Penalty for Omission of Information in Residential Development AdvertisingSanción por omisión de información en publicidad de residencial

**V.** Administrative sanctioning law, in its capacity as the punitive power of the State, is protected by the principle of legality —as it is a matter reserved to law (materia de reserva de ley), in accordance with the provisions of Article 124 of Law No. 6227, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)— as well as by the definition (tipicidad) of the infringing conduct and the sanction. For this reason, it has been determined doctrinally and jurisprudentially that both the infraction and the legal consequence of such conduct must necessarily be defined in the law, so that the individual subject to the administration (administrado) can discern between what is lawful and what is unlawful. That is, a norm of legal rank and force, in a formal and material sense, must clearly regulate the unlawful conduct and determine the coercive or sanctioning measure to be imposed on the offender when they incur in the fault that contravenes it. The foregoing, in protection of the principle enshrined in numeral 39 of our Political Constitution, which establishes that no one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a “fault” (falta) sanctioned in a prior law. Now, this administrative sanction, not because it is applicable in this venue is it exempt from complying with the requirements established for this purpose by the current Legal System; rather, it must be issued in clear observance and application of them, in light of the specific analysis of the concrete case by the legal operator. To that extent, the public administration, as occurs in the case under examination, must resort to the implementation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and justice when exercising that punitive and repressive power, because the application of the Constitution's law is imposed, which permeates the lower-ranking norms to be applied to the specific and particular case.

**VI.** Having analyzed the case in light of the described principles, this instance must first address what was alleged by the plaintiffs' representation regarding the non-conformity of the sanctioned conduct with the elements of the sanctioning type, since in their opinion, the administrative resolutions they attack clearly determined that there was no deception (engaño) of the consumer on their part, and that furthermore, the plaintiffs complied with what was offered in due course to those consumers who acquired homes in the Rincón Verde II residential development, developed by Fomento Urbano S.A. and Viviendas del Sur S.A., but the Consumer Defense Commission (Comisión de Defensa del Consumidor) further found that the provisions of subsections b) and c) of Article 34 of Law No. 7472 were violated in relation to numeral 37 of the same regulatory body, in that they did not provide sufficient information about what the scope of the so-called "restricted access" (acceso restringido) was, a characteristic that was advertised as inherent to said housing project. It is not that the interested parties were lied to by being told that the residential development would have "tire spikes" (agujas) installed on its access road, but rather that it was omitted to inform them that those would not be there, although there would be cameras placed, perimeter walls (tapias), a surveillance service —a guard—, etc. In the absence of deception or error (engaño o error), they consider that the provisions of the cited sanctioning types are not met, and to that extent, the challenged administrative acts become contradictory, and furthermore, in their opinion, error and deception are essential elements of the type. In this regard, this Court considers that the plaintiff's arguments are not well-founded, for the considerations set forth below. Article 34 of Law No. 7472 literally establishes, in what is of interest: "Article 34.- Obligations of the merchant. The obligations of the merchant and the producer, to the consumer, are the following: (...) b) Sufficiently inform the consumer, in Spanish and in a clear and truthful manner, about the elements that directly affect their consumption decision. They must inform them of the nature, composition, content, weight, when applicable, the characteristics of the goods and services, the cash price on the packaging, the container, the wrapper or the label of the product and the gondola or shelf of the commercial establishment, as well as any other determining data. (…) (The previous subsection as amended by Article 40 of Law No. 8591 of June 28, 2007). c) Offer, promote, or advertise goods and services in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of this Law. (...) l) Comply with Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 41 bis of this law. (As amended by Article 1, subsection a), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). (...) All information, advertising, or offer to the public of goods offered or services to be rendered, transmitted by any means or form of communication, binds the producer who transmits, uses, or orders it and forms part of the contract. Non-compliance with any of the obligations listed in this article empowers the interested party to resort to the National Consumer Commission (Comisión nacional del consumidor) created in this Law, or to the competent jurisdictional bodies, and to assert their rights, in the terms indicated in Article 43 of this Law. (Its numbering as amended by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 31 to 34)" From the transcribed legal text, it follows that one of the legal impositions that the merchant must satisfy is the duty of information, which not only comprises the obligation to provide it to the potential consumer, but must also be made known in a truthful manner, that is, veracious, transparent, without resorting to duplicity, partial concealments, or biases, to the detriment of the person who, in their internal forum, is forming their acquisitive will, and additionally, in a timely manner, that is, while the process of weighing the various negative and positive aspects of the good or service of interest and the assessment of the eventual consequences that this volitional determination will entail for the consumer is still underway within the human psyche. For its part, Article 37 of the same regulatory body, intrinsically related to the previous one, states —also in what is of interest—: "Article 37.- Offer, promotion, and advertising. The offer, promotion, or advertising of goods and services must be carried out according to their nature, characteristics, conditions, content, weight when applicable, utility, or purpose, in such a way that it does not induce error or deception (error o engaño) to the consumer. Such information cannot be omitted, if damage or danger to the health or safety of the consumer may derive from it. The clauses stipulated in the contracts shall prevail if they are more beneficial than the content of the offer, promotion, or advertising of the goods and services. The use of comparative terms in the offer, promotion, or advertising of goods and services is only admissible regarding essential, related, and objectively demonstrable data, provided they are compared with other similar, known products or those with significant market participation. The comparison is not admissible when it is limited to the general and indiscriminate proclamation of the superiority of one's own products; that which omits any element necessary to determine the real value of the products is considered misleading. The producer or merchant who, in the offer, promotion, advertising, or information, fails to comply with the requirements set forth in this article, must be obliged to rectify the advertising, pay for it, and disseminate the truthful or omitted information, by the same means and form previously used. (Its numbering as amended by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 34 to 37)" From the foregoing, it follows that said duty of information intends that, at the moment of carrying out the commercial transaction, the consumer is fully informed of the characteristics of the good or service they are acquiring, and therefore, that the decision they make when defining the respective contracting is a conscious and informed one, without there being factors that, had they come to light, could have modified their will or caused them to incur in error (error) regarding the conditions, nature, characteristics, disadvantages, or strengths of what they are acquiring. Now, in the case under judgment, the plaintiffs' representation makes a mistaken assessment in considering that the effects derived from the statement that there was no error or deception on their part, expressed by the Commission for Consumer Defense, in itself excludes the existence of responsibility on their part. And it is that the challenged acts do not sanction them for having deceived their clients, nor for inducing them into error, but rather the administrative sanction imposed is based on having omitted information when, in a timely manner, it should have been made known to them. The term "error" is not applicable to the described and sanctioned conduct, since the eventual buyers of the homes knew the characteristics of the properties they were acquiring, and also stated they were aware of the various security measures that the companies contracted and installed in the Rincón Verde II residential development, as derived from the evidentiary material and the record of oral and private appearance found in the administrative file; nor is there "deception" (engaño) regarding the information that was provided in due course to the complainants, since it was not distorted or changed for false information, falsity and lies being an inherent element of deception; rather, it was omitted, that is, something was not said that should have been brought to the attention of the interested parties. That is the reprehensible conduct sanctioned in the ordinary administrative procedure that gave rise to the issuance of the challenged acts, as deduced from their detailed reading. And it is subject to sanction, just as the administration determined, because said information, referring to aspects of the security of the residential development, was important for defining the contractual will of the buyers, especially in these times, where indices of citizen insecurity and violence have increased exponentially in recent years. It must be taken into consideration that the advertised object was homes, which are usually inhabited by family nuclei. Therefore, one of the core aspects to take into account in order to determine the place to acquire a dwelling house is precisely the security systems available for the adequate protection of people's patrimonial wealth, their household goods, and the physical and mental integrity of their loved ones and close ones. Especially if one values the fact that normally, those who make the investment of acquiring a real estate property of this nature, do so with the purpose or conviction of establishing their place of residence there for a medium or long term. To that extent, this Court considers that the companies Fomento Urbano S.A. and Viviendas del Sur S.A. did indeed, at the opportune moment, omit to disclose the scope of the so-called "restricted access" that was offered in mass media as an added value to make the residential development in question more attractive, and to that extent, the plaintiffs made themselves deserving of the applied sanctions, which are contained in the legislation transcribed above. However, it must be clarified that this cannot be taken to the extreme of considering that, in the case of a residential development or urbanization, the entry of persons could have been definitively restricted by implementing a system of what are colloquially called "tire spikes" (agujas), as the complainants erroneously sought, setting aside the regulatory provisions established for this purpose in Article 32 and following of Law No. 5060, the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), since the access roads to said residential development are public domain property of the State, and therefore not susceptible to restrictions regarding passage through them, —except for those previously determined and authorized by law—, binding provisions of general scope whose existence the complainants could not ignore or disregard, in accordance with Article 129 of our fundamental norm. Admitting a position like the one posited by the former complainants would have constituted a violation of the right to free transit, established in Article 22 of our current Constitution, which enshrines it as a fundamental right, since streets and highways are public domain assets (bienes demaniales). Continuing with the debated point, for the reasons stated, the arguments issued in this regard by the dissenting parties lack validity, and their rejection must proceed, as is hereby ordered.

**VII.** Regarding the nullity that the plaintiffs' representation accuses as existing over the challenged administrative acts, it must be indicated that in the opinion of this collegiate body, their allegations are partially well-founded. First, it is important to bring up the provisions of Articles 57 and 59 of Law No. 7472, in what is of importance for the resolution of this matter, which state: "Article 57.- Sanctions. The National Consumer Commission (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor) must hear and sanction the administrative infractions committed in matters of consumption, stipulated in this law, without prejudice to the corresponding criminal or civil liability. According to the gravity of the act, the infractions committed to the detriment of consumers shall be sanctioned with a fine in the following manner: a) From one to ten times the lowest minimum monthly salary established in the Law of the Ordinary Budget of the Republic, for the infractions indicated in subsections d), e), f), j) and n) of Article 31 and in Article 35 of this law. b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Law of the Ordinary Budget of the Republic, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l) and m) of Article 31 of this law. The maximum of the administrative sanction indicated in the preceding paragraph must be applied when, from the infraction against this law, damages derive for health, safety, or the environment, which exert an adverse effect on consumers. (As amended by Article 1, subsection c), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). (Its numbering as amended by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 54 to 57)" It must be noted, simply by way of clarification, that as a consequence of the amendments suffered by the cited legislation, the numeral formerly designated as "31" currently corresponds to the one numbered "34". Likewise, numeral 59 of the same law establishes: "Article 59. Valuation criteria. To assess the sanctions to be imposed, the qualification must consider the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the non-compliance with quality standards, the position of the infringer in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intentionality, the gravity of the damage, and the recidivism of the infringer. (Its numbering as amended by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 56 to 59)". From the transcribed legal texts, it is shown how the conduct displayed by the merchant or producer does directly affect the quantum or grading of the sanction to be imposed, since the fine depends unfailingly on the nature of the infraction committed and the particular circumstances of each specific case. On this point, the Court respectfully disagrees with the State's defense, for it should be recalled, as stated above, that administrative sanctioning matters are imbued with the constitutional principles that generally govern the punitive activity of the State, so it is not possible to apply to a concrete act a sanction different from the one expressly established for it in the Law. If the legislator provided for differentiating administrative illicit acts in order to also impose a diverse range of corrective measures, in attention to the casuistic assessment that the legal operator carries out for this purpose, this cannot be indifferent to the administrative bodies in charge of applying its precepts, which are obliged to observe such gradations, according to the wording of the applicable regulations, the possibility of resorting to analogical application or the diverse systems of hermeneutics recognized by Law being prohibited, regarding the determination of that punitive measure, as proclaimed by the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 39 of the Political Constitution, from which also derives, as a core and integral part of due process and the right of defense, the imperative necessity for the administrative judge to adequately state the reasons why they defined the application of a specific sanction, and not a different one. From a detailed study of the case file, it is verified that in this matter, the plaintiff did incur in the fault provided for in subsections b) and c) of Article 34 of Law 7472, which is why it was appropriate to resort to the application of a sanctioning measure established within the scope contemplated in the second paragraph, subsection b) of numeral 57 of that regulatory body, which the Commission did effectively apply. However, it remains now to define whether the grading of the applied sanction conforms to what is established in the current legal system.

**VIII.** Article 57 subsection b) cited above does not establish a fixed fine for the infractions committed that are cited there, but establishes a band system, by setting a minimum and a maximum sanction as a margin within which the administration can, with a statement of reasons, choose the one applicable to the specific case, by establishing "b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Law of the Ordinary Budget of the Republic, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l) and m) of Article 31 of this law." Now, Article 59 establishes, for its part, the criteria to take into consideration for determining what amount, as a fine, will be applied to the infringer, within the range spanning from ten to forty minimum salaries, and as parameters for said individualization, it indicates in its final paragraph that the higher end must be imposed when damages to health, safety, or the environment derive that exert an adverse effect on one or more consumers; a precept that is complemented by the aforementioned Article 59 according to which must be assessed "(...) the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the non-compliance with quality standards, the position of the infringer in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intentionality, the gravity of the damage, and the recidivism of the infringer." The foregoing allows for an examination of the particular circumstances that surrounded the commission of the administrative infraction to be punished, with the purpose of guaranteeing the observance of the principle of proportionality between the illicit act committed and the applicable "penalty," so that the latter adjusts to the former in a reasonable manner. The National Consumer Commission, in subjection to the invoked principles, cannot move at its complete pleasure within the two extremes provided for by subsection b) of Article 57, since both that normative provision and Article 59 impose the limitations to be followed and taken into account for its determination. The amount of the applicable fine must be clearly substantiated, and for that purpose, the Administration must carry out an exegesis, and point out the reasons that led it to impose the one that, in its judgment, corresponds to the sanctioned conduct, adequately stating the reasons for said aspect in the resolution to be issued. It is thus constrained to expressly weigh aspects such as "the position of the infringer in the market," "the amount of the benefit obtained," "the degree of intentionality," "the gravity of the damage," or "the recidivism of the infringer," in relation to the specific case, dimensioning in what form they occurred —if they exist— and to what degree. It goes without saying that it is not enough to vaguely or lightly cite those determining circumstances, as if they were ritual formulas without endowing them with concrete content, because in that way the affected party's right of defense would be violated, by preventing them from knowing with certainty the motivations that gave rise to the specific condemnation, without being able to deduce why another was not the one applied to their situation. This also violates the principle of legitimate trust (confianza legítima) that implicitly permeates our current legal system, which also stands as a guiding aphorism for the actions carried out by the public administration, with greater reason when it comes to sanctioning matters. Admitting such digressions would make it difficult to exercise adequate legality control over the final acts of the instituted procedure. The duty to state the grounds for penalties further integrates a parameter of constitutionality and legality, as an integral part of the right to due process and effective judicial protection; and from this point of view, for what concerns here, it comprises the right of citizens to obtain, from the administrative bodies with the power to negatively impact their private sphere, not only a decision in accordance with the law, but also one duly reasoned, based on the assessment of all the elements that constitute the visible and differentiating facets of the specific case. With the satisfaction of the duty to state reasons, the sanctioning function is rationalized, and it is this that allows defining whether the final act is not only legal, in accordance with the law, but also whether it is just and the reasons that lead to those conclusions. But it is not only about giving a statement of reasons or grounds to satisfy said constitutional imperative, but it also fulfills the unpostponable necessity to persuade its addressee that the measure applied is the result of a thoughtful analysis, and not the result of improvisation or force. Additionally, it turns out to be the obligatory reference parameter for challenge purposes, since it is based on it that the existence or not of an adequate application of the Law is assessed.” If the products are organic, this condition must be indicated in a visible place. In addition, the product label must indicate the certifying body. (...) (The preceding subsection thus amended by Article 40 of Law No. 8591 of June 28, 2007). c) Offer, promote, or advertise goods and services in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of this Law. (...) l) Comply with Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 41 bis of this law. (Thus amended by Article 1, subsection a), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). (...) All information, advertising, or public offer of goods offered or services to be provided, transmitted by any medium or form of communication, binds the producer that transmits, uses, or orders it and forms part of the contract. The breach of any of the obligations listed in this article empowers the interested party to resort to the National Consumer Commission created in this Law, or to the competent jurisdictional bodies, and to assert their rights, in the terms indicated in Article 43 of this Law. (Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, which moved it from 31 to 34)" From the transcribed legal text, it follows that one of the legal impositions that the merchant must satisfy is the duty to inform, which not only includes the obligation to provide information to the potential consumer but also that it must be made known in a truthful manner, that is, veracious, transparent, without resorting to duplicity, even partial concealments or biases, to the detriment of the person who is internally forming their purchasing intent, and additionally, in a timely manner, that is, while still in process within the human psyche, the weighing of the various negative and positive aspects of the good or service of interest and the assessment of the eventual consequences that this volitional determination will entail for the consumer.

For its part, Article 37 of the same regulatory body, intrinsically related to the preceding one, states—also in what is relevant—:

"Article 37.- Offer, promotion, and advertising. The offer, promotion, or advertising of goods and services must be carried out in accordance with their nature, their characteristics, conditions, content, weight when applicable, utility, or purpose, so as not to mislead or deceive the consumer. Such information cannot be omitted if harm or danger to the health or safety of the consumer may derive from it. The clauses stipulated in contracts must prevail if they are more beneficial than the content of the offer, promotion, or advertising of the goods and services. The use of comparative terms in the offer, promotion, or advertising of goods and services is only admissible regarding essential, related, and objectively demonstrable data, provided they are compared with other similar, known products or products with significant market share. Comparison is not admissible when limited to the general and indiscriminate proclamation of the superiority of one's own products; any comparison that omits any element necessary to determine the real value of the products is considered misleading. The producer or merchant that, in the offer, promotion, advertising, or information, fails to comply with the requirements set forth in this article, must be compelled to rectify the advertising, pay for it, and disseminate the truthful or omitted information, by the same medium and form previously used. (Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, which moved it from 34 to 37)" From the foregoing, it follows that said duty to inform aims to ensure that, at the time of carrying out the commercial transaction, the consumer is fully informed of the specific characteristics of the good or service they are acquiring, and therefore, that the decision made when defining the respective contract is a conscious and informed one, without any factors that, had they come to light, could have modified their will or caused them to err regarding the conditions, nature, characteristics, disadvantages, or strengths of what they are acquiring. Now then, in the case sub judice, the plaintiffs' representation makes an erroneous assessment when considering that the effects derived from the Consumer Defense Commission's statement that there was no error or deception on their part, in itself, excludes the existence of liability on their part. And the challenged acts do not sanction them for having deceived their clients, nor for leading them into error; rather, the imposed administrative sanction is based on having omitted information when it should have been made known to them in a timely manner. The term "error" is not applicable to the described and sanctioned conduct, since the eventual homebuyers were aware of the specific characteristics of the properties they were acquiring, and also stated they were aware of the various security measures that the companies contracted and installed in the Rincón Verde II residential complex, as derived from the evidentiary material and the record of the oral and private appearance contained in the administrative file; nor is there any "deception" regarding the information provided at the time to the complainants, since it was not distorted or replaced with false information—falsehood and lying being inherent elements of deception—but rather it was omitted, that is, something that should have been brought to the interested parties' attention was not disclosed. That is the reprehensible conduct sanctioned in the ordinary administrative procedure that led to the issuance of the challenged acts, as deduced from a detailed reading thereof. And such conduct is susceptible to sanction, as determined by the administration, because said information, referring to aspects specific to the residential complex's security, was important for defining the contractual will of the buyers, especially in these times, when rates of citizen insecurity and violence have increased exponentially in recent years. It must be taken into consideration that the advertised object was housing, which is usually inhabited by family units. Therefore, one of the core aspects to take into account when determining the place to purchase a dwelling is precisely the security systems available for the proper protection of individuals' patrimonial assets, their household goods, and the physical and mental integrity of their loved ones and close relations. Especially considering the fact that normally, those who invest in acquiring real estate of this nature do so with the purpose or conviction of establishing their place of residence there for a medium or long term. To that extent, this Court considers that the companies Fomento Urbano S.A. and Viviendas del Sur S.A. indeed omitted, at the appropriate time, to disclose the scope of the so-called "restricted access" offered in the mass media as an added value to make the aforementioned residential complex more attractive, and to that extent, the plaintiffs warranted the applied sanctions, which are contained in the legislation transcribed above. However, it must be clarified that this cannot be taken to the extreme of considering that, in the case of a residential complex or subdivision, the entry of persons could have been definitively restricted through the implementation of a system colloquially known as "needles," as the complainants erroneously sought, disregarding the regulatory provisions established for this purpose in Article 32 and following of Law No. 5060 Ley General de Caminos Públicos, since the access streets to said residential complex are public domain assets of the State, and therefore not subject to restrictions regarding passage through them—save for those previously determined and authorized by law—binding provisions of general scope whose existence the complainants could not ignore or disregard, in accordance with Article 129 of our fundamental norm. If a position like the one advanced by the former complainants were accepted, it would have incurred a violation of the right to free transit, established in Article 22 of our current Constitution, which enshrines it as a fundamental right, since streets and roads are demanial assets. Continuing with the debated point, for the reasons stated, the arguments issued by the dissatisfied parties lack validity, and their rejection must proceed, as is hereby ordered.

VII.Regarding the nullity alleged by the plaintiffs' representation as existing over the challenged administrative acts, it must be indicated that, in the opinion of this collegiate body, their arguments are partially correct. First, it is important to bring up the provisions of Articles 57 and 59 of Law No. 7472, regarding what is important for the resolution of this matter, which provide:

"Article 57.- Sanctions. The Comisión Nacional del Consumidor must hear and sanction the administrative infractions committed in consumer matters, stipulated in this law, without prejudice to the corresponding criminal or civil liability. Depending on the seriousness of the act, infractions committed to the detriment of consumers must be sanctioned with a fine as follows:

• a)From one to ten times the lowest minimum monthly salary established in the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, for the infractions indicated in subsections d), e), f), j), and n) of Article 31 and in Article 35 of this law. b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l), and m) of Article 31 of this law.

The maximum of the administrative sanction indicated in the preceding paragraph must be applied when, from the infraction against this law, harm to health, safety, or the environment results, which exerts an adverse effect on consumers. (Thus amended by Article 1, subsection c), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). (Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, which moved it from 54 to 57)" It should be noted, simply for clarification purposes, that as a result of the modifications undergone by the cited legislation, the numeral formerly indicated as "31" currently corresponds to the one numbered "34". Similarly, numeral 59 ibidem establishes:

"Article 59. Assessment criteria. To assess the sanctions to be imposed, the qualification must consider the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the breach of quality standards, the position of the offender in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intent, the seriousness of the damage, and the recidivism of the offender. (Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, which moved it from 56 to 59)".

From the transcribed legal texts, it is noted how the conduct displayed by the merchant or producer directly affects the quantum or gradation of the sanction to be imposed, since the fine depends unfailingly on the nature of the committed infraction and the particular circumstances of each specific case. On this point, the Court respectfully disagrees with the State's defense, as it must be recalled, as stated above, that administrative sanctioning matters are imbued with the constitutional principles that generally govern the State's punitive activity, such that it is not possible to apply to a specific act a sanction different from that expressly established for it in the Law. If the legislator provided for differentiating administrative illicit acts in order to also impose a diverse range of corrective measures, in light of the casuistic assessment that the legal operator carries out for this purpose, this cannot be irrelevant to the administrative bodies responsible for applying its precepts, which are obligated to observe such gradations, according to the wording of the applicable regulations, with the possibility of resorting to analogical application or to the various hermeneutic systems recognized by Law regarding the determination of that punitive measure being prohibited, as proclaimed by the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 39 of the Constitución Política, from which also derives, as a core and integral part of due process and the right of defense, the imperative need for the administrative judge to adequately state the reasons for which they defined the application of a specific sanction, and not another different one. From a detailed study of the case file, it is confirmed that in this matter, the plaintiff did incur in the fault provided for in subsections b) and c) of Article 34 of Law 7472, for which reason it was appropriate to resort to the application of a sanctioning measure established within the scope contemplated in the second paragraph, subsection b) of numeral 57 of that regulatory body, which the Commission indeed applied. However, it remains to be determined whether the gradation of the applied sanction conforms to the provisions of the current legal system.

VIII.Article 57, subsection b) cited above, does not establish a fixed fine for the infractions committed that are cited therein, but rather establishes a band system, by setting a minimum and maximum sanction as a margin within which the administration can, with reasoning, choose the one applicable to the specific case, by establishing "b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l), and m) of Article 31 of this law." Now then, Article 59, for its part, establishes the criteria to be taken into consideration to determine the amount that, as a fine, will be applied to the offender, within the range covering from ten to forty minimum salaries, and as parameters for said individualization, states in its final paragraph that the higher end must be imposed when harm to health, safety, or the environment results, which exerts an adverse effect on one or more consumers; a precept that is complemented by the referenced Article 59, according to which must be assessed "(...) the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the breach of quality standards, the position of the offender in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intent, the seriousness of the damage, and the recidivism of the offender.". The foregoing allows for an examination of the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the administrative infraction to be punished, with the purpose of guaranteeing the observance of the principle of proportionality between the illicit act committed and the applicable "penalty," so that the latter reasonably conforms to the former. The Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, in subjection to the invoked principles, cannot move at its entire pleasure within the two extremes provided for by subsection b) of Article 57, since both that normative provision and Article 59 impose the limitations to follow and take into account for its determination. The amount of the applicable fine must be clearly based, and for that purpose, the Administration must carry out an exegesis and state the reasons that led it to impose the one it believes corresponds to the sanctioned conduct, properly reasoning said aspect in the resolution to be issued. It is then constrained to expressly weigh aspects such as "the position of the offender in the market," "the amount of the benefit obtained," "the degree of intent," "the seriousness of the damage," or "the recidivism of the offender," in relation to the specific case, dimensioning in what form they occurred—if they exist—and to what degree. It goes without saying that it is not enough to vaguely or lightly cite these determining circumstances, as if they were ritual formulas without endowing them with specific content, since doing so would violate the affected party's right of defense, by preventing them from knowing with certainty the motivations that gave rise to the specific condemnation, without being able to deduce why another was not the one applied to their situation. This also violates the principle of legitimate expectations that implicitly permeates our current legal system, which also stands as a guiding aphorism of the actions carried out by the public administration, with greater reason when it concerns sanctioning matters. Admitting such digressions would hinder the exercise of adequate judicial review over the final acts of the initiated procedure. The duty to state the basis for penalties, moreover, constitutes a parameter of constitutionality and legality, as an integral part of the right to due process and effective judicial protection; and from this point of view, for what concerns us here, it comprises the right of citizens to obtain, from administrative bodies with the power to negatively affect their private sphere, not only a decision in accordance with the law, but also one that is duly reasoned, based on the assessment of all the elements that constitute the visible and differentiating features of the specific case. By satisfying the duty to state reasons, the sanctioning function is rationalized, and it is this reasoning that allows for defining whether the final act is not only legal, in accordance with the law, but also whether it is just, and the reasons that lead to these conclusions. But it is not only about providing reasoning or a basis to satisfy said constitutional imperative, but it also fulfills the urgent need to persuade its recipient that the applied measure is the result of a considered analysis, and not the result of improvisation or force.

Additionally, it turns out to be the mandatory reference parameter for challenge purposes, since it is based on this that the existence or not of an adequate application of the Law is assessed.

**V.** The administrative sanctioning law (derecho administrativo sancionador), in its capacity as the punitive power of the State, is protected by legality—as it is a matter reserved for law, in accordance with the provisions of Article 124 of Law No. 6227, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—as well as by the specificity of the infringing conduct and the sanction. For this reason, it has been determined doctrinally and jurisprudentially that both the infraction and the legal consequence of conduct of this nature must necessarily be typified in law, so that the administered party can distinguish between what is lawful and what is unlawful. That is to say, a norm of legal rank and force, in a formal and material sense, must clearly regulate the unlawful conduct and determine the coercive or sanctioning measure that will be imposed on the violator thereof when they incur the fault that contravenes it. The foregoing, in protection of the principle enshrined in Article 39 of our Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which establishes that no one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a "fault" sanctioned in a previous law. Now then, said administrative sanction, just because it is applicable in this venue, is not exempt from complying with the requirements established for that purpose by the current Legal System (Ordenamiento Jurídico), but rather it must be issued in clear observance and application of them, in view of the analysis specific to the concrete case by the operator of the Law. To that extent, the public administration, as occurs in the case under examination, must resort to the implementation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and justice when exercising that punitive and repressive power, given that the application of the law of the Constitution is imposed, the same that permeates the lower-ranking norms to be applied to the concrete and particular case.

**VI.** Having analyzed the case in light of the described principles, first of all, this instance must address what was alleged by the plaintiffs' representation regarding the non-conformity of the sanctioned conduct with the elements of the sanctioning type, since in their opinion, the administrative resolutions being challenged clearly determined that there was no deception of the consumer on their part, and that furthermore, the plaintiffs complied with what was offered in their time to those consumers who acquired homes in the Rincón Verde II residential complex, developed by Fomento Urbano S.A. and Viviendas del Sur S.A., but also the Consumer Defense Commission (Comisión de Defensa del Consumidor) considered that the provisions of subsections b) and c) of Article 34 of Law No. 7472 were violated in relation to Article 37 of the same regulatory body, insofar as they did not provide sufficient information about what the scope of the so-called "restricted access" entailed, a characteristic that was advertised as inherent to said housing project. It is not a case of having lied to those interested by telling them that the residential complex would have "spikes" installed on its access road, but rather of having omitted to inform them that those would not be present, although it would have installed cameras, perimeter walls, surveillance service (a guard), etc. Since there was no deception or error, they consider that what is established in the cited sanctioning types is not fulfilled, and to that extent, the contested administrative acts become contradictory, and furthermore, in their opinion, error and deception are essential elements of the type. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff party is not correct in its arguments, for the considerations set forth below.

Article 34 of Law No. 7472 literally establishes, in what is of interest: "Article 34.- Obligations of the merchant. The obligations of the merchant and the producer, with the consumer, are the following: (...) b) Sufficiently inform the consumer, in Spanish and in a clear and truthful manner, about the elements that directly influence their consumption decision. They must inform them of the nature, composition, content, weight, when applicable, the characteristics of the goods and services, the cash price on the packaging, the container, the wrapping or the product label and the gondola or shelf of the commercial establishment, as well as any other determining data. If it concerns organic products, this condition must be indicated in a visible place. Furthermore, the product label must indicate which is the certifying entity. (...) (The previous subsection thus amended by Article 40 of Law No. 8591 of June 28, 2007). c) Offer, promote or advertise goods and services in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of this Law. (...) l) Comply with Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 41 bis of this law. (Thus amended by Article 1, subsection a), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). (...) All information, advertising, or offer to the public of goods offered or services to be provided, transmitted by any means or form of communication, binds the producer who transmits, uses, or orders it and forms part of the contract. Failure to comply with any of the obligations listed in this article empowers the interested party to go to the National Consumer Commission (Comisión nacional del consumidor) created in this Law, or to the competent jurisdictional bodies, and to assert their rights, under the terms indicated in Article 43 of this Law. (Thus amended in its numbering by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Tax Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal), which moved it from Article 31 to 34)." From the transcribed legal text, it follows that one of the legal impositions that the merchant must satisfy is the duty of information, which not only includes the obligation of the latter to provide it to the potential consumer, but also that it must be made known in a truthful manner, that is, accurate, transparent, without resorting to duplicity, even partial concealments or biases, to the detriment of the person who internally is forming their acquisitive will, and additionally in a timely manner, that is, while the weighing of the various negative and positive aspects that the good or service of interest possesses and the assessment of the eventual consequences that this volitive determination will entail for the consumer is still in process within the human psyche.

For its part, Article 37 of the same regulatory body, intrinsically related to the previous one, indicates—also in what is of interest—: "Article 37.- Offer, promotion and advertising. The offer, promotion or advertising of goods and services must be carried out according to their nature, characteristics, conditions, content, weight when applicable, utility or purpose, so as not to induce error or deception to the consumer. Such information cannot be omitted if damage or danger to the health or safety of the consumer may derive from it. Clauses stipulated in contracts must prevail if they are more beneficial than the content of the offer, promotion or advertising of the goods and services. The use of comparative terms in the offer, promotion or advertising of goods and services is only admitted with respect to essential, related, and objectively demonstrable data, provided they are compared with other similar, known, or significantly participating ones in the market. Comparison is not admissible when it is limited to the general and indiscriminate proclamation of the superiority of one's own products; any omission of a necessary element to determine the real value of the products is considered deceptive. The producer or merchant who, in the offer, promotion, advertising or information, fails to comply with the requirements provided in this article, must be obliged to rectify the advertising, pay for it, and disseminate the truthful or omitted information, by the same means and form previously used. (Thus amended in its numbering by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Tax Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal), which moved it from Article 34 to 37)." From the above, it follows that said duty of information aims to ensure that at the time of carrying out the commercial transaction, the consumer is fully informed of the characteristics of the good or service they are acquiring, and therefore, that it is a conscious and informed decision they make when defining the respective contract, without there being any factors that, had they come to light, could have modified their will or else, caused them to fall into error regarding the conditions, nature, characteristics, disadvantages, or strengths of what they are acquiring. Now then, in the case under judgment, the plaintiffs' representation makes an erroneous assessment in considering that the effects derived from the statement that there was no error or deception on their part, expressed by the Consumer Defense Commission, by itself excludes the existence of liability on their part. And it is that the contested acts do not sanction them for having deceived their clients, nor for inducing them into error, but rather the administrative sanction imposed is based on having omitted information when it should have been made known to them in a timely manner. The term "error" is not applicable to the described and sanctioned conduct, since the prospective buyers of the homes knew the characteristics of the properties they were acquiring, and also stated that they were aware of the various security measures that the companies contracted and installed in the Rincón Verde II residential complex, as derived from the evidence and the record of oral and private appearance contained in the administrative file; nor much less does "deception" exist regarding the information that was provided in its time to the complainants, since it was not distorted or changed for a false one, falseness and lies being an inherent element of deception; but rather it was omitted, that is, something was not said that should have been made known to those interested. It is this reprehensible conduct that was sanctioned in the ordinary administrative procedure that gave rise to the issuance of the contested acts, as deduced from a detailed reading of them. And it is susceptible to sanction, just as the administration determined, since said information, referring to aspects proper to the security of the residential complex, was of importance for the purpose of defining the contractual will of the buyers, especially in these times, where citizen insecurity and violence indices have increased exponentially over recent years. It must be taken into consideration that the advertised object was homes, which are usually inhabited by family units. Therefore, one of the core aspects to take into account, for the purpose of determining the place to acquire a dwelling house, is precisely the security systems available for the adequate safeguarding of people's patrimonial assets, their household goods, and the physical and mental integrity of their loved ones and close ones. Especially if one assesses the fact that normally, those who make the investment of acquiring a real estate property of this nature do so with the purpose or conviction of establishing their place of residence there for a medium or long term. To that extent, this Tribunal considers that the companies Fomento Urbano S.A.

and Viviendas del Sur S.A., omitted at the opportune moment to disclose the scope of the so-called "restricted access" that was offered in the mass media as an added value to make the aforementioned residential development more attractive, and to that extent, the plaintiffs became deserving of the sanctions applied, which are contained in the legislation transcribed above. However, it must be clarified that this cannot be taken to the extreme of considering that, in the case of a residential development or subdivision (urbanización), the entry of persons could have been definitively restricted through the implementation of a system colloquially referred to as "needles" (agujas), as the complainants erroneously intended, disregarding the normative provisions established for this purpose in Article 32 and following of Law No. 5060, the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), since the access streets to said residential development are public domain assets of the State, and therefore not subject to restrictions regarding passage through them—except for those previously determined and authorized by law—binding provisions of general scope whose existence the complainants could not ignore or overlook, in accordance with Article 129 of our fundamental norm. If a position like the one advanced by the former complainants were to be admitted, a violation of the right to free transit, established in Article 22 of our current Constitution, which enshrines it as a fundamental right, would have been incurred, given that streets and highways are public domain assets (bienes demaniales).

Continuing with the point under debate, for the reasons stated, the arguments issued to that effect by the dissenting parties lack validity, and their rejection must proceed, as is hereby ordered. **VII.** Regarding the nullity that the plaintiffs' representation alleges exists over the challenged administrative acts, it must be stated that, in the opinion of this collegiate body, their arguments are partially correct. First, it is important to bring up the provisions of Articles 57 and 59 of Law No. 7472, in what is relevant for the resolution of this matter, which state: "Article 57.- Sanctions. The National Consumer Commission (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor) must hear and sanction the administrative infractions committed in consumer matters, stipulated in this law, without prejudice to the corresponding criminal or civil liability. According to the gravity of the act, infractions committed to the detriment of consumers must be sanctioned with a fine in the following manner:

• a)From one to ten times the lowest minimum monthly salary established in the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic (Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República), for the infractions indicated in subsections d), e), f), j) and n) of Article 31 and in Article 35 of this law. b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l) and m) of Article 31 of this law.

The maximum of the administrative sanction indicated in the preceding paragraph must be applied when the infraction against this law results in damages to health, safety, or the environment, which exert an adverse effect on consumers. (Thus reformed by Article 1, subsection c), of Law No. 7854 of December 14, 1998). *(Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal), which moved it from 54 to 57)*" It should be noted, simply by way of clarification, that as a result of the modifications undergone by the cited legislation, the numeral formerly designated as "31" currently corresponds to the one numbered "34". Similarly, numeral 59 of the same law establishes: "*Article 59. Valuation Criteria.* To assess the sanctions to be imposed, the qualification must consider the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the non-compliance with quality standards, the position of the infringer in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intent, the seriousness of the damage, and the recidivism of the infringer. (Its numbering thus modified by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 56 to 59)." From the transcribed legal texts, it is evident how the conduct displayed by the merchant or producer does directly affect the *quantum* or gradation of the sanction to be imposed, since the fine depends unavoidably on the nature of the infraction committed and the particular circumstances of each specific case. On this point, the Court respectfully disagrees with the State's defense, for it bears recalling, as stated above, that administrative sanctioning matters are imbued with the constitutional principles that generally govern the punitive activity of the State, such that it is not possible to apply to a specific act a sanction different from that expressly established for it in the Law. If the legislator provided for differentiating administrative offenses in order to also impose a diverse range of corrective measures, in attention to the case-by-case assessment that the legal operator carries out for this purpose, this cannot be a matter of indifference to the administrative bodies responsible for applying its precepts, who are obligated to observe such gradations, according to the wording of the applicable regulations, the possibility of resorting to analogical application or the various systems of hermeneutics recognized by Law being prohibited with respect to the determination of that punitive measure, as proclaimed by the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 39 of the Political Constitution, from which derives, as a core and integral part of due process and the right of defense, the imperative need for the administrative judge to adequately justify the reasons for which they defined the application of a specific sanction, and not a different one. From a detailed study of the case records, it is verified that in this matter, the plaintiff did incur the offense provided for in subsections b) and c) of Article 34 of Law 7472, which is why it was appropriate to resort to the application of a sanctioning measure established within the scope contemplated in the second paragraph, subsection b) of numeral 57 of that regulatory body, which the Commission effectively applied. However, it remains to be defined whether the gradation of the applied sanction conforms to what is established in the current legal system. **VIII.** The aforementioned Article 57, subsection b), does not establish a fixed fine for the infractions committed as cited therein, but rather establishes a range system, by setting a minimum and a maximum sanction as a margin within which the administration can, with proper justification, choose the one applicable to the specific case, by establishing "b) From ten to forty times the lowest minimum monthly salary set in the Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic, for the infractions mentioned in subsections b), h), i), k), l) and m) of Article 31 of this law." Now, Article 59, for its part, establishes the criteria to be taken into consideration for determining the amount to be applied to the infringer as a fine, within the range covering ten to forty minimum salaries, and as parameters for said determination, it indicates in its final paragraph that the higher end must be imposed when damages arise to health, safety, or the environment that exert an adverse effect on one or more consumers; a precept that is complemented by the referenced Article 59, according to which there must be assessed "* (...) the criteria of risk to health, safety, the environment, the seriousness of the non-compliance with quality standards, the position of the infringer in the market, the amount of the benefit obtained, the degree of intent, the seriousness of the damage, and the recidivism of the infringer.*" The foregoing allows for an examination of the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the administrative infraction to be punished, with the purpose of guaranteeing observance of the principle of proportionality between the offense committed and the applicable "penalty," so that the latter fits the former in a reasonable manner.

The National Consumer Commission, in subjection to the invoked principles, cannot move at its complete pleasure within the two extremes provided for by subsection b) of Article 57, for both that normative provision and Article 59 impose the limiting factors to follow and take into account for its determination. The amount of the applicable fine must be transparently grounded, and for that purpose, the Administration must carry out an exegesis and indicate the reasons that led it to impose the fine that, in its judgment, corresponds to the sanctioned conduct, adequately justifying that aspect in the resolution to be issued. It is seen then constrained to expressly weigh aspects such as "the position of the infringer in the market," "the amount of the benefit obtained," "the degree of intent," "the seriousness of the damage," or "the recidivism of the infringer," in relation to the specific case, dimensioning in what form they appeared—if they exist—and to what degree. It goes without saying that it is not sufficient to vaguely or lightly cite these determining circumstances, as if they were ritual formulas without endowing them with concrete content, for in that way the affected party's right of defense would be violated, by preventing them from knowing with certainty the reasons that gave rise to the specific condemnation, without being able to deduce why another was not applied to their situation. This also violates the principle of legitimate trust (principio de confianza legítima) that implicitly permeates our current legal system, which also stands as a guiding aphorism for the actions deployed by public administration, with greater reason when it comes to sanctioning matters. Admitting such vagaries would make it difficult to exercise adequate legality control (control de juridicidad) over the final acts of the proceeding instituted. The duty to provide a basis for penalties further constitutes a parameter of constitutionality and legality, as an integral part of the right to due process and effective judicial protection; and from this point of view, for what concerns us here, it comprises the right of citizens to obtain, from the administrative bodies with the power to negatively affect their private sphere, not only a decision in accordance with the law, but also one that is duly reasoned, based on the assessment of all the elements that constitute the visible and differentiating facets of the specific case. By satisfying the duty to provide reasoning, the sanctioning function is rationalized, and it is this reasoning that allows defining whether the final act is not only legal, in accordance with the law, but also whether it is just and the reasons leading to said conclusions. But it is not merely a matter of providing reasoning or justification to satisfy that constitutional imperative; rather, it also fulfills the urgent need to persuade its addressee that the measure applied is the fruit of a deliberate analysis, and not the result of improvisation or force. Additionally, it turns out to be the requisite reference parameter for challenge (impugnatorios) purposes, for it is based on it that the existence or not of an adequate application of the Law is assessed."

“V. El derecho administrativo sancionador, en su condición de poder punitivo del Estado, está amparado en la legalidad -por tratarse de materia de reserva de ley, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 124 de la Ley No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública-, así como en la tipicidad de la conducta infractora y de la sanción. Por ello doctrinal y jurisprudencialmente se ha determinado, que tanto la infracción como la consecuencia jurídica de una conducta de esta naturaleza, deben estar necesariamente tipificadas en la ley, para que el administrado pueda discernir entre lo lícito de lo ilícito. Es decir, una norma de rango y potencia legal, en sentido formal y material, debe regular en forma clara la conducta antijurídica y determinar la medida coactiva o sancionatoria que se impondrá al infractor de aquélla cuando incurra en la falta que la contraría. Lo anterior, en resguardo del principio consagrado en el numeral 39 de nuestra Constitución Política que establece que a nadie se le hará sufrir pena sino por “falta” sancionada en ley anterior. Ahora bien, dicha sanción administrativa, no por ser aplicable en esta sede se encuentra exenta de cumplir con los requerimientos al efecto establecidos por el Ordenamiento Jurídico vigente, sino que debe de emitirse en clara observancia y aplicación de ellos, de cara al análisis propio del caso concreto por parte del operador del Derecho. En ese tanto, la administración pública, cual ocurre en el subexamen, debe recurrir a la implementación de los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y justicia al momento de ejercer ese poder punitivo y represor, por imponerse la aplicación del derecho de la Constitución, mismo que permea las normas de rango inferior por aplicarse al caso concreto y particular. VI. Analizado el caso a la luz de los principios descritos, en primer término debe entrarse a conocer por esta instancia, lo alegado por la representación de las actoras en cuanto a la no adecuación de la conducta sancionada, con los elementos propios del tipo sancionatorio, pues en su opinión, en las resoluciones administrativas que ataca se determinó con claridad que no hubo engaño al consumidor de su parte, y que además las actoras cumplieron con lo ofrecido en su oportunidad a aquellos consumidores que adquirieron viviendas en el residencial Rincón Verde II, desarrollado por Fomento Urbano S.A. y Viviendas del Sur S.A., pero además estimó la Comisión de Defensa del Consumidor, que se violentó lo dispuesto en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 34 de la ley No. 7472 en relación con el numeral 37 del mismo cuerpo normativo, en cuanto no brindaron información suficiente sobre cuáles eran los alcances del denominado "acceso restringido", característica que se publicitó como inherente a dicho proyecto habitacional. No se trata de que se les mintió a los interesados al decirles que el residencial tendría instaladas "agujas" en su calle de acceso, sino de que se omitió informarles que aquéllas no estarían, aunque sí se contaría con cámaras colocadas, tapias, servicio de vigilancia -un guarda-, etc. Al no mediar engaño o error, estima que no se cumple con lo dispuesto en los tipos sancionadores citados, y en ese tanto los actos administrativos impugnados devienen en contradictorios, y además, en su opinión el error y engaño son elementos esenciales del tipo. Al respecto, considera este Tribunal que no lleva razón en sus argumentaciones la parte actora, por las consideraciones que de seguido se exponen. El artículo 34 de la ley No. 7472 a la letra establece, en lo que resulta de interés: "Artículo 34.- Obligaciones del comerciante. Son obligaciones del comerciante y el productor, con el consumidor, las siguientes: (...) b) Informar suficientemente al consumidor, en español y de manera clara y veraz, acerca de los elementos que incidan en forma directa sobre su decisión de consumo. Debe enterarlo de la naturaleza, la composición, el contenido, el peso, cuando corresponda, las características de los bienes y servicios, el precio de contado en el empaque, el recipiente, el envase o la etiqueta del producto y la góndola o el anaquel del establecimiento comercial, así como de cualquier otro dato determinante. Si se trata de productos orgánicos, esta condición deberá indicarse en un lugar visible. Además, la etiqueta del producto deberá indicar cuál es el ente certificador. (...) (Así reformado el inciso anterior mediante el artículo 40 de la ley N° 8591 del 28 de junio del 2007). c) Ofrecer, promocionar o publicitar los bienes y servicios de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 34 de esta Ley. (...) l) Cumplir con los artículos 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 y 41 bis de esta ley. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º, inciso a), de la ley No.7854 de 14 de diciembre de 1998). (...) Toda información, publicidad u oferta al público de bienes ofrecidos o servicios por prestar, transmitida por cualquier medio o forma de comunicación, vincula al productor que la transmite, la utiliza o la ordena y forma parte del contrato. El incumplimiento de alguna de las obligaciones enumeradas en este artículo, faculta al interesado para acudir a la Comisión nacional del consumidor creada en esta Ley, o a los órganos jurisdiccionales competentes y para hacer valer sus derechos, en los términos que señala el artículo 43 de la presente Ley. (Así modificada su numeración por el artículo 80 de la ley N° 8343 de 27 de diciembre del 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, que lo pasó del 31 al 34)" Del texto legal transcrito se deriva que uno de las imposiciones legales que debe satisfacer el comerciante, es el deber de información, el cual no sólo comprende la obligación de éste de brindarla al potencial consumidor, sino que la misma debe darse a conocer de manera veraz, es decir, verídica, transparente, sin recurrir a dobleces, ocultamientos siquiera parciales o sesgos, en perjuicio de quien en su fuero interno se encuentra conformando la voluntad adquisitiva y adicionalmente de modo oportuno, es decir, mientras todavía se encuentra en proceso dentro de la psique humana, la ponderación de los diversos aspectos tanto negativos como positivos que posée el bien o servicio de interés y la valoración de las eventuales consecuencias que esa determinación volitiva conllevará para el consumidor. Por su parte, el artículo 37 del mismo cuerpo normativo, intrínsecamente relacionado con el anterior, señala -también en lo que interesa-: "Artículo 37.- Oferta, promoción y publicidad. La oferta, la promoción o la publicidad de los bienes y servicios debe realizarse de acuerdo con la naturaleza de ellos, sus características, condiciones, contenido, peso cuando corresponda, utilidad o finalidad, de modo que no induzca a error o engaño al consumidor. No pueden omitirse tales informaciones, si de ello puede derivarse daño o peligro para la salud o la seguridad del consumidor. Deben prevalecer las cláusulas estipuladas en los contratos, si son más beneficiosas que el contenido de la oferta, la promoción o la publicidad de los bienes y servicios. El empleo de términos comparativos en la oferta, la promoción o la publicidad de los bienes y servicios, sólo se admite respecto a datos esenciales, afines y objetivamente demostrables, siempre que se comparen con otros similares, conocidos o de participación significativa en el mercado. La comparación no es admisible cuando se limite a la proclamación, general e indiscriminada, de la superioridad de los productos propios; se tiene por engañosa la que omita cualquier elemento necesario para determinar el valor real de los productos. Al productor o al comerciante que, en la oferta, la promoción, la publicidad o la información, incumpla con las exigencias previstas en este artículo, se le debe obligar a rectificar la publicidad, costearla y divulgar la información veraz u omitida, por el mismo medio y forma antes empleados. (Así modificada su numeración por el artículo 80 de la ley N° 8343 de 27 de diciembre del 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, que lo pasó del 34 al 37)" De lo anterior se deriva que dicho deber de información, pretende que al momento de realizar la transacción comercial el consumidor se encuentre plenamente informado de las características propias del bien o servicio que adquiere, y por ende, que sea una decisión conciente e informada la que tome al momento de definir la contratación respectiva, sin que existan factores que de haber salido a la luz, hubiesen podido modificar su voluntad o bien, haberlo hecho incurrir en error en cuanto a las condiciones, naturaleza, características, desventajas o fortalezas de lo que adquiere. Ahora bien, en el subjúdice incurre en una equivocada apreciación la representación de las accionantes al estimar que los efectos derivados de la afirmación de que no hubo error o engaño de su parte, manifestada por la Comisión para la Defensa del Consumidor, por si misma excluye la existencia de una responsabilidad de su parte. Y es que los actos impugnados no lo sancionan por haber engañado a sus clientes, ni por inducirlos a error, sino que la sanción administrativa impuesta se sustenta en haber omitido información cuando de manera oportuna debió hacerse del conocimiento de aquéllos. El término "error", no resulta aplicable a la conducta descrita y sancionada, pues los eventuales compradores de las viviendas conocían las características propias de los inmuebles que adquirían, y también manifestaron ser conocedores de los diversos medios de seguridad que las empresas contrataron e instalaron en el residencial Rincón Verde II, según se deriva del material probatorio y del acta de comparecencia oral y privada que consta en el expediente administrativo; ni mucho menos existe "engaño" en cuanto a la información que se brindó en su oportunidad a los denunciantes, pues no se tergiverso ni se varió por una de carácter falso, siendo la falsedad y la mentira un elemento propio del engaño; sino que más bien se omitió, es decir, no se dijo algo que debió ponerse en conocimiento de los interesados. Es ésa la conducta reprochable sancionada en el procedimiento administrativo ordinario que dió pie al dictado de los actos impugnados, según se deduce de la lectura detallada de los mismos. Y resulta la misma susceptible de sanción, tal y como lo determinó la administración, por cuanto dicha información, al referirse a aspectos propios de la seguridad del residencial, resultaba de importancia a efecto de definir la voluntad contractual de los compradores, máxime en estos tiempos, donde los índices de inseguridad ciudadana y violencia han aumentado exponencialmente durante los últimos años. Debe tomarse en consideración que el objeto publicitado eran viviendas, las cuales usualmente son habitadas por núcleos familiares. Por ende, uno de los aspectos medulares por tomar en cuenta, a efecto de determinar el lugar para adquirir una casa de habitación es precisamente los sistemas de seguridad con que se cuenta para el adecuado resguardo del haber patrimonial de las personas, de su menaje de casa y de la integridad física y mental de sus seres queridos y allegados. Máxime si se valora el hecho de que normalmente, quienes hacen la inversión de adquirir un bien inmueble de esta naturaleza, lo hacen con el propósito o convicción de establecer allí su lugar de residencia por un mediano o largo plazo. En ese tanto, considera este Tribunal que efectivamente las empresas Fomento Urbano S.A. y Viviendas del Sur S.A., omitieron en el momento oportuno dar a conocer los alcances del denominado "acceso restringido" que se ofertó en los medios de comunicación masiva como un valor agregado para hacer más atrayente el residencial de marras, y en ese tanto, las actoras se hicieron merecedoras de las sanciones aplicadas, mismas que están contenidas en la legislación transcrita líneas atrás. Sin embargo, debe aclararse que ello no puede llevarse al extremo de considerar que en tratándose de un residencial o urbanización, se hubiera podido restringir definitivamente el ingreso de personas al mismo con la implementación de un sistema de las denominadas coloquialmente "agujas", como erróneamente lo pretendían los denunciantes, dejando de lado las disposiciones normativas al efecto establecidas en el artículo 32 y siguientes de la ley No. 5060 Ley General de Caminos Públicos, por tratarse las calles de acceso a dicho residencial, de bienes de dominio público del Estado, y por ende no susceptibles de restricciones en cuanto al paso por las mismas, -salvedad hecha de aquellas previamente determinadas y autorizadas por ley-, disposiciones vinculantes de alcance general cuya existencia no podían ignorar u obviar los denunciantes, de conformidad con el artículo129 de nuestra norma fundamental. De admitirse una posición como la esgrimida por los otrora denunciantes, se hubiese estado incurriendo en una violación al derecho de libre tránsito, establecido en el artículo 22 de nuestra Constitución vigente, misma que lo consagra como un derecho fundamental, por tratarse las calles y carreteras de bienes demaniales. Siguiendo con el punto debatido, por las razones expuestas carecen de validez los argumentos al efecto emitidos por las disconformes, debiendo procederse a su rechazo, como en efecto se dispone. VII. Con respecto a la nulidad que acusa la representación de las actoras, como existente sobre los actos administrativos impugnados, debe indicarse que en criterio de este órgano colegiado lleva parcialmente razón en sus alegatos. En primer término, resulta importante traer a colación lo dispuesto por los artículos 57 y 59 de la ley No. 7472, en lo que resulta de importancia para la resolución de este asunto, al disponer: "Artículo 57.- Sanciones. La Comisión Nacional del Consumidor debe conocer y sancionar las infracciones administrativas cometidas en materia de consumo, estipuladas en esta ley, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal o civil correspondiente. Según la gravedad del hecho, las infracciones cometidas en perjuicio de los consumidores deben sancionarse con multa del siguiente modo: a) De una a diez veces el menor salario mínimo mensual establecido en la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, por las infracciones indicadas en los incisos d), e), f), j) y n) del artículo 31 y en el artículo 35 de esta ley. b) De diez a cuarenta veces el menor salario mínimo mensual fijado en la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, por las infracciones mencionadas en los incisos b), h), i), k), l) y m) del artículo 31 de la presente ley. Debe aplicarse el máximo de la sanción administrativa indicada en el párrafo anterior cuando, de la infracción contra esta ley, se deriven daños para la salud, la seguridad o el medio ambiente, que ejerzan un efecto adverso sobre los consumidores. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º, inciso c), de la ley No.7854 de 14 de diciembre de 1998). (Así modificada su numeración por el artículo 80 de la ley N° 8343 de 27 de diciembre del 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, que lo pasó del 54 al 57)" Debe acotarse, simplemente a modo de aclaración, que a consecuencia de las modificaciones sufridas por la legislación citada, el numeral otrora señalado como "31" actualmente corresponde al numerado como "34". Del mismo modo, el numeral 59 ídem, establece: "Artículo 59. Criterios de valoración. Para valorar las sanciones por imponer, la calificación debe atender los criterios de riesgo para la salud, la seguridad, el medio ambiente, la gravedad del incumplimiento de estándares de calidad, la posición del infractor en el mercado, la cuantía del beneficio obtenido, el grado de intencionalidad, la gravedad del daño y la reincidencia del infractor. (Así modificada su numeración por el artículo 80 de la ley N° 8343 de 27 de diciembre del 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, que lo pasó del 56 al 59)". De los textos legales transcritos se advierte cómo la conducta desplegada por el comerciante o productor, sí incide directamente en el quantum o gradación de la sanción por imponerse, pues la multa depende indefectiblemente de la naturaleza de la infracción cometida y de las circunstancias particulares de cada supuesto en particular. En este extremo, el Tribunal discrepa respetuosamente de la defensa del Estado, pues cabe recordar, tal y como se enunciara líneas atrás, que la materia sancionatoria administrativa está imbuida de los principios constitucionales que rigen en general la actividad punitiva del Estado, de forma que no es posible aplicar a un hecho concreto una sanción diversa de la establecida expresamente para él en la Ley. Si el legislador dispuso diferenciar los ilícitos administrativos a fin de imponer también una gama diversa de correctivos, en atención a la valoración casuística que al efecto realice el operador jurídico, ello no puede resultar indiferente a los órganos administrativos encargados de emplear sus preceptos, quienes se encuentran obligados a la observancia de tales gradaciones, según la redacción de la normativa aplicable, encontrándose vedada la posibilidad de recurrir a la aplicación analógica ni a los diversos sistemas de hermenéutica reconocidos por el Derecho, en lo relativo a la determinación de esa medida punitiva, según pregona el principio de legalidad consagrado en el numeral 39 de la Constitución Política, del cual se deriva además, como parte medular e integrante del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa, la imperiosa necesidad del juez administrativo, de motivar adecuadamente las razones por las cuales definió la aplicación de una sanción específica, y no otra diversa. De un estudio detallado de los autos se constata que en este asunto, la accionante sí incurrió en la falta prevista en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 34 de la Ley 7472, razón por la cual era lo procedente recurrir a la aplicación de una medida sancionatoria establecida dentro del ámbito contemplado en el párrafo segundo, inciso b) del numeral 57 de ese cuerpo normativo, el cual efectivamente aplicó la Comisión. Sin embargo, resta ahora por definir si la gradación de la sanción aplicada se ajusta a lo establecido en el ordenamiento vigente. VIII. El artículo 57 inciso b) antes citado, no establece una multa fija por las infracciones cometidas que allí se citan, sino que establece un sistema de bandas, al fijar una sanción mínima y una máxima como márgen dentro del cual la administración puede escoger motivadamente la aplicable al caso concreto, al establecer "b) De diez a cuarenta veces el menor salario mínimo mensual fijado en la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de la República, por las infracciones mencionadas en los incisos b), h), i), k), l) y m) del artículo 31 de la presente ley." Ahora bien, el artículo 59 establece por su parte, los criterios a tomar en consideración a efecto de determinar cuál será la cantidad que por concepto de multa se aplicará al infractor,dentro del rango que abarca de diez a cuarenta salarios mínimos, y como parámetros para dicha individualización, señala en su párrafo in fine, que el extremo mayor debe imponerse cuando deriven daños a la salud, la seguridad o al medio ambiente que ejerzan un efecto adverso sobre uno o más consumidores; precepto que se complementa con el referido artículo 59 de conformidad con el cual deben valorarse " (...) los criterios de riesgo para la salud, la seguridad, el medio ambiente, la gravedad del incumplimiento de estándares de calidad, la posición del infractor en el mercado, la cuantía del beneficio obtenido, el grado de intencionalidad, la gravedad del daño y la reincidencia del infractor.". Lo anterior permite realizar un examen de las particulares circunstancias que rodearon la comisión de la infracción administrativa a castigar, con el propósito de garantizar la observancia del principio de proporcionalidad entre ilícito cometido y la "pena" aplicable, de modo que ésta se ajuste al primero de manera razonable. La Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, en sujeción a los principios invocados, no puede moverse a su entero placer dentro de los dos extremos previstos por el inciso b) del artículo 57, pues tanto esa disposición normativa como el artículo 59, le imponen las limitantes a seguir y tomar en cuenta para su determinación. El monto de la multa aplicable debe fundamentarse diáfanamente, y para ese fin, la Administración ha de realizar una exégesis, y señalar las razones que la llevaron a imponer la que a su juicio corresponde a la conducta sancionada, motivando adecuadamente dicho aspecto en la resolución por dictarse. Se ve entonces constreñida a ponderar expresamente aspectos tales como "la posición del infractor en el mercado", "la cuantía del beneficio obtenido", "el grado de intencionalidad"," la gravedad del daño" o" la reincidencia del infractor", en relación con el caso concreto, dimensionando en qué forma se presentaron -de existir- y en qué grado. Por descontado está, que no basta con citar vagamente o con ligereza esas circunstancias determinantes, como si se tratara de fórmulas rituales sin dotarlas de un contenido concreto, pues de esa forma se violentaría el derecho de defensa del afectado, al impedírsele conocer certeramente las motivaciones que dieron lugar a la condena en uno específico, sin poder derivar por qué no fue otro el aplicado a su situación. Con ello se vulnera además el principio de confianza legítima que implícitamente permea nuestro ordenamiento jurídico vigente, el cual también se erige como aforismo rector de las actuaciones desplegadas por la administración pública, con mayor razón cuando de materia sancionatoria se trata. Admitir tales divagaciones dificultaría ejercer el adecuado control de juridicidad sobre los actos finales del procedimiento instaurado. El deber de fundamentación de las penas, integra por demás un parámetro de constitucionalidad y legalidad, como parte integrante del derecho al debido proceso y a una tutela judicial efectiva; y desde este punto de vista, para lo que aquí concierne, comprende el derecho de los ciudadanos de obtener, de parte de los órganos administrativos con potestad para incidir negativamente en su esfera particular, no sólo una decisión conforme a derecho, sino también debidamente razonada, a partir de la valoración de todos los elementos que constituyen las aristas visibles y diferenciadoras del caso concreto. Con la satisfacción del deber de motivación se racionaliza la función sancionadora y es ella la que permite definir si el acto final no sólo es legal, conforme a derecho, sino también si es justo y las razones que llevan a dichas conclusiones. Pero no se trata solamente de dar una motivación o fundamentación para satisfacer dicho imperativo constitucional, sino que además cumple con la necesidad impostergable de persuadir a su destinatario de que la medida aplicada es fruto de un meditado análisis, y no resultado de la improvisación o de la fuerza. Adicionalmente, resulta ser el parámetro de obligada referencia para efectos impugnatorios, pues es con sustento en ella que se valora la existencia o no de una adecuada aplicación del Derecho.”