Banco Nacional's obligation to pay retroactive school bonus under collective bargaining agreementObligación del Banco Nacional de pagar salario escolar con efectos retroactivos pactados en convención colectiva

**III.- LEGAL NATURE OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA:** Pursuant to the Law of the National Banking System No. 1644, of September 26, 1953, the Banco Nacional forms part of the National Banking System together with the Banco Central, the Banco de Costa Rica, the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, and any other state banking entity that may be created in the future. Likewise, private commercial banks, established and administered in accordance with the provisions of Title VI of that law, also form part of said banking system. For its part, section 2 of that regulatory body provides: “The state banks listed in the preceding article are autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of governance and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities. Decisions on the functions placed under their competence may only emanate from their respective boards of directors. In accordance with the foregoing, each bank shall have its own responsibility in the execution of its functions, which imposes on the members of the Board of Directors the obligation to act in accordance with their own judgment in the direction and administration of the bank, within the provisions of the Constitution, the pertinent laws and regulations, and technical principles, as well as the obligation to answer for their management, in a total and unavoidable manner, in accordance with articles 27 and 28 of this law. (As amended by article 2 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970)”. (Emphasis supplied). For its part, section 3 idem stipulates: “The following essential functions are incumbent upon the banks: 1) To collaborate in the execution of the monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policy of the Republic. 2) To ensure the liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the National Banking System. 3) To safeguard and administer the banking deposits of the community. In the case of private banks that raise funds in checking or demand savings accounts, provided they meet the requirements established in article 59 of this law. 4) To prevent inactive means of production from existing in the country, seeking out the producer to place at his service the economic and technical means available to the System. (As amended by article 162, subsection a), of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995)". To the extent relevant, article 4 reads: “The State Banks shall have the guarantee and the fullest cooperation of the State and all its dependencies and institutions." Among other essential powers, article 34 of the aforementioned law lists the following: "1) To direct the financial and economic policy of the Bank. 2) To fulfill and enforce the powers and duties assigned to the Bank, as well as the legal and regulatory provisions governing its operation. 3) To agree upon, amend, and interpret for their application the Bank's regulations; to regulate the organization and administration services of the establishment and direct its operation. 4) To agree upon the Bank's annual budget and any extraordinary budgets that may be necessary, which shall require the approval of the Contraloría General de la República; to create the positions and services essential for the due operation of the institution and set the respective remuneration. 5) To appoint and remove, when applicable, the General Manager, Deputy General Manager, Auditor, and Deputy Auditor of the Bank, and assign them their functions and duties, within the prescriptions of this law. 6) To approve the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts and the allocation of profits, in accordance with the law, as well as to approve any publication made by the Bank. 7)… 8)… 9)… 10)… 11)… and 12) To exercise the other functions, powers, and duties incumbent upon it, in accordance with the pertinent laws and regulations and technical principles". From the foregoing, it is inferred that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous institution of Public Law, with its own legal personality and full administrative autonomy, although in matters of governance it is subject to the law, as will be analyzed more closely in the following considering. **IV.- REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNANCE AUTONOMY OF AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS:** It is important to emphasize that article 188 of the Political Constitution, amended by Law No. 4123, of May 31, 1968, establishes: “The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of governance. Their directors are answerable for their management”. (The bold does not belong to the original). Next, section 189 stipulates: “The following are autonomous institutions: 1) The State Banks; 2) The state insurance institutions; 3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total membership”. (The bold was supplied by the drafter). The Constitutional Chamber, in hearing various actions of unconstitutionality, especially against the Law Creating the Budgetary Authority, has addressed, in various rulings, the issue of the autonomy enjoyed by these institutions. Thus, in Decision No. 3309, of 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994, it held: “…autonomous institutions do not enjoy a guarantee of unrestricted constitutional autonomy, since the law, apart from defining their competence, may subject them to directives derived from development policies that the law itself entrusts to the Central Executive Power, provided, of course, that the sphere of administrative autonomy proper, nor the competence of the Assembly itself or of other constitutional bodies such as the Contraloría General de la República, are not thereby invaded. It should be noted that the antecedents and effects of the reform itself, by reserving to those entities the matter of their own administration, excluded from their management the power of governance that implies: a) the setting of ends, goals, and types of means to achieve them; b) the issuance of autonomous service or activity regulations, in accordance with provisions normally called general policy provisions. In this way, the reform made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities in general to national planning criteria and, in particular, to subject them to the directives of a general nature issued by the central Executive Branch or bodies of the Central Administration (called upon to complement or oversee that general policy). As part of those political bodies, the Budgetary Authority was established, with the purpose of formulating and executing the general directives on salary matters, among others, emanating from the Executive Branch or central administration bodies". For its part, in the judgment of that same Chamber No. 6095 of 9:18 a.m. on October 18, 1994, it was indicated that the Legislative Assembly does have the competence to impose legal limitations on those institutions, hence the reason for the phrase in article 188 of the Constitution, according to which they are subject to the law in matters of governance. That same decision dealt with the point of salary matters, for which it held that the setting of salaries in the public sector is an integral part of government policy, which must tend to constitute a uniform and universal state public employment regime. To that end, it refers to a decision of the Full Court, in which, acting as a Constitutional Court, it clearly resolved the point when it stated: "The goals (typical 'matter of governance') that the State sets for itself in the remuneration of its servants constitute an entire salary policy that has to do not only with the retribution for the effort of the individually considered person, but also with its consequences on the other aspects of the economy, since it may introduce factors of economic distortion due to social unrest. ‘Directive’ must be understood as the ‘set of instruments or general rules for the execution of something,’ that is, of guidelines or orientations that serve as a conceptual framework for decision-making. Thus, what relates to the setting of salaries as a general policy in the Public Sector cannot be said to be a primarily, exclusively, or predominantly ‘administrative’ matter, but rather one of ‘governance,’ and in which the subjection of a decentralized entity to the law is not only possible but also necessary and advisable." (Full Court, judgment of June 16, 1984). Also, in Constitutional Chamber Judgment No. 6513, of 2:57 p.m. on 2002, it was indicated: “Salary policy being defined as part of government policy, it is necessary to reiterate that when the constituent decentralized the Executive Branch, it sought to prevent arbitrary and anti-technical interference in the management of each of those institutions, as defined by law. But the constituent legislator did not opt to create a salary or labor regime segregated from the central Executive Branch, since there is no doubt that Title XV, Single Chapter of the Political Constitution has as its immediate antecedent the prior practice of mass dismissal of state officials and employees on the occasion of each change of government. The antithesis of this practice, then, is a stable, professional, permanent public service system, governed by an integrated and coherent regulatory body, establishing a single employment regime for public servants that includes the totality of State institutions, with the exception made in article 156 of the Magna Carta regarding the Judicial Branch. … For this reason, neither the governance powers that the Central Executive Branch exercises today, nor the administrative powers reserved to the decentralized entities, ever intended to leave labor policy to the free will of the latter and thereby constitute two or many more public service regimes to the detriment of the officials and employees of the central administration. […] …the effects that imbalances in the State salary regime produce on public finances and, therefore, for the country in general, make it fully justifiable and even constitutionally necessary to subject everything concerning the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria.” (In this regard, see also Decision No. 3309, of 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994). It follows from the foregoing that the Constitutional Chamber has concluded that it is constitutionally necessary to subject the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria, antecedents that are binding on this other Chamber, in light of the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Now, by virtue of the foregoing, it is justified that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is subject not only to the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, but also of the Contraloría General de la República, an entity that is governed by its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994, according to which it "is a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the higher control of the Public Treasury and governing body of the oversight system contemplated by this Law". (Article 1). For its part, section 2 provides: "In the exercise of its powers, the Contraloría General de la República enjoys absolute functional and administrative independence regarding any Power, entity, or public body. Its decisions are only subject to the Political Constitution, international treaties or conventions, and the law. The Comptroller General of the Republic and the Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic answer before the Legislative Assembly for the fulfillment of their duties." Article 4 defines the scope of its competence, for which it indicates: "The Contraloría General de la República shall exercise its competence over all entities and bodies that make up the Public Treasury. The criteria issued by the Contraloría General de la República, within the scope of its competence, shall be binding on the passive subjects subject to its control or oversight." (Emphasis supplied). Article 8 defines what the public treasury is by indicating that it "shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms related to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the liability of public officials. Regarding non-state public entities, companies with minority public sector participation, or private entities, only the resources they administer or dispose of, by any title, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or made available to them, by norm or budget allocation, by the Powers of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary bodies, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks shall form part of the Public Treasury. Resources of a source other than those indicated do not form part of the Public Treasury; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations governing them. The public patrimony shall be the universe constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the component subjects of the Public Treasury. Component subjects of the Public Treasury shall be the State and other public entities or bodies, state or non-state, and public enterprises, as well as Private Law subjects, insofar as they administer or safeguard public funds by any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph. (As amended by subsection d) of article 126 of Law 8131 of September 18, 2001, Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets)". Section 9 defines the term public funds, for which it states that they "are the resources, securities, goods, and rights owned by the State, by public bodies, enterprises, or entities." Furthermore, according to said law: "It is incumbent upon the Contraloría General de la República to examine for their approval or total or partial disapproval the budgets of the entities referred to in article 184 of the Political Constitution, as well as those of the rest of the decentralized Administration, semi-autonomous institutions, and public enterprises. Non-state public entities must comply with such requirement when a special law so requires. In the event that any budget is disapproved, that of the immediately preceding year shall govern. If the budget disapproval is partial, until the deficiencies are corrected, the budget of the preceding year shall govern regarding the disapproved item. Bodies, executing units, funds, programs, and accounts that administer resources independently must likewise comply with the provisions of this article. The Contraloría General de la República shall determine, by reasoned resolution for these cases, the budgets that due to their amount are excluded from this procedure. The Contraloría General de la República shall oversee that budgets are formulated and submitted for each fiscal year, in accordance with legal and technical provisions. If the Contraloría delays the processing and approval of a budget, the previous one shall continue to govern until the Contraloría issues a ruling. In the case of programs or projects whose execution extends beyond said period, the entity formulating the budget must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Contraloría General de la República, that it will have the complementary financing to complete the respective program and project." (Article 18, amended by subsection d) of article 126 of Law No. 8131, of September 18, 2001, Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets). Finally, section 25 of that same law stipulates the powers over income and exemption control by providing: "The Contraloría General de la República may oversee whether those responsible within the active administration, charged with the determination, collection management, receipt, custody, and deposit of revenues and other public funds, fully comply with their functions. The Contraloría, in accordance with the availability of its resources, shall oversee that the dependencies of the active administration charged with granting patrimonial benefits, free of charge or without any consideration, to private subjects, adjust their action to the legal system and carry out, efficiently, control over the use and destination of those benefits, within the limits indicated in this Law." **V.- ON THE REFORMATIVE POWER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS:** In accordance with what has been analyzed above, it is clear that there exists the possibility that, with the limitations imposed by the legal system and as the Constitutional Chamber has come to define, in an autonomous institution, such as the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) may be concluded, which have the force of law by constitutional provision (article 62 of the Political Constitution). In relation to such instruments, in a similar vein, the second paragraph of article 54 of the Labor Code establishes "… The collective bargaining agreement has the character of a professional law and all individual or collective contracts existing or subsequently concluded in the enterprises, industries, or regions it affects must adapt to its norms…”. For its part, section 55 idem provides: "The stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it, having justified their legal standing in accordance with the provisions of article 51; b) All persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work in the company, companies, or production centers to which the agreement refers, insofar as they are favored thereby and even if they are not members of the labor union or unions that have concluded it; and c) Those who in the future conclude individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the agreement, in the understanding that said contracts may not be concluded under conditions less favorable to the workers than those contained in the collective bargaining agreement." In relation to this issue, in Decision number 227, of 9:30 a.m. on April 1, 2005, this Chamber warned: "Nevertheless, the force of law is conferred upon them insofar as the collective bargaining agreements have been agreed upon in accordance with the legislation. It follows, from the foregoing, a subordination of these to the legislative power of the State." (In the same sense, see, from this Chamber, judgment No. 213, of 11:00 a.m. on March 30, 2007). Now, the Constitutional Chamber in Decision number 1355, of 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, referring to the reformative power of collective bargaining agreements, held: "Because article 62 of the Political Constitution expressly so provides, collective bargaining agreements concluded in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective bargaining agreements is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective bargaining agreement to introduce legal modifications or reforms. But since article 129 of the Political Constitution indicates that laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent law, we must conclude that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement cannot strip ordinary laws of their validity, but rather that, in labor relations, those existing minimums can in fact be exceeded, but only for the specific case in question, with the law remaining in force. That is to say, the normative provisions of collective bargaining agreements must adjust to existing labor legal norms, which they can exceed when granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed, by which it is meant that collective bargaining agreements remain subject to and limited by laws of public order. […] From the foregoing it is inferred that this Chamber has already ruled on the scope of coverage of the collective bargaining agreement. And we now add, that in any event this regulation cannot reform ordinary law that confers powers to constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that have nothing to do with the content of individual employment contracts." (Emphasis supplied). From what has been transcribed, it is deduced that what is agreed in a collective agreement or bargaining agreement (convenio o convención colectiva) cannot contravene what is established by law, especially when it is of public order, since such instrument, as to its content, must be subject to the legal regulations (article 58 of the Labor Code), but, on the other hand, it can indeed exceed the minimum guarantees that have been legally established.

**VI.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** In the matter under study, the application of the provisions of article 62 of the Tenth Amendment to the V Collective Bargaining Agreement (V Convención Colectiva), signed on February 1, 2002, is claimed. According to said norm: "The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica shall recognize to its employees, starting from the year 2001, the remuneration called School Salary (Salario Escolar), which shall be equivalent to 1% of the salaries earned by the employee that year. Said sum shall be made effective in January of the year 2002. The following year (2002) and consecutive years shall increase that percentage by 1.25% each year until completing 8%." (See copy of the text of said amendment in a separate file). As the main claim, the plaintiff union (sindicato accionante) requested that the judgment declare that the defendant entity breached said conventional norm, and therefore it should be ordered "to pay each of its workers the agreed amount of the school salary corresponding to the entire year 2001, in the order of 1% of the salaries earned that year, and in the order of the additional 1.25% (accumulated at 2.25%), corresponding to the salaries earned in the first semester of the year 2002, all in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned article 62, together with the corresponding adjustments." (Sic. Folios 1-13). The aforementioned bargaining agreement was approved (homologada) by the Department of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through resolution No. DRT-090-2002, of 10:00 a.m. on April 18, 2002. (Folios 15-16). Administratively, the representatives of SEBANA formulated the respective claims for the recognition of said payment (folios 18-24), but the Bank denied the petition based on the disapproval (improbación) ordered by the Contraloría General, thereby considering the administrative channel exhausted (folios 17 and 25-30). This position of the Bank coincides with the arguments that its representative has put forward in court, where the presence of the aforementioned legal impediment has been emphatically alleged. According to what was decided by the lower court, the plaintiff's claims are not admissible insofar as the payment corresponding to the school salary was disapproved by the Contraloría General de la República, for which reason the principle of budgetary legality that governs the Public Administration is applicable. Through official letter FOE-FEC-401, dated May 28, 2002, the Manager of the Area of Financial Services, Economy, and Commerce of the Operative and Evaluative Oversight Division of the Contraloría General de la República informed the General Manager of the Banco Nacional of the partial approval of external modification 2-2002 to the banking entity's current budget. However, it was also stated in said document: "… you are informed that the budget allocation to support the payment of the School salary is disapproved, because the legal effects arising from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the provisions of article 57 of the Labor Code are complied with, and therefore it is not appropriate to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001. / Additionally, we must point out that the concept 'school salary' is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the salary increases approved in the corresponding period are paid in a deferred manner, such that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which will be paid in the month of January of the following year, and it is these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. / Consequently, the disapproved sum must be transferred to 'funds without budgetary allocation,' and thus reflected in the budget execution reports." (Sic. Folio 75). By reason of the foregoing, the General Manager of the institution filed a new request for reconsideration of said petition (folios 47-48); however, through official letter FOE-FEC-534, of July 16, 2002, what was sought by the banking entity was again denied. On that occasion it was concluded: "In the opinion of this Contraloría General, clause 62 of the collective bargaining agreement is not inappropriate, insofar as it is applied under the same terms in force in the Public Administration, which implies that it cannot be given retroactive effect. / Consequently, the Banco Nacional is obliged to withhold from its workers the percentage agreed in the collective bargaining agreement for the school salary concept, which may be made effective only when this condition is met, according to the paragraph (sic) of the legal opinion of that banking entity. / By virtue of the foregoing, we maintain unchanged the disapproval contained in official letter No. 6193 dated May 28, 2002." (Folios 59-74). In accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to analyze whether the appellant's claims are acceptable, or whether the decision of the appeals body should be upheld. In view of the criticisms raised by the plaintiff, it is important to note that although, in application of the provisions of article 188 of the Political Constitution and in relation to the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber mentioned above, the defendant Bank enjoys administrative autonomy, it is also true that, in matters of governance, it is subject to the law. Based on the decisions issued by the Constitutional Chamber, it is concluded that, regarding salary policy matters (which are matters of governance and not administrative), conventional regulations must be consistent with the so-called general policy which, as such, contains the uniform criteria prevailing, in principle, throughout the entire Public Administration, for the purposes of ensuring a uniform and universal state public employment regime. Now, despite the foregoing, in the matter under analysis, the oversight entity (entidad contralora) based its disapproval of the payment sought by the union on two grounds, namely: that the legal effects arising from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the provisions of article 57 of the Labor Code are complied with, and therefore it is not appropriate to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001; and, on the other hand, that the concept of "school salary" is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the salary increases approved in the corresponding period are paid in a deferred manner, such that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which will be paid in the month of January of the following year, and it is these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. It is, then, on this context that the grievances of the appeal must be analyzed, insofar as the competence of this Chamber is limited to reviewing whether the administrative act that disapproved the budget allocation for that effect is in accord or not with the legal system. In the first place, it must be stated that, by virtue of the reformative power of the collective bargaining agreement analyzed above, both parties agreed to the creation of a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) which was termed "school salary," although it was not regulated in the same manner as the type of salary created by decree for the rest of the public sector.

Thus, what the parties did was to attempt to exceed the legal minimum for the benefit of the workers, and therefore the name given to it in the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) is irrelevant, since, as stated, the intent of the parties was to create an additional salary (sobresueldo) in accordance with the reforming powers derived from a collective bargaining agreement for the purpose of exceeding legal minimums for the benefit of the workers. Furthermore, as previously indicated, the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General), in determining the impropriety of retroactive payment to the year 2001, cited as its basis the provision of Article 57 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in that it considered that the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the requirement established in said provision is fulfilled. Said article, in pertinent part, provides that the aforementioned instrument shall have no legal validity except from the date on which a copy thereof is deposited with the Office of Union Affairs and Administrative Conciliation (Oficina de Asuntos Gremiales y de Conciliación Administrativa) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social); that is, from that moment forward, what was agreed upon under the terms stipulated by the negotiating parties may be demanded. Hence, what is established in that provision does not constitute any legal impediment to the payment being ordered retroactively, for it was so agreed, making it evident that the basis given by the controlling entity is erroneous, given that it confused the validity of the act with its effectiveness, the latter circumstance being the one referred to by the aforementioned provision. Moreover, what was agreed upon in those terms is considered reasonable, given that the negotiation of the aforementioned instrument had already begun by that time, and precisely because of the delay in the procedure, ordering its payment from the outset was further justified. In relation to the foregoing, it must be clarified that according to the second allegation of fact in the complaint, admitted by the defendant’s representative, the commencement of negotiations took place in December 2000. Note that the conventional provision even stated that the referenced payment would be made effective in January 2002. In that regard, this Chamber (Sala) finds that the reasons invoked by the controlling body did not justify denying approval of the budget line item. VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: According to the foregoing, it is worth clarifying that this matter cannot be viewed as a proceeding for awarding specific obligations, since the union would lack standing for that under the terms of Article 360 of the Labor Code; rather, it must be considered that what was demanded by said entity—in its capacity as counterparty to the conventional instrument—was compliance with the provisions of the referenced conventional provision, which is why specific collections along with the claimed interest are not appropriate in this proceeding. Based on the foregoing, the appealed judgment must be reversed, only insofar as it denied the union’s claim regarding the breach of the retroactive effects provided for in Article 62 of the collective bargaining agreement, and consequently, the defendant must pay its workers the agreed amount of the school salary (salario escolar) for the entire year of two thousand one—in the order of one percent of the salaries earned that year—and the additional one point twenty-five percent—cumulatively two point twenty-five percent—referring to the salaries earned in the first semester of two thousand two. Likewise, it is appropriate to uphold the trial court’s decision to resolve the matter without special award of costs (costas), finding that the defendant Bank acted with evident good faith, inasmuch as it was willing, in the administrative venue, to recognize the right in light of the conventional regulations, which it did not do due to the act issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) (Article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Código Procesal Civil). In all other respects, the appealed ruling must be affirmed.” In relation to those instruments, in a similar vein, the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes “… The collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) has the character of professional law and all existing individual or collective contracts, or those subsequently entered into in the enterprises, industries, or regions it affects, must conform to its rules…”. For its part, numeral 55 idem provides: “The stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement have the force of law for: a) The parties that have subscribed it, having justified their legal standing in accordance with the provisions of Article 51; b) All persons who, at the time it enters into force, work in the enterprise, enterprises, or production centers to which the agreement refers, insofar as they are benefited, even when they are not members of the trade union or unions that concluded it; and c) Those who in the future conclude individual or collective contracts within the same enterprise, enterprises, or production center affected by the agreement, on the understanding that said contracts may not be concluded under conditions less favorable to the workers than those contained in the collective bargaining agreement.” In relation to this subject, in vote number 227, at 9:30 a.m. on April 1, 2005, this Chamber warned: “Nonetheless, the force of law is conferred upon them insofar as the collective bargaining agreements have been agreed in accordance with the law. From the foregoing, a subordination of these to the legislative power of the State is inferred.” (In the same sense, see, from this Chamber, ruling No. 213, at 11:00 a.m. on March 30, 2007). Now, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote number 1355, at 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, referring to the reform power of collective bargaining agreements, resolved: “Because Article 62 of the Political Constitution expressly so provides, collective labor agreements concluded in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective labor agreements is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective bargaining agreement to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But since Article 129 of the Political Constitution indicates that laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement cannot remove the validity of ordinary laws; rather, in the case of labor relations, they can in fact surpass those existing minimums, but only for the specific case at hand, with the law maintaining its validity. That is to say, the normative provisions of collective labor agreements must adjust to the existing legal labor norms, which they can surpass when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed, by which it is meant that collective labor agreements are subject to and limited by public order laws. […] From the foregoing, it is inferred that this Chamber has already resolved on the scope of coverage of the collective bargaining agreement. And we now add that in any case, that normative body cannot reform the ordinary law that confers powers upon constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that do not relate to the content of individual labor contracts.” (Emphasis supplied). From the transcribed text, it is deduced that what is agreed upon in a collective agreement or convention cannot go against what is established in the law, especially when the latter is of public order, since such an instrument, as to its content, must be subject to the legal regulations (Article 58 of the Labor Code) but, on the other hand, through it, the minimum guarantees that have been legally established can indeed be surpassed.

VI.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: In the matter under study, the application of the provisions of Article 62 of the Tenth Reform to the V Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), signed on February 1, 2002, is demanded. According to said rule: "The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica shall recognize for its employees, as of the year 2001, the remuneration called School Salary (Salario Escolar), which shall be equivalent to 1% of the salaries earned by the employee that year. Said sum shall be made effective in January of the year 2002. The following year (2002) and consecutive years, that percentage shall increase by 1.25% each year until completing 8%." (See a copy of the text of said reform in a separate dossier). As its main claim, the plaintiff trade union requested that the judgment declare that the defendant entity breached said contractual norm, and therefore it should be ordered "to pay each of its workers the agreed amount of the school salary corresponding to the entire year 2001, in the order of 1% of the salaries earned that year, and in the order of the additional 1.25% (accumulated 2.25%), corresponding to the salaries earned in the first semester of the year 2002, all in accordance with the terms of Article 62 cited above, together with the corresponding adjustments." (Sic. Folios 1-13). The aforementioned agreement was homologated by the Labor Relations Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through resolution No. DRT-090-2002, at 10:00 a.m. on April 18, 2002. (Folios 15-16). Administratively, the representatives of SEBANA formulated the respective claims for the recognition of said payment (folios 18-24), but the Bank denied the petition based on the disapproval ordered by the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General), thereby deeming the administrative channel exhausted (folios 17 and 25-30). This position of the Bank coincides with the arguments that its representative has indicated in the judicial channel, where the presence of the aforementioned legal impediment has been emphatically alleged. According to what was resolved by the court, the plaintiff's claims are not admissible insofar as the payment corresponding to the school salary was disapproved by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and therefore the principle of budget legality that governs the Public Administration is applicable. Through official communication FOE-FEC-401, dated May 28, 2002, the Manager of the Financial Services, Economy and Commerce Area of the Operational and Evaluative Auditing Division of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic informed the general manager of the Banco Nacional of the partial approval of external modification 2-2002 to the current budget of the banking entity. However, in addition, it was stated in said document: "… you are hereby notified that the budget provision to support that related to the payment of the School Salary is disapproved, since the legal effects deriving from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which compliance with the provisions of Article 57 of the Labor Code is fulfilled, and therefore it is not appropriate to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001. / Additionally, we must indicate that the concept 'school salary' is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the salary increases approved in the corresponding period is paid in a deferred manner, such that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which will be paid in the month of January of the following year, and it is these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. / Consequently, the disapproved sum must be transferred to 'funds without budget assignment', and reflected thus in the budget execution reports." (Sic. Folio 75). By reason of the foregoing, the institution's general manager submitted a new request for reconsideration of said petition (folios 47-48); however, through official communication FOE-FEC-534, dated July 16, 2002, what was sought by the banking entity was once again denied. On that occasion, it was concluded: "In the opinion of this Office of the Comptroller General, clause 62 of the collective bargaining agreement is not inadmissible, insofar as it is applied under the same terms in force in the Public Administration, which implies that it cannot be given retroactive effect. / Consequently, the Banco Nacional is obliged to withhold from its workers the percentage agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement for the concept of school salary, which may be made effective only once this condition is met, in accordance with the paragraph (sic) of the legal opinion of that banking entity. / By virtue of the foregoing, we maintain unchanged the disapproval contained in official communication No. 6193 dated May 28, 2002." (Folios 59-74). In accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to analyze whether the appellant's claims are receivable, or whether what was resolved by the appellate body should be upheld. In view of the criticisms expressed by the plaintiff, it is important to highlight that although, in application of the provisions of Article 188 of the Political Constitution and in relation to the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber mentioned earlier, the defendant Bank enjoys administrative autonomy, it is also true that, in matters of government, it is subject to the law. Based on the resolutions emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, it is concluded that, regarding matters of salary policy (which is a government matter and not an administrative one), the conventional regulations must be consistent with the so-called general policy, which, as such, contains the uniform criteria prevailing, in principle, throughout the entire Public Administration, for the purpose of pursuing a uniform and universal state public employment regime. Now, despite the foregoing, in the matter under analysis, the comptroller entity based itself on two reasons to disapprove the payment sought by the trade union, namely: that the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which compliance with the provisions of Article 57 of the Labor Code is fulfilled, and therefore it is not appropriate to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001; and, on the other hand, that the concept of "school salary" is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the salary increases approved in the corresponding period is paid in a deferred manner, so that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which will be paid in the month of January of the following year, and it is these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. It is, then, upon this context that the grievances of the appeal must be analyzed, insofar as this Chamber's competence is limited to reviewing whether the administrative act that disapproved the budget line item for said effect is or is not in accordance with the legal system. Firstly, it must be indicated that, by virtue of the reform power of the collective bargaining agreement analyzed above, both parties agreed to the creation of a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) to which they gave the name “school salary”, although it was not regulated in the same manner as the type of salary created by decree for the rest of the public sector. Thus, what the parties did was try to surpass the legal minimum for the benefit of the workers; hence, the name given to it in the collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant, because, as stated, the will of the parties was to create a supplementary salary in accordance with the reform powers derived from a collective bargaining agreement, for the purpose of surpassing the legal minimums for the benefit of the workers. On the other hand, as indicated above, the Office of the Comptroller General, to determine the inadmissibility of the payment retroactively to the year 2001, cited as its basis the provisions of Article 57 of the Labor Code, insofar as it considered that the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which compliance with the provisions of said norm is fulfilled. Said numeral, in what is relevant herein, provides that the aforementioned instrument shall have no legal validity except from the date on which a copy thereof is deposited with the Office of Trade Union Affairs and Administrative Conciliation of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; that is, from that moment on, what was agreed upon may be demanded in the terms stipulated by the negotiating parties. Hence, what is established in that norm does not constitute any legal impediment for the payment to have been ordered retroactively, since it was so agreed; thus, it is evident that the basis given by the comptroller entity is erroneous, given that the validity of the act was confused with its effectiveness, the latter circumstance being what the aforementioned norm refers to. Furthermore, what was agreed upon in those terms is considered reasonable, given that the negotiation of the mentioned instrument had already begun at that time, and, precisely due to the delay in the procedure, ordering its payment from the outset was further justified. In relation to the foregoing, it must be clarified that according to the second fact of the complaint, admitted by the representative of the defendant, the commencement of the negotiations took place in December 2000. Note that, even in the contractual norm, it was stated that the referred payment would be made effective in January of the year 2002. In that sense, this Chamber considers that the reasons invoked by the comptroller organ did not justify denying the approval of the line item.

VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: According to the foregoing, it must be clarified that the present matter cannot be seen as a proceeding for judgment for specific obligations, since, for that, the trade union would not have standing, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 360 of the Labor Code; rather, it must be considered that what was sought by said entity – in its capacity as counterpart to the contractual instrument – was compliance with the provisions of the referenced conventional norm, which is why it is not appropriate in this proceeding to carry out specific collections together with the interest claimed. Based on the foregoing, the contested judgment must be reversed, only insofar as it denied the trade union’s claim in relation to the breach of the retroactive effects provided for in Article 62 of the collective bargaining agreement, and consequently, the defendant must pay its workers the agreed amount of the school salary corresponding to the entirety of the year two thousand one – in the order of one percent of the salaries earned that year – and the additional one point twenty-five percent – accumulated of two point twenty-five percent – referring to the salaries earned in the first semester of two thousand two. Likewise, it is appropriate to maintain the court’s decision to resolve the matter without special condemnation for costs, as it is considered that the defendant Bank acted with evident good faith, given that, from the administrative venue, it was willing to recognize the right in light of the conventional regulations, which it did not do in the face of the act issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code). In all other respects, the contested ruling must be affirmed.” **III.- LEGAL NATURE OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA:** In accordance with the *Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional* No. 1644, of September 26, 1953, the Banco Nacional is part of the Sistema Bancario Nacional together with the Banco Central, the Banco de Costa Rica, the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, and any other state banking entity that may be created in the future. Likewise, private commercial banks, established and administered in accordance with the provisions of Title VI of that law, also form part of said banking system. In turn, numeral 2 of that normative body provides: *“The state banks listed in the preceding article are autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities. Decisions regarding the functions placed under their competence may only emanate from their respective boards of directors. In accordance with the foregoing, each bank shall have its own responsibility in the execution of its functions, which imposes on the members of the Board of Directors the obligation to act in accordance with their own judgment in the direction and administration of the bank, within the provisions of the Constitution, the pertinent laws and regulations, and the principles of technique, as well as the obligation to account for their management, totally and unavoidably, in accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of this law. (As amended by Article 2 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970)”*. (Emphasis supplied). In turn, ordinal 3 *ídem* stipulates: *“The following essential functions are incumbent upon the banks: 1) Collaborate in the execution of the monetary, exchange, credit, and banking policy of the Republic. 2) Ensure the liquidity, solvency, and proper functioning of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. 3) Safeguard and administer the banking deposits of the community. When dealing with private banks that capture resources in checking or demand savings accounts, provided that the requirements established in Article 59 of this law are met. 4) Prevent any means of production in the country from remaining idle, seeking out the producer to place at their service the economic and technical means available to the System. (As amended by Article 162, subsection a), of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995)”*. As relevant here, Article 4 reads: *“The State Banks shall have the guarantee and the fullest cooperation of the State and all its dependencies and institutions”*. Among other essential powers, Article 34 of the mentioned law enumerates the following: *“1) Direct the financial and economic policy of the Bank. 2) Fulfill and enforce the powers and duties assigned to the Bank, as well as the legal and regulatory provisions governing its operation. 3) Agree upon, amend, and interpret for their application the Bank's regulations; regulate the organization and administration services of the establishment and direct its operation. 4) Agree upon the Bank's annual budget and any extraordinary budgets that may be necessary, which shall require the approval of the Contraloría General de la República; create the positions and services indispensable for the proper functioning of the institution and set the respective remunerations. 5) Appoint and remove, when applicable, the Manager, Deputy Manager, Auditor, and Deputy Auditor of the Bank, and assign their functions and duties, within the prescriptions of this law. 6) Approve the balance sheets and profit and loss statements and the use of profits, in accordance with the law, as well as approve any publication made by the Bank. 7)… 8)… 9)… 10)… 11)… and 12) Exercise the other functions, powers, and duties incumbent upon it, in accordance with the pertinent laws and regulations and the principles of technique”*.

From the foregoing, it is inferred that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is an autonomous institution of Public Law, with its own legal personality and full administrative autonomy, although in matters of government it is subject to the law, as will be analyzed more thoroughly in the following recital.

**IV.- REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY OF AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS:** It is important to highlight that Article 188 of the *Constitución Política*, amended by Law No. 4123, of May 31, 1968, establishes: “*The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management*”. (The bold does not belong to the original). Subsequently, numeral 189 stipulates: “*The following are autonomous institutions: 1) The State Banks; 2) The state insurance institutions; 3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total membership*”. (The bold was supplied by the drafter). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), when hearing various actions of unconstitutionality, especially against the *Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Presupuestaria*, has referred, in various rulings, to the issue of the autonomy enjoyed by these institutions. Thus, in vote (voto) No. 3309, of 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994, it resolved: *“…autonomous institutions do not enjoy an unrestricted constitutional guarantee of autonomy, since the law, apart from defining their competence, may subject them to directives derived from development policies that the law itself entrusts to the Central Executive Branch, provided that, of course, this does not invade either the sphere of administrative autonomy itself, or the competence of the Assembly itself or of other constitutional bodies such as the Contraloría General de la República. It should be noted that the antecedents and effects of the reform itself, by reserving to those entities the matter of their own administration, excluded from their management the power of government which implies: a) the setting of goals, targets, and types of means to achieve them b) the issuance of autonomous service or activity regulations, in accordance with provisions normally called general policy. In this way, the reform made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities in general to national planning criteria and, in particular, to subject them to the general directives issued by the central Executive Branch or by organs of the Central Administration (called upon to complement or oversee that general policy). As part of those political organs, the Autoridad Presupuestaria was established, with the purpose of formulating and executing the general directives regarding salaries, among others, emanating from the Executive Branch or from central administration organs.”* In turn, in the judgment of that same Chamber No. 6095 of 9:18 a.m. on October 18, 1994, it was indicated that the Legislative Assembly does have the competence to impose legal limitations on those institutions, hence the rationale for the phrase in Article 188 of the Constitution, according to which, they are subject to the law in matters of government. That same resolution addressed the point of salary matters, for which, it resolved that the setting of salaries in the public sector is an integral part of government policy, which should aim to constitute a uniform and universal state public employment regime. To this end, it refers to a resolution of the Full Court (Corte Plena), in which, acting as the Constitutional Court, it clearly resolved the point when it stated: *"The goals (typical ‘matter of government’) set by the State regarding the remuneration of its servants constitute an entire salary policy that has to do not only with the retribution of the individually considered person’s effort, but also with its consequences on the other aspects of the economy, since it can introduce distorting factors into the economy due to social unrest. By ‘directive’ must be understood the ‘set of instruments or general norms for the execution of something,’ that is, guidelines or orientations that serve as a conceptual framework for decision-making. So, matters related to salary setting as general policy in the Public Sector cannot be said to be a principal, exclusive, or predominantly ‘administrative’ matter, but rather one of ‘government,’ and in which the subjection of a decentralized entity to the law is not only possible but also necessary and convenient."* (Full Court, judgment of June 16, 1984). Also, in Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 6513, of 2:57 p.m. in 2002, it was stated: *“Having defined salary policy as part of government policy, it is necessary to reiterate that when the constituent decentralized the Executive Branch, it sought to avoid arbitrary and antithetical interference regarding the management of each of those institutions, defined by law. But the constituent legislator did not choose to create a salary or labor regime segregated from the central Executive Branch, since there is no doubt that Title XV, Single Chapter of the Constitución Política has as its immediate antecedent the prior practice of massively dismissing state officials and employees with each change of government. The antithesis of this practice, then, is a stable, professional, permanent system of public service, governed by an integrated and coherent normative body, establishing a single employment regime for public servants that includes all State institutions, with the exception made in Article 156 of the Carta Magna regarding the Judicial Branch. … Therefore, neither the powers of government that the Central Executive Branch exercises today, nor those of administration that were reserved for the decentralized entities, ever intended to leave labor policy to the free will of the latter and thereby constitute two or many more public service regimes to the detriment of the officials and employees of the central administration. […] …the effects that imbalances in the State salary regime produce on public finances and, therefore, for the country in general, make it fully justifiable and even constitutionally necessary to subject everything concerning the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria.”* (In this sense, see also vote No. 3309, of 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994). From the foregoing, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber has concluded that it is constitutionally necessary to subject the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria, precedents that are binding for this other Chamber, in light of the provisions of Article 13 of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional*.

Now then, by virtue of the foregoing, it is justified that the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is subject to the supervision, not only of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, but also of the Contraloría General de la República, an entity governed by its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994, according to which, it *"is a fundamental constitutional organ of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) and the governing body of the oversight system contemplated by this Law."* (Article 1). In turn, numeral 2 provides: *"In the exercise of its powers, the Contraloría General de la República enjoys absolute functional and administrative independence, with respect to any Branch, public entity, or organ. Its decisions are only subject to the Constitución Política, international treaties or conventions, and the law. The Comptroller General of the Republic and the Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic are accountable to the Legislative Assembly for the fulfillment of their duties."* In Article 4, the scope of its competence is defined, for which it is indicated: *"The Contraloría General de la República shall exercise its competence over all entities and organs that make up the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). The criteria issued by the Contraloría General de la República, within the scope of its competence, shall be binding for the passive subjects subject to its control or oversight."* (Emphasis supplied). Article 8 defines what constitutes the public treasury by stating that it *"shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials. Regarding non-state public entities, companies with minority public sector participation, or private entities, only the resources they administer or dispose of, by any title, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or placed at their disposal, through a legal norm or budget line item, by the Branches of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary organs, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks, shall form part of the Public Treasury. Resources of origin different from those indicated do not form part of the Public Treasury; consequently, the applicable legal regime for those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations governing them. Public patrimony shall be the universe constituted by public funds and the liabilities of the subjects comprising the Public Treasury. The subjects comprising the Public Treasury shall be the State and the other public entities or organs, whether state or not, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, insofar as they administer or safeguard public funds by any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph. (As amended by subsection d) of Article 126 of Law 8131 of September 18, 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos)"*. Numeral 9 conceptualizes the term public funds, for which, it refers that they *"are the resources, securities, goods, and rights owned by the State, by organs, companies, or public entities."* Furthermore, according to said law: *"It is incumbent upon the Contraloría General de la República to examine for approval or rejection, total or partial, the budgets of the entities referred to in Article 184 of the Constitución Política, as well as those of the rest of the decentralized administration, semi-autonomous institutions, and public enterprises. Non-state public entities must comply with this requirement when a special law so requires. In the event that any budget is rejected, the budget of the immediately preceding year shall govern. If the rejection of the budget is partial, until the deficiencies are corrected, the prior year's budget shall govern with respect to what was rejected. Organs, executing units, funds, programs, and accounts that administer resources independently must likewise comply with the provisions of this article. The Contraloría General de la República shall determine, by reasoned resolution for these cases, the budgets that are excluded from this procedure due to their amount. The Contraloría General de la República shall oversee that budgets are formulated and presented for each fiscal year, in accordance with legal and technical provisions. If the Contraloría delays the processing and approval of a budget, the former budget shall continue to govern until the Contraloría issues its ruling. In the case of programs or projects whose execution extends beyond said period, the entity formulating the budget must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Contraloría General de la República, that it will have the complementary financing to complete the respective program and project."* (Article 18, amended by subsection d) of Article 126 of Law No. 8131, of September 18, 2001, *Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos*). Finally, numeral 25 of that same law stipulates the powers regarding control of revenues and exemptions by providing: *"The Contraloría General de la República may oversee whether those responsible within the active administration, charged with the determination, collection management, receipt, custody, and deposit of revenues and other public funds, fully meet their functions. The Contraloría, in accordance with the availability of its resources, shall oversee that the dependencies of the active administration charged with granting to private subjects, gratuitous patrimonial benefits, or benefits without any consideration whatsoever, adjust their action to the legal framework and efficiently carry out control over the use and destination of those benefits, within the limits set forth in this Law."* **V.- ON THE REFORMATIVE POWER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (CONVENCIONES COLECTIVAS):** In accordance with the foregoing, it is clear that there exists the possibility that, with the limitations imposed by the legal system and as the Constitutional Chamber has come to define, collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas), which have the force of law by constitutional provision (Article 62 of the *Constitución Política*), may be concluded in an autonomous institution, such as the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.

In relation to those instruments, in a similar vein, the second paragraph of article 54 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes “… The collective bargaining agreement has the character of professional law and all existing individual or collective contracts, or those subsequently entered into in the companies, industries, or regions it affects, must adapt to its norms…”. For its part, numeral 55 idem provides: “The stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it, having justified their representation in accordance with the provisions of article 51; b) All persons who, at the time it enters into force, work in the company, companies, or production centers to which the agreement refers, insofar as they are benefited and even when they are not members of the trade union or trade unions of workers that entered into it; and c) Those who, in the future, enter into individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the agreement, on the understanding that such contracts may not be entered into under conditions less favorable to the workers than those contained in the collective bargaining agreement.” In relation to this matter, in vote number 227, at 9:30 a.m. on April 1, 2005, this Chamber warned: “Notwithstanding, the force of law is conferred upon them insofar as the collective bargaining agreements have been agreed upon in accordance with the law. From the foregoing, a subordination of these to the legislative power of the State is inferred.” (In the same sense, see, from this Chamber, judgment no. 213, at 11:00 a.m. on March 30, 2007). Now then, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote number 1355, at 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, referring to the reforming power of collective bargaining agreements, resolved: “Because article 62 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) expressly provides so, collective bargaining agreements entered into in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective bargaining agreements is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective bargaining agreement to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But as article 129 of the Political Constitution indicates that laws are mandatory and can only be repealed by a later one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement cannot render ordinary laws ineffective, but rather, in the case of labor relations, those existing minimums can in fact be surpassed, but only for the specific case in question, with the law maintaining its effectiveness. That is, the normative provisions of collective bargaining agreements must conform to the existing labor legal norms, which they may surpass when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed, by which it is meant that collective bargaining agreements remain subject to and limited by public order laws. […] From the foregoing it is inferred that this Chamber has already resolved on the scope of coverage of the collective bargaining agreement. And we now add, that in any case that regulation cannot reform the ordinary law that confers powers on constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that have nothing to do with the content of individual employment contracts.” (Emphasis supplied). From the transcribed text, it is deduced that what is agreed upon in a collective agreement or bargaining agreement cannot go against what is established in the law, especially when this is of public order, since such an instrument, as to its content, must be subject to the legal regulations (article 58 of the Labor Code) but, on the other hand, through it, the minimum guarantees that have been legally established can indeed be surpassed.

**VI.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** In the matter under study, the application of the provisions of article 62 of the Tenth Reform to the V Collective Bargaining Agreement (Décima Reforma a la V Convención Colectiva), signed on February 1, 2002, is claimed. According to said norm: “The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica will recognize for its employees, starting from the year 2001, the remuneration called School Salary (Salario Escolar), which will be equivalent to 1% of the salaries earned by the employee that year. Said sum will become effective in January of the year 2002. The following year (2002) and subsequent years, that percentage will increase by 1.25% each year until completing 8%.” (See copy of the text of said reform contained in a separate file). As the main claim, the plaintiff union requested that the judgment declare that the defendant entity breached said conventional norm, for which reason it should be ordered “to pay each of its workers the agreed amount of the school salary corresponding to the entire year 2001, in the amount of 1% of the salaries earned that year, and in the amount of an additional 1.25% (accumulated 2.25%), corresponding to the salaries earned in the first semester of the year 2002, all in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned article 62, together with the corresponding adjustments.” (Sic. Folios 1-13). The aforementioned agreement was approved (homologada) by the Department of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Departamento de Relaciones de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) through resolution no. DRT-090-2002, at 10:00 a.m. on April 18, 2002. (Folios 15-16). Administratively, the representatives of SEBANA formulated the respective claims for the recognition of said payment (folios 18-24), but the Bank denied the request based on the rejection (improbación) that the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General) had ordered, thereby considering the administrative channel exhausted (folios 17 and 25-30). This position of the Bank coincides with the arguments that its representative has indicated in the judicial channel, where the presence of the aforementioned legal impediment has been emphatically alleged. According to what was resolved by the court, the plaintiff’s claims are not admissible insofar as the payment corresponding to the school salary was rejected (improbado) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, for which reason the principle of budget legality (principio de legalidad presupuestario) that governs the Public Administration is applicable. Through official communication FOE-FEC-401, dated May 28, 2002, the Manager of the Financial Services, Economy and Commerce Area of the Division of Operative Supervision and Evaluation of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic informed the general manager of Banco Nacional of the partial approval of external modification 2-2002 to the current budget of the banking entity. However, in addition, that document recorded: “… you are notified that the budgetary provision to support the payment of the School salary is rejected (imprueba), because the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the provisions of article 57 of the Labor Code are complied with, for which reason it is not proper to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001. / Additionally, we must indicate to you that the concept ‘school salary’ is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the approved salary increases in the corresponding period are paid in a deferred form, in such a way that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which will be paid in the month of January of the following year, it being these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. / Consequently, the rejected sum must be transferred to ‘funds without budgetary allocation’, and reflected thus in the budget execution reports.” (Sic. Folio 75). By reason of the foregoing, the institution’s general manager presented a new request for that petition to be reconsidered (folios 47-48); however, through official communication FOE-FEC-534, of July 16, 2002, what was sought by the banking entity was again denied. On that occasion it was concluded: “In the opinion of this Office of the Comptroller General, clause 62 of the collective bargaining agreement is not improper, insofar as it is applied under the same terms in force in the Public Administration, which implies that it cannot be given retroactive effect. / Consequently, Banco Nacional is obliged to withhold from its workers the percentage agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement as school salary, which may become effective only once this condition is met, in accordance with the paragraph (sic) of the legal opinion of that banking entity. / By virtue of the foregoing, we maintain the rejection (improbación) contained in official communication No. 6193 of May 28, 2002 unchanged.” (Folios 59-74). In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze whether the appellant’s claims are receivable, or whether the decision of the appellate body should be upheld. In consideration of the reproaches set forth by the plaintiff, it is important to highlight that although, in application of the provisions of article 188 of the Political Constitution and in relation to the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber mentioned above, the defendant Bank enjoys administrative autonomy, it is also true that, in matters of governance (gobierno), it is subject to the law. Based on the resolutions emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, it is concluded that, regarding matters of salary policy (which is of governance and not administrative), the conventional regulations must be consistent with the so-called general policy which, as such, contains the uniform criteria prevailing, in principle, throughout the entire Public Administration, for the purposes of seeking a uniform and universal state regime of public employment. Now then, despite the foregoing, in the matter under analysis, the comptroller entity based its rejection (improbar) of the payment requested by the union on two grounds, namely: that the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the provisions of article 57 of the Labor Code are complied with, for which reason it is not proper to make the proposed payment retroactively to the year 2001; and, on the other hand, that the concept of “school salary” is used in the public sector as a mechanism through which part of the approved salary increases in the corresponding period are paid in a deferred form, so that a percentage of said increase is withheld from each worker, which is paid in the month of January of the following year, it being these withholdings that justify the payment of the referred concept. It is, then, upon this context that the grievances of the appeal must be analyzed, as the competence of this Chamber is limited to reviewing whether the administrative act that rejected (improbó) the budget allocation for said purpose is or is not in accordance with the legal system. In the first place, it must be indicated that, by virtue of the reforming power of the collective bargaining agreement analyzed previously, both parties agreed on the creation of an extra salary (sobresueldo) which was called “school salary,” although it was not regulated in the same manner as the type of salary created by decree for the rest of the public sector. Thus, what the parties did was try to surpass the legal minimum for the benefit of the workers, hence the denomination given to it in the collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant, since, as stated, the will of the parties was to create an extra salary in accordance with the reforming powers derived from a collective bargaining agreement for the purpose of surpassing the legal minimums for the benefit of the workers. On the other hand, as previously indicated, the Office of the Comptroller General, in order to determine the impropriety of the payment retroactively to the year 2001, cited as a basis the provisions of article 57 of the Labor Code, insofar as it deemed that the legal effects derived from the application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement arise from the date on which the provisions of that norm are complied with. Said numeral, in what is relevant, provides that the aforementioned instrument shall have no legal value except as of the date on which a copy thereof is deposited with the Office of Union Affairs and Administrative Conciliation (Oficina de Asuntos Gremiales y de Conciliación Administrativa) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, that is, as of that moment what was agreed upon may be demanded in the terms stipulated by the negotiating parties. Hence, what is established in that norm does not constitute any legal impediment for the payment to be ordered retroactively, since it was agreed upon in that way, such that it is evident that the basis given by the comptroller entity is erroneous, given that it confused the validity of the act with its efficacy, the latter circumstance being what the aforementioned norm refers to. Furthermore, what was agreed upon in those terms is deemed reasonable, given that by that time the negotiation of the mentioned instrument had already begun and, precisely, due to the delay in the procedure, ordering its payment from the outset was even more justified. In relation to the foregoing, it must be clarified that according to the second fact of the complaint, admitted by the representative of the defendant, the start of the negotiations took place in December 2000. Note that, even in the conventional norm, it was indicated that the referred payment would become effective in January of the year 2002. In that sense, this Chamber deems that the reasons invoked by the comptroller body did not justify denying the approval of the allocation.

**VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** According to what has been set forth above, it is appropriate to clarify that the present matter cannot be viewed as a process for the enforcement of particular obligations (proceso de condena por obligaciones particulares), since, for that, the union would not have standing, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 360 of the Labor Code; rather, it must be considered that what was demanded by said entity—in its capacity as counterparty to the conventional instrument—was compliance with the provisions of the referred conventional norm, which is why it is not proper in this proceeding to carry out specific collections together with the interest claimed. Based on the foregoing, the challenged judgment must be overturned, solely insofar as it denied the union’s claim in relation to the non-compliance with the retroactive effects provided for in article 62 of the collective bargaining agreement and, consequently, the defendant must pay its workers the agreed amount of the school salary corresponding to the entire year two thousand one—in the amount of one percent of the salaries earned that year—and of the additional one point twenty-five percent—accumulated two point twenty-five percent—referring to the salaries earned in the first semester of two thousand two. Likewise, it is proper to maintain the court’s decision to resolve the matter without special award of costs because it is deemed that the defendant Bank acted with evident good faith, since, from the administrative venue, it was willing to recognize the right in light of the conventional regulations, which it did not do in the face of the act emanating from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Código Procesal Civil). In all other respects, the appealed ruling must be confirmed.”

“III.- NATURALEZA JURÍDICA DEL BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA: De conformidad con la Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional n° 1644, del 26 de septiembre de 1953, el Banco Nacional integra el Sistema Bancario Nacional en conjunto con el Banco Central, el Banco de Costa Rica, el Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago y cualquier otra entidad bancaria del Estado que en el futuro llegare a crearse. Asimismo, conforman dicho sistema bancario los bancos comerciales privados, establecidos y administrados conforme con lo prescrito en el Título VI de esa ley. Por su parte, el numeral 2 de ese cuerpo normativo dispone: “Los bancos del Estado enumerados en el artículo anterior son instituciones autónomas de derecho público, con personería jurídica propia e independencia en materia de administración. Están sujetos a la ley en materia de gobierno y deben actuar en estrecha colaboración con el Poder Ejecutivo, coordinando sus esfuerzos y actividades. Las decisiones sobre las funciones puestas bajo su competencia sólo podrán emanar de sus respectivas juntas directivas. De acuerdo con lo anterior, cada banco tendrá responsabilidad propia en la ejecución de sus funciones, lo cual impone a los miembros de la Junta Directiva la obligación de actuar conforme con su criterio en la dirección y administración del banco, dentro de las disposiciones de la Constitución, de las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes y de los principios de la técnica, así como la obligación de responder por su gestión, en forma total e ineludible, de acuerdo con los artículos 27 y 28 de esta ley. (Así reformado por el artículo 2º de la ley Nº 4646 de 20 de octubre de 1970)”. (Énfasis suplido). Por su parte, el ordinal 3 ídem estipula: “Competen a los bancos las siguientes funciones esenciales: 1) Colaborar en la ejecución de la política monetaria, cambiaria, crediticia y bancaria de la República. 2) Procurar la liquidez, solvencia y buen funcionamiento del Sistema Bancario Nacional. 3) Custodiar y administrar los depósitos bancarios de la colectividad. Cuando se trate de bancos privados que capten recursos en cuenta corriente o de ahorro a la vista, siempre que se cumpla con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 59 de esta ley. 4) Evitar que haya en el país medios de producción inactivos, buscando al productor para poner a su servicio los medios económicos y técnicos de que dispone el Sistema. (Así reformado por el artículo 162, inciso a), de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica Nº 7558 del 3 de noviembre de 1995)". En lo que interesa, el artículo 4 reza: “Los Bancos del Estado contarán con la garantía y la más completa cooperación del Estado y de todas sus dependencias e instituciones". Entre otras atribuciones esenciales, el artículo 34 de la mencionada ley enumera las siguientes: "1) Dirigir la política financiera y económica del Banco. 2) Cumplir y hacer cumplir las facultades y los deberes asignados al Banco, así como las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias que rigen su funcionamiento. 3) Acordar, reformar e interpretar para su aplicación los reglamentos del Banco; regular los servicios de organización y administración del establecimiento y dirigir su funcionamiento. 4) Acordar el presupuesto anual del Banco y los presupuestos extraordinarios que fueren necesarios, los cuales requerirán la aprobación de la Contraloría General de la República; crear las plazas y servicios indispensables para el debido funcionamiento de la institución y fijar las respectivas remuneraciones. 5) Nombrar y remover, cuando fuere del caso, al Gerente, Subgerente, Auditor y Subauditor del Banco, y asignarles sus funciones y deberes, dentro de las prescripciones de esta ley. 6) Aprobar los balances y cuentas de ganancias y pérdidas y el destino de las utilidades, de acuerdo con la ley, así como aprobar cualquier publicación que haga el Banco. 7)… 8)… 9)… 10)… 11)… y 12) Ejercer las demás funciones, facultades y deberes que le correspondan, de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes y con los principios de la técnica". De lo anterior se infiere que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica es una institución autónoma de Derecho Público, con personería jurídica propia y plena autonomía administrativa, aunque en materia de gobierno está sujeto a la ley, tal y como se analizará más detenidamente en el siguiente considerando. IV.- ACERCA DE LA AUTONOMÍA ADMINISTRATIVA Y DE GOBIERNO DE LAS INSTITUCIONES AUTÓNOMAS: Es importante destacar que el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política, reformado por la Ley N° 4123, del 31 de mayo de 1968, establece: “Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión”. (La negrita no pertenece al original). De seguido, el numeral 189 estipula: “Son instituciones autónomas: 1) Los Bancos del Estado; 2) Las instituciones aseguradoras del Estado; 3) Las que esta Constitución establece, y los nuevos organismos que creare la Asamblea Legislativa por votación no menor de los dos tercios del total de sus miembros”. (La negrita fue suplida por el redactor). La Sala Constitucional, al conocer varias acciones de inconstitucionalidad, sobre todo contra la Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, se ha referido, en diversos fallos, al tema de la autonomía de que gozan estas instituciones. Así, en el voto n° 3309, de las 15:00 horas del 5 de julio de 1994, resolvió: “…las instituciones autónomas no gozan de una garantía de autonomía constitucional irrestricta, toda vez que la ley, aparte de definir su competencia, puede someterlas a directrices derivadas de políticas de desarrollo que ésta misma encomiende al Poder Ejecutivo Central, siempre que, desde luego, no se invada con ello ni la esfera de la autonomía administrativa propiamente dicha, ni la competencia de la misma Asamblea o de otros órganos constitucionales como la Contraloría General de la República. Debe hacerse notar que los antecedentes y efectos de la propia reforma, al reservar a esas entidades la materia de su propia administración, excluyó de su gestión la potestad de gobierno que implica: a) la fijación de fines, metas y tipos de medios para realizarlas b) la emisión de reglamentos autónomos de servicio o actividad, acorde con las disposiciones normalmente llamadas de política general. De esta manera, la reforma hizo constitucionalmente posible someter a las entidades autónomas en general a los criterios de planificación nacional y en particular, someterlas a las directrices de carácter general dictadas desde el Poder Ejecutivo central o de órganos de la Administración Central (llamados a complementar o a fiscalizar esa política general). Como parte de esos órganos políticos, fue establecida la Autoridad Presupuestaria, con el objeto de formular y ejecutar las directrices generales en materia de salarios, entre otras, emanadas del Poder Ejecutivo o de órganos de la administración central”. Por su parte, en la sentencia de esa misma Sala n° 6095 de las 9:18 horas del 18 de octubre de 1994, se indicó que la Asamblea Legislativa sí tiene competencia para imponer limitaciones legales a esas instituciones, de ahí la razón de ser de la frase del artículo 188 constitucional, según el cual, estas se encuentran sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Esa misma resolución trató el punto de la materia salarial, para lo cual, resolvió que la fijación de salarios en el sector público es parte integrante de la política de gobierno, la cual debe tender a constituir un régimen estatal de empleo público uniforme y universal. Para ello, remite a una resolución de la Corte Plena, en la cual, actuando esta como Tribunal Constitucional, resolvió claramente el punto cuando indicó: "Las metas (típica ‘materia de gobierno’) que se fije el Estado en la remuneración de sus servidores constituyen toda una política salarial que tiene que ver no sólo con la retribución del esfuerzo de la persona individualmente considerada, sino también con sus consecuencias sobre los demás aspectos de la economía, ya que puede introducir factores de distorsión en lo económico debido a la intranquilidad social. Por ‘directriz’ debe entenderse el ‘conjunto de instrumentos o normas generales para la ejecución de alguna cosa’, o sea de pautas u orientaciones que sirven de marco conceptual para la toma de decisiones. De manera que lo relativo a la fijación de salarios como política general en el Sector Público no puede decirse que es materia principal, exclusiva o predominantemente ‘administrativa’, sino más bien de ‘gobierno’, y en que la sujeción de un ente descentralizado a la ley no sólo es posible sino también necesaria y conveniente". (Corte Plena, sentencia del 16 de junio de 1984). También, en la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional n° 6513, de las 14:57 horas del 2002 se indicó: “Definida la política salarial como parte de la política de gobierno, es necesario reiterar que cuando el constituyente descentralizó el Poder Ejecutivo, procuró evitar las injerencias arbitrarias y antitéticas en cuanto a la gestión de cada una de esas instituciones, definida por ley. Pero no optó el legislador constituyente por crear un régimen salarial o laboral segregado del Poder Ejecutivo central, pues no hay duda que el Título XV, Capítulo Unico de la Constitución Política tiene como antecedente inmediato, la práctica anterior de destituir masivamente a los funcionarios y empleados estatales con ocasión de cada cambio de gobierno. La antítesis de esta práctica, entonces es un sistema de servicio público estable, profesional, permanente, regido por un cuerpo normativo integrado y coherente, estableciéndose un régimen único de empleo para los servidores públicos que incluye a la totalidad de las instituciones del Estado, con la excepción hecha del artículo 156 de la Carta Magna en cuanto al Poder Judicial. … Por ello, ni las potestades de gobierno que hoy ejerce el Poder Ejecutivo Central, ni las de administración que se reservaron a las entidades descentralizadas, pretendieron nunca dejar al libre albedrío de éstas últimas la política laboral y con ello constituir dos o muchos más regímenes de servicio público en detrimento de los funcionarios y empleados de la administración central. […] …los efectos que sobre las finanzas públicas y por ende, para el país en general producen los desequilibrios en el régimen salarial del Estado, hacen plenamente justificable y hasta constitucionalmente necesario someter a criterios uniformes todo lo concerniente a la política salarial de la Administración Pública”. (En este sentido, véase también el voto n° 3309, de las 15:00 horas del 5 de julio de 1994). De lo anterior se desprende que la Sala Constitucional ha concluido que resulta constitucionalmente necesario someter la política salarial de la Administración Pública a criterios uniformes, antecedentes que resultan vinculantes para esta otra Sala, a la luz de lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo expuesto, se justifica que el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica esté sujeto a la supervisión, no solo, de la Superintendencia General de la Entidades Financieras, sino también de la Contraloría General de la República, entidad que se encuentra regida por su Ley Orgánica n° 7428 del 7 de septiembre de 1994, según la cual, esta "es un órgano constitucional fundamental del Estado, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa en el control superior de la Hacienda Pública y rector del sistema de fiscalización que contempla esta Ley". (Artículo 1°). Por su parte, el numeral 2 dispone: "En el ejercicio de sus potestades, la Contraloría General de la República goza de absoluta independencia funcional y administrativa, respecto de cualquier Poder, ente u órgano público. Sus decisiones solamente se encuentran sometidas a la Constitución Política, a tratados o convenios internacionales y a la ley. El Contralor General de la República y el Subcontralor General de la República responden ante la Asamblea Legislativa por el cumplimiento de sus funciones". En el artículo 4 se define el ámbito de su competencia, para lo cual se indica: "La Contraloría General de la República ejercerá su competencia sobre todos los entes y órganos que integran la Hacienda Pública. Los criterios que emita la Contraloría General de la República, en el ámbito de su competencia, serán vinculantes para los sujetos pasivos sometidos a su control o fiscalización". (Énfasis suplido). El artículo 8 define lo que es hacienda pública al indicar que esta "estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos. Respecto a los entes públicos no estatales, las sociedades con participación minoritaria del sector público o las entidades privadas, únicamente formarán parte de la Hacienda Pública los recursos que administren o dispongan, por cualquier título, para conseguir sus fines y que hayan sido transferidos o puestos a su disposición, mediante norma o partida presupuestaria, por los Poderes del Estado, sus dependencias y órganos auxiliares, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la administración descentralizada, las universidades estatales, las municipalidades y los bancos del Estado. Los recursos de origen distinto de los indicados no integran la Hacienda Pública; en consecuencia, el régimen jurídico aplicable a esas entidades es el contenido en las Leyes que las crearon o los ordenamientos especiales que las regulan. El patrimonio público será el universo constituido por los fondos públicos y los pasivos a cargo de los sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública. Serán sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública, el Estado y los demás entes u órganos públicos, estatales o no, y las empresas públicas, así como los sujetos de Derecho Privado, en cuanto administren o custodien fondos públicos por cualquier título, con las salvedades establecidas en el párrafo anterior. (Así reformado por el inciso d) del artículo 126 de la Ley 8131 de 18 de septiembre del 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos)". El numeral 9 conceptúa el término fondos públicos, para lo cual, refiere que "son los recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos". Además, según dicha ley: "Corresponde a la Contraloría General de la República examinar para su aprobación o improbación, total o parcial, los presupuestos de los entes referidos en el artículo 184 de la Constitución Política, así como los del resto de la Administración descentralizada, las instituciones semiautónomas y las empresas públicas. Los entes públicos no estatales deberán cumplir con tal requisito cuando una ley especial así lo exija. En caso de que algún presupuesto sea improbado regirá el del año inmediato anterior. Si la improbación del presupuesto es parcial, hasta tanto no se corrijan las deficiencias, regirá en cuanto a lo improbado el del año anterior. Los órganos, las unidades ejecutoras, los fondos, los programas y las cuentas que administren recursos de manera independiente, igualmente deberán cumplir con lo dispuesto por este artículo. La Contraloría General de la República determinará, mediante resolución razonada para estos casos, los presupuestos que por su monto se excluyan de este trámite. La Contraloría General de la República fiscalizará que los presupuestos sean formulados y presentados para cada ejercicio, de conformidad con las disposiciones legales y técnicas. Si la Contraloría atrasa la tramitación y aprobación de un presupuesto, continuará rigiendo el anterior hasta que la Contraloría se pronuncie. Cuando se trate de programas o proyectos cuya ejecución se extienda más allá de dicho período, la entidad que formule el presupuesto deberá demostrar, a satisfacción de la Contraloría General de la República, que dispondrá de la financiación complementaria para terminar el programa y el proyecto respectivo". (Artículo 18, reformado por el inciso d) del artículo 126 de la Ley n° 8131, de 18 de septiembre del 2001, Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos). Por último, el numeral 25 de aquella misma ley estipula las potestades sobre control de ingresos y exoneraciones al disponer: "La Contraloría General de la República podrá fiscalizar si los responsables dentro de la administración activa, encargados de la determinación, gestión de cobro, percepción, custodia y depósito de las rentas y de otros fondos públicos, cumplen a cabalidad con sus funciones. La Contraloría, de conformidad con la disponibilidad de sus recursos, fiscalizará que las dependencias de la administración activa encargadas de otorgar a sujetos privados, beneficios patrimoniales, gratuitos o sin contraprestación alguna, ajusten su acción al ordenamiento y realicen, en forma eficiente, el control sobre el uso y el destino de esos beneficios, dentro de los límites señalados en esta Ley". V.- SOBRE EL PODER REFORMADOR DE LAS CONVENCIONES COLECTIVAS: De conformidad con lo anteriormente analizado, es claro que existe la posibilidad de que, con las limitaciones impuestas por el ordenamiento jurídico y según lo ha venido a definir la Sala Constitucional, en una institución autónoma, como lo es el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, se realicen convenciones colectivas, las cuales tienen fuerza de ley por disposición constitucional (artículo 62 de la Constitución Política). En relación con dichos instrumentos, en un sentido similar, el párrafo segundo del artículo 54 del Código de Trabajo establece "… La convención colectiva tiene carácter de ley profesional y a sus normas deben adaptarse todos los contratos individuales o colectivos existentes o que luego se realicen en las empresas, industriales o regiones que afecte…”. Por su parte, el numeral 55 ídem dispone: "Las estipulaciones de la convención colectiva tienen fuerza de ley para: a) Las partes que han suscrito, justificando su personería de acuerdo con lo dispuesto por el artículo 51; b) Todas las personas que en el momento de entrar en vigor trabajen en la empresa, empresas o centros de producción a que el pacto se refiera, en lo que aquéllas resulten favorecidas y aún cuando no sean miembros del sindicato o sindicatos de trabajadores que los hubieren celebrado; y c) Los que concierten en lo futuro contratos individuales o colectivos dentro de la misma empresa, empresas o centro de producción afectados por el pacto, en el concepto de que dichos contratos no podrán celebrarse en condiciones menos favorables para los trabajadores que las contenidas en la convención colectiva”. En relación con este tema, en el voto número 227, de las 9:30 horas del 1° de abril del 2005, esta Sala advirtió: "No obstante, la fuerza de ley les está conferida en el tanto en que las convenciones colectivas se hayan acordado conforme a la legislación. Se desprende, de lo anterior, una subordinación de éstas a la potestad legislativa del Estado." (En igual sentido se puede consultar, de esta Sala, la sentencia n° 213, de las 11:00 horas del 30 de marzo del 2007). Ahora bien, la Sala Constitucional en el voto número 1355, de las 12:18 horas del 22 de marzo de 1996, refiriéndose al poder reformador de las convenciones colectivas, resolvió: "Por disponerlo así expresamente el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que se celebren conforme a la ley, tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes. Y como hemos dicho que uno de los objetivos de las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, es revisar el contenido mínimo de los beneficios legales establecidos para los trabajadores, en principio, es posible argumentar que es jurídicamente válido que una convención colectiva pueda introducir modificaciones o reformas de carácter legal. Pero como el artículo 129 de la Constitución Política señala que las leyes son obligatorias y solo pueden ser derogadas por otra posterior, debemos concluir en que una norma de una convención colectiva no puede quitar vigencia a las leyes ordinarias, sino que, en tratándose de relaciones laborales, de hecho se pueden superar esos mínimos existentes, pero solo para el caso concreto de que se trata, manteniendo la ley su vigencia. Es decir, que las disposiciones normativas de las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, deben ajustarse a las normas legales laborales existentes, las que pueden superar cuando se trata de conceder beneficios a los trabajadores, siempre y cuando no se afecten o deroguen disposiciones de carácter imperativo, con lo que se quiere decir que las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, quedan sujetas y limitadas por las leyes de orden público. […] De lo anterior se infiere que ya esta Sala ha resuelto sobre el ámbito de cobertura de la convención colectiva. Y agregamos ahora, que de todas formas no puede esa normativa reformar la ley ordinaria que confiere atribuciones a órganos constitucionales, ni otras disposiciones legales, que no tienen que ver con el contenido de los contratos individuales de trabajo". (Énfasis suplido). De lo trascrito se deduce que lo pactado en un convenio o convención colectiva no puede ir en contra de lo establecido en la ley, especialmente, cuando esta es de orden público, puesto que tal instrumento, en cuanto a su contenido, debe estar sujeto a la normativa legal (artículo 58 del Código de Trabajo) pero, por otra parte, mediante este sí se pueden superar las garantías mínimas que han sido establecidas legalmente. VI.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: En el asunto bajo estudio se reclama la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 62 de la Décima Reforma a la V Convención Colectiva, suscrita el 1° de febrero del 2002. Según dicha norma: "El Banco Nacional de Costa Rica reconocerá a sus empleados a partir del año 2001 la remuneración denominada Salario Escolar, la cual será equivalente a un 1% de los salarios devengados por el empleado ese año. Dicha suma se hará efectiva en enero del año 2002. El año siguiente (2002) y los consecutivos incrementará ese porcentaje en 1.25% cada año hasta completar un 8%". (Ver copia de texto de dicha reforma constante en legajo aparte). Como pretensión principal, el sindicato accionante solicitó que en sentencia se declare que la entidad demandada incumplió dicha norma convencional, por lo que se le deberá condenar "a pagarle a cada uno de sus trabajadores, el importe convenido del salario escolar correspondiente a todo el año 2001, en el orden del 1% de los salarios devengados ese año, y en el orden del 1.25% adicional (acumulado de un 2.25%), correspondiente a los salarios devengados en el primer semestre del año 2002, todo conforme los términos del artículo 62 supracitado, junto con los reajustes que correspondan". (Sic. Folios 1-13). La mencionada convención fue homologada por el Departamento de Relaciones de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social mediante resolución n° DRT-090-2002, de las 10:00 horas del 18 de abril del 2002. (Folios 15-16). Administrativamente, los representantes de SEBANA formularon los respectivos reclamos para el reconocimiento del pago dicho (folios 18-24), pero el Banco denegó la petición con base en la improbación que había dispuesto la Contraloría General, con lo cual dio por agotada la vía administrativa (folios 17 y 25-30). Esta posición del Banco coincide con los argumentos que su representante ha indicado en vía judicial, donde se ha alegado enfáticamente la presencia del impedimento legal antes referido. Según lo resuelto por el tribunal, las pretensiones del demandante no resultan procedentes en tanto el pago correspondiente al salario escolar fue improbado por parte de la Contraloría General de la República, por lo que resulta aplicable el principio de legalidad presupuestario que rige en la Administración Pública. Mediante oficio FOE-FEC-401, fechado 28 de mayo del 2002, el Gerente del Área de Servicios Financieros, Economía y Comercio de la División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativo de la Contraloría General de la República informó al gerente general del Banco Nacional la aprobación parcial de la modificación externa 2-2002 al presupuesto vigente de la entidad bancaria. No obstante, además, se consignó en dicho documento: "… se le comunica que se imprueba la previsión presupuestaria para respaldar lo relativo al pago del Salario escolar, por cuanto los efectos jurídicos que derivan de la aplicación de la Convención Colectiva surgen a partir de la fecha en que se cumpla con lo establecido en el artículo 57 del Código de Trabajo, por lo que no procede realizar el pago propuesto de manera retroactiva al año 2001. / Adicionalmente, debemos indicarle que el concepto 'salario escolar' se utiliza en el sector público como un mecanismo mediante el cual se paga en forma diferida, parte de los aumentos salariales aprobados en el periodo correspondiente, de forma tal que a cada trabajador se le retiene un porcentaje de dicho incremento, el cual se cancelará en el mes de enero del año siguiente, siendo estas retenciones lo que justifica el pago del referido concepto. / En consecuencia la suma improbada deberá trasladarse a 'fondos sin asignación presupuestaria', y reflejarse así en los informes de ejecución presupuestaria". (Sic. Folio 75). En razón de lo anterior, el gerente general de la institución presentó una nueva solicitud para que se reconsiderara dicha petición (folios 47-48); sin embargo, mediante oficio FOE-FEC-534, del 16 de julio del 2002, nuevamente se denegó lo pretendido por la entidad bancaria. En esa oportunidad se concluyó: "En criterio de esta Contraloría General, la cláusula 62 de la convención colectiva no resulta improcedente, en el tanto se aplique en los mismos términos vigentes en la Administración Pública, lo que implica que no se le puede dar efecto retroactivo. / En consecuencia, el Banco Nacional se encuentra obligado a retener a sus trabajadores el porcentaje pactado en la convención colectiva por concepto de salario escolar, el cual podrá hacerse efectivo hasta tanto se cumpla con esta condición, conforme el párrafo (sic) del criterio legal de esa entidad bancaria. / En virtud de lo anterior, mantenemos invariable la improbación contenida en el oficio Nro. 6193 de fecha 28 de mayo del 2002". (Folios 59-74). De conformidad con lo anterior, corresponde analizar si las pretensiones del recurrente son de recibo, o bien, si cabe mantener lo resuelto por el órgano de alzada. En atención a los reproches expuestos por el demandante, es importante destacar que si bien, en aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política y en relación con las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional mencionadas anteriormente, el Banco demandado goza de autonomía administrativa, también es cierto que, en materia de gobierno, está sujeto a la ley. Con base en las resoluciones emanadas de la Sala Constitucional se concluye que, en lo referente a materia de política salarial (la cual es de gobierno y no administrativa), la normativa convencional debe ser consecuente con la denominada política general que, como tal, contiene los criterios uniformes imperantes, en principio, en toda la Administración Pública, a los efectos de procurar un régimen estatal de empleo público uniforme y universal. Ahora bien, a pesar de lo anterior, en al asunto bajo análisis la entidad contralora se fundamentó en dos motivos para improbar el pago solicitado por el sindicato, a saber: que los efectos jurídicos derivados de la aplicación de la Convención Colectiva surgen a partir de la fecha en que se cumpla con lo establecido en el artículo 57 del Código de Trabajo, por lo que no procede realizar el pago propuesto de manera retroactiva al año 2001; y, por otra parte que el concepto de "salario escolar" se utiliza en el sector público como un mecanismo mediante el cual se paga en forma diferida, parte de los aumentos salariales aprobados en el período correspondiente, de modo que a cada trabajador se le retiene un porcentaje de dicho incremento, el cual se cancelará en el mes de enero del año siguiente, siendo estas retenciones las que justifican el pago del referido concepto. Es, pues, sobre este contexto que deben analizarse los agravios del recurso, en tanto la competencia de esta Sala se limita a revisar si el acto administrativo que improbó la partida presupuestaria para dicho efecto está acorde o no con el ordenamiento jurídico. En primer término, debe indicarse que, en virtud del poder reformador de la convención colectiva analizado anteriormente, ambas partes acordaron la creación de un sobresueldo al que se le denominó “salario escolar”, aunque no se reguló de la misma manera que el tipo de salario creado mediante decreto para el resto del sector público. Así, las partes lo que hicieron fue tratar de superar el mínimo legal en beneficio de los trabajadores, de ahí que resulte intrascendente la denominación que se le haya dado en la convención colectiva, pues, como se dijo, la voluntad de las partes fue crear un sobresueldo de conformidad con las potestades reformadoras derivadas de una convención colectiva a los efectos de superar los mínimos legales en beneficio de los trabajadores. Por otra parte, como se indicó anteriormente, la Contraloría General, para determinar la improcedencia del pago de forma retroactiva al año 2001, señaló como fundamento lo dispuesto en el artículo 57 del Código de Trabajo, en tanto estimó que los efectos jurídicos derivados de la aplicación de la Convención Colectiva surgen a partir de la fecha en que se cumpla con lo establecido en dicha norma. Dicho numeral, en lo que interesa, dispone que el instrumento aludido no tendrá valor legal sino a partir de la fecha en que quede depositada la copia de este en la Oficina de Asuntos Gremiales y de Conciliación Administrativa del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, es decir, a partir de ese momento puede exigirse lo acordado en los términos dispuestos por las partes de la negociación. De ahí que lo establecido en esa norma no constituye impedimento legal alguno para que el pago se ordenara retroactivamente, pues así se pactó, por lo que es evidente que el fundamento dado por la entidad contralora es erróneo, dado que se confundió la validez del acto con su eficacia, circunstancia esta última a la que se refiere la norma aludida. Además, lo acordado en esos términos se estima razonable, dado que ya para ese tiempo se había iniciado la negociación del mencionado instrumento y, precisamente, debido a la tardanza en el procedimiento, se justificó aún más disponer su pago desde un inicio. En relación con lo anterior, debe aclararse que según el hecho segundo de la demanda, admitido por la representante del accionado, el inicio de las negociaciones tuvo lugar en diciembre del 2000. Nótese que, incluso en la norma convencional se señaló que el pago referido se haría efectivo en enero del año 2002. En ese sentido, esta Sala estima que los motivos invocados por el órgano contralor no justificaban denegar la aprobación de la partida. VII.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: Según lo antes expuesto, cabe aclarar que el presente asunto no puede verse como un proceso de condena por obligaciones particulares, pues, para ello, el sindicato no estaría legitimado, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 360 del Código de Trabajo; sino que debe considerarse que lo exigido por dicho ente -en su calidad de contraparte del instrumento convencional- fue el cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en la referida norma convencional, razón por la cual no procede realizar en este proceso cobros específicos junto con los intereses que se reclaman. Con base en lo expuesto, la sentencia impugnada debe revocarse, únicamente en cuanto denegó la pretensión del sindicato en relación con el incumplimiento de los efectos retroactivos previstos en el artículo 62 de la convención colectiva y, en consecuencia, el demandado deberá pagarle a sus trabajadores el importe convenido del salario escolar correspondiente a todo el año dos mil uno -en el orden del uno por ciento de los salarios devengados ese año- y del uno punto veinticinco por ciento adicional -acumulado de un dos punto veinticinco por ciento- referente a los salarios devengados en el primer semestre del dos mil dos. Asimismo, procede mantener la decisión del tribunal de resolver el asunto sin especial condena en costas por estimarse que el Banco demandado actuó con evidente buena fe, en tanto, desde la sede administrativa estuvo dispuesto a reconocer el derecho a la luz de la normativa convencional, lo que no hizo ante el acto emanado de la Contraloría General de la República (artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil). En lo demás, se debe confirmar el fallo impugnado.”