffers from two defects, that said affirmation is not demonstrated and that custom cannot be claimed against express law (…).”- In the same vein and as the defendant Institute aptly points out, judgments numbers 299-2001 of ten hours thirty minutes of September nineteen, two thousand one, issued by the Sección Segunda of this Tribunal, 303-2003 of the ten hours twenty-five minutes of August eight, two thousand three, issued by the Sección Primera of this Tribunal, can be seen. / V.- Meanwhile, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia also ruled on the subject under analysis and through judgment 580-F-2007 of thirteen hours thirty minutes of August fourteen, two thousand seven, indicated: "... The questions raised in the appeal were already known and resolved by this Sala in another matter identical to the present one, raised similarly by the CNP against the State, only referring to a different period, from November 1998 to October 31, 1999, so what was said on that occasion fully applies to the case under study. On that occasion it was said: “III.- Principle of tax legality (legalidad tributaria). Because of its interest in this case, it is essential to analyze the scope of the so-called principle of tax legality, in order to establish the possibility of considering the non-incorporation of several items within the taxable base of the tax under examination. Taxes and their exceptions are covered by the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), according to which, their creation, modification, and extinction correspond to the legislator. This principle is called ‘tax legality (legalidad tributaria).’ At the constitutional level, it finds its basis in the text of numeral 121 subsection 13 of the Carta Magna which assigns to the Asamblea Legislativa the exclusive power to ‘establish national taxes and contributions, and authorize municipal ones.’ Said norm has been subject to legal development, to establish with clarity and precision the scope and coverage of the cited postulate. Thus, Article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios clearly states: ‘In tax matters only the law may: a) Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo); b) Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; (…)’ A precept that finds full harmony with canon 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as it provides: ‘Regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose levies (exacciones), dues, fines, or other similar charges.’ For its part, numeral 4 ibidem defines tax as the payments in money, whether taxes (impuestos), dues (tasas), or special contributions, which the State, in exercise of its sovereign power, demands with the purpose of obtaining resources for the fulfillment of its ends. The characteristics of each of those types are developed by that same precept. This Sala, furthermore, in various pronouncements, with support in provisions 5 and 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, has been emphatic in respecting the principle of tax legality. For this reason, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions by a means other than express law has been highlighted (among others, no. 5 of 15 hours 30 minutes of January 5, 2000). This postulate therefore implies not only the unity of the tax system in general, but at the same time, legal security and certainty in tax matters, insofar as the taxpayer can discern and know with due anticipation and sufficient precision, the scope and content of the fiscal obligations, which is relevant to know the regime of subjection, taxable event (hecho imponible), calculation base, rate, among other elements of the levy. It is necessary to specify that it also infers a material scope, within which the components of the tax that necessarily must be created by express law are established. These are the essential and determining components of the tax, which must necessarily be established by the legislator. Among these elements, indefectibly, are the taxable event (hecho generador), the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), the taxable base (base imponible), the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. The intervention of the law is therefore imperative in all those points that affect the rights and guarantees of the private individual before the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). The merely procedural components escape its rigorousness, such as collection mechanisms, processing, among others. However, regarding the rate, the Tribunal Constitucional has established the possibility of a legislative delegation, of course, through a law that establishes beforehand the limits within which this exercise may be carried out. It is the case of the selective consumption tax. Hence the referred legal reserve can be described as “relative,” as said Sala has ratified in several of its pronouncements, among others in resolutions nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. Within this conception, exemptions and in general tax benefits must equally be created by law, in which it is appropriate to incorporate, for application clarity, the factual premise or the generating event of the fiscal benefit. In this direction, the initial paragraph of ordinal 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios provides: ‘The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements set to grant them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it covers, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or in the course of said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or else whether transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.’ IV.- Purpose of the norms that provide exemptions. A tax exemption (exención tributaria) occurs when a norm contemplates that in certain expressly provided circumstances, despite the generating event occurring, the obligation of the taxpayer to pay the tax liability does not arise. It forms part of the so-called ‘tax benefits (beneficios fiscales),’ which usually respond to an extra-fiscal purpose, or to the stimulation of certain activities. On many occasions, these benefits are based on the logic of the principle of economic capacity, or on other reasons that motivate the legislator's decision. In this sense, within tax law doctrine they are constituted, and thus must be considered, as mechanisms and tools inherent to the tax environment. They constitute pathways that in essence seek and allow, through strategic conditions (which may be temporary), the promotion, development, or advocacy of a specific economic sector, certain areas of activity, social contexts, or, the equalization of economic conditions to foster a state of equality in the distribution of tax burdens, in the short, medium, or long term. On occasions, they simply seek to prevent the tax system from becoming confiscatory. Hence, they are unviable when their purpose is an unjustified benefit, incompatible with their para-fiscal purpose or deviate from reasonable criteria and the value system proper to the Constitución Política. Seen in this way, their creation is not incompatible with the principles of equality, generality, and the duty to contribute to public burdens that derives from numeral 18 of the Constitución Política, but rather they are elements that complement each other to achieve, in principle, a balance and stability in the country's fiscal situation in its integral dimension. That is, in substance they seek the fulfillment of those postulates, through actions oriented to constitute a system imbued with conditions of equity in terms of economic capacity and development. Therefore, in its new integration, this Sala considers that contrary to the criterion sustained until now in this field, they do not constitute, strict sensu, exceptions to the duty to contribute, but parts of a system that provide for the waiver of tax payment, or other benefits, which considered comprehensively, seek to improve, in a global sense, the tax system in quantitative and qualitative terms. The foregoing through the total or partial waiver of tax payment or the decrease of its calculation base, ergo, they may fall upon the tax liability in its entirety, or, upon the exclusion of some components from that base. Given these particularities, their handling must be careful and cautious, since their arbitrary application may cause impacts on the principles of generality and equality, disrupting their own purpose. V.- Interpretation of tax norms and exemptions. Purpose. The hermeneutic work of the norms that regulate tax relations must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its diverse methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a specific mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has provided for its issuance. In this sense, numeral 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establishes: ‘Tax norms must be interpreted in accordance with all the methods admitted by Common Law. Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps but by virtue of it, taxes nor exemptions may be created.’ (The highlighting is not from the original) In this work, in tune with the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the diverse variables that converge in each situation, within them, the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope it establishes, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that evades the very purpose of its content. The exegesis of tax norms cannot be restrictive. Tax is characterized by its coerciveness, as it emanates from the exercise of Public Power, which, through this means, imposes, under the protection of the Constitution, economic levies on taxpayers. But in addition, it is identified by its contributory nature as its purpose is to collaborate with public burdens, in order to provide the State with the adequate resources that allow it to deploy its functional and service-providing framework in favor of the community. This of course does not exclude that in certain cases, this type of charges are born with a different objective, as would be the case of the criterion of para-fiscality (parafiscalidad). From this plane, tax norms cannot be considered exceptional or limitative of individuals' rights, given that such a character would lead to their application and therefore their interpretation being equally restrictive. Nor is that interpretative form correct within the context of provisions that establish exemptions or tax benefits. This Sala, until now, had sustained the thesis that, in accordance with the provisions of the referred Code and the legal regime proper to exemptions, their interpretation must be restrictive, because the context of numerals 5, 6 in relation to the cited ordinal 62, all of that legal body, demonstrates the protection of the principle of legality in matters of exemptions, through the impossibility of extensively interpreting the norms referring to them. In this sense among many, judgment no. 162, of 15 hours 22 minutes of September 25, 1991, no. 93 of 15 hours 30 minutes of August 28, 1996, no. 86 of 15 hours of August 19, 1998, and no. 318 of 9 hours of May 19, 2004. However, with its new integration, and after deep reflection on the point, it arrives at a criterion different from the one referred to. The nature and object of the norms of the type alluded to, in the terms already set forth, as well as their legal regime, do not imply nor justify that they must be interpreted with a different prism than other tax provisions, that is, with special criteria, since ultimately, it is reiterated, they are all components of the same system that seeks, in its teleological dimension, equity in the contributive burdens. For this, it is necessary, in some cases, to implement norms that, in essence, seek compliance with the diverse principles with which the constituent power has imbued the fiscal system.

As has been stated, it is common for tax benefits to respond to economic capacity, or to non-tax criteria (criterios extrafiscales), which may equally be present in other components of the tax. A restrictive interpretation in this matter would suppose that such benefits are exceptional, being applicable only when the law so provides. However, the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria) to which they are subject cannot constitute a valid condition justifying a special (restrictive) interpretation, but must be weighed in its correct dimension, that is, they can only be created by legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the aforementioned Code, and they only take effect if the fact that has been pre-established for their occurrence takes place. Therefore, tax legality viewed in this way does not justify a restrictive consideration of tax favors. It should be clarified, however, that rules of this kind are those known as mandates with an exclusive factual prerequisite (mandatos con presupuesto de hecho exclusivo), which, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned articles 6 and 62, prevent their application by analogy, which is a situation distinct from interpretation itself. In this context, just as taxes are subject to a principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva legal), so too are exemptions and benefits, in whose source of creation the basic elements that delimit them must be enunciated. Within this approach, then, rules containing regulations of the referenced type must be weighed without being subject to any special or specific criterion. In this task, it must be remembered that the transcribed rule establishes in its final paragraph an objective limit to this exegetical task, namely, the impossibility of creating taxes or exemptions via analogy, a mechanism that, while useful for filling legal gaps, cannot supplant, in these terms, the role of the legislator by virtue of the principle of legal reserve. Viewed thus, the field of creating tax burdens and benefits is forbidden through this means, these being, therefore, figures that must be created by a formal legislative manifestation, in the terms already explained previously. Now, this last mentioned characteristic supposes that tax exemptions and benefits can only be granted if the specific fact invoked corresponds to the factual premise (supuesto fáctico) of the authorizing rule and its granting is feasible according to the parameter set by the legislator in the source of its creation. Therefore, when the rule clearly and undoubtedly imposes specific conditions for the enjoyment or receipt of the benevolent effects of the tax regime, in its application these parameters cannot be circumvented, as they are an inexorable part of the conditioning fact that the legal system has established. Viewed thus, the conditioned effect will occur when those factual prerequisites stipulated in the mandate have been satisfied. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with due care, whether the factual premise proposed by the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) fits and coincides with the exempt event (hecho exento) provided by the rule that establishes the benefit, within its material content. In this confrontation, as a matter of principle, it is inappropriate to extend the effects of the rule to extremes it does not contemplate, nor that derive from its content, just as analogical practices in this type of situation are equally unfeasible by force of law, since the risk arises of incorporating into the exempt event situations not contemplated by the law, which would violate the aforementioned principle of legal reserve that prevails in these fields. The foregoing does not prejudge the correct or incorrect interpretation of the legal instruments applicable to the case, a topic that will be addressed later. This development is applicable to the totality of the elements of the tax, including, of course, the taxable base (base imponible), which, defined by the legislator, constitutes the parameter on which the rate will be applied to obtain the actual contribution to the Treasury. From this standpoint, the formula for establishing this source of calculation must be as clear as possible to avoid inaccuracies in its application. In any case, for deliberation on the extremes covered by this element, the interpretative rules mentioned supra are fully applicable, which supposes that only aspects that have been expressly excluded by applicable legal rule will be excluded from its scope of coverage (calculation base). **VI.- On the specific case. Taxable base.** Having clarified the foregoing, we proceed to the examination of the charges formulated. The first, second, and third objections revolve around the possibility of extracting from the taxable base of the tax on liquors the items alleged by the appellant, which derives, it indicates, from the fact that the calculation base of the tax is constituted by the ex-factory price (precio ex fábrica). Hence, since they deal with the same thematic axis, they will be analyzed jointly. Violation is alleged of numerals 36 and 37 of the Ley de Licores, which establish a tax on national and foreign liquors, insofar as, the appellant maintains, the exclusion of discounts that are frequently and as a commercial practice offered to buyers has not been permitted, as well as of the so-called Impuesto de Grecia and surpluses. For these purposes, it is essential to bring up the text of the rules invoked by the appellant (casacionista), in order to specify the scope of the various elements of the tax in question, with special emphasis on the one corresponding to the taxable event (hecho generador). In this sense, the direct creation of the tax is determined in numeral 36 of the Ley de Licores, number 10 of October 7, 1936, a regulation that at the same time, establishes with great clarity who the taxpayers of the tax obligation will be. The referenced precept provides: "A tax is created on the sale (expendio) of liquors, both national and foreign, and on foreign beer, which shall be paid by the liquor patent holders referred to in this law, its transfer to the consuming public not being permitted in any way." For its part, ordinal 37 ibidem establishes the other components by indicating: "The tax on national liquors shall be 10% on the producer's sale price, excluding the corresponding sales tax. Likewise, foreign liquors and beers shall pay as tax 10% on the total import cost. The income received by the municipalities, according to the provisions of this article (second and third paragraphs), shall be destined exclusively to the subdivision plan (plan de lotificación), referred to in subsection 4) of article 4 of the Código Municipal." As can be observed, the indicated rules, in accordance with the principle of tax legality, establish all the elements of the tax. What is of exclusive interest is that concerning the taxable base, this being the aspect under debate and on which the controversy centers regarding the legality of the determination made by the Tax Administration. According to the last transcribed rule, the taxable base in the case of national liquors is constituted by the producer's sale price, a quantitative source from which the corresponding sales tax must be excluded, by express mandate of law. Said reference allows, without much confusion, determining that the calculation base established by the legislator was the price authorized to the producer. However, this price, according to Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, which authentically interprets article 37 of the Ley de Licores, "... shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer." In this same sense, from this Chamber, consult resolution no. 12 of 4:03 p.m. on January 5, 2000. **VII.- Incidence of discounts applied on the taxable base.** For the appellant, in accordance with applicable legislation, and even derived from the authentic interpretation of article 37 of the Ley de Licores, the discounts granted in favor of clients, the Impuesto de Grecia, and the surpluses must be excluded from the calculation base of the tax. The charge lacks legal basis and must be rejected. Indeed, a proper analysis and interpretation of the rule in question allows inferring that the only element that does not form part of that quantification source is the sales tax. Discounts are frequent practices in commercial traffic, as a market strategy to increase or ensure the attraction of customers for a particular good or service. Although regarding the tax under analysis, there is no prohibition for FANAL to practice them, the rules regulating the tax do not expressly provide that the amounts discounted to customers may be deducted from the calculation base, an aspect that could only be established by law that expressly so provides. As already indicated in Considerando III, under the principle of tax legal reserve and under the shelter of numerals 5 subsection b) in relation to 62, both of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, only by formal law (in the strict sense) can exemptions or, in general, tax benefits be created that entail a dispensation from the duty to contribute to public burdens. In fact, the creation of a fiscal benefit of this nature supposes the clear establishment of the conditions under which it is granted. In the instant case, the appellant seeks to have the discounts made removed from the base, alleging for that purpose that what is regulated by numeral 11 subsection a) of the Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas is applicable by analogy, as article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios so provides. That precept excludes from the taxable base "Discounts accepted in commercial practices, provided they are usual and general and are recorded separately from the sale price on the respective invoice." The appellant is correct that ordinal 6 already cited establishes in its second paragraph that analogy is a legal mechanism that allows filling legal gaps, however, immediately following, that same provision states that by virtue of it, neither exemptions nor taxes can be created. That is, the law itself has established that analogy cannot be transformed into a device to reduce the amount of tax obligations, or at least, a reduction in the taxable base. Analogy is a valid method for filling legal gaps where no rule regulates the point, however, its application cannot give rise to the creation of taxes or exemptions, as is intended here, because that corresponds exclusively to the legislator (tax legality). It is a valid mechanism of legal integration, insofar as it supposes the lack of an expressly and directly applicable rule, however, that gap is not present in this case, which makes its application inappropriate in the proposed terms. In the sub-judice, this is the consequence that the CNP seeks, by attempting to import from the Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas a provision that allows the effect it now seeks. However, that consequence becomes inappropriate for this particular case, insofar as it is a subterfuge that would lead to reducing the tax burden of a taxpayer, under an assumption not authorized by the legal framework that delimits the elements of the tax. Indeed, from the analysis of the cited ordinal 37 of the Ley de Licores, it does not appear that any gap exists, given that this legal body is sufficiently clear regarding the definition of the taxable base, as well as the elements that are outside of it, indicating that it will be constituted by the producer's sale price without considering the sales tax. The regulations of the Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas that authorize deducting discounts from the taxable base apply to that type of tax, but not to the tax on alcoholic beverages, whose internal aspects, as has been discussed, are regulated in a clear manner by a special law, which makes the analogical application of article 11 subsection a) of the referenced legal set unfeasible, coupled with the fact of the nonexistence of an enabling legal rule that allows making the alleged reduction on the taxable base. From another angle, the topic in question has already been analyzed on other occasions by this Chamber, namely, among others, in ruling no. 12 of 4:03 p.m. on January 5, 2000, in which it was stated: "In the instant case, the matter at hand is to establish the scope of article 37 of the Ley de Licores, to determine whether the tax assessments on the sale of liquors, carried out by the Consejo Nacional de Licores during the periods supra delineated, conform or not, in the manner alleged in the appeal, to what is ordered in that numeral. Article 37 provides that the base for calculating the 10% tax is the sale price of the national liquor producer, excluding the corresponding sales tax. This price, according to Law number 6796 of August 17, 1982, which authentically interprets article 37 of the law, '... shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer.' It suffices to carefully read the previous regulations and to grasp their spirit for it to become evident that the legislator did indeed establish the taxable base in a precise manner: 'the price authorized to the producer.' It is clear that no regulation exists prohibiting the Fábrica Nacional de Licores from applying discounts to the prices of its products as a commercial practice. What it is forbidden to do is to deduct the discounts actually granted from the taxable base, to the detriment of the Tax Administration, because the law does not contemplate this possibility for this specific tax, as happens with others, for example, the general sales tax. Nor can it be affirmed that the authorization for such practice derives from the analogical application of article 11 of the Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas. As established by article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, analogy is not a method of normative interpretation but of integration, admissible for 'filling legal gaps,' which is obviously not the case." This criterion was later reiterated in resolution no. 559 of 3:20 p.m. on July 17, 2002, and in no. 696 of 4:05 p.m. on September 11, 2002. Hence, then, for the reasons stated, there exists a legal impossibility of deducting from the calculation base of the tax on national liquors the discounts that FANAL grants to its clients. **VIII.- On the Impuesto de Grecia.** Regarding the issue of the Impuesto de Grecia, the objection is also not admissible for the same reasons expressed in the previous section. In the specificity of this aspect, it must be indicated again that ordinal 37 of the Ley de Licores excludes from the taxable base only the sales tax, all other taxes that form part of the final sale price of the product being understood as incorporated within its calculation source, as was provided in Law no. 6796, authentic interpretation of the mentioned article 37, in whose precept 1 indicates: "The article 37 of the Ley Sobre la Venta de Licores, No. 10 of October 7, 1936, and its amendments, is authentically interpreted in the sense that the sale price authorized to the producer shall be understood to include any taxes, present or future, as well as any administrative expense that forms part of the final sale price authorized to the producer. Only the sales tax shall not form part of the taxable base." (Emphasis added). From the foregoing it is deduced that the intended deduction of the Impuesto de Grecia is inappropriate from the legal standpoint, insofar as it was the legislator himself, through the powers granted by subsection 1) of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, who established beyond doubt that any other tax, other than the sales tax, cannot be excluded from the calculation platform of the tax on liquor sales. For this reason, in accordance with the principle of tax legal reserve and the same reasons developed in the previous Considerando, it is not feasible to remove the items corresponding to the Impuesto de Grecia from the taxable base of the tax under examination. In the same sense, this Chamber has already pronounced, among others, in ruling no. 194 of 10:50 a.m. on March 17, 2004, which established that: "In that regard, the Tribunal, in Considerando V, considered that this specific law – Ley sobre la Venta de Licores – expressly indicates that the authorized sale price will include any present, future, or other expenses, except the sales tax, a criterion that this Chamber shares because the differences inherent to the case, as was indicated on the topic of discounts, and whose rejection has the same legal basis (ordinal 37 of the Ley sobre la Venta de Licores), the current regulations do not allow, as the appellant intends, deducting from the taxable base the 'Impuesto de Grecia.' The fact that during some period a contrary approach may have been taken is not a valid argument in a jurisdictional venue to supply the lack of a legal mandate that permits it." Therefore, the alleged charge must be rejected. **IX. On double taxation.** The appellant alleges that by denying the application of the mentioned discounts, a violation of the principle of prohibition of double taxation is incurred. Regarding this argument, it must be indicated that on the topic, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has established that the Carta Magna does not provide for its prohibition; on the contrary, it has indicated that in certain cases, it is accepted by the national legal system. In this sense, in ruling no. 3494-94 of 2:54 p.m. on July 12, 1994, it indicated: "III. The State's power to tax is granted to the Asamblea Legislativa in accordance with article 121 subsection 13.) of our Constitución Política 'In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds to the Asamblea Legislativa: ... 13.) To establish national taxes and contributions, and to authorize municipal ones.' As observed, (...) there is no constitutional rule or principle whatsoever that prohibits establishing a double tax imposition on the same taxable event, as the plaintiff alleges. Quite the contrary, it is the constitutional text itself that contemplates the possibility of establishing that double imposition, given that, on the one hand, it grants the Asamblea Legislativa the general power to impose taxes and other tax burdens, and on the other, it grants the Municipalities the same prerogatives in their territorial jurisdiction, with prior authorization from Congress." In the same direction from that same Chamber, see resolution no. 7541 of 4:45 p.m. on December 21, 1994. However, it must be clearly borne in mind that despite national legislation not expressly prohibiting a double burden on the same activity, the truth is that the taxing power encounters a series of substantial limits imposed by the constitutional text, which constitute the bases of the principles inherent to taxation activity. Such is the case of the postulates of generality (article 18 constitutional), principle of equality (based on numeral 33 ibidem), ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) (which is the result of all taxation principles), and non-confiscation (no confiscatoriedad). This last one is of particular interest. This axiom derives from numeral 45 of the Carta Magna, which protects property rights. From this standpoint, it supposes that the taxing power cannot reach such quantitative levels that it empties the property right, by exposing the taxpayer of the contributory obligation to burdens that are above reasonable levels of their income. Hence, double taxation, even when viable, is forbidden when it implies an affectation of the principle of non-confiscation. Although a duty to contribute to public burdens is established, the taxes imposed for such effects must reasonably weigh the taxpayers' ability to pay, so that they do not become tax means that sever their property and possibilities of economic development. However, the appellant limits himself to accusing that alleged defect, without providing substantive arguments that allow concluding on its confiscatory consequences, that is, he omits the clear explanation of the alleged excess, so the Chamber cannot address its examination (numeral 596 of the civil procedural rules). For this reason, the objection is not admissible, the appeal on this reproach being necessarily denied. ... **XI.-** From this perspective, in this case, both the Impuesto de Grecia, as well as the discounts, form part of the parameters of the taxable base, in the stated terms, so that in accordance with article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, they can only be excepted by virtue of an express law, which is not evidenced in the case under study, hence those items must be considered to establish the tax base. This was indeed assessed by the Judges in the contested ruling. In this way, there is no affectation of the provisions regulating the interpretive procedure for tax rules, specifically, those delimiting the tax on liquors, which, in the judgment of this Chamber, have been duly applied to the litigation, so that the charges formulated must be rejected...". Thus, and in accordance with what is indicated supra, there is not the slightest doubt that the arguments presented by the plaintiff in this process are not admissible and consequently, it becomes inappropriate to exclude from the taxable base of the tax in favor of the defendant Institute the so-called discounts and the tax to the Municipality of Grecia. It remains to analyze the appropriateness of the requested exclusion, regarding the expenses or contributions to the Consejo Nacional de Producción. On this particular, it is of interest to note that by resolution number 321-2005 of nine o'clock on August eleventh, two thousand five, the Sala Primera of the Administrative Tribunal, when resolving the clarification and addition requested by the plaintiff, ordered that the cited items must be excluded from the taxable base of the tax that must be paid in favor of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal. Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to refer to the point, since this was granted in the administrative venue. (...)

Based on the foregoing, in which all the arguments presented by the plaintiff regarding the items of "Deductions" ("Descuentos") and "Tax to the Municipality of Grecia" ("Impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia") in relation to the tax base calculation of the national liquor tax for the benefit of the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal are analyzed, and as the alleged nullity defects do not exist nor are there other elements capable of modifying what is established in the jurisprudence, the rejection of the grievances raised is imposed. Regarding the issue of the "Contributions to the CNP" ("Aportes al CNP"), it is verified that resolution number 312-2006 of eleven hours on July thirteenth, two thousand six, of the First Chamber of the Administrative Tribunal, ordered the partial revocation of the challenged administrative resolution regarding the cited item, and indicates that it is not appropriate to include it within the taxable base of the national liquor tax. By virtue of the foregoing, since what was petitioned in the administrative venue was granted, it becomes unnecessary for a ruling to be issued in this judicial venue. Consequently, the action filed by the plaintiff is declared without merit, upon determining that resolution No. 312-2006 issued by the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo is in accordance with the law."

“II.- SOBRE LA EXCLUSIÓN DE LOS RUBROS GASTOS, DESCUENTOS E IMPUESTO A LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE GRECIA DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LOS LICORES A FAVOR DEL IFAM: El actor cuestiona el ajuste realizado por el IFAM al impuesto sobre los Licores, en el que se incluyó el cobro por concepto de gastos o aportes al CNP, descuentos e Impuestos a la Municipalidad de Grecia. Estima que tal cobro resulta improcedente y para sustentar su tesis esgrime los siguientes argumentos: en primer término alude a la naturaleza jurídica del impuesto sobre los licores, señala que la posición del I.F.A.M. y del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo no se encuentra ajustada a derecho al definir la naturaleza del impuesto sobre licores nacionales como si fuera de consumo general igualándolo al impuesto de ventas, cuando contrariamente, se trata de un gravamen que incide directamente en el costo del bien y no en el precio final. Indica la parte actora que el numeral 37 de la Ley de Licores establece como base imponible el precio de venta del productor, excluido el impuesto de venta y que tal normativa ha sido mal interpretada, al considerar que la base del impuesto es el precio detallista con el rebajo del impuesto sobre la venta -únicamente-, lo que en su entender resulta a todas luces improcedente, ya que "(...) el precio antes del impuesto de ventas será el precio de venta del fabricante (...)", de conformidad con la interpretación auténtica del artículo 37 de la Ley de Licores. Puntualiza el actor que "la tesis de que la base imponible que refiere la norma del impuesto a favor del IFAM, es el precio de venta del productor o precio ex-fábrica, también ha sido compartida por el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo en casos similares como es el de la base imponible del impuesto sobre la cerveza nacional (artículo 10 Ley 5792 reformado por artículo 35 Ley 6735), y por la Procuraduría General de la República en su dictamen C-346-2002 de 19 de diciembre de 2002, respecto al impuesto sobre los refrescos gaseosos y bebidas carbonatadas a favor del IDA (artículo 6 Ley 5792 reformado por artículo 35 Ley 6735)", y que en el artículo 7 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 29463-H del dos de mayo del 2001, se establecen los parámetros para definir la estructura de precios de las bebidas alcohólicas en el país, deriva de lo anterior que se trata de un impuesto específico de consumo, que se ubica en la etapa de fabricación y que su base de cálculo no se asimila a la que sirve al Impuesto General sobre las ventas, concluyendo que "ni el rubro denominado Gastos o Aporte al CNP, ni el impuesto a favor de la Municipalidad de Grecia, ni los descuentos forman parte de la base de cálculo del impuesto a favor del IFAM, pues no forman parte del precio de venta del fabricante, sino que son rubros que surgen con posterioridad a esa etapa y que se consolidan en la etapa de distribución y venta final del producto". En criterio del actor, se debería aplicar el principio de igualdad de las cargas tributarias, derivado de una comparación entre el impuesto sobre los licores nacionales y los importados a favor del IFAM, por cuanto, en los últimos, la base imponible incluye estrictamente los rubros de costos, gastos y tributos. En cuanto a la exclusión de los rubros denominados Gastos o Aportes al Consejo Nacional de Producción, el actor estima que también deben excluirse de la base imponible del impuesto sobre los licores con fundamento en el artículo 53 de la Ley Orgánica del Consejo Nacional de Producción y por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo. Sobre el rubro denominado "descuentos", considera la parte actora que en la misma ley creadora del Tributo se establece que los indicados descuentos no forman parte de la estructura de cálculo, pues se ubican fuera del precio del productor, es decir, fuera del precio del fabricante, ya que se aplican en la última etapa de comercialización para incentivar las ventas. Finalmente, sobre la exclusión del Impuesto a Grecia, alega el actor que se trata de un impuesto independiente que no forma parte de la etapa de fabricación de los licores nacionales, según lo establece el artículo 7 del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29463-H del 02 de mayo de 2001, y que su inclusión no solo constituye una ilegalidad, sino una doble imposición, al no figurar originalmente en la estructura de costos para la fabricación del bien. Por otro lado, el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, aduce que los criterios del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo que sostienen la exclusión de los rubros "descuentos" e "Impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia", en la determinación del impuesto a su favor, tienen asidero en la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera, que ha establecido que éstos conceptos deben ser considerados en el cálculo. Respecto a la exclusión de los gastos, señala que "lo único que ha hecho la Fábrica Nacional de Licores es intercambiar nombres de los rubros y con ello pretender evadir el pago correcto de los impuestos, al incluir dentro del rubro de "Aportes" la parte de "Gastos", y así justificar su exclusión de la base impositiva del impuesto a favor del IFAM". Por su parte, el Estado, contesta la demanda y señala que el artículo 37 de la Ley Sobre Venta de Licores, dispone que únicamente puede excluirse de la base imponible del impuesto a favor del IFAM, el impuesto de ventas y que existen pronunciamientos de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que refuerzan tal postura. Este Tribunal Contencioso, conoció un caso en idénticas condiciones a la demanda que aquí se atiende, siendo que lo ahí resuelto, aplica en su totalidad a la presente litis. En lo que interesa, esta Sección resolvió en el voto N° 04-2008 lo siguiente: "IV).- SOBRE LOS DESCUENTOS Y EL IMPUESTO A LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE GRECIA COMO PARTE DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE EN EL TRIBUTO A FAVOR DEL IFAM: En el caso que nos ocupa, se discute la procedencia de incluir en la base imponible del impuesto que pesa sobre el licor y que debe cancelarse al Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, los descuentos realizados por la Fábrica Nacional de Licores y el Impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia. Sobre este particular y en relación con los argumentos esgrimidos por las partes, en un caso similar y que resulta de total aplicación en la especie, se ha pronunciado la Sección Segunda de este Tribunal, mediante voto 438-2006, dictado a las catorce horas treinta minutos del veintidós de setiembre de dos mil seis, al indicar: " ... La génesis de este proceso se presenta, cuando el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, realiza determinaciones oficiosas al Consejo Nacional de Producción, y grava tres rubros, a saber: “descuentos”, “impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia” y “Superávit”. En consecuencia, para resolver el punto sometido a debate, debe acudirse, necesariamente, a la Ley de Licores vigente, y sus reformas, en especial, a los numerales 36 y 37. El primero de ellos, crea el impuesto sobre el expendio de licores, nacionales y extranjeros, el que deberá pagarse por los patentados de licores, no permitiendo, su traslado al público consumidor. El siguiente, establece el porcentaje, en un diez por ciento sobre el precio de venta del productor, excluido, el correspondiente impuesto de ventas. Este numeral, cuenta con una interpretación auténtica por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa mediante Ley número 6796 de 17 de agosto de 1982, en el sentido de que “ el precio de venta autorizado al productor de licores nacionales, se entenderá comprensivo de cualesquiera impuestos, presentes o futuros, así como de cualquier gasto administrativo que forme parte del precio final de venta autorizado al productor. Únicamente el impuesto de ventas no formará parte de la base imponible”. Visto así el panorama jurídico que regula este tributo, con fundamento en él, ha de analizarse la práctica comercial del Consejo Nacional de Producción por medio de la Fábrica Nacional de Licores, para determinar, la procedencia o no de su demanda.- VII.- En primer término, se entra al examen de los descuentos. Ellos, son prácticas comerciales de libre utilización, por los comerciantes o productores y se entienden, como “ (...) Rebaja en el precio de una mercancía, cuando se efectúa la operación de un comerciante a otro, por razones de amistad, de haber pasado de actualidad el producto, de haberse averiado o por propaganda y otras causas (...)” (Diccionario Enciclopédico de Derecho Usual. Guillermo Cabanellas. Tomo III. Editorial Heliasta, Buenos Aires, República Argentina, 1989. pág. 182). Lo que el Consejo Nacional de Producción está realizando, es que, al precio de venta al productor - sobre el que se paga el impuesto del diez por ciento establecido en la ley -, le rebaja los diferentes descuentos que otorga dentro de su práctica comercial. Con esto, lo que hace es deflacionar la base del tributo al considerar, que tiene el derecho a deducir los efectivamente concedidos de la base imponible, práctica que no puede aceptarse en perjuicio de la Administración Tributaria. Ésta - base imponible -, se determina, según la norma que lo regula, “sobre el precio de venta del productor” , excluido únicamente, lo relativo al impuesto de ventas, por lo que no pueden aceptarse los disminuciones como parte del “precio de venta del productor”, para descontar el monto sobre el que debe pagarse el tributo. En otro tipo de gravámenes, como por ejemplo, el selectivo de consumo, se autoriza la deducción de rebajas, empero, siempre y cuando sean usuales y reales y otorgados por el productor con carácter general a todos sus compradores en condiciones similares y cuando la correspondiente ley, así lo autorice. La Ley de Licores, no contiene disposición alguna al respecto y por el contrario, el artículo citado y su interpretación auténtica solo permiten deducir de la base imponible, el impuesto de ventas, lo que lleva a determinar, que la actuación de la accionante lo que está produciendo es una subvaluación de esa base para el cálculo del tributo de licores nacionales, al recortar de ésta, los descuentos no autorizados por ley; la que a todas luces es irreal y exclusivamente para el cómputo del tributo, lo que redunda en perjuicio fiscal, y por ende es inaceptable. Esto permite arribar a la conclusión, de que lo actuado por las instancias calificadoras en este aspecto está ajustado a derecho y debe mantenerse.- VIII.- Atinente al otro extremo recalificado “impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia”, tampoco son de recibo los argumentos del demandante. Estima quien impugna, que el decreto ejecutivo número 29463-H, en su artículo 7, “(…) confirma el concepto de “precio de venta del productor” contenido en la norma creadora del tributo, que es lo mismo que “el precio del fabricante” o “el precio exfábrica”, dentro del cual no se incluye el impuesto a Grecia, sino solamente aquellos rubros inherentes a la primera etapa económica (…)”. Manifiesta además, que tradicionalmente, esta carga estaba excluida de la base imponible para el cálculo del impuesto a favor del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal. Como se ve de lo transcrito, trata de indicar, que es un gravamen distinto y que como tal, está incluido en el precio de fábrica y por ende, comprendido en la base imponible. No obstante debe reiterarse, que de conformidad con la interpretación auténtica de la Asamblea Legislativa, mediante Ley número 6796 de 17 de agosto de 1982, en relación con el numeral 37 de la Ley de Licores, dispuso, que “ el precio de venta autorizado al productor de licores nacionales, se entenderá comprensivo de cualesquiera impuestos, presentes o futuros, así como de cualquier gasto administrativo que forme parte del precio final de venta autorizado al productor. Únicamente el impuesto de ventas no formará parte de la base imponible”. Ante disposición tan clara, es evidente que el artículo 37, igualmente aplicable para dilucidar este extremo, no permite, en modo alguno, deducir de la base imponible “el impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia”, y por el ello, el cargo realizado en este aspecto también merece ser mantenido. Además, cabe indicar al accionante, que el hecho de que con anterioridad se hubiere permitido su deducción, no implica obligatoriedad de aceptarlo, dado que el error no crea derecho, y por el contrario, la ley debe aplicarse en toda su dimensión. Por demás, este es un tema ya definido con anterioridad. En relación con él, la Sección Primera de este Tribunal, en su sentencia número 303-2003 de diez horas veinticinco minutos del ocho de agosto de dos mil tres, dispuso: “(…) V.- En relación a la inclusión en la base impositiva que nos interesa del tributo a favor de la Municipalidad de Grecia (ley de Creación del Impuesto al Alcohol, número 6619 de 25 de noviembre de 1981), el demandante expone dos argumentos: uno, que se trata de un impuesto singular, independiente, que al ser incluido en el precio final implica una "piramidación" del tributo, al cobrarse un impuesto sobre el valor que incluye otro gravamen, razonamiento que es conforme a la doctrina de esta materia, pero contrario a la ley específica, pues el artículo 37 de la Ley de Venta de Licores, (según interpretación auténtica por ley 6796 de 17 de agosto de 1982) expresamente indica que el precio de venta autorizado comprenderá cualesquiera impuestos presentes o futuros u otros gastos, con la única excepción del de ventas, motivo que obliga a rechazar el alegato. El otro argumento es que hasta abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho no se tomaba en cuenta, lo que adolece de dos defectos, que dicha afirmación no se demuestra y que no cabe alegar costumbre en contra de ley expresa (…)”.- En igual sentido y como atinadamente lo señala el Instituto demandado, pueden verse las sentencias números 299-2001 de diez horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de setiembre del dos mil uno, dictada por la Sección Segunda de este Tribunal, 303-2003 de las las diez horas veinticinco minutos del ocho de agosto del dos mil tres, emitida por la Sección Primera de este Tribunal. / V.- Por su parte, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, también se pronunció respecto del tema objeto de análisis y mediante sentencia 580-F-2007 de las trece horas treinta minutos del catorce de agosto de dos mil siete, indicó: "... Las cuestiones planteadas en el recurso ya fueron conocidas y resueltas por esta Sala en otro asunto idéntico al presente planteado de igual manera por el CNP contra el Estado, solo que referido a un período distinto, de noviembre de 1998 al 31 de octubre de 1999, por lo que lo dicho en esa oportunidad aplica de pleno al caso bajo estudio. En esa ocasión se dijo: “ III.- Principio de legalidad tributaria. Por ser de interés en la especie, es de rigor analizar los alcances del denominado principio de legalidad tributaria, de cara a establecer la posibilidad de considerar la no incorporación de varios rubros dentro de la base imponible del impuesto bajo examen. Los tributos y sus excepciones están cubiertos por el principio de reserva de ley, según el cual, corresponde al legislador, su creación, modificación y extinción. Este principio es denominado como “legalidad tributaria”. A nivel constitucional, encuentra su fundamento en la letra del numeral 121 inciso 13 de la Carta Magna que asigna a la Asamblea Legislativa la atribución exclusiva de “establecer los impuestos y contribuciones nacionales, y autorizar las municipales.” Dicha norma ha sido objeto de desarrollo legal, para establecer con claridad y precisión los alcances y cobertura del citado postulado. Así, en el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios se dispone con claridad: “En cuestiones tributarias solo la ley puede: a) Crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir el hecho generador de la relación tributaria; establecer las tarifas de los tributos y sus bases de cálculo; e indicar el sujeto pasivo; b) Otorgar exenciones, reducciones o beneficios; (...)” Precepto que encuentra plena armonía con el canon 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en tanto dispone: “Los reglamentos, circulares, instrucciones y demás disposiciones administrativas de carácter general no podrán establecer penas ni imponer exacciones, tasas, multas ni otras cargas similares.” Por su parte, el numeral 4 ibidem define el tributo como las prestaciones en dinero, sean impuestos, tasas o contribuciones especiales, que el Estado, en ejercicio de su poder de imperio, exige con el objeto de obtener recursos para el cumplimiento de sus fines. Las características de cada uno de esos tipos, son desarrollados por ese mismo precepto. Esta Sala, por lo demás, en diversos pronunciamientos, con apoyo en las disposiciones 5 y 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, ha sido enfática en respetar el principio de legalidad tributaria. Por tal motivo se ha destacado la imposibilidad de crear tributos o exenciones por vía distinta a la de la ley expresa (entre otras, no. 5 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 5 de enero del 2000). Este postulado implica por ende no solo la unidad del sistema tributario en general, sino a la vez, la seguridad y certeza jurídica en materia impositiva, en tanto el contribuyente puede advertir y conocer con la debida antelación y con la precisión suficiente, el alcance y contenido de las obligaciones fiscales, lo que le resulta relevante para conocer el régimen de sujeción, hecho imponible, base de cálculo, tarifa, entre otros elementos del gravamen. Cabe precisar que además infiere un ámbito material, dentro del cual, se establecen los componentes del tributo que necesariamente, deben ser creados por ley expresa. Se trata de los componentes esenciales y determinantes del tributo, los que forzosamente, deben ser establecidos por el legislador. Entre estos elementos, se encuentran, de manera indefectible, el hecho generador, el sujeto pasivo, la base imponible, la tarifa del tributo, así como período de cobro, según sea progresivo o instantáneo. La intervención de la ley por ende, es imperiosa en todos aquellos puntos que afectan los derechos y garantías del particular frente a la Administración Tributaria. Escapan de su rigurosidad los componentes meramente procedimentales, tales como mecanismos de recaudación, tramitación, entre otros. No obstante, en cuanto a la tarifa, el Tribunal Constitucional ha establecido la posibilidad de una delegación legislativa, claro está, mediante una ley que establezca de antemano los límites en que este ejercicio puede realizarse. Es el caso del impuesto selectivo de consumo. De allí que la reserva de ley referida pueda calificarse como “relativa”, según lo ha ratificado en varios de sus pronunciamientos dicha Sala, entre otros en las resoluciones nos. 8271-2001, 8580-2001 y 5504-2002. Dentro de esta concepción, las exenciones y en general los beneficios tributarios, deben ser igualmente creados mediante ley, en la que corresponde incorporar, para claridad aplicativa, el supuesto de hecho o el hecho generador del beneficio fiscal. En esta dirección, el párrafo inicial del ordinal 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios dispone: “La ley que contemple exenciones debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones.” IV.- Finalidad de las normas que disponen exenciones. La exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma contempla que en determinados supuestos obligación del sujeto pasivo de cancelar la obligación tributaria. Forma parte de los denominados “beneficios fiscales”, los que suelen responder a una finalidad extrafiscal, o bien de estímulo a ciertas actividades. En muchas ocasiones, estos beneficios se sustentan en la lógica del principio de capacidad económica, o en otras razones que motivan la decisión del legislador. En este sentido, dentro de la doctrina tributarista se constituyen y así deben considerarse, como mecanismos y herramientas propias del entorno tributario. Constituyen vías que en el fondo pretenden y permiten, mediante condiciones estratégicas (que pueden ser temporales), el fomento, desarrollo o promoción de un determinado sector económico, de ciertas áreas de actividad, contextos sociales, o bien, la equiparación de las condiciones económicas para potenciar un estado de igualdad en la distribución de las cargas contributivas, a corto, mediano o largo plazo. En ocasiones, simplemente buscan evitar que el sistema tributario se torne confiscatorio. De ahí que resulten inviables cuando tengan por fin un beneficio injustificado, incompatible con su finalidad parafiscal o se aparten de criterios razonables y del sistema de valores propio de la Constitución Política. Así visto, su creación no es incompatible con los principios de igualdad, generalidad y el deber de contribuir con las cargas públicas que se desprende del numeral 18 de la Constitución Política, sino que son elementos que se complementan para lograr, en tesis de principio, un equilibrio y estabilidad en la situación fiscal del país en su dimensión integral. Es decir, en el fondo buscan el cumplimiento de esos postulados, mediante acciones que se orientan a constituir un sistema revestido por condiciones de equidad en términos de capacidad económica y desarrollo. Por ende, en su nueva integración, esta Sala considera que contrario al criterio hasta el momento sostenido en este campo, no constituyen estricto sensu, excepciones al deber de contribuir, sino partes de un sistema que disponen la dispensa del pago del impuesto, o bien otros beneficios, que integralmente considerados, buscan mejorar, en sentido global, el sistema impositivo en términos cuantitativos y cualitativos. Lo anterior mediante la dispensa total o parcial del pago del impuesto o la disminución de su base de cálculo, ergo, pueden recaer sobre la obligación tributaria en su plenitud, o bien, sobre la exclusión de aquella base de algunos componentes. Ante estas particularidades, su manejo debe ser cuidadoso y cauteloso, pues su aplicación arbitraria puede hacer incurrir en afectaciones a los principios de generalidad y de igualdad, trastornando su propia finalidad. V.- Interpretación de las normas tributarias y exenciones. Finalidad. La labor hermenéutica de las normas que regulen las relaciones tributarias, debe realizarse dentro de los causes de las reglas de la interpretación jurídica, comunes a todas las ramas del derecho acudiendo a sus diversos métodos, a fin de precisar los alcances y particularidades de un determinado mandato, de modo que la formulación hipotética, aplicada a la praxis diaria, cumpla su cometido intrínseco y el fin que ha dispuesto el legislador para su emisión. En este sentido, el numeral 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establece: “Las normas tributarias se deben interpretar con arreglo a todos los métodos admitidos por el Derecho Común. La analogía es procedimiento admisible para llenar los vacíos legales pero en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni exenciones .” (El resaltado no es del original) En esta labor, a tono con el principio de igualdad constitucional, es claro que el intérprete debe ponderar las diversas variables que convergen en cada situación, dentro de ellas, la naturaleza de la disposición, procurando que su uso, en la forma y alcances que establezca, sea igual para todos los casos similares y evitar una aplicación material que burle la finalidad misma de su contenido. La exégesis de las normas tributarias no puede ser restrictiva. El tributo se particulariza por su coactividad, en tanto dimana del ejercicio del Poder Público, que mediante esta vía, impone, al amparo de la Constitución, gravámenes económicos a los sujetos pasivos. Pero además, se identifica por su carácter contributivo en tanto su finalidad es colaborar con las cargas públicas, a fin de dotar al Estado de los recursos adecuados que le permitan desplegar su marco funcional y prestacional a favor de la colectividad. Esto desde luego no excluye que en ciertos casos, este tipo de cargas nazcan con un objetivo diferente, como sería el caso del criterio de la parafiscalidad. Desde este plano, las normas tributarias no pueden ser consideradas excepcionales o bien, limitativas de los derechos de los particulares, dado que ese carácter llevaría a que su aplicación y por tanto su interpretación, fuese igualmente restrictivo. Tampoco resulta acertada esa forma interpretativa dentro del contexto de las disposiciones que establezcan exenciones o beneficios fiscales. Esta Sala, hasta la fecha, había sostenido la tesis de que, conforme a lo dispuesto por el Código referido y el régimen jurídico propio de las exenciones, su interpretación debe ser restrictiva, en razón de que del contexto de los numerales 5, 6 en relación al citado ordinal 62, todos de aquel cuerpo legal, se desprende la protección al principio de legalidad en materia de exenciones, mediante la imposibilidad de interpretar ampliativamente las normas a ellas referidas. En este sentido entre muchas, sentencia no. 162, de las 15 horas 22 minutos del 25 de setiembre de 1991, no. 93 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 28 de agosto de 1996, no. 86 de las 15 horas del 19 de agosto de 1998 y no. 318 de las 9 horas del 19 de mayo del 2004. No obstante, con su nueva integración, y luego de una profunda reflexión del punto, llega a un criterio distinto al referido. La naturaleza y objeto de las normas del tipo aludido, en los términos ya expuestos, así como su régimen jurídico, no implica ni justifica que deban ser interpretadas con un prisma diferente al de las otras disposiciones tributarias, sea, con criterios especiales, pues a fin de cuentas, se reitera, son todas componentes de un mismo sistema que busca, en su dimensión teleológica, la equidad en las cargas contributivas. Para ello es necesario, en algunos casos, implementar normas que en el fondo, busquen el cumplimiento de los diversos principios con los que el constituyente ha revestido el sistema fiscal. Como se ha dicho, es frecuente que los beneficios fiscales respondan a la capacidad económica, o bien a criterios extrafiscales, los que igualmente pueden estar presentes en otros componentes del tributo. Una interpretación restrictiva en esta materia supondría que ese tipo de beneficios son excepcionales, siendo que solo son aplicables cuando la ley lo disponga. No obstante, el principio de legalidad tributaria al que están sujetos, no puede constituirse en un condicionante válido que justifique una interpretación especial (restrictiva), sino que debe ser ponderado en su correcta dimensión, esto es, solo por vía legal pueden crearse, su fuente de origen debe reunir las condiciones señaladas en el numeral 62 del citado Código y solo surten efectos si ocurre el hecho que ha sido preestablecido para su ocurrencia. Por tanto, la legalidad tributaria así vista, no es justificante de una consideración restrictiva de las gracias fiscales. Conviene aclarar empero, que las normas de esta clase son las que se conocen como mandatos con presupuesto de hecho exclusivo, lo que, a tono con lo dispuesto por los artículos 6 y 62 mencionados, impiden su aplicación analógica, lo que es una situación distinta a la propia interpretación. En esta tesitura, al igual que los tributos se encuentran sujetos a un principio de reserva legal, también lo están las exenciones y beneficios, en cuya fuente de creación, deben enunciarse los elementos básicos que la delimitan. Dentro de este enfoque entonces, las normas que contengan regulaciones del tipo referido, deben ser ponderadas sin sujeción a ningún criterio especial o específico. En esta tarea, debe recordarse que la norma transcrita establece en su párrafo final un límite objetivo a esta labor exegética, tal cual es, la imposibilidad de crear tributos o exenciones vía analógica, mecanismo que si bien es útil para llenar los vacíos legales, no puede suplir en estos términos, el papel del legislador en virtud del principio de reserva legal. Así visto, el campo de la creación de gravámenes y beneficios tributarios está vedado por este medio, siendo por ende figuras que deben crearse por una manifestación legislativa formal, en los términos ya explicitados con antelación. Ahora bien, esta última característica aludida supone que las exenciones y beneficios tributarios solo pueden concederse si el hecho concreto que se invoca, corresponde al supuesto fáctico de la norma autorizante y su otorgamiento es factible acorde al parámetro fijado por el legislador en la fuente de su creación. Por ende, cuando la norma imponga de forma clara e indubitable condiciones concretas para el disfrute o recepción de los efectos benevolentes del régimen fiscal, en su aplicación estos parámetros no podrán ser eludidos en tanto son parte inexorable del hecho condicionante que el ordenamiento ha fijado. Así visto, el efecto condicionado se producirá, cuando esos presupuestos fácticos estipulados en el mandato se hayan satisfecho. De este modo, el juzgador debe analizar en cada caso, con el cuidado de rigor, si el supuesto de hecho propuesto por el sujeto pasivo encuadra y coincide con el hecho exento dispuesto por la norma que prevé el beneficio, dentro de su contenido material. En esta confrontación, en tesis de principio, resulta improcedente ampliar los efectos de la norma a extremos que ella no contempla, ni que deriven de su contenido, como igualmente inviable por imperio de ley lo son las prácticas analógicas en este tipo de situaciones, pues surge el riesgo de incorporar dentro del hecho exento, supuestos que no contempla la ley, lo que atentaría contra el precitado principio de reserva legal que impera en estos campos. Lo anterior no prejuzga sobre la correcta o indebida interpretación de los instrumentos jurídicos aplicables al caso, tema que será tratado adelante. Este desarrollo es de aplicación para la globalidad de los elementos del tributo, incluido, claro está, la base imponible, la que, definida por el legislador, constituye el parámetro sobre el cual se aplicará la tarifa para obtener el aporte real al Fisco. Desde este plano, la fórmula de consignación de esta fuente de cálculo debe ser lo más diáfana posible, para evitar imprecisiones en su aplicación. En todo caso, para la deliberación sobre los extremos que cubre este elemento, son de total aplicación las reglas interpretativas mencionadas supra, lo que supone, que solamente estarán excluidos de su ámbito de cobertura (base de cálculo), los aspectos que de forma expresa hayan sido excluidos por norma jurídica aplicable. VI.- Sobre el caso concreto. Base imponible. Aclarado lo anterior, se ingresa al examen de los cargos formulados. Los reparos primero, segundo y tercero, gravitan en torno a la posibilidad de extraer de la base imponible del impuesto a los licores, las partidas que alega el recurrente, lo que se deriva, indica, de que la base de cálculo del gravamen está conformada por el precio ex fábrica. De ahí que al versar sobre un mismo eje temático, serán analizados en forma conjunta. Se acusa violación de los numerales 36 y 37 de la Ley de Licores, que establecen un impuesto sobre los licores nacionales y extranjeros, en tanto, sostiene el recurrente, no se ha permitido la exclusión de los descuentos que con frecuencia y como práctica comercial, se ofrecen a los compradores, así como del denominado Impuesto de Grecia y los superávit. Para tales efectos, es de rigor traer a colación el texto de las normas invocadas por el casacionista, a fin de precisar los alcances de los diversos elementos del tributo que interesa, con especial énfasis en el correspondiente al hecho generador. En este sentido, la creación directa del gravamen se determina en el numeral 36 de la Ley de Licores, número 10 del 7 de octubre de 1936, normativa que a la vez, estatuye con suma claridad, quiénes serán los sujetos pasivos de la obligación tributaria. Dispone el precepto de referencia: “Créase un impuesto sobre el expendio de licores, tanto nacionales como extranjeros y sobre la cerveza extranjera, el cual será pagado por los patentados de licores a que se refiere esta ley, no permitiéndose en forma alguna su traslación al público consumidor.” Por su parte, el ordinal 37 ibidem establece los demás componentes al indicar: “El impuesto sobre los licores nacionales será del 10% sobre el precio de venta del productor, excluido el correspondiente impuesto de ventas. Asimismo, los licores y cervezas extranjeras pagarán por concepto de impuesto el 10% sobre el costo total de importación. Los ingresos que perciban las municipalidades, según lo dispuesto en este artículo (párrafo segundo y tercero), serán destinados exclusivamente al plan de lotificación, a que se refiere el inciso 4) del artículo 4º del Código Municipal.” Como puede observarse, las normas indicadas, a tono con el principio de legalidad tributaria, establecen todos los elementos del tributo. Interesa exclusivamente lo concerniente a la base imponible, al ser este el aspecto debatido, y sobre el que se centra la polémica en cuanto a la legalidad de la determinación realizada por la Administración Tributaria. Acorde a la última norma transcrita, la base imponible en el caso de los licores nacionales, se encuentra constituida por el precio de venta del productor, fuente cuantitativa de la cual debe excluirse, por mandato expreso de ley, el correspondiente impuesto de ventas. Dicha referencia permite sin mayor confusión, determinar que la base de cálculo establecida por el legislador fue el precio autorizado al productor. Empero, este precio, según la Ley número 6796 de 17 de agosto de 1982 que interpreta auténticamente el artículo 37 de la Ley de Licores, "... se entenderá comprensivo de cualesquiera impuestos, presentes o futuros, así como cualquier gasto administrativo que forme parte del precio final de venta autorizado al productor". En este mismo sentido, de esta Sala, consúltese resolución no. 12 de las 16 horas 3 minutos del 5 de enero del 2000. VII.- Incidencia de descuentos aplicados en la base imponible. Para el casacionista, acorde a la legislación aplicable, e incluso, derivado de la interpretación auténtica del artículo 37 de la Ley de Licores, los descuentos otorgados a favor de los clientes, el Impuesto de Grecia y los superávit, deben ser excluidos de la base de cálculo del gravamen. El cargo carece de fundamento jurídico y deberá rechazarse. En efecto, un análisis e interpretación adecuada de la norma en cuestión, permite inferir que el único elemento que no forma parte de esa fuente de cuantificación es el impuesto sobre las ventas. Los descuentos son prácticas frecuentes en el tráfico mercantil, como estrategia de mercado para acrecentar o asegurar la captación de clientes de un determinado bien o servicio. Si bien en lo que se refiere al impuesto de análisis, no se encuentra prohibición para que FANAL los practique, las normas que regulan el gravamen no disponen de modo base de cálculo, aspecto que sólo podría ser establecido por ley que de manera al socaire de los numerales 5 inciso b) en relación con el 62, ambos del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, solamente mediante ley formal (en sentido estricto) pueden crearse exenciones o en general, beneficios tributarios que importen una dispensa al deber de contribuir con las cargas públicas. De hecho, la creación de un beneficio fiscal de esta naturaleza supone el establecimiento diáfano de las condiciones en que se otorga. En la especie, el recurrente pretende se dispensen de la base, los descuentos realizados, alegando para ello, que es de aplicación analógica lo regulado por el numeral 11 inciso a) de la Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas, al disponerlo así el artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Aquel precepto excluye de la base imponible “Los descuentos aceptados en las prácticas comerciales, siempre que sean usuales y generales y se consignen por separado del precio de venta en la factura respectiva.” Lleva razón el recurrente en que el ordinal 6 ya citado establece en su párrafo segundo que la analogía es un mecanismo jurídico que permite llenar vacíos legales, no obstante, de seguido esa misma disposición prevé que en virtud de ella, no pueden crearse exenciones ni tributos. Es decir, la misma ley ha establecido que la analogía no puede transformarse en un dispositivo para disminuir la cuantía de las obligaciones tributarias, o al menos, una rebaja en la base imponible. La analogía es un método válido para llenar lagunas legales donde no exista norma que regule el punto, no obstante, su aplicación no puede dar origen a la creación de tributos o exenciones, como aquí se pretende, pues ello corresponde, con exclusividad, al legislador (legalidad tributaria). Es un mecanismo válido de integración del Derecho, en tanto supone la carencia de norma expresa directamente aplicable, sin embargo, esa laguna no se presenta en este caso, lo que hace improcedente su aplicación en los términos propuestos. En el sub-júdice, esa consecuencia es la que procura el CNP, al pretender importar de la Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas, una disposición que permite el efecto que ahora busca. Sin embargo, esa consecuencia deviene en improcedente para este caso en particular, en tanto se trata de un subterfugio que conduciría a reducir la carga fiscal de un sujeto pasivo, bajo un supuesto no autorizado por el marco legal que delimita los elementos del impuesto. En efecto, del análisis del citado ordinal 37 de la Ley de Licores, no se desprende que exista vacío alguno, en razón de que ese cuerpo legal es lo suficientemente claro respecto de la definición de la base imponible, así como de los elementos que se encuentran ajenos a ella, indicando que estará conformada por el precio de venta del productor sin considerar el impuesto de venta. La normativa de la Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas que autoriza descontar de la base imponible los descuentos, es de aplicación para ese tipo de tributo, no así para el impuesto sobre las bebidas alcohólicas, cuyos aspectos internos, según se ha comentado, se encuentran regulados en forma clara por una ley especial, lo que hace que la aplicación analógica del artículo 11 inciso a) del conjunto legal referido, sea inviable, aunado al hecho de la inexistencia de una norma legal habilitante que permita realizar la disminución alegada sobre la base imponible. Desde otro ángulo, el tema en mención ya ha sido analizado en otras oportunidades por esta Sala, a saber, entre otras, en el fallo no. 12 de las 16 horas 3 minutos del 5 de enero del 2000, en el que se indicó: “En la especie de lo que trata es de establecer el alcance del artículo 37 de la Ley de licores, para determinar si las liquidaciones del impuesto sobre el expendio de licores, efectuadas por el Consejo Nacional de Licores durante los períodos supra reseñados, se ajustan o no, del modo que se alega en el recurso, a lo ordenado en ese numeral. Dispone el artículo 37 que la base para calcular el 10% del impuesto es el precio de venta del productor de licores nacionales, excluido el correspondiente impuesto de ventas. Este precio, según la ley número 6796 de 17 de agosto de 1982 que interpreta auténticamente artículo 37 de la ley, "... se entenderá comprensivo de cualesquiera impuestos, presentes o futuros, así como cualquier gasto administrativo que forme parte del precio final de venta autorizado al productor". Basta leer con atención la normativa anterior y compenetrarse en su espíritu, para que se haga evidente que el legislador sí estableció en forma precisa la base imponible: "el precio autorizado al productor". Es claro que no existe normativa que prohíba a la Fábrica Nacional de Licores aplicar descuentos en los precios de sus productos, como práctica comercial. Lo que tiene vedado es deducir los descuentos efectivamente concedidos de la base imponible, en perjuicio de la Administración Tributaria, por que la ley no contempla para este tributo concreto esa posibilidad, tal y como sucede con otros, verbigracia el impuesto general sobre ventas. Tampoco puede afirmarse que la autorización para tal práctica derive de la aplicación analógica del artículo 11 de la Ley General del Impuesto sobre las Ventas. Tal y como lo establece el artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, la analogía no es un método de interpretación normativa, sino de integración, admisible para "llenar los vacíos legales", que obviamente no es el caso.” Este criterio fue luego reiterado en la resolución no. 559 de las 15 horas 20 minutos del 17 de julio del 2002 y en la no. 696 de las 16 horas 5 minutos del 11 de septiembre del 2002. De ahí entonces que por las causas señaladas, exista la imposibilidad legal de deducir de la base de cálculo del impuesto sobre licores nacionales, los descuentos que concede FANAL a sus clientes. VIII.- Sobre el Impuesto de Grecia. En lo que se refiere al tema del impuesto de Grecia, el reparo tampoco es de recibo por los mismos motivos expresados en el aparte anterior. En la especificidad de este aspecto, debe indicarse de nuevo, que el ordinal 37 de la Ley de Licores, excluye de la base imponible solo al impuesto sobre las ventas, entendiéndose por incorporados dentro de su fuente de cálculo, todos los demás tributos que formen parte del precio final de venta del producto, según así fue dispuesto en la Ley no. 6796, interpretación auténtica del artículo 37 de mención, en cuyo precepto 1 indica: "Interprétase auténticamente el artículo 37 de la Ley Sobre la Venta de Licores, No. 10 de 7 de octubre de 1936 y sus reformas, en el sentido de que el precio de venta autorizado al productor, se entenderá comprensivo de cualesquiera impuestos, presentes o futuros, así como cualquier gasto administrativo que forme parte del precio final de venta autorizado al productor. Únicamente el impuesto de venta no formará parte de la base imponible. " (El resaltado es propio). De lo anterior se colige que la deducción pretendida del Impuesto de Grecia, resulta improcedente desde el plano jurídico, en tanto fue el mismo legislador, mediante los poderes que le otorga el inciso 1) del numeral 121 de la Constitución Política, quien estableció de modo indubitable, que cualquier otro tributo, distinto al de ventas, no puede ser excluido de la plataforma de cálculo del impuesto a la venta de licores. Por tal motivo, acorde con el principio de reserva de ley tributaria y las mismas razones desarrolladas en el considerando anterior, no es dable suprimir las partidas correspondientes al Impuesto de Grecia de la base imponible del tributo bajo examen. En el mismo sentido ya se ha pronunciado esta Sala, entre otros en el fallo no. 194 de las 10 horas 50 minutos del 17 de marzo del 2004. estableció que: “A ese respecto, el Tribunal, en el Considerando V, estimó que esta ley específica –Ley sobre la Venta de Licores- expresamente indica que el precio de venta autorizado comprenderá cualquier impuesto presente, futuro u otros gastos, excepto el de ventas, criterio que esta Sala comparte porque las diferencias propias del caso, conforme se indicó en el tema de los descuentos, y cuyo rechazo tiene el mismo fundamento jurídico (ordinal 37 de la Ley sobre la Venta de Licores), la normativa vigente no permite, como lo pretende el recurrente, deducir de la base imponible el “Impuesto de Grecia”. El hecho de que durante algún período se hubiere procedido en sentido contrario, no es un argumento válido en sede jurisdiccional para suplir la falta de un mandato legal que lo permita.” Por ende, el cargo aludido debe ser rechazado. IX. Sobre la doble imposición. El casacionista acusa que al negarse la aplicación de los descuentos mencionados, se incurre en quebranto del principio de prohibición de doble imposición. En lo atinente a este alegato, debe indicarse que en torno al tema, la misma Sala Constitucional ha establecido que la Carta Magna no dispone su prohibición, al contrario, ha indicado que en ciertos supuestos, es aceptada por el Ordenamiento Jurídico nacional. En este sentido, en la sentencia no. 3494-94 de las 14 horas 54 minutos del 12 de julio de 1994 indicó: "III. La facultad impositiva del Estado está otorgada a la Asamblea Legislativa de conformidad con el artículo 121 inciso 13.) de nuestra Constitución Política "Además de las otras atribuciones que le confiere esta Constitución, corresponde a la Asamblea Legislativa: ... 13.) Establecer los impuestos y contribuciones nacionales, y autorizar los municipales." Como se observa, (...) no existe norma o principio constitucional alguno que prohiba establecer una doble imposición tributaria sobre el mismo hecho generador, según lo alega el accionante. Todo lo contrario, es el mismo texto constitucional el que contempla la posibilidad de establecer esa doble imposición, por cuanto, por una parte, le otorga a la Asamblea Legislativa la facultad general de imponer los impuestos y demás cargas tributarias, y por otra, le otorga a las Municipalidades las mismas prerrogativas en su circunscripción territorial, previa autorización del Congreso." En igual dirección de esa misma Sala, véase resolución no. 7541 de las 16 horas 45 minutos del 21 de diciembre de 1994. No obstante, debe tenerse claro que al margen de que la legislación nacional no prohíba en forma expresa el doble gravamen sobre una misma actividad, es lo cierto que el poder tributario encuentra una serie de límites sustanciales que le impone el texto constitucional, y que constituyen las bases de los principios inherentes a la actividad impositiva. Tal es el caso de los postulados de generalidad (artículo 18 constitucional), principio de igualdad (sustentado en el numeral 33 ibidem), de capacidad contributiva (que es el resultado de todos los principios impositivos) y de no confiscatoriedad. Interesa particularmente este último. Este axioma se desprende del numeral 45 de la Carta Magna que protege el derecho de propiedad. Desde este plano, supone que el poder tributario no puede llegar a niveles cuantitativos tales, que vacíen el derecho de propiedad, al exponer al sujeto pasivo de la obligación contributiva a cargas que se encuentren por encima de los niveles razonables de sus rentas. De ahí que la doble imposición, aún cuando viable, está vedada cuando implique una afectación al principio de no confiscatoriedad. Si bien se establece un deber de contribuir a las cargas públicas, los gravámenes que se impongan para tales efectos, deben ponderar en forma razonable la capacidad contributiva de los sujetos pasivos, de modo que no se transformen en medios impositivos que cercenen su propiedad y posibilidades de desarrollo económico. Empero, el casacionista se limita a acusar ese supuesto vicio, sin aportar argumentos de fondo que permitan concluir sobre sus consecuencias confiscatorias, es decir, omite la explicación diáfana del supuesto desafuero, por lo que la Sala no puede abordar su examen (numeral 596 de la normativa procesal civil). Por esta razón, el reparo no es de recibo, debiéndose denegar el recurso por este reproche. ... XI.- Desde esta óptica, en este caso, tanto el Impuesto de Grecia, así como los descuentos, forman parte de los parámetros de la base imponible, en los términos dichos, por lo que a tono con el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, solamente en virtud de ley expresa pueden ser exceptuados, lo que no se evidencia en el caso de estudio, de ahí que esos extremos deben ser considerados para fijar la base del tributo. Así fue efectivamente valorado por los Juzgadores en el fallo impugnado. De este modo, no se da la afectación a las disposiciones que regulan el proceder interpretativo de las normas tributarias, en concreto, de las que delimitan el tributo sobre los licores, las que, a juicio de esta Sala, han sido debidamente aplicadas al litigio, por lo que, los cargos formulados deberán ser rechazados...". Así las cosas y de conformidad con lo supra indicado, no cabe la menor duda que no resultan de recibo los argumentos expuestos por el actor del presente proceso y en consecuencia deviene de improcedente excluir de la base imponible del impuesto a favor del Instituto accionado los denominados descuentos y el impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia. Resta analizar la procedencia de la exclusión peticionada, respecto de los gastos o aportes al Consejo Nacional de Producción. Sobre este particular, resulta de interés señalar que mediante resolución número 321-2005 de las nueve horas del once de agosto del dos mil cinco, la Sala Primera del Tribunal Administrativo, al resolver la aclaración y adición peticionada por el actor, dispuso que los rubros citados deben excluirse de la base imponible del impuesto que debe cancelarse a favor del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal. Por lo que, deviene de innecesario referirse al punto, ya que este fue concedido en sede administrativa. (...)". Con fundamento en lo antes expuesto, en donde se analizan todos los alegatos interpuestos por la parte actora respecto a los rubros de "Descuentos" e "Impuesto a la Municipalidad de Grecia" en relación con la base de cálculo del impuesto sobre los licores nacionales a favor del Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, y no existiendo los vicios de nulidad alegados ni otros elementos capaces de modificar lo establecido en la jurisprudencia, se impone el rechazo de los agravios planteados. En cuanto al tema de los "Aportes al CNP", se verifica que la resolución número 312-2006 de las once horas del trece de julio del dos mil seis de la Sala Primera del Tribunal Administrativo, dispuso revocar parcialmente la resolución administrativa impugnada en cuanto al rubro citado, e indica que no procede incluirlo dentro de la base imponible del impuesto sobre los licores nacionales, en virtud de lo anterior, al haberse concedido lo peticionado en sede administrativa, resulta innecesario que se emita pronunciamiento en esta sede judicial. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar la acción planteada por el actor, al determinarse que la resolución N° 312-2006 dictada por el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo se ajusta a derecho.”