Jurisdiction to resolve appeals against municipal decisions and conflict of jurisdiction between the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal and the Comptroller General's OfficeCompetencia para resolver apelaciones contra acuerdos municipales y conflicto de competencia entre Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Contraloría General de la República

**I.- The actions giving rise to this matter.** 1.- The Municipal Council of the central canton of the province of Heredia, in ordinary session no. 300-2005 of December 15, 2005, agreement IV, declared the patrimonial liability of the appellants, who served as members of the Heredia 2003 Popular Festivities Commission (Comisión de Festejos Populares de Heredia 2003), since the existence of gross negligence (culpa grave) was demonstrated by entering into irregular contracts, for which reason it ordered that they be required, jointly and severally, to reimburse ¢1,017,980.74. 2.- Disagreeing with the decision, the former members of the Festivities Commission filed on January 18, 2006, “…Revocation Appeal with subsidiary Appeal, Exception of statute of limitations, lack of right, and Absolute Nullity…” (sic). 3.- The Municipal Council in ordinary session no. 319-2006, held on March 13, 2006, article IV, rejected both the exceptions and the revocation appeal filed and, in accordance with articles 156 of the Municipal Code (hereinafter C.M.) and 85 of the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) (hereinafter L.R.J.C.A.), elevated the subsidiary appeal to the Contentious-Administrative Court “…FOR ITS CORRESPONDING RESOLUTION, …”. 4.- The Second Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, in resolution no. 523-2007 of 4:10 p.m. on November 7, 2007, declared the appeal was improperly granted and instructed the respondent Municipality to transfer the appeal filed before the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, C.G.R.). By analyzing Law no. 4286 in its original text (prior to the reform introduced by Law no. 8494) and the Operations Manual for Popular Festivities Commissions (Manual de Operaciones para las Comisiones de Festejos Populares), issued by the C.G.R. on September 20, 1990, that Court determined its lack of jurisdiction, considering that “…based on the regulatory framework governing the matter of auditing oversight and its consequences, at the time the events occurred, jurisdiction resided in the constitutional body in charge of controlling public finances, that is, the Comptroller General of the Republic, …”. 5.- The Legal Advisory and Management Division (División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica) of the C.G.R., through pronouncement DAGJ-0269-2008 (01777) of February 29, 2008, relating numeral 183 of the Political Constitution to the provisions of its Organic Law, no. 7428; the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos), no. 8131; article 4 of Law 4268 (sic); the concept of improper hierarchy (jerarquía impropia) and precept 81 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), determined: “…before and after Law 8494 underwent reforms, it is not possible to infer that a monophasic improper hierarchy was established therein, such that this Comptroller Body would be called upon to resolve appeals regarding Popular Festivities Commissions.” They add to the above that constitutional ordinal 173 is clear in providing what pertains to the challenge of municipal acts, as developed by canon 156 of the C.M. They conclude that this Comptroller’s Office is not competent to resolve an appeal against a municipal agreement, given that it is not an improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio) in this matter; likewise, it is impossible to interpret that Law 4268 (sic) “…granted that competence to the Comptroller General, since it was not expressly regulated that this office must resolve an appeal regarding Popular Festivities Commissions.//One cannot confuse the competence assigned at the time by Law 4268 to determine disciplinary or damage liabilities with that of resolving an appeal as an improper hierarchical superior, since, as noted, such competence must be expressly regulated.” 6.- The Municipal Nombre1978 filed an extraordinary review appeal before the Comptroller General of the Republic, essentially stating that “…we are not dealing with an action as an improper hierarchy, but rather with the oversight and superior control of a municipal act […] concerning public finances.” Based on the foregoing and since “…the superior oversight of public finances is involved…”, they base the Comptroller Body’s competence to hear and resolve the appeal filed, not as an improper hierarchy, but as a superior body in matters of oversight of Public Finances. 7.- The Comptroller General of the Republic, in resolution R-CO-22-2008 at 11:00 a.m. on May 15, 2008, in view of the situation arising from the lack of jurisdiction declared both by the Legal Advisory and Management Division—endorsed by that hierarchy—and by the Contentious-Administrative Court, ordered “…for procedural economy, to elevate the proceedings directly …” to this Chamber so that “…using the powers conferred by article 54, subsection 12), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), it may resolve the conflict presented.” **II.- The nature of the conflict and the body competent to resolve it.** 1) This matter involves a (negative) conflict of jurisdiction, since both instances decline it; that is, neither claims it for themselves (positive conflict). 2) On one hand, neither the Constitution nor the law attribute any competence whatsoever to the C.G.R. to hear appeals against municipal agreements; on the other hand, the fact that the final paragraph of numeral 173 of the Political Constitution establishes that “…the record shall be sent to the Tribunal dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law for its definitive resolution” is not sufficient to determine that the conflict is of a constitutional nature and, therefore, must be resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. In this regard, that decision-making body has been clear in stating: “…for a constitutional conflict of competencies to proceed, it is not enough that the constitutional text mentions the public entity or body, but rather it must attribute specific competencies to it, the interpretation and application of which, regarding ownership and exercise, is to be resolved. Consequently, when the question revolves around attributions granted by the infra-constitutional legal system—legal or regulatory—the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rules provided by the General Law of Public Administration in its articles 71 to 82, since it will be, in that case, an administrative conflict of legality…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 of 12:59 p.m. on February 27, 2004). Based on the foregoing, it can be affirmed that the specific attribution of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), a body not mentioned in the constitutional norm, to hear appeals of municipal agreements (which are not only those issued by Municipal Councils), is not of a constitutional nature but rather infra-constitutional, being provided and regulated in the Municipal and Contentious-Administrative Procedural Codes, as it was in the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. That is to say, this is not a conflict that, by the very interpretation and definition of its competence provided by the Constitutional Chamber (article 7 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), corresponds to that Chamber to resolve. In reinforcement of the above, the following considerations from that Court are important: a) for a conflict to be admissible before that Chamber “…two fundamental elements must be evaluated: the subject filing it and against whom it is filed; and on the other part, the matter or competence upon which the conflict is based…” (resolution no. 11585-2001 idem). b) “…by definition, a conflict of competencies—whether constitutional or administrative—arises when two or more public bodies or entities dispute the exercise of a power or attribution, each considering itself the one that must carry it out. For this reason, this court's jurisprudence has been clear that if one party challenges the competence of the other, but does not claim it for itself, the intervention of the Chamber is not appropriate…” (resolution no. 619-2001 of 3:18 p.m. on January 24, 2001). The foregoing was reiterated by that Chamber in resolution no. 9364-2005 of 2:48 p.m. on July 13, 2005, stating: “…there is a conflict when two or more entities dispute an attribution. This Chamber so held in judgment No. 2001-00619, of 1-24-01, …”; a resolution in which it also stated: “…Consequently, there is no conflict of constitutional competencies when one body questions the attributions of another but does not claim them for itself…” c) constitutional conflicts can be of two types; “…a) Positive, which is raised when, simultaneously, two entities or bodies consider themselves competent; and b) negative, when the two entities or bodies decline their competence and consider themselves incompetent to hear and resolve a given matter. In both cases, the question of competence is resolved by determining exactly which entity or body is the holder and, consequently, must exercise it…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 idem). d) “…In the present case, the situation described would not, in reality, go beyond the existence of allegedly contradictory legal criteria, which is not the same as saying that two or more parties are attempting to exercise a constitutional competence to the exclusion of the other or others, which is the type of conflict this Chamber would generally resolve…” (resolution no. 11346-2004 of 2:39 p.m. on October 13, 2004). e) “…The legislator, despite the original constituent's will being implicit, took care to emphasize that, in any case, such conflicts of competence are of a constitutional nature, that is, when a discussion is engaged concerning the ownership and exercise of the set of powers that the Political Constitution attributes to a specific public body or entity…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 idem). f) “…In summary, the object of a conflict can only be a competence of a constitutional nature, not a legal and much less a regulatory attribution. Likewise, the purpose of the action is to claim that competence generally,…” (resolution no. 9364-2005 idem). g) that jurisdiction only has powers to hear “…conflicts relating to constitutional competencies; that is, spheres of attributions, immunities, and privileges established by the Constitution, and not conflicts relating to competencies of another nature, meaning that in this venue it is not appropriate to hear conflicts of legality or administrative conflicts, …” (among others, resolutions no. 443-2000 of 4:48 p.m. on January 12, 2000; no. 619-2001 of 3:18 p.m. on January 24, 2001; no. 11585-2001 of 8:54 a.m. on November 9, 2001; 7689-2002 of 2:44 p.m. on August 7, 2002; no. 9364-2005 idem; no. 15955-2006 of 2:48 p.m. on November 1, 2006, citing “…the holding in Judgment No. 2004-11346…” (sic); and no. 13577-2007 idem). 3.- It is clear that this is also not an infra-constitutional conflict to be resolved by the President of the Republic, given that, by the nature of the disagreeing bodies, this does not fall within any of the scenarios contained in articles 26 subsection d) (between Ministries) and 78 (between a Ministry and a decentralized institution or between the latter) of the General Law of Public Administration.

**III.- The competence of this Chamber to resolve the conflict raised.** Given that it does not correspond to the Constitutional Chamber or the President of the Republic to resolve it, for the reasons stated, it must be determined whether this Chamber is competent. The Constitutional Chamber, in resolution no. 2199-2004 idem, indicated that “…when the question revolves around attributions granted by the infra-constitutional legal system—legal or regulatory—the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rules provided by the General Law of Public Administration in its articles 71 to 82, since it will be, in that case, an administrative conflict of legality…” (Emphasis not in original). It is pertinent to note that this must be harmonized and complemented with what is established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (hereinafter L.O.P.J.), which specially regulates conflicts between jurisdictional bodies and even between judicial and administrative authorities. The foregoing, given that, in addition to the resolution of conflicts between jurisdictional bodies (among others, numerals 54 subsections 8, 9, 10, and 11; 55 subsection 4); 57 subsection 4); 59 subsection 5) and 102 of the L.O.P.J.), the legislator vested in a Judicial Branch body the attribution to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction in which at least one judicial authority intervenes, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Thus, precept 54 subsection 12) of the L.O.P.J. expressly establishes that this Chamber shall hear: “…Conflicts of jurisdiction that arise regarding judicial and administrative authorities.” It is clear that the principle of distribution of functions; the constitutional and legal attribution given to the Constitutional Chamber by the derived constituent to resolve conflicts of the highest rank (constitutional), as well as the special regulation contained in the L.O.P.J. regarding competencies, exclude any intervention by a State Power, entity, or non-judicial body in the hearing and resolution of conflicts in which any judicial authority participates—it is reiterated, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Based on the foregoing, and because in this matter at least one of the disagreeing parties is a judicial authority, it does correspond to this Chamber to resolve the discrepancy submitted to its knowledge, and it is so ordered, both for what has already been stated and for reasons of legal certainty, procedural economy, and speed. The foregoing is reinforced even by the attribution the legislator provided for this Chamber to hear “…other matters indicated by law when, by their nature, they do not correspond to another of the Court's chambers.” (subsection 13 of article 54 of the L.O.P.J.)

**IV.- On the merits.** The Court is quite correct in stating that to resolve the matter, it must be based on Law no. 4286 of December 17, 1968, in its original text before the reform introduced by Law no. 8494, as well as on the Operations Manual for Popular Festivities Commissions, of the Comptroller General of the Republic, no. 202 of September 20, 1990, published in La Gaceta no. 202 of October 25 of that year. However, regarding this applicable regulatory framework, the following clarifications are necessary: 1) According to the original text of Law no. 4286, Popular Festivities Commissions were obliged to render a liquidation of accounts to the C.G.R. (article 1); that Comptroller Body had to “…reject those expenditures that do not include complete documentation and those that, in its judgment, are unrelated to the events held or were not indispensable or necessary for the festivities.” (first paragraph, article 3); the expenditures rejected or not accepted by the Comptroller “…shall be assumed proportionally by the commission members and reimbursed within one month from the date of the resolution…” (second paragraph, article 3); and the C.G.R. had the obligation to bring the necessary actions to establish the corresponding liabilities “…when it verifies incorrectness or irregularity in the handling of funds.” (article 4). 2) The cited Law no. 4286 was reformed in its article 1 by numeral 9, general norm no. 119, of Law no. 6700 of December 23, 1981 (Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law for the year 1982). As of that moment, it corresponded to the Municipal Auditing or Accounting Offices to review and approve the liquidation of accounts of the popular festivities commissions and “…to render that liquidation to the Comptroller General of the Republic…”. That is, the Commissions no longer had to send the liquidation of accounts to the C.G.R. but rather to the Municipal Auditing or Accounting Offices. 3) The Comptroller Body, through Manual 202 of September 20, 1990, “Operations Manual for Popular Festivities Commissions”, established that “…the Commission must render, to the Auditor or, failing that, to the Municipal Accountant, for their approval, the liquidation of the income and disbursements of that Commission…” (article 32); if the Municipal Auditor or Accountant determined “…shortfalls, improper payments, accounts receivable pending collection, expenses not backed by supporting vouchers, or any other irregularity that causes economic harm to the Commission, they shall inform the Municipal Council thereof, so that within a period of fifteen days, this body may directly manage with the relevant Commission members the reimbursement of the respective sums to the municipal coffers…” (first paragraph, article 34); if recovery of these sums is not achieved through administrative channels,”…the Council must exercise the corresponding legal actions for their compensation, in accordance with the provisions of article 210 of the General Law of Public Administration.” In other words, starting from the development of the Law made in the Manual issued by the Comptroller’s Office, a bifurcation in the procedure occurs. The respective liquidation of the Commission is submitted to the Auditor, or failing that, to the Municipal Accountant, and if those officials determine “…shortfalls, improper payments, accounts receivable pending collection, expenses not backed by supporting vouchers, or any other irregularity that causes economic harm to the Commission…”, they must bring it to the attention of the Municipal Council so that it may manage directly with the relevant Commission members the reimbursement of the respective sums; failing that, that collegiate body had to exercise the corresponding legal actions. 4) However, the C.G.R., noticing deficiencies “…in relation to compliance with the regulations governing the performance of popular festivities commissions,…”, through circular no. 2198 (DI-CR-71) of February 28, 2002, addressed to internal municipal auditors and municipal councils, deemed it prudent to warn and remind them “…for their application, of a summary of the principal applicable regulations.” In the relevant part, it expressly stated: “… d) Article 34 contemplates the eventual case where the official responsible for approving the liquidation determines shortfalls, improper payments, or any other irregularity causing economic harm to the Commission, stating that they must inform the Municipal Council thereof, for the purpose of enabling the Council to manage the reimbursement of the corresponding sums through the applicable legal channel…” From the foregoing, it is clear that the actions of both the internal municipal oversight and control body and the municipal councils were (and are) without prejudice to the final oversight by the Comptroller’s Office within the scope of its competencies as superior comptroller of Public Finances and the exercise of its attributions established in articles 3 and 4 of Law no. 4286. In reinforcement of what has been said, note that in the reform of articles 1, 3, and 4 introduced by Law no. 8494 of March 30, 2006, “Reforms of the Legal Framework assigning competencies to the Comptroller General of the Republic in the municipal regime”, that procedure is resumed regarding what pertains to the Council, but with the express statement “…without prejudice to the superior oversight corresponding to the Comptroller General of the Republic.” **V.-** Based on what is established in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), this Chamber understands that what was done at the time by the Municipality does not conflict with the normative and regulatory provisions and the directive of the Comptroller Body that regulated and guided, at that time, both the activity and responsibilities of the Popular Festivities Commissions and the attributions of the internal municipal control bodies and the Superior Oversight Body of Public Finances. Therefore, since this is an appeal against the Municipal Council’s agreement, its hearing and resolution corresponds to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, in accordance with the provisions of articles 156 of the Municipal Code and 189 and 190 subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), and it is so ordered.

**VI.- The current municipal appeal regime.** Regarding what was stated in whereas clause II of this resolution, concerning that municipal agreements “…are not only those issued by Municipal Councils…” and concerning the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (hereinafter C.P.C.A.), the following specific considerations regarding the current municipal appeal regime are timely. 1.- The possibility of challenging municipal decisions. The challenge of municipal decisions and agreements finds express support in numeral 173 of the Political Constitution. This norm regulates the so-called Mayor's veto, but also an appeal by any interested party; ergo, the power of citizens (munícipes) to appeal the decisions of the municipal government. In turn, it establishes that if the Municipality (in a broad sense) does not revoke or modify the objected or appealed agreement; that is, the challenged decision, the record shall be sent to the Tribunal dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law for its definitive resolution. From that point, currently, the Municipal Code and, more recently, the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code constitute the sources that generally develop the legal regime for the appealability of decisions issued by local corporations. Broadly, based on the provisions of ordinal 153 of the C.M., those decisions can be challenged at two levels. a) The first level includes internal appeals, so named because they can only be invoked by internal bodies of the local organization. These are: a.1) the veto of the Nombre1978 (articles 173 subsection 1) of the Constitution and 17 subsection d) and 158 to 160 of the C.M.), and a.2) the review that council members can bring against agreements that have not yet been definitively approved (articles 27 subsection c) and 153 ejusdem). b) The second level includes external appeals, which can only be filed by interested parties (article 173, subsection 2 of the Constitution), that is, the recipients of the actions. At this level are the ordinary revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) remedies, and the extraordinary review (revisión) remedy. Each remedy has specific regulations, depending on whether the acts were issued by the Council or bodies dependent on it, or whether the acts were issued by bodies that are not hierarchically dependent on that collegiate body. In all cases, as will be seen, in line with canon 173 of the Magna Carta, the rejection of those measures at the municipal level allows the matter to be sent to the Contentious-Administrative Court, so that within the biphasic non-hierarchical supervising (contralor no jerárquico bifásico) function it must exercise, it may resolve the eventual appeal and, in most cases (except special regulation to that effect), consider the administrative remedy exhausted (article 31 subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A.). From this perspective, and for clarity regarding the treatment to be given to the challenge of conduct issued by the various local authorities, it must be noted that in the current context, municipalities have a bifront regime, composed of two hierarchical centers of authority, which, by express provision of article 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code, make up the Municipal Government (hierarchical superior) of the Municipal Corporations. On one hand, the Council, made up of popularly elected council members, with political and normative functions (ordinal 12 of the C.M.), that is, it is a deliberative body of political connotation. On the other hand, the Mayor, also a popularly elected official (article 12 of the C.M.), with competences of a technical nature, with managerial and executive connotations (numerals 14 to 20 ibidem). Their competence framework is linked to executive and administrative functions. Between the two, there is no hierarchical link, but rather an inter-administrative coordination relationship, necessary for the work of administering the local interests and services of the canton in charge of the Municipal Government that both comprise, in the terms of article 169 of the Constitution. More simply, the Nombre1978 is not a hierarchical inferior of the Council; they are bodies with coordinated but not subject competences that ultimately must be complementary for the efficient and agile functioning of the municipalities. Their duty to ensure the due fulfillment of municipal agreements does not presuppose hierarchical subordination to the Council. It consists of a task inherent to their managerial and executive competences, for the proper organization and functioning of local services. 2.- Regulatory treatment of so-called external appeals. Title VI of the Municipal Code, called “Appeals against municipal acts”, separately regulates “Appeals against Council agreements” (Chapter I) and “Appeals against other municipal acts” (Chapter II). a) In the first case, both the decision adopted directly (that is, in a single instance by direct exercise of specific non-reviewing competence), “…or hearing on appeal against the decision of some hierarchically inferior municipal body…” (emphasis not in original), is subject to the ordinary remedies of revocation and appeal, with the exceptions provided in canon 154 of the C.M., remedies that must be filed within five business days (common time limit in this matter). The first remedy, for reasons of appropriateness or legality; the second, only for matters of legality (article 156 C.M.). Before the Council's decision in a single instance, the appeal must be heard by the Contentious-Administrative Court, according to precepts 189 to 192 of the C.P.C.A. in relation to 156 of the C.M. In the decisions of the direct inferior bodies of that collegiate body, a chain or appeal ladder operates, since that declaration is challengeable through ordinary remedies. For those cases (and only for those), the appeal is heard by the Council. However, against the decision, revocation and appeal would again be possible, the latter being the competence of the aforementioned Court. In this last case, it is crucial to indicate that the competence held by the Municipal Council as administrative hierarchical superior (jerarca administrativo) to review the conduct of its inferiors (a power that, in any case, derives from numeral 102 subsections b) and d) of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter L.G.A.P.)), is reserved for the legality review of acts issued by its inferiors, that is, by bodies that, within the organizational chain of command (101 ibidem), maintain a direct relationship of hierarchical subordination. Therefore, the decisions of all those offices that do not depend (directly or indirectly) on the Council would be excluded from such power. This is inferred from the cited ordinal 154 of the C.M. when it establishes that “Any agreement of the municipal council, issued directly or hearing on appeal against the decision of some hierarchically inferior municipal body…” (emphasis not in original) will be subject to the remedies of revocation and appeal. This is confirmed by ordinal 190.1 of the C.P.C.A. when it states: “The appeal against agreements emanating from the municipal council, whether directly or on the occasion of the resolution of appeals against agreements of hierarchically inferior municipal bodies…” (emphasis not in original). Note that the common reference in both norms is hierarchical dependence. The foregoing implies, as has been stated, that it corresponds to the Council to hear the appeal of decisions from bodies over which it holds a hierarchical link or relationship, directly or indirectly of an organic and functional nature, which is evident if one considers that it is a power inherent to its condition as hierarchical superior. b) In the second case, it regulates the challenge of other municipal acts. This refers to all those actions of other administrative offices where the adoption does not involve a collegiate will. On this point, a distinction must be made between acts issued by bodies dependent on the Council and those issued by offices that do not depend even indirectly on that collegiate body.

Before addressing this differentiation, it is worth noting, as a common axis of both categories, that the inferior’s act is subject to the remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación), the former being waivable, in which case, the matter must be transferred to the hierarch for the appropriate action, without this being an obstacle for the reluctant party to correct or amend its conduct. As has already been indicated, the manifestations of the units subject to a hierarchical relationship within that center of authority are capable of being reviewed through the remedy of appeal (apelación), as derived from numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190 subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A. 3.- In this line, numeral 161 of the C.M. reiterates that the Council (Concejo) hears on appeal (alzada) what is resolved by a municipal official, whether they depend directly or not. The norm should not lend itself to confusion, much less should it be interpreted from its content that it constitutes a special rule and therefore precedes in application regarding what is established in the indicated numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190 subsection 1) of the L.G.A.P. This provision must be considered in an integral manner with the rest of the mandates that regulate the matter, especially with those already mentioned, as well as with the competencies that, in light of precept 101 of the L.G.A.P., every hierarch holds. This is because its reading could lead to the mistake of considering that, despite other norms clearly stating that the municipal council hears on appeal (apelación) the acts of its direct inferiors, it must also hear every conduct of other officials or bodies, regardless of whether they are inferiors or not. Indeed, as has been noted, the reference to the power of review applies only to hierarchically inferior bodies; therefore, regarding the Council (Concejo), it is pertinent for the acts of officials of bodies that have some degree of subordination to that collegiate body, even if remote. However, it would not apply to those in which the referred hierarchical link is not present, with the administrative units that depend on another hierarchical source: the Mayor (Alcalde), being excluded from this power. 4.- Seen thus, it is clear and evident that the Council (Concejo) could not hear on appeal (apelación) the acts of the Nombre1978 nor of those officials over whom the latter has hierarchical authority. To consider that it could, would imply completely stripping that official of one of his essential attributions, such as: “To exercise the functions inherent to the condition of general administrator and chief of the municipal dependencies, overseeing the organization, functioning, coordination, and faithful compliance with municipal agreements, laws, and regulations in general,” (highlighting not from the original), as indicated in subsection a) of canon 17 of the C.M. That chiefdom could not be fully realized if he is not responsible for hearing on appeal (apelación) the acts of his inferiors, because it is through this remedy that he has the opportunity to adjust them to legality or expediency. Ergo, the review of those acts does not pertain to the Council (Concejo), but to the Mayor (Alcalde). The contrary would imply the establishment of an improper monophasic hierarchy in a recourse chain where a biphasic one already exists, which, of course, does not correspond to the administrative efficiency and procedural speed that must, as a matter of principle, permeate every administrative procedure, without the municipal one having an objective cause allowing an exception. 5.- Now then, this position of the Nombre1978 lays the groundwork for the treatment of the challenge regime for the acts of officials who do not depend on the Council (Concejo), but on him. In such a case, it is evident that under constitutional numeral 173, the filing of the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) within five days is possible. The legal regulation and procedure that must be given to these complaint measures are the same as those provided for in mandates 161 to 163 of the C.M., with the caveat that in these cases, the appeal (apelación) must be processed before the Nombre1978 and not before the Council (Concejo). In the face of the apparent gap observed in the legal regime that would apply to the appealability of this type of act, the legal framework that specifies the appeal (apelación) of the acts of the Council (Concejo) and its dependencies must be used. An analogical criterion applies here that allows extending to those decisions the norms that define the recourse framework of those others, given that in substance, they are administrative acts issued by municipal authorities. Therefore, there is no reason to treat them differently when the similarity they possess is obvious; an aspect that precisely justifies and validates said application. 6.- Moreover, although, for the reasons indicated, it has been established that the Council (Concejo) is not empowered to hear on appeal (apelación) the decisions of the Mayor (Alcalde), whether in his exercise of competencies in a single instance or hearing on appeal (alzada) the acts of his inferiors, it is clear that the actions of that official are exposed to review by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), within the improper hierarchical remedy (recurso jerárquico impropio) that operates in this matter. It should be noted that the control by said Tribunal derives not from legal norms, even though these establish its competence and develop the procedural aspects of that improper controlling function. It emanates directly from the Magna Carta. In this sense, numeral 173 clearly states: “…if the Municipality does not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement, the records shall pass to the Tribunal dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates for a final resolution.” The reference to the Municipality is not limited to the acts of the Council (Concejo). It must be understood and appreciated in its broad sense, that is, the set of bodies that make up the local organization, but that also have the power of review (to hear on appeal—conocer en alzada) that allows them to make the contested act unquestionable at the municipal level. This would be the case of the Council (Concejo) and the Mayor (Alcalde), each within the specific field of their competencies. In this context, article 169 of the Magna Carta states that the administration of local interests corresponds to the Municipal Government (Gobierno Municipal), composed of a deliberative body (Council—Concejo) and the Mayor (Alcalde). Ergo, it is a figure established by the Political Constitution itself, which forms part of the local public power structure and which therefore, has the powers that allow it to issue conduct attributable to the Municipality and that, as such, are understood to be included within the scope of coverage of the referred constitutional ordinal 173. Therefore, as a derivation of the democratic principle (which even allows his appointment through popular election mechanisms) and attending to factors of transparency and control (to which all public function is subject), the decisions of the Nombre1978 are also susceptible to being appealed in the manner indicated by the cited rule. Only thus is its referral to the Tribunal, an external body, justified, so that it may resolve the matter definitively if it does not determine to revoke the questioned act. This is because the supreme norm, the pillar of the entire challenge system for local decisions, allows the challenge of any administrative conduct of the town councils, which, as has been said, is not limited to the manifestations of the Council (Concejo), but includes, within the already indicated two-fronted scheme, the Mayor (Alcalde). It is clear that the cited precept encompasses the conduct of both bodies that make up the Municipal Government and indicates the remedies available against them. The so-called veto of the Mayor (Alcalde), of course, when dealing with acts of the Council (Concejo), and the challenge by interested parties, against any act or function of the town councils, whether deriving from the deliberative body or from the Nombre1978. A different treatment of both hierarchs could not be justified, because at bottom, they are acts and conducts that derive from a center of local public power, which, for purposes of full and efficient functioning, has been established through an organizational system characterized by the co-existence and coordination of two hierarchical instances; it is reiterated, that make up the Municipal Government. Thus, if the constitutional right itself establishes control by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) over the acts of local corporations when, after being challenged within their internal framework, the objected or appealed conduct is not revoked or reformed, the logical consequence is the exercise of this non-hierarchical competence. Therefore, it is considered, it corresponds to said Tribunal to hear the appeals (apelaciones) against the acts issued not only by the Council (Concejo), but also by the Mayor (Alcalde), under the terms already discussed. Again, starting from the fact that both the C.M. and the C.P.C.A. develop the guidelines to follow regarding the acts of the Council (Concejo), by systematic integration of the legal system and attending to the mechanism of analogy (articles 7, 8, and 9 of the L.G.A.P. and 5 of the L.O.P.J.), such legal development must be applicable to the challenge of the acts of the Mayor (Alcalde), so that the Tribunal proceeds to exercise that control of legality that has been conferred upon it by the constituent, in accordance with said rules, and what is established for the acts of the deliberative body must be applied to that official. VII.- Based on all the foregoing, it can be specified in the following terms: 1) In this matter, we are facing an infra-constitutional conflict that it is appropriate for this Chamber to resolve. 2) According to the regulations and provisions in effect at the time of the appealed act, its resolution corresponds to the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). 3) The Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) and the Municipal Nombre1978, in the terms of articles 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code, constitute the Municipal Government (superior hierarchy—two-fronted structure) of the Municipal Corporations. 4) In the municipal challenge system that has its foundations in constitutional canon 173 (and its development both by the Municipal Code and by the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code), the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) is constituted as an improper biphasic hierarch. 5) In that capacity, it is the responsibility of that Tribunal to definitively resolve the appeals (recursos) filed against municipal agreements or decisions in their two aspects, that is, those adopted independently by the Council (Concejo) or by the Mayor (Alcalde); whether in a single instance by direct exercise of a specific non-reviewing competence, or hearing on appeal (alzada) regarding some hierarchically inferior municipal body to an immediate and direct degree, when, as appropriate and under the terms established by the Constituent, they do not revoke or reform their objected or appealed decisions.”", 2199-2004 idem, indicated that **"** *...when the question revolves around powers granted by the infra-constitutional legal system —legislative or regulatory— the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rules set forth in the General Public Administration Law in its articles 71 to 82, since, in that case, it will be an administrative conflict of legality.* **".** (The highlighting is not from the original). It is pertinent to warn that this must be harmonized and complemented with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (hereinafter L.O.P.J.), which specially regulates matters relating to conflicts between jurisdictional bodies and even between judicial and administrative authorities. The foregoing, given that, in addition to the resolution of conflicts between jurisdictional bodies (among others, numerals 54 subsections 8, 9, 10 and 11; 55 subsection 4); 57 subsection 4); 59 subsection 5) and 102 of the L.O.P.J.), the legislator vested in a body of the Judicial Branch the power to settle conflicts of jurisdiction in which at least one judicial authority is involved, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Thus, precept 54 subsection 12) of the L.O.P.J. expressly establishes that this Chamber shall hear: **"** *...Conflicts of jurisdiction that arise regarding judicial and administrative authorities.* **"**. It is clear that the principle of distribution of functions; the constitutional and legal power given to the Constitutional Chamber by the derived constituent to resolve higher-ranking conflicts (constitutional ones), as well as the special regulation contained in the L.O.P.J. regarding jurisdiction, exclude any intervention by a State Branch, entity, or non-judicial body in the hearing and resolution of conflicts where any judicial authority participates, it is reiterated, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Based on the foregoing and because in this matter, at least one of the disputants is a judicial authority, it does fall to this Chamber to resolve the discrepancy submitted for its consideration, and it is so ordered, both for what has already been indicated and for reasons of legal certainty, procedural economy, and speed. The foregoing is reinforced, even, by the power that the legislator provided for this Chamber, to hear **"** *...other matters indicated by law, when, by their nature, they do not correspond to another of the Court's chambers.* **"** (subsection 13 of article 54 of the L.O.P.J.)

**IV.- On the merits.** The Court rightly specifies that to resolve the matter, it must be based on Law No. 4286 of December 17, 1968, in its original text before the reform introduced by Law No. 8494, as well as the Operations Manual for the Popular Festivities Commissions, from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (C.G.R.), No. 202 of September 20, 1990, published in La Gaceta No. 202 of October 25 of that year. However, regarding this applicable regulatory framework, the following clarifications are necessary: **1)** According to the original text of Law No. 4286, the Popular Festivities Commissions were obliged to render a statement of accounts (liquidación de cuentas) to the C.G.R. (article 1); that Controlling Body had to **"** *...reject those expenditures that do not contain complete documentation and those that in its judgment are not related to the events held or were not indispensable or necessary for the festivities.* **"** (first paragraph, article 3); the expenditures rejected or not accepted by the Office of the Comptroller **"** *...shall be proportionally assumed by the members of the commission and reimbursed within a period of one month from the date of the resolution...* **"** (second paragraph, article 3); and the C.G.R. had the obligation to exercise the necessary actions to establish the corresponding liabilities of the case **"** *...when it verifies incorrectness or irregularity in the handling of the funds.* **"** (article 4). **2)** The cited Law No. 4286 was reformed in its article 1 by numeral 9, general rule No. 119, of Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981 (Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget for the year 1982). From that moment on, it fell to the Municipal Audit Offices or Accounting Offices to review and approve the statement of accounts of the popular festivities commissions and **"** *... render that statement of accounts to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, ...* **"**. That is, the Commissions no longer had to submit the statement of accounts to the C.G.R. but rather to the Municipal Audit Offices or Accounting Offices. **3)** The Controlling Body, through Manual 202 of September 20, 1990, "Operations Manual for the Popular Festivities Commissions," established that **"** *...the Commission shall render to the Auditor or, failing that, to the Municipal Accountant, for his approval, the statement of income and expenditures of that Commission. ....* **"** (article 32); if the Municipal Auditor or Accountant determines **"** *...shortages, improper payments, pending accounts receivable, expenses that are not supported by receipts, or any other irregularity that causes economic harm to the Commission, he/she shall inform the Municipal Council thereof, so that within a term of fifteen days, this body may directly manage, before the corresponding members of the Commission, the reimbursement of the respective sums to the municipal coffers. ...* **"** (first paragraph, article 34); if the recovery of these sums is not achieved through administrative channels **"** *...the Council must exercise the corresponding judicial actions for their compensation, in accordance with the provisions of article 210 of the General Public Administration Law.* **"**. In other words, starting from the development of the Law made in the Manual issued by the Office of the Comptroller, a bifurcation in the process occurs. The respective statement of accounts of the Commission is submitted to the Auditor, or failing that, to the Municipal Accountant, and in the event that these officials determine **"** *...shortages, improper payments, pending accounts receivable, expenses that are not supported by receipts, or any other irregularity that causes economic harm to the Commission, ...* **"** , they must bring it to the attention of the Municipal Council so that it manages directly before the corresponding members of the Commission the reimbursement of the respective sums; failing that, that collegiate body had to exercise the corresponding legal actions. **4)** However, the C.G.R., noting deficiencies **"** *...in relation to compliance with the regulations governing the performance of the popular festivities commissions, ...* **"** , through circular No. 2198 (DI-CR-71) of February 28, 2002, addressed to municipal internal auditors and municipal councils, considered it prudent to warn and remind them **"** *...for their application, a summary of the main regulations in this regard.* **"** . In what is relevant, it expressly indicated to them **"** ... *d) Article 34 contemplates the possible case that the official responsible for approving the statement of accounts determines shortages, improper payments, or any other irregularity that causes economic harm to the Commission, indicating that he/she must inform the Municipal Council thereof, in order for it to manage the reimbursement of the corresponding sums through the applicable legal channel. ...* **"** . From the foregoing, it is clear that the action of both the internal municipal control and oversight body and the municipal councils was (and is) without prejudice to the final oversight by the Office of the Comptroller within the scope of its competencies as the superior comptroller of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) and the exercise of its powers established in articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 4286. In reinforcement of what has been said, note that in the reform of articles 1, 3, and 4 introduced by Law No. 8494 of March 30, 2006, "Reforms of the Legal Framework that assigns competencies to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in the municipal regime," said procedure is retaken as far as the Council is concerned, but with the express indication **"** *...without prejudice to the superior oversight that corresponds to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.* **"** .

**V.-** Based on what is established in the preceding recital (considerando), this Chamber understands that what was acted upon at the time by the Municipality does not conflict with the regulatory and legislative provisions and the directive of the Controlling Body that regulated and guided, at that time, both the activity and responsibilities of the Popular Festivities Commissions and the powers of the internal municipal control bodies and of the Superior Oversight Body of the Public Treasury. Therefore, being faced with an appeal (recurso de apelación) against the agreement of the Municipal Council, its hearing and resolution falls to the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), in accordance with the provisions of articles 156 of the Municipal Code and 189 and 190 subsection 1) of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), and it is so ordered.

**VI.- On the current municipal appellate regime.** Regarding what was indicated in recital II of this resolution, to the effect that municipal agreements **"** *...are not only those issued by the Municipal Councils...* **"** and concerning the entry into force of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (hereinafter C.P.C.A.), the following specific considerations regarding the current municipal appellate regime are timely. **1.- The possibility of challenging municipal decisions.** The challenge of municipal decisions and agreements finds express support in numeral 173 of the Political Constitution. The rule regulates the so-called veto of the Mayor, but also the appeal (recurso) by any interested party; ergo, the power of the citizens to appeal the decisions of the municipal government. In turn, it establishes that in the event that the Municipality (in a broad sense) does not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement; that is, the challenged decision, the file shall be sent to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates, so that it may issue a definitive ruling. From there, currently, the Municipal Code and more recently the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure, constitute the sources that, in a general manner, develop the specific legal regime for the appealability of the decisions issued by the local corporations. Broadly speaking, according to the provisions of ordinal 153 of the C.M., these decisions can be challenged at two levels. **a)** At the first level are the internal appeals (recursos internos), so-called by virtue of the fact that they can only be invoked by internal bodies of the local organization. These are **a.1)** the veto of the Mayor (artículos 173 subsection 1) of the Constitution and 17 subsection d) and 158 to 160 of the C.M.) and **a.2)** the review that the council members (regidores) can establish against agreements that have not yet been definitively approved (articles 27 subsection c) and 153 ejusdem). **b)** At the second level are the external appeals (recursos externos) that can only be formulated by interested parties (article 173, subsection 2 of the Constitution), that is, the recipients of the actions. In this context, there are the ordinary appeals for revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación), and the extraordinary appeal for review (revisión). Each appeal has specific regulations, depending on whether it concerns acts that have been issued by the Council or bodies that depend on it, or acts of bodies that are not hierarchically dependent on that collegiate body. In all cases, as will be seen, in line with the precepts of canon 173 of the Magna Carta, the rejection of these measures at the municipal level allows the referral of the matter to the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), so that, within the biphasic non-hierarchical supervisory function (función de contralor no jerárquico bifásico) that it must exercise, it may resolve the eventual appeal (apelación) and, in most cases (save for special regulation to that effect), deem the administrative channel exhausted (article 31 subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A.). From this perspective, and in order to have clarity regarding the treatment that must be given to the challenge of conduct issued by the various local authorities, it must be emphasized that in the current context, the city councils have a two-sided regime, composed of two hierarchical centers of authority, which, by express provision of article 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code, make up the Municipal Government (higher hierarchy) of the Municipal Corporations. On one hand, the Council, composed of popularly elected council members, with political and normative functions (ordinal 12 of the C.M.), that is, it is a deliberation body with political connotation. On the other, the Mayor, an official also popularly elected (article 12 of the C.M.), with technical competencies, managerial and executive connotation (numerals 14 to 20 ibidem). His/her competence framework is linked to executive and administrative functions. Between the two, there is no hierarchical link, but rather an inter-administrative coordination relationship, necessary for the task of administering the local interests and services of the canton under the charge of the Municipal Government that both constitute, under the terms of article 169 of the Constitution. More simply, the Mayor is not a hierarchical inferior of the Council; they are bodies with coordinated competencies but not subject, which ultimately must complement each other for the efficient and agile functioning of the city councils. Their duty to ensure due compliance with municipal agreements does not presuppose hierarchical subjection to the Council. It consists of a task inherent to their managerial and executive competencies, for the good organization and functioning of local services. **2.- Normative treatment of the so-called external appeals.** Title VI of the Municipal Code, called "Appeals against municipal acts," separately regulates what are "Appeals against Council agreements" (Chapter I) and "Appeals against other municipal acts" (Chapter II). **a)** In the first case, both the decision adopted directly (that is, in sole instance by direct exercise of a specific non-reviewing competence), **"** *...or hearing in appeal (alzada) against what was resolved by some hierarchically inferior municipal body, ...* **"** (the highlighting is not from the original), is subject to the ordinary appeals for revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación), with the exceptions provided by canon 154 of the C.M., measures that must be formulated within a period of five business days (common time limit in this matter). The first remedy, for reasons of appropriateness or legality; the second, only for questions of legality (article 156 C.M.). Faced with the Council's decision in sole instance, the appeal (apelación) must be heard by the Administrative Litigation Court, in accordance with precepts 189 to 192 of the C.P.C.A. in relation to 156 of the C.M. In decisions of the direct inferior bodies of that collegiate body, an appellate chain or ladder operates, since that manifestation can be challenged through the ordinary appeals. For those cases (and only for those), the appeal (apelación) is heard by the Council. However, against what is resolved, revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) would apply again, the latter under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned Court. In this last scenario, it is decisive to indicate that the competence that the Municipal Council holds as administrative superior to review the conduct of its inferiors (power that in any case is given by numeral 102 subsections b) and d) of the General Public Administration Law (hereinafter L.G.A.P.)), is reserved for the comparison of legality of the acts issued by its inferiors, that is, by the bodies that, within the organizational line of command (101 ibidem), maintain a direct relationship of hierarchical subjection. Therefore, the decisions of all those offices that do not depend (directly or indirectly) on the Council would be excluded from such power. Thus, it follows from the cited ordinal 154 of the C.M. when it establishes that any agreement of the municipal council, issued directly or hearing in appeal (alzada) against what was resolved by some hierarchically inferior municipal body is subject to the appeals for revocation and appeal (apelación). This is confirmed with ordinal 190.1 of the C.P.C.A. insofar as it indicates **"** *The appeal against the agreements that emanate from the municipal council, either directly or as a result of the resolution of appeals against agreements of hierarchically inferior municipal bodies...* **"** (the highlighting is not from the original). Note that the common reference in both rules is hierarchical dependency. The foregoing implies, as has been noted, that it falls to the Council to hear the appeal (apelación) of decisions of bodies over which it holds a direct or indirect organic and functional hierarchical link or relationship, which is evident if one considers that it is a power inherent to its status as superior. **b)** In the second case, it regulates the challenge of other municipal acts. This concerns all those conducts of other administrative offices and in the adoption of which a collegiate will does not mediate. At this point, a distinction must be made between acts issued by bodies dependent on the Council, and those issued by offices that do not depend, not even indirectly, on that collegiate body. It is worth mentioning, prior to addressing this differentiation, as a common axis of both categories, that the act of the inferior has the appeals for revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) available, the first being waivable, in which case the matter must be transferred to the superior for the appropriate actions, without this being an obstacle for the hesitant party to correct or amend its conduct. As already indicated, the manifestations of the units subject to a hierarchical relationship to that center of authority are liable to be reviewed through the remedy of appeal (apelación), as follows from numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190 subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A. **3.-** Along these lines, numeral 161 of the C.M. reiterates that the Council hears in appeal (alzada) what is resolved by a municipal official, whether directly dependent or not. The rule should not lend itself to confusion, much less should it be interpreted from its content that it constitutes a special provision and therefore takes precedence in application over what is established in the indicated numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190 subsection 1) of the L.G.A.P. That provision must be considered in an integral manner with the rest of the mandates that regulate the subject, especially with those already mentioned, as well as with the powers that, in light of precept 101 of the L.G.A.P., every superior holds. This is because its reading could lead to the mistake of considering that, although other rules clearly indicate that the municipal council hears in appeal the acts of its direct inferiors, it must also hear every conduct of other officials or bodies, regardless of whether they are inferiors or not. Indeed, as has been noted, the reference to the power of review applies only to hierarchically inferior bodies; therefore, with respect to the Council, it is pertinent for the acts of officials of bodies that have some degree of subjection to that collegiate body, even if indirectly. However, it would not apply to those in which the aforementioned hierarchical link does not exist, with the administrative units that depend on another hierarchical source: the Mayor, being excluded from this power. **4.-** Thus seen, it is clear and evident that the Council could not hear in appeal the acts of the Mayor nor of those officials over whom the latter has hierarchical authority. To consider that it could, would completely strip that official of one of his/her essential powers, which is: **"** *To exercise the functions inherent to the condition of general administrator and head of the municipal offices, overseeing the organization, functioning, coordination, and faithful compliance with municipal agreements, laws, and regulations in general* **"** , (the highlighting is not from the original), as stated in subsection a) of canon 17 of the C.M. That headship could not be fully realized if it does not fall to him/her to hear in appeal the acts of his/her inferiors, since it is through this remedy that he/she has the opportunity to adjust them to legality or appropriateness. Ergo, the review of those acts does not befall the Council, but rather the Mayor. The contrary would imply the establishment of an improper monophasic hierarchy in an appellate chain in which a biphasic one already exists, which, of course, does not correspond to the administrative efficiency and procedural speed that must permeate, by reason of principle, every administrative procedure, without the municipal one having an objective cause that allows an exception. **5.-** Now then, this position of the Mayor lays the foundations for the treatment of the challenge regime for acts of officials who do not depend on the Council, but on him. In such a case, it is evident that under the protection of numeral 173 of the Constitution, the filing of the ordinary appeals for revocation (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) within the fifth day is possible. The legal regulation and procedure that must be given to these claim measures are the same ones that are provided for in mandates 161 through 163 of the C.M., with the warning that in these cases, the appeal (apelación) must be processed before the Mayor and not before the Council. Faced with the apparent gap observed in the legal regime that would apply in the appealability of this type of act, the legal framework that specifies the appeal (apelación) of the acts of the Council and its dependencies must be used. An analogical criterion applies here that allows the rules that define the appellate framework for those other decisions to be extended to these, since in essence, these are administrative acts issued by municipal authorities. Therefore, there is no reason to treat them differently when the similarity they possess is obvious, an aspect that precisely justifies and validates said application.

**6.-** On the other hand, although, for the reasons indicated, it has been established that the Council is not empowered to hear appeals against the Mayor's decisions, whether in the exercise of his single-instance powers or when hearing appeals (alzada) against the acts of his subordinates, it is manifest that the actions of that official are subject to review by the Contentious-Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), within the improper hierarchical appeal (recurso jerárquico impropio) that operates in this matter. It should be noted that the control by said Court derives not from legal norms, even though these establish its jurisdiction (competencia) and develop the procedural and process-related aspects of that improper supervisory function. It stems directly from the Magna Carta. In this regard, numeral 173 clearly states: **“**…if the Municipality does not revoke or amend the objected or appealed agreement, the background records shall be referred to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates for it to resolve definitively.**”** The reference to the Municipality is not exhausted in the acts of the Council. It must be understood and appreciated in its broad sense, that is, the set of bodies that make up the local organization, but which also have the power of review (to hear on appeal (alzada)) that allows them to make the contested act unassailable within the municipal sphere. This would be the case of the Council and the Mayor, each in the specific field of their powers. On this level, Article 169 of the Magna Carta indicates that the administration of local interests corresponds to the Municipal Government, composed of a deliberative body (Council) and the Mayor. Ergo, it is a figure provided for by the Political Constitution itself, which forms part of the local public power structure and which, therefore, possesses the powers that allow it to issue conduct attributable to the Municipality and which, to that extent, are understood to be included within the scope of coverage of said constitutional numeral 173. Therefore, as a derivation of the democratic principle (which even allows their designation through popular election mechanisms) and attending to factors of transparency and control (to which all public function is subject), the decisions of Nombre1978 are also susceptible to being appealed in the manner indicated by the cited rule. Only thus is their referral to the Court, an external body, justified so that it may definitively resolve the matter if it does not determine to revoke the questioned act. This is because the supreme norm, the pillar of the entire system of appeals (sistema recursivo) against local decisions, allows the challenge of any administrative conduct of the municipal corporations (ayuntamientos), which, as has been stated, is not exhausted in the manifestations of the Council but includes, within the two-headed (bifronte) structure already indicated, the Mayor. It is clear that the cited precept encompasses the conduct of both bodies that form the Municipal Government and indicates the remedies (recursos) applicable against them. The so-called veto of the Mayor, of course, when it concerns acts of the Council, and the challenge by interested parties against any act or function of the municipal corporations (ayuntamientos), whether it derives from the deliberative body or from Nombre1978. A different treatment of both senior officials could not be justified, since at bottom, they are acts and conduct deriving from a center of local public power, which, for the purposes of full and efficient operation, has been established through an organizational system characterized by the co-existence and coordination of two hierarchical instances, it is reiterated, that form the Municipal Government. Therefore, if the constitutional law itself establishes control by the Contentious-Administrative Court over the acts of local corporations when, after being challenged within their internal framework, the objected or appealed conduct is not revoked or amended, the logical consequence is the exercise of this non-hierarchical jurisdiction (competencia). Hence, it is considered that said Court is responsible for hearing appeals against acts issued not only by the Council, but also by the Mayor, under the terms already discussed. Again, starting from the basis that both the C.M. and the C.P.C.A. develop the guidelines to be followed regarding the acts of the Council, through systematic integration of the legal system and attending to the mechanism of analogy (articles 7, 8 and 9 of the L.G.A.P. and 5 of the L.O.P.J.), such legal development must be applicable to the challenge of the acts of the Mayor, so that the Court may proceed to exercise that legality control (control de legalidad) that has been conferred upon it by the constituent power, in accordance with said rules, and what is provided for the acts of the deliberative body must be applied to that official.

**VII.-** Based on all the above, it can be specified in the following terms: **1)** In this matter, we are facing an infra-constitutional conflict (conflicto infraconstitucional) that this Chamber must resolve. **2)** By the regulations and provisions in force at the time of the appealed act, its cognizance corresponds to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). **3)** The Municipal Council and the Municipal Nombre1978, under the terms of articles 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code, form the Municipal Government (superior hierarchy-two-headed (bifronte) structure) of the Municipal Corporations. **4)** In the municipal appeals regime (régimen recursivo municipal) which has its foundations in canon 173 of the Constitution (and its development both by the Municipal Code and by the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court constitutes a two-stage improper superior body (jerarca impropio bifásico). **5)** In that capacity, it is the responsibility of that Court to definitively resolve the remedies (recursos) filed against municipal agreements or decisions in their two aspects, that is, those adopted independently by the Council or by the Mayor; whether in a single instance by direct exercise of a specific non-reviewing power or when hearing on appeal (alzada) with respect to some municipal body _hierarchically inferior in direct and immediate degree_, when, as appropriate and under the terms provided by the Constituent Power, they do not revoke or amend their objected or appealed decisions.

"I.- Of the actions that give rise to this matter. 1.- The Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) of the central canton of the province of Heredia, in ordinary session no. 300-2005 of December 15, 2005, agreement IV, declared the patrimonial liability of the appellants, who served as members of the Comisión de Festejos Populares of Heredia 2003, for having demonstrated the existence of gross negligence in conducting irregular contracts, for which reason it ordered that they be jointly and severally required to reimburse ¢1,017,980.74. 2.- Disagreeing with the resolution, the former members of the Comisión de Festejos filed on January 18, 2006, “…Recurso de Revocatoria with Apelación in subsidio, Exception of prescription, lack of right, and Absolute Nullity…” (sic). 3.- The Municipal Council, in ordinary session no. 319-2006, held on March 13, 2006, article IV, rejected both the exceptions and the recurso de revocatoria filed and, in accordance with articles 156 of the Código Municipal (hereinafter C.M.) and 85 of the repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (hereinafter L.R.J.C.A.), elevated the apelación in subsidio to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo “…FOR ITS CORRESPONDING RESOLUTION,…”. 4.- The Second Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, in resolution no. 523-2007 of 4:10 p.m. on November 7, 2007, declared the appeal wrongly admitted and instructed the respondent Municipality to transfer the apelación filed before the Contraloría General de la República (C.G.R.). With an analysis of Law No. 4286 in its original text (prior to the reform introduced by Law No. 8494) and the Manual de Operaciones para las Comisiones de Festejos Populares, issued by the C.G.R. on September 20, 1990, that Tribunal determined its lack of jurisdiction, considering that “…based on the regulations governing the matter of auditing oversight (fiscalización de los auditorajes) and its consequences, at the time the events occurred, it was vested in the constitutional body responsible for the control of the public treasury, that is, the Contraloría General de la República,…”. 5.- The División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica of the C.G.R., through pronouncement DAGJ-0269-2008 (01777) of February 29, 2008, relating article 183 of the Political Constitution with the provisions of its Organic Law, No. 7428; the Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, No. 8131; article 4 of Law 4268 (sic); the concept of improper hierarchical superior (jerarquía impropia) and precept 81 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, determined: “…before and after it underwent the reforms of Law 8494, it is not possible to infer that a single-phase improper hierarchy was established therein, such that this Contralor Body would be the one called upon to resolve recursos de apelación in matters of Comisiones de Festejos Populares.” It adds to the above that constitutional article 173 is clear in providing for the challenge of municipal acts, developed by canon 156 of the C.M. It concludes that this Contraloría is not competent to resolve a recurso de apelación against a municipal agreement, since it is not an improper hierarchical superior in this matter; likewise, it is impossible to interpret that Law 4268 (sic) “…granted that competence to the Contraloría General, since it was not expressly regulated that it must resolve the recurso de apelación in matters of Comisiones de Festejos Populares.//One cannot confuse the competence assigned at the time by Law 4268 to determine disciplinary or damage liabilities with that of resolving a recurso as an improper hierarchical superior, since, as indicated, it must be expressly regulated.” 6.- The Municipality filed an extraordinary recurso de revisión before the Contralora General de la República, arguing in essence that “…we are not facing an action as improper hierarchy, but rather the superior oversight and control (fiscalización y control superior) of a municipal act […] concerning the public treasury (hacienda pública).” Based on the foregoing and since “…the superior oversight (fiscalización superior) of the public treasury (hacienda pública) is involved…”, it bases the competence of the Contralor Body to hear and resolve the recurso de apelación filed, not as an improper hierarchy, but as the superior body in matters of oversight of the Public Treasury. 7.- The Contralora General de la República, in resolution R-CO-22-2008 of 11:00 a.m. on May 15, 2008, in view of the situation arising from the lack of jurisdiction declared by both the División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica, which that hierarchy endorses, and the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, ordered “…for reasons of procedural economy to directly elevate the case file…” before this Chamber so that “…in use of the powers conferred by article 54, subsection 12), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, it may resolve the conflict that has arisen.” II.- Of the nature of the conflict and the body competent to resolve it. 1) This matter involves a (negative) conflict of jurisdiction (conflicto de competencia), since both instances decline it, that is, they do not claim it for themselves (positive conflict). 2) On one hand, neither the Constitution nor the law in any way attributes to the C.G.R. jurisdiction to hear apelaciones against municipal agreements; on the other, the circumstance that the final paragraph of article 173 of the Political Constitution establishes that “…the background records shall be forwarded to the Tribunal dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates for its final resolution…”, is not sufficient to determine that the conflict is of a constitutional nature and, therefore, must be resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). In this regard, that decision-making body has clearly stated: “…for a constitutional conflict of jurisdictions to proceed, it is not enough that the constitutional text mentions the public entity or body, but it must attribute specific powers to it, regarding whose interpretation and application in terms of their ownership and exercise it is appropriate to resolve. Consequently, when the issue revolves around powers granted by the statutory or regulatory infra-constitutional system, the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rules provided by the Ley General de la Administración Pública in its articles 71 to 82, since, in that case, it will be an administrative legality conflict…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 of 12:59 p.m. on February 27, 2004). From the foregoing, it can be affirmed that the specific power of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), a body not mentioned in the constitutional norm, to hear apelaciones of municipal agreements (which are not only those issued by the Municipal Councils), is not of a constitutional but infra-constitutional nature, being provided for and regulated in the Municipal and Contentious Administrative Procedure Codes, as well as it was in the repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. That is, it is not a conflict that, by the very interpretation and definition of its jurisdiction given by the Constitutional Chamber (article 7 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), falls to that Chamber to settle. In reinforcement of the above, the following considerations of that Tribunal are important: a) for a conflict before that Chamber to proceed “…two fundamental elements must be evaluated: the subject who raises it and against whom they do so; and on the other hand, the matter or jurisdiction upon which the conflict is based…” (resolution no. 11585-2001 idem). b) “…by definition, a conflict of jurisdictions—whether constitutional or administrative—arises when two or more public bodies or entities dispute the exercise of a power or function, each considering itself to be the one that must carry it out. For that reason, the case law of this tribunal has been clear in the sense that if one party challenges the jurisdiction of the other but does not claim it for itself, the intervention of the Chamber is not appropriate…” (resolution no. 619-2001 of 3:18 p.m. on January 24, 2001). The foregoing was reiterated by that Chamber in resolution no. 9364-2005 of 2:48 p.m. on July 13, 2005, stating: “…there is a conflict when two or more entities dispute a power. This Chamber has so held in judgment No. 2001-00619, of 1-24-01,…”; a resolution in which it also indicated “…Consequently, there is no conflict of constitutional jurisdictions when one body questions, but does not claim for itself, the powers of another…”. c) constitutional conflicts can be of two orders; “…a) Positive, which arises when, at the same time, two entities or bodies consider themselves competent, and b) negative, when both entities or bodies decline their jurisdiction and consider themselves incompetent to hear and resolve a specific matter. In both scenarios, the question of jurisdiction is settled by determining exactly which entity or body is its holder and, therefore, must exercise it…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 idem). d) “…In the present case, the situation described would not, in reality, go beyond the existence of allegedly contradictory legal criteria, which is not the same as saying that two or more parties are attempting to exercise a constitutional jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other(s), which is the kind of conflict this Chamber would generally settle…” (resolution no. 11346-2004 of 2:39 p.m. on October 13, 2004). e) “…The legislator, even though the original constituent’s will was implicit, took care to emphasize that, in any case, such conflicts of jurisdiction are of a constitutional nature, that is, when a discussion is engaged concerning the ownership and exercise of the set of faculties that the Political Constitution attributes to a specific public body or entity…” (resolution no. 2199-2004 idem). f) “…In summary, the object of a conflict can only be a jurisdiction of a constitutional nature, not a legal power, much less a regulatory one. Likewise, the purpose of the action is to claim that jurisdiction in a general manner,…” (resolution no. 9364-2005 idem). g) that jurisdiction only has faculties to hear “…conflicts related to constitutional jurisdictions; that is, to spheres of powers, immunities, and privileges established by the Constitution and not related to jurisdictions of another nature, meaning that it is not appropriate in this avenue to hear legality or administrative conflicts…” (among others, resolutions no. 443-2000 of 4:48 p.m. on January 12, 2000; no. 619-2001 of 3:18 p.m. on January 24, 2001; no. 11585-2001 of 8:54 a.m. on November 9, 2001; 7689-2002 of 2:44 p.m. on August 7, 2002; no, 9364-2005 idem; no. 15955-2006 of 2:48 p.m. on November 1, 2006, citing “…what was resolved in judgment No. 2004-11346…”(sic); and no. 13577-2007 idem). 3.- It is clear that it is also not an infra-constitutional conflict to be resolved by the President of the Republic, given that, due to the nature of the disagreeing bodies, it does not fall within any of the scenarios contained in articles 26 subsection d) (between Ministries) and 78 (between a Ministry and a decentralized institution or between these) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. III.- Of the jurisdiction of this Chamber to resolve the conflict raised. Given that it is not for the Constitutional Chamber or the President of the Republic to resolve it, for the reasons stated, it must be determined whether this Chamber is competent. The Constitutional Chamber, in resolution no. 2199-2004 idem, indicated that “…when the issue revolves around powers granted by the statutory or regulatory infra-constitutional system, the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rules provided by the Ley General de la Administración Pública in its articles 71 to 82, since, in that case, it will be an administrative legality conflict…” (Emphasis not in the original). It is appropriate to note that this must be harmonized and complemented with the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (hereinafter L.O.P.J.), where matters relating to conflicts between jurisdictional bodies and even between judicial and administrative authorities are specially regulated.

The foregoing, given that, in addition to resolving conflicts between jurisdictional bodies (among others, numerals 54, subsections 8, 9, 10, and 11; 55, subsection 4); 57, subsection 4); 59, subsection 5); and 102 of the L.O.P.J.), the legislator vested in an organ of the Judicial Branch the authority to settle conflicts of competence in which at least one judicial authority participates, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Thus, in precept 54, subsection 12) of the L.O.P.J., it expressly establishes that this Chamber shall hear: **“***…Conflicts of competence that arise regarding judicial and administrative authorities.***”**. It is clear that the principle of distribution of functions; the constitutional and legal authority granted to the Constitutional Chamber by the derived constituent power to resolve conflicts of the highest rank (constitutional), as well as the special regulation contained in the L.O.P.J. regarding matters of competence, exclude any intervention by a Branch of the State, non-judicial entity or organ, in the hearing and resolution of conflicts where any judicial authority participates, it is reiterated, regardless of the capacity in which it acts. Based on the foregoing, and because in this matter, at least one of the disputing parties is a judicial authority, it is appropriate for this Chamber to resolve the discrepancy submitted for its consideration, and it is so ordered, both for the reasons already stated and for aspects of legal certainty, economy, and procedural speed. The foregoing is reinforced, even, by the authority that the legislator provided for this Chamber, to hear **“***…the other matters indicated by law, when, by their nature, they do not correspond to another of the Court's chambers.***”** (subsection 13 of Article 54 of the L.O.P.J.) **IV.- Regarding the merits.** The Court correctly points out that to resolve the matter, it must be based on Law No. 4286 of December 17, 1968, in its original text before the reform introduced by Law No. 8494, as well as on the Operations Manual for Popular Festivities Commissions, from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, C.G.R.), No. 202 of September 20, 1990, published in La Gaceta No. 202 of October 25 of that year. However, regarding that applicable regulatory framework, the following clarifications are necessary: **1)** Pursuant to the original text of Law No. 4286, the Popular Festivities Commissions were obligated to render a settlement of accounts to the C.G.R. (Article 1); that Controlling Body was to **“***…reject those expenditures that do not contain complete documentation and those that in its judgment are not related to the events held or were not indispensable or necessary for the festivities.***”** (first paragraph, Article 3); the expenditures rejected or not accepted by the Office of the Comptroller **“***…shall be borne proportionally by the members of the commission and reimbursed within a period of one month from the date of the resolution…***”** (second paragraph, Article 3); and the C.G.R. had the obligation to exercise the necessary actions to establish the corresponding liabilities **“***…when it verifies incorrectness or irregularity in the handling of the funds.***”** (Article 4). **2)** The cited Law No. 4286 was amended in its Article 1 by numeral 9, general norm No. 119, of Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981 (Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law for the year 1982). From that moment on, it was the responsibility of the Municipal Auditors’ Offices or Accounting Departments to review and approve the settlement of accounts of the popular festivities commissions and **“***…render that settlement to the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic, …***”**. That is, the Commissions no longer had to remit the settlement of accounts to the C.G.R. but to the Municipal Auditors’ Offices or Accounting Departments. **3)** The Controlling Body, through Manual 202 of September 20, 1990, “Operations Manual for Popular Festivities Commissions,” established that **“***…the Commission shall render to the Auditor or, in their absence, to the Municipal Accountant, for their approval, the settlement of income and expenditures of that Commission. ….***”** (Article 32); if the Municipal Auditor or Accountant determined **“***…shortages, improper payments, accounts pending collection, expenses that are not supported by vouchers, or any other irregularity that caused economic harm to the Commission, they shall inform the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) thereof, so that within a term of fifteen days this body may directly manage with the corresponding members of the Commission, the reimbursement of the respective sums to the municipal coffers. …***”** (first paragraph, Article 34); if the recovery of those sums is not achieved through the administrative route **“***…the Council shall exercise the corresponding judicial actions for the recovery of the same, in accordance with the provisions of Article 210 of the General Law of Public Administration.***”**. In other words, from the development of the Law made in the Manual issued by the Office of the Comptroller, a bifurcation in the procedure occurs. The respective settlement of the Commission is submitted to the Auditor, or in their absence to the Municipal Accountant, and should those officials determine **“***…shortages, improper payments, accounts pending collection, expenses that are not supported by vouchers, or any other irregularity that caused economic harm to the Commission, …***”** , they must bring it to the attention of the Municipal Council so that it may manage directly with the corresponding members of the Commission, the reimbursement of the respective sums; should this fail, that collegiate body had to exercise the corresponding legal actions. **4)** However, the C.G.R., noting deficiencies **“***…in relation to compliance with the regulations governing the performance of popular festivities commissions, …***”** , through circular No. 2198 (DI-CR-71) of February 28, 2002, addressed to the municipal internal auditors and municipal councils, considered it prudent to warn and remind them **“***…for their application a summary of the principal regulations in this regard.***”** . In what is relevant, it expressly indicated to them **“***… d) Article 34 contemplates the eventual case where the official responsible for the approval of the settlement determines shortages, improper payments, or any other irregularity that caused economic harm to the Commission, indicating that they shall inform the Municipal Council thereof, with the purpose of the latter managing the reimbursement of the corresponding sums through the applicable legal channel. …***”** . From the foregoing, it is clear that the actions of both the municipal internal control and oversight body and the municipal councils were (and are) without prejudice to the final oversight by the Office of the Comptroller within the scope of its powers as the superior comptroller of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) and the exercise of its powers established in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 4286. In support of the foregoing, note that in the reform of Articles 1, 3, and 4 introduced by Law No. 8494 of March 30, 2006, “Reforms of the Legal Framework assigning powers to the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic in the municipal regime,” said procedure is retaken regarding the Council's responsibility, but with the express indication **“***…without prejudice to the superior oversight corresponding to the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic.***”** . **V.-** Based on what was established in the preceding recital, this Chamber understands that the actions taken at that time by the Municipality do not conflict with the normative and regulatory provisions and the directive of the Controlling Body that regulated and guided, at that time, both the activity and responsibilities of the Popular Festivities Commissions and the powers of the municipal internal control bodies and the Superior Oversight Body of the Public Treasury. Therefore, as this involves an appeal against the agreement of the Municipal Council, its hearing and resolution corresponds to the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), in accordance with the provisions of Articles 156 of the Municipal Code and 189 and 190, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, and it is so ordered. **VI.- Regarding the current municipal appeals regime.** Regarding what was stated in recital II of this resolution, that municipal agreements **“***…are not only those issued by the Municipal Councils…***”** and regarding the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter C.P.C.A.), the following specific considerations are timely regarding the current municipal appeals regime. **1.- The possibility of challenging municipal decisions.** The challenge of municipal decisions and agreements finds express support in numeral 173 of the Political Constitution. The norm regulates the so-called veto of the Mayor (Nombre1978), but also the appeal by any interested party; ergo, the power of the citizens to appeal the decisions of the municipal government. In turn, it establishes that should the Municipality (in a broad sense) not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement; that is, the challenged decision, the record shall pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law, to resolve definitively. From there, currently, the Municipal Code and more recently the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code constitute the sources that generally develop the legal regime proper to the appealability of decisions issued by local corporations. Broadly speaking, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 153 of the C.M., those decisions can be challenged at two levels. **a)** At the first level are located internal remedies, so named by virtue of the fact that they can only be invoked by internal organs of the local organization. These are **a.1)** the veto of the Nombre1978 (Articles 173, subsection 1) of the Constitution and 17, subsection d) and 158 through 160 of the C.M.) and **a.2)** the review that council members may establish against agreements that have not yet been definitively approved (Articles 27, subsection c) and 153 ejusdem). **b)** At the second level are located external remedies that can only be formulated by interested parties (Article 173, subsection 2 of the Constitution), that is, the recipients of the actions. At this level are found the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación), and the extraordinary remedy of review (revisión). Each remedy has specific regulations, depending on whether it concerns acts that have been issued by the Council or bodies that depend on it, or acts of bodies that are not hierarchically dependent on that collegiate body. In all cases, as will be seen, in line with canon 173 of the Magna Carta, the rejection of those measures at the municipal level allows the remission of the matter to the Contentious-Administrative Court, so that, within the biphasic non-hierarchical oversight function it must exercise, it may resolve the eventual appeal and, in most cases (barring special regulation to that effect), consider the administrative route exhausted (Article 31, subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A.). From this perspective, and in order to have clarity regarding the treatment that must be given to the challenge of conduct issued by the various local authorities, it should be emphasized that in the current context, the town councils (ayuntamientos) have a two-faced regime, composed of two hierarchical centers of authority, which, by express provision of Article 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code, constitute the Municipal Government (higher hierarchy) of the Municipal Corporations. On one hand, the Council, composed of popularly elected council members (regidores), with political and normative functions (ordinal 12 of the C.M.), that is, it is a deliberative body of political connotation. On the other, the Mayor (Alcalde), also a popularly elected official (Article 12 of the C.M.), with technical competences, managerial and executive connotations (numerals 14 to 20 ibidem). Their competence framework is linked to executive and administrative functions. Between the two, there is no hierarchical bond, but rather an interadministrative coordination relationship, necessary for the work of administering the interests and local services of the canton in charge of the Municipal Government that both comprise, in the terms of Article 169 of the Constitution. More simply, Nombre1978 is not hierarchically inferior to the Council; they are bodies with coordinated but not subject competences that must ultimately complement each other for the efficient and agile functioning of the town councils. Their duty to ensure the due fulfillment of municipal agreements does not presuppose hierarchical subordination to the Council. It consists of a task inherent to their managerial and executive competences, for the good organization and functioning of the local services. **2.- Normative treatment of the so-called external remedies.** Title VI of the Municipal Code, called “Remedies against municipal acts,” separately regulates what are “Remedies against council agreements” (Chapter I) and “Remedies against other municipal acts” (Chapter II). **a)** In the first case, both the decision adopted directly (that is, in a single instance by direct exercise of specific non-reviewing competence), **“***…or hearing on appeal against the resolution of some hierarchically inferior municipal body, …***”** (the highlighting is not from the original), is subject to the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación), with the exceptions provided in canon 154 of the C.M., measures that must be formulated within the term of five business days (common time limit in this matter). The first remedy, for reasons of opportunity or legality; the second, only for questions of legality (Article 156 C.M.). Faced with the Council's decision in a single instance, the appeal must be heard by the Contentious-Administrative Court, in accordance with precepts 189 through 192 of the C.P.C.A. in relation to 156 of the C.M. In the decisions of the direct inferior bodies of that collegiate body, a chain or appeals ladder operates, as that manifestation is challengeable through ordinary remedies. For those cases (and only for those), the appeal is heard by the Council. However, against what is resolved, reconsideration and appeal would again be possible, the latter being the competence of the aforementioned Court. In this last scenario, it is crucial to indicate that the competence held by the Municipal Council as the administrative superior to review the conduct of its inferiors (a power that in any case is given by numeral 102, subsections b) and d) of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter L.G.A.P.), is reserved for the legality review of the acts issued by its inferiors, that is, by the bodies that within the organizational line of command (101 ibidem), maintain a direct relationship of hierarchical subordination. Excluded from such power, therefore, would be the decisions of all those offices that do not depend (directly or indirectly) on the Council. This can be inferred from the cited ordinal 154 of the C.M. when it establishes that **“**Any agreement of the municipal council, issued directly or hearing on appeal against the resolution by some hierarchically inferior municipal body…**”** (the highlighting is not from the original) shall be subject to the remedies of reconsideration and appeal. This is confirmed by ordinal 190.1 of the C.P.C.A. insofar as it indicates **“**The appeal against agreements emanating from the municipal council, whether directly or on the occasion of the resolution of remedies against agreements of hierarchically inferior municipal bodies…**”** (the highlighting is not from the original). Note that the common reference in both norms is hierarchical dependency. The foregoing implies, as has been stated, that it is for the Council to hear the appeal of decisions from bodies over which it holds a hierarchical bond or relationship, directly or indirectly of an organic and functional nature, which is evident if one considers that it is a power inherent to its condition as superior. **b)** In the second case, it regulates the challenge of other municipal acts. This concerns all those conducts of other administrative units and in whose adoption no collegiate will intervenes. At this point, a distinction must be made between acts issued by bodies dependent on the Council, and those issued by offices that do not depend, even reflexively, on that collegiate body. It is worth mentioning, before addressing this differentiation, as a common axis for both categories, that the act of the inferior body has the remedies of reconsideration and appeal, the former being waivable, in which case, the matter must be transferred to the superior for what is appropriate, without this being an obstacle for the reluctant body to correct or amend its conduct. As already stated, the manifestations of the units subject to a hierarchical relationship with that center of authority are subject to review through the remedy of appeal, as can be inferred from numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190, subsection 1) of the C.P.C.A. **3.-** Along these lines, numeral 161 of the C.M. reiterates that the Council hears on appeal what is resolved by a municipal official, whether or not they depend directly. The norm should not lend itself to confusion, much less should it be interpreted from its content that it constitutes a special provision and therefore takes precedence in application over what is established in the indicated numerals 154 of the C.M. and 190, subsection 1) of the L.G.A.P. That provision must be considered integrally with the rest of the mandates that regulate the subject, especially with those already mentioned, as well as with the powers that, in light of precept 101 of the L.G.A.P., every superior holds. This is because its reading could lead to the mistake of considering that, despite other norms clearly stating that the municipal body hears on appeal the acts of its direct inferiors, it must also hear all conduct of other officials or bodies, regardless of whether they are inferiors or not. Indeed, as stated, the reference to the power of review applies only to hierarchically inferior bodies, therefore, regarding the Council, it is relevant for the acts of officials of bodies that have some degree of subordination to that collegiate body, even reflexive. However, it would not apply to those where the referred hierarchical bond is not present, resulting in the administrative units that depend on another hierarchical source being excluded from this power: the Mayor (Alcalde). **4.-** Thus seen, it is clear and evident that the Council could not hear on appeal the acts of Nombre1978 nor of those officials over which the latter has hierarchical authority. To consider that it could, would imply completely stripping that official of one of their essential powers, which is: **“***To exercise the functions inherent in the condition of general administrator and head of the municipal units, overseeing the organization, functioning, coordination, and faithful compliance with municipal agreements, laws, and regulations in general***”**, (the highlighting is not from the original), as stated in subsection a) of canon 17 of the C.M. That leadership could not be fully realized if they are not responsible for hearing on appeal the acts of their inferiors, insofar as it is through this remedy that they have the opportunity to align them with legality or opportunity. Ergo, the review of those acts is not the concern of the Council, but of the Mayor. The contrary would imply the establishment of an improper monophasic hierarchy in an appeals chain where a biphasic one already exists, which, of course, does not correspond to the administrative efficiency and procedural speed that must permeate, by principle, every administrative procedure, without the municipal one having an objective cause that allows an exception. **5.-** Now then, this position of Nombre1978 lays the foundations for the treatment of the regime of challenge of the acts of officials who do not depend on the Council, but on them. In such a case, it is evident that under the protection of constitutional numeral 173, the interposition of the ordinary remedies of reconsideration and appeal within the fifth day is possible. The legal regulation and procedure that must be given to these claim measures are the same as those provided for in mandates 161 through 163 of the C.M., with the warning that in these cases, the appeal must be processed before Nombre1978 and not before the Council. Faced with the apparent gap observed in the legal regime that would apply in the appealability of this type of acts, the legal framework specified for the appeal of acts of the Council and its dependencies must be used. An analogical criterion applies here that allows extending to those decisions the norms that define the appeals framework of those others, given that ultimately, they are administrative acts issued by municipal authorities. Therefore, there is no reason to treat them differently when the similarity they bear is obvious; an aspect that precisely justifies and validates said application. **6.-** On the other hand, although, for the reasons stated, it has been established that the Council is not empowered to hear on appeal the decisions of the Mayor, whether in their exercise of competences in a single instance or hearing on appeal the acts of their inferiors, it is plain that the actions of that official are exposed to the review of the Contentious-Administrative Court, within the improper hierarchical remedy that operates in this matter. It should be noted that the control by the cited Court derives not from legal norms, even though these establish its competence and develop the procedural aspects of that improper oversight function. It emanates directly from the Magna Carta. In this sense, numeral 173 clearly states: **“***…if the Municipality does not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement, the record shall pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law to resolve definitively.***”** The reference to the Municipality is not exhausted in the acts of the Council.

It must be understood and appreciated in its broad sense, that is, the set of bodies that make up the local organization, but which additionally hold the power of review (hear on appeal, conocer en alzada) that allows them to render the contested act unchallengeable at the municipal level. This would be the case of the Council (Concejo) and the Mayor (Alcalde), each within the specific field of their competencies. In this regard, Article 169 of the Magna Carta states that the administration of local interests corresponds to the Municipal Government (Gobierno Municipal), composed of a deliberative body (Council) and the Mayor. Therefore, it is a figure established by the Political Constitution itself, which forms part of the local public power structure and which consequently holds the powers that allow it to issue conduct attributable to the Municipality (Municipalidad) and that, to that extent, are understood to be included within the coverage purpose of the aforementioned constitutional precept 173. Thus, as a derivation of the democratic principle (which even allows their designation through popular election mechanisms) and in consideration of factors of transparency and control (to which all public functions are subject), the decisions of the Nombre1978 are also subject to appeal in the manner indicated by the cited rule. Only in this way is their referral to the Court (Tribunal), an external body, justified so that it definitively resolves the matter if it does not determine to revoke the challenged act. This is because the supreme norm, the pillar of the entire system of appeals against local decisions, allows the challenge of any administrative conduct of the local governments (ayuntamientos), which, as stated, is not exhausted in the manifestations of the Council, but rather includes, within the two-headed scheme (esquema bifronte) already indicated, the Mayor. It is clear that the cited precept encompasses the conduct of both bodies that make up the Municipal Government and indicates the appeals available against them. The so-called veto of the Mayor, of course, when dealing with acts of the Council, and the challenge by interested parties, against any act or function of the local governments, whether it derives from the deliberative body or from the Nombre1978. A different treatment of both chiefs (jerarcas) could not be justified, since, in essence, they are acts and conduct that derive from a center of local public power, which, for purposes of full and efficient functioning, has been established through an organizational system characterized by the co-existence and coordination of two hierarchical instances, it is reiterated, that make up the Municipal Government. This being the case, if constitutional law itself establishes the control by the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) over the acts of local corporations when, after being challenged within their internal framework, the objected or appealed conduct is not revoked or reformed, the logical consequence is the exercise of this non-hierarchical competence. Therefore, it is considered that it corresponds to said Court to hear appeals against acts issued not only by the Council but also by the Mayor, under the terms already discussed. Again, based on the fact that both the C.M. and the C.P.C.A. develop the guidelines to follow regarding the acts of the Council, by systematic integration of the legal order and pursuant to the mechanism of analogy (Articles 7, 8, and 9 L.G.A.P. and 5 of the L.O.P.J.), such legal development must be applicable to the challenge of the acts of the Mayor, so that the Court proceeds to exercise that legality control that has been conferred upon it by the constituent power, in accordance with said rules, and what is established for the acts of the deliberative body must be applied to that official. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VII.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Based on all of the foregoing, it can be stated in the following terms: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In this matter, we are faced with an infraconstitutional conflict that this Chamber (Sala) must resolve. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> By the regulations and provisions in force at the time of the appealed act, its cognizance corresponds to the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">3)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> The Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) and the Municipal Nombre1978, in the terms of Articles 169 of the Political Constitution and 3 and 12 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), make up the Municipal Government (superior hierarchy-two-headed structure) of the Municipal Corporations (Corporaciones Municipales). </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">4)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the municipal appeals regime (régimen recursivo municipal) that has its foundations in constitutional canon 173 (and its development both by the Municipal Code and by the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure, Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court is constituted as an improper two-phase chief (jerarca impropio bifásico). </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">5)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In that capacity, it is incumbent upon that Court to definitively resolve the appeals filed against municipal agreements or decisions in their two aspects, that is, those adopted independently by the Council or by the Mayor; whether in a sole instance by direct exercise of specific non-reviewing competence or by hearing on appeal (conociendo en alzada) with respect to some municipal body </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">hierarchically inferior in direct and immediate degree</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, when as appropriate and in the terms set forth by the Constituent Power, they do not revoke or reform their objected or appealed decisions.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>"

“I.- De las actuaciones que motivan este asunto. 1.- El Concejo Municipal del cantón Central de la provincia de Heredia, en sesión ordinaria no. 300-2005 de 15 de diciembre de 2005, acuerdo IV, declaró la responsabilidad patrimonial de los recurrentes, quienes se desempeñaron como miembros de la Comisión de Festejos Populares de Heredia 2003, por haberse demostrado la existencia de culpa grave al realizar contrataciones irregulares, razón por la cual ordenó requerir de ellos, solidariamente, el reembolso de ¢1.017.980,74. 2.- Inconformes con lo resuelto, los exmiembros de la Comisión de Festejos presentaron el 18 de enero de 2006 “…Recurso de Revocatoria con Apelación en subsidio, Excepción de prescripción falta de derecho y Nulidad Absoluta …” (sic). 3.- El Concejo Municipal en sesión ordinaria no. 319-2006, celebrada el 13 de marzo de 2006, artículo IV, rechazó tanto las excepciones cuanto el recurso de revocatoria interpuestos y de conformidad con los artículos 156 del Código Municipal (en adelante C.M.) y 85 de la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (en lo sucesivo L.R.J.C.A.), elevó la apelación en subsidio ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo “…PARA SU CORRESPONDIENTE RESOLUCIÓN, …”. 4.- La Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en resolución no. 523-2007 de las 16 horas 10 minutos del 7 de noviembre de 2007, declaró mal admitida la alzada e indicó a la Municipalidad recurrida trasladar la apelación formulada ante la Contraloría General de la República (C.G.R.). Con análisis de la Ley no. 4286 en su texto original (previo a la reforma introducida por Ley no. 8494) y el Manual de Operaciones para las Comisiones de Festejos Populares, dictado por la C.G.R. el 20 de setiembre de 1990, ese Tribunal determinó su falta de competencia al considerar que ”…con fundamento en la normativa que rige la materia de fiscalización de los auditorajes y sus consecuencias, al momento de darse los hechos, la residenció en el órgano constitucional encargado del control de la hacienda pública, sea la Contraloría General de la República, …”. 5.- La División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica de la C.G.R., mediante pronunciamiento DAGJ-0269-2008 (01777) de 29 de febrero de 2008, relacionando el numeral 183 de la Constitución Política con lo establecido en su Ley Orgánica, no. 7428; la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, no. 8131; el artículo 4 de la Ley 4268 (sic); el concepto de jerarquía impropia y el precepto 81 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, determinó: “…antes y después de que sufriera las reformas de la Ley 8494, no es posible desprender que allí se estableciera una jerarquía impropia monofásica, para que este Órgano Contralor fuera el llamado a resolver recursos de apelación en materia de Comisiones de Festejos Populares.”. A lo anterior, agrega, el ordinal 173 constitucional es claro al disponer lo relacionado con la impugnación de los actos municipales, desarrollado por el canon 156 de C.M. Concluye que esa Contraloría no es competente para resolver un recurso de apelación en contra de un acuerdo municipal, toda vez que no es jerarca impropio en esta materia, asimismo, es imposible interpretar que la Ley 4268 (sic) “…le otorgaba esa competencia a la Contraloría General, pues no se encontraba regulado expresamente que debía resolver el recurso de apelación en materia de Comisiones de Festejos Populares.//No se puede confundir la competencia asignada en su momento por la Ley 4268 de determinar las responsabilidades disciplinarias o por daños con la de resolver un recurso como jerarca impropio, pues tal y como se señaló debe estar regulado expresamente.”. 6.- El Nombre1978 Municipal interpuso ante la Contralora General de la República recurso extraordinario de revisión, señalando en lo medular que “…no estamos ante una actuación como jerarquía impropia, sino ante la fiscalización y control superior de un acto municipal […] referente a la hacienda pública.”. A partir de lo anterior y al estar “…de por medio la fiscalización superior de la hacienda pública.”, fundamenta la competencia del Órgano Contralor para conocer y resolver el recurso de apelación interpuesto, no como jerarquía impropia, sino como órgano superior en materia de fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública. 7.- La Contralora General de la República en resolución R-CO-22-2008 de las 11 horas del 15 de mayo de 2008, con vista en la situación que ocurre a partir de la incompetencia declarada tanto por la División de Asesoría y Gestión Jurídica, que esa jerarquía avala, cuanto por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, dispuso “…por economía procesal elevar directamente los autos …” ante esta Sala para que “…en uso de las potestades que le confiere el artículo 54, inciso 12), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, difiera el conflicto presentado.”. II.- De la naturaleza del conflicto y del órgano competente para dirimirlo. 1) En este asunto se está frente a un conflicto (negativo) de competencia, pues ambas instancias la declinan, es decir, no la discuten para sí (conflicto positivo). 2) Por una parte, la Constitución ni la ley atribuyen en modo alguno a la C.G.R. competencia para el conocimiento de las apelaciones contra los acuerdos municipales; por otra, la circunstancia de que el párrafo final del numeral 173 de la Constitución Política establezca que “…los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente.”, no es suficiente para determinar que el conflicto es de orden constitucional y, por ello, deba ser resuelto por la Sala Constitucional. Al respecto, ese órgano decisor ha sido clara en señalar:“…para que proceda un conflicto constitucional de competencias, no basta con que el texto constitucional mencione al ente u órgano público sino que debe atribuirle competencias específicas respecto de cuya interpretación y aplicación en cuanto a su titularidad y ejercicio proceda dirimirlo. Consecuentemente, cuando la cuestión gira en torno a atribuciones otorgadas por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional -legal o reglamentario- el conflicto debe ser resuelto de conformidad con las normas dispuestas por la Ley General de la Administración Pública en sus artículos 71 a 82, puesto que, se tratará, en ese caso, de un conflicto administrativo de legalidad. …” (resolución no. 2199-2004 de las 12 horas 59 minutos del 27 de febrero de 2004). A partir de lo anterior, se puede afirmar que la atribución específica del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, órgano que no se menciona en la norma constitucional, de conocer las apelaciones de los acuerdos municipales (que no son solo los emitidos por los Concejos Municipales), no es de orden constitucional sino infraconstitucional, al estar dispuesta y regulada en los Códigos Municipal y Procesal Contencioso, así como lo estuvo en la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. Es decir, no se está frente a un conflicto que, por la misma interpretación y definición de su competencia que ha dado la Sala Constitucional (artículo 7 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), no le corresponde dirimir a esa Cámara. En refuerzo de lo anterior, son importantes las siguientes consideraciones de ese Tribunal: a) para la procedencia de un conflicto ante esa Sala “…deben evaluarse dos elementos fundamentales, el sujeto que lo plantea y respecto de quién lo hace; y por otra parte, la materia o competencia en la que se sustenta el conflicto. …” (resolución no. 11585-2001 ídem). b) “…por definición, un conflicto de competencias -sea constitucional o administrativo- surge cuando dos o más órganos o entidades públicas se disputan el ejercicio de una potestad o atribución, por estimar cada uno de ellos ser el que debe llevarla a efecto. Por ese motivo, la jurisprudencia de este tribunal ha sido clara en el sentido de que si una parte impugna la competencia de la otra, pero no la reclama para sí, no procede la intervención de la Sala. …” (resolución no. 619-2001 de las 15 horas 18 minutos del 24 de enero de 2001). Lo anterior, fue reiterado por esa Sala en resolución no. 9364-2005 de las 14 horas 48 minutos del 13 de julio de 2005, al señalar: “…hay un conflicto cuando dos o más entidades se disputan una atribución. Así lo ha dicho la Sala en sentencia No. 2001-00619, del 24-1-01, …”; resolución en la que también indicó “…Por consiguiente, no hay conflicto de competencias constitucionales cuando un órgano cuestiona, pero no reclama para sí, las atribuciones de otro. …”. c) los conflictos constitucionales pueden ser de dos órdenes; “…a) Positivo, el cual se plantea cuando, al propio tiempo, dos entes u órganos estiman que son competentes y b) negativo, cuando los dos entes u órganos declinan su competencia y se reputan incompetentes para conocer y resolver determinado asunto. En sendos supuestos, la cuestión de competencia queda dirimida determinando exactamente cuál ente u órgano es su titular y, por consiguiente, debe ejercerla. …” (resolución no. 2199-2004 ídem). d) “…En el presente caso, la situación que se enuncia en realidad no iría más allá de la existencia de criterios jurídicos alegadamente contradictorios, que no es lo mismo que decir que dos o más partes estén pretendiendo ejercer una competencia constitucional con exclusión de la otra u otras, que es la clase de conflictos que generalmente dirimiría esta Sala. …” (resolución no. 11346-2004 de las 14 horas 39 minutos del 13 de octubre de 2004). e) “…El legislador, pese a encontrarse implícita la voluntad del constituyente originario, se encargó de resaltar que, en todo caso, tales conflictos de competencia son de orden constitucional, esto es, cuando se encuentre empeñada una discusión acerca de la titularidad y ejercicio del conjunto de facultades que la Constitución Política le atribuye a un órgano o ente público determinado. …” (resolución no. 2199-2004 ídem). f) “…En síntesis, el objeto de un conflicto solo puede ser una competencia de orden constitucional, no una atribución legal y mucho menos reglamentaria. De igual manera, el fin de la gestión es reclamar esa competencia de manera general,…” (resolución no. 9364-2005 ídem). g) esa jurisdicción solo tiene facultades para conocer “…sobre conflictos relativos a competencias constitucionales; es decir, de esferas de atribuciones, inmunidades y privilegios establecidos por la Constitución y no relativos a competencias de otra naturaleza, sea que en esta vía no resulta procedente conocer los de (sic) conflictos de legalidad o administrativos, …” (entre otras, resoluciones no. 443-2000 de las 16 horas 48 minutos del 12 de enero de 2000; no. 619-2001 de las 15 horas 18 minutos del 24 de enero de 2001; no. 11585-2001 de 8 horas 54 minutos del 9 de noviembre de 2001; 7689-2002 de las 14 horas 44 minutos del 7 de agosto de 2002; no, 9364-2005 ídem; no. 15955-2006 de las 14 horas 48 minutos del 1° de noviembre de 2006 con cita de “…lo resuelto en la sentencia No. 2004-11346…”(sic); y no. 13577-2007 ídem). 3.- Claro es que tampoco se trata de un conflicto infraconstitucional a dirimir por el señor Presidente de la República, toda vez que por la naturaleza de los órganos discrepantes, no se está en alguno de los supuestos contenidos en los artículos 26 inciso d) (entre Ministerios) y 78 (entre un Ministerio y una institución descentralizada o entre éstas), de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. III.- De la competencia de esta Sala para dirimir el conflicto planteado. A partir de que no corresponde resolverlo a la Sala Constitucional ni al señor Presidente de la República, por las razones expuestas, debe determinarse si esta Sala es la competente. La Sala Constitucional en resolución no. 2199-2004 ídem, indicó que “…cuando la cuestión gira en torno a atribuciones otorgadas por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional -legal o reglamentario- el conflicto debe ser resuelto de conformidad con las normas dispuestas por la Ley General de la Administración Pública en sus artículos 71 a 82, puesto que, se tratará, en ese caso, de un conflicto administrativo de legalidad. …”. (El resaltado no es del original). Es oportuno advertir, ello debe armonizarse y complementarse con lo establecido en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (en adelante L.O.P.J.), donde se regula de manera especial lo relativo a los conflictos entre órganos jurisdiccionales e incluso, entre autoridades judiciales y administrativas. Lo anterior, toda vez que, además de la resolución de los conflictos entre órganos jurisdiccionales (entre otros, numerales 54 incisos 8, 9, 10 y 11; 55 inciso 4); 57 inciso 4); 59 inciso 5) y 102 de la L.O.P.J.), el legislador residenció en un órgano del Poder Judicial, la atribución de dirimir los conflictos de competencia en los que intervenga al menos una autoridad judicial independientemente del carácter con el que actúe. Es así como en el precepto 54 inciso 12) de la L.O.P.J., expresamente establece que esta Sala conocerá: “…De los conflictos de competencia que se planteen respecto de autoridades judiciales y administrativas.”. Es claro que el principio de distribución de funciones; la atribución constitucional y legal dada a la Sala Constitucional por el constituyente derivado para resolver los conflictos de mayor rango (constitucionales), así como la regulación especial contenida en la L.O.P.J. en materia de competencias, excluyen cualquier intervención de un Poder del Estado, ente u órgano no judicial, del conocimiento y resolución de los conflictos donde participe cualquier autoridad judicial, se reitera, independientemente del carácter con que actúa. A partir de lo anterior y por cuanto en este asunto, al menos, uno de los discrepantes es una autoridad judicial; sí corresponde a esta Sala resolver la discrepancia sometida a su conocimiento y así se dispone, tanto por lo ya indicado cuanto por aspectos de seguridad jurídica, economía y celeridad procesal. Lo anterior se refuerza, incluso, con la atribución que el legislador dispuso para esta Sala, de conocer de “…los demás asuntos que indique la ley, cuando, por su naturaleza, no correspondan a otra de las salas de la Corte.” (inciso 13 del artículo 54 de la L.O.P.J.) IV.- Sobre el fondo. Bien precisa el Tribunal al indicar que para resolver el asunto debe serlo con fundamento en la Ley no. 4286 de 17 de diciembre de 1968, en su texto original antes de la reforma introducida por la Ley no. 8494, así como del Manual de Operaciones para las Comisiones de Festejos Populares, de la Contraloría General de la República, no. 202 de 20 de setiembre de 1990, publicado en La Gaceta no. 202 de 25 de octubre de ese año. Sin embargo, respecto de ese marco normativo aplicable, son necesarias las siguientes aclaraciones: 1) Conforme al texto original de la Ley no. 4286, las Comisiones de Festejos Populares estaban obligadas a rendir una liquidación de cuentas a la C.G.R. (artículo 1°); ese Órgano Contralor debía “…rechazar aquellos egresos que no contengan la documentación completa y los que a su juicio no tengan relación con los eventos realizados o no hayan sido indispensables o necesarios para los festejos.” (párrafo primero, artículo 3°); los egresos rechazados o no aceptados por parte de la Contraloría “…serán asumidos proporcionalmente por los integrantes de la comisión y reintegrados dentro de un plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de resolución…” (párrafo segundo, artículo 3°); y la C.G.R. tenía la obligación de ejercitar las acciones necesarias para sentar las responsabilidades del caso “…cuando comprobare incorrección o irregularidad en el manejo de los fondos.” (artículo 4°). 2) la citada Ley no. 4286 fue reformada en su artículo 1° por el numeral 9, norma general no. 119, de La ley no. 6700 de 23 de diciembre de 1981 (Ley de presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario para el año 1982). A partir de ese momento correspondía a las Auditorías o Contadurías municipales, revisar y aprobar la liquidación de cuentas de las comisiones de festejos populares y “… rendir esa liquidación a la Contraloría General de la República, …”. Es decir, ya las Comisiones no debían remitir la liquidación de cuentas a la C.G.R. sino a las Auditorías o Contadurías Municipales. 3) El Órgano Contralor mediante el Manual 202 de 20 de setiembre de 1990 “Manual de Operación para las Comisiones de Festejos Populares”, estableció que “…la Comisión deberá rendir al Auditor o en su defecto al Contador Municipal, para su aprobación, la liquidación de los ingresos y egresos de esa Comisión. ….” (artículo 32); si el Auditor o Contador Municipal determinara “…faltantes, pagos improcedentes, cuentas pendientes de cobro, gastos que no están respaldados con justificantes o cualquier otra irregularidad que causara un perjuicio económico a la Comisión, informará de ello al Concejo Municipal, para que en un término de quince días este órgano gestione directamente ante los miembros de la Comisión que corresponda, el reintegro de las sumas respectivas a las arcas municipales. …” (párrafo primero, artículo 34); de no lograrse la recuperación de esas sumas por la vía administrativa “…el Concejo deberá ejercer las acciones judiciales correspondientes para el resarcimiento de las mismas, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 210 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.”. Con otras palabras, a partir del desarrollo que de la Ley se hace en el Manual emitido por la Contraloría, ocurre una bifurcación en el trámite. Se somete al Auditor, o en su defecto al Contador Municipal, la liquidación respectiva de la Comisión, y en caso de que esos funcionarios determinaran “…faltantes, pagos improcedentes, cuentas pendientes de cobro, gastos que no están respaldados con justificantes o cualquier otra irregularidad que causara un perjuicio económico a la Comisión, …”, deben ponerlo en conocimiento del Concejo Municipal para que gestionara directamente ante los miembros de la Comisión que corresponda, el reintegro de las sumas respectivas; de no lograrse, ese órgano colegiado debía ejercer las acciones legales correspondientes. 4) Sin embargo, la C.G.R. advirtiendo deficiencias “…en relación con el cumplimiento de la normativa que rige el desempeño de las comisiones de festejos populares, …”, mediante circular no. 2198 (DI-CR-71) de 28 de febrero de 2002, dirigida a los auditores internos municipales y concejos municipales, consideró prudente advertirles y recordarles “…para su aplicación un resumen de la principal normativa al respecto.”. En lo que interesa, expresamente les indicó “… d) El artículo 34 contempla el eventual caso de que el funcionario responsable de la aprobación de la liquidación determinara faltantes, pagos improcedentes o alguna otra irregularidad que causara un perjuicio económico a la Comisión, indicando que deberá informar de ello al Concejo Municipal, con el propósito de que este gestione el reintegro de las sumas que correspondan por la vía legal que aplique. …”. De lo anterior, es claro que la actuación tanto del órgano interno municipal de control y fiscalización cuanto de los concejos municipales, lo era (y lo es) sin perjuicio de la fiscalización final por parte de la Contraloría en el ámbito de sus competencias como contralor superior de la Hacienda Pública y del ejercicio de sus atribuciones establecidas en los artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley no. 4286. En refuerzo de lo dicho, nótese que en la reforma de los artículos 1, 3 y 4 introducida por la Ley no. 8494 de 30 de marzo de 2006 “Reformas del Marco Legal que asigna competencias a la Contraloría General de la República en el régimen municipal”, se retoma dicho procedimiento en lo que al Concejo compete, pero con indicación expresa “…sin perjuicio de la fiscalización superior que corresponde a la Contraloría General de la República.”. V.- A partir de lo establecido en el considerando que precede, entiende esta Sala que lo actuado en su momento por la Municipalidad no riñe con las disposiciones normativas y reglamentarias y la directriz del Órgano Contralor que regulaban y orientaban, en ese entonces, tanto la actividad y responsabilidades de las Comisiones de Festejos Populares cuanto las atribuciones de los órganos de control interno municipal y del Órgano de Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública. Por lo anterior, al estar frente a un recurso de apelación contra el acuerdo del Concejo Municipal, su conocimiento y resolución corresponde al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, de conformidad con lo establecido en los artículos 156 del Código Municipal y 189 y 190 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y así se dispone. VI.- Del actual régimen recursivo municipal. Respecto de lo señalado en el considerando II de esta resolución, en cuanto a que los acuerdos municipales “…no son solo los emitidos por los Concejos Municipales…” y a propósito de la entrada en vigencia del Código Procesal Contencioso (en adelante C.P.C.A.), son oportunas las siguientes consideraciones puntuales respecto del actual régimen recursivo municipal. 1.- La posibilidad de impugnación de las decisiones municipales. La impugnación de las decisiones y acuerdos municipales encuentra sustento expreso en el numeral 173 de la Constitución Política. La norma regula el denominado veto del Alcalde, pero además el recurso por cualquier interesado; ergo, la facultad de los munícipes de recurrir las decisiones del gobierno municipal. A su vez, establece que en caso de que la Municipalidad (en sentido amplio) no revoque o reforme el acuerdo objetado o recurrido; es decir, la decisión impugnada, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley, para que resuelva definitivamente. A partir de allí, en la actualidad, el Código Municipal y más recientemente el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, constituyen las fuentes que de manera general, desarrollan el régimen jurídico propio de la recurribilidad de las decisiones dictadas por las corporaciones locales. Grosso modo, al tenor de lo dispuesto por el ordinal 153 del C.M., esas decisiones pueden impugnarse a dos niveles. a) En el primero se ubican los recursos internos, denominados de esa manera en virtud de que solo pueden invocarse por órganos internos de la organización local. Se trata de a.1) veto del Nombre1978 (artículos 173 inciso 1) constitucional y 17 inciso d) y 158 al 160 del C.M.) y a.2) la revisión que pueden establecer los regidores contra los acuerdos que aún no han sido aprobados de manera definitiva (artículos 27 inciso c) y 153 ejusdem). b) En el segundo se ubican los recursos externos que solo pueden formularse por los interesados (artículo 173, inciso 2 constitucional), sea, los destinatarios de las actuaciones. En este plano, se encuentran los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria y apelación, y el extraordinario de revisión. Cada recurso cuenta con regulaciones específicas, según se trate de actos que hayan sido emitidos por el Concejo u órganos que dependan de este o bien, de actos de órganos que no son jerárquicamente dependientes de ese cuerpo colegiado. En todos los casos, según se verá, a tono con lo preceptuado por el canon 173 de la Carta Magna, el rechazo de esas medidas en la sede municipal, permite la remisión del asunto al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, para que dentro de la función de contralor no jerárquico bifásico que debe ejercer, resuelva la eventual apelación y, en la mayoría de los casos (salvo regulación especial al efecto), dé por agotada la vía administrativa (artículo 31 inciso 1) del C.P.C.A.). Desde este plano, y a fin de tener claridad en torno al tratamiento que debe darse a la impugnación de las conductas emitidas por las diversas autoridades locales, debe destacarse que en el contexto actual, los ayuntamientos tienen un régimen bifronte, compuesto por dos centros jerárquicos de autoridad, los que, por disposición expresa del artículo 169 de la Constitución Política y 3 y 12 del Código Municipal, conforman el Gobierno Municipal (jerarquía superior) de las Corporaciones Municipales. Por un lado, el Concejo, integrado por regidores de elección popular, con funciones de tipo política y normativa (ordinal 12 del C.M), es decir, trata de un órgano de deliberación de connotación política. Por otro, el Alcalde, funcionario también de elección popular (artículo 12 del C.M.), con competencias de índole técnica, connotación gerencial y de ejecución (numerales 14 al 20 ibidem). Su marco competencial se vincula a funciones ejecutivas y de administración. Entre ambos, no existe un ligamen jerárquico, sino una relación interadministrativa de coordinación, necesaria para la labor de administración de los intereses y servicios locales del cantón a cargo del Gobierno Municipal que ambos conforman, en los términos del artículo 169 constitucional. Más simple, el Nombre1978 no es inferior jerárquico del Concejo; son órganos con competencias coordinadas pero no sujetas que en definitiva deben complementarse para un funcionamiento eficiente y ágil de los ayuntamientos. Su deber de velar por el debido cumplimiento de los acuerdos municipales no presupone una sujeción jerárquica con el Concejo. Consiste en una tarea consustancial a sus competencias gerenciales y ejecutorias, para la buena organización y funcionamiento de los servicios locales. 2.- Tratamiento normativo a los denominados recursos externos. El Titulo VI del Código Municipal denominado “Recursos contra los actos municipales”, regula por separado lo que son “Recursos contra los acuerdos del Concejo” (Capítulo I) y “Recursos contra los demás actos municipales” (Capítulo II). a) En el primer caso, tanto la decisión adoptada directamente (sea, en única instancia por ejercicio directo de competencia específica no revisora), “…o conociendo en alzada contra lo resuelto por algún órgano municipal jerárquicamente inferior, …” (el resaltado no es del original), está sujeta a los recurso ordinarios de revocatoria y apelación, con las salvedades que dispone el canon 154 del C.M., medidas que deben formularse dentro del plazo de cinco días hábiles (límite temporal común en esta materia). El primer remedio, por razones de oportunidad o legalidad; el segundo, solo por cuestiones de legalidad (artículo 156 C.M.). Ante la decisión del Concejo en única instancia, la apelación debe ser conocida por el Tribunal Contencioso, conforme a los preceptos 189 al 192 del C.P.C.A. en relación con el 156 del C.M. En las decisiones de los órganos inferiores directos de ese cuerpo colegiado, opera una cadena o escalera recursiva, ya que esa manifestación es impugnable mediante los recursos ordinarios. Para esos casos (y solo para esos), la apelación es conocida por el Concejo. Empero, contra lo resuelto, cabría de nuevo revocatoria y apelación, esta última de competencia del Tribunal mencionado. En este último supuesto, resulta determinante indicar que la competencia que ostenta el Concejo Municipal como jerarca administrativo para revisar la conducta de sus inferiores (potestad que en todo caso viene dada por el numeral 102 incisos b) y d) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en adelante L.G.A.P.), se encuentra reservada al cotejo de legalidad de los actos dictados por sus inferiores, es decir, por los órganos que dentro de la línea organizativa de mando (101 ibídem), guardan una relación directa de sujeción jerárquica. Estarían excluidas de tal potestad por ende, las decisiones de todas aquellas oficinas que no dependan (directa o indirectamente) del Concejo. Así se desprende del citado ordinal 154 del C.M. cuando establece que estarán sujetos a los recursos de revocatoria y apelación “Cualquier acuerdo del concejo municipal, emitido directamente o conociendo en alzada contra lo resuelto por algún órgano municipal jerárquicamente inferior…” (el resaltado no es del original). Esto se confirma con el ordinal 190.1 del C.P.C.A. en cuanto señala “La apelación contra los acuerdos que emanen del concejo municipal, ya sea directamente o con motivo de la resolución de recursos contra acuerdos de órganos municipales jerárquicamente inferiores…” (el resaltado no es del original). Nótese que la referencia común en ambas normas es la dependencia jerárquica. Lo anterior implica, como se ha señalado, que corresponde al Concejo conocer de la apelación de las decisiones de los órganos respecto de los cuales ostente un ligamen o relación jerárquica, directa o indirectamente de carácter orgánico y funcional, lo que resulta evidente si se considera que es una potestad inherente a su condición de jerarca. b) En el segundo caso, regula la impugnación de los demás actos municipales. Se trata de todas aquellas conductas de otras dependencias administrativas y que en su adopción no media voluntad colegiada. En este punto, deben diferenciarse los actos emitidos por órganos dependientes del Concejo, de aquellos dictados por oficinas que no dependen ni siquiera de modo reflejo de ese cuerpo colegiado. Valga mencionar, de previo a abordar esta diferenciación, como eje común de ambas categorías, que el acto del inferior cuenta con los recursos de revocatoria y apelación, siendo el primero renunciable, caso en el cual, el asunto debe trasladarse al jerarca para lo de rigor, sin que ello sea óbice para que el remiso, corrija o enmiende su conducta. Como se ha indicado ya, las manifestaciones de las unidades sujetas a relación jerárquica de ese centro de autoridad, son pasibles de ser revisadas mediante el remedio de la apelación, según se desprende de los numerales 154 del C.M. y 190 inciso 1) del C.P.C.A. 3.- En esta línea, el numeral 161 del C.M. reitera que el Concejo conoce en alzada lo resuelto por un funcionario municipal, ya sea que dependa o no directamente. La norma no debe prestarse a confusión, mucho menos interpretar a partir de su contenido, que se constituye en especial y por ende precede en aplicación respecto de lo establecido en los numerales 154 del C.M. y 190 inciso 1) de la L.G.A.P. indicados. Esa disposición debe ser considerada de manera integral con el resto de los mandatos que regulan el tema, en especial con los ya mencionados, así como con las competencias que a la luz del precepto 101 de la L.G.A.P. ostenta todo jerarca. Esto debido a que su lectura podría llevar al equívoco de considerar que, pese a que otras normas señalan con claridad que el colegio municipal conoce en apelación los actos de sus inferiores directos, también debe conocer de toda conducta de otros funcionarios u órganos, con independencia de que sean inferiores o no. En efecto, como se ha señalado, la referencia a la potestad de revisión aplica solo para los órganos jerárquicamente inferiores, por ende, respecto del Concejo, es pertinente para los actos de los funcionarios de los órganos que tengan algún grado de sujeción con ese cuerpo colegiado, aún refleja. Empero, no aplicaría para aquellos en los que no se presente el ligamen jerárquico referido, resultando excluidas de esta potestad las unidades administrativas que dependen de otra fuente jerárquica: el Alcalde. 4.- Así visto, es claro y evidente que el Concejo no podría conocer en apelación los actos del Nombre1978 ni de aquellos funcionarios sobre los cuales, éste último tenga la potestad jerárquica. Considerar que sí, implicaría por completo despojar a ese funcionario de una de sus atribuciones esenciales, tal cual es: “Ejercer las funciones inherentes a la condición de administrador general y jefe de las dependencias municipales, vigilando la organización, el funcionamiento, la coordinación y el fiel cumplimiento de los acuerdos municipales, las leyes y los reglamentos en general”, (el resaltado no es del original), como lo señala el inciso a) del canon 17 del C.M. Esa jefatura no podría concretarse plenamente si no le corresponde conocer en apelación los actos de sus inferiores, por cuanto, es mediante este remedio que tiene la oportunidad de ajustarlas a la legalidad u oportunidad. Ergo, la revisión de esos actos no incumbe al Concejo, sino al Alcalde. Lo contrario supondría el establecimiento de una jerarquía impropia monofásica en una cadena recursiva en la que ya existe una bifásica, lo que desde luego, no se corresponde a la eficiencia administrativa y celeridad procedimental que debe impregnar por razón de principio, todo procedimiento administrativo, sin que el municipal tenga causa objetiva que permita excepción. 5.- Ahora bien, esta posición del Nombre1978 sienta las bases para el tratamiento del régimen de impugnación de los actos de los funcionarios que no dependen del Concejo, sino de él. En tal caso, es evidente que al amparo del numeral 173 constitucional, resulta posible la interposición de los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria y de apelación dentro del quinto día. La regulación jurídica y trámite que deben darse a estas medidas de reclamo, son las mismas que se encuentran previstas en los mandatos 161 al 163 del C.M., con la advertencia de que en estos casos, la apelación debe ser tramitada ante el Nombre1978 y no ante el Concejo. Frente a la aparente laguna que se observa en el régimen jurídico que aplicaría en la recurribilidad de este tipo de actos, debe utilizarse el marco legal que precisa la apelación de los actos del Concejo y sus dependencias. Aplica acá un criterio analógico que permite extender a esas decisiones las normas que define el marco recursivo de aquellas otras, toda vez que en el fondo, se trata de actos administrativos emitidos por autoridades municipales. Por tanto, no existe entonces razón para tratarlas de manera diferente cuando es obvia la similitud que ostentan; aspecto que precisamente justifica y valida la aplicación dicha. 6.- Por otra parte, si bien, por las razones indicadas, se ha establecido que el Concejo no se encuentra facultado para conocer en apelación las decisiones del Alcalde, sea en su ejercicio de competencias en única instancia o conociendo en alzada los actos de sus inferiores, resulta palmario que las actuaciones de ese funcionario están expuestas a la revisión del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, dentro del recurso jerárquico impropio que opera en esta materia. Cabe hacer notar que el control por parte del citado Tribunal se desprende no de normas legales, aún cuando estas establecen su competencia y desarrollan los aspectos procesales y procedimentales de esa labor contralora impropia. Dimana de modo directo de la Carta Magna. En este sentido, el numeral 173 señala con claridad: “…si la Municipalidad no revoca o reforma el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente.” La referencia a la Municipalidad no se agota en los actos del Concejo. Debe ser entendido y apreciado en su sentido amplio, esto es, el conjunto de órganos que integran la organización local, pero que además, tienen la potestad de revisión (conocer en alzada) que les permite hacer incuestionable en sede municipal el acto combatido. Sería el caso del Concejo y del Alcalde, cada uno en el campo específico de sus competencias. En este plano, el artículo 169 de la Carta Magna señala que la administración de los intereses locales corresponde al Gobierno Municipal, compuesto por un cuerpo deliberativo (Concejo) y el Alcalde. Ergo, se trata de una figura dispuesta por la propia Constitución Política, que forma parte de la estructura de poder público local y que por ende, cuenta con las potestades que le permiten emitir conductas referibles a la Municipalidad y que en ese tanto, se entienden comprendidas dentro del objeto de cobertura del referido ordinal 173 constitucional. Por ende, como derivación del principio democrático (que incluso permite su designación por mecanismos de elección popular) y atendiendo a factores de transparencia y control (al que está sujeta toda función pública), las decisiones del Nombre1978 también son susceptibles de ser recurridas en la forma que señala la citada regla. Solo así se justifica su remisión al Tribunal, órgano externo, para que resuelva definitivamente el asunto si no determina revocar el acto cuestionado. Esto obedece a que la norma suprema, pilar de todo el sistema recursivo de las decisiones locales, permite la impugnación de cualquier conducta administrativa de los ayuntamientos, que como se ha dicho, no se agota en las manifestaciones del Concejo, sino que incluye, dentro del esquema bifronte ya indicado, al Alcalde. Resulta claro que el precepto citado engloba las conductas de ambos órganos que conforman el Gobierno Municipal y señala los recursos que caben contra ellos. El denominado veto del Alcalde, claro está, cuando se trate de actos del Concejo y la impugnación de los interesados, contra cualquier acto o función de los ayuntamientos, sea que derive del cuerpo deliberativo o del Nombre1978. No podría justificarse un tratamiento diferente de ambos jerarcas, pues en el fondo, son actos y conductas que derivan de un centro de poder público local, que para efectos de un funcionamiento pleno y eficiente, ha sido establecido mediante un sistema organizacional que se caracteriza por la co-existencia y coordinación de dos instancias jerárquicas, se reitera, que conforman el Gobierno Municipal. Así las cosas, si el propio derecho de la constitución estatuye el control por parte del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo de los actos de las corporaciones locales cuando luego de impugnados en su marco interno, no se revoca o reforma la conducta objetada o recurrida, la consecuencia lógica es el ejercicio de esta competencia no jerárquica. Por ende, se estima, corresponde a dicho Tribunal conocer las apelaciones contra los actos dictados no solo por el Concejo, sino además, por el Alcalde, en los términos ya comentados. De nuevo, partiendo de que tanto el C.M. como el C.P.C.A. desarrollan las pautas a seguir a propósito de los actos del Concejo, por integración sistemática del ordenamiento y atendiendo al mecanismo de la analogía (artículos 7, 8 y 9 L.G.A.P. y 5 de la L.O.P.J.), tal desarrollo legal debe ser aplicable a la impugnación de los actos del Alcalde, a fin de que el Tribunal proceda a ejercitar ese control de legalidad que le ha sido conferido por el constituyente, conforme a dichas reglas, debiendo aplicarse a ese funcionario lo estatuido para los actos del cuerpo deliberativo. VII.- A partir de todo lo anteriormente indicado, se puede precisar en los siguiente términos: 1) En este asunto se está ante un conflicto infraconstitucional que corresponde dirimir a esta Sala. 2) Por la normativa y disposiciones vigentes al momento del acto recurrido, su conocimiento corresponde al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. 3) El Concejo Municipal y el Nombre1978 Municipal, en los términos de los artículos 169 de la Constitución Política y 3 y 12 del Código Municipal, conforman el Gobierno Municipal (jerarquía superior-estructura bifronte) de las Corporaciones Municipales. 4) En el régimen recursivo municipal que tiene sus cimientos en el canon 173 constitucional (y su desarrollo tanto por el Código Municipal cuanto por el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, se constituye en jerarca impropio bifásico. 5) En ese carácter, le corresponde a ese Tribunal resolver definitivamente los recursos que se interpongan contra los acuerdos o decisiones municipales en sus dos vertientes, es decir, los adoptados de manera independiente por el Concejo o por el Alcalde; sea en única instancia por ejercicio directo de competencia específica no revisora o conociendo en alzada respecto de algún órgano municipal jerárquicamente inferior en grado directo e inmediato, cuando según corresponda y en los términos dispuestos por el Constituyente, no revocan o reforman sus decisiones objetadas o recurridas.”