JASEC requires municipal permit for electrical grid installationJASEC requiere permiso municipal para tendido eléctrico

“5.- ON THE CONGRUENCE OF JUDGMENTS: The technical definition of congruence is found in Article 99 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to the contentious-administrative process by authorization of Article 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), the first article of which establishes: ‘The judgment shall be rendered within the limits established in the complaint. The judge is prohibited from ruling on undebated issues regarding which the law requires the initiative of the party.’ Additionally, Article 153 of the same Civil Procedure Code requires that judgments be clear, precise, and congruent. This Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Second Section, has explained the concept of incongruence in vote No. 151-2008 of fifteen hours on the ninth of May, two thousand eight, which in relevant part states: ‘II.- ON INCONGRUENCE.- (...) In this regard, contentious-administrative jurisprudence has defined it as follows: “Incongruence consists of the lack of correlation between what is sought and what is decided, relative to the parties, the object, or the cause; the latter is constituted by the facts.- Incongruence therefore does not arise from contradictions that may result, for example, between the facts proven or unproven and the rulings, or between these and the substantive assessments; in such a situation, the most that could occur would be a defective reasoning of the judgment, which is a matter of a different nature, specifically of the cassation appeal on the merits, for error of fact or law in the assessment of the evidence.- Stated differently, there is no incongruence between the recitals of the judgment and what is decided in the operative part. Finally, the judgment may grant all that is sought, just as it may deny all of it, and if it can do the latter, it can with equal or greater reason grant only a part, and in none of these cases is incongruence incurred; it would occur if more than what was sought or something beyond what was sought is granted, which is what is termed ultra petita and extra petita" (judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, number 35-91, of fifteen hours on the twenty-second of March, nineteen ninety-one). By virtue of which, the proper correlation between what is sought by the plaintiff in the complaint and what is decided by the jurisdictional body in judgment constitutes a procedural obligation of inescapable compliance for judges in the resolution of the complaints formulated; which derives from the provisions of Articles 99, 153, and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable, pursuant to Article 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). Notwithstanding the foregoing, there exists in the aforementioned Regulatory Law an express provision, which acts as a limit on the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the contentious-administrative judge, Article 24.1 insofar as it literally provides: “The Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction shall judge within the limits of the claims formulated by the parties and of the allegations deduced to support the action and the opposition”; whereby, the judge must decide within the scope of the allegations deduced by the parties to support the action and the opposition. Thus, the legislator has established as a general principle in procedural matters the congruence of judgments with the claims presented by the plaintiff in the complaint document. From that point of view, it can be pointed out that it is the active subject of the claim who, beforehand, sets the limits within which the adjudicator must decide; and the adjudicator, in turn, cannot omit a ruling on any of the points brought to debate by the plaintiff in their complaint, or by the defendant or defendants through the counterclaim, nor on defenses. So the judge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must observe, in this respect, greater rigor than the civil judge, a situation determined by the undoubtedly public nature of its subject matter. The additional obligation to be observed by the adjudicator of this jurisdiction implies a limitation more accentuated than that simply derived from the principle of congruence. Here, in addition to the necessary correlation between the claims and the judgment, the adequacy between the allegations deduced by the parties and the judgment is imposed. In reality, it should be noted, in contentious-administrative matters, and specifically in the article under comment, the term “allegations” is used with a precise meaning, equivalent to grounds for infringement or significant defects. The aggravated situation faced by the contentious-administrative decision-maker is compensated for, and has meaning in itself, by the exceptional power that the same legislation provides when indicating in Article 24, paragraph 2, the following: “2. Notwithstanding, if the Tribunal, when rendering the judgment, considers that the issue submitted for its consideration might not have been properly appreciated by the parties, because there apparently exist other grounds capable of supporting the action or the defense, it shall submit it to them by means of a decree in which, warning that it does not prejudge the final judgment, it shall set them forth and grant the interested parties a period of eight days to formulate the allegations they deem appropriate, with suspension of the period for pronouncing the judgment.” Evidently, this is an extraordinary power, not conferred upon the judge of the civil jurisdiction. However, its exercise is subject to compliance with the procedure that said norm stipulates. (Regarding this matter, consult, among others, the judgments of the First Chamber, numbers 235 of 14:25 hrs. on July 27; 275 of 15:10 hrs. on September 19, both of 1990; 43 of 15:05 hrs. on April 3, 1991; 18 of 15:30 hrs. on January 29; 127 of 15:05 hrs. on August 19, both of 1992; 88 of 15:05 hrs. on October 19, 1994; 23 of 10:10 hrs. on February 23; 35 of 14:40 hrs. on March 29, both of 1996.) Likewise, it must be borne in mind that pursuant to the provisions of the first paragraph of subsection 3) of Article 594 of the Civil Procedure Code, incongruence is established as a ground for the cassation appeal based on form, which is precisely caused, as indicated, by the lack of correlation between what is decided in the operative part of the judgment, in relation to the claims of the complaint, answer, counterclaim, reply, and of course, in relation to the exceptions (...).’ The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice explains that a judgment is incongruent when: “1) What is decided does not coincide with what was sought by the parties. 2) It fails to decide any of the claims timely raised. 3) It grants more than what was sought. 4) It contains contradictory provisions” (Vote No. 369-F-2004 of eleven hours five minutes on the twenty-sixth of May, two thousand four). 6.- ON THE MERITS: As a first aspect, it must be indicated that the appellant is incorrect in invoking the defect of incongruence in the lower court’s judgment on the basis of an alleged incomplete list of proven facts and an analysis on the merits that, in their view, is incorrect and is contained in the judgment under review here. According to the analysis of the concept of congruence contained in the preceding Recital, it is observed that the appellant’s objections do not refer to a lack of correlation between what is sought and what is decided, nor is any of the following aspects challenged: that what is decided does not coincide with what was sought by the parties; that some of the claims timely raised was not resolved; that more than what was sought was granted; or that it contains contradictory provisions; in summary, none of the grounds that could give rise to incongruence in the lower court’s judgment is invoked, so the articulation must be dismissed as improper with respect to the alleged lack of congruence. Nevertheless, it is necessary to review the arguments presented, since alleged errors in the assessment of the evidence and in the analysis of the regulations applicable to the case were claimed. Regarding the FIRST GRIEVANCE: ON THE PROVEN FACTS: The appellant claims that the lack of a resolution in the administrative venue of the appeal for reversal filed against the act ordering the closure of the works, lodged via official letter No. 482-G-2004 on September 21, 2004, was not included as a proven fact; the argument must be dismissed as unnecessary, since it is entirely irrelevant to the decision on the merits of this matter, given that it is a challenge against a resolution that decides the appeal filed before the same municipal body, and furthermore, because it is verified that the request was addressed by agreement of the Municipal Council of Cartago adopted in Article 16 of Minutes 180 of October 26, 2004 (folios 292 to 294 of the administrative file). As for the argument that the proven facts of the challenged judgment omitted reference to official letter No. 1116-03/04-JDG of September 16, 2004, from the Federated College of Engineers and Architects, in view of what is indicated in proven fact No. 8, the indicated allegation must be dismissed, since the existence of the aforementioned official letter from the professional College and thereby its entire content was taken as proven. Regarding the argument that the proven facts omit the date of the closure of the works on September 20, 2004, according to the notarial certificate provided in the complaint’s factual recitation, this reproach must be dismissed, since proven facts 1 and 3 clearly contain the exact date of the closure of the works and its confirmation based on the evidence in the record, given that the notarial certificate provided by the plaintiff and visible at folios 56 to 58 of the judicial file is a simple copy that lacks all legal value. In another argument, the plaintiff claims that the proven facts omit to indicate that JASEC informed the Municipality of Cartago of the works in a timely manner via official letter No. 479-G-2002 of July 25, 2002; on this point, the Municipality denies what is indicated by the plaintiff and states that it was never informed in a timely manner. Reviewed official letter No. 479-G-2002 provided by the plaintiff and visible at folios 50 to 54 of the judicial file, it is verified that it refers to information on the 2001 and 2002 tariff increases, the company’s financial situation, and the current market for JASEC’s tariffs; however, it does not include precise information on the El Bosque-Fátima electrical distribution project, and the only record of the invoked document is a simple copy without the receipt stamps of the Municipality of Cartago, which detracts from its evidentiary value and influence for the decision in this case, and for that reason the alleged point must be dismissed. In summary, the list of proven facts listed by the lower court is based on the evidence in the record, with no errors in the assessment of the evidence being evident. Regarding the SECOND GRIEVANCE: ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS OF THE LOWER COURT: The plaintiff indicates that, in their view, there is an incorrect application of the regulations in the specific case, resulting from an inadequate interpretation of the law and the jurisprudence invoked. The appellant is incorrect. It should be highlighted that upon review of the challenged Judgment, it is verified that Substantive Recitals No. 3, 4, and 5 contain a detailed analysis on the merits regarding the regulations and jurisprudence applicable to JASEC’s particular case, with no evidence of an incorrect interpretation of the norms or the jurisprudence cited by the plaintiff. The legal basis of Article 26 of Law 3300, used by the trial judge to determine that the Municipality of Cartago can demand construction permits for the works carried out by JASEC, is in accordance with the law and the literal sense of the norm, which conditions that all activities carried out by JASEC must be coordinated with the competent authorities, without the norm distinguishing only a posteriori repair activities. The foregoing is consistent with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Municipal Code, which requires Public Administration entities to coordinate works and projects with the Municipality with due notice, thus the normative foundation used by the trial judge is valid and of abundant solidity within the Principle of Completeness of the Legal Order, without needing to strain or interpret the mentioned norm, for which reason the indicated argument must be dismissed. As regards the jurisprudence invoked by the plaintiff, no vice or defect is observed in the assessment made by the Judge, inasmuch as the jurisprudence cited by the plaintiff in the complaint is not applicable to the specific case, since it involves plaintiffs and proceedings different from the one we are dealing with here, and it must be noted that the votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) mentioned by the plaintiff (No. 2806-1998 and 9513-2000) cite the duty of the Public Administration to inform and coordinate with the Municipalities the works to be developed, as established in Article 6 of the Municipal Code. More specifically, vote No. 2806-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice refers to the legal powers attributed to the Costa Rican Electricity Institute to achieve its assigned purposes, and explains that “The Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute is clear in the sense that the interests and services that this entity is tasked with managing are of an undoubtedly national character. It is in this direction that its second article points, when indicating: / The purposes of the Institute, towards the achievement of which all its efforts and work programs shall be directed, shall be the following: / a) To provide a prompt and effective solution to the scarcity of electric power in the Nation, and to ensure that energy is available at all times to satisfy normal demand and to promote the development of new industries, the use of electricity in rural regions, and its greater domestic consumption...’ / The autonomy that the legislator intended to grant ICE to design and develop its activities is recognized precisely in the following article, the third, which establishes that in the determination of work programs, works, and projects, no other state agency shall intervene —in technical aspects— unless the Institute itself has requested its collaboration”, which is not applicable to the present case, as the trial judge correctly indicated, given that the plaintiff company JASEC is not regulated by the Constitutive Law of ICE. In the same vein, Vote No. 9513-00 of the Constitutional Chamber addresses an amparo remedy filed solely against ICE, and is not applicable to this matter, as they are public entities of a different character, regardless of the national purposes they must fulfill, which are analyzed next. On the topic of the powers granted to Municipalities for issuing construction permits for local projects of national importance, what was explained by this Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, First Section in Vote No. 428-2007 of fifteen hours five minutes on October seventeenth, two thousand seven, must be taken into account, which in relevant part is transcribed: ‘(...) From a legal-doctrinal point of view, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity of Municipalities to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything concerning the organization of a specific locality (the canton, in our case). (...) From the foregoing, it is clear that local governments have broad autonomy in decision-making on local matters; these, in turn, can manifest from the perspective of jurisdiction over public roads, constructions, and urbanism, as presented in this matter. Likewise, the autonomy enjoyed by municipalities allows them to take lines of action with total independence from the Central Public Administration (Administración Pública Central), an aspect of great relevance in the case before us, as shall be explained below. b) Municipal powers regarding public roads and the necessary obligation of coordination of jurisdictions between the Municipality and the State: Precisely, in this matter, it has been indicated that since Ninth Street is a road that belongs to the National Road Network (Red Vial Nacional) (Article 1 of the General Law of Public Roads), the Municipality of San José would not be competent to grant the construction permit for the pedestrian bridge, but rather that jurisdiction rests solely with the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Regarding what is indicated, this authority does not entirely share this view, since although it is true that Ninth Street is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, given that the municipality itself clearly indicated so in official letter DIUR-595-2004, from the Urban Planning Directorate of said municipal corporation, it cannot be ignored that said road crosses the city of San José, and that the local municipality maintains, in this regard, a series of jurisdictions that legitimize it to rule regarding the use of that public road, jointly with the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. In this sense, it would have to be established that from the perspective of authorization for the use of Ninth Street, both the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipality of San José are competent; that is, a shared jurisdiction exists between both entities on this point. This statement is based in accordance with existing regulations and our constitutional jurisprudence. Precisely, the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) indicates: / Article 1.- The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the powers that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. / This law is clear in granting municipalities authority in matters of health, safety, comfort, and beauty in the public roads located within their territorial sphere, without prejudice to other powers granted to other administrative bodies, as, in this case, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport also has them, in accordance with what is indicated in Article 1 of the General Law of Public Roads. Along this same line of thought, the Municipal Code admits the coexistence of municipal and state jurisdictions, by establishing: / Article 6. — The municipality and the other bodies and entities of the Public Administration shall coordinate their actions. For this purpose, they shall communicate, with due notice, the works they plan to execute. / Likewise, our Constitutional Tribunal has analyzed cases similar to the present one, in which a shared jurisdiction between municipal entities and the State arises, explaining, in relevant part, the following: / X.- ON THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS. Several of the provisions challenged in this unconstitutionality action - Articles 5, 10 and 186 of the Municipal Code, 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads, 2 of the General Law of Public Roads, 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law, 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law -, refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch, to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed based on the very nature of municipal autonomy. It is by virtue of the provisions of Article 170 of the Constitution, that municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (Article 169 of the Political Constitution), which has been recognized in constitutional jurisprudence repeatedly (in this sense, see, among others, judgments number 01119-90, 02934-93, 00140-94, 03494-94, 06000-94, 03930-95, 02231-96, and 06469-97). And as has been pointed out in that jurisprudence and in the concepts contained in the previous recitals, the sphere of jurisdiction and definition of powers that municipalities are entrusted with are determined in the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they strictly refer to what is "local." The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material jurisdiction in favor of local governments and their regulation to define "the local," a sphere that can only be reduced by law - since it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions -, in such a way that it leads to the maintenance of the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Tribunal in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. A conflict cannot, therefore, be created through antagonism or protagonism between the matter that makes up the general purpose of "local interests and services" and "national" or "state" public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are called upon to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may, eventually, be intermingled, and moreover, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as the jurisprudence previously cited has expressed, it will ultimately be up to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform to constitutional dimensioning or not. Once the material jurisdiction of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that, by their nature, are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be considered national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of powers that is inevitable, since the public capacity of municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; hence, the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require. That is, municipalities may share their jurisdictions with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must develop under the terms as defined in the law (Article 5 of the former Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of "coordination" between municipalities and public institutions that concur in the performance of their jurisdictions, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, especially because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy since it is its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called upon to enter into cooperative relationships with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature - in many cases - of interests around a specific matter. (...) The defined relationship of cooperation has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which has repeatedly pointed out that for projects of different public institutions to be carried out, it must be done with respect for the legal system: first, constitutional-level norms, and thereafter, those of legal and regulatory rank, so that for the Executive Branch or other public entities to carry out projects on their own initiative in a specific locality, they must have the respective municipal permits and licenses, (...) (Vote 5445-99; Constitutional Chamber, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine). / (...) c) The powers regarding constructions and urbanism granted by the legal framework to local governments in their respective territorial spheres: Now, independently of the aspect analyzed previously, which refers to the shared jurisdiction to issue the permit for the use of the public road by both entities, the municipal and the state, it is advisable to indicate that, in the case before us, the Municipal Corporation of San José not only has the power to issue an opinion and authorization on the use of the indicated public road, but the legal framework grants it powers in other aspects that are directly related to the construction of the pedestrian bridge; that is, this type of works not only involve the use of physical space on a public road, but they form part of the expansion and connection of a series of buildings, such as the building of the Hotel del Rey with other buildings, so we are in the presence of a sphere eminently pertaining to the construction process of works. Precisely, the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) grants municipalities the power to issue permits and supervise construction processes carried out on properties that are part of their territorial jurisdiction; this is clearly derived from reading Article 74 of that law, which provides: / Article 74.- Licenses. Any work related to construction, whether permanent or provisional, that is executed in the towns of the Republic, must be executed with a license from the corresponding Municipality. / Consequently, from the perspective of constructing a work that forms part of existing buildings, as is presented in the record, the Municipality of San José is the only entity enabled by law, exclusively and to the exclusion of other institutions, to grant a construction permit so that the pedestrian bridge can be built. Precisely, it is clear that in this case, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport does not have the power to grant a permit for the construction of this type of work, which involves the expansion and connection of existing buildings, an aspect that only the Municipality of San José can authorize, with full powers as indicated previously. On the other hand, a work such as the one intended to be built in this matter also has implications from the urban planning or urban development perspective, understood as "the continuous and comprehensive process of analysis and formulation of plans and regulations on urban development, aimed at ensuring the safety, health, comfort, and well-being of the community." (Article 1 of the Urban Planning Law). In this area, local governments have very well-defined powers and jurisdictions. In this sense, the Urban Planning Law establishes: / Article 15.- In accordance with the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their jurisdictional territory is recognized. Consequently, each of them shall make the appropriate arrangements to implement a regulatory plan (plan regulador), and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must apply, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors where qualified reasons prevail for establishing a specific controlling regime. / Article 19.- Each Municipality shall issue and promulgate the procedural rules necessary for the due compliance with the regulatory plan and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community.’ / Likewise, our Constitutional Court has been clear regarding the powers that the body of law has granted to municipalities in urban planning matters, by providing: / "In accordance with the provisions of Article 169 of the Political Constitution and Article 15 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), it is the competence of the Municipalities to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their territory. To fulfill this objective, the Municipalities may implement regulatory plans in which they may determine—among many other aspects (Article 16 of Law 4240 and its amendments)—the zoning of land use for housing, commerce, industry, education, recreation, public purposes, and any other pertinent destination." (Voto 02153-93; Sala Constitucional, at nine hours twenty-one minutes on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three)" (the underlining is not from the original). The foregoing is applicable to the specific case, since for the electrical line installation and placement of new poles for the El Bosque-Fátima Distribution project executed by the plaintiff within the municipal territory assigned to the defendant, the respective construction permits issued by the Municipality of Cartago (Municipalidad de Cartago) must be obtained, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) in conjunction with numerals 1, 74 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), 15, 19 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), and 19 paragraphs 8) and 9) of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos), with the last mentioned paragraphs literally prescribing the following: " (...) For the placement of new poles for the transmission of electric power or for telegraphs or telephones, authorization must be requested from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) or from the respective Municipality, depending on whether they are national roads or local roads. / If the Ministry's requirement is not met, it may carry out the necessary work on its own account, charging the responsible party the value thereof plus a 50% surcharge, without prejudice to the applicable fine" (the bold and underlining are not from the original). Consequently, since it is demonstrated that the plaintiff's project is of a local nature and for the placement of new electrical line poles, the alleged grievance must be dismissed as unfounded. " Precisely, the Construction Law states: / **Article 1.- The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other population centers meet the necessary conditions of safety, health (salubridad), comfort, and beauty in their public thoroughfares and in the buildings and constructions erected on their lands, without prejudice to the powers granted by law in these matters to other administrative bodies.** / This provision is clear in granting municipalities authority in matters of health, safety, comfort, and beauty regarding public thoroughfares within their territorial scope, without prejudice to other powers granted to other administrative bodies, as in this case, those also held by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), in accordance with Article 1 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos). Along the same lines, the Municipal Code acknowledges the coexistence of municipal and state competences, establishing: / **Article 6. — The municipality and the other organs and entities of the Public Administration shall coordinate their actions. For this purpose, they shall communicate, with due advance notice, the works they plan to execute. /** Likewise, our Constitutional Court has analyzed cases similar to the present one, involving shared competence between municipal entities and the State, explaining, in pertinent part, the following: / **X.- ON THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS. Several of the provisions challenged in this unconstitutionality action—Articles 5, 10, and 186 of the Municipal Code, 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), 2 of the General Public Roads Law, 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Nacional), 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)—refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed considering the very nature of municipal autonomy. By virtue of Article 170 of the Constitution, municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (Article 169 of the Political Constitution), which has been repeatedly recognized in constitutional case law (in this regard, see, among others, rulings number 01119-90, 02934-93, 00140-94, 03494-94, 06000-94, 03930-95, 02231-96, and 06469-97). And as indicated in that case law and in the concepts contained in the preceding recitals, the sphere of competence and the definition of attributions entrusted to municipalities are determined by the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they strictly refer to that which is "local." The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define "the local," a scope that can only be reduced by law—being a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—in a manner that maintains the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms set forth by this Court in ruling number 06469-97, cited supra. A conflict cannot therefore be created from antagonism or protagonism between the matter comprising the general purpose of "local interests and services" and "national" or "state" public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another but in reality meant to coexist; and this is so because both types of interest may, eventually, be intermingled; indeed, it is often the case that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those which appear as national or state interests, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable but rather gradual or variable. In any case, as expressed in the aforementioned case law, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning. Once the material competence of the municipality is defined within a given territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that, by their nature, are exclusively municipal, alongside others that may be deemed national or state; therefore, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; consequently, the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional territory, to the extent required by circumstances. That is, municipalities may share their competences with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must develop in the terms defined by law (Article 5 of the former Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of "coordination" between municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their competences, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, especially because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy, being its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called upon to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature—in many cases—of interests regarding a specific matter. (...) The defined cooperative relationship has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which has repeatedly indicated that for projects of the different public institutions to be carried out, they must be done in respect of the legal system: first, the norms of constitutional rank, and then, those of legal and regulatory rank, such that for the Executive Branch or other public entities to carry out projects on their own initiative in a specific locality, they must have the respective municipal permits and licenses, (...) (Voto 5445-99; Constitutional Chamber, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes of the fourteenth of July, nineteen ninety-nine). /** (...) **c) The powers in matters of construction and urbanism granted by the legal framework to local governments in their respective territorial scopes:** Now, regardless of the aspect analyzed above, which refers to the shared competence to issue a permit for the use of the public thoroughfare by both entities—municipal and state—it is appropriate to indicate that in the case at hand, the Municipal Corporation of San José not only has the power to issue an opinion and authorization for the use of the indicated public thoroughfare, but the legal framework also grants it powers in other aspects directly related to the construction of the pedestrian bridge. That is, this type of work not only involves the use of physical space over a public thoroughfare but also forms part of the expansion and connection of a series of buildings, such as the Hotel del Rey building with other buildings; therefore, we are in the presence of a scope that is eminently part of the construction process of works. Precisely, the Construction Law grants municipalities the power to issue permits and supervise the construction processes carried out on properties within their territorial jurisdiction; this is clearly evident from reading Article 74 of that law, which provides: / **Article 74.- Licenses. All work related to construction, executed in the population centers of the Republic, whether of a permanent or provisional nature, must be carried out with a license from the corresponding Municipality.** / Consequently, from the perspective of the construction of a work that forms part of existing buildings, as presented in the case file, the Municipality of San José is the sole entity authorized by law, exclusively and to the exclusion of other institutions, to issue a construction permit so that the pedestrian bridge may be built. Precisely, it is clear that in this case, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport does not have the power to issue a permit for the construction of a work of this type, which involves the expansion and connection of existing buildings, an aspect that only the Municipality of San José can authorize, with full competences as previously indicated. On the other hand, a work like the one intended to be constructed in this matter also has implications from the urban planning or urban development perspective, this concept being understood as "the continuous and comprehensive process of analysis and formulation of plans and regulations on urban development, aimed at ensuring the safety, health, comfort, and well-being of the community." (Article 1 of the Urban Planning Law). In this matter, local governments have very well-defined powers and competences. In this sense, the Urban Planning Law establishes: / **Article 15.- In accordance with the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, is recognized. Consequently, each of them shall provide what is necessary to implement a regulatory plan (plan regulador), and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors where qualified reasons exist to establish a specific control regime. / Article 19.- Each Municipality shall issue and promulgate the necessary procedural rules for due compliance with the regulatory plan and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community. /** Likewise, our Constitutional Court has been clear on the powers granted by the legal framework to municipalities in urban planning matters, stating: / **"Pursuant to the provisions of Article 169 of the Political Constitution and 15 of the Urban Planning Law, it is the competence of the Municipalities to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their territory. To fulfill this objective, the Municipalities may implement regulatory plans in which they may determine—among many other aspects (Article 16 Law 4240 and its amendments)—the zoning of land use for housing, commerce, industry, education, recreation, public purposes, and any other pertinent destination." (Voto 02153-93; Constitutional Chamber, at nine hours and twenty-one minutes of the twenty-first of May, nineteen ninety-three)"** (the underlining is not in the original). The foregoing is applicable to the specific case, since for the power line installation (tendido eléctrico) and placement of new posts of the El Bosque-Fátima Distribution project executed by the plaintiff within the municipal territory assigned to the defendant, the respective construction permits issued by the Municipality of Cartago must be obtained, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Municipal Code in conjunction with numerals 1, 74 of the Construction Law, 15, 19 of the Urban Planning Law, and 19 paragraphs 8) and 9) of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), with the last mentioned paragraphs literally prescribing the following: *"(...) For the placement of new posts (postería) for the transmission of electric power or for telegraphs or telephones, authorization must be requested from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport or from the respective Municipality, depending on whether it concerns national highways or local roads."* / If the Ministry's requirement is not fulfilled, it may carry out the necessary works at its own expense, charging the responsible party the value of those works plus a 50% surcharge, without prejudice to any applicable fine" (the bold and underline are not from the original). Consequently, since it is proven that the plaintiff's project is of a local nature and for the placement of new electricity line posts, the alleged grievance must be dismissed as unfounded. " **"5.- ON THE CONGRUENCE OF JUDGMENTS:** The technical definition of congruence is located in Article 99 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to the contentious-administrative process by authorization of Article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the first numeral of which establishes: *"The judgment shall be handed down within the limits established in the claim. The judge is prohibited from ruling on issues not debated regarding which the law requires the initiative of the party"*. Furthermore, Article 153 of the same Civil Procedure Code requires judgments to be clear, precise, and congruent. This Contentious-Administrative Court, Second Section, has explained the concept of incongruence, in vote No. 151-2008 of fifteen hours on the ninth of May two thousand eight, which in relevant part states: ***"II.- ON INCONGRUENCE.-** (...) In this regard, the contentious-administrative case law has defined it as follows: "Incongruence consists of the lack of relationship between what is requested and what is decided, in relation to the parties, to the object, or to the cause; the cause is constituted by the facts.- Therefore, incongruence does not arise from contradictions that may result, for example, between the proven or unproven facts and the rulings, or between these and the substantive assessments; in such a situation the most that could occur would be a defective reasoning of the judgment, which is a matter of a different nature, specifically of the cassation appeal on the merits, for error of fact or of law in the assessment of the evidence.- Stated differently, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what is decided in the operative part. Finally, the judgment can grant everything requested, just as it can deny everything, and if it can do the latter, with equal or greater reason it can grant only a part, and in none of those cases is incongruence incurred; **it would occur if more than what was requested or something outside of what was requested is granted, which is what is termed ultra petita and extra petita**" (ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 35-91, of fifteen hours on the twenty-second of March nineteen ninety-one). By virtue of which, **the proper correspondence between what is requested by the plaintiff in the claim and what is decided by the jurisdictional body in the judgment constitutes a procedural obligation of unavoidable compliance for judges in resolving the formulated claims**; deriving from the provisions of Articles 99, 153, and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable, according to the terms of Article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the above, in the cited Regulatory Law, there is an express provision, which acts as a limit on the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the contentious-administrative judge, Article 24.1 in that it literally provides: "The Contentious Jurisdiction shall judge within the limits of the claims formulated by the parties and of the allegations deduced to support the action and the opposition"; with which, the judge must resolve within the scope of the allegations deduced by the parties to support the action and the opposition. Thus, the legislator has established as a general principle in procedural matters the congruence of rulings with the claims presented by the plaintiff in the pleading. From that point of view, it can be pointed out that it is the active subject of the claim who, in advance, sets the limits within which the judge must resolve; and the latter, in turn, cannot omit a pronouncement on any of the points brought to debate by the plaintiff in his claim, or by the defendant or defendants through the counterclaim, nor on the defenses. So the judge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must observe, regarding this aspect, greater rigor than the civil judge, a situation determined by the undoubtedly public nature of its subject matter. The additional obligation to be observed by the judge of this jurisdiction implies a limitation more accentuated than that directly derived from the principle of congruence. Here, in addition to the necessary relationship between the claims and the judgment, the adequacy between the allegations deduced by the parties and the judgment is imposed. In reality, it should be noted, in contentious-administrative matters, and specifically in the article being discussed, the term "**allegations**" is used with a precise meaning, equivalent to grounds for infringement or significant defects. The aggravated situation faced by the contentious-administrative decision-maker is compensated, and has its own meaning, by the exceptional power granted by the same legislation when it provides in Article 24, paragraph 2, the following: "**2.** However, if upon issuing the judgment the Court deems that the question submitted for its consideration may not have been properly appreciated by the parties, because there apparently exist other grounds capable of supporting the action or the defense, it shall submit them to the parties by means of a procedural resolution in which, warning that it does not prejudge the final judgment, it will set them forth and grant the interested parties a period of eight days to formulate the allegations they deem appropriate, with suspension of the period for rendering the judgment." Evidently this is an extraordinary power, not conferred upon the judge of the civil jurisdiction. However, its exercise is subject to compliance with the procedure that said rule establishes. (On this particular, consult, among others, the rulings of the First Chamber numbers 235 of 14:25 hrs. on July 27; 275 of 15:10 hrs. on September 19, both of 1990; 43 of 15:05 hrs. on April 3, 1991; 18 of 15:30 hrs. on January 29; 127 of 15:05 hrs. on August 19, both of 1992; 88 of 15:05 hrs. on October 19, 1994; 23 of 10:10 hrs. on February 23; 35 of 14:40 hrs. on March 29, both of 1996.) Likewise, it must be borne in mind that according to the first paragraph of subsection 3) of Article 594 of the Civil Procedure Code, incongruence is established as a ground for the cassation appeal as to form, which precisely is caused, as indicated, by the lack of relationship between what is decided in the operative part of the ruling, in relation to the claims of the claim, the answer, the counterclaim, the replication, and of course, in relation to the exceptions (...)"*. The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice explains that a ruling is incongruent when: *"1) What is decided does not coincide with what was requested by the parties. 2) It does not resolve any of the claims timely deduced. 3) It grants more than what was requested. 4) It contains contradictory provisions"* (Vote No. 369-F-2004 of eleven hours five minutes on the twenty-sixth of May two thousand four). **6.- ON THE MERITS**: As a first aspect, it must be stated that the appellant is not correct in invoking the defect of incongruence in the lower court's ruling based on a supposed incomplete list of proven facts and an analysis on the merits that in his opinion is incorrect and that is contained in the judgment being reviewed here. According to the analysis of the concept of congruence contained in the previous Considering, it is observed that the appellant's questions do not refer to the lack of relationship between what is requested and what is decided, nor is any of the following aspects challenged: *that what is decided does not coincide with what was requested by the parties; that any of the claims timely deduced was not resolved, that more than what was requested was granted, or that it contains contradictory provisions;* in short, none of the grounds that could motivate an incongruence in the lower court's ruling is invoked, for which reason the articulation must be dismissed as unfounded insofar as it refers to the lack of congruence. However, it is necessary to review the arguments presented, since alleged errors in the appreciation of the evidence and in the analysis of the regulations applicable to the case were claimed. With respect to the **FIRST GRIEVANCE: ON THE PROVEN FACTS**: The appellant alleges that the lack of resolution, at the administrative level, of the appeal for reversal filed against the act of closure of the works, lodged via official letter No. 482-G-2004 on September 21, 2004, was not included as a proven fact; the argument must be dismissed as unnecessary, since it lacks any influence on the decision on the merits of this matter, given that it is a challenge against a resolution that decides the appeal filed before the same municipal entity, and furthermore, because it is verified that the matter was addressed by agreement of the Municipal Council of Cartago adopted in Article 16 of Minutes 180 of October 26, 2004 (pages 292 to 294 of the administrative file). Regarding the argument that the proven facts of the contested judgment omitted to refer to official letter No. 1116-03/04-JDG of September 16, 2004 from the Federated College of Engineers and Architects, in view of what is indicated in proven fact No. 8, the indicated allegation must be dismissed, because the existence of the aforementioned official letter from the professional College and thereby its entire content was taken as proven.

Regarding the argument that the proven facts omit the date of the closure of the works on September 20, 2004, according to the notarial certificate (acta notarial) submitted with the claim, this objection must be rejected, since proven facts 1 and 3 clearly contain the exact date of the closure of the works and its confirmation based on the evidence in the case file, given that the notarial certificate (acta notarial) provided by the plaintiff and visible on folios 56 a 58 of the judicial file is a simple copy that lacks all legal value. In another argument, the plaintiff claims that the proven facts omit to indicate that JASEC informed the Municipality of Cartago of the works in a timely manner through official communication (oficio) N° 479-G-2002 of July 25, 2002; on this point, the Municipality denies what the plaintiff indicated and states that it was never informed in a timely manner. Having reviewed official communication (oficio) N° 479-G-2002 provided by the plaintiff and visible on folios 50 a 54 of the judicial file, it is verified that it refers to information about the 2001 and 2002 rate increases, the financial situation of the company, and the current market for JASEC's rates; however, it does not include precise information about the El Bosque-Fátima electrical distribution project, and the only record of the invoked document is a simple copy without the receipt stamps of the Municipality of Cartago, which diminishes its evidentiary value and influence for the decision in the present case, and for that reason, the alleged point must be rejected. In summary, the list of proven facts enumerated by the lower court (A-quo) is based on the evidence in the case file, with no errors being evident in the assessment of the evidence. Regarding the SECOND GRIEVANCE: ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS OF THE LOWER COURT (A-QUO): The plaintiff indicates that, in their view, there is an incorrect application of the regulations in the specific case, resulting from an inadequate interpretation of the law and the invoked case law. The appellant is incorrect. It is highlighted that upon reviewing the contested judgment, it is verified that Substantive Considerandos (Considerandos) N° 3, 4, and 5 contain a detailed substantive analysis of the regulations and case law applicable to JASEC's particular case, with no incorrect interpretation of the laws or the case law cited by the plaintiff being evident. The legal basis of Article 26 of Law 3300, used by the trial judge to determine that the Municipality of Cartago can require a construction permit for the works carried out by JASEC, is in accordance with the law and the literal meaning of the norm, which conditions that all activities carried out by JASEC must be coordinated with the competent authorities, without the norm distinguishing only post-facto repair activities. The foregoing agrees with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Municipal Code, which require Public Administration entities to coordinate works and projects with the Municipality with due notice, such that the normative basis used by the trial judge is valid and has abundant solidity within the Principle of Completeness of the Juridical System, without the need to strain or interpret the mentioned norm, for which reason the indicated argument must be rejected. Regarding the case law invoked by the plaintiff, no vice or defect is observed in the judge's assessment, as the case law cited by the plaintiff in the claim is not applicable to the specific case, since it involves different plaintiffs and processes than the one at hand; it should be noted that the rulings (votos) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) mentioned by the plaintiff (N° 2806-1998 and 9513-2000) cite the duty of the Public Administration to inform and coordinate with the Municipalities the works to be developed as established in Article 6 of the Municipal Code. More specifically, ruling (voto) N° 2806-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, refers to the legal powers attributed to the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity to achieve its assigned purposes, and explains that "The Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity is clear in the sense that the interests and services that this entity must manage are of an undoubtedly national character. It is in this direction that its second article points, stating: / The purposes of the Institute, towards the achievement of which all its efforts and work programs will be directed, shall be the following: / a) To provide a prompt and effective solution to the scarcity of electric power in the Nation, and to ensure that at all times there is energy available to satisfy normal demand and to promote the development of new industries, the use of electricity in rural regions, and its greater domestic consumption..." / The autonomy that the legislator wished to grant to ICE to design and develop its activities is recognized precisely in the following article, the third, which establishes that in determining work programs, works, and projects, no other state dependency—in technical aspects—shall intervene that the Institute itself has not requested collaboration from", which is not applicable to the present case, as the trial judge correctly indicated, since the plaintiff company JASEC is not regulated by the Constitutive Law of ICE. In the same vein, Ruling (Voto) N° 9513-00 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) addresses an amparo action filed solely against ICE and is not applicable to the present matter, as it involves public entities of a different nature, irrespective of the national purposes they must fulfill, which are analyzed subsequently. On the subject of the powers granted to Municipalities for granting construction permits for local projects of national importance, the explanation provided by this Contentious-Administrative Court, First Section in Ruling (Voto) N° 428-2007 of fifteen hours five minutes on October seventeen, two thousand seven, must be taken into account, which in relevant part reads: "(...) From a juridical-doctrinal point of view, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity of the Municipalities to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything related to the organization of a specific locality (the canton, in our case). (...) From the foregoing, it is clear that local governments possess broad autonomy in decision-making regarding local matters; these, in turn, can manifest from the perspective of powers in the area of public roads, constructions, and urban planning, as presented in this matter. Likewise, the autonomy enjoyed by the municipalities allows them to take lines of action with total independence from the Central Public Administration, an aspect of great relevance in the case at hand, as will be explained below. b) Municipal powers in matters of public roads and the necessary obligation of coordination of competencies between the Municipality and the State: Precisely, in the present matter, it has been indicated that since Ninth Street is a road belonging to the National Road Network (Article 1 of the General Law of Public Roads), the Municipality of San José would not be competent to grant the construction permit for the pedestrian bridge, but rather this is solely the competence of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Regarding what was indicated, this authority does not fully share this criterion, since although it is true that Ninth Street is the competence of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, because the same municipality clearly indicated this in official communication (oficio) DIUR-595-2004 from the Urban Planning Directorate of that municipal corporation, it cannot be ignored that said road crosses the city of San José, and that the local municipality maintains, in this respect, a series of powers that legitimize it to pronounce regarding the use of that public road, jointly with the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. In that sense, it would have to be established that from the perspective of authorization for the use of Ninth Street, both the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipality of San José are competent; that is, there exists at this point a shared competence between both entities. This is based in accordance with the existing regulations and our constitutional case law. Precisely, the Construction Law indicates: / Article 1.- The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on their lands, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. / This norm is clear in giving municipalities a power in matters of health, safety, comfort, and beauty on public roads within their territorial scope, without prejudice to other powers granted to other administrative bodies, as in this case, those also held by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, in accordance with what is indicated in Article 1 of the General Law of Public Roads. Along these same lines, the Municipal Code admits the coexistence of municipal and state competencies, by establishing: / Article 6. — The municipality and the other bodies and entities of the Public Administration shall coordinate their actions. For this purpose, they must communicate, with due notice, the works they plan to execute. / Likewise, our Constitutional Court has analyzed cases similar to the present one, in which a shared competence arises between municipal entities and the State, explaining in relevant part the following: / X.- ON THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS. Several of the provisions challenged in this unconstitutionality action —Articles 5, 10, and 186 of the Municipal Code, 2 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Roads, 2 of the General Law of Public Roads, 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law, 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law— refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed based on the very nature of municipal autonomy. It is by virtue of Article 170 of the Constitution, that municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (Article 169 of the Political Constitution), as has been repeatedly recognized in constitutional case law (in this sense, see judgments number 01119-90, 02934-93, 00140-94, 03494-94, 06000-94, 03930-95, 02231-96, and 06469-97, among others). And as indicated in that case law and in the concepts contained in the preceding considerandos, the sphere of competence and definition of powers entrusted to municipalities are determined in the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they strictly refer to what is "local." The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define "the local," a scope that can only be reduced by law—since it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—in such a way that it leads to maintaining the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. Therefore, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter integrating the general purpose of "local interests and services" and "national" or "state" public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are destined to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may, eventually, be intermingled, and rather, it is common that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as the previously cited case law has expressed, it will ultimately be up to the judge to decide whether or not the criteria of distinction conform to the constitutional dimensioning. Once the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial jurisdiction is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that may be considered national or state; it is therefore essential to define the form of co-participation of powers that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; from which it follows that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require. That is, municipalities can share their competencies with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must unfold in the terms defined by law (Article 5 of the previous Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of "coordination" between municipalities and public institutions that concur in the performance of their competencies, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy, being its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature—in many cases—of interests regarding a specific matter. (...) The defined cooperative relationship has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which has repeatedly indicated that for the projects of different public institutions to be carried out, they must be done with respect for the juridical system: first, norms of constitutional rank, and then, those of legal and regulatory rank, such that, for the Executive Branch or other public entities to carry out projects of their initiative in a specific locality, they must have the respective municipal permits and licenses, (...) (Voto 5445-99; Constitutional Chamber, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine). / (...) c) The powers in matters of constructions and urban planning granted by the block of legality to local governments in their respective territorial scopes: Now, independently of the aspect analyzed previously, which refers to the shared competence to issue the permit for the use of the public road, by both entities, the municipal and the state, it is convenient to indicate that in the case at hand, the Municipal Corporation of San José not only has the power to issue an opinion and authorization for the use of the indicated public road, but also that the block of legality grants it powers in other aspects directly related to the construction of the pedestrian bridge; that is, this type of works not only imply the use of physical space over a public road, but also form part of the expansion and union of a series of buildings, such as the Hotel del Rey building with the other buildings, so we are in the presence of a scope eminently involving the construction process of works. Precisely, the Construction Law grants municipalities the power to grant permits and supervise construction processes carried out on properties within their territorial jurisdiction; this is clearly derived from a reading of Article 74 of that law, which provides: / Article 74.- Licenses. Every work related to construction, executed in the towns of the Republic, whether permanent or provisional, must be executed with a license from the corresponding Municipality. / Consequently, from the perspective of the construction of a work that is part of existing buildings, as presented in the case file, the Municipality of San José is the only entity authorized by law, exclusively and excluding other institutions, to grant a construction permit for the pedestrian bridge to be built. Precisely, it is clear that in this case, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has no power to grant a permit for the construction of a work of this type, which implies the expansion and union of existing buildings, an aspect that only the Municipality of San José can authorize, with full powers as previously indicated. On the other hand, a work like the one intended to be built in this matter also has implications from the urban planning or urban development perspective, this concept being understood as "the continuous and integral process of analysis and formulation of plans and regulations on urban development, aimed at ensuring the safety, health, comfort, and welfare of the community." (Article 1 of the Urban Planning Law). In this matter, local governments have very well-defined powers and competencies. In that sense, the Urban Planning Law establishes: / Article 15.- In accordance with the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their jurisdictional territory are recognized. Consequently, each of them shall provide whatever is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan, and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons prevail for establishing a specific control regime. / Article 19.- Each Municipality shall issue and promulgate the necessary procedural rules for the due compliance with the regulatory plan and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and welfare of the community. / Likewise, our Constitutional Court has been clear on the powers in urban planning matters granted to municipalities by the block of legality, by providing: / "In accordance with the provisions of Article 169 of the Political Constitution and 15 of the Urban Planning Law, it is the competence of the Municipalities to plan and control urban development within the limits of their territory. To fulfill this objective, the Municipalities can implement regulatory plans in which they may determine - among many other aspects (Article 16 Law 4240 and its amendments) - the zoning of land use for housing, commerce, industry, education, recreation, public purposes, and any other pertinent destination." (Voto 02153-93; Constitutional Chamber, at nine hours twenty-one minutes on May twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three)" (the underlining is not from the original). The foregoing is applicable to the specific case, since for the electrical line installation and placement of new poles for the El Bosque-Fátima Distribution project executed by the plaintiff within the municipal territory assigned to the defendant, the respective construction permits issued by the Municipality of Cartago must be obtained, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Municipal Code in concordance with sections 1, 74 of the Construction Law, 15, 19 of the Urban Planning Law, and 19 paragraphs 8) and 9) of the General Law of Roads, given that the last-mentioned paragraphs literally prescribe the following: " (...) For the placement of new pole infrastructure for the transmission of electric power or for telegraphs or telephones, authorization must be requested from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport or from the respective Municipality, depending on whether it concerns highways or local roads. / If the Ministry's requirement is not fulfilled, it may carry out the necessary works on its own, charging the responsible party the value thereof plus a 50% surcharge, without prejudice to any applicable fine" (the bold and underlining are not from the original). Consequently, since it is accredited that the plaintiff's project is of a local nature and for the placement of new poles for the electrical line, the alleged grievance must be rejected as unfounded.

“5.- SOBRE LA CONGRUENCIA DE LAS SENTENCIAS: La definición técnica de la congruencia, se ubica en el artículo 99 del Código Procesal Civil, aplicable al proceso contencioso, por autorización del artículo 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, primer numeral que establece: "La sentencia se dictará dentro de los límites establecidos en la demanda. Es prohibido para el juez pronunciarse sobre cuestiones no debatidas respecto de las cuales la ley exige la iniciativa de la parte". Además, el artículo 153 del mismo Código Procesal Civil exige que las sentencias sean claras, precisas y congruentes. Este Tribunal Contencioso, Sección Segunda, ha 151-2008 de las quince horas del nueve de mayo de dos mil ocho, en lo que interesa dice: "II.- DE LA INCONGRUENCIA.- (...) Al respecto la jurisprudencia contenciosa la ha definido de la siguiente manera: "La incongruencia consiste en la falta de relación entre lo pedido y lo resuelto, relativamente a las partes, al objeto o a la causa; ésta la constituyen los hechos.- No se da entonces la incongruencia por las contradicciones que puedan resultar por ejemplo entre los hechos probados o no probados y los pronunciamientos, o entre éstos y las apreciaciones de fondo; en tal situación lo más que podría hacer sería una defectuosa motivación del fallo, que es cuestión de otra índole, concretamente del recurso de casación por el fondo, por error de hecho o de derecho en la apreciación de la prueba.- Dicho de otro modo, no hay incongruencia entre las consideraciones de la sentencia y lo resuelto en la parte dispositiva. Finalmente, la sentencia puede otorgar todo lo pedido, como denegarlo todo, y si puede esto último, con igual o mayor razón puede conceder sólo una parte, y en ninguno de esos casos se incurre en incongruencia; ésta se daría si se otorgara más de lo pedido o fuera de lo pedido, que es lo que se denomina ultra petita y extra petita" (sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 35-91, de las quince horas del veintidós de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y uno). En virtud de lo cual, la debida correspondencia entre lo solicitado por el actor en la demanda y lo resuelto por el órgano jurisdiccional en sentencia, se constituye en una obligación procesal de acatamiento ineludible para los jueces en la resolución de las demandas formuladas; que deriva de lo dispuesto en los artículos 99, 153 y 155 del Código Procesal Civil, de aplicación, al tenor del artículo 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. No obstante lo anterior, existe en la Ley Reguladora citada, una disposición expresa, que actúa a modo de límite del ejercicio la función jurisdiccional del juez contencioso, el artículo 24.1 en tanto dispone literalmente: "La Jurisdicción Contenciosa juzgará dentro de los límites de las pretensiones formuladas por las partes y de las alegaciones deducidas para fundamentar la acción y la oposición"; con lo cual, el juez debe resolver dentro del ámbito de las alegaciones deducidas por las partes para fundamentar la acción y la oposición. Así, el legislador ha establecido como principio general en materia procesal la congruencia de los fallos con las pretensiones presentadas por el accionante en el escrito de demanda. Desde ese punto de vista, puede señalarse que es el sujeto activo de la pretensión quien, de antemano, fija los límites dentro de los cuales debe resolver el juzgador; y éste, a su vez, no puede omitir pronunciamiento sobre alguno de los puntos traídos a debate por el actor en su demanda, o por el o los demandados a través de la reconvención, así como tampoco sobre las defensas. De manera que el juez de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa debe observar en cuanto al aspecto dicho, mayor rigor que el juez civil, situación determinada por la naturaleza indudablemente pública de su materia. La obligación adicional a observar por el juzgador de esta jurisdicción implica una limitación más acentuada a la escuetamente derivada del principio de congruencia. Aquí, además de la necesaria relación entre las pretensiones y la sentencia, se impone la adecuación entre las alegaciones deducidas por las partes y la sentencia. En realidad, cabe señalar, en materia contencioso administrativa, y concretamente en el artículo de comentario, el vocablo "alegaciones", se emplea con un sentido preciso, equivalente a motivos de infracción o vicios importantes. La agravada situación a la cual se enfrenta el decisor contencioso se ve compensada, y tiene en sí misma sentido, por la potestad excepcional que le brinda la misma legislación al señalar en el artículo 24, párrafo 2, lo siguiente: "2. No obstante, si el Tribunal al dictar la sentencia estimare que la cuestión sometida a su conocimiento pudiera no haber sido apreciada debidamente por las partes, por existir en apariencia otros motivos susceptibles de fundar la acción o la defensa, lo someterá a aquellas mediante providencia en la que, advirtiendo que no prejuzga el fallo definitivo, los expondrá y concederá a los interesados un plazo de ocho días para que formulen las alegaciones que estimen oportunas, con suspensión del plazo para pronunciar el fallo." Evidentemente se trata de una potestad extraordinaria, no conferida al juez de la jurisdicción civil. Ahora bien, su ejercicio está sujeto al cumplimiento del trámite que dicha norma estatuye. (Sobre el particular, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de la Sala Primera números 235 de las 14:25 hrs. del 27 de julio; 275 de las 15:10 hrs. del 19 de setiembre, ambas de 1990; 43 de las 15:05 hrs. del 3 de abril de 1991; 18 de las 15:30 hrs. del 29 de enero; 127 de las 15:05 hrs. del 19 de agosto, ambas de 1992; 88 de las 15:05 hrs. del 19 de octubre de 1994; 23 de las 10:10 hrs. del 23 de febrero; 35 de las 14:40 hrs. del 29 de marzo, ambas de 1996.) Asimismo, debe tenerse en cuenta que al tenor de lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero del inciso 3) del artículo 594 del Código Procesal Civil, se establece la incongruencia como una causal del recursos de casación por la forma, que precisamente se causa, como se indicó, la falta de relación entre lo resuelto en la parte dispositiva del fallo, en relación con las pretensiones de la demanda, contestación, contrademanda, réplica, y desde luego, en relación con las excepciones (...)". La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, explica que un fallo es incongruente cuando: "1) Lo resuelto no coincide con lo solicitado por las partes. 2) No resuelve alguna de las pretensiones oportunamente deducidas. 3) Otorga más de lo pedido. 4) Contiene disposiciones contradictorias" (Voto N° 369-F-2004 de las once horas cinco minutos del veintiséis de mayo de dos mil cuatro). 6.- SOBRE EL FONDO: Como primer aspecto, se debe indicar que no lleva razón el recurrente al invocar el vicio de incongruencia en el fallo de instancia sobre la base de un supuesto elenco de los hechos probados incompleto y un análisis de fondo que a su criterio es incorrecto y que contiene la sentencia que aquí se revisa. Según el análisis sobre la figura de la congruencia que contiene el Considerando anterior, se observa que los cuestionamientos del apelante no se refieren a la falta de relación entre lo pedido y lo resuelto, tampoco se impugna alguno de los siguientes aspectos: que lo resuelto no coincida con lo solicitado por las partes; que no se resolviera alguna de las pretensiones oportunamente deducidas, que se otorgara más de lo pedido, o que contenga disposiciones contradictorias; en suma no se invoca ninguna de las causales que podrían motivar una incongruencia del fallo de instancia, por lo que debe rechazarse la articulación por improcedente en lo que se refiere a la falta de congruencia. No obstante, resulta necesario entrar a revisar los argumentos expuestos, ya que se alegaron supuestos errores en la apreciación de la prueba y en el análisis de la normativa aplicable al caso. Con respecto al PRIMER AGRAVIO: SOBRE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS: Alega el apelante que no se incluyó como hecho probado la falta de resolución en sede administrativa del recurso de revocatoria presentando contra el acto de clausura de las obras interpuesto mediante oficio N° 482-G-2004 el 21 de setiembre de 2004; debe rechazarse el argumento por innecesario, ya que carece toda influencia para la decisión de fondo del presente asunto, toda vez que se trata de una impugnación contra una resolución que resuelve la apelación presentada ante el mismo ente municipal, y además, por cuanto se constata que la gestión fue atendida por acuerdo del Consejo Municipal de Cartago adoptado en el artículo 16 del Acta 180 del 26 de octubre de 2004 (folios 292 a 294 del expediente administrativo). En cuanto al argumento de que en los hechos probados de la sentencia impugnada se omitió hacer referencia al oficio N° 1116-03/04-JDG del 16 de setiembre de 2004 del Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos, con vista de lo indicado en el hecho probado N° 8 se debe rechazar el alegato indicado, por cuanto se tuvo por probado la existencia del aludido oficio del Colegio profesional y con ello su contenido íntegro. Respecto al argumento de que se omite en los hechos probados la fecha de la clausura de las obras el día 20 de setiembre de 2004, según acta notarial que aportó en la deducción de la demanda, debe rechazarse este reproche, ya que los hechos probados 1 y 3 contienen con claridad la fecha exacta de la clausura de las obras y su confirmación con fundamento en las probanzas que obran en autos, siendo que el acta notarial aportada por el actor y visible a folios 56 a 58 del expediente judicial, es una copia simple que carece de todo valor legal. En otro argumento el actor reclama que los hechos probados omiten señalar que JASEC informó de las obras oportunamente a la Municipalidad de Cartago mediante oficio N° 479-G-2002 del 25 de julio del 2002, sobre este extremo la Municipalidad niega lo indicado por el actor y señala que nunca fue informada oportunamente. Revisado el oficio N˚ 479-G-2002 aportado por la parte actora y visible a folios 50 a 54 del expediente judicial, se constata que se refiere a información sobre los aumentos tarifarios 2001 y 2002, a la situación financiera de la empresa y al mercado actual de las tarifas de JASEC, sin embargo no se incluye información precisa sobre el proyecto de distribución eléctrica El Bosque-Fátima, siendo que la única constancia del documento invocado, se trata de una copia simple sin los sellos de recibido de la Municipalidad de Cartago, lo que le resta valor probatorio e influencia para la decisión del presente caso y por ese motivo debe rechazarse el extremo alegado. En resumen, el elenco de hechos probados enlistado por el A- quo se fundamenta en la prueba que obra en autos, no evidenciándose errores en la valoración de la prueba. Respecto al SEGUNDO AGRAVIO: SOBRE LOS ARGUMENTOS DE FONDO DEL A-QUO: Señala el actor que en su criterio existe una incorrecta aplicación de la normativa en el caso concreto, producto de una inadecuada interpretación de la norma y de la jurisprudencia invocada. No lleva razón el recurrente. Se destaca que revisada la Sentencia impugnada, se verifica que los Considerandos de Fondo N˚ 3, 4 y 5 contienen un detallado análisis de fondo sobre la normativa y jurisprudencia aplicable al caso particular de JASEC, sin evidenciarse una incorrecta interpretación de las normas ni de la jurisprudencia citada por el actor. El fundamento legal del artículo 26 de la Ley 3300, utilizado por el Juez de instancia, para determinar que la Municipalidad de Cartago puede exigir el permiso de construcción de las obras que realice JASEC, se ajusta a derecho y al sentido literal de la norma que condiciona que todas las actividades realizadas por JASEC deben ser coordinadas con las autoridades competentes, sin que distinga en la norma únicamente las actividades de reparación a posteriori. Lo anterior, concuerda con lo establecido en los artículos 5 y 6 del Código Municipal que exige a las entidades de la Administración Pública a coordinar las obras y proyectos con la Municipalidad con la debida antelación, de manera que el fundamento normativo utilizado por el Juez de Instancia, resulta válido y con abundante solidez dentro del Principio de Completez del Ordenamiento Jurídico, sin necesidad de forzar o interpretar la norma mencionada, motivo por el cual se debe rechazar el argumento señalado. En lo que atañe a la jurisprudencia invocada por el actor, no se observa ningún vicio o defecto en la apreciación realizada por el Juez, por cuanto la jurisprudencia citada por el actor en la demanda no es de aplicación al caso concreto, ya que se trata de actores y procesos diferentes al que aquí nos ocupa, debiendo rescatar que los votos de la Sala Constitucional mencionados por el actor (N˚ 2806-1998 y 9513-2000) citan el deber de la Administración Pública de informar y coordinar con las Municipalidades las obras a desarrollar según lo establecido en el artículo 6 del Código Municipal. Más concretamente, el voto N° 2806-1998 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se refiere a las competencias legales atribuidas al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad para alcanzar los fines asignados, y explica que "La Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad es clara en el sentido de que los intereses y servicios que a esta entidad toca gestionar son de carácter indudablemente nacional. Es en esa dirección que apunta su ordinal segundo, al señalar: / Las finalidades del Instituto, hacia la consecución de las cuales se dirigirán todos sus esfuerzos y programas de trabajo, serán las siguientes: / a) Dar solución pronta y eficaz a la escasez de fuerza eléctrica en la Nación, y procurar que haya en todo momento energía disponible para satisfacer la demanda normal y para impulsar el desarrollo de nuevas industrias, el uso de la electricidad en las regiones rurales y su mayor consumo doméstico..." / La autonomía que quiso otorgarle el legislador al ICE para diseñar y desarrollar sus actividades está reconocida precisamente en el artículo siguiente, el tercero, que establece que en la determinación de los programas de trabajo, obras y proyectos, no deberá intervenir –en los aspectos técnicos– ninguna otra dependencia estatal a la que el propio Instituto no haya pedido colaboración", lo que no resulta de aplicación al presente caso, como bien lo indicó la Jueza de Instancia, toda vez que la empresa actora JASEC, no se regula por la Ley Constitutiva del ICE. En el mismo sentido, el Voto N° 9513-00 de la Sala Constitucional, atiende un recurso de amparo planteado contra el ICE únicamente, no es aplicable al presente asunto, por tratarse de entes públicos con carácter diferente, ello con independencia de los fines nacionales que deben cumplir y de seguido se analizan. Sobre el tema de las potestades concedidas a las Municipalidades para el otorgamiento de permisos de construcción a proyectos locales con importancia nacional, se debe tomar en cuenta lo explicado por este Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección Primera en el Voto N° 428-2007 de las quince horas cinco minutos del diecisiete de octubre de dos mil siete, que en lo que interesa se transcribe: "(...) Desde un punto de vista jurídico-doctrinario, esta autonomía debe ser entendida como la capacidad que tienen las Municipalidades de decidir libremente y bajo su propia responsabilidad, todo lo referente a la organización de determinada localidad (el cantón, en nuestro caso). (...) De lo expuesto, es claro que los gobiernos locales cuentan con una autonomía amplia en la toma de decisiones en los asuntos locales, éstos a su vez, se pueden manifestar desde la perspectiva de las competencias en el ámbito de los caminos públicos, construcciones y urbanismo, tal y como se presentan en este asunto. Asimismo, la autonomía que gozan las municipalidades, les permiten a éstas, el tomar líneas de acción, con total independencia de la Administración Pública Central, aspecto de gran relevancia en el caso que nos ocupa, como se explicará a continuación. b) Las potestades municipales en materia de caminos públicos y la necesaria obligación de coordinación de competencias entre la Municipalidad con el Estado: Justamente, en el presente asunto, se ha indicado que al ser la calle nueve, una vía que pertenece a la Red Vial Nacional (artículo 1 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos), la Municipalidad de San José no sería competente para otorgar el permiso de construcción del puente peatonal, sino que únicamente es competencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Respecto a lo indicado, esta autoridad no comparte del todo este criterio, ya que si bien es cierto la calle nueve es competencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, debido a que la misma municipalidad lo indicó claramente en el oficio DIUR-595-2004, de la Dirección de Urbanismo de esa corporación municipal, no puede obviarse que dicha vía atraviesa la ciudad de San José, y que el municipio local mantiene en este aspecto, una serie de competencias que lo legitiman para pronunciarse respecto al uso de esa vía pública, conjuntamente con el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. En ese sentido, habría que establecer que desde la perspectiva de la autorización en el uso de la calle nueve, tanto el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes es competente como la Municipalidad de San José, es decir, existe en este punto una competencia compartida entre ambos entes. Lo dicho se fundamenta de conformidad con la normativa existente y nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional. Precisamente, la Ley de Construcciones, indica: / Artículo 1º.- Las Municipalidades de la República son las encargadas de que las ciudades y demás poblaciones reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad, comodidad, y belleza en sus vías públicas y en los edificios y construcciones que en terrenos de las mismas se levanten sin perjuicio de las facultades que las leyes conceden en estas materias a otros órganos administrativos. / Esta norma es clara al darle a las municipalidades una potestad en materia de salubridad, seguridad, comodidad y belleza en las vías públicas que se encuentren dentro de su ámbito territorial, sin perjuicio de otras facultades otorgadas a otros órganos administrativos, como en este caso, las tiene también el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, de conformidad con lo indicado en el artículo 1 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos. En esta misma línea de ideas, el Código Municipal admite la coexistencia de competencias municipales y estatales, al establecer: / Artículo 6. — La municipalidad y los demás órganos y entes de la Administración Pública deberán coordinar sus acciones. Para tal efecto deberán comunicar, con la debida anticipación, las obras que proyecten ejecutar. / Asimismo, nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, ha analizado casos similares al presente, en los cuales se presenta una competencia compartida entre los entes municipales y el Estado, al explicar en lo que interesa lo siguiente: / X.- DE LA OBLIGACIÓN DE COORDINACIÓN CON LAS INSTITUCIONES ESTATALES. Varias de las disposiciones que se cuestionan en esta inconstitucionalidad -artículos 5, 10 y 186 del Código Municipal, 2 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, 2 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, 9 y 10 de la Ley de Planificación Nacional, 26 y 27 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 4, 10, 16, 17 y 18 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana-, se refieren a la obligación de coordinación que debe existir entre los gobiernos locales, las instituciones descentralizadas y el Poder Ejecutivo, para llevar a cabo las funciones que le han sido encomendadas, lo que debe ser analizado a partir de la naturaleza misma de la autonomía municipal. Es en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 170 constitucional, que las municipalidades (entes corporativos locales) gozan de autonomía funcional, administrativa y financiera en la administración de los intereses y servicios locales (artículo 169 de la Constitución Política), lo que ha sido reconocido en la jurisprudencia constitucional en forma reiterada (en este sentido, entre otras ver sentencias número 01119-90, 02934-93, 00140-94, 03494-94, 06000-94, 03930-95, 02231-96, y 06469-97). Y como se ha señalado en esa jurisprudencia y en los conceptos contenidos en los anteriores considerandos, la esfera de competencia y definición de atribuciones que tienen encomendadas las municipalidades se determinan en la propia Carta Fundamental, en tanto se refieren estrictamente a lo "local". Debe entenderse el mandato constitucional como una reserva de competencia material en favor de los gobiernos locales y de su reglamento para definir " lo local ", ámbito que sólo puede ser reducido por ley -por tratarse de materia constitucional y de un verdadero derecho a favor de estas instituciones-, de manera tal que conduzca al mantenimiento de la integridad de los servicios e intereses locales, en los términos señalados por este Tribunal en sentencia número 06469-97, supra citada. No puede, entonces, crearse un conflicto por antagonismo o protagonismo entre la materia que integra el fin general de "los intereses y servicios locales" de los intereses y servicios públicos "nacionales" o "estatales", intrínsecamente distintos unos de otros, pero que en realidad están llamados a coexistir; y ello es así, porque ambos tipos de interés pueden estar, eventualmente, entremezclados y más bien, es frecuente que, dependiendo de la capacidad económica y organizativa de los gobiernos locales, sus limitaciones propias conduzcan a ampliar el círculo de los que aparecen como nacionales o estatales, lo que hace ver que la distinción no debe ser inmutable, sino gradual o variable; pero en todo caso, como lo ha expresado la jurisprudencia antes citada, corresponderá en última instancia al juez decidir si los criterios de distinción se conforman o no con el dimensionamiento constitucional. Definida la competencia material de la municipalidad en una circunscripción territorial determinada, queda claro que habrá cometidos que por su naturaleza son exclusivamente municipales, a la par de otros que pueden ser reputados nacionales o estatales; por ello es esencial definir la forma de cooparticipación de atribuciones que resulta inevitable, puesto que la capacidad pública de las municipalidades es local, y la del Estado y los demás entes, nacional; de donde resulta que el territorio municipal es simultáneamente estatal e institucional, en la medida en que lo exijan las circunstancias. Es decir, las municipalidades pueden compartir sus competencias con la Administración Pública en general, relación que debe desenvolverse en los términos como está definida en la ley (artículo 5 del Código Municipal anterior, artículo 7 del nuevo Código), que establece la obligación de "coordinación" entre la municipalidades y las instituciones públicas que concurran en el desempeño de sus competencias, para evitar duplicaciones de esfuerzos y contradicciones, sobre todo, porque sólo la coordinación voluntaria es compatible con la autonomía municipal por ser su relaciones de cooperación con otros entes públicos, y viceversa , dado el carácter concurrente o coincidente -en muchos casos-, de intereses en torno a un asunto concreto. (...) La relación de cooperación definida ha sido comprendida por la Sala Constitucional, que en forma reiterada ha señalado que para que puedan llevarse a cabo los proyectos de las distintas instituciones públicas, debe hacerse con respeto del ordenamiento jurídico: en primer lugar, las normas de rango constitucional, y después, las de rango legal y reglamentarias, de manera tal que, para que el Poder Ejecutivo o los otros entes públicos lleven a cabo proyectos de su iniciativa en una determinada localidad, deben contar con los respectivos permisos y licencias municipales, (...) (Voto 5445-99; Sala Constitucional, a las catorce horas con treinta minutos del catorce de julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve). / (...) c) Las potestades en materia de construcciones y urbanismo otorgadas por el bloque de legalidad a los gobiernos locales en sus respectivos ámbitos territoriales: Ahora, independientemente del aspecto analizado anteriormente, que se refiere a la competencia compartida para emitir el permiso en el uso de la vía pública, por ambos entes, el municipal y el estatal, es conveniente indicar, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la Corporación Municipal de San José, no solo tiene la potestad de emitir criterio y autorización en el uso de la vía pública indicada, sino que el bloque de legalidad le da potestades en otros aspectos que se relacionan directamente con la construcción del puente peatonal, es decir, este tipo de obras no solo implican el uso del espacio físico sobre una vía pública, sino que forman parte de la ampliación y unión de una serie de edificaciones, como serían el edificio del Hotel del Rey con los otros edificios, por lo que estamos en presencia de un ámbito eminentemente del proceso de construcción de obras. Justamente, la Ley de Construcciones, le da la potestad a las municipalidades de otorgar permisos y supervisar los procesos constructivos que se realicen en los inmuebles que sean parte de su jurisdicción territorial, esto se desprende claramente de la lectura del artículo 74 de esa ley, que dispone: / Artículo 74.- Licencias. Toda obra relacionada con la construcción, que se ejecute en las poblaciones de la República, sea de carácter permanente o provisional, deberá ejecutarse con licencia de la Municipalidad correspondiente. / En consecuencia, desde la perspectiva de la construcción de una obra que forma parte de edificios existentes, como se presenta en autos, la Municipalidad de San José, es la única entidad habilitada por ley, de forma exclusiva y excluyente a otras instituciones, de otorgar un permiso de construcción para que el puente peatonal pueda realizarse. Precisamente, es claro que en este caso, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes no tiene potestad de otorgar un permiso para la construcción de una obra de este tipo, que implica la ampliación y unión de edificios existentes, aspecto que solo puede autorizar la Municipalidad de San José, con competencias plenas como se ha indicado anteriormente. Por otro lado, una obra como la que se pretende construir en este asunto, tiene, también, implicaciones desde la perspectiva urbanística o de planificación urbana, entendido este concepto como "el proceso continuo e integral de análisis y formulación de planes y reglamentos sobre desarrollo urbano, tendiente a procurar la seguridad, salud, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad." (Artículo 1 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana). En esta materia, los gobiernos locales tienen potestades y competencias muy bien definidas. En ese sentido, la Ley de Planificación Urbana, establece: / Artículo 15.- Conforme al precepto del artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, reconócese la competencia y autoridad de los gobiernos municipales para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio jurisdiccional. Consecuentemente, cada uno de ellos dispondrá lo que proceda para implantar un plan regulador, y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano conexos, en las áreas donde deba regir, sin perjuicio de extender todos o algunos de sus efectos a otros sectores, en que priven razones calificadas para establecer un determinado régimen contralor. / Artículo 19.- Cada Municipalidad emitirá y promulgará las reglas procesales necesarias para el debido acatamiento del plan regulador y para la protección de los intereses de las salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad. / Asimismo, nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, ha sido claro en las potestades que en materia urbanística le ha otorgado a las municipalidades el bloque de legalidad, al disponer: / "De conformidad con lo establecido por el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política y 15 de la Ley de la Planificación Urbana, es competencia de las Municipalidades planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio. Para cumplir con este objetivo las Municipalidades pueden implantar planes reguladores en los que podrán determinar -entre otros muchos aspectos (artículo 16 Ley 4240 y sus reformas) - la zonificación del uso de la tierra para vivienda, comercio, industria, educación, recreación, fines públicos y cualquier otro destino pertinente." (Voto 02153-93; Sala Constitucional, a las nueve horas veintiún minutos del veintiuno de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres)" (el subrayado no es del original). Lo antes indicado, resulta de aplicación al caso concreto, ya que para el tendido eléctrico y colocación de postes nuevos del proyecto de Distribución El Bosque-Fátima ejecutado por la parte actora dentro del territorio municipal asignado a la demandada, se debe contar con los respectivos permisos de construcción expedidos por la Municipalidad de Cartago, de conformidad con lo establecido en los artículos 6 y 7 del Código Municipal en concordancia con los numerales 1, 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, 15, 19 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana y 19 párrafos 8) y 9) de la Ley General de Caminos, siendo que los últimos párrafos mencionados literalmente preceptúan lo siguiente: " (...) Para la colocación de una nueva postería para la trasmisión de fuerza eléctrica o para telégrafos o teléfonos, se debe pedir autorización del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes o a la respectiva Municipalidad, según se trate de carreteras o caminos vecinales. / De no cumplirse el requerimiento del Ministerio, este podrá hacer los trabajos que sean necesarios por su cuenta cobrando al responsable el valor de aquéllos más de un 50% como recargo, sin perjuicio de la multa que fuere aplicable" (la negrita y subrayado no son del original). En consecuencia, al acreditarse que el proyecto del actor es de índole local y para la colocación de postes nuevos del tendido eléctrico, el agravio aludido debe ser rechazado por improcedente. “