Tax credit denial for tourism: share repurchase simulating investmentDenegatoria de crédito fiscal por turismo: recompra de acciones simulando inversión

**2)- REGARDING THE COMPETENCE OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION TO AUDIT THE RECOGNITION OR NON-RECOGNITION OF THE FISCAL INCENTIVE. NATURE OF THE ACT.** In accordance with the provisions of Articles 99 and 103 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and Article 12 of Law 6990, the powers of audit and verification of the Tax Administration regarding the correct application of the tax benefits established in the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development are derived. In this sense, the provision contained in Article 12 of Law 6990 is very clear in establishing that: "The Instituto Costarricense de Turismo and the Ministry of Finance shall audit all aspects concerning the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by companies or individuals by virtue of the granting of the benefits and incentives of this law." As indicated by the State representative, a thesis shared by this Tribunal, in accordance with the powers established in those rules, the Direct Taxation Administration is empowered to analyze the propriety of the application of the fiscal benefits established in Article 11 of Law 6990, in a specific fiscal period, when it is verified that the benefits established in current legislation are not being complied with, as well as the obligations assumed before the Public Administration, without this implying a challenge to the act that granted the administered party the right regarding the possibility of enjoying the benefit of fiscal incentives, nor that the Tax Administration is assuming powers of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or the Tourism Regulatory Commission. In the sense indicated, the considerations of the State representative are shared, in that, as established by the Procuraduría General de la República in Legal Opinion No. OJ-016-2001 dated February 22, 2000, although according to applicable regulations the Dirección General de Tributación Directa does not have the competence to annul, render ineffective, or disapply agreements of the Tourism Regulatory Commission, by which the benefit provided in Article 11 of Law 6990 had been granted, the fact is that the Tax Administration is empowered to verify the correct utilization of the tax benefit. This Tribunal has ruled in this sense in Judgments No. 2008-53-2006, issued by the Fourth Section at fourteen hours on June 28, 2003, the First Section in Judgment 2008-90-2006 at ten hours thirty minutes on March 1, 2006, and more recently the Fourth Section in Judgment 2008-32-2007 at thirteen hours thirty minutes on August 8, 2007, where the following was considered: " (...) V) OF THE AUDIT POWER OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION: This Tribunal fully agrees with the affirmations made by the state representation in its statement of defense as well as the arguments put forth by Tributación Directa and the First Chamber of the Tax Administrative Tribunal.- The audit power of the Tax Administration in matters pertaining to taxes in general is conferred by law (Articles 103 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, 62 of the Income Tax Law, and 12 of Law 6090 on Tourism Incentives), and is neither exhausted nor limited by the reading of Article 11 of Law 6990, which does not expressly grant it.- In tax matters, it is known that our Legal System entrusted its protection to the Ministry of Finance and through it to Tributación Directa and its other bodies, which cannot be ignored as has been attempted in this matter; especially when it concerns, as in the case before us, a reduction of income to the treasury, by way of exemption, having not only the duty but the obligation to verify, as has been stated, not just the formal requirements demanded, but the operation of fitting the hypothesis to the concrete factual framework, that is, an exemption granted in the abstract to companies when they make the specific investment.- It is undeniable for this Tribunal the fact that the tourism contract signed by (......) was complemented with a fiscal credit benefit for its investors, from which, hypothetically speaking, the plaintiff company here would be a beneficiary; however, at the moment of applying such fiscal credit, the Tax Administration had, as has been stated, the power to verify that it was truly an investment to promote the development of tourism activity, which it carried out within the scope of its activity and functions proper to its nature.- No defect is found in the deployment of activity by the Tax Administration, which is legally responsible for auditing in the matter of taxes and their respective exemptions, as they are a consequence of the former, when the law expressly so provides.- " By virtue of what has been indicated, the plaintiff's arguments regarding the lack of competence on the part of the Tax Administration to deny the fiscal incentive contained in the Income Tax Declaration for the year 1998, under the protection of the provisions of Article 11 of Law 6990, lack foundation, without this implying that competences or powers pertaining to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or the Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos are being exercised.

**3)- THE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE FISCAL INCENTIVE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE NULLITY PROCEDURE OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA.** Regarding the plaintiff's arguments to the effect that the Tax Administration should have resorted to the lesividad (self-review) procedure in order to eliminate the fiscal benefit, it must be considered in the first instance that in the present case we are not in the presence of an own act over which the tax administration seeks to determine its nullity, in which case it would have to resort to the procedure established in Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública or to the filing of a lesividad process. This Chamber endorses the considerations of the State representative in the sense that the Administration is not questioning the validity of the Tourism Contract that was signed by the Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, given that in the present case the loss of the benefit is a fact attributable to the Plaintiff and not to the active Administration, so that to reject the benefit it is not necessary to resort to the procedure of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, nor to the contentious-administrative lesividad proceeding. In the case at hand, the application of the fiscal incentive in a specific period is questioned due to the taxpayer's non-compliance with legal requirements. At no time has the Tax Administration proceeded to annul or review the administrative acts issued by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or by the Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos, as it would not be competent for such purposes, and said administrative acts prevail. The taxpayer could even have processed the request in another fiscal period so that the fiscal benefit would be recognized, which could have been recognized if the legal requirements established for that purpose were met. The Sala Constitucional ruled in this sense in Judgment No. 2001-7960 of 13:25 hours on August 10, 2001, issued within the Amparo Appeal filed by today's Plaintiff, where it considered the following: (....) II.- On the merits. The Chamber deems that in the sub judice the violations of the constitutional order alleged by the appellant do not occur and, without any doubt, the matter raised before this Chamber is one of mere legality and must be discussed in administrative proceedings and, eventually, in the special tax contentious proceeding. Indeed, the legal system assigns to the tax administration audit powers over the correct use of tax benefits, and in the exercise of those powers it has rejected the fiscal benefit sought by the amparo protected party, and against what was resolved by the tax administration, ordinary appeals provided for by the legal system are available. The amparo protected party has not been deprived of any subjective right, insofar as the fiscal credit claimed has not been recognized by the tax administration; rather, it has been denied to it; consequently, it is not necessary to resort to the special nullity and lesividad procedures, since we are not in the presence of the suppression of an act declaring subjective rights, but rather before the exercise of a public power. The discussion regarding the action of the tax administration, in relation to the rejection of the benefit, is a matter of mere legality that must be discussed in ordinary proceedings, and not in the summary amparo process, in accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution. Upon the Transfer of Charges, the opportunity opens for the interested party to appear in the proceeding initiated in defense of its rights and interests, and for this reason, the Chamber also does not find that the alleged violation of due process has occurred. On the grounds set forth, the appeal must be dismissed. Therefore: The appeal is declared without merit." (The underlining does not correspond to the original). As evidenced by what has been indicated, the plaintiff's arguments that the Tax Administration should have resorted to the lesividad procedure or the procedure established in Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública in order not to recognize the fiscal incentive lack foundation.

**4)- REGARDING THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRIVATE PURCHASE-SALE AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN SARDIMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA AND THE EMPRESA HOTEL CAMINO REAL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA.** As indicated, on September 10, 1998, the Plaintiff signed a Private Share Subscription Agreement with the Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, and an analysis of the main provisions contained in the Agreement must be carried out in order to determine, according to its provisions, its contractual nature. Clause One of the Agreement establishes the following: "First: HCR will be gradually increasing its share capital in the sum of FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE UNITED STATES DOLLARS, in its equivalent in colones, through the issuance of preferred, nominative shares of one thousand colones each, fully subscribed and paid for by different investors." For its part, Clause Two establishes: "... Second: Said preferred shares will be divided into Class "F" and Class "G" Shares, and their descriptions and privileges will be as follows: The Class "F" Shares and Class "G" Shares will have a value of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS or its equivalent in colones at the date of investment, of each class, preferred and nominative of one thousand colones each, where they will only generate a net return of nine percent (09%) annually on the Class "F" shares, returns that will be calculated on the nominal value of the shares indexed to the United States dollar at the time of total payment by THE CLIENT of the shares and which will be paid quarterly on the first business day of the months of April, July, October, and January of each year; the Class "G" shares will not generate any return. Any withholding that might exist or that might have to be made on said return will be covered by HCR at its cost. The owners of said shares will have neither voice nor vote in the Ordinary General Shareholders' Meetings of HCR, except in the Meetings indicated in articles one hundred thirty-nine and one hundred forty-seven of the Commercial Code. Both shares will have the repurchase privilege based on their value indexed in dollars in accordance with clause nine of this contract." For its part, Clause Five establishes the following: "Fifth: HCR declares that as of this date its tourism contract number three hundred eighty-seven is valid and in order, in which it is authorized to issue shares protected under article eleven of the Ley de Incentivos Turísticos, number six thousand nine hundred ninety, and further declares that it has been authorized by the Tourism Regulatory Commission to sell shares with this fiscal benefit for at least the amounts indicated in this contract, thus fulfilling its responsibilities established in the 'Procedure to Opt for the Benefits of article eleven of Law six thousand nine hundred ninety, Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico,' issued by the Instituto Costarricense del Turismo, a copy of which is attached to this contract. HCR also declares its commitment to keep its aforementioned tourism contract valid and in order, for the entire period necessary so that THE CLIENT, at its own account and cost, can assert its fiscal benefit rights, as well as to make its best efforts to help THE CLIENT comply with the requirements corresponding to it according to the cited procedure, so that THE CLIENT may benefit from the established benefit. The fiscal benefit enjoyed by the investment, in accordance with Law number 6990, will be subject to THE CLIENT meeting all the conditions referred to in said Law and to it being duly approved by the Competent Authorities." In this sense, note the provision contained in the final part of the Clause to the effect that the fiscal benefit enjoyed by the investment was subject to the client, in this case Sardimar Sociedad Anónima, complying with the conditions established in Ley 6990 and to it being duly approved by the Competent Authorities. For its part, Clause Seven of the Agreement under comment establishes the following: "Seventh: THE CLIENT in this act grants a special power, as broad as required by law, to FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A., so that in its name and at its cost, once the share capital increase is registered and the shares or share ownership certificate are prepared, it places said shares or certificate in a trust in a State Bank member of the National Banking System or in the Bolsa Nacional de Valores, in accordance with the requirements established in article eleven of the Ley de Incentivos turísticos number six thousand nine hundred ninety. THE CLIENT will be obligated to carry out all the procedures and fulfill all the requirements requested for that purpose by the ICT, the Tourism Regulatory Commission, and the Ministry of Finance, so that the fiscal credit is granted to it. FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A, undertakes to return the mentioned share certificates to THE CLIENT upon the expiration of the two-year period provided in the legal norm cited above." Note how the contractual provision expressly establishes that The Client, in this case the Plaintiff Company, was obligated to carry out all the procedures and fulfill all the requirements that were requested for that purpose by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, the Tourism Regulatory Commission, and the Ministry of Finance so that the fiscal credit would be granted to it. Clause Eight of the signed Agreement establishes the following: "Eighth: HCR declares that the value of the shares will be indexed to the United States dollar according to the selling exchange rate, of reference of the Banco Central de Costa Rica on this date, an equivalent amount that will be noted on the back of the shares. The returns that the Class "F" Shares will generate, as described in clause two of this contract, will be calculated on the indexed, or 'dollarized' value, returns that will be paid in United States dollars or their equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica on the day of payment." Finally, Clause Nine of the Agreement signed by the parties establishes the following: "Ninth: International Realty Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter IHR)... undertakes to repurchase from THE CLIENT or its holder, and THE CLIENT or its holder undertakes to sell to it, the Class 'F' Shares no later than September 30, 2002, and the Class 'G' Shares no later than September 30, 2004, for their nominal value indexed to the United States dollar, as noted on the back of the document itself, or its equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica on the day of payment." From the analysis of the cited Clauses, this Chamber considers that the arguments of the Tax Administration for denying the tax credit to the Plaintiff are in accordance with the law, given that in the Private Share Subscription Agreement signed between the parties there exists a series of provisions that distort its purpose, converting it into an Agreement for the acquisition of debt instruments and not preferred, nominative shares, contravening article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development, as detailed: a). There is a provision that establishes a reciprocal commitment of both parties to carry out the repurchase of the instruments on an established date. b)- There is a provision that establishes the payment of returns or interest on the loan, independent of the financial results of the Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima; c)- The repurchase commitment is for the nominal value of the shares, without considering the capital gain generated by the Hotel as a going concern; d)- The purchase and sale agreement for some instruments establishes that they do not generate any right to dividends, nor to the proportional part of the retained earnings, nor to equity revaluations, nor to paid-in capital in excess of Hotel Camino Real S.A. Likewise, this Chamber shares the argument of the State representative, in the sense that, as considered by the Tax Audit, by repurchasing the Class "B" instruments in the month of September 1977 and issuing them again in the month of December 1997 under the "F" classification, the Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima violated the provisions contained in article 11 of Ley 6990, since said instruments, having been repurchased, were in treasury, so that if it had issued shares in the years 1997 and 1998, the Class "B" instruments changed to Class "F" did not increase the share capital, meaning that the capital increase authorized by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo for the Class "F" instruments never occurred, since the company merely put back into circulation the Class "B" instruments that had been issued in the year 1993. This Tribunal considers the considerations of the Tax Audit to be in accordance with the law, in the sense that even though the company developing the tourism project has indicated that the instruments being issued were preferred shares, the conditions established in the Agreement evidenced the creation of a credit instrument. In the sense indicated, the Fourth Section of this Tribunal, in a case where the acquisition of shares from the Empresa Camino Real Sociedad Anónima was being discussed, under identical conditions to those agreed upon with the Plaintiff here, considered the following: " (...). VI)- OF THE PREFERRED SHARES: As advanced supra, no question has been raised regarding the propriety of privileged corporate shares, as commercial law so permits; however, it is appropriate to make reference to this type of shares to determine not only their content, scope, and extent but also, and no less importantly, their objective within a commercial company; so that this Tribunal can determine if what the company carried out was a purchase of preferred shares or rather another type of transaction. The share, as an expression of corporate participation and the status of the partner that summarizes the rights and obligations incumbent upon the partner (its holder), is defined as '... the negotiable instrument that incorporates and certifies the effective participation in the life of the corporate entity, with all the rights and duties that descend from it' (CERTAD Maroto, Gastón. "Meditaciones a propósito de acciones y cuotas de sociedades de capital" in Ivstitia, San José Costa Rica, Year 3, No. 30, June, 1989, p.11).- By virtue of the principles of parity of treatment, uniformity or identity among shares, or parity of rights, our Commercial Code in Article 120 establishes that common and ordinary shares grant identical rights and represent equal parts of the share capital as their value is nominally equal.- This means that within their respective category, the shares are equal and therefore attribute identical rights and powers.- In the presence of the so-called 'freedom to issue shares with diverse characteristics,' our Article 121 of the Commercial Code permits companies to issue one or more classes (understood as categories) of shares, with the designations, preferences, privileges, restrictions, limitations, and other modalities stipulated in the corporate charter, provided they refer to benefits, to the corporate assets, to profits, to voting rights, or to any other aspect of corporate activity. Thus, in our environment, there exist common or ordinary shares and special shares, where preferred shares belong to this second category; which are extracted from Article 139 of the Commercial Code.- There is no doubt that preferred shares can arise both at the time of the company's founding and from a subsequent act, in which case the formalities prescribed for the amendment of the bylaws must be observed. Generally, the category of preferred shares finds its limit in the object of the privilege: it can only refer to the rights (patrimonial in principle) and not to the passive situations of the partner; it follows, then, that the obligation of contribution or participation in losses cannot be waived in any way (in this sense, see: Di SABATO, Franco. "Manuale delle società", Utet, Torino, Italy, second edition, 1987, p.281). This means, however elementary it may seem, that preferred shares are or represent part of the share capital and, in accordance with Articles 18, 19, and 106 of the Commercial Code, must be recorded in the corporate charter: the number, the nominal value, the nature, and the category of shares into which the share capital is divided.- Thus, when a corporation decides to issue shares of this category, such a decision must be recorded in the corporate pact in the clause respective to the share capital; where the authorization required by Article 156 of the same cited regulatory body is for those referred to or made possible in the original or modified corporate pact.- Now, in general terms, patrimonial rights consist of the right to a proportional part of the net profits and the right to the liquidation quota; however, our legislation does not contain a single provision enshrining these rights, but they are clearly derived from Articles 27 (prohibition of paying dividends or making distributions of any kind, except from realized and liquid profits resulting from a balance sheet approved by the Ordinary Shareholders' Meeting, where if there were a loss of share capital, it must be reinstated or legally reduced before any distribution or allocation of profits is made); Article 143 (which establishes the legal reserve and prescribes that once the reserve and those provided for in the corporate charter are made, if the Shareholders' Meeting resolves to distribute profits, the shareholders will acquire against the company a right to the collection of dividends).- This point undoubtedly refers to the phenomenon of 'self-financing' by virtue of which, despite there being declared net profits, it decides not to distribute them for that purpose, given that the right to a dividend is held in the abstract (as a power) and materializes (as a right) only when the Shareholders' Meeting resolves to distribute them. With Law 7201, Article 32 bis was added to the Commercial Code, and it regulates the right of withdrawal, establishing some normative limitation to the 'self-financing' power; as for the reimbursement of the liquidation quota, it is not established as a right per se, but it is extracted from Article 214 subsection e), by which powers are granted to liquidators of commercial companies, such as concluding pending operations, collecting credits and satisfying corporate obligations, selling corporate assets for the price authorized according to the liquidation rules, preparing the final liquidation statement and submitting it to discussion and approval of the partners in the manner appropriate according to the nature of the company, and delivering to each partner the part of the corporate assets that corresponds to them.- VII) It is not unknown that preferred shares grant a more advantageous position with respect to ordinary shares, as regards patrimonial rights; however, such privileges find a material limit: the prohibition of the leonine pact, which is derived from Articles 25 and 122, both of the Commercial Code, which is nothing other than that in common shares, the pact that limits one or more partners from participation in the profits but also in the losses is not effective, and regarding preferred shares, the pact that limits participation in both profits and losses will be effective; a system that contrasts with the provisions of the Civil Code for civil companies (Article 1205).- Finally, it must be noted that Law 7202 does not permit preferred shares on the stock exchanges, in investment companies, nor in operating companies of investment companies (Article 30 sub. c), 92 sub. 2) and 110 sub. c) of Law 7201 on the Securities Market), and they are permitted in open-capital corporations (Art. 126 sub. c) of Law 7201).- In summary, the privileges that our law allows to be granted through shares of such category are referred solely to the distribution of profits or reimbursements of the liquidation quota, the reasons for whose creation are basically explained by financial reasons and the desire for administrative control of the company.- Thus, when the company is a going concern, the most common reason for the issuance of this type of shares is the need for a capital increase that is difficult to place, and for this reason, we insist, the privileges can be applied only to patrimonial rights in the terms indicated by Article 139 of the Commercial Code and with the material limits set forth herein, always directed at the capital increase.- It is also important to mention that the privileges can consist of the right to receive, against the profits of the fiscal year, a preferential dividend of an amount that is generally set as a percentage of the nominal value of the preferred shares, and that instead of being annually due, it may be a cumulative right, where the corporate profits of one year are insufficient to pay the entire preferential dividend, such that it is paid off with subsequent corporate profits before proceeding to the distribution of dividends to the other shares.

In the words of Mr. Luis Herrera Reyes: "privileged shares (acciones privilegiadas) may, likewise, confer certain more considerable pecuniary advantages, for example, that the preference shares issued at five hundred pesos be reimbursed at one thousand, granting them preference over the available capital in the event of liquidation. But, one must not lose sight of the fact that preference shares are, like the others, simple shares and that therefore they cannot have rights other than those ordinarily established by the shareholders, such that it would not be permitted to stipulate a dividend or interest for privileged shares in the event that no corporate profits exist, as this would be an attack against the rights of third parties" (HERRERA Reyes, Luis. "Sociedades Anónimas," Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, Chile, 1935, p.135).

VIII- THE REPURCHASE TRANSACTION (NEGOCIO DE RECOMPRA): Certainly, despite the fact that it is not entirely clear to investors what it consists of, it is a transaction that is increasingly in use, created above all for subjects who participate in stock market transactions, such as brokerage firms (puestos de bolsa) and the National Stock Exchange itself (Bolsa Nacional de Valores). In the absence of doctrinal reference and comparative law, it can be assimilated to the known "repurchase agreement" (reporto) or "double contract," the latter being the one referred to by the current Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores) (art. 23, 49 and 50). The repurchase (recompra) figure appears as an adaptation of the repurchase agreement (contrato de reporto) to the Costa Rican securities market. Understanding them as similar, for the purposes of this ruling, the repurchase (recompra) consists of a stock market contract constituted between two parties, one of which is the holder of a security (título valor) and the other who holds cash, and where two operations take place; the first when the holder of the security transfers their instrument to the other party, and the second, when they buy it back within an established period, thereby obtaining temporary liquidity without the need to permanently dispose of their financial asset. "In general terms, a repurchase agreement involves the immediate acquisition of funds through the sale of securities with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase said securities on a specific date (normally within a determined period of less than one year) at a previously agreed price that includes interest or its equivalent, at an agreed yield" (JOHANNING, Patricia. "Aspectos generales del mercado de valores costarricense"., Programa de capacitación bursátil gerencial, fundación de Estudios de Postgrado e Investigación en Ciencias Económicas -Fundepos-, Universidad de Costa Rica, p.45). Rather than two contracts, we can see two obligations (prestaciones) where the owner of the securities does not wish to part with them but requires liquidity, which they obtain by negotiating them subject to the right and obligation to acquire them within the agreed period; thus ensuring the buyer or investor a gain without acquiring ownership of the securities, which is achieved upon the fulfillment of the second operation. It is a single legal relationship, with a single purpose or cause. Now then, the conditions or parameters of the agreement include the term and the yield, which do not necessarily have to be equal to the nominal yield of the security, due to the difference existing between the terms of both instruments. Thus, the security cannot have a term shorter than the term of the repurchase obligation, and the yield of the repurchase will be determined according to the term and market conditions, taking into consideration the price paid in the first operation. This means, for the purposes at hand, that the repurchase will always imply a gain for the investor who acquires in the first operation, which assimilates it to the interest that would be paid for a commercial loan, so this type of contract is outlined as a financing operation, where the buyer in the repurchase seeks a return on their money placed in repurchase. It follows then, in the terms presented, that the party who sells the securities by repurchase does not want to dispose of them but simply requires money or liquidity against those securities or instruments, and the party who buys them to resell them is not interested in acquiring definitive ownership of the same, but only that these exist as a guarantee for their money until payment by the initial seller. In our context, the repurchase (recompra) of shares (acciones) is recognized, although in the stock market it is very limited, but it is legally permitted in accordance with article 7 of the Operating System and article 45 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores), the latter providing that the interest, dividends, and other benefits deriving from the securities that are the object of the repurchase operations and that are payable during the term of said operations, shall correspond to the final forward seller, unless the parties expressly state in the stock exchange contract their will to be governed by the general rule, with the voting right corresponding to the seller until the moment of delivery. In summary, the repurchase (recompra) is neither a purchase-sale nor a transfer of ownership of the securities or instruments (in this regard, see: ARIAS L., Fabio Alberto: "Recompra: reporto o préstamo?", Ivustitia, year 13, No. 151-152, July-August, 1999). All of this leads us to conclude that the repurchase (recompra) is a financing or loan operation guaranteed by the securities, which are then delivered in trust (fideicomiso) as guarantee.

IX)- (....) It follows from what has been presented and analyzed in the case file, that what was negotiated by the plaintiff here does not meet the characteristics of privileged shares (acciones privilegiadas) and, therefore, they are not susceptible to being considered within the tax credit (crédito fiscal) benefit, which leads to fully endorsing what was acted upon and resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) without the challenged resolutions in any way violating the legislation that regulates the matter in this respect, nor the power granted through that avenue to oversee and determine the appropriateness of a benefit such as the one before us. Note that the negotiation begins with a private contract not opposable to the tax authority (fisco), in the first place; an agreement where the parties, despite calling them "privileged shares (acciones privilegiadas)," constitute a financing where even the transfer of ownership does not occur, as was duly accredited in the case file. We are in the presence, as has been said, of a bilateral contract, where both Hotel Camino Real S.A. and (.......) converge their will to negotiate in the terms described, with consequences for the plaintiff here that cause the denial of a fiscal benefit, not for failing to comply with required formalities but due to their content, instruments that correspond to nothing more than a financing that it is not possible to fit, for the reasons set forth in the administrative venue and verified in this one, within the letter of article 11 of Ley 6990, confirming that in none of the cases (neither the so-called class "F" shares nor class "G" shares) did they imply an increase in the corporate capital (capital social), which is the primary purpose of the issuance of privileged corporate shares (acciones societarias privilegiadas). The economic reality principle (principio de realidad económica) (contained in article 8 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)), as mentioned by the parties, certainly and in very simple terms, means overcoming the form to materially review what has been done with tax repercussions to determine whether or not what was requested applies; and in this case, that reality confirmed to be very different from what is regulated and pursued with the granting of a tax benefit. If the disallowance of the benefit causes some type of disagreement for the plaintiff here, it would eventually be against their co-contractor whom they should proceed, a legal entity regarding which, in any case, was not included in any of the claims of this lawsuit, so this Court finds legal limitations to assess its conduct within this process. Although the authentic interpretation of legal norms is the province of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), the scope of the norms in tax matters with a view to fitting the specific case within the legal hypothesis, corresponds to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), without what has been analyzed by this Court revealing any friction or violation with what, in relation, is legitimately and legally permitted to it; leaving no option but to confirm what was resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) in the terms contained in the challenged resolutions that rejected the granting of the tax credit (crédito fiscal) based on the respective tourism contract (contrato turístico); without this denying the legitimacy of the investments but rather their nature as privileged shares (acciones privilegiadas); which, as was stated, do not fit within the assumption for applying such a benefit; tourism incentives (incentivos turísticos) over which the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) legitimately exercised control and oversight without the investments made by the plaintiff here achieving the necessary specific legal definition (tipicidad) to grant the tourism benefit of exemption (exoneración). The assessment and application to a specific situation in a determined fiscal period of the granting of the tourism benefit granted in the abstract, is conditional on the fulfillment of determined obligations whose oversight function is held by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), and where the debt instruments (títulos de deuda) do not fit within the assumption required for its recognition, neither regarding the so-called class "F" shares nor class "G" shares, with the result that both the principal claim and the subsidiary claim find no support in our Legal System, the defense of lack of right being admissible and, consequently, the lawsuit filed here being without merit in all its extremes." (Contentious Administrative Court, Fourth Section at thirteen hours thirty minutes on the eighth of August two thousand seven).

Considering the reasons described, although the commercial legislation in force allows the legal possibility of issuing and selling privileged shares (acciones privilegiadas) and the possibility of concluding share repurchase contracts (contratos de recompra de acciones), the truth is that in the present case, this Court considers the arguments of the State's representative to be appropriate, to the effect that in reality, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Private Share Subscription Contract (Contrato Privado de Suscripción de Acciones) signed between the Plaintiff and the Entity Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, what the plaintiff acquired were debt instruments (títulos de deuda) and not shares (acciones) that would allow, under the provisions established in article 11 of Ley 6990, recognition of the tax credit (crédito fiscal) originating from said purchase. In this sense, this Court considers that the arguments put forth by the plaintiff regarding the impropriety of the actions of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) lack foundation, since in accordance with the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties, the repurchase obligation (obligación de recompra) of the shares (acciones) that were acquired by the plaintiff here, coincidentally constitutes one of the main elements to consider the non-existence of a Share Purchase-Sale Contract (Contrato de Compra-Venta de Acciones) within the purposes established by the legislator when issuing the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley de Incentivos para el desarrollo Turístico).

4)- THE PRIVATE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT OPPOSABLE TO THE TAX AUTHORITY (FISCO). ECONOMIC REALITY PRINCIPLE (PRINCIPIO DE REALIDAD ECONOMICA). In accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) when defining the form of interpretation of the norm that regulates the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation, the legal forms adopted by the taxpayers do not bind the interpreter, who may attribute to the situations and acts that occurred a meaning consistent with the facts, when it emerges from the tax law that the taxable event of the respective obligation was defined based on reality and not on the legal form. When the legal forms are manifestly inappropriate to the reality of the taxed facts and this results in a decrease in the amount of the obligations, the tax law must be applied disregarding such forms. For its part, article 12 of the cited Code establishes that agreements concerning tax matters entered into between private parties are not admissible against the Tax Authority (Fisco). In the indicated sense, the Contentious Administrative Court, Second Section in Judgment No. 241-2008 delivered at eleven hours twenty minutes on the eighteenth of July two thousand eight, already cited, considered the following: " (...) Thus, it is not enough to provide the vouchers to justify the expense, but rather these must be duly authorized by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), as follows from articles 8 and 9 of the cited Law and 103 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), because 'the validity of the deduction self-performed by the taxpayer for the purposes of their return, is subject to the subsequent verification that the Treasury (Fisco) can carry out in these matters' (judgment number 000633-F-2006, of ten hours forty-five minutes on the sixth of September two thousand six, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia)); because the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) has been endowed with sufficient powers to verify or cross-check the information provided by the taxpayer, that is, a power of oversight (fiscalización) and investigation, both of the documents provided and of those it deems necessary for the accreditation of the expenses, as this function has the purpose of '[...] unraveling the underlying economic reality in the tax obligation, giving way to the duty to complete what is due, if it was determined that the tax quota is higher, or else, that is, if too much was paid, to return upon claim the excess paid, since its retention, if it were to occur, would be improper, therefore, contrary to legality. The inquisitive power in question, equally, allows requesting information from third parties, public offices or officials, or from the passive subject themselves, who in accordance with the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), are obliged to provide the documentation that is required (articles 128 and 132 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)). All with the object of channeling, within its correct dimension, the amount of the tax duty, that is, to establish the real dimension of the duty to contribute, constituting a burden of collaboration with the Tax Authority (Fisco), which has its root in the very doctrine of constitutional canon 18. This is why the appropriateness of the expense must be fully accredited by the taxpayer, and it corresponds to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in exercise of these powers, to conclude on its appropriateness, not only in qualitative terms, but also in quantitative ones. In this way, upon its rejection, it corresponds to the passive subject to provide the evidence that justifies the change of criteria, that is, the burden of proof is incumbent upon them, most of the time' (judgment number 000633-F-2006, supra cited)." In the present case, given the circumstances that have been detailed, in the opinion of this Court, in attention to the economic reality principle (principio de realidad económica) and under the protection of the provisions contained in articles 8 and 12 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), the denial of the credit applied by the Plaintiff in its Income Tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta) return for the 1998 period regarding the investment in shares (acciones) through the Tourism Contract (Contrato Turístico) of Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima is in accordance with the law, because what was acquired were debt instruments (títulos de deuda) and not preferred shares (acciones preferentes), with said Agreement constituting an agreement between private parties that is not admissible against the Tax Authority (Fisco), without this implying - as the plaintiff considers - that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is exercising powers that are proper to the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo).

3)- THE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE TAX INCENTIVE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE NULLITY PROCEDURE OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Regarding the plaintiff's arguments that the Tax Administration should have resorted to the lesividad procedure in order to eliminate the tax benefit, it must be considered in the first instance that in this case we are not in the presence of an act of the tax administration itself whose nullity it seeks to determine, in which case it would have to resort to the procedure established in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or to the filing of a lesividad proceeding. This Chamber endorses the considerations of the State representative in the sense that the Administration is not questioning the validity of the Tourism Contract that was signed by the Hotel Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, given that in the present case the loss of the benefit is an act attributable to the Plaintiff and not to the active Administration, so that to reject the benefit it is not necessary to resort to the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity procedure, nor to the lesividad contentious proceeding. In this case, the application of the tax incentive in a specific period is questioned due to the taxpayer's non-compliance with legal requirements. At no time has the Tax Administration proceeded to annul or review the administrative acts issued by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute or by the Joint Commission for the Approval of Tourism Incentives, as it would not be competent for such purposes, and said administrative acts prevail. The taxpayer could even have processed the request in another fiscal period for the tax benefit to be recognized, which could have been recognized if it had met the legal requirements established for that purpose. The Constitutional Chamber ruled in this sense in Judgment No.7960-2001 of 1:25 p.m. on August 10, 2001, issued within the Amparo Appeal filed by the current Plaintiff, in which it considered the following: (....) II.- On the merits. The Chamber considers that in this subjudice, the violations of the constitutional order alleged by the appellant do not occur and, without any doubt, the matter brought before this Chamber is one of mere legality and must be discussed in the administrative venue and eventually in the special tax contentious jurisdiction. Indeed, the legal system assigns the tax administration oversight powers over the correct use of tax benefits and, in the use of those powers, it has rejected the tax benefit sought by the protected party, and against what was resolved by the tax administration, ordinary appeals provided for by the legal system are available. **The protected party has not been deprived of any subjective right, as the tax credit it claims has not been recognized by the tax administration; rather, it has been denied; consequently, it is not necessary to resort to the special nullity and *lesividad* procedures, since we are not in the presence of the suppression of a declaratory act of subjective rights, but rather before the exercise of a public power.** The discussion about the tax administration's action, in relation to the rejection of the benefit, is a matter of mere legality that must be discussed in the ordinary venue, and not in the summary amparo proceeding, in accordance with the provisions of article 49 of the Political Constitution. From the Transfer of Charges, the interested party is given the opportunity to appear in the procedure established in defense of their rights and interests, and for this reason, the Chamber also does not find that the alleged violation of due process has occurred. By reason of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed. Therefore: The appeal is declared without merit." (The underlining does not correspond to the original). As evidenced by the foregoing, the plaintiff's arguments that the Tax Administration should have resorted to the *lesividad* procedure or the procedure established in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration in order not to recognize the tax incentive lack merit.

4)- REGARDING THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRIVATE SALE AND PURCHASE CONTRACT SIGNED BETWEEN SARDIMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA AND THE HOTEL COMPANY CAMINO REAL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA. As indicated, on September ten, 1998, the Plaintiff signed with the Hotel Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima a Private Contract for the subscription of Shares, and the analysis of the main provisions contained in the Agreement must be carried out in order to determine, according to its provisions, its contractual nature. The First Clause of the Agreement establishes the following: "First: **HCR** will be gradually increasing its capital stock in the sum of **FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE UNITED STATES DOLLARS**, in its equivalent in colones, through the issuance of preferred and nominative shares of one thousand colones each, fully subscribed and paid by different investors." For its part, the Second Clause establishes: "... Second: Said preferred shares will be divided into Class **"F"** and Class **"G"** Shares and their descriptions and privileges will be as follows: Class **"F"** and Class **"G"** Shares will have a value of **TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS** or its equivalent in colones at the date of investment, of each class, preferred and nominative of one thousand colones each, where only the Class **"F"** ones will generate a net yield of nine percent (09%) per annum, yields that will be calculated on the nominal value of the shares indexed to the United States dollar at the time of the total cancellation by **THE CLIENT** of the shares and that will be paid quarterly on the first business day of the months of April, July, October, and January of each year; the Class **"G"** shares will not generate any yield. Any withholding that might exist or that might have to be made to said yield will be covered by **HCR** at its cost. The owners of said shares will have neither voice nor vote in the Ordinary General Shareholders' Meetings of **HCR**, except in the Meetings indicated in articles one hundred thirty-nine and one hundred forty-seven of the Commercial Code. Both shares will have the privilege of repurchase based on their value indexed in dollars in accordance with the ninth clause of this contract." For its part, the fifth clause establishes the following: "Fifth: **HCR** states that as of this date its tourism contract number three hundred eighty-seven is valid and in order, in which it is authorized to issue shares covered by article eleven of the Tourism Incentives Law, number six thousand nine hundred ninety, and it also states that it has been authorized by the Tourism Regulatory Commission to sell shares with this tax benefit for at least the amounts indicated in this contract, thus complying with its responsibilities established in the **"Procedure to Opt for the Benefits of article eleven of Law six thousand nine hundred ninety, Incentives for Tourism Development"**, issued by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, a copy of which is attached to this contract. **HCR** also states its commitment to keep its aforementioned tourism contract valid and in order for all the time necessary so that **THE CLIENT**, on its own account and cost, may assert its rights to the tax benefit, as well as to use its best efforts to help **THE CLIENT** comply with the requirements that correspond to the latter according to the cited procedure, so that **THE CLIENT** may benefit from the established benefit. The tax benefit enjoyed by the investment, in accordance with Law number 6990, will be subject to **THE CLIENT** meeting all the conditions referred to in said Law and being duly approved by the Competent Authorities." In this regard, note the provision contained in the final part of the Clause in the sense that the tax benefit enjoyed by the investment was subject to the client, in this case Sardimar Sociedad Anónima, complying with the conditions established in Law 6990 and being duly approved by the competent Authorities. For its part, the Seventh Clause of the Contract under discussion establishes the following: "Seventh: **THE CLIENT** in this act grants a special power of attorney, as broad as required by law, to **FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A.**, so that in its name and at its cost, once the increase in capital stock is registered and the shares or share ownership certificate are prepared, it may place said shares or certificate in trust in a State Bank, a member of the National Banking System, or in the National Stock Exchange, in accordance with the requirements established in article eleven of the Tourism Incentives Law number six thousand nine hundred ninety. **THE CLIENT** will be obliged to carry out all the procedures and fulfill all the requirements that are requested for this purpose by the ICT, the Tourism Regulatory Commission, and the Ministry of Finance, so that the tax credit is granted to it. **FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A.**, undertakes to return the aforementioned share certificates to **THE CLIENT** upon the expiration of the two-year period provided for in the aforementioned legal norm." Note how the contractual provision expressly establishes that The Client, in this case the Plaintiff Company, was obliged to carry out all the procedures and fulfill all the requirements that were requested for this purpose by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, the Tourism Regulatory Commission, and the Ministry of Finance so that the tax credit would be granted to it. The Eighth Clause of the signed Contract establishes the following: "Eighth: **HCR** declares that the value of the shares will be indexed to the United States dollar according to the reference selling exchange rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica as of this date, an equivalent amount that will be stated on the back of the shares. The yields that the Class "F" shares will generate, as described in the second clause of this contract, will be calculated on the indexed or "dollarized" value, yields that will be paid in United States dollars or their equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica on the payment date." Finally, the Ninth Clause of the Contract signed by the parties establishes the following: "Ninth: **International Realty Holdings, Inc.** (hereinafter **IHR**)... undertakes to repurchase from **THE CLIENT** or its holder, and **THE CLIENT** or its holder undertakes to sell to it, the Class "F" Shares no later than September thirtieth of the year two thousand two and the Class "G" Shares no later than September thirtieth of the year two thousand four, at their nominal value indexed to the United States dollar, as stated on the back of the document itself, or their equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica on the payment date." From the analysis of the cited Clauses, this Chamber considers that the arguments of the Tax Administration to deny the tax credit to the Plaintiff are in accordance with the law, given that in the Private Share Subscription Contract signed between the parties, there are a series of provisions that distort its purpose, turning it into an Agreement for the acquisition of debt instruments and not preferred and nominative shares, contravening article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development, as detailed: a). There is a provision that establishes a reciprocal commitment of both parties to repurchase the instruments on an established date. b)- There is a provision that establishes the payment of yields or interest on the loan, independent of the financial results of Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima; c)- The commitment to repurchase is for the nominal value of the shares, without considering the capital gain generated by the Hotel as a going concern; d)- The purchase and sale contract for some instruments establishes that they do not generate any right to dividends, nor to the proportional part of retained earnings, nor to asset revaluations, nor to paid-in capital in excess of Hotel Camino Real S.A. Likewise, this Chamber shares the argument of the State representative, in the sense that, as considered by the Tax Audit, when the Hotel Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima repurchased the class "B" instruments in September 1977 and reissued them in December 1997 under the "F" classification, the provisions contained in article 11 of Law 6990 were violated, since said instruments, having been repurchased, were in treasury, so if it had issued shares in 1997 and 1998, the class "B" instruments changed to class "F" did not increase the share capital, meaning that the capital increase authorized by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute for the class "F" instruments never occurred, since the company simply put back into circulation the class "B" instruments that had been issued in 1993. This Court considers the Tax Audit's considerations to be legally correct, in the sense that even though the developing company of the tourism project has indicated that the instruments issued were preferred shares, the conditions established in the Agreement evidence the creation of a credit instrument. In the sense indicated, the Fourth Section of this Court, in a case in which the acquisition of shares from the Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima was discussed, under identical conditions to those agreed with the Plaintiff here, considered the following: **" (...). VI)- REGARDING PREFERRED SHARES:** As noted supra, no question has been raised regarding the appropriateness of privileged corporate shares, as commercial law allows it; however, it is appropriate to refer to this type of shares to determine not only their content, scope, and extent but also, and no less importantly, their objective within a commercial company; so that this Court can determine if what the company carried out was a purchase of preferred shares or another type of business. The share, as an expression of corporate participation and the status of the shareholder that summarizes the rights and obligations pertaining to the shareholder (its holder), is defined as "... the circulating instrument that incorporates and certifies the effective participation in the life of the corporate entity, with all the rights and duties that descend from it" (CERTAD Maroto, Gastón. "Meditations regarding shares and quotas of capital companies" in Ivstitia, San José Costa Rica, Year 3, No. 30, June, 1989, p.11).- By virtue of the principles of parity of treatment, uniformity or identity among shares, or parity of rights, our Commercial Code in article 120 establishes that common and ordinary shares grant identical rights and represent equal parts of the capital stock, as their value is nominally equal.- This means that within their respective category, shares are equal and therefore attribute identical rights and powers.- In the presence of the so-called "freedom to issue shares with diverse characteristics", our article 121 of the Commercial Code allows companies to issue one or more classes (understood as categories) of shares, with the designations, preferences, privileges, restrictions, limitations, and other modalities that are stipulated in the corporate charter, as long as they refer to benefits, corporate assets, profits, voting, or any other aspect of corporate activity. Thus, in our environment, there are common or ordinary shares and special ones, where preferred shares belong to this second category; which are extracted from article 139 of the Commercial Code.- There is no doubt that preferred shares can arise both at the time of the company's founding and from a subsequent act, in which case the formalities prescribed for the amendment of the by-laws must be observed. Generally, the category of preferred shares finds its limit in the object of the privilege: it can only refer to rights (patrimonial in principle) and not to the passive situations of the shareholder; consequently, the obligation of contribution and participation in losses cannot be exempted in any way (in this regard, see: Di SABATO, Franco.

”Manual of Companies” ("Manuale delle societá"), Utet, Turin ("Torino"), Italy, second edition, 1987, p.281). This means, although it may seem elementary, that preferred shares are or represent part of the corporate capital and, pursuant to Articles 18, 19, and 106 of the Commercial Code, the following must be stated in the corporate charter: the number, the nominal value, the nature, and the class of shares into which the corporate capital is divided. Thus, when a corporation (sociedad anónima) decides to issue shares of this class, such intention must be stated in the corporate bylaws (pacto social) in the respective clause regarding corporate capital; where the authorization required by Article 156 of the same cited regulatory body is for those referred to or made possible in the original or amended corporate bylaws (pacto social). Now, in general terms, the rights of a patrimonial nature consist of the right to a proportional share of net profits and the right to the liquidation quota; however, our legislation does not contain a single provision enshrining these rights, but they clearly emerge from Articles 27 (prohibition of paying dividends or making distributions of any kind, except from realized and liquid profits resulting from a balance sheet approved by the Ordinary General Meeting (Asamblea Ordinaria), where if there has been a loss of corporate capital, it must be replenished or legally reduced before making any distribution or allocation of profits); Article 143 (which establishes the legal reserve and prescribes that if, after setting aside the reserve and those provided for in the corporate charter, the General Meeting (Asamblea) agrees to distribute profits, the shares shall acquire a right vis-à-vis the corporation for the collection of dividends). This point undoubtedly refers to the phenomenon of “self-financing” ("autofinanciamiento"), by virtue of which, despite there being declared net profits, it is decided not to distribute them for that purpose, given that the right to the dividend is held in abstracto (as a power) and materializes (as a right) only when the General Meeting (Asamblea) agrees to distribute them. With Law 7201, Article 32 bis was added to the Commercial Code, and it regulates the right of withdrawal, establishing some normative limitation on the power of “self-financing” ("autofinanciamiento"); regarding the reimbursement of the liquidation quota, it is not established as such a right, but it is extracted from Article 214, subsection e), through which powers are granted to the liquidators of commercial companies, such as concluding pending operations, collecting credits and satisfying corporate obligations, selling corporate assets for the price authorized according to the liquidation rules, preparing the final statement of liquidation and submitting it for discussion and approval by the partners in the form corresponding according to the nature of the company, and delivering to each partner the portion of the corporate assets corresponding to them.

**VII)** It is not unknown that preferred shares grant a more advantageous position compared to ordinary shares regarding patrimonial rights; however, such privileges find a material limit: the prohibition of the leonine agreement (pacto leonino), which emerges from Articles 25 and 122, both of the Commercial Code, which is nothing other than that for common shares, a pact that limits one or more partners' participation in profits but not in losses is ineffective, and regarding preferred shares, a pact that limits participation in both profits and losses shall be effective; a system that contrasts with what is stipulated in the Civil Code for civil partnerships (Article 1205). Finally, it must be noted that Law 7202 does not permit preferred shares on stock exchanges (bolsas de valores), in investment companies (sociedades de inversión), or in operating companies of investment companies (sociedades operadoras de sociedades de inversión) (Article 30, subsection c), 92, subsection 2), and 110, subsection c) of Law 7201 on the Securities Market (Mercado de Valores)), and they are permitted in publicly held corporations (sociedades anónimas de capital abierto) (art. 126, subsection c) of Law 7201). In summary, the privileges that our law allows to be granted through shares of such class are referred solely to the distribution of profits or reimbursements of the liquidation quota, the reasons for whose creation are basically explained by financial reasons and a desire for administrative control of the corporation. Thus, when the corporation is a going concern, the most common reason for issuing this type of shares is the need for a capital increase that is difficult to place, and because of this, we insist, the privileges can apply only to rights of a patrimonial nature in the terms set forth in Article 139 of the Commercial Code and with the material limits set forth herein, always directed towards the capital increase. It is also important to mention that the privileges may consist of the right to receive, charged against the profits of the fiscal year, a preferred dividend of an amount that is generally set as a percentage of the nominal value of the preferred shares, and which, instead of being annually due, may be a cumulative right, where the corporate profits of one year are insufficient to pay the entire preferred dividend, so it is paid with subsequent corporate profits before proceeding to the distribution of dividends to the other shares. In the words of Mr. Luis Herrera Reyes: "preferred shares may also confer certain more considerable pecuniary advantages, for example, that priority shares issued at five hundred pesos be reimbursed at one thousand, granting them preference over available capital in the event of liquidation. But it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that priority shares are, like the others, simple shares and that therefore they cannot have rights other than those ordinarily established by the shareholders, so that it would not be permissible to stipulate for preferred shares a dividend or interest in the event that no corporate profits exist, as this would be detrimental to the rights of third parties" (HERRERA Reyes, Luis. "Sociedades Anónimas, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, Chile, 1935, p,135).

**VIII - OF THE REPURCHASE TRANSACTION (NEGOCIO DE RECOMPRA):** Certainly, although it is not entirely clear to investors what it consists of, it is a transaction that is increasingly in use, created above all for subjects who participate in stock exchange transactions, such as brokerage houses and the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) itself. In the absence of doctrinal reference and comparative law, it can be likened to the well-known "report" contract or "double contract," the latter being the one referred to by the current Securities Market Law (arts. 23, 49, and 50). The repurchase (recompra) figure appears as an adaptation of the report contract to the Costa Rican securities market. Understanding them as similar for the purposes of this resolution, the repurchase (recompra) consists of a stock exchange contract established between two parties, one of whom is the holder of a security and the other who holds cash, and where two operations occur: the first when the holder of the title transfers their instrument to the other party, and the second, when they buy it back within an established term, thereby obtaining temporary liquidity without needing to permanently relinquish their financial asset. "In general terms, a repurchase agreement involves the immediate acquisition of funds through the sale of securities with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase said securities on a specific date (normally in a determined period of less than one year) at a previously agreed price that includes interest or its equivalent, at an agreed yield" (JOHANNING, Patricia. "Aspectos generales del mercado de valores costarricense", Programa de capacitación bursátil gerencial, Fundación de Estudios de Postgrado e Investigación en Ciencias Económicas -Fundepos-, Universidad de Costa Rica, p.45). More than two contracts, we can see two performances where the owner of the securities does not wish to dispose of them but requires liquidity, which they obtain by negotiating them subject to the right and obligation to reacquire them within the agreed term; the buyer or investor thereby ensuring a profit without acquiring ownership of the securities, which is achieved upon the fulfillment of the second operation. It is a unitary legal relationship, with a single purpose or cause. Now, the conditions or parameters of the agreement include the term and the yield, which does not necessarily have to be equal to the nominal yield of the security, due to the difference existing between the terms of both instruments. Thus, the security cannot have a term shorter than the term of the repurchase obligation, and the yield of the repurchase (recompra) will be determined according to the term and market conditions, taking into consideration the price paid in the first operation. This means, for the purposes that concern us, that the repurchase (recompra) will always imply a gain for the investor who acquires in the first operation, which likens it to the interest that would be paid for a commercial loan, so this type of contract is outlined as a financing operation, where the acquirer in a repurchase (recompra) seeks a return on their money placed in repurchase (recompra). It follows then, in the terms set forth, that the person who sells the securities via repurchase (recompra) does not wish to dispose of them but simply requires money or liquidity on those securities or titles, and the person who buys them to resell them is not interested in acquiring definitive ownership of them, but only in them existing as a guarantee for their money until payment by the initial seller. In our environment, repurchase (recompra) on shares is recognized, although it is very limited in the stock market, but it is legally permitted in accordance with Article 7 of the Operating System and Article 45 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores), the latter providing that the interest, dividends, and other benefits deriving from the securities object of the repurchase (recompra) operations and which are due during the term of said operations shall correspond to the final forward seller, unless the parties expressly state in the stock exchange contract their will to be governed by the general rule, the seller corresponding to the voting right until the moment of delivery. Repurchase (recompra) is, in short, neither a purchase-sale nor a transmission of the ownership of the securities (in this sense, see: ARIAS L., Fabio Alberto: "Recompra: reporto o préstamo?", Ivstitia, year 13, No. 151-152, July-August, 1999). All of this leads us to conclude that the repurchase (recompra) is a financing or loan operation with a guarantee in the securities, which are later delivered in a guarantee trust (fideicomiso en garantía).

**IX)- (....)** It follows from what has been set forth and analyzed in the case record that what was negotiated by the plaintiff herein does not meet the characteristics of preferred shares and, therefore, they are not susceptible to being considered within the tax credit benefit, which leads to fully endorsing what was performed and resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), without the challenged resolutions in any way violating the legislation that regulates the matter in this regard, nor the power granted through that avenue to audit and define the provenance of a benefit such as the one in question. Note that the negotiation begins from a private contract not opposable to the Public Treasury (fisco), in the first place; an agreement where the parties, despite calling them "preferred shares," constitute a financing where the transfer of ownership does not even occur, as was duly accredited in the case record. We are in the presence, as has been said, of a bilateral contract, where both Hotel Camino Real S.A. and (.......) bring together their will to negotiate in the terms described, with consequences for the case of the plaintiff herein that cause the denial of a tax benefit, not for non-compliance with required formalities but for their content, titles that correspond to nothing more than financing that it is not possible to fit, for the reasons set forth in the administrative venue and verified herein, within the letter of Article 11 of Law 6990, verifying that in none of the cases (neither the so-called class "F" shares nor the class "G" shares) implied an increase in the corporate capital, which is the primary purpose of issuing preferred corporate shares. The principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) (contained in Article 8 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)), as the parties mention, certainly and in very simple terms, means overcoming the form to materially review what was performed with fiscal repercussions to determine if what is requested applies or not; and in this case, that reality confirmed to be very different from what is regulated and pursued with the granting of a tax benefit. If the denial of the benefit causes any type of disagreement to the plaintiff herein, it would eventually be with her co-contracting party against whom she should proceed, a legal entity regarding which, in any case, was not included in any of the claims of this lawsuit, so this Court finds legal limitations to assess its conduct within this proceeding. Although the authentic interpretation of legal rules is the province of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), the scope of the rules in tax matters with a view to fitting the concrete case within the legal hypothesis corresponds to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), without it appearing from what this Court has analyzed that there is any friction or violation with what, in relation, is legitimately and legally permitted to it; leaving no further option than to confirm what was resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) in the terms contained in the challenged resolutions that rejected the granting of the tax credit based on the respective tourism contract; without this denying the legitimacy of the investments but rather their nature as preferred shares; which, as stated, do not fit within the premise for applying such a benefit; tourism incentives over which the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) legitimately exercised control and oversight, without the investments made by the plaintiff herein reaching the necessary typicity to grant the tourism benefit of exemption. The assessment and application to a specific situation in a determined fiscal period of the granting of the tourism benefit granted in abstracto is conditioned on compliance with certain obligations, the oversight function of which lies with the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), and where the debt securities do not fit within the premise required for their recognition, neither regarding the so-called class "F" shares nor the class "G" shares, with both the main claim and the subsidiary claim finding no support in our Legal System, the defense of lack of right being admissible and, consequently, the lawsuit filed here being without merit in all its aspects." **(Contencioso Administrative Tribunal, Fourth Section at thirteen hours thirty minutes on August eighth, two thousand seven) .** Considering the reasons described, although the current commercial legislation allows the legal possibility of issuing and selling preferred shares and the possibility of entering into share repurchase (recompra) contracts, the truth is that in the present case, this Court considers the arguments of the State's legal representative to be applicable, in the sense that, in reality, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Private Share Subscription Agreement (Contrato Privado de Suscripción de Acciones) entered into between the Plaintiff (la Actora) and the Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, what the plaintiff acquired were debt securities and not shares that would allow, under the provisions of Article 11 of Law 6990, the recognition of the tax credit arising from said purchase. In this sense, this Court considers that the arguments put forth by the plaintiff regarding the impropriety of the Tax Administration's (Administración Tributaria) actions lack foundation, since in accordance with the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties, the obligation to repurchase (recompra) the shares that were acquired by the plaintiff herein precisely constitutes one of the main elements for considering the non-existence of a Share Purchase-Sale Contract within the purposes established by the legislator upon issuing the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development. **4)- THE PRIVATE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT (CONVENIO PRIVADO DE SUSCRIPCION DE ACCIONES) IS NOT OPPOSABLE TO THE PUBLIC TREASURY. PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC REALITY (PRINCIPIO DE REALIDAD ECONOMICA).** In accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures upon defining the form of interpretation of the norm that regulates the taxable event of the tax obligation, the legal forms adopted by the taxpayers do not bind the interpreter, who may attribute to the situations and acts that have occurred a meaning consistent with the facts, when it appears from the tax law that the taxable event of the respective obligation was defined attending to reality and not to the legal form. When the legal forms are manifestly inappropriate to the reality of the taxed facts and this results in a decrease in the amount of the obligations, the tax law must be applied disregarding such forms. For its part, Article 12 of the cited Code establishes that agreements concerning tax matters entered into between private parties are not admissible against the Public Treasury (Fisco). In the indicated sense, the Contencioso Administrative Tribunal, Second Section, in Judgment No. 241-2008 delivered at eleven hours twenty minutes on July eighteenth, two thousand eight, already cited, considered the following: *" (...) So, it is not enough to provide the receipts to justify the expense, but these must be duly authorized by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), as inferred from Articles 8 and 9 of the cited Law and 103 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, since 'the validity of the deduction self-performed by the taxpayer for the purposes of their declaration is subject to the subsequent verification that the Public Treasury (Fisco) may carry out in these matters' (judgment number 000633-F-2006, at ten hours forty-five minutes on September (setiembre) sixth, two thousand six, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia)); since the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) has been provided with sufficient powers to verify or collate the information provided by the taxpayer, that is, a power of oversight and investigation, both of the documents provided and of those it deems necessary for the accreditation of expenses, insofar as this function has the purpose of '[...] unearthing the underlying economic reality in the tax obligation, giving way to the duty to complete what is due, if it was determined that the tax quota is higher, or, on the contrary, that is, if excess was paid, to return upon claim the excess paid, since its retention, if it occurs, would be undue, therefore, contrary to legality. The inquisitorial power in question also allows for requesting information from third parties, public offices, or officials, or from the taxable person themselves, who, in accordance with the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, are obliged to provide the documentation that is required (Articles 128 and 132 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures). All with the purpose of channeling, within its correct dimension, the amount of the tax duty, that is, establishing the real dimension of the duty to contribute, constituting a burden of collaboration with the Public Treasury (Fisco), which has its roots in the very doctrine of constitutional canon 18. It is for this reason that the provenance of the expense must be fully accredited by the taxpayer, and it corresponds to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in the exercise of these powers, to conclude on its provenance, not only in qualitative terms but also in quantitative ones. Thus, in the event of its rejection, the taxable person is responsible for providing the evidence that justifies the change of criteria, that is, the burden of proof usually falls on them' (judgment number 000633-F-2006, cited above)."* In the present case, given the circumstances that have been detailed, in the opinion of this Court, in consideration of the principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) and under the protection of the provisions contained in Articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, the denial of the credit applied by the Plaintiff (la Actora) in her 1998 period Income Tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta) return concerning the investment in shares through the Tourism Contract of Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima is in accordance with the law, since what was acquired were debt securities and not preferred shares, said Agreement being an agreement between private parties that is not admissible against the Public Treasury (Fisco), without this implying - as the plaintiff considers - that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is exercising powers that are proper to the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo).

**"2)- REGARDING THE COMPETENCE OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION TO AUDIT THE RECOGNITION OR NON-RECOGNITION OF THE TAX INCENTIVE. NATURE OF THE ACT.** In accordance with the provisions of articles 99 and 103 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Código Tributario), and article 12 of Ley 6990, the powers of audit and verification of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) regarding the correct application of the tax benefits established in the Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico are derived. In this sense, the provision contained in article 12 of Ley 6990 is very clear in establishing that: *"The Instituto Costarricense de Turismo and the Ministry of Finance shall audit all aspects concerning compliance with the obligations contracted by companies or individuals by virtue of the granting of the benefits and incentives of this law."* As indicated by the State's representative, a thesis shared by this Court, in accordance with the competences established in those norms, the Dirección General de Tributación Directa is empowered to analyze the appropriateness of applying the tax benefits established in article 11 of Ley 6990, in a given fiscal period, when it is proven that the benefits established in current legislation are breached, as well as the obligations assumed before the Public Administration, without this implying a challenge to the act that granted the administered party the right regarding the possibility of enjoying the benefit of tax incentives, nor that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is assuming competences of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo. In the indicated sense, the considerations of the State's representative are shared, to the effect that, as established by the Procuraduría General de la República in legal opinion No. OJ-016-2001 dated February 22, 2000, although under applicable regulations the Dirección General de Tributación Directa does not have the competence to annul, render ineffective, or disapply agreements of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, through which the benefit provided in article 11 of Ley 6990 had been granted, the truth is that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is empowered to verify the correct use of the tax benefit. This Court has ruled in this sense in Judgments No. 53-2006 issued by the Fourth Section (Sección Cuarta) at fourteen hours on June 28, 2003, the First Section (Sección Primera) in Judgment 90-2006 at ten hours thirty minutes on March 1, 2006, and more recently the Fourth Section (Sección Cuarta) in Judgment 32-2007 at thirteen hours thirty minutes on August 8, 2007, in which the following was considered: **" (...) V) THE POWER OF AUDIT OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION (ADMINISTRACIÓN TRIBUTARIA):** *This Court fully agrees with the statements made by the State representation in its response brief, as well as the arguments put forth by Tributación Directa and the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo. The power of audit of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) in matters pertaining to taxes in general, is conferred upon it by law (articles 103 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Código Tributario), 62 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and 12 of Ley 6090 of Incentivos Turísticos), and it is not exhausted or limited by the reading of article 11 of Ley 6990, which does not expressly grant it. In tax matters, it is known that our Legal System entrusted its oversight to the Ministry of Finance and, through it, to Tributación Directa and its other bodies, which cannot be ignored as has been attempted in this matter; especially when, as in the case before us, it concerns a reduction of income to the treasury, by way of tax relief (exoneración), where it not only has the right but the duty to verify, as stated, not only the required formal requisites but also the operation of fitting the hypothesis to the specific factual picture, that is, a tax relief granted in the abstract to companies when they make the investment in concrete. It is undeniable for this Court that the tourism contract (contrato turístico) signed by (......) was complemented with a tax credit (crédito fiscal) benefit for its investors, of which, hypothetically speaking, the plaintiff company here would be a beneficiary; however, when applying such tax credit, the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) had, as stated, the power to verify that it was truly an investment to promote the development of tourism activity, which it carried out within the scope of its activity and functions inherent to its nature. No defect is found in the deployment of activity by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), which is legally responsible for auditing in the matter of taxes and their respective tax reliefs, as they are a consequence of the former, when expressly provided by law.* In virtue of the foregoing, the plaintiff's arguments regarding the lack of competence on the part of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) to deny the tax incentive contained in the Income Tax Return (Declaración de Impuesto sobre la Renta) for the year 1998, under the protection of the provisions of article 11 of Ley 6990, lack foundation, without this implying that competences or powers pertaining to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or the Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos are being exercised.

**3)- THE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE TAX INCENTIVE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE NULLITY PROCEDURE OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA.** Regarding the plaintiff's arguments to the effect that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) should have resorted to the lesividad (adverse challenge) procedure in order to eliminate the tax benefit, it must first be considered that in this specific case we are not in the presence of an act proper upon which the tax administration seeks to determine its nullity, in which case it would have to resort to the procedure established in article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública or to the filing of a lesividad Proceeding. This Chamber endorses the considerations of the State representative to the effect that the Administration is not questioning the validity of the Tourism Contract (Contrato Turístico) that was signed by the company Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, given that in the present case the loss of the benefit is a fact attributable to the Plaintiff and not to the active Administration, so to reject the benefit it is not necessary to resort to the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity procedure, nor to the lesividad contentious-administrative proceeding. In this case, the application of the tax incentive in a specific period is questioned due to non-compliance with legal requirements by the taxpayer. At no time has the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) proceeded to annul or review the administrative acts issued by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or by the Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos, as it would not be competent for such effects, and such administrative acts prevail. The taxpayer could even have processed the request in another fiscal period so that the tax benefit would be recognized, which could have been recognized if the legal requirements established for that purpose were met. In this sense, the Sala Constitucional ruled in Judgment No. 7960-2001 at 13:25 hours on August 10, 2001, issued within the Recurso de Amparo filed by the current Plaintiff, where it considered the following: *(....) II.- On the merits. The Chamber (Sala) deems that in the subjudice no violations of the constitutional order alleged by the appellant have occurred and, undoubtedly, the matter raised before this Chamber is one of mere legality and must be discussed in administrative venue and, eventually, in the special tax contentious-administrative venue. Indeed, the legal system assigns the tax administration powers of audit over the correct use of tax benefits, and in the use of those powers it has rejected the tax benefit sought by the amparo-protected party, and ordinary remedies provided by the legal system are available against what is resolved by the tax administration.* ***The amparo-protected party has not been deprived of any subjective right, insofar as the tax credit she claims has not been recognized by the tax administration; rather, it has been denied; consequently, it is not necessary to resort to the special procedures of nullity and lesividad, because we are not in the presence of the suppression of an act declaratory of subjective rights, but rather before the exercise of a public power.** * The discussion about the action of the tax administration, in relation to the rejection of the benefit, is a matter of mere legality that must be discussed in ordinary venue, and not in the summary amparo proceeding, in accordance with the provisions of article 49 of the Constitución Política. From the Transfer of Charges (*Traslado de cargos*) onward, the opportunity opens for the interested party to appear in the instituted proceeding in defense of her rights and interests, and for this reason the Chamber (Sala*) also does not find that the violation of due process that is alleged has occurred. On the grounds stated, the remedy must be dismissed.

Therefore: The appeal is dismissed." (The underline does not correspond to the original). As evidenced by the foregoing, the arguments of the plaintiff that the Tax Administration should have resorted to the lesividad (declaration of harmfulness) procedure or the procedure established in Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (General Law of Public Administration) to deny the tax incentive are unfounded. 4)- REGARDING THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRIVATE SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN SARDIMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA AND LA EMPRESA HOTEL CAMINO REAL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA. As previously stated, on September tenth, of 1998, the Plaintiff entered into a Private Share Subscription Agreement with la Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, and an analysis must be conducted of the main provisions contained in the Agreement in order to determine, according to its provisions, its contractual nature. Clause One of the Agreement establishes the following: "First: HCR will be gradually increasing its share capital in the sum of FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE UNITED STATES DOLLARS, in its equivalent in colones, through the issuance of preferred, registered shares of one thousand colones each, fully subscribed and paid for by different investors." In turn, Clause Two establishes: "... Second: Said preferred shares will be divided into Class "F" Shares and Class "G" Shares and their descriptions and privileges will be as follows: The Class "F" and Class "G" Shares will have a value of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO DOLLARS FIFTY CENTS or its equivalent in colones at the date of the investment, of each class, preferred and registered of one thousand colones each, where they will only generate a net yield of nine percent (09%) per annum on the Class "F" shares, yields that will be calculated on the nominal value of the shares indexed to the United States dollar at the time of the total cancellation by THE CLIENT of the shares and that will be paid quarterly on the first business day of the months of April, July, October, and January of each year; the class "G" shares will not generate any yield. Any withholding that may exist or that must be applied to said yield will be covered by HCR at its own cost. The owners of said shares will have no voice or vote in the Ordinary General Shareholders' Meetings of HCR, except in the Meetings indicated in articles one hundred thirty-nine and one hundred forty-seven of the Commercial Code. Both shares will have the repurchase privilege based on their value indexed in dollars in accordance with clause nine of this contract." In turn, Clause Five establishes the following: "Fifth: HCR states that as of this date it has its tourism contract number three hundred eighty-seven in force and in order, in which it is authorized to issue shares under article eleven of the Ley de Incentivos Turísticos, number six thousand nine hundred ninety, and it also states that it has been authorized by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo to sell shares with this fiscal benefit for at least the amounts indicated in this contract, thus fulfilling its responsibilities established in the "Procedure to Qualify for the Benefits of article eleven of Ley 6990, Incentives for Tourism Development," issued by the Instituto Costarricense del Turismo, a copy of which is attached to this contract. HCR also declares its commitment to keep its aforementioned tourism contract in force and in order, for the entire term necessary so that THE CLIENT, at its own account and cost, can enforce its rights to the fiscal benefit, as well as to use its best efforts to help THE CLIENT comply with the requirements corresponding to it according to the cited procedure, so that THE CLIENT may benefit from the established benefit. The fiscal benefit enjoyed by the investment, in accordance with Ley 6990, will be subject to THE CLIENT meeting all the conditions referred to in said Law and being duly approved by the Competent Authorities." In this regard, note the provision contained in the final part of the Clause to the effect that the fiscal benefit enjoyed by the investment was subject to the client, in this case Sardimar Sociedad Anónima, complying with the conditions established in Ley 6990 and being duly approved by the competent Authorities. In turn, Clause Seven of the Agreement under discussion establishes the following: "Seventh: THE CLIENT hereby grants a special power of attorney, as broad as is required by law, to FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A., so that in its name and at its cost, once the increase in share capital is registered and the shares or share ownership certificate are prepared, it may place said shares or certificate in trust in a State Bank, member of the National Banking System, or in the Bolsa Nacional de Valores, in accordance with the requirements established in article eleven of the Ley de Incentivos turísticos number six thousand nine hundred ninety. THE CLIENT shall be obliged to carry out all procedures and meet all requirements requested for this purpose by the ICT, the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, and the Ministerio de Hacienda, so that the tax credit is granted to it. FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A, undertakes to return the mentioned share certificates to THE CLIENT upon the expiration of the two-year period provided for in the aforementioned legal norm." Note how the contractual provision expressly establishes that The Client, in this case the Plaintiff Corporation, was obligated to carry out all procedures and meet all requirements requested for this purpose by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, and the Ministerio de Hacienda so that the tax credit would be granted to it. Clause Eight of the signed Contract establishes the following: "Eighth: HCR declares that the value of the shares will be indexed to the United States dollar according to the reference selling exchange rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica as of this date, an equivalent amount that will be recorded on the back of the shares. The yields that the Class "F" shares will generate, as described in clause two of this contract, will be calculated on the indexed, or "dollarized" value, yields that will be paid in United States dollars or their equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica on the day of payment." Finally, Clause Nine of the Contract signed by the parties establishes the following: "Ninth: International Realty Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter IHR)... undertakes to repurchase from THE CLIENT or its holder, and THE CLIENT or its holder undertakes to sell to it, the Class "F" Shares no later than September thirtieth of the year two thousand two, and the Class "G" Shares no later than September thirtieth of the year two thousand four, at their nominal value indexed to the United States dollar, as recorded on the back of the document itself, or its equivalent at the reference selling exchange rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica on the day of payment." From the analysis of the cited Clauses, this Chamber considers that the arguments of the Tax Administration to deny the tax credit to the Plaintiff are in accordance with the law, given that in the Private Share Subscription Agreement signed between the parties there are a series of provisions that distort its purpose, turning it into an Agreement for the acquisition of debt instruments and not preferred and registered shares, contravening article 11 of the Ley de Incentivos al Desarrollo Turístico, as detailed: a). There is a provision that establishes a reciprocal commitment of both parties to effect the repurchase of the instruments on an established date. b)- There is a provision that establishes the payment of yields or interest on the loan, independent of the financial results of Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima; c)- The repurchase commitment is for the nominal value of the shares, without considering the surplus value generated by the Hotel as a going concern; d)- The purchase and sale agreement for some instruments establishes that they do not generate any right to dividends, nor to the proportional part of retained earnings, nor to asset revaluations, nor to paid-in capital in excess of Hotel Camino Real S.A. Likewise, this Chamber shares the argument of the State representative, to the effect that as considered by the Auditing Office, when la Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima repurchased the class "B" instruments in the month of September of 1977 and re-issued them in the month of December of 1997 under the classification "F", the provisions contained in article 11 of Ley 6990 were violated, since said instruments, having been repurchased, were in treasury; therefore, if it had issued shares in 1997 and 1998, the class "B" instruments changed to class "F" did not increase the share capital, meaning the capital increase authorized by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo for the class "F" instruments never occurred, because what the company did was put back into circulation the class "B" instruments that had been issued in 1993. This Court considers the considerations of the Auditing Office to be in accordance with the law, in the sense that even though the company developing the tourism project has indicated that the instruments being issued are preferred shares, the conditions established in the Agreement evidence the creation of a credit instrument. In the indicated sense, the Fourth Section of this Court, in a case where the acquisition of shares from la Empresa Camino Real Sociedad Anónima was discussed, under identical conditions to those agreed upon with the Plaintiff here, considered the following: "(...). VI)- OF THE PREFERRED SHARES: As stated supra, no question has been raised regarding the propriety of preferred corporate shares, as commercial law permits them; however, it is appropriate to make a reference to this type of shares to determine not only their content, scope, and extent but also, and no less importantly, their objective within a commercial company; so that this Court can determine whether what the company carried out was a purchase of preferred shares or another type of business. The share, as an expression of corporate participation and status of the partner summarizing the rights and obligations incumbent upon the partner (its holder), is defined as "... the negotiable instrument that incorporates and certifies effective participation in the life of the corporate entity, with all the rights and duties descending from it" (CERTAD Maroto, Gastón. "Meditaciones a propósito de acciones y cuotas de sociedades de capital" in Ivstitia, San José Costa Rica, Year 3, No. 30, June, 1989, p.11).- By virtue of the principles of parity in treatment, uniformity or identity among shares, or parity of rights, our Commercial Code in Article 120 establishes that common and ordinary shares grant identical rights and represent equal parts of the share capital because their value is nominally equal.- This means that within their respective category, shares are equal and therefore attribute identical rights and powers.- In the presence of the so-called "freedom to issue shares with diverse characteristics," our Article 121 of the Commercial Code allows companies the issuance of one or more classes (understood as categories) of shares, with the designations, preferences, privileges, restrictions, limitations, and other modalities stipulated in the corporate charter, provided they refer to benefits, corporate assets, profits, voting, or any other aspect of corporate activity. Thus in our system there are common or ordinary shares and special ones, where the preferred ones belong to this second category; which are extracted from Article 139 of the Commercial Code.- There is no doubt that preferred shares can arise both at the time of the company's founding and from a subsequent act, in which case the formalities prescribed for the amendment of the by-laws must be observed. In general, the category of preferred shares finds its limit in the object of the privilege: it can only refer to rights (patrimonial in principle) and not to the passive situations of the partner; it resulting then that the obligation of contribution or participation in losses cannot be exempted in any way (in this sense, see: Di SABATO, Franco. "Manuale delle societá", Utet, Torino, Italy, second edition, 1987, p.281). This means, however elementary it may seem, that preferred shares are or represent part of the share capital and, in accordance with Articles 18, 19, and 106 of the Commercial Code, must be recorded in the corporate charter: the number, the nominal value, the nature, and the category of shares into which the share capital is divided.- Thus, when a corporation decides to issue shares of this category, such intention must be recorded in the corporate charter in the respective clause concerning the share capital; where the authorization required by Article 156 of the same cited legal body is for those referred to or made possible in the original or amended corporate charter.- Now, in general terms, patrimonio rights consist of the right to a proportional part of the net profits and the right to the liquidation quota; however, our legislation does not contain a single provision consecrating these rights, but they clearly emerge from Articles 27 (prohibition of paying dividends or making distributions of any kind, except from realized and liquid profits resulting from a balance sheet approved by the Ordinary Meeting, where if there is a loss of the share capital it must be reinstated or legally reduced before any distribution or allocation of profits is made); Article 143 (which establishes the legal reserve and prescribes that if, once the reserve and those provided for in the corporate charter have been made, the Meeting agrees to distribute profits, the shareholders acquire a right against the company for the collection of dividends).- This point undoubtedly refers to the phenomenon of "self-financing" by virtue of which, despite there being declared net profits, it decides not to distribute them for that purpose, given that the right to a dividend exists in the abstract (as a power) and is concretized (as a right) only when the Meeting agrees to distribute them. With the enactment of Ley 7201, Article 32 bis was added to the Commercial Code and it regulates the right of withdrawal, establishing some normative limitation to the power of "self-financing"; as for the reimbursement of the liquidation quota, a right as such is not established, but it is extracted from Article 214 subsection e), through which powers are granted to the liquidators of commercial companies such as concluding pending operations, collecting credits and satisfying corporate obligations, selling corporate assets for the price authorized according to the liquidation rules, preparing the final liquidation statement and submitting it for discussion and approval of the partners in the manner corresponding according to the nature of the company, and delivering to each partner the part corresponding to him from the corporate assets.- VII) It is not ignored that preferred shares grant a more advantageous position with respect to ordinary shares, in terms of patrimonio rights; however, such privileges find a material limit: the prohibition of the leonine pact, which emerges from Articles 25 and 122, both of the Commercial Code, which is nothing other than that in common shares, a pact that limits one or more partners from participation in the profits but not in the losses is not effective, and with respect to preferred shares, a pact that limits participation in both the profits and the losses will be effective; a system that contrasts with what is prescribed in the Civil Code for civil partnerships (Article 1205).- Finally, it must be noted that Ley 7202 does not allow preferred shares on stock exchanges, in investment companies, or in companies operating investment companies (Article 30 sub. c), 92 sub. 2) and 110 sub. c) of Ley 7201 d Mercado de Valores) and they are permitted in publicly held corporations (art. 126 sub. c) of Ley 7201).- In summary, the privileges that our law allows to be granted through shares of such category are referred solely to the distribution of profits or reimbursements of the liquidation quota, whose reasons for creation are basically explained in financial reasons and the desire for administrative control of the company.- In such a way that when the company is a going concern, the most common reason for the issuance of this type of shares is the need for a capital increase that is difficult to place and for this reason, we insist, the privileges can only be applied to patrimonio rights in the terms indicated by Article 139 of the Commercial Code and with the material limits set forth herein, always aimed at capital increase.- It is also of importance to mention that the privileges may consist of the right to receive, charged against the profits of the fiscal year, a preferred dividend of an amount that is generally set as a percentage of the nominal value of the preferred shares and that, instead of maturing annually, may be a cumulative right, where the corporate profits of one year are insufficient to pay the entire preferred dividend, therefore it is cancelled with subsequent corporate profits before proceeding to the distribution of dividends to the other shares.

In the words of Mr. Luis Herrera Reyes: "preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas) may also confer certain more considerable pecuniary advantages, for example, that preference shares (acciones de prioridad) issued at five hundred pesos be reimbursed at one thousand, granting them preference over the capital available in the event of liquidation. But it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that preference shares (acciones de prioridad) are, like the others, simple shares and that therefore they cannot have rights other than those ordinarily established by the shareholders, so that it would not be permitted to stipulate a dividend or interest for preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas) in the event that there are no corporate profits, as this would be an attack against the rights of third parties" (HERRERA Reyes, Luis. "Sociedades Anónimas, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, Chile, 1935, p.135).

**VIII- OF THE REPURCHASE TRANSACTION (NEGOCIO DE RECOMPRA):** Certainly, even though for investors it is not entirely clear what it consists of, it is a transaction that is increasingly in use, created above all for subjects involved in stock market operations, such as brokerage firms (puestos de bolsa) and the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) itself. In the absence of doctrinal reference and comparative law, it can be assimilated to the well-known "report" contract or "double contract", the latter being the one referred to by the current Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores) (arts. 23, 49 and 50). The figure of the repurchase (recompra) appears as an adaptation of the report contract to the Costa Rican securities market. Understanding them as similar, for the purposes of this resolution, the repurchase (recompra) consists of a stock market contract (contrato bursátil) constituted between two parties, one of whom is the holder of a security and the other who has cash, and where two operations occur: the first when the holder of the security transfers his instrument to the other party, and the second when he buys it back within an established period, thereby obtaining temporary liquidity without the need to permanently dispose of his financial asset. "In general terms, a repurchase agreement involves the immediate acquisition of funds through the sale of securities with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase said securities on a specific date (normally within a certain period of less than one year) at a previously agreed price that includes interest or its equivalent, at an agreed yield" (JOHANNING, Patricia. "Aspectos generales del mercado de valores costarricense", Programa de capacitación bursátil gerencial, fundación de Estudios de Postgrado e Investigación en Ciencias Económicas -Fundepos-, Universidad de Costa Rica, p.45). More than two contracts, we can see two obligations where the owner of the securities does not wish to part with them but requires liquidity, which he obtains by negotiating them subject to the right and obligation to acquire them within the agreed period; the buyer or investor securing a gain without acquiring ownership of the securities, which is achieved upon fulfillment of the second operation. It is a unitary legal relationship, with a single purpose or cause. Now, the conditions or parameters of the agreement include the term and the yield, which does not have to be equal to the nominal yield of the security, due to the difference between the terms of both instruments. Thus, the security may not have a term shorter than the term of the repurchase obligation, and the yield of the repurchase (recompra) shall be determined according to the term and market conditions, taking into consideration the price paid in the first operation. This means, for the purposes at hand, that the repurchase (recompra) will always imply a gain for the investor who acquires in the first operation, which assimilates it to the interest that would be paid on a commercial loan, so this type of contract is outlined as a financing operation, where the acquirer in repurchase seeks a return on his money placed in repurchase. It follows then, in the terms set forth, that the one who sells the securities by repurchase does not wish to dispose of them but simply requires money or liquidity on those securities or values, and the one who buys them to resell them is not interested in acquiring definitive ownership of them, but only that they exist as a guarantee for his money until payment by the initial seller. In our environment, the repurchase (recompra) of shares is recognized, although in the stock market it is very limited, but it is legally permitted in accordance with Article 7 of the Operating System (Sistema Operativo) and Article 45 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores), the latter providing that interest, dividends, and other benefits derived from the securities that are the object of the repurchase operations and are due during the term of said operations shall belong to the final forward seller, unless the parties expressly state in the stock exchange contract their intention to be governed by the general rule, with the voting right corresponding to the seller until the moment of delivery. The repurchase (recompra) is in summary neither a purchase-sale nor a transfer of ownership of the securities or values (in this sense, one may consult: ARIAS L., Fabio Alberto: "Recompra: reporto o préstamo?", Ivstitia, year 13, No. 151-152, July-August, 1999). All of this leads us to conclude that the repurchase (recompra) is a financing or loan operation guaranteed by the securities, which are then delivered in trust (fideicomiso) as collateral.

**IX)- (....)** It follows from what has been set forth and analyzed in the case file that what was negotiated by the plaintiff herein does not meet the characteristics of preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas) and, therefore, they are not susceptible to being considered within the tax credit benefit, which leads to fully upholding what was performed and resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), without the challenged resolutions in any way harming the legislation that regulates the matter in this regard or the power granted through said means to audit and define the appropriateness of a benefit such as the one at hand. Note that the negotiation begins from a private contract that is not enforceable against the treasury, in the first place; an agreement where the parties, despite calling them "preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas)", constitute a financing arrangement where even a transfer of ownership does not occur, as was duly proven in the case file. We are in the presence, as has been said, of a bilateral contract, where both Hotel Camino Real S.A. and (.......) converge their will to negotiate in the terms described, with consequences for the case of the plaintiff herein that cause the denial of a tax benefit, not for failing to comply with required formalities but due to the content thereof, securities that correspond to nothing more than a financing arrangement that it is not possible to fit, for the reasons set forth in the administrative venue and verified in this one, within the letter of Article 11 of Law 6990, it being proven that in none of the cases (neither the so-called class "F" shares nor the class "G" shares) did they imply an increase in the share capital, which is the primary purpose of issuing preferred corporate shares. The principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) (contained in Article 8 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)), as mentioned by the parties, certainly and in very simple terms, means going beyond the form to materially review what has been done with tax repercussions to determine whether or not what is requested is applicable; and in this case, that reality confirmed itself to be very different from what is regulated and pursued with the granting of a tax benefit. If the disallowance of the benefit causes some type of disagreement to the plaintiff herein, she should eventually address it with her co-contracting party, a legal entity against which, in any case, no claims were included in this lawsuit, so this Tribunal finds legal limitations to assessing its conduct within this process. Although the authentic interpretation of legal provisions is the purview of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), the scope of the provisions in tax matters with a view to fitting the specific case within the legal hypothesis corresponds to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria); from what has been analyzed by this Tribunal, no friction or harm emerges regarding what, in relation to it, is legitimately and legally permitted; leaving no option but to confirm what was resolved by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) in the terms contained in the challenged resolutions that denied the granting of the tax credit based on the respective tourism contract (contrato turístico); without this denying the legitimacy of the investments but rather their nature as preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas); which, as was set forth, do not fit within the assumption to apply such a benefit; tourism incentives over which the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) exercised legitimate control and oversight without the investments made by the plaintiff herein achieving the necessary specificity (tipicidad) to grant the tourism exemption benefit. The assessment and application to a specific situation in a specific fiscal period of the tourism benefit granted in the abstract is conditioned on the fulfillment of certain obligations, the oversight function of which is held by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), and where the debt securities do not fit within the assumption required for their recognition, neither with respect to the so-called class "F" shares nor with respect to the class "G" shares, with the result that both the main claim and the subsidiary claim find no support in our Legal System (Ordenamiento Jurídico), the defense of lack of right being receivable and consequently, the lawsuit filed herein being without merit in all its aspects." **(Contentious Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), Fourth Section, at one thirty p.m. on August eight, two thousand seven).** Considering the described reasons, although the current commercial legislation allows the legal possibility of issuing and selling preferred shares (acciones privilegiadas) and the possibility of arranging share repurchase contracts, the truth is that in the present case, this Tribunal deems appropriate the arguments of the State's legal representative in the sense that, in reality, according to the provisions contained in the Private Share Subscription Contract (Contrato Privado de Suscripción de Acciones) entered into between the Plaintiff and the Company Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, what the plaintiff acquired were debt securities and not shares that would allow, under the protection of the provisions of Article 11 of Law 6990, the recognition of the tax credit (crédito fiscal) originating from said purchase. In this sense, this Tribunal considers that the arguments put forward by the plaintiff regarding the impropriety of the Tax Administration's (Administración Tributaria) actions lack foundation, since according to the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties, the repurchase obligation of the shares that were acquired by the plaintiff herein casually constitutes one of the main elements for considering the non-existence of a Share Purchase-Sale Contract within the purposes established by the legislator when issuing the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley de Incentivos para el desarrollo Turístico).

**4)- THE PRIVATE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE TREASURY. PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC REALITY (PRINCIPIO DE REALIDAD ECONOMICA).** In accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), when defining the manner of interpreting the rule governing the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation, the legal forms adopted by taxpayers do not bind the interpreter, who can attribute to the situations and acts that have occurred a meaning consistent with the facts, when it emerges from the tax law that the taxable event (hecho generador) of the respective obligation was defined taking into account reality and not the legal form. When the legal forms are manifestly inappropriate to the reality of the taxed facts and this translates into a decrease in the amount of the obligations, the tax law must be applied disregarding such forms. For its part, Article 12 of the cited Code establishes that agreements regarding tax matters entered into between private parties are not pleadable (aducibles) against the Treasury (Fisco). In the indicated sense, the Contentious Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), Second Section, in Judgment No. 241-2008 issued at eleven twenty a.m. on July eighteen, two thousand eight, already cited, considered the following: *"(...) Therefore, it is not enough to provide the vouchers to justify the expense, but rather these must be duly authorized by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), as emerges from Articles 8 and 9 of the cited Law and 103 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), since 'the validity of the deduction self-assessed by the taxpayer for purposes of his return is subject to the subsequent verification that the Treasury can perform in these matters' (Judgment number 000633-F-2006, at ten forty-five a.m. on September six, two thousand six, of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia)); because the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) has been provided with sufficient powers to verify or collate the information supplied by the taxpayer, that is, a power of audit and investigation, both of the documents provided and those it deems necessary for the accreditation of expenses, as this function has the purpose of '[...] unraveling the underlying economic reality in the tax obligation, giving way to the duty to complete what is due, if it was determined that the tax quota is higher, or, in the contrary case, that is, that an overpayment was made, to refund upon claim the excess paid, as its retention, if it occurred, would be undue, therefore, contrary to legality. The inquisitorial power in question also allows requesting information from third parties, public offices or officials, or from the passive subject himself, who in accordance with the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), are obliged to provide the documentation that is required (Articles 128 and 132 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)). All with the purpose of channeling, within its correct dimension, the amount of the tax duty, that is, establishing the real dimension of the duty to contribute, constituting a burden of collaboration with the Treasury, which has its roots in the very doctrine of constitutional canon 18. That is why the appropriateness of the expense must be fully accredited by the taxpayer, and it is up to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in the exercise of these powers, to conclude on its appropriateness, not only in qualitative but also in quantitative terms. Thus, upon its rejection, it is up to the passive subject to provide the evidence that justifies the change in criterion, i.e., the demonstrative burden falls upon him, most of the time' (Judgment number 000633-F-2006, cited supra)."* In the present case, given the circumstances that have been detailed, in the opinion of this Tribunal, in attention to the principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) and under the protection of the provisions contained in Articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), the denial of the credit applied by the Plaintiff in her Income Tax return for the 1998 period regarding the investment in shares by Tourism Contract of Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima is in accordance with the law, since what was acquired were debt securities and not preferred shares, and said Agreement constitutes an agreement between private parties that is not pleadable (aducible) against the Treasury, without this implying -as the plaintiff considers- that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is exercising powers that belong to the Legislative Branch.

“2)- RESPECTO DE LA COMPETENCIA DE LA ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARA PARA LA FISCALIZACIÓN PARA EL RECONOCIMIENTO O NO DEL INCENTIVO FISCAL. NATURALEZA DEL ACTO. De conformidad con lo establecido por los artículos 99, 103 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, el artículo 12 de la Ley 6990, se desprenden las potestades de fiscalización y verificación de la Administración Tributaria respecto de la correcta aplicación de los beneficios tributarios establecidos en la Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico. En este sentido la disposición contenida en el artículo 12 de la Ley 6990 es muy clara al establecer que: " El Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y el Ministerio de Hacienda fiscalizarán todos los aspectos concernientes al cumplimiento de las obligaciones contraídas por las empresas o personas físicas en virtud de la concesión de los beneficios e incentivos de la presente ley." Conforme lo indica el representante del Estado, tesis que es compartida por este Tribunal, de acuerdo a las competencias establecidas en esas normas, la Administración de Tributación Directa se encuentra en facultad de analizar la procedencia de la aplicación de los beneficios fiscales establecidos en el artículo 11 la Ley 6990, en un determinado período fiscal, cuando se compruebe que los beneficios establecidos en la legislación vigente se incumplen, así como las obligaciones asumidas ante la Administración Pública, sin que ello implique un cuestionamiento del acto que concedió el derecho al administrado respecto de la posibilidad de disfrute del beneficio de incentivos fiscales, ni que la Administración Tributaria esté asumiendo competencias del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo o de la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo. En el sentido indicado, se comparten las consideraciones del representante del Estado en el sentido de que conforme lo estableció la Procuraduría General de la República en la opinión jurídica No. OJ-016-2001 de fecha 22 de febrero del 2000, si bien conforme a la normativa aplicable la Dirección General de Tributación Directa no tiene la competencia para anular, dejar sin efecto o desaplicar acuerdos de la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, mediante los cuales se hubiera concedido el beneficio previsto en el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990, lo cierto es que la Administración Tributaria está facultada para verificar la correcta utilización del beneficio tributario. En este sentido se ha pronunciado este Tribunal en las Sentencias No. 53-2006 dictada por la Sección Cuarta de las catorce horas del 28 de junio del 2003, la Sección Primera en la Sentencia 90-2006 de las diez horas treinta minutos del primero de marzo del 2006 y más recientemente la Sección Cuarta en la Sentencia 32-2007 de las trece horas treinta minutos del 8 de agosto del 2007, en donde se consideró lo siguiente: " (...) V) DE LA POTESTAD DE FISCALIZACIÓN DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN TRIBUTARIA: Concuerda en un todo este Tribunal con las afirmaciones que hace la representación estatal en su libelo de contestación como de los argumentos esgrimidos por Tributación Directa y la Sala Primera del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo.- La potestad de fiscalización de la Administración Tributaria en materia atinente a tributos en general, le está conferida por ley (artículos 103 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, 62 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta y 12 de la Ley 6090 de Incentivos Turísticos), y no se agota ni se limita con la lectura del artículo 11 de la Ley 6990 que no la concede Jurídico encomendó su tutela al Ministerio de Hacienda y a través de él a Tributación Directa y sus restantes órganos, lo que no puede desconocerse como se ha pretendido en este asunto; máxime cuando se trata como es el caso que nos ocupa de una disminución del ingreso al fisco, por vía de exoneración, asistiéndole no sólo el deber sino la obligación de verificar como se ha dicho, requisitos formales que se exigen sino la operación de encuadrar la hipótesis al cuadro fáctico concreto, esto es, una exoneración concedida en abstracto para las empresas cuando éstas realicen la inversión en concreto.- Resulta innegable para este Tribunal el hecho de que el contrato turístico suscrito por (......) fuera complementado con un beneficio de crédito fiscal para sus inversores, de lo cual hipotéticamente hablando sería beneficiaria la empresa aquí actora; sin embargo, al momento de aplicar tal crédito fiscal, la Administración Tributaria contaba como se ha dicho, con la potestad de verificar que realmente se tratara de una inversión para promover el desarrollo de la actividad turística, lo cual realizó dentro del ámbito de su actividad y funciones propias de su naturaleza.- No se encuentra vicio alguno en el despliegue de actividad de la Administración Tributaria, a quien le compete legalmente la fiscalización en el tema de tributos y sus respectivas exoneraciones, por ser consecuencia de los primeros, cuando así lo dispone expresamente la ley.- " En virtud de lo indicado, las argumentaciones de la actora con respecto a la ausencia de competencia por parte de la Administración Tributaria a efecto de denegar el incentivo fiscal contenido en la Declaración de Impuesto sobre la Renta del año 1998, al amparo de lo establecido en el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990, carece de fundamento, sin que ello implique que se estén ejerciendo competencias o potestades que le atañen al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo o a la Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos. 3)- EL NO RECONOCIMIENTO DEL INCENTIVO FISCAL NO REQUIERE DEL PROCEDIMIENTO DE NULIDAD DEL ARTICULO 173 DE LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA. Con respecto a las argumentaciones de la actora en el sentido de que la Administración Tributaria debió acudir al procedimiento de lesividad con el fin de eliminar el beneficio fiscal, debe considerarse en primera instancia que en la especie no estamos en presencia de un acto propio sobre el cual la administración tributaria pretende determinar su nulidad, en cuyo caso debería acudir al procedimiento establecido en el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o bien a la formulación de un Proceso de lesividad. Esta Cámara avala las consideraciones del representante estatal en el sentido de que la Administración no está cuestionando la validez del Contrato Turístico que fuera suscrito por la Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, siendo que en el presente caso la pérdida del beneficio es un hecho imputable a la Actora y no a la Administración activa, por lo que para rechazar el beneficio no se requiere acudir al procedimiento de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, ni al contencioso de lesividad. En la especie se cuestiona la aplicación del incentivo fiscal en un período determinado por incumplimiento de los requisitos legales por parte del contribuyente. En ningún momento la Administración Tributaria ha procedido a anular o revisar los actos administrativos dictados por el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo o por parte de la Comisión Mixta para la Aprobación de Incentivos Turísticos, pues no sería competente para tales efectos, siendo que dichos actos administrativos prevalecen. Incluso la contribuyente podría haber tramitado en otro período fiscal la solicitud a efecto de que se reconociera el beneficio fiscal, el cual podría haber sido reconocido en caso de cumplir los requisitos legales establecidos al efecto. En este sentido se pronunció la Sala Constitucional en la Sentencia No.7960-2001 de las 13:25 horas del 10 de agosto del 2001, dictada dentro del Recurso de Amparo interpuesto por la hoy Actora en donde consideró lo siguiente: (....) II.- Sobre el fondo. La Sala estima que en el subjudice no se producen las vulneraciones al orden constitucional que alega el recurrente y, sin duda alguna, el asunto que se plantea ante esta Sala es de mera legalidad y debe ser discutido en sede administrativa y en eventualmente en el contencioso especial tributario. En efecto, el ordenamiento jurídico asigna a la administración tributaria potestades de fiscalización sobre la correcta utilización de los beneficios tributarios y en el uso de esas potestades ha rechazado el beneficio fiscal pretendido por la amparada y contra lo resuelto por la administración tributaria cabe recursos ordinarios previstos por el ordenamiento jurídico. A la amparada no se le ha privado de ningún derecho subjetivo, en tanto el crédito fiscal que reclama no ha sido reconocido por la administración tributaria, antes bien, el mismo le ha sido denegado; consiguientemente, no es necesario acudir a los procedimientos especiales de nulidad y lesividad, pues no estamos en presencia de la supresión de un acto declarativo de derechos subjetivos, sino ante el ejercicio de una potestad pública. La discusión sobre la actuación de la administración tributaria, en relación con el rechazo del beneficio, es un asunto de mera legalidad que debe ser discutido en sede ordinaria, y no en el proceso sumario de amparo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política. A partir del Traslado de cargos se abre para la interesada la oportunidad de apersonarse al procedimiento instaurado en defensa de sus derechos e intereses, y por tal motivo la Sala tampoco encuentra que se haya producido la vulneración al debido proceso que se acusa. En razón de lo expuesto el recurso debe desestimarse el recurso. Por tanto: Se declara sin lugar el recurso." (El subrayado no corresponde al original). Conforme se evidencia de lo indicado, las argumentaciones de la actora con respecto a que la Administración Tributaria debió acudir al procedimiento de lesividad o al procedimiento establecido en el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública para no reconocer el incentivo fiscal, carece de fundamento. 4)- RESPECTO DE LAS DISPOSICIONES CONTENIDAS EN EL CONTRATO PRIVADO DE COMPRAVENTA SUSCRITO ENTRE SARDIMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA Y LA EMPRESA HOTEL CAMINO REAL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA. Según se indicara, el día diez de setiembre de 1998 la Actora suscribió con la Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima un Contrato Privado de suscripción de Acciones, debiendo realizarse el análisis de las principales disposiciones contenidas en el Convenio a efecto de determinar conforme a sus disposiciones su naturaleza contractual. La Cláusula Primera del Convenio establece lo siguiente: " Primera: HCR estará paulatinamente incrementando su capital social en la suma de CUATRO MILLONES SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS MIL DOSCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CINCO DOLARES ESTADOUNIDENSES, en su equivalente en colones, mediante la emisión de acciones preferidas y nominativas de mil colones cada una, íntegramente suscritas y pagadas por diferentes inversionistas. " Por su parte la Cláusula Segunda establece : "... Segunda: Dichas acciones preferidas se dividirán en Acciones clase "F" y Clase "G" y sus descripciones y privilegios serán los siguientes: Las Acciones Clase "F" y Clase "G" tendrán un valor de DOS MILLONES TRESCIENTOS DIECIOCHO MIL CIENTO CUARENTA Y DOS DOLARES CINCUENTA CENTAVOS o su equivalente en colones a la fecha de la inversión, de cada clase, preferidas y nominativas de mil colones cada una, en donde únicamente generarán un rendimiento neto del nueve por ciento (09%) anual en las de Clase "F", rendimientos que serán calculados sobre el valor nominal de las acciones indexado al dólar estadounidense al momento de la cancelación total por parte de EL CLIENTE de las acciones y que se pagará trimestralmente el primer día hábil de los meses abril, julio, octubre y enero de cada año, las acciones clase "G" no generarán rendimiento alguno. Cualquier retención que pudiera existir o que se le hubiese que realizar a dicho rendimiento será cubierto por HCR bajo su costo. Los propietarios de dichas acciones no tendrán ni voz ni voto en las Asambleas Generales Ordinarias de Accionistas de HCR, salvo en las Asambleas que se indican en los artículos ciento treinta y nueve y ciento cuarenta y siete del Código de Comercio. Ambas acciones tendrán el privilegio de recompra sobre la base de su valor indexado en dólares de conformidad con la cláusula novena de este contrato." Por su parte la Cláusula quinta establece lo siguiente: " Quinta: HCR manifiesta que a esta fecha tiene vigente y en orden su contrato turístico número trescientos ochenta y siete, en el que se le autoriza a emitir acciones amparadas al artículo once de la Ley de Incentivos Turísticos, número seis mil novecientos noventa y además manifiesta que ha sido autorizada por la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo para vender acciones con este beneficio fiscal por al menos los montos indicados en este contrato, cumpliendo así con sus responsabilidades establecidas en el "Procedimiento para Optar por los Beneficios del artículo once de la Ley seis mil novecientos noventa, Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico", emitido por el Instituto Costarricense del Turismo, copia del cual se adjunta al presente contrato. HCR además manifiesta su compromiso de mantener vigente y en orden su mencionado contrato turístico, por todo el plazo necesario para que EL CLIENTE por su cuenta y costo, pueda hacer valer sus derechos de beneficio fiscal, al igual que a interponer sus mejores esfuerzos para ayudar a EL CLIENTE a cumplir con los requisitos que a éste corresponden según el procedimiento citado, a efecto de que EL CLIENTE pueda favorecerse con el beneficio establecido. El beneficio fiscal de que goza la inversión, de conformidad con la Ley número 6990, quedará sujeto a que EL CLIENTE , reúna todas las condiciones a que hace referencia dicha Ley y que sea debidamente aprobada por las Autoridades Competentes." En este sentido, nótese la disposición contenida en el aparte final de la Cláusula en el sentido de que el beneficio fiscal de que gozaba la inversión, quedaba sujeta a que el cliente, en este caso Sardimar Sociedad Anónima, cumpliera las condiciones establecidas en la Ley 6990 y que fuera debidamente aprobada por las Autoridades competentes. Por su parte la Cláusula Sétima del Contrato de comentario, establece lo siguiente: "Sétima: EL CLIENTE en este acto otorga poder especial tan amplio como en derecho se requiera a FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A., para que en su nombre y costo, una vez inscrito el aumento de capital social y confeccionadas las acciones o certificado de propiedad de acciones, coloque dichas acciones o certificado en fideicomiso en un Banco del Estado miembro del Sistema Bancario Nacional o en la Bolsa Nacional de Valores, de conformidad con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo once de la Ley de Incentivos turísticos número seis mil novecientos noventa. EL CLIENTE estará en la obligación de realizar todos los trámites y llenar todos los requisitos que al efecto sean solicitados por el ICT, la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo y el Ministerio de Hacienda, para que el crédito fiscal le sea otorgado. FINANCORP PUESTO DE BOLSA, S.A, se compromete a reintegrar a EL CLIENTE los mencionados certificados de acciones al vencer el plazo de dos años previstos en la norma legal antes citada." Nótese como la disposición contractual establece expresamente que El Cliente, en este caso la Sociedad Actora, se encontraba en la obligación de realizar todos los trámites y llenar todos los requisitos que al efecto fueran solicitados por el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo y el Ministerio de Hacienda para que el crédito fiscal le fuera otorgado. La Cláusula Octava del Contrato suscrito establece lo siguiente: " Octava: HCR declara que el valor de las acciones estará indexado al dólar estadounidense según el tipo de cambio de venta, de referencia del Banco Central de Costa Rica a esta fecha, monto equivalente que se hará constar al dorso de las acciones. Los rendimientos que las acciones Clase "F" generarán, según se describe en la cláusula segunda de este contrato, serán calculados sobre el valor indexado, o "dolarizado", rendimientos que se pagarán en dólares estadounidense o su equivalente al tipo de cambio de venta de referencia del Banco Central de Costa Rica al día de pago." Finalmente la Cláusula Novena del Contrato suscrito por las partes establece lo siguiente: "Novena: International Realty Holdings, Inc. (en adelante IHR)...se compromete a recomprarle a EL CLIENTE o a su tenedor y EL CLIENTE o su tenedor se compromete a venderle, las Acciones Clase "F" a más tardar el día treinta de septiembre del año dos mil dos y las Acciones Clase "G" a más tardar el día treinta de septiembre del año dos mil cuatro, por su valor nominal indexado al dólar estadounidense, según consta al dorso del documento mismo, o su equivalente al tipo de cambio de venta de referencia del Banco Central de Costa Rica al día de pago." Del análisis de las Cláusulas citadas, ésta Cámara considera que las argumentaciones de la Administración Tributaria para denegar el crédito de impuesto a la Actora, se encuentra conforme a derecho, toda vez que en el Contrato Privado de suscripción de Acciones suscrito entre las partes existen una serie de disposiciones que desnaturalizan su finalidad, convirtiéndolo en un Convenio para la adquisición de títulos de deuda y no acciones preferentes y nominativas, contraviniendo el artículo 11 de la Ley de Incentivos al Desarrollo Turístico, según se detalla: a). Existe una disposición que establece un compromiso recíproco de ambas partes de efectuar la recompra de los títulos en una fecha establecida. b)- Existe una disposición que establece el pago de rendimientos o intereses sobre el préstamo, independiente de los resultados financieros del Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima; c)- El compromiso de la recompra es por el valor nominal de las acciones, sin considerar la plusvalía generada por el Hotel como empresa en marcha; d)-El contrato de compra y venta de algunos títulos establecen que no generan ningún derecho de los dividendos, ni de la parte proporcional de las utilidades retenidas, ni de las revaluaciones de patrimonio, ni de capital pagado en exceso del Hotel Camino Real S.A. De igual manera, comparte ésta Cámara la argumentación del representante Estatal, en el sentido de que conforme lo consideró la Auditoría Fiscal, al recomprar la Empresa Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima los títulos clase "B" en el mes de setiembre de 1977 y volverlos a emitir en el mes de diciembre de 1997 bajo la clasificación "F", se violentaron las disposiciones contenidas en el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990, ya que dichos títulos como habían sido recomprados se encontraban en tesorería, por lo que si hubiera emitido acciones en el año 1997 y 1998, los títulos clases "B" cambiados a clase "F" no aumentaron el capital accionario, por lo que el aumento de capital autorizado por el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo por los títulos clases "F" en ningún momento se dio, ya que la empresa lo que hizo fue poner en circulación nuevamente los títulos clases "B" que se habían emitido en el año 1993. Este Tribunal considera ajustada a derecho las consideraciones de la Auditoría Fiscal en el sentido de que a pesar de que la empresa desarrolladora del proyecto turístico ha indicado que los títulos que se emitían son acciones preferentes, las condiciones establecidas en el Convenio evidencian la creación de un instrumento de crédito. En el sentido indicado, ya la Sección Cuarta de éste Tribunal, en un caso en el que se discutía la adquisición de acciones a la Empresa Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, en idénticas condiciones a las pactadas con la aquí Actora, consideró lo siguiente:" (...). VI)- DE LAS ACCIONES PRIVILEGIADAS: Como se adelantó supra, ningún cuestionamiento se ha hecho respecto de la procedencia de acciones societarias de carácter privilegiado, pues así lo permite la ley mercantil; sin embargo es oportuno hacer una referencia a este tipo de acciones para determinar no solo su contenido, alcances y extensión sino además y no menos importante, su objetivo dentro de una sociedad mercantil; de manera que pueda este Tribunal determinar si lo que la empresa realizó fue una compra de acciones privilegiadas o bien otro tipo de negocio. La acción, como expresión de la participación social y status del socio que resume los derechos y obligaciones que le competen al socio (su titular), se define como "... el título circulativo que incorpora y certifica la participación efectiva en la vida del ente social, con todos los derechos y deberes que de ella descienden " (CERTAD Maroto, Gastón. "Meditaciones a propósito de acciones y cuotas de sociedades de capital" en Ivstitia, San José Costa Rica, Año 3, No. 30, Junio, 1989, p.11).- En virtud de los principios de paridad en el trato, uniformidad o identidad entre las acciones o de paridad de derechos, nuestro Código de Comercio en el artículo 120 establece que las acciones comunes y ordinarias otorgan idénticos derechos y representan partes iguales del capital social pues su valor es nominativamente igual.- Esto quiere decir que dentro de su respectiva categoría, las acciones son iguales y atribuyen por tanto, idénticos derechos y poderes.- En presencia de la llamada "libertad de emitir acciones con características diversas", nuestro artículo 121 del Código Mercantil permite a las sociedades la emisión de una o más clases (entiéndase categorías) de acciones, con las designaciones, preferencias, privilegios, restricciones, limitaciones y otras modalidades que se estipulen en la escritura social, siempre que se refieran a beneficios, al activo social, a las utilidades, al voto o a cualquier otro aspecto de la actividad social. Así en nuestro medio existen acciones comunes u ordinarias y especiales, donde las privilegiadas pertenecen a esta segunda categoría; las cuales se extraen del artículo 139 del Código de Comercio.- No hay duda que las acciones privilegiadas pueden surgir tanto al momento de la fundación de la sociedad como de un acto posterior, caso en el cual deberán observarse las formalidades prescritas para la modificación de los estatutos. Con carácter general, la categoría de acciones privilegiadas encuentra su límite en el objeto del privilegio: el mismo sólo puede referirse a los derechos (patrimoniales en principio) y no así a las situaciones pasivas del socio; resultando entonces que no se puede exonerar de forma alguna la obligación del aporte ni la participación en las pérdidas (en este sentido puede consultarse: Di SABATO, Franco. "Manuale delle societá", Utet, Torino, Italia, segunda edición, 1987, p.281). Esto significa aunque parezca elemental, que las acciones privilegiadas son o representan parte del capital social y al tenor de los artículo 18, 19 y 106 del Código de Comercio, deben constar en la escritura social: el número, el valor nominal, la naturaleza y la categoría de acciones en que se divide el capital social.- Así, cuando una sociedad anónima decide emitir acciones de esta categoría, debe hacerse constar tal voluntad en el pacto social en la cláusula respectiva al capital social; donde la autorización que exige el artículo 156 del mismo cuerpo normativo citado, es para aquellas referidas o posibilitadas en el pacto social original o modificado.- Ahora bien, en términos generales los derechos de naturaleza patrimonial consisten en el derecho a una parte proporcional de las utilidades netas y en el derecho a la cuota de liquidación; sin embargo nuestra legislación no contiene una disposición única en que se consagren estos derechos pero que se desprenden con claridad de los artículos 27 (prohibición de pagar dividendos ni hacerse distribuciones de ningún género, sino sobre utilidades realizadas y líquidas resultantes de un balance aprobado por la Asamblea Ordinaria, donde si hubiera pérdida del capital social debe ser reintegrado o reducido legalmente antes de hacerse repartición o asignación de utilidades); el artículo 143 (que establece la reserva legal y prescribe que si una vez hecha la reserva y previstas en la escritura social, la Asamblea acordará distribuir utilidades, los acciones adquirirán frente a la sociedad, un derecho para el cobro de los dividendos).- Este punto se refiere sin duda al fenómeno del "autofinanciamiento" en virtud del cual pese a haber utilidades netas declaradas decide no distribuirlas con ese propósito, visto que el derecho al dividendo se tiene en abstracto (como poder) y se concreta (como derecho) solo cuando la Asamblea acuerda distribuirlas. Con la Ley 7201 se agregó el artículo 32 bis al Código de Comercio y e él se regula el derecho de receso, estableciéndose alguna limitación normativa a la facultad de "autofinanciamiento", en cuanto al reembolso de la cuota de liquidación, no se establece como tal un derecho, pero el mismo se extrae del artículo 214 inciso e), mediante el cual se otorgan facultades a los liquidadores de sociedades mercantiles como la de concluir las operaciones pendientes, cobrar los créditos y satisfacer las obligaciones sociales, vender los bienes sociales por el precio autorizado según las normas de liquidación, elaborar el estado final de liquidación y someterlo a discusión y aprobación de los socios en la forma que corresponda según la naturaleza de la sociedad y la de entregar a cada socio la parte que le corresponde del haber social.-VII) No se desconoce que las acciones privilegiadas otorguen una posición más ventajosa respecto de las acciones ordinarias, en cuanto a los derechos patrimoniales; sin embargo tales privilegios encuentran un límite material: la prohibición del pacto leonino, que se desprende de los artículos 25 y 122 ambos del Código de Comercio, lo que no es otra cosa que en las acciones comunes no es eficaz el pacto que limite a uno o más socios de la participación en las ganancias pero sí en las pérdidas y respecto de las acciones privilegiadas, será eficaz el pacto que limite la participación tanto en las ganancias como en las pérdidas; sistema que contrasta con lo preceptuado en el Código Civil para sociedades civiles (artículo 1205).- Finalmente ha de hacerse notar que la Ley 7202 no permite las acciones privilegiadas en las bolsas de valores, en las sociedades de inversión ni en la sociedades operadoras de sociedades de inversión (artículo 30 inc. c), 92 inc. 2) y 110 inc. c) de la Ley 7201 d Mercado de Valores) y sí son permitidas en las sociedades anónimas de capital abierto (art. 126 inc. c) de la Ley 7201).- En síntesis, los privilegios que nuestra ley permite se conceden a través de acciones de tal categoría, están referidos únicamente a repartición de utilidades o reembolsos de la cuota de liquidación, cuyos motivos de creación se explican básicamente en razones financieras y deseo de control administrativo de la sociedad.- De tal modo que cuando la sociedad está en marcha, el motivo más común para la emisión de este tipo de acciones es la necesidad de un aumento de capital difícil de colocar y en razón de ello, insistimos, los privilegios pueden aplicarse únicamente a los derechos de orden patrimonial en los términos que señala el artículo 139 del Código de Comercio y con los límites materiales aquí expuestos, dirigidas siempre al aumento de capital.- También resulta de importancia mencionar que los privilegios pueden consistir en el derecho a percibir con cargo a los beneficios del ejercicio un dividendo preferente de un importe que generalmente se fija en un porcentaje del valor nominal de las acciones privilegiadas y que en lugar de ser de vencimiento anual puede tratarse de un derecho acumulativo, donde los beneficios sociales de un año son insuficientes para pagar todo el dividendo preferente, por lo que se cancela con los beneficios sociales posteriores antes de proceder al reparto de dividendos a las otras acciones. En palabras de don Luis Herrera Reyes: "las acciones privilegiadas pueden, asimismo, conferir ciertas ventajas pecuniarias más considerables, por ejemplo, que las acciones de prioridad emitidas a quinientos pesos se reembolsen a mil, concediéndoles preferencia sobre los capitales disponibles para el caso de liquidación. Mas, es preciso no perder de vista que las acciones de prioridad son, como las demás, simples acciones y que por tanto no pueden tener otros derechos que los ordinariamente establecidos por los accionistas, de suerte que no sería permitido estipular para las acciones privilegiadas un dividendo o interés en el caso de no existir beneficios sociales, pues esto sería atentatorio contra los derechos de terceros" (HERRERA Reyes, Luis. "Sociedades Anónimas, Editorial Nascimiento, Santiago, Chile, 1935, p,135). VIII-DEL NEGOCIO DE RECOMPRA: Ciertamente a pesar de que para los inversionistas no es del todo claro en qué consiste, es un negocio que está cada día más en uso, creado sobre todo para sujetos que intervienen en las transacciones bursátiles, como puestos de bolsa y la propia Bolsa Nacional de Valores.- Ante la ausencia de referencia doctrinal y derecho comparado, puede asimilarse al conocido contrato de "reporto" o "contrato de doble", siendo a éste al que se refiere la actual Ley de Mercado de Valores (art. 23, 49 y 50). La figura de la recompra aparece como una adaptación del contrato de reporto al mercado de valores costarricense.- Entendiéndolos como similares, para efectos de esta resolución, la recompra consiste en un contrato bursátil constituido entre dos partes, una de las cuales es poseedora de un título valor y otra que posee efectivo y donde se dan dos operaciones; la primera cuando el tenedor del título traspasa su instrumento a la otra parte y la segunda, cuando la vuelve a comprar en un plazo establecido, con lo que obtiene liquidez temporal sin necesidad de deshacerse permanentemente de su activo financiero.- "En términos generales un acuerdo de recompra involucra la adquisición inmediata de fondos a través de la venta de títulos valores con acuerdo simultáneo para recomprar dichos títulos en una fecha específica (normalmente en un período determinado menor a un año) a un precio previamente pactado que incluyen intereses o su equivalente, a un rendimiento acordado" (JOHANINNG, Patricia. "Aspectos generales del mercado de valores costarricense"., Programa de capacitación bursátil gerencial, fundación de Estudios de Postgrado e Investigación en Ciencias Económicas -Fundepos-, Universidad de Costa Rica, p.45).- Más que dos contratos podemos ver dos prestaciones donde el dueño de los títulos no desea desprenderse de los mismos pero requiere de liquidez, la cual obtiene al negociarlos sujetándolos al derecho y obligación de adquirirlos en el plazo convenido; asegurándose el comprador o inversionista una ganancia sin adquirir la propiedad de los títulos, que alcanza con el cumplimiento de la segunda operación.- Se trata de una relación jurídica unitaria, con una finalidad o causa única.- Ahora bien, las condiciones o parámetros del pacto, comprenden el plazo y el rendimiento que no tiene por qué ser igual al rendimiento nominal del título, debido a la diferencia existente entre los plazos de ambos instrumentos.- Así, el título no podrá tener un plazo inferior al plazo de la obligación de recompra y el rendimiento de la recompra se determinará según el plazo y las condiciones del mercado, tomando en consideración el precio que se paga en la primera operación.- Esto significa para los efectos que nos ocupa, que la recompra siempre implicará una ganancia para el inversionista que adquiere en la primera operación, lo que lo asimila al interés que se pagaría por un préstamo mercantil, por lo que este tipo de contrato se perfila como una operación de financiamiento, donde el adquirente en recompra busca una rentabilidad de su dinero colocado en recompra .- Resulta entonces, en los términos expuestos, que quien vende los títulos por recompra no quiere deshacerse de ellos sino simplemente requiere de dinero o liquidez sobre esos títulos o valores y quien los compra para revenderlos, no está interesado en adquirir la propiedad definitiva de los mismos, sino únicamente de que estos existan como garantía de su dinero hasta el pago por el vendedor inicial.- En nuestro medio se reconoce la recompra sobre acciones, aunque en el mercado accionario está muy limitado, pero está legalmente permitido de conformidad con el artículo 7 del Sistema Operativo y el artículo 45 de la Ley Reguladora de Mercado de Valores, disponiendo este último que los intereses, dividendos y otros beneficios que deriven de los títulos valores objeto de las operaciones de recompra y que sean exigibles durante el plazo de dichas operaciones, corresponderán al vendedor final a plazo, salvo que las partes manifiesten general, correspondiendo al vendedor el derecho de voto hasta el momento de entrega. La recompra no es en síntesis ni una compra-venta ni tampoco de una transmisión de la propiedad de los títulos o valores ( en tal sentido, puede consultarse: ARIAS L., Fabio Alberto: "Recompra: reporto o préstamo?", Ivustitia, año 13, No. 151-152, Julio-Agosto, 1999).- Todo esto nos lleva a concluir que la recompra es una operación de financiamiento o préstamo con garantía en los títulos, que luego son entregados en fideicomiso en garantía.- IX)- (....) Resulta de lo expuesto y analizado en autos, que lo negociado por la aquí actora no cumple con las características de acciones privilegiadas y por ende, no son susceptibles de ser consideradas dentro del beneficio de crédito fiscal, lo cual conduce avalar en un todo lo actuado y resuelto por la Administración Tributaria sin que las resoluciones impugnadas lesiones (sic) de forma alguna la legislación que al respecto regula la materia ni la potestad concedida por dicha vía para fiscalizar y definir la procedencia de un beneficio como el que nos ocupa. Obsérvese que inicia la negociación a partir de un contrato privado no oponible al fisco, en primer lugar; convenio donde las partes a pesar de llamarlas "acciones privilegiadas" constituyen un financiamiento donde incluso no se da la traslación de dominio, tal y como quedó debidamente acreditado en autos.- Nos encontramos en presencia como se ha dicho, de un contrato bilateral, donde tanto Hotel Camino Real S.A. como (.......) confluyen su voluntad de negociar en los términos descritos con consecuencias para el caso de la aquí actora que provocan la denegatoria de un beneficio fiscal, no por incumplir formalidades requeridas sino por el contenido de las mismas, títulos que no corresponden más que a un financiamiento que no es posible encuadrar por las razones expuestas en sede administrativa y constatadas en ésta, dentro de la letra del artículo 11 de la Ley 6990, comprobándose que en ninguno de los casos (ni las llamadas acciones clase "F" ni las de clase "G") implicaron un crecimiento en el capital social, que es la finalidad primordial de la emisión de acciones societarias privilegiadas.- El principio de realidad económica (contenido en el artículo 8 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), tal y como lo mencionan las partes, ciertamente y en términos muy simples, significa superar la forma para revisar materialmente lo actuado con repercusión fiscal para determinar si aplica o no lo solicitado; y en este caso, esa realidad confirmó ser muy distinta a lo que se regula y se persigue con el otorgamiento de un beneficio fiscal.- Si el desconocimiento del beneficio provoca algún tipo de disconformidad a la aquí actora eventualmente sería con su cocontratante contra quien debería dirigirse, persona jurídica respecto de quien, en todo caso, no se incluyó en ninguna de las pretensiones de esta demanda, por lo que este Tribunal encuentra limitaciones jurídicas para valorar su conducta dentro de este proceso.- Si bien la interpretación auténtica de normas jurídicas es resorte de la Asamblea Legislativa, los alcances de las normas en materia tributaria con miras a encuadrar dentro de la hipótesis legal el caso concreto, corresponde a la Administración Tributaria, sin que de lo analizado por este Tribunal se desprenda roce ni lesión con lo que, en relación, le está legítima y legalmente permitido; no quedando más opción que la de confirmar lo resuelto por la Administración Tributaria en los términos contenidos en la resoluciones impugnadas que rechazó el otorgamiento del crédito fiscal con base en el contrato turístico respectivo; sin que con ello se niegue la legitimidad de las inversiones sino su naturaleza en condición de acciones privilegiadas; las cuales, como quedó expuesto, no encuadran dentro del supuesto para aplicar tal beneficio; incentivos turísticos sobre los cuales ejerció control y vigilancia legítimamente la Administración Tributaria sin que alcanzaran las inversiones efectuadas por la aquí accionante la tipicidad necesaria para conceder el beneficio turístico de exoneración.- La valoración y aplicación a una situación específica en un período fiscal determinado del otorgamiento del beneficio turístico concedido en forma abstracta, está condicionada al cumplimiento de obligaciones determinadas cuya función fiscalizadora ostenta la Administración Tributaria, y donde los títulos de deuda no encuadran dentro del supuesto requerido para su reconocimiento ni respecto de las denominadas acciones clase "F" ni respecto de las de clase "G", deviniendo tanto la pretensión principal como la subsidiaria no encuentran apoyo en nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, resultando de recibo la defensa de falta de derecho y en consecuencia, sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda aquí planteada".-(Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Cuarta a las trece horas treinta minutos del ocho de agosto del 2007) . Considerando las razones descritas, si bien la legislación comercial vigente permite la posibilidad legal de emisión y venta de acciones privilegiadas y la posibilidad de concertar contratos de recompra de acciones, lo cierto es que en el presente caso, este Tribunal considera procedentes las argumentaciones del apoderado del Estado en el sentido de que en realidad conforme a las disposiciones contenidas en el Contrato Privado de Suscripción de Acciones suscrito entre la Actora y la Empresa Camino Real Sociedad Anónima, lo que adquirió la accionante fueron títulos de deuda y no acciones que permitieran al amparo de lo establecido en el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990, reconocer el crédito fiscal originado en dicha compra. En este sentido, considera este Tribunal que carecen de fundamento los argumentos esgrimidos por la actora respecto de la improcedencia de la actuación de la Administración Tributaria, toda vez que conforme a los términos contractuales pactados por las partes la obligación de recompra de las acciones que fueron adquiridas por la aquí accionante, constituye casualmente uno de los principales elementos para considerar la inexistencia de un Contrato de Compra-Venta de Acciones dentro de los fines establecidos por el legislador al emitir la Ley de Incentivos para el desarrollo Turístico. 4)- EL CONVENIO PRIVADO DE SUSCRIPCION DE ACCIONES NO ES OPONIBLE AL FISCO. PRINCIPIO DE REALIDAD ECONOMICA. De conformidad con lo establecido por el artículo 8 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios al definir la forma de interpretación de la norma que regula el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria, las formas jurídicas adoptadas por los contribuyentes no obligan al intérprete, quién puede atribuir a las situaciones y actos ocurridos una significación acorde con los hechos, cuando de la ley tributaria surja que el hecho generador de la respectiva obligación fue definido atendiendo a la realidad y no a la forma jurídica. Cuando las formas jurídicas sean manifiestamente inapropiadas a la realidad de los hechos gravados y ello se traduzca en una disminución de la cuantía de las obligaciones, la ley tributaria se debe aplicar prescindiendo de tales formas. Por su parte el artículo 12 del Código de cita establece que los convenios referentes a materia tributaria celebrados entre particulares no son aducibles en contra del Fisco. En el sentido indicado, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Segunda en la Sentencia No. 241-2008 dictada a las once horas veinte minutos del dieciocho de julio del 2008, ya citada consideró lo siguiente: " (...) De manera que, no basta con aportar los comprobantes para justificar el gasto, sino que éstos deben estar debidamente autorizados por la Administración Tributaria, como se desprende de los artículos 8 y 9 de la citada Ley y 103 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, por cuanto "la validez de la deducción autorrealizada por el contribuyente para efectos de su declaración, está sujeta a la posterior comprobación que en estos menesteres puede realizar el Fisco" (sentencia número 000633-F-2006, de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de setiembre del dos mil seis, de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia); por cuanto a la Administración Tributaria se le ha dotado de facultades suficientes para comprobar o cotejar la información suministrada por el contribuyente, esto es, un poder de fiscalización e investigación, tanto de los documentos aportados como de los que estime necesarios para la acreditación de los gastos, en tanto esta función tiene como finalidad el "[...] desentrañar la realidad económica subyacente en la obligación tributaria, dando paso al deber de completar lo debido, si se determinó que la cuota del impuesto es superior, o bien, en caso contrario, esto es, que se pagó de más, devolver ante el reclamo, el exceso cancelado, pues su retención, de darse, sería indebida, por ende, contraria a legalidad. El poder inquisitivo en cuestión, permite, igualmente, solicitar información a terceros, oficinas o funcionarios públicos, o al mismo sujeto pasivo, quienes de conformidad con el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, están obligados a aportar la documentación que sea requerida (artículos 128 y 132 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Todo con el objeto de encausar, dentro de su correcta dimensión, el monto del deber tributario, esto es, establecer la dimensión real del deber de contribuir, constituyendo una carga de colaboración con el Fisco, lo que tiene su raíz en la misma doctrina del canon 18 constitucional. Es por ello que la procedencia del gasto debe ser plenamente acreditada por el contribuyente, y corresponde a la Administración Tributaria, en ejercicio de estas potestades, concluir sobre su procedencia, no solo en términos cualitativos, sino en los cuantitativos. De este modo, ante su rechazo, corresponde al sujeto pasivo aportar las pruebas que justifiquen el cambio de criterio, es decir, le incumbe, la mayoría de las veces, la carga demostrativa" (sentencia número 000633-F-2006, supra citada)." En el presente caso, dadas las circunstancias que han sido detalladas , en criterio de este Tribunal en atención al principio de realidad económica y al amparo de las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 8 y 12 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios , la denegatoria del crédito aplicado por la Actora en su declaración del Impuesto sobre la Renta del período de 1998 referente a la inversión en acciones por Contrato Turístico del Hotel Camino Real Sociedad Anónima se encuentra ajustada a derecho, por cuanto lo que se adquirió fueron títulos de deuda y no acciones preferentes, siendo que dicho Convenio constituye un acuerdo entre particulares que no es aducible en contra del Fisco, sin que ello implique -según lo considera la actora-, que la Administración Tributaria esté ejerciendo potestades que le son propias al Poder Legislativo.”