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Res. 00175-2009 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III · 2009
OutcomeResultado
The Court holds that urban law is part of environmental law and details the procedures for annulling favorable administrative acts, stating that failure to observe legal requirements results in absolute nullity.El Tribunal declara que el derecho urbanístico es parte del derecho ambiental y detalla los procedimientos para anular actos administrativos favorables, afirmando que la inobservancia de los requisitos legales acarrea nulidad absoluta.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Litigation Court, Section III, in a municipal appeal, issues a substantive ruling analyzing in detail the intersection of urban planning and environmental law, affirming its constitutional rank. The judgment distinguishes between simple subdivisions (in already urbanized areas) and complex ones (requiring infrastructure like streets, parks, and services), and emphasizes that local governments must exercise their police power to ensure sustainable development and protect both the natural and urban environment. The decision examines the avenues for annulling a favorable administrative act, such as a municipal permit, either through an extraordinary review appeal by an interested third party or through ex officio annulment by the Municipal Council. The latter requires an ordinary administrative procedure with a binding opinion from the Office of the Attorney General or the Comptroller General, qualifying the nullity as absolute, evident, and manifest. Failure to observe these requirements results in the absolute nullity of the annulment and the liability of the responsible official.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección III, en una apelación municipal, emite una resolución de fondo que analiza en detalle la intersección entre el derecho urbanístico y el derecho ambiental, afirmando su rango constitucional. La sentencia distingue entre fraccionamientos simples (en áreas ya urbanizadas) y complejos (que requieren habilitación con calles, parques y servicios), y subraya que los gobiernos locales deben ejercer su poder de policía para garantizar el desarrollo sostenible y la protección del ambiente natural y urbano. Se examinan las vías para anular un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos, como un visado municipal, ya sea mediante recurso extraordinario de revisión por un tercero interesado o por anulación oficiosa del Concejo Municipal. Para esta última, se requiere un procedimiento administrativo ordinario con dictamen vinculante de la Procuraduría o Contraloría General de la República, que califique la nulidad como absoluta, evidente y manifiesta. La inobservancia de estos requisitos acarrea la nulidad absoluta de la anulación y responsabilidad del funcionario.
Key excerptExtracto clave
VIII).- URBAN PLANNING LAW AS PART OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: The healthy and balanced environment guaranteed by Constitutional Law includes urban planning matters, entrusted at the local level to municipalities (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, 15 et seq. of the Urban Planning Law). In this regard, our highest Constitutional Court stated: "Like two sides of the same coin: the natural environment and the urban environment. Thus, a more human environment is sought, that is, an environment that is not only healthy and ecologically balanced, but also a symbolic reference and giver of national, regional or local identity. Thus, the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment — broadly developed by constitutional jurisprudence — will include both its natural parts and its artificial parts, the latter being understood as the human habitat, that built by man, i.e., the urban environment, so that they remain free from all contamination, both due to the effects and repercussions it may have on the health of persons and other living beings, as well as for the intrinsic value of the environment." (Vote 2003-03656 — highlights not from original). The inclusion of urban matters as a branch of Environmental Law can also be found in a recent precedent of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which stated, relevantly: "The notion of property merges fully and perfectly with the constitutional right to the environment, which the constitutional body proclaims with equal intensity and hierarchy in its Article 50. Therefore, it is not difficult to infer urban planning regulation as an intermediary between property and the environment, since it is, after all, the gray, ordering, and constructive obverse of the latter matter. Environment and urban planning thus constitute areas of Law that, with their limiting role, delimit the precise contour of property rights, that is, their essential content." (Res. 000507-F-04). X).- ON THE AVENUES FOR ANNULLING AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACT DECLARING RIGHTS AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL: In municipal matters, the declaration of nullity of a final administrative act that has granted a right to the administered party may occur in two ways: a) at the request of an "interested" third party ("any person" under Article 173 of the Political Constitution), through the filing of an extraordinary review appeal as provided for in Articles 157 and 163 of the Municipal Code; or b) by the local government acting against its own prior act, which declared subjective rights. [...] It is also possible — as noted above — for the Municipal Council, in its capacity as supreme authority, to proceed to annul ex officio administrative acts favorable to the administered party (e.g., permits, construction permits, etc.), to the extent it believes they exhibit defects of nullity.VIII).- DERECHO URBANÍSTICO PARTE DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL: El ambiente sano y equilibrado que garantiza el Derecho de la Constitución incluye la materia urbanística, encomendada a nivel local a las municipalidades (artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, 15 y siguientes de la Ley de Planificación Urbana). En este sentido se pronunció nuestro máximo Tribunal Constitucional al indicar: “Como las dos caras de una misma moneda: el ambiente natural y el ambiente urbano. Es así como se pretende un ambiente más humano, es decir, un ambiente que no sólo sea sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, sino también como un referente simbólico y dador de identidad nacional, regional o local. Así, el derecho fundamental a tener un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado -desarrollado ampliamente por la jurisprudencia constitucional- comprenderá, tanto sus partes naturales, como sus partes artificiales, entendiéndose por tales, el hábitat humano, lo construido por el hombre, sea, lo urbano, de manera que se mantengan libres de toda contaminación, tanto por los efectos y repercusiones que puede tener en la salud de las personas y demás seres vivientes, como por el valor intrínseco del ambiente.” (Voto 2003-03656-el destacado no es del original). La inclusión de lo urbano como vertiente del Derecho ambiental, también puede encontrarse en un reciente precedente de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en que señaló, en lo de interés, lo siguiente: “la noción de propiedad se amalgama de manera plena y perfecta con el derecho constitucional al medio ambiente, que con igual intensidad y jerarquía, proclama el cuerpo constitucional en su precepto 50. Por ello no es difícil inferir la regulación urbanística como intermedia entre propiedad y ambiente, pues al fin y al cabo, es el anverso gris, ordenatorio y edificativo de esta última materia. Ambiente y urbanismo se constituyen así en áreas del Derecho que con su rol limitante, delimitan el contorno preciso del derecho de propiedad, es decir, su contenido esencial. (Res. 000507-F-04. X).- DE LAS VÍAS PARA ANULAR UN ACTO ADMINISTRATIVO DECLARATORIO DE DERECHOS EN SEDE MUNICIPAL: En material municipal, la declaratoria de nulidad de un acto administrativo firme que le ha otorgado un derecho al administrado, puede producirse de dos formas: a) a instancia de un tercero “interesado” (“cualquiera" 173 de la Constitución Política), a través de la presentación del recurso extraordinario de revisión tal como lo prevén los numerales 157 y 163 del Código Municipal o; b) volviendo el gobierno local contra aquél acto suyo anterior, declaratorio de derechos subjetivos. [...] También es posible –según se adelantó- que el Concejo Municipal, en su condición de jerarca supremo, se disponga a anular de oficio actos administrativos favorables para el administrado (v.gr. visados, permisos constructivos, etc), en tanto estima exhiben vicios de nulidad.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El ambiente sano y equilibrado que garantiza el Derecho de la Constitución incluye la materia urbanística, encomendada a nivel local a las municipalidades"
"The healthy and balanced environment guaranteed by Constitutional Law includes urban planning matters, entrusted at the local level to municipalities"
Considerando VIII
"El ambiente sano y equilibrado que garantiza el Derecho de la Constitución incluye la materia urbanística, encomendada a nivel local a las municipalidades"
Considerando VIII
"la noción de propiedad se amalgama de manera plena y perfecta con el derecho constitucional al medio ambiente"
"the notion of property merges fully and perfectly with the constitutional right to the environment"
Considerando VIII (citando Sala Primera)
"la noción de propiedad se amalgama de manera plena y perfecta con el derecho constitucional al medio ambiente"
Considerando VIII (citando Sala Primera)
"Basta que un parcelamiento requiera obras para habilitar el ingreso y brindar servicios diversos a algunos de esos fundos, para sostener que no existe un “simple fraccionamiento”, sino un proyecto residencial que debe, en consecuencia, cumplir con todos los requisitos señalados."
"It suffices that a parcelation requires works to enable access and provide various services to some of those properties, to assert that it is not a "simple subdivision," but rather a residential project that must, consequently, comply with all the requirements set forth."
Considerando IX
"Basta que un parcelamiento requiera obras para habilitar el ingreso y brindar servicios diversos a algunos de esos fundos, para sostener que no existe un “simple fraccionamiento”, sino un proyecto residencial que debe, en consecuencia, cumplir con todos los requisitos señalados."
Considerando IX
"El visado municipal, no se concede o deniega por la administración municipal de manera discrecional, sino en forma reglada, en consecuencia, si se cumple con los requisitos exigidos, éste no podrá ser denegado."
"The municipal permit is not granted or denied by the municipal administration on a discretionary basis, but rather in a regulated manner; consequently, if the requirements are met, it cannot be denied."
Considerando IX
"El visado municipal, no se concede o deniega por la administración municipal de manera discrecional, sino en forma reglada, en consecuencia, si se cumple con los requisitos exigidos, éste no podrá ser denegado."
Considerando IX
Full documentDocumento completo
**VIII).- URBAN PLANNING LAW AS PART OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:** The healthy and balanced environment guaranteed by Constitutional Law includes urban planning matters, entrusted at the local level to the municipalities (article 169 of the Political Constitution, 15 and following of the Urban Planning Law). Our highest Constitutional Court ruled in this sense, stating: "Like two sides of the same coin: the natural environment and the urban environment. This is how a more humane environment is sought, that is, an environment that is not only healthy and ecologically balanced, but also as a symbolic reference and giver of national, regional, or local identity. Thus, the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment—broadly developed by constitutional jurisprudence—will encompass both its natural parts and its artificial parts, the latter being understood as the human habitat, that built by man, i.e., the urban, so that they remain free of all contamination, both because of the effects and repercussions it may have on the health of people and other living beings, and because of the intrinsic value of the environment." (Voto 2003-03656—emphasis not in original).
The inclusion of the urban as an aspect of Environmental Law can also be found in a recent precedent of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which indicated, in relevant part, the following: "the notion of property amalgamates fully and perfectly with the constitutional right to the environment, which with equal intensity and hierarchy, the constitutional body proclaims in its precept 50. Therefore, it is not difficult to infer urban planning regulation as an intermediary between property and the environment, as it is, after all, the gray, regulatory, and constructive side of the latter matter. Environment and urban planning are thus constituted as areas of Law that, with their limiting role, delimit the precise contour of property rights, that is, their essential content. (Res. 000507-F-04. Without a doubt, alongside the norms that require the conservation and protection of natural resources, are the needs of different economic activities that demand the use and exploitation of environmental goods, which normally occurs with the urban development process. Within this framework, the obligation arises to pay attention to sustainable urban development, so that the needs of the residents (munícipes), to whom municipal governments must provide a healthy and ecologically balanced environment that grants them well-being, are guaranteed. There is an undeniable national interest, coinciding with the local one, in that the municipalities exercise their police power promptly and timely in relation to the norms for the protection of the natural environment (protection zones, natural beauty, landscape, biodiversity, etc.) and the urban environment (land uses, building coverage ratios, facades, architectural heritage, etc.). It must be borne in mind that the classification of Urban Planning Law as an aspect of Environmental Law has very important consequences insofar as it grants the former an indisputable constitutional rank; consequently, the inactivity of local governments in environmental matters involves the infringement of a fundamental right (in a similar sense from this same Court, see votes 815-2008, and 83-2008, among others). The legal provisions that, in development of the constitutional order, grant competence in urban-environmental matters to the municipalities are abundant. In this sense and, without intending to elaborate an exhaustive list, articles 29 of the Biodiversity Law, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73 of the Organic Environmental Law, among many other normative provisions, can be cited, which amalgamate the urban as part of environmental law, which has a green (biodiversity) and a gray (urbanization process) component. The possibility of imposing precautionary measures and administrative sanctions on developers who affect the environment is provided for in article 99 of the Organic Environmental Law, which entrusts the 'Public Administration' (including the local government) with the issuance—without further procedure—of both protective measures—precautionary principle—and definitive sanctions—which require compliance with the postulates of due process. Of special interest is the provision of subsection f) of that normative provision, in which the municipal Administration is empowered, among others, to order the '....partial, total, permanent, or temporary cancellation of the permits, licenses, premises, or companies that cause the complaint, the contaminating or destructive act or fact' (emphasis not in original).
The different Municipal Councils must bear in mind that sovereign powers are inalienable, non-transferable, imprescriptible, and of obligatory exercise (article 66 of the LGAP). In the case of precautionary measures—with constitutional provision in numeral 41—these can be ordered before, during, or in the course of an administrative procedure. The new Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, applicable to administrative procedures conducted at the municipal level, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 9 of the General Law of Public Administration, contains a wide range of precautionary measures of a conservative, anticipatory, innovative, etc. type, and with its provision, the legislator has sought to prevent '...serious damages or injuries, current or potential, from occurring...'. However, the characteristics of instrumentality, provisionality, and proportionality of precautionary measures (article 22 of the same normative body) oblige the Court to indicate that it is necessary for the measure to be complemented with an ordinary procedure, either to determine whether or not the urban planning norms or the scope of the granted license have been respected, or to declare in the administrative venue the nullity of an approval (visado) or permit that was issued in contravention of urban-environmental norms. The adoption of precautionary measures, without an administrative procedure to support them, distorts precautionary justice, as it turns it into an anticipated sanction, without compliance with due legal process. In the administrative procedure initiated by local governments, the postulates of due process must be complied with—in full—and the end of the procedure implies the extinction of the precautionary measure, since it lacks independent existence, given its instrumentality.
**IX).- DISTINCTION BETWEEN SIMPLE SUBDIVISIONS AND SUBDIVISION AND URBANIZATION:** A subdivision (fraccionamiento) is the division of a property (predio) for the purpose of introducing it into commerce, which implies, as each local government must verify when granting the corresponding approval (visado), that it conforms, in terms of size and characteristics, to the current urban planning provisions, especially the Regulatory Plan for local land—if one exists—as well as the development regulations and other special public policy laws. The subdivision that the law calls "simple" does not include a process of urban development (habilitación urbana) for the use and enjoyment of the parcels resulting from that subdivision, and this is so because the legislator assumes that in these cases, the lands (fundos) already have accesses and green areas resulting from a previous urban development. It is for this reason that article 40 of the Urban Planning Law provides: "(…) Likewise, the obligation to cede areas for parks and communal facilities is excepted for simple subdivisions of parcels in previously urbanized areas…" (emphasis not in original). When a certain area is previously urbanized, the acquirers of the subdivided parcels have access to the lands (fundos), parks, and communal facilities, and it must not be lost sight of that this forms part of their right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (constitutional article 50). For this reason—it is reiterated—the legislator has not deemed it necessary to require, in the case of a "simple" subdivision with urban development, larger land endowments for reasons of social interest. The approval (visado) for simple subdivisions, due to its minor significance, is usually granted to an official (e.g., Municipal Engineer) different from the one entrusted with "complex" approvals (e.g., Municipal Council, urban planning commissions, etc.), with the former lacking competence to authorize a different type of approval (visado); this in case the urban planning norms make such a distinction. However, a subdivision that forms part of the urbanization process and entails the development (habilitación) of the lands (fundos), for the first time, for urban purposes, must be provided with streets, green areas, and parks, as well as the services necessary for their use and enjoyment. In this second scenario, we are dealing with a complex process of subdivision and urbanization that introduces limitations on private property for urban planning reasons (article 22 of the Urban Planning Law), which the Constitutional Court has indicated are completely consistent with Constitutional Law (vote No. 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs. on October 15, 1993). The residential or subdivision project that we will call "complex" is provided for in numeral 40 of the Urban Planning Law, which, in relevant part, provides: "Every subdivider (fraccionador) of land (…) and every urbanizer shall cede gratuitously for public use both the areas destined for roads and those corresponding to parks and communal facilities; what is established for the latter two concepts shall be determined in the respective regulation, by setting percentages of the total area to be subdivided or urbanized, which may fluctuate between five percent and twenty percent, according to the average size of the lots, the intended use of the land, and the norms in this regard. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the sum of the lands to be ceded for public roads, parks, and communal facilities shall not exceed forty-five percent of the total surface area of the land to be subdivided or urbanized. (…). The obligation of the urbanizer to provide the subdivided parcels with accesses, green zones, parks, public roads, obliges them to comply with the urban provisions that establish minimum standards regarding space, quality, quantity, and other requirements demanded by law and development regulations for these areas. The local government must exercise its police power in a timely manner, guaranteeing to the residents of the canton that the works will be carried out in the manner that the urban planning norms indicate and under the conditions that those provisions set forth. It is sufficient that a parceling (parcelamiento) requires works to enable the ingress and provide various services to some of those lands (fundos), to hold that a 'simple subdivision' does not exist, but rather a residential project that must, consequently, meet all the indicated requirements. Urban residential projects can only enable ingress to the lands (fundos) through public roads that must have the dimensions and requirements of the General Law of Public Roads and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, in the absence—in this latter case—of specific provisions in local norms. None of the municipal bodies has the competence to authorize a project in which the development (habilitación) of the lands (fundos) is done through 'cobblestone-paved agricultural easements,' 'agricultural easements,' or 'simple easements,' since these are figures proper to Private Law and not to the residential urban planning regime, which is governed by the rules and principles of Public Law. The Constitutional Chamber, in vote No. 03964-2001 of 16:26 hours on May 15, 2001, indicated on this point the following: '…the construction works that have been carried out have not taken into account the interest of the landlocked property (fundo enclavado), which they have rather directly harmed, which means that the intentions of the works are different. Precisely, the Chamber adds, that of subdividing and urbanizing the lands without the communal burdens, and for this reason, municipal tolerance directly affects the rights of the municipality and respect for the current and applicable legislation. Consequently, the Chamber considers that the legal cause for the constitution of the easement (servidumbre) is spurious, since in essence, what has been intended is to provide a means of enabling (salida habilitante) lots that can be traded, but outside the legal framework (…) the Chamber reaches the conclusion that that area has been prepared so that the owners of the involved properties, both dominant and servient lands (fundos), can segregate lots and erect constructions, which would facilitate, in the medium term, the construction of a residential complex similar to the one that exists on the adjacent street in the same area. The assessment of the evidence, in light of the rules of sound criticism, allows concluding that with the project proposal, two objectives are intended to be achieved, as already stated: to develop (habilitar) a landlocked lot, by the most complex and expensive route from an economic point of view, and to allow the development (habilitación) of the farms for urban planning purposes, but without complying with the legal requirements established for that purpose and with serious impact on the forest that had already regenerated in the area and on the biological corridor of the titi monkey. The works alter the soil system and increase sea pollution, a natural wealth of all generations, which cannot be disrespected based on a use of property rights that, by not conforming to the corresponding legal norms, is abusive. ….' (emphases not in original). Regarding the municipal competence to develop (habilitar) urban planning projects through easements and the responsibility of public officials who act contrary to urban planning norms, in that same judgment, the Chamber expressed: 'VI.- Municipal Competence: As already stated in recital IV of this judgment, it is not strictly within the purview of the municipal government to grant permission for the constitution of easements (servidumbres), much less when it is done contrary to the legal norms that this Council swore to faithfully observe and comply with. Because it is important to emphasize that among the norms regulating the matter of communal government, there are no provisions to intervene in relationships of a private nature, with the sole purpose that the economic rights of the owners of lands (fundos) have access to a street of doubtful nature, in order to subdivide their lands. In contrast, what does correspond to the local corporation—and it is evident that it omitted to do so in the specific case—is to verify that local development is done in accordance with the regulations governing the matter of territorial planning and environmental protection, which forms part of the administration of the local interests and services of the community, as expressly provided by article 169 of the Political Constitution. Given that the Canton of Aguirre is an urban district, according to the classification certified in application of the Urban Planning Law by the Urban Planning Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism and lacks a regulatory plan, the intervention of other public entities by reason of their specialty is essential, for the purpose of obtaining a rational application of the urban planning norms. This is so, because not all lands acquired by individuals are suitable for urbanizing or constructing upon and the ownership over them is not unlimited, as two of the co-respondents appear to understand, being concerned solely with the market value of their lands and the possibility of disposing of them without limit. The administered parties must observe land use in their territory and bear in mind that, by the mandate of Constitutional Law, the use of resources cannot be unreasonable. The municipal approval (visado) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre and for its registry registration, and it has been provided to guarantee that the segregations and urbanizations that occur are in conformity with public policy laws and local regulatory norms, but in any case, at least with what the Law provides in a generic sense. The function of the municipality in matters of urban planning and environmental control, as already stated, must always be in clear defense of local interests, those of the community, which in the criteria of the Chamber, in this specific case, fully coincide with national interests, according to what has been manifested by the Office of the Aguirre-Parrita Sub-Region of the Central Pacific Conservation Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (folio 161), reason for which this Municipality could not fail to verify that the easement-constituting and construction permits it grants conform to those public policy norms. This function, in accordance with what has been acted upon in the case file, was disregarded by the Municipal Councilors who authorized the permit under examination, Agreement No. 1 adopted in Ordinary Session number 94 of September 6, 1999, a copy of which is attached to folio 61. All this implies a serious misapplication of the duties of the Municipal Councilors, who could have expressly resolved against the current legal provisions, for which reason the Chamber considers, in addition to granting the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo), as will be stated, that regarding the members of the Municipal Council and the Municipal Mayor in office at the date of the Agreement, who, having the power to veto the Agreement, did not do so, certified copies of the case file should be sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office, so that it may be investigated whether their conducts constitute criminal offenses or not.' (emphases are ours). As has been indicated, the municipal approval (visado) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre and for its registry registration (articles 33 and 34 of the Urban Planning Law) and, its validity depends, in addition to compliance with the applicable urban planning norms, on it having been issued by the competent official or body, according to the indicated regulations. The municipal approval (visado) is not granted or denied by the municipal administration in a discretionary manner, but rather in a regulated manner; consequently, if the required requisites are met, it may not be denied. The approval (visado) grants a subjective right to the person who obtained it, and it is not possible to go against that right, except by resorting to the legal procedures for the suppression of an act declarative of subjective rights, as will be analyzed below.
**X).- OF THE WAYS TO ANNUL AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACT DECLARATIVE OF RIGHTS IN THE MUNICIPAL VENUE:** In municipal matters, the declaration of nullity of a final administrative act that has granted a right to the administered party can occur in two ways: a) at the instance of an 'interested' third party ('anyone' 173 of the Political Constitution), through the filing of the extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) as provided for in numerals 157 and 163 of the Municipal Code or; b) the local government going back against that prior act of its own, declarative of subjective rights. In the first scenario, depending on whether the nullity is sought of an administrative act issued by the Municipal Council, by the Mayor, or by an official dependent on the former, the time limits established for one or the other scenario (5 and 10 years) must be observed. In relation to the processing of this extraordinary appeal, this same section, in vote 219-2007 indicated: '…This Court considers that, in this case, the petitioner has filed an "extraordinary appeal for review". (…) On this occasion, we are dealing with a special appellate nullity procedure filed by the administered party, which does not require the opinion of the General Attorney's Office of the Republic, nor the procedure regulated in numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, since, to request the nullity of municipal acts through the appellate route, there is a special norm that establishes a term of ten years for that purpose. V).- A correct hermeneutics leads us to affirm that, through the review appeal, neither a prior administrative procedure nor the binding opinion of the General Attorney's Office of the Republic is required, which are only demanded—as stated supra—when the administration, on its own initiative, goes back against one of its acts that has declared subjective rights. In this sense, it must be borne in mind that numeral 162 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes: "The administrative appeal well-founded on an existing ground of legality shall make the annulment of the act obligatory." That provision makes no differentiation by types of acts; consequently, the Court cannot differentiate where the law does not, and therefore concludes that the nullity—of any act—can be obtained through the appellate route, as long as the requirements demanded by due process are met.' It is also possible—as advanced—that the Municipal Council, in its condition as supreme head, decides to annul, on its own initiative, administrative acts favorable to the administered party (e.g., approvals (visados), construction permits, etc.), insofar as it considers they exhibit nullity defects. In this regard, there are two possibilities, developed with clarity by the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in vote 02-005854-0007-C0 in which it stated: '…The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declarative of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being the annulment or review on its own initiative and the revocation. For that purpose, the public administration, as a general principle, must resort, as the plaintiff and prior to a declaration of lesividad of the act to public, economic, or other interests, to the lesividad process (articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for the administered parties. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Vote No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, indicated that "...the Administration is prohibited from suppressing, by its own action, those acts it has issued granting subjective rights to individuals. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit regarding the powers of revocation (or modification) of administrative acts, in order to be able to demand greater procedural guarantees. The Administration, upon issuing an act and subsequently issuing another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, is disregarding these rights, which it had granted through the first act, whether by error or for any other reason. This implies that the only way the State has to remove one of its acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional lesividad process, since this process is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the administered party; or, alternatively, in our legal system, there is the possibility of going against its own acts in the administrative venue, in the case of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, upon a prior opinion of the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic and the General Attorney's Office of the Republic (as an additional guarantee in favor of the administered party) and in accordance with article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, if the Administration has disregarded the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them entirely or in part... the principle of own acts determines the invalidity of the act as an effect of said irregularity." Pursuant to numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public entity or body may well annul in the administrative venue an act declarative of rights for the administered party but detrimental (lesivo) to the public or patrimonial interests of the former, without needing to resort to the contentious-administrative lesividad process regulated in articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (a process in which the plaintiff is a public administration challenging its own act favorable to the administered party but detrimental to it) when it is vitiated by an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity. The absolute, evident, and manifest nullity must be pronounced upon, previously and favorably, by the General Attorney's Office or the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic—a preparatory act for the final annulment act. It will correspond to the Comptroller's Office when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative contracting (Public Treasury). That opinion is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber, in Vote No. 1563-91 of 3:00 PM on August 14, 1991, considered that "... It is evident, then, that from the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, the competence to annul in the administrative venue can only be admitted if the duty to provide an expert and external criterion to the body that is to issue the final act is fulfilled." It is a binding opinion—from which the consulting body or entity may not depart—since numeral 2 of the Organic Law of the General Attorney's Office of the Republic establishes that it is of obligatory compliance, through which a kind of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, insofar as it must precede the final act of the ordinary procedure initiated to decree the annulment on its own initiative, which does not conflict with any of the degrees of administrative autonomy, as it is a specific manifestation of the power of control inherent to intersubjective direction or administrative tutelage. It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all, that it positively verifies the seriousness and substance of the defects justifying the exercise of the power of review or annulment on its own initiative. The respective Public Administration is prevented by infra-constitutional law from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since that matter is reserved for the technical-legal and consultative body called the General Attorney's Office of the Republic, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the opinion must be rendered by the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic, it also has a binding nature by virtue of the provisions of article 4, final paragraph, of its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994.
**XI.- EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PRESUPPOSITION ENABLING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** Not just any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires that certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations concur to qualify it. The nullity that justifies the ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, "evident and manifest." The evident and manifest is that which results as patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and that offers no margin of doubt or that does not require a dialectical or logical verification process or effort to be discovered, precisely because of its gross and serious nature.
In this sense, it is sufficient to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that provides its coverage to reach such a conclusion, without any need for hermeneutics or exegesis. It must be added that numeral 173 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, with some being simple and others evident and manifest; rather, what it seeks to promote is that, in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the contentious-administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate review through administrative channels. XII.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. The respective public administration —author of the act sought to be annulled or reviewed—, prior to the declaration of nullity, must open an ordinary administrative procedure in which the principles and guarantees of due process and the right to a defense must be observed (Article 173, paragraph 3, of the General Public Administration Law); the justification for observing this procedure lies in the fact that the final act may suppress a subjective right of the administered party (Article 308 ibidem). During the substantiation of the ordinary procedure, it is essential to obtain the opinion (dictamen) of the Procuraduría or the Contraloría, this being a procedural step thereof. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident character of the nullity (Article 173, paragraph 4, of the General Public Administration Law). If the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República or the Contraloría General de la República is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally prevented from annulling the act through administrative channels and will have to resort, inexcusably, to the ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding for actions challenging the validity of an administrative act (lesividad). The opinion of the two cited consultative bodies is binding on the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest character of the nullity. On this point, Article 183, paragraph 1, of the General Public Administration Law prescribes that “Outside the cases provided for in Article 173, the administration may not ex officio annul acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party, and to obtain their elimination it must resort to the action for lesividad provided for in Articles 10 and 35 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa)”. XIII.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ORDINAL 173 OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION LAW. The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding whereas clauses (considerandos) “whether due to omission of the prescribed formalities or because the absolute nullity is not evident and manifest” (v. gr. that the opinion is unfavorable, that the opinion was not obtained, or that an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and renders both the public administration and the official liable for the damages and losses caused (Article 173, paragraph 6, ibidem).” Precisely, the Chamber adds, that of subdividing and urbanizing <u>the lands without the communal charges and therefore municipal tolerance directly affects the rights of the municipality and respect for the current and applicable legislation.</u> Consequently, the Chamber considers that the legal basis for the constitution of the easement (servidumbre) is spurious, since in essence, what has been intended is to provide an enabling outlet for lots that can be traded, but outside the legal framework (…) the Chamber concludes that this area has been prepared so that the owners of the properties involved, both dominant and servient estates (fundos), can segregate lots and erect constructions, which would facilitate, in the medium term, the construction of a residential complex similar to the one existing on the adjacent street in the same area. The assessment of the evidence, in light of the rules of sound criticism, allows the conclusion that the project proposal seeks to achieve two objectives, as already stated: to enable a landlocked lot, via the most complex and economically expensive route<b>, and to allow the enabling of the properties for urban development purposes, but without complying with the legal requirements</b> <b>established for that purpose</b> and with serious impact on the forest that had already regenerated in the area and on the biological corridor of the titi monkey. The works alter the soil system and increase sea pollution, a natural wealth for all generations, <u>which cannot be disrespected based on a use of the property right that, by not conforming to the corresponding legal norms, is abusive</u>. ….” (the highlights are not from the original). Regarding municipal authority to enable urban development projects through easements (servidumbres) and the responsibility of public officials who act against urban planning norms, in that same judgment the Chamber stated: <b><i><u>“VI.- Municipal Authority</u></i></b><i>: As already stated in Considerando IV of this judgment, it is not strictly within the purview of the municipal government <u>to grant permission for the constitution of easements (servidumbres), much less when it is done against the legal norms that this Council swore to faithfully observe and fulfill</u>. Because it is important to highlight that among the norms regulating communal government matters, those of intervening in relations of a private nature are not found, with the sole purpose of enabling the economic rights of the estate (fundos) owners to gain access to a street of dubious nature, in order to subdivide their lands. In contrast, what does correspond to the local corporation —and it is evident that it omitted in the specific case— <u>is to verify that local development is carried out in accordance with the regulations governing territorial planning and environmental protection matters, which is part of the administration of the local interests and services of the community, as expressly provided by Article 169 of the Political Constitution. By virtue of the Canton of Aguirre being an urban district, according to the classification certified by the Directorate of Urbanism of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism in application of the Urban Planning Law, and lacking a regulatory plan, the intervention of other public entities by reason of their specialty is essential, for the purpose of obtaining a rational application of the urban planning norms. This is so, because not all lands acquired by private parties are suitable for urban development or for construction and the ownership over them is not unlimited, as two of the co-defendants seem to understand, who are concerned solely with the market value of their lands and the possibility of disposing over them without limit. The administered parties must attend to the land use in their territory and bear in mind that by the force of Constitutional Law, the use of resources cannot be unreasonable. </u></i></b><i><u>Municipal approval (visado municipal) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre and for its registration in the Property Registry, and has been envisaged to guarantee that the segregations and urbanizations produced are in conformity with public order laws and local regulatory norms, but in any case, at least with the provisions of the Law in a generic sense. The function of the municipality in matters of urban and environmental control, as already stated, must always be in clear defense of local interests, those of the community, which in the criteria of the Chamber, in this specific case,</u></i><i><u> fully coincide with national interests</u>, according to what has been stated by the Office of the Sub-Regional Aguirre-Parrita of the Central Pacific Conservation Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (folio 161), <u>reason for which this Municipality could not fail to verify that the easement-constituting and construction permits it grants, conform to those public order norms</u>. This function, in accordance with what has been acted upon in the case file, was disregarded by the Municipal Councilors who authorized the permit being examined, Agreement No. 1 adopted in Ordinary Session number 94 of September 6, 1999, a copy of which is attached to folio 61. All of this implies a serious misapplication of the duties of the Municipal Councilors, who may have expressly resolved against the current legal provisions, for which reason the Chamber considers, besides declaring the amparo appeal with merit, as will be stated, that with regard to the members of the Municipal Council and the Municipal Mayor in office at the date of the Agreement, who being able to veto the Agreement did not do so, certified copies of case documents must be sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office, so that it may be investigated whether or not their conduct constitutes criminal offenses.” (the highlights are our own). As has been indicated, municipal approval (visado municipal) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre and for its registration in the Property Registry (Articles 33 and 34 of the Urban Planning Law) and, <b>its validity</b> depends, in addition to compliance with the applicable urban planning norms, on it having been issued by the competent official or body, according to the indicated regulations. Municipal approval (visado municipal) is not granted or denied by the municipal administration in a discretionary manner, </i><b><i>but rather in a regulated manner,</i></b> consequently, if the required requisites are met, it cannot be denied. <u>Approval (visado) grants a subjective right to the person who obtained it</u> and, it is not possible to go back against that right, <u>except by resorting to the legal procedures for the suppression of an act declaratory of subjective rights, as will be analyzed next.</u> **X).- OF THE WAYS TO ANNUL AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACT DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS IN THE MUNICIPAL SPHERE:** In municipal matters, the declaration of nullity of a *firm* administrative act that has granted a right to the administered party can occur in two ways: **a) at the request of a third “*interested* party”** (*“anyone” under Article 173 of the Political Constitution*), through the filing of the <u>extraordinary recourse for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión)</u> as provided for in numerals 157 and 163 of the Municipal Code or; **b) by the local government going back against its own prior act, declaratory of subjective rights.** In the first case, depending on whether the nullity of an administrative act issued by the Municipal Council, by the Mayor, or by an official dependent on the former is sought, the deadlines established for one or the other scenario must be observed (5 and 10 years). In relation to the processing of this extraordinary recourse (recurso extraordinario), this same section, in vote 219-2007 indicated: *“…This Tribunal considers that, in this case, the petitioner has filed an "extraordinary recourse for review". (…) On this occasion, we are before a special recourse procedure for nullity filed by the administered party, which does not require the opinion of the General Procurator's Office of the Republic, nor the procedure regulated in numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, since to request the nullity of municipal acts via the recourse route there is a special norm that establishes a term of ten years for such purpose. **V).-** A correct hermeneutic leads us to affirm that via the recourse for review it is not required, neither a prior administrative procedure, nor the binding opinion of the General Procurator's Office of the Republic, which are only required –as stated supra– when the administration goes back ex officio against an act of its own that has declared subjective rights. In this sense, it must be borne in mind that numeral 162 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes: "The well-founded administrative recourse based on an existing legality ground, shall make the annulment of the act mandatory". That provision does not make any differentiation by types of acts, consequently, the Tribunal cannot differentiate where the law does not do so and therefore concludes that, nullity -of any act- can be obtained via the recourse route, provided that the requirements demanded by due process are met”*.
It is also possible –as anticipated– that the Municipal Council, in its capacity as supreme head, resolves to annul *ex officio* administrative acts favorable to the administered party (e.g., approvals (visados), construction permits, etc.), insofar as it deems they exhibit nullity defects. In this regard, there are two possibilities, clearly developed by the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in vote 02-005854-0007-C0 in which it stated: *“…The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being the annulment or ex officio review and the revocation. For that effect, the public administration, as a general principle, must resort, as the plaintiff and prior to a declaration of lesivity (lesividad) of the act to public, economic, or other interests, to the lesivity process (Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for the administered parties. On this particular, this Constitutional Tribunal in Vote No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, stated that “... the Administration is forbidden to suppress by its own action those acts it has issued conferring subjective rights upon private parties. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit regarding the powers of revocation (or modification) of administrative acts, in order to be able to demand greater procedural guarantees. The Administration, upon issuing an act and subsequently issuing another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, is disregarding these rights, which through the first act it had granted, be it by error or for any other motive. This implies that the only means the State has to eliminate an act of its own from the legal system is the jurisdictional process of lesivity (lesividad), since this process is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the administered party, or alternatively, in our legal system, there exists the possibility of going against one's own acts via the administrative route, in the hypothesis of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, with the prior opinion of the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic and of the General Procurator's Office of the Republic (as a further guarantee in favor of the administered party) and in accordance with Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, if the Administration has disregarded the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them entirely or in part... the principle of one's own acts determines as an effect of said irregularity the invalidity of the act.”. Pursuant to numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public entity or body may well annul in the administrative venue an act declaratory of rights for the administered party but harmful to the public interests or patrimonial interests of the former, without needing to resort to the contentious-administrative process of lesivity (lesividad) regulated in Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (a process in which the plaintiff is a public administration challenging its own act favorable to the administered party but harmful to it) when the same is vitiated by an evident and manifest absolute nullity. The evident and manifest absolute nullity must be assessed, previously and favorably, by the General Procurator's Office or the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic —a preparatory act of the final annulment act—. It will correspond to the Comptroller's Office when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative contracting (Public Treasury). That opinion is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber in Vote No. 1563-91 of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, considered that “... It is evident, then, that from the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, the competence to annul in the administrative venue can only be admitted if the duty to provide an expert and external criterion to the body that is to issue the final act is fulfilled.”. It is an opinion of a binding nature —from which the consulting body or entity cannot depart—, since paragraph 2 of the Organic Law of the General Procurator's Office of the Republic establishes that it is of mandatory observance, through which a kind of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, as it must precede the final act of the ordinary procedure commenced to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any of the degrees of administrative autonomy, being a specific manifestation of the control power inherent to intersubjective direction or administrative tutelage. It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all, that it positively confirms the gravity and entity of the defects that justify the exercise of the power of ex officio review or annulment. The respective public administration is inhibited by the infra-constitutional legal system from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since that aspect is reserved to the technical-juridical and consultative body called the General Procurator's Office of the Republic, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In the cases in which the opinion must be rendered by the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic, it also has a binding nature by virtue of the provisions of Article 4, final paragraph, of its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994. **XI.- THE EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PREREQUISITE THAT ENABLES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires that certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations concur that qualify it. The nullity that justifies the ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, “evident and manifest”. That which is evident and manifest is what is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and that offers no margin for doubt or that does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover it, precisely, due to its gross and serious nature. In such sense, it is enough to confront the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that gives it coverage to arrive at such a conclusion, without the need for any hermeneutics or exegesis whatsoever. It is necessary to add that numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, some of them being simple and others evident and manifest, but rather what it attempts to foster is that in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the contentious-administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate its review in the administrative venue. **XII.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY**. The respective public administration —author of the act sought to be annulled or reviewed—, prior to the declaration of nullity, must open an ordinary administrative procedure in which the principles and guarantees of due process and defense must be observed (Article 173, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration). The justification for observing this procedure lies in the fact that the final act can suppress a subjective right of the administered party (Article 308 ibidem). During the substantiation of the ordinary procedure, it is indispensable to obtain the opinion of the General Procurator's Office or the General Comptroller's Office, which constitutes an intermediate procedural act thereof. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident character of the nullity (Article 173, paragraph 4, of the General Law of Public Administration). If the opinion of the General Procurator's Office or the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally impeded from annulling the act in the administrative venue and will have to resort, irremissibly, to the ordinary contentious-administrative process of lesivity (lesividad). The opinion of the two aforementioned consultative bodies is binding for the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest character of the nullity.
On this point, Article 183, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration provides that “Outside of the cases provided for in Article 173, the administration may not ex officio annul acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party, and to obtain their elimination must resort to the lesividad proceeding provided for in Articles 10 and 35 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.” **XIII.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ORDINAL 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.** The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding recitals (considerandos) “whether by omission of the required formalities or because the absolute nullity is not evident and manifest” (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and makes both the public administration and the official liable for the resulting damages (Article 173, paragraph 6, ibidem).” Of special interest is the provision of subsection <b>f) </b>of that normative provision, which empowers, among others, the municipal Administration to order the "...<i>.partial, total, permanent, or temporary cancellation, </i></span><b><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>of the permits, licenses, premises, or businesses</span></u></i></b><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> </span></i></b><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>that give rise to the complaint, </span></i><b><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>the polluting or destructive act or deed"</span></u></i></b><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>(emphasis not in the original). The various Municipal Councils must bear in mind that the powers of imperium are inalienable, non-transferable, imprescriptible, and of mandatory exercise (article 66 of the LGAP). In the case of precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) –with constitutional provision in article 41- these can be ordered <u>before, during, or in the course</u> of an administrative procedure. The new Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, applicable to administrative procedures carried out at the municipal level, pursuant to the provisions of article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration, contains a wide range of precautionary measures of a conservative, anticipatory, innovative type, etc., and with its provision the legislator has sought to prevent <i>"...serious damages or injuries, current or potential, from occurring..."</i>. However, the characteristics of instrumentality, provisionality, and proportionality of precautionary measures (article 22 of the same normative body), oblige the Tribunal to indicate that it is necessary for the measure to be complemented by an ordinary procedure, either to determine whether urban planning regulations or the scope of the granted license have been respected or not, or to declare in an administrative venue the nullity of an approval (visado) or permit that was issued in contravention of the urban-environmental regulations. The adoption of precautionary measures, without an administrative procedure to serve as its basis, denatures precautionary justice, as it turns it into an anticipated sanction, without compliance with due process of law. In the administrative procedure instituted by local governments, the postulates of due process must be fully complied with, and the conclusion of the procedure entails the extinction of the precautionary measure, since it lacks independent existence, given its instrumentality. <b>I</b></span><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>X</span></b><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>)</span></b><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>.- </span></b><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>DISTINCTION BETWEEN SIMPLE SUBDIVISIONS AND SUBDIVISION AND URBANIZATION</span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>: A subdivision (fraccionamiento), is the division of a property with the purpose of introducing it into commerce, which supposes, as each local government must verify when granting the corresponding approval (visado), that it conforms, in terms of size and characteristics, to the current urban planning provisions, especially to the local land-use regulatory plan (Plan Regulador) –if one exists– as well as to the development regulations and other special public policy laws. The subdivision that the law terms as </span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>“simple”, </span></i></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>does not include a process of urban habilitation for the use and enjoyment of the parcels resulting from that subdivision, and this is because the legislator assumes that in these, the properties (fundos) have access and green areas resulting from a previous urban development. It is for this reason that article 40 of the Urban Planning Law provides: <i>"(...)<span class=GramE>Likewise,</span> the obligation to cede areas for parks and community facilities is exempted </i></span><b><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>for simple subdivisions of parcels</span></u></i></b><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> in </span></i><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><b>previously</b> urbanized areas</span></u></i><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>…"</span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> (emphasis not in the original). When a certain area is previously urbanized, the purchasers of the subdivided parcels have access to the properties (fundos), parks, and community facilities, and it must not be lost sight of that this is part of their right to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (article 50 of the Constitution). For this reason –it is reiterated– the legislator has not deemed it necessary to require, in the case of a <i>"simple"</i> subdivision with prior urban development, greater land endowments for reasons of social interest. The approval (visado) for <i>simple</i> subdivisions, due to its minor significance, is usually granted to an official (e.g., Municipal Engineer) different from the one entrusted with <i>"complex"</i> approvals (e.g., Municipal Council, urban planning commissions, etc.), the former lacking the competence to authorize a different approval; this in the event that urban planning regulations make such a distinction. However, a subdivision that is part of the urbanization process and that entails a habilitation of the properties (fundos), </span><b><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>for the first time,</span></u></i></b><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>for urban purposes,</span></i></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> must be pro</span><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>vided</span><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> </span><b><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>with streets, green areas, and parks</span></u></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>, as well as the </span><b><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>services</span></u></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> necessary for its use and enjoyment. In this second scenario, we are dealing with <u>a complex process of subdivision and urbanization that introduces</u> limitations on private property for urban planning reasons (article 22 of the Urban Planning Law), which the Constitutional Tribunal has indicated are fully in accordance with Constitutional Law (Voto N° 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs on October 15, 1993). The residential or subdivision project that we will call <i>“complex”,</i> is provided for in article 40 of the Urban Planning Law which, as pertinent, provides: <i>“</i></span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>Every subdivider (fraccionador)</span></i></b><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> of land (…) and every </span></i><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>urbanizer (urbanizador)</span></i></b><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> shall cede free of charge for public use both the areas destined for roads and those corresponding to parks and community facilities; the amount to be set for the latter two concepts shall be determined in the respective regulation, through the establishment of percentages,</span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> <i>of the total area to be subdivided or urbanized, which may fluctuate between five percent and twenty percent, according to the average size of the lots, the intended use of the land, and the relevant regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the sum of the land to be ceded for public roads, parks, and community facilities shall not exceed forty-five percent of the total surface area of the land to be subdivided or urbanized.</span></i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> (…). The urbanizer's obligation to provide the subdivided parcels with access, green zones, parks, and public roads obliges them to comply with the urban provisions that establish minimum standards regarding space, quality, quantity, and other requirements demanded by law and development regulations for those areas. The local government must exercise its police power in a timely manner, guaranteeing to the residents of the canton that the works will be carried out in the manner indicated by urban planning regulations and under the conditions they stipulate. <u>It is sufficient that a subdivision (parcelamiento) requires works to enable access and provide various services to some of those properties (fundos), to maintain that </u></span><b><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>there is not</span></u></i></b><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> a <i>“</i></span></u><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>simple subdivision</span></u></i><i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>”</span></u></i><i><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>, </span></u></i><u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>but rather a residential project that must, consequently, comply with all the indicated requirements.</span></u><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> Urban residential projects can only enable access to the properties (fundos) through </span><b><u><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>public roads</span></u></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> that must have the dimensions and requirements of the General Public Roads Law and, failing specific provisions in local regulations, the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. None of the municipal bodies has the competence to authorize a project in which the habilitations to the properties (fundos) are made through </span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>“cobbled agricultural easements (servidumbres agrícolas adoquinadas)</span></i></b><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>”</span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>, </span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>"agricultural easements" or “simple easements”, </span></i></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>since these are figures proper to Private Law and not to the residential urban planning regime, which is governed by the rules and principles of Public Law. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Voto N° 03964-2001</span><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> </span><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>of 16:26 hours on May fifteenth, two thousand one, stated regarding this matter the following: </span><i>“…the construction works that have been carried out have not taken into account the interest of the landlocked property (fundo enclavado), which they have instead directly harmed, which means that the intentions of the works are other ones. Precisely, the Chamber adds, that of subdividing and urbanizing <u>the lands without the communal charges and for this reason the municipal tolerance directly affects the rights of the municipality and respect for the current and applicable legislation.</u> Consequently, the Chamber considers that the legal cause for the constitution of the easement (servidumbre) is spurious, since, in essence, what has been intended is to provide an enabling exit for lots that can be negotiated, but outside the legal system (…) the Chamber concludes that that zone has been prepared so that the owners of the involved properties, both dominant and servient properties (fundos), can segregate lots and erect constructions which would facilitate, in the medium term, the construction of a residential complex similar to the one existing on the adjacent street in the same zone. The assessment of the evidence, in light of the rules of sound judgment, allows the conclusion that with the project proposal, two objectives are sought, as already stated: to provide access to a landlocked lot, by the most complex and economically expensive route, <b>and to allow the habilitation of the farms for urban development purposes, but without complying with the legal requirements</b> <b>established for such purpose</b> and with serious impact on the forest that had already regenerated in the zone and on the biological corridor of the titi monkey. The works alter the soil system and potentiate the contamination of the sea, a natural wealth for all generations, <u>which cannot be violated based on a use of the right of property, which for not conforming to the corresponding legal rules is abusive</u>. ….” (emphasis not in the original). </i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>Regarding the municipal competence to approve urban development projects through easements (servidumbres), and the responsibility of public officials who act contrary to urban planning regulations, in that same judgment, the Chamber expressed: </span><b><i><u>“VI.- Municipal Competence</u></i></b><i>: As already stated in Considerando IV of this judgment, it is not strictly within the purview of the municipal government <u>to grant permission for the constitution of easements (servidumbres), much less when it is done contrary to the legal norms that that Council swore to observe and faithfully comply with</u>. Because it is important to emphasize that among the norms regulating the matter of communal government, there are not those of intervening in relations of a private nature, with the sole purpose that the economic rights of the property (fundo) owners have access to a street of dubious nature, in order to subdivide their lands. In contrast, what does correspond to the local corporation –and it is evident it omitted in the specific case– <u>is to verify that local development is carried out in accordance with the regulations governing the matter of territorial planning and environmental protection, which is part of the administration of the local interests and services of the community, as expressly provided by article 169 of the Political Constitution. By virtue of the Canton of Aguirre being an urban district, according to the qualification that, in application of the Urban Planning Law, has been certified by the Urban Planning Directorate of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo and lacking a regulatory plan (plan regulador), the intervention of other public entities by reason of their specialty is essential, for the purpose of obtaining a rational application of urban planning norms. This is so, because not all lands that individuals acquire are suitable for urbanization or construction and dominion over them is not limitless as two of the defendants seem to understand, who are concerned solely with the market value of their lands and the possibility of disposing of them without limit. The administered parties must attend to the use of the soil in their territory and bear in mind that by mandate of Constitutional Law the use of resources cannot be unreasonable. </span>The municipal approval (visado) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre (Catastro Nacional) and for its registry inscription and has been provided for to guarantee that the segregations and urbanizations that occur are in conformity with public policy laws and local regulatory norms, but in any case, at least with what the Law in a generic sense provides. The role of the municipality in matters of urban and environmental control, as already stated, must always be in clear defense of local interests, those of the community, which in the judgment of the Chamber, in this specific case,</u></i><i><u><span style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> </span>fully coincide with national interests</u>, according to what has been stated by the Office of the Sub-Regional Aguirre-Parrita of the Central Pacific Conservation Area of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (folio 161), <u>reason for which that Municipality could not fail to verify that the permits constituting easements (servidumbres) and construction permits it grants, conform to those public policy norms</u>. This function, in accordance with what has been acted upon in the expediente, was disregarded by the Municipal Councilors who authorized the permit being examined, Agreement No. 1 adopted in the Ordinary Session number 94 of September 6, 1999, a copy of which is attached to folio 61. All this implies a serious misapplication of the duties of the Municipal Councilors, who may have resolved expressly against the valid legal provisions, for which reason the Chamber deems, besides declaring the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) well-placed, as will be stated, that regarding the members of the Municipal Council and the Municipal Mayor in office on the date of the Agreement, who being able to veto the Agreement did not do so, certified copies must be sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), so that it may be investigated whether their conduct constitutes criminal offenses or not.” (emphasis is this Chamber's). </i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> As has been indicated, the municipal approval (visado) is an essential requirement for the registration of a plan in the National Cadastre (Catastro Nacional) and for its registry inscription (articles 33 and 34 of the Urban Planning Law), and <b>its validity</b> depends, besides compliance with the applicable urban planning regulations, on it having been issued by the competent official or body, according to the indicated regulations. The municipal approval (visado), is not granted or denied by the municipal administration in a discretionary manner, </span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>but in a regulated manner,</span></i></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> consequently, if the required requisites are met, it cannot be denied. <u>The approval (visado) grants a subjective right to whoever obtained it</u> and, it is not possible to go back against that right, <u>unless by resorting to the legal procedures for the suppression of a declaratory act of subjective rights, as will be analyzed next</u>. </span><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>X</span></b><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>).- OF THE MEANS TO ANNUL AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACT DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS IN A MUNICIPAL VENUE:</span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> In municipal matters, the declaration of nullity of a <i>final</i> administrative act that has granted a right to the administered party, can occur in two ways: <b>a) at the instance of an “</b></span><b><i><span lang=ES-CR style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>interested”</span></i></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'> third party (<i>“anyone” 173 of the Political Constitution</i>), through the filing of the <u>extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión)</u> as provided for in articles 157 and 163 of the Municipal Code or; <b>b)</b> <b>the local government turning against that prior act of its own, declaratory of subjective rights. </b>In the first scenario, depending on whether the nullity of an administrative act issued by the Municipal Council, by the Mayor, or by an official dependent on the former is sought, the terms established for one or the other situation must be observed (5 and 10 years). In relation to the processing of this extraordinary appeal, this same section, in Voto 219-2007 indicated: <i><span lang=EN style='color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“</span></i></span></span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN'>…This Tribunal considers that, in this case, the petitioner has filed an "extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión)". (...) On this occasion, we are facing a special appeal procedure for nullity filed by the administered party, which does not require the opinion of the General Attorney's Office of the Republic, nor the procedure regulated in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, given that to request the nullity of municipal acts through the appeal process there is a special norm that establishes a term of ten years for that purpose. <b>V).- </b>A correct hermeneutics leads us to affirm that through the appeal for review (recurso de revisión) process, neither a prior administrative procedure, nor the binding opinion of the General Attorney's Office of the Republic, is required, which are only demanded -as stated supra- when the administration <i>ex officio</i> turns against an act of its own that has declared subjective rights. In this sense, it must be kept in mind that article 162 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes: "The well-founded administrative appeal based on an existing ground of legality, shall make the annulment of the act mandatory".
That provision makes no differentiation whatsoever by type of act; consequently, the Court cannot differentiate where the law does not, and therefore concludes that nullity—of any act—may be obtained through the appellate route, provided the requirements demanded by due process are met.” It is also possible—as noted above—for the Municipal Council, in its capacity as supreme head, to proceed to annul *ex officio* administrative acts favorable to the administered party (e.g., permits, construction permits, etc.), insofar as it considers they exhibit nullity defects. In this regard, there are two possibilities, clearly developed by the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in vote 02-005854-0007-C0, in which it stated: “…The general rule is that the respective public administration may not annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being annulment or revision *ex officio* and revocation. For that purpose, the public administration, as a general principle, must resort, as the plaintiff and after a prior declaration of harmfulness (lesividad) of the act to public, economic, or other interests, to the harmfulness (lesividad) proceeding (Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for administered parties. On this point, this Constitutional Court in Vote No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, indicated that ‘... the Administration is prohibited from suppressing by its own action those acts it has issued conferring subjective rights upon private parties. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit regarding the powers of revocation (or modification) of administrative acts, in order to be able to demand greater procedural guarantees. The Administration, upon issuing an act and subsequently issuing another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, is disregarding these rights, which it had granted through the first act, whether by error or for any other reason. This implies that the only means the State has to eliminate one of its own acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional harmfulness (lesividad) proceeding, since this proceeding is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the administered party, or, in our legal system, there exists the possibility of acting against one's own acts in the administrative route, in the case of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, following a ruling from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (as an additional guarantee in favor of the administered party) and in accordance with Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, if the Administration has failed to observe the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them entirely or in part... the principle of one’s own acts determines as an effect of such irregularity the invalidity of the act.’ Pursuant to numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public entity or body may well annul in the administrative route an act declaratory of rights for the administered party but harmful to the public or patrimonial interests of the former, without needing to resort to the contentious-administrative harmfulness (lesividad) proceeding regulated in Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (a proceeding in which the plaintiff is a public administration challenging one of its own acts favorable to the administered party but harmful to it) when the act is vitiated by an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity. The absolute, evident, and manifest nullity must be ruled upon, previously and favorably, by the Attorney General’s Office or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic—a preparatory act for the final annulment act. It will correspond to the Comptroller’s Office when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative contracting (Public Treasury). That ruling is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber in Vote No. 1563-91 at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, held that ‘... It is evident, then, that as of the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, the competence to annul in the administrative venue can only be admitted if the duty to provide an expert criterion external to the body that will issue the final act is fulfilled.’ It is a binding ruling—from which the consulting body or entity cannot depart—since numeral 2 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic establishes that it is of mandatory compliance, through which a sort of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, in that it must precede the final act of the ordinary procedure initiated to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any degree of administrative autonomy, as it is a specific manifestation of the control power inherent to inter-subjective direction or administrative oversight. It is logical that such a ruling must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all that it positively confirms the seriousness and significance of the defects that justify the exercise of the power of revision or ex officio annulment. The respective Public Administration is inhibited by the sub-constitutional legal system from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since that extreme is reserved to the technical-legal and consultative body called the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the ruling must be rendered by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it also has a binding nature by virtue of the provisions in Article 4, final paragraph, of its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994.
**XI.- EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS THE PREREQUISITE THAT ENABLES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires the concurrence of certain specific and aggravated characteristics that qualify it. The nullity that justifies *ex officio* revision must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, “evident and manifest.” That which is evident and manifest is that which is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and which offers no margin of doubt or does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In that sense, it suffices to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that covers it to reach such a conclusion, without any need for hermeneutics or exegesis. It is necessary to add that numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, some being simple and others evident and manifest; rather, what it seeks to promote is that in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the contentious-administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate its revision in the administrative route.
**XII.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE *EX OFFICIO* REVISION OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** The respective public administration—author of the act sought to be annulled or revised—must, prior to the declaration of nullity, open an ordinary administrative procedure in which the principles and guarantees of due process and defense must be observed (Article 173, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration); the justification for observing that procedure lies in the fact that the final act may suppress a subjective right of the administered party (Article 308 ibidem). During the processing of the ordinary procedure, it is indispensable to obtain the ruling of the Attorney General’s Office or the Comptroller’s Office, which constitutes a procedural act within it. As indicated supra, the ruling must expressly address the absolute, manifest, and evident character of the nullity (Article 173, paragraph 4, of the General Law of Public Administration). If the ruling of the Attorney General’s Office or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally prevented from annulling the act in the administrative route and will have to resort, irremissibly, to the ordinary contentious-administrative harmfulness (lesividad) proceeding. The ruling of the two cited consultative bodies is binding for the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest character of the nullity. On this point, Article 183, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration prescribes that: “Outside the cases provided for in Article 173, the administration may not annul *ex officio* acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party, and to obtain their elimination, it must resort to the harmfulness (lesividad) contentious proceeding provided for in Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.” **XIII.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF NUMERAL 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.** *Ex officio* revision or annulment in violation of the legal requisites referred to in the preceding recitals “whether due to omission of the prescribed formalities or because the absolute nullity is not evident and manifest” (e.g., the ruling is unfavorable, the ruling was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and makes both the public administration and the official liable for the resulting damages and losses (Article 173, paragraph 6, ibidem).”
“VIII).- DERECHO URBANÍSTICO PARTE DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL: El ambiente sano y equilibrado que garantiza el Derecho de la Constitución incluye la materia urbanística, encomendada a nivel local a las municipalidades (artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, 15 y siguientes de la Ley de Planificación Urbana). En este sentido se pronunció nuestro máximo Tribunal Constitucional al indicar: “Como las dos caras de una misma moneda: el ambiente natural y el ambiente urbano. Es así como se pretende un ambiente más humano, es decir, un ambiente que no sólo sea sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, sino también como un referente simbólico y dador de identidad nacional, regional o local. Así, el derecho fundamental a tener un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado -desarrollado ampliamente por la jurisprudencia constitucional- comprenderá, tanto sus partes naturales, como sus partes artificiales, entendiéndose por tales, el hábitat humano, lo construido por el hombre, sea, lo urbano, de manera que se mantengan libres de toda contaminación, tanto por los efectos y repercusiones que puede tener en la salud de las personas y demás seres vivientes, como por el valor intrínseco del ambiente.” (Voto 2003-03656-el destacado no es del original) . La inclusión de lo urbano como vertiente del Derecho ambiental, también puede encontrarse en un reciente precedente de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en que señaló, en lo de interés, lo siguiente: “la noción de propiedad se amalgama de manera plena y perfecta con el derecho constitucional al medio ambiente, que con igual intensidad y jerarquía, proclama el cuerpo constitucional en su precepto 50. Por ello no es difícil inferir la regulación urbanística como intermedia entre propiedad y ambiente, pues al fin y al cabo, es el anverso gris, ordenatorio y edificativo de esta última materia. Ambiente y urbanismo se constituyen así en áreas del Derecho que con su rol limitante, delimitan el contorno preciso del derecho de propiedad, es decir, su contenido esencial. (Res. 000507-F-04. Sin duda alguna, a la par de las normas que exigen la conservación y protección de los recursos naturales, están las necesidades de las diferentes actividades económicas que demandan el uso y la explotación de bienes ambientales, lo que normalmente ocurre con el proceso de desarrollo urbano. Dentro de este marco, surge la obligación de poner atención al desarrollo urbano sostenible, de manera que, se garanticen las necesidades de los munícipes a los que los gobiernos municipales deben procurarle un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado que les otorgue bienestar. Existe un innegable interés nacional, coincidente con el local, en que los ayuntamientos ejerzan pronta y oportunamente su poder de policía en relación con las normas de protección del entorno natural (zonas de protección, belleza natural, paisajística, biodiversidad, etc) y urbano (usos de suelo, coeficientes de edificabilidad, fachadas, patrimonio arquitectónico, etc). Debe tenerse presente que, la inscripción del Derecho Urbanístico como vertiente del Derecho Ambiental tiene consecuencias importantísimas en tanto le otorga al primero un indiscutible rango constitucional, consiguientemente, la inactividad de los gobiernos locales en materia ambiental, involucra la lesión a un derecho fundamental (en similar sentido de este mismo Tribunal vid votos 815-2008, y 83-2008, entre otros). Las disposiciones legales que, en desarrollo del orden constitucional otorgan competencia en materia urbano-ambiental a las municipalidades, son abundantes. En este sentido y, sin ánimo de elaborar una lista taxativa, pueden citarse los artículos 29 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, entre otras muchas disposiciones normativas, que amalgaman lo urbano como parte del derecho ambiental el que tiene un componente verde (biodiversidad) y otro gris (proceso urbanizador). La posibilidad de imponer medidas cautelares y sanciones administrativas a los proyectistas que afecten el ambiente, está prevista en el artículo 99 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente que encomienda a la "Administración Pública" (incluido el gobierno local) el dictado -sin más trámite-, tanto de medidas protectoras -principio precautorio- como sanciones definitivas -que requieren del cumplimiento de los postulados del debido proceso-. De especial interés resulta lo dispuesto por el numeral f) de esa disposición normativa, en que se faculta, entre otras, a la Administración municipal para ordenar la "....cancelación parcial, total, permanente o temporal, de los permisos, las patentes, los locales o las empresas que provocan la denuncia, el acto o el hecho contaminante o destructivo" (el destacado no es del original). Deben tener presente los distintos Concejos Municipales que, las potestades de imperio son irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles y de obligado ejercicio (artículo 66 de la LGAP). Tratándose de medidas cautelares –con previsión constitucional en el numeral 41- éstas pueden ser ordenadas antes, durante o en el curso de un procedimiento administrativo. El nuevo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, aplicable a los procedimientos administrativos desarrollados en sede municipal, al tenor de lo establecido en el numeral 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, contiene una amplia gama de medidas cautelares de tipo conservativas, anticipativas, innovativas etc. y con su previsión el legislador ha buscado evitar que "...se produzcan graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales...". Ahora bien, las características de instrumentalidad, provisionalidad y proporcionalidad de las medidas cautelares (artículo 22 del mismo cuerpo normativo), obligan al Tribunal a indicar que, es necesario que la medida se complemente con un procedimiento ordinario, sea para determinar si se han respetado o no las normas urbanísticas o los alcances de la licencia otorgada, o para declarar en sede administrativa la nulidad de un visado o permiso que se extendió en contravención con las normas urbano-ambientales. La adopción de medidas cautelares, sin un procedimiento administrativo que le sirva de sustento, desnaturaliza la justicia cautelar, en tanto la convierte en una sanción anticipada, sin el cumplimiento del debido proceso legal. En el procedimiento administrativo que instauren los gobiernos locales deben cumplirse, -a cabalidad-, los postulados del debido proceso y, el término del procedimiento supone la extinción de la medida cautelar, pues ella carece de existencia independiente, dada su instrumentalidad. IX).- DISTINCIÓN ENTRE SIMPLES FRACCIONAMIENTOS Y FRACCIONAMIENTO Y URBANIZACIÓN: El fraccionamiento, es la división de un predio con la finalidad de introducirlo al comercio de los hombres, lo que supone, tal y como lo debe constatar cada gobierno local al otorgar el visado correspondiente, que el mismo se ajuste, en cuanto a tamaño y características, a las disposiciones urbanísticas vigentes, en especial, al Plan Regulador del suelo local –si lo hubiere- así como a la normativa de desarrollo y demás leyes especiales de orden público. El fraccionamiento que la ley denomina como “simple”, no incluye un proceso de habilitación urbana para el uso y disfrute de las parcelas resultantes de ese fraccionamiento y ello es así porque el legislador parte de que en estos, los fundos cuentan con accesos y áreas verdes producto de un desarrollo urbanístico anterior. Es por este motivo que el artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana dispone: “(…)Asimismo se exceptúa de la obligación de ceder áreas para parques y facilidades comunales a los simples fraccionamientos de parcelas en áreas previamente urbanizadas…” (el destacado no es del original). Cuando una determinada área se encuentra previamente urbanizada, los adquirentes de las parcelas fraccionadas cuentan con acceso a los fundos, parques y facilidades comunales y es que no debe perderse de vista que ello hace parte de su derecho a disfrutar de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (artículo 50 constitucional). Por este motivo –se reitera- el legislador no ha estimado necesario exigir en el caso del fraccionamiento “simple” con desarrollo urbanístico, mayores dotaciones de tierra por motivos de interés social. El visado para fraccionamientos simples, por su poca trascendencia, suele otorgarse a un funcionario (v.gr. Ingeniero Municipal) diverso de aquél al que se encomiendan los visados “complejos” (v. gr. Concejo Municipal, comisiones de urbanismo, etc), careciendo el primero de competencia para autorizar un visado diverso; ello en el caso de que las normas urbanísticas hagan tal distinción. Ahora bien, al fraccionamiento que hace parte del proceso urbanizador y que conlleva una habilitación de los fundos, por vez primera, para fines urbanos, debe proveersele de calles, áreas verdes y parques, así como de los servicios necesarios para su uso y disfrute. En este segundo supuesto, estamos ante un proceso complejo de fraccionamiento y urbanización que introduce limitaciones a la propiedad privada por razón de urbanismo (artículo 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana), las que el Tribunal Constitucional ha señalado son totalmente conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución (voto N° 5097-93 de las 10:24 hrs del 15 de octubre de 1993). El proyecto residencial o de fraccionamiento que llamaremos “complejo”, se encuentra previsto en el numeral 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana que, en lo conducente, dispone: “Todo fraccionador de terrenos (…) y todo urbanizador cederá gratuitamente al uso público tanto las áreas destinadas a vías como las correspondientes a parques y facilidades comunales; lo que fijará por los dos conceptos últimos se determinará en el respectivo reglamento, mediante la fijación de porcentajes, del área total a fraccionar o urbanizar, que podrá fluctuar entre un cinco por ciento a un veinte por ciento, según el tamaño promedio de los lotes, el uso que se pretenda dar al terreno y las normas al respecto. No obstante lo anterior, la suma de los terrenos que deben cederse para vías públicas, parques y facilidades comunales no excederá de un cuarenta y cinco por ciento de la superficie total del terreno a fraccionar o urbanizar. (…). La obligación del urbanizador de dotar las parcelas fraccionadas de accesos, zonas verdes, parques, vías públicas, le obliga a acatar las disposiciones urbanas que establecen estándares mínimos en cuanto a espacio, calidad, cantidad y demás requisitos exigidos por ley y los reglamentos de desarrollo en cuanto a esas áreas. El gobierno local tiene que ejercer oportunamente su poder de policía, garantizando a los vecinos del cantón, que las obras se realizarán de la forma que las normas urbanísticas lo indican y con las condiciones que aquellas disponen. Basta que un parcelamiento requiera obras para habilitar el ingreso y brindar servicios diversos a algunos de esos fundos, para sostener que no existe un “simple fraccionamiento”, sino un proyecto residencial que debe, en consecuencia, cumplir con todos los requisitos señalados. Los proyectos residenciales urbanos sólo pueden habilitar el ingreso a los fundos a través de vías públicas que deben tener las dimensiones y exigencias de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos y, el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, a falta, -en este ultimo caso- de disposiciones concretas en las normas locales. Ninguno de los órganos municipales tiene competencia para autorizar un proyecto en el que las habilitaciones a los fundos se hace mediante “servidumbres agrícolas adoquinadas”, "servidumbres agrícolas" o “simples servidumbres”, puesto que ellas son figuras propias del Derecho Privado y no del régimen urbanístico residencial que se rige por las normas y principios del Derecho Público. La Sala Constitucional en el voto N° 03964-2001 de las 16:26 horas del quince de mayo de 2001 señaló sobre este extremo lo siguiente: “…las obras de construcción que se han realizado, no han tenido en cuenta el interés del fundo enclavado, al que más bien han perjudicado directamente, lo que significa que las intenciones de las obras, son otras. Precisamente, añade la Sala, la de fraccionar y urbanizar las tierras sin las cargas comunales y por ello la tolerancia municipal incide directamente sobre los derechos del municipio y el respeto de la legislación vigente y aplicable. Consecuentemente, la Sala estima que la causa jurídica de la constitución de la servidumbre es espuria, puesto que en el fondo, lo que se ha pretendido es darle una salida habilitante de lotes que se pueden negociar, pero fuera del ordenamiento jurídico (…) la Sala llega a la conclusión de que aquella zona se ha preparado para que los propietarios de los predios involucrados, tanto fundos dominantes como sirvientes, puedan segregar lotes y levantar construcciones lo que facilitaría, a mediano plazo, la construcción de un complejo residencial similar al que existe sobre la calle aledaña en la misma zona. La valoración de la prueba, a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica, permite concluir que con la propuesta del proyecto, se pretenden lograr dos objetivos, como ya se dijo: habilitar un lote enclavado, por la ruta más compleja y cara desde el punto de vista económico, y permitir la habilitación de las fincas con fines urbanísticos, pero sin cumplir con los requisitos legales establecidos para tal fin y con grave afectación al bosque que ya había regenerado en la zona y al corredor biológico del mono titi. Las obras alteran el sistema del suelo y potencian la contaminación del mar, riqueza natural de todas las generaciones, que no puede irrespetarse sobre la base de un uso del derecho de propiedad, que por no ajustarse a las normales legales correspondientes resulta abusivo. ….” (los destacados no son del original). Sobre la competencia municipal para habilitar proyectos urbanísticos mediante servidumbres y, las responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos que actúan a contrapelo de las normas urbanísticas, en esa misma sentencia la Sala expresó: “VI.- Competencia Municipal: Como ya se dijo en el considerando IV de esta sentencia, no es de estricto resorte del gobierno municipal, otorgar permiso para la constitución de servidumbres, mucho menos cuando se hace a contrapelo de las normas jurídicas que ese Concejo juró observar y cumplir fielmente. Porque es importante resaltar que entre las normas que regulan la materia del gobierno comunal, no se encuentran las de intervenir en las relaciones de índole privada, con la sola finalidad de que los derechos económicos de los propietarios de fundos, tengan acceso a una calle de dudosa naturaleza, con el fin de fraccionar sus terrenos. En cambio, lo que sí corresponde a la corporación local -y es evidente que omitió en el caso concreto- es verificar que el desarrollo local se haga de acuerdo con la normativa que rigen la materia del ordenamiento territorial y la protección del medio ambiente, lo que hace parte de la administración de los intereses y servicios locales de la comunidad, como lo dispone expresamente el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política. En virtud de que el Cantón de Aguirre en un distrito urbano, según la calificación que en aplicación de la Ley de Planificación Urbana ha certificado la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo y carece de plan regulador, la intervención de otros entes públicos en razón de su especialidad es esencial, a los efectos de obtener una aplicación racional de las normas de ordenamiento urbano. Ello es así, por que no todos los terrenos que adquieren los particulares son aptos para urbanizar o para construir y el dominio sobre ellos no es ilimitado como parecen entenderlo dos de los coaccionados que se preocupan únicamente por el valor de mercado de sus tierras y la posibilidad de disponer sin límite sobre ellas. Los administrados deben atender en su territorio el uso del suelo y tener presente que por imperio del Derecho de la Constitución la utilización de los recursos no puede ser irrazonable. El visado municipal es requisito esencial para la inscripción de un plano en el Catastro Nacional y para su inscripción registral y ha sido previsto para garantizar que las segregaciones y urbanizaciones que se produzcan sean conformes con las leyes de orden público y las normas reguladoras locales, pero en todo caso, al menos con lo que dispone la Ley en sentido genérico. La función de la municipalidad en materia de control urbanístico y ambiental, como ya se dijo, debe ser siempre en clara defensa de los intereses locales, los de la comunidad, que en el criterio de la Sala, en este caso concreto, coinciden plenamente con los intereses nacionales, según lo que ha manifestado la Oficina de la Sub-Regional Aguirre-Parrita del Área de Conservación Pacífico Central del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (folio 161), razón por la que no podía esa Municipalidad, dejar de verificar que los permisos constitutivos de servidumbre y constructivos que otorga, se ajusten a esas normas de orden público. Esta función, de conformidad con lo actuado en el expediente, fue inobservada por los Regidores Municipales que autorizaron el permiso que viene examinándose, Acuerdo No. 1 adoptado en la Sesión Ordinaria número 94 del 6 de setiembre de 1999, copia del cual está agregado al folio 61. Todo esto implica una grave desaplicación de los deberes de los Regidores Municipales, que podrían haber resuelto expresamente en contra de las disposiciones legales vigentes, por lo que la Sala estima, además de declarar con lugar el recurso de amparo, como se dirá, que en cuanto a los integrantes del Concejo Municipal y el Alcalde Municipal en funciones a la fecha del Acuerdo, quien pudiendo vetar el Acuerdo no lo hizo, se deben testimoniar piezas para ante el Ministerio Público, para que se investigue si sus conductas son o no constitutivas de infracciones de tipo penal.” (los destacados son propios). Como se ha venido indicando, el visado municipal es requisito esencial para la inscripción de un plano en el Catastro Nacional y para su inscripción registral (artículos 33 y 34 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana) y, su validez depende, además del cumplimiento de las normas urbanísticas aplicables, que el mismo haya sido extendido por el funcionario u órgano competente, según las regulaciones indicadas. El visado municipal, no se concede o deniega por la administración municipal de manera discrecional, sino en forma reglada, en consecuencia, si se cumple con los requisitos exigidos, éste no podrá ser denegado. El visado otorga un derecho subjetivo a quien lo obtuvo y, no es posible volver contra ese derecho, como no sea acudiendo a los procedimientos legales de supresión de un acto declarativo de derechos subjetivos, tal y como se analizará de seguido. X).- DE LAS VÍAS PARA ANULAR UN ACTO ADMINISTRATIVO DECLARATORIO DE DERECHOS EN SEDE MUNICIPAL: En material municipal, la declaratoria de nulidad de un acto administrativo firme que le ha otorgado un derecho al administrado, puede producirse de dos formas: a) a instancia de un tercero “interesado” (“cualquiera" 173 de la Constitución Política), a través de la presentación del recurso extraordinario de revisión tal como lo prevén los numerales 157 y 163 del Código Municipal o; b) volviendo el gobierno local contra aquél acto suyo anterior, declaratorio de derechos subjetivos. En el primer supuesto, según se pretenda la nulidad de un acto administrativo emitido por el Concejo Municipal, por el Alcalde o, por un funcionario dependiente de aqúel, deben observare los plazos establecidos para uno u otro supuesto (5 y 10 años). En relación con la tramitación de este recurso extraordinario, esta misma sección, en el voto 219-2007 indicó: “…Este Tribunal estima que, en este caso, el articulante ha presentado un "recurso extraordinario de revisión". (…) En esta ocasión, estamos ante un procedimiento recursivo especial de nulidad presentado por el administrado, el que no requiere del dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República, ni del procedimiento regulado en el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, puesto que para solicitar la nulidad de los actos municipales por la vía recursiva hay una norma especial que establece un plazo de diez años con tal propósito. V).- Una correcta hermenéutica nos lleva a afirmar que por la vía del recurso de revisión no se requiere, ni de un procedimiento administrativo previo, ni del dictamen vinculante de la Procuraduría General de la República, los que solo se exigen -según se dijo supra- cuando la administración de oficio vuelve contra un acto suyo que ha declarado derechos subjetivos. En este sentido debe tenerse presente que el numeral 162 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece: "El recurso administrativo bien fundado por un motivo existente de legalidad, hará obligatoria la anulación del acto". Esa disposición no hace diferenciación alguna por tipos de actos, consiguientemente, el Tribunal no puede diferenciar donde la ley no lo hace y por ello concluye que, la nulidad -de cualquier acto- puede obtenerse por la vía recursiva, siempre y cuando se cumpla con los recaudos que exige el debido proceso”. También es posible –según se adelantó- que el Concejo Municipal, en su condición de jerarca supremo, se disponga a anular de oficio actos administrativos favorables para el administrado (v.gr. visados, permisos constructivos, etc), en tanto estima exhiben vicios de nulidad. Al respecto existen dos posibilidades, desarrolladas de manera diáfana por la Sala Constitucional, entre otras, en el voto 02-005854-0007-C0 en que señaló: “…La regla general es que la administración pública respectiva no puede anular un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado, siendo las excepciones la anulación o revisión de oficio y la revocación. Para ese efecto, la administración pública, como principio general, debe acudir, en calidad de parte actora y previa declaratoria de lesividad del acto a los intereses públicos, económicos o de otra índole, al proceso de lesividad (artículos 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), el cual se ha entendido, tradicionalmente, como una garantía para los administrados. Sobre este particular, este Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto No. 897-98 del 11 de febrero de 1998 señaló que “... a la Administración le está vedado suprimir por su propia acción aquellos actos que haya emitido confiriendo derechos subjetivos a los particulares. Así, los derechos subjetivos constituyen un límite respecto de las potestades de revocación (o modificación) de los actos administrativos, con el fin de poder exigir mayores garantías procedimentales. La Administración, al emitir un acto y con posterioridad al emanar otro contrario al primero, en menoscabo de derechos subjetivos, está desconociendo estos derechos, que a través del primer acto había concedido, sea por error o por cualquier otro motivo. Ello implica que la única vía que el Estado tiene para eliminar un acto suyo del ordenamiento es el proceso de jurisdiccional de lesividad, pues este proceso está concebido como una garantía procesal a favor del administrado, o bien, en nuestro ordenamiento existe la posibilidad de ir contra los actos propios en la vía administrativa, en la hipótesis de nulidades absolutas, evidentes y manifiestas, previo dictamen de la Contraloría General de la República y de la Procuraduría General de la República (como una garantía más a favor del administrado) y de conformidad con el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En consecuencia, si la Administración ha inobservado las reglas de estos procedimientos, o bien, las ha omitido del todo o en parte... el principio de los actos propios determina como efecto de dicha irregularidad la invalidez del acto.”. A tenor del numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, un ente u órgano público bien puede anular en vía administrativa un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado pero lesivo para los intereses públicos o patrimoniales de la primera, sin necesidad de recurrir al proceso contencioso administrativo de lesividad normado en los artículos 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (proceso en el cual la parte actora es una administración pública que impugna un acto propio favorable para el administrado pero lesivo para ella) cuando el mismo este viciado de una nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta. La nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta debe ser dictaminada, previa y favorablemente, por la Procuraduría o la Contraloría Generales de la República —acto preparatorio del acto anulatorio final—. Le corresponderá a la Contraloría cuando la nulidad verse sobre actos administrativos relacionados directamente con el proceso presupuestario o la contratación administrativa (Hacienda Pública). Ese dictamen es indispensable, a tal punto que esta Sala en el Voto No. 1563-91 de las 15 hrs. del 14 de agosto de 1991 estimó que “... Es evidente, entonces, que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la competencia de anular en sede administrativa solamente puede ser admitida si se cumple con el deber de allegar un criterio experto y externo al órgano que va a dictar el acto final.”. Se trata de un dictamen de carácter vinculante —del que no puede apartarse el órgano o ente consultante—, puesto que, el ordinal 2° de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República establece que es de acatamiento obligatorio, a través del cual se ejerce una suerte de control previo o preventivo de legalidad, en cuanto debe anteceder el acto final del procedimiento ordinario incoado para decretar la anulación oficiosa, que no riñe con ninguno de los grados de autonomía administrativa, por ser manifestación específica de la potestad de control inherente a la dirección intersubjetiva o tutela administrativa. Resulta lógico que tal dictamen debe ser favorable a la pretensión anulatoria de la administración consultante, y sobre todo que constate, positivamente, la gravedad y entidad de los vicios que justifican el ejercicio de la potestad de revisión o anulación oficiosa. La Administración pública respectiva está inhibida por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional de determinar cuándo hay una nulidad evidente y manifiesta, puesto que, ese extremo le está reservado al órgano técnico-jurídico y consultivo denominado Procuraduría General de la República, como órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio de Justicia. En los supuestos en que el dictamen debe ser vertido por la Contraloría General de la República, también, tiene naturaleza vinculante en virtud de lo dispuesto en artículo 4°, párrafo in fine, de su Ley Orgánica No. 7428 del 7 de septiembre de 1994. XI.- LA NULIDAD EVIDENTE Y MANIFIESTA COMO PRESUPUESTO QUE HABILITA A LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PUBLICAS PARA EJERCER SU POTESTAD DE ANULACIÓN OFICIOSA DE ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. No cualquier grado de invalidez o nulidad autoriza a un ente u órgano público para decretar la anulación oficiosa de un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos para un administrado, dado que, el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo exige que concurran ciertas características o connotaciones específicas y agravadas que la califiquen. La nulidad que justifica la revisión de oficio debe tener tal trascendencia y magnitud que debe ser, a tenor de lo establecido en el numeral 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, “evidente y manifiesta”. Lo evidente y manifiesto es lo que resulta patente, notorio, ostensible, palpable, claro, cierto y que no ofrece ningún margen de duda o que no requiere de un proceso o esfuerzo dialéctico o lógico de verificación para descubrirlo, precisamente, por su índole grosera y grave. En tal sentido, basta confrontar el acto administrativo con la norma legal o reglamentaria que le dan cobertura para arribar a tal conclusión, sin necesidad de hermenéutica o exégesis ninguna. Es menester agregar que el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública no crea una suerte de bipartición de las nulidades absolutas, siendo algunas de ellas simples y otras evidentes y manifiestas, sino lo que trata de propiciar es que en el supuesto de las segundas sea innecesario o prescindible el análisis profundo y experto del juez contencioso-administrativo para facilitar su revisión en vía administrativa. XII.- LA NECESIDAD DE INCOAR UN PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO ORDINARIO PARA LA REVISIÓN O ANULACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La administración pública respectiva —autora del acto que se pretende anular o revisar—, de previo a la declaratoria de nulidad, debe abrir un procedimiento administrativo ordinario en el que se deben observar los principios y las garantías del debido proceso y de la defensa (artículo 173, párrafo 3°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), la justificación de observar ese procedimiento está en que el acto final puede suprimir un derecho subjetivo del administrado (artículo 308 ibidem). Durante la sustanciación del procedimiento ordinario, resulta indispensable recabar el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría siendo un acto de trámite del mismo. Tal y como se indicó supra, el dictamen debe pronunciarse, expresamente, sobre el carácter absoluto, manifiesto y evidente de la nulidad (artículo 173, párrafo 4°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Si el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría Generales de la República es desfavorable, en el sentido que la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo no es evidente y manifiesta, la respectiva administración pública se verá impedida, legalmente, para anular el acto en vía administrativa y tendrá que acudir, irremisiblemente, al proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo de lesividad. El dictamen de los dos órganos consultivos citados es vinculante para la administración respectiva en cuanto al carácter evidente y manifiesto de la nulidad. Sobre este punto, el artículo 183, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública preceptúa que “Fuera de los casos previstos en el artículo 173, la administración no podrá anular de oficio los actos declaratorios de derechos a favor del administrado y para obtener su eliminación deberá recurrir al contencioso de lesividad previsto en los artículos 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa”. XIII.- CONSECUENCIAS JURÍDICAS DE LA INOBSERVANCIA DE LOS RECAUDOS FORMALES Y SUSTANCIALES DEL ORDINAL 173 DE LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA. La revisión oficiosa o anulación con quebranto de los requisitos legales referidos en los considerandos precedentes “sea por omisión de las formalidades previstas o por no ser la nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta” (v. gr. que el dictamen sea desfavorable, que no se recabó el dictamen o que no se abrió un procedimiento administrativo ordinario) es absolutamente nula y hace responsable por los daños y perjuicios provocados tanto a la administración pública como al funcionario (artículo 173, párrafo 6°, ibidem).”
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