Annulment of administrative directive on timber transport permits for lack of competenceAnulación de directriz administrativa sobre guías de transporte de madera por incompetencia

**V.-** In the first place, it is important to define whether, in this case, the challenged act, namely R-SINAC-DG-010 issued by the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas, regardless of its denomination, is a directive (directriz). The power of direction is the authority to orient and guide the action of another organ, but not its acts, by imposing goals and the types of means to be used to achieve them, thereby satisfying public interests. It should be noted that this power is exercised through various instruments, such as, for example, the directive (directriz), which consists of a general act, intended to regulate certain relationships within the Administration itself, whose content is a set of policy orientations or definitions for the fulfillment of public purposes. This is the guideline followed by the General Law of Public Administration in its precepts 99 and 100. Directives (directrices) do not form part of the legal order, since they are not norms, nor do they form part of the hierarchy of sources of the Administrative Legal Order (Article 6 of the referenced Law); therefore, their violation does not produce the nullity of the specific act, but rather the disciplinary sanction of the official who fails to observe them, under the terms of Article 100 of the same law, which reads verbatim: *“1. When an organ has the power of direction over another, it may issue directives (directrices) to it, monitor their compliance, and sanction with removal the head who fails to observe them in a repeated and serious manner, without justifying the non-observance. 2. The directing organ shall not, as such, have hierarchical authority over the directed one, and the latter shall in all cases have discretion to apply the directives (directrices) according to the circumstances. 3. The directing organ shall also have the authority to coordinate the directed organ with others, always within the limits previously indicated.”* According to the transcribed concept, despite the fact that the questioned act states its intention is to issue directives (directrices), its content does not correspond to such. It is, rather, a type of manual or instructions that regulate and detail, step by step, the organs that must intervene and the specific procedures for the delivery and use of transport guides and plastic plates for timber transportation, including, for example, the design of the authorization forms and who must sign them, as well as the conditions that must necessarily be met by the reports issued by forestry regents (regentes forestales) or the certificates of origin. Indeed, the act contains requirements for forestry regents (regentes forestales) that contravene what is provided in the Regulation to the Forestry Law, as is the case with section 1.2.1.11, which establishes: *“Modifications to the management plan referred to in Article 23, subsection 4 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law… may only be executed in the field once they have been approved by the State Forest Administration (AFE) (after a field inspection) through an administrative resolution that modifies the original resolution…”* It is clear that the intention was also to introduce conditions not framed within the Regulation. This is outside the scope of the power of direction. It is therefore concluded that what is challenged is not a set of directives (directrices), but a general act, whose content goes beyond the internal relations between organs of the Administration, to have an impact on those administered.

**VI.-** Having clarified the nature of the questioned act, this Chamber decides to first address the **fourth grievance** formulated by the appellant, as it concerns one of its essential elements, which is the competence of the organ that issued it. The appellant considers that Decreto 24652-MIRENEM was implicitly repealed by canons 22 through 26 of the Biodiversity Law. On this particular point, it is crucial to make an analysis of the related norms. Article 5 of the 1996 Forestry Law stipulates that the State Forest Administration shall be in charge of the Ministry of Environment and Energy; its management structure is foreseen to be governed by what is stipulated in the Regulation to that law. In this Regulation, numeral 3 creates the National System of Conservation Areas and the position of Director General. The powers of this official are also indicated, referring to what is stipulated in the cited Decreto. In 1998, the Biodiversity Law was enacted, which again brings up the System as the governing entity in matters of State Forest Administration. In Article 23 of the same law, the National Council of Conservation Areas is created as part of SINAC, which, according to the following precept 24, is comprised, among others, of an Executive Director, who acts as its secretary. Then, it is first necessary to make a study of each of these figures to determine if they correspond to the same position or if, on the contrary, they are distinct. The Director General to whom the Regulation to the Forestry Law refers, remits in its canon 3 to the position of Superior Director of Natural Resources described in the Decreto; which evidences that they refer to the same position or post. Doubt arises regarding the functions granted by the Biodiversity Law to the Executive Director (Article 26); there it is established that they will be responsible for executing the directives (directrices) and decisions of the National Council of Conservation Areas, as well as supervising and following up on the regulations, policies, and directives (directrices) issued on the matter. Article 25 of the Biodiversity Law enumerates the functions that this Council will have, stating, among others: supervising and overseeing the correct technical and administrative management of the Conservation Areas; coordinating the preparation and updating of the national strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; defining the strategies and policies related to the consolidation and development of state protected areas, as well as supervising their management; issuing guidelines and directives (directrices) to make coherent the structures, administrative mechanisms, and regulations of the Conservation Areas; other functions necessary to fulfill the objectives of the law. On the other hand, the Decreto gave the Director the competence to exercise superior technical coordination over the Conservation Areas, as well as to issue directives (directrices) for the preparation of regional operational plans, ensuring their application and execution. Therefore, a mere reading of the powers given to the Council is sufficient to recognize that what had been assigned to the Director General is today the responsibility of the National Council, in such a way that the Biodiversity Law eliminated certain powers of the former, subordinating it to a superior organ and working based on the latter regarding the agreements made there. So much so that the law grants the Council the power to issue directives (directrices) and the Director the obligation to ensure that these are fulfilled. It can well be affirmed that the Biodiversity Law leaves the figure of the Director General without effect and creates that of the Executive Director. This legislation is very specific in determining the functions it attributes to each organ that makes up the National System of Conservation Areas. There is no doubt that the coordination and the formulation of policies on the topic are vested in the Council, which is the body responsible for issuing the directive (directriz) on the delivery and use of transport guides and plastic plates for timber transportation. According to the foregoing, the appellant is correct in their argument, and what is challenged is null for being substantially non-conforming with the legal order, since it was not issued by the competent organ and the appointed servant at the time of issuing it (Articles 128 and 129 of the General Law of Public Administration). In this sense, reference is once again made to canon 166 of the same law, which imposes absolute nullity, as it is an irremediable defect. In accordance with what has been reasoned, this grievance must be accepted, which makes it unnecessary to address the other allegations made.” The directing body shall also have the power to coordinate the directed party with others, always within the limits previously indicated.” According to the transcribed concept, even though the challenged act states that its intention is to issue directives, its content does not correspond to such. Rather, it is a kind of manual or an instruction that regulates and details step by step, the bodies that must intervene and the specific procedures for the delivery and use of transport guides and plastic plates for timber transport, which includes, for example, the design of the authorization forms and who must sign them, as well as the conditions that the reports issued by forest regents (regentes forestales) or the certificates of origin must necessarily meet. Even the act contains requirements directed at forest regents that contravene the provisions of the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, as is the case of section 1.2.1.11, which establishes: “Modifications to the management plan (plan de manejo) referred to in Article 23, subsection 4 of the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal… may only be executed in the field once they have been approved by the AFE (after a field inspection) by means of an administrative resolution that modifies the original resolution…” It is clear that the intention was also to introduce conditions that are not framed within the Reglamento. That is beyond the scope of the power of direction. It is therefore concluded that what is challenged is not a set of directives, but a general act, whose content goes beyond the internal relations between Administration bodies, to have an impact on the administered parties. **VI.-** The nature of the challenged act having been clarified, the Chamber opts to hear, in the first instance, the **fourth grievance** formulated by the appellant, as it concerns one of its essential elements, namely the competence of the body that issued it. The appellant considers that Decreto 24652-MIRENEM was implicitly repealed by canons 22 to 26 of the Ley de Biodiversidad. On this point, it is crucial to analyze the related norms. Article 5 of the Ley Forestal of 1996 stipulates that the State Forest Administration will be in charge of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía; the structure of its management is provided to be governed by the provisions of the Reglamento to that law. In this Reglamento, numeral 3 creates the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación and the position of Director General. The powers of this official are also indicated, referring to the provisions of the aforementioned Decreto. In 1998, the Ley de Biodiversidad was enacted, which again brings up the Sistema as the governing body in matters of State Forest Administration. In ordinal 23 ibidem, the Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación is created as part of SINAC, which according to the following precept 24, is composed, among others, of an Executive Director, who acts as its secretary. Therefore, it is first necessary to study each of these figures in order to determine whether they pertain to the same position or, on the contrary, if they are distinct. The Director General referred to in the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal refers in its canon 3 to the position of Director Superior de Recursos Naturales described in the Decreto; which shows that they refer to the same position or post. The doubt arises regarding the functions granted by the Ley de Biodiversidad to the Executive Director (Article 26); it is established there that he will be responsible for executing the directives and decisions of the Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, as well as supervising and following up on the regulations, policies, and directives issued in the matter. Numeral 25 of the Ley de Biodiversidad enumerates the functions that this Council will have, among others it indicates: supervising and overseeing the correct technical and administrative management of the Áreas de Conservación; coordinating the preparation and updating of the national strategy for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; defining the strategies and policies related to the consolidation and development of state protected areas, as well as supervising their management; issuing the guidelines and directives to make coherent the structures, administrative mechanisms, and regulations of the Áreas de Conservación; other functions necessary to fulfill the objectives of the law. On the other hand, the Decreto gave the Director the competence to exercise superior technical coordination over the Áreas de Conservación, as well as to issue directives for the preparation of regional operational plans, and to ensure their application and execution. Thus, one need only read the powers given to the Council to recognize that what had been concentrated in the Director General now falls to the Consejo Nacional, such that the Ley de Biodiversidad did was eliminate certain powers of the former, subjecting him to a superior body and working in function of the latter regarding the agreements reached there. So much so that the law grants the Council the power to issue directives and the Director the obligation to ensure that these are complied with. It can well be affirmed that the Ley de Biodiversidad renders the figure of the Director General without effect and creates that of the Executive Director. This regulation is very specific in determining the functions attributed to each body that makes up the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. There is no doubt that the coordination and the formulation of policies on the subject are given to the Council, which is the body responsible for issuing the directive on the delivery and use of transport guides and plastic plates for timber transport. According to the foregoing, the appellant is correct in his argument, and the challenged act is null and void for being substantially inconsistent with the legal order, since it was not issued by the competent body and the designated official at the time it was issued (Articles 128 and 129 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In this sense, canon 166 of the same law is invoked once again, which imposes absolute nullity, as it is an irremediable defect. According to the reasoned, this grievance must be upheld, which makes it unnecessary to hear the other allegations formulated.”

“V.- En primer término, resulta importante definir si en la especie el acto impugnado, sea el R-SINAC-DG-010 emitido por el Director General del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, independientemente de su denominación, es una directriz. El poder de dirección es la facultad de orientar y guiar la acción de otro órgano, pero no sus actos, imponiéndole metas y los tipos de medios que ha de utilizar para realizarlas y así lograr la satisfacción de los intereses públicos. Cabe señalar, que este poder se ejerce a través de diversos instrumentos, como por ejemplo, la directriz, que consiste en un acto general, destinado a regular ciertas relaciones entre la misma Administración, cuyo contenido es un conjunto de orientaciones o definiciones de política, para el cumplimiento de fines públicos. Es este el lineamiento que sigue la Ley General de la Administración Pública en sus preceptos 99 y 100. Las directrices no integran el ordenamiento jurídico, puesto que no son normas, ni forman parte la jerarquía de las fuentes del Ordenamiento Jurídico Administrativo (artículo 6 de la Ley de referencia), por lo que su infracción no produce la nulidad del acto concreto, sino la sanción disciplinaria del funcionario que falta a ellas, a tenor del numeral 100 ibídem, que a la letra expresa: “1. Cuando un órgano tenga potestad de dirección sobre otro podrá impartirle directrices, vigilar su cumplimiento y sancionar con la remoción al titular que falta a las mismas en forma reiterada y grave, sin justificar la inobservancia. 2. El órgano director no tendrá como tal potestad jerárquica sobre el dirigido, y éste tendrá en todo caso discrecionalidad para aplicar las directrices de acuerdo con las circunstancias. 3. El órgano director tendrá también potestad para coordinar al dirigido con otros, siempre dentro de los límites antes indicados.” Según el concepto transcrito, a pesar de que en el acto cuestionado expresa que su intención es dictar directrices, su contenido no corresponde a tales. Resulta más bien, una especie de manual o un instructivo que regula y detalla paso a paso, los órganos que deben intervenir y los trámites puntuales para la entrega y empleo de guías y placas plásticas en el transporte de madera, dentro de lo que se incluye, por ejemplo, el diseño de las boletas de autorización y quién debe firmarlas, así como las condiciones que han de cumplir necesariamente los informes que emitan los regentes forestales o los certificados de origen. Incluso, el acto contiene requerimientos hacia los regentes forestales que contravienen lo previsto en el Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, tal es el caso del apartado 1.2.1.11, el cual establece: “Las modificaciones al plan de manejo a las que se refiere el artículo 23 inciso 4 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal… solo podrán ejecutarse en el campo una vez que se haya aprobado por la AFE (previa inspección del campo) mediante resolución administrativa que modifique la resolución original…”. Es claro que, lo pretendido fue introducir también condiciones que no están enmarcadas en el Reglamento. Eso está fuera del alcance de la potestad de dirección. Se concluye entonces que lo impugnado no es un conjunto de directrices, sino un acto general, cuyo contenido va más allá de las relaciones internas entre órganos de la Administración, para tener incidencia en los administrados. VI.- Aclarada la naturaleza del acto cuestionado, la Sala opta por conocer en primer término, el cuarto agravio formulado por el casacionista, al versar sobre uno de sus elementos esenciales, cual es la competencia del órgano que lo emitió. Considera el recurrente, que el Decreto 24652-MIRENEM fue derogado implícitamente por los cánones 22 al 26 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Sobre este particular resulta trascendental hacer un análisis de las normas que están vinculadas. El artículo 5 de la Ley Forestal de 1996 estipula que la Administración Forestal del Estado, estará a cargo del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía; la estructura de su manejo prevé, se rija por lo estipulado en el Reglamento a esa ley. En este, en el numeral 3 se crea el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación y el cargo de Director General. Se indican, además, las atribuciones de este funcionario, remitiendo a lo estipulado en el Decreto de cita. En 1998, se promulgó la Ley de Biodiversidad, la que de nuevo trae a colación al Sistema como ente rector en materia de Administración Forestal del Estado. En el ordinal 23 ibídem se crea como parte del SINAC el Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, que según indica el precepto 24 siguiente, está conformado entre otros por un Director Ejecutivo, quien funge como su secretario. Entonces, corresponde de previo hacer un estudio de cada una de las figuras con el fin de determinar si incumben al mismo cargo o por el contrario, si son distintos. El Director General al cual hace referencia el Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, remite en su canon 3 al puesto de Director Superior de Recursos Naturales descrito en el Decreto; lo que evidencia que se refieren a un mismo cargo o puesto. La duda surge respecto de las funciones otorgadas por la Ley de Biodiversidad al Director Ejecutivo (artículo 26); allí se instituye que será el responsable de ejecutar la directrices y decisiones del Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, así como supervisar y dar seguimiento a los reglamentos, políticas y directrices emanadas en la materia. El numeral 25 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, enumera las funciones que va a tener ese Consejo, entre otras señala: supervisar y fiscalizar la correcta gestión técnica y administrativa de las Áreas de Conservación; coordinar la elaboración y actualización de la estrategia nacional para la conservación y el uso sostenible de la biodiversidad; definir las estrategias y políticas relacionadas con la consolidación y el desarrollo de las áreas protegidas estatales, así como supervisar su manejo; dictar los lineamientos y directrices para hacer coherentes las estructuras, mecanismos administrativos y reglamentos de las Áreas de Conservación; otras funciones necesarias para cumplir con los objetivos de la ley. Por otro lado el Decreto le daba competencia al Director para ejercer la coordinación superior técnica sobre las Áreas de Conservación, así como emitir directrices para la elaboración de los planes operativos regionales, velar por su aplicación y ejecución. Entonces, basta hacer una lectura de las potestades dadas al Consejo para reconocer que lo que se había recargado en el Director General, hoy día le compete al Consejo Nacional, de tal forma que la Ley de Biodiversidad lo que hizo fue eliminar ciertas potestades de aquel, sometiéndolo a un órgano superior y trabajando en función de este en cuanto a los acuerdos que allí se tomen. Tanto así, que la ley le otorga al Consejo la potestad de emitir directrices y al Director la obligación de velar porque estas se cumplan. Bien se puede afirmar que la Ley de Biodiversidad deja sin efecto la figura del Director General y crea la del Director Ejecutivo. Esta normativa es muy específica en determinar las funciones que le atribuye a cada órgano que conforma el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. No cabe ninguna duda que la coordinación y el planteamiento de políticas en el tema, está dado al Consejo, quien es el encargado de emitir la directriz sobre la entrega y empleo de guías y placas plásticas para el transporte de maderas. Según lo expuesto, lleva razón el recurrente en su alegato, y lo impugnado es nulo por ser disconforme sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico, ya que no fue dictado por el órgano competente y el servidor designado al momento de emanarlo (artículos 128 y 129 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). En este sentido, una vez más se acude al canon 166 de la misma ley, que impone la nulidad absoluta, por ser un vicio insubsanable. Acorde a lo razonado, este agravio deberá acogerse, lo cual torna innecesario conocer de las otras alegaciones formuladas.”