Dismissal annulled due to workplace harassment in Municipality of MoraviaAnulación de despido por acoso laboral en Municipalidad de Moravia

**III.-** As the authorities of first and second instance correctly demonstrated, the point to be elucidated is not the existence of the telephone calls attributed as a fault, since, both in the administrative proceeding and in this venue, the plaintiff accepted having made them. Indeed, in her written opposition to the purpose of dismissal, dated October 7, 2002, she stated: "From the above list I must acknowledge the calls to the numbers: / A.- 380-66-27……Mr. [Nombre1] ……462.87 MIN. / B.- (…) THE ONE INDICATED WITH THE LETTER – A – AS I STATED (sic) IS TO MR. [Nombre1], MY AFFECTIVE PARTNER, WHOM I TURN TO FOR REASONS OF AFFINITY, IN SEARCH OF SUPPORT SINCE I BELIEVE I SUFFER FROM WORKPLACE PERSECUTION BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR'S OFFICE. I AM IN FULL AGREEMENT TO REIMBURSE THE COST INCURRED FROM THE CALLS. / THOSE INDICATED WITH THE LETTER –B– REFER (sic) TO CALLS OF A STRICTLY WORK-RELATED NATURE, THE FIRST FOUR TO WORK COLLEAGUES AND THE LAST ONE TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC. / (…) FROM THE ABOVE LIST OF CALLS I MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE MADE TO MR. [Nombre1] TOTALING 174 MINUTES, WHICH I AM WILLING TO PAY AT THE MOMENT YOUR AUTHORITY SO DECIDES. / From the foregoing it can be deduced that, while it is true that the undersigned made calls, it is also notorious that I was not the only person with access to the telephone line and, therefore, trying to pin the entire responsibility on me is neither fair nor equitable. Compensating for the damage caused is an evident form of good faith, which gives rise to acknowledging the error committed. / (…) / I acknowledged in previous lines the responsibility that concerns me regarding the calls to cell phone 380-66-27, a responsibility that obliges me to pay what is due for said calls, but which does not entail, in its dimensioned magnitude, a sanction as incriminating* (sic) as the intended dismissal." (Boldface is added, folios 104, 109 and 111). What must be determined, then, is whether that conduct is sufficiently serious for the imposed sanction to be considered in accordance with the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. To achieve that objective, it is convenient to make a chronological recount of the relevant events that occurred during the time the plaintiff provided her services to the defendant entity. **IV.-** Ms. [Nombre2] began working for the Municipality of Moravia as a clerk 3 on March 14, 1998. Among other tasks, she was responsible for preparing personnel actions and vacation actions and processing payments, disability leaves, and work permits. In mid-1999, with the endorsement of the Comptroller General of the Republic, she was reclassified to technician and professional 1 and was designated as head of Human Resources. Although that position was not contemplated within the organization of the defendant entity, she performed it assigned to the mayor's office. In January 2002, the corporate entity adopted a new nomenclature and, by virtue of it, her position and profile were classified as "Technician 5". That same year, the Division of Administrative Planning and Human Resources was created and [Nombre3] [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio was designated as its director. As part of that Division, the Human Resources Unit was established and the plaintiff took charge of it (affirmative answer to the facts of the complaint, folios 2 and 311). At the request of Mr. [Nombre3][Nombre5], she carried out a job study in the Municipality, thanks to which she determined that the positions of service comptroller and municipal accountant, held, respectively, by Messrs. [Nombre6] and [Nombre7], had been reclassified to professional 2, without their holders meeting the required qualifications, namely: the academic degree of Professional Bachelor and their incorporation into the respective professional association. The result of that study was made known to Mr. [Nombre5], who elevated it to the mayor, Lic. Óscar Ureña Huertas. On the following February 6, in official letter No. 12-2002 addressed to her immediate boss, she documented her opposition to the actions taken by the corporation regarding those positions and warned about the consequences of a potential audit, in order to protect her responsibility. Furthermore, she rejected the request for exclusive dedication payment raised by her superior (complaint at folios 2 and 3 and folios 10 and 11). On February 18, the mayor ordered her to process that payment, holding her responsible for any delay (memorandum No.* DAMM 092-2002, at folio 12); he informed her that, in accordance with the new organizational chart approved by the Council and endorsed by the Comptroller's Office, the functions of Human Resources were of exclusive competence and fell under the responsibility of the Director of the Division of Administrative Planning, who would be responsible for internal or external relations in the human resources area and for representing the entity in the Municipal Career Commission, and ordered her to formally hand over her office before the following Tuesday, to allocate it to the computing area, and to abide by the directives of her immediate boss, who would detail her functions as technician 5 in the Directorate of Administrative Planning (official letter No.* DAMM 093-2002 at folio 13). The next day, Mr. [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio delimited her* functions* (official letter No.* DPAMM 02-2002, titled "Definición de competencias" [Definition of competencies], at folios 14-16), while the municipal accountant, Mr. [Nombre7], informed her that the exclusive dedication payment to Mr. [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] was not included in the ordinary budget for the 2002 period (note at folio 17). On April 22, Mr. [Nombre5] asked her to make the necessary changes and formulate recommendations in the distribution of municipal human capital in order to have a better personnel management policy (official letter No.* DPAMM 15-2002, at folios 20-21). On May 3, she asked Mr.* [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio to clarify the inconsistencies that, in her opinion, official letter DPAMM 15-2002 contained, and formulated a series of observations regarding the problems encountered with vacations from previous periods not yet taken by the staff (note at folios 22-23). On May 13, in a note addressed to that same official, she referred to the errors in payroll preparation raised by the municipal accountant and rejected his assertions (folios 24-25). On June 10, Mr. [Nombre4] informed her that the Directorate of Administrative Planning and Human Resources was assuming the administration of the Municipal Cemetery and that, because she had intervened in obtaining materials and equipment for that service, as of that date she would assume the administrative responsibility of guiding the processing of documents for its proper management. Additionally, he recommended that she conduct an inventory and determine its main needs (official letter No.* DPARHMM 26-2002, called "entrega de activo 991/B" [delivery of asset 991/B], at folio 26). On June 28, the plaintiff communicated to Mr. [Nombre5] her observations on the priorities and needs of the cemetery and suggested preparing a cadastral plan, conducting appraisals, carrying out a diagnosis of the facility needs, the status of the rights, and the conditions of the officials working there, and gathering information on previous processes and procedures, with the purpose of having an organized database to efficiently attend to user inquiries (official letter No. 44-2002, at folios 27-28). On July 5, the mayor indicated to Lic. José Luis Ocampo, Head of Human Resources, the following: "From Memorandum # 044-2002, sent by the official [Nombre2] [Nombre2] (attached), regarding the Cemetery, I was able to interpret that this program requires special attention, so I suggest that as of today the aforementioned official dedicate herself exclusively to that important Cemetery topic, which requires a full-time official." (Memorandum* No.* DAMM 463-2002, at folio 29). On July 15, Mr. [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] informed the internal auditor that the errors in the payrolls presented to the Accounting Department were due to the rudimentary way of preparing them and that the necessary efforts were being made to eliminate them through a computer application. Furthermore, he pointed out that the official payroll is the one presented to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which, having been verified and signed by the respective responsible parties, does not contain errors nor present anomalous situations (official letter No.* DPAMM 30-2002, at folios 30-31). On July 18, the plaintiff indicated to Mr. [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] the following: "Verbally, I have learned of my transfer to Cemetery proceedings, by decision of the Mayor. / In the most attentive manner, I request that said appointment be sent to me in writing, since up to this moment I have not received any notification from your office or from the Mayor's Office, except the mockery of all my colleagues who call me *‘[Nombre8]*’." (Note at folio 32). On that same date, via official letter No.* DPAMM 33-2002, Mr. [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] informed her that: "In response to official letter D.A.M.M 488-2002, which indicates that the official [Nombre2] 'will continue handling matters related to the administrative procedures of the Municipal Cemetery', I inform you that, in accordance with the Ley General de Administración Pública [General Law of Public Administration], in its Title V, Second Section, Articles 107,108,109,110, the mentioned official will be transferred. / * I do not omit to state that in a conversation held on Monday, July 16 of the current year, at the heads of department meeting, I mentioned (sic) that it was not advisable to act in that manner, since the official is qualified and trained to perform the functions and competencies of Human Resources. / In compliance with your mandate, I indicate that as of this date, the collaborator [Nombre2] will not work (sic) for Human Resources, designating the competencies to Lic. José Luis Ocampo Rojas and to Mr. Roque Solís Castro as Payroll Clerk." (Official letter No.* DPAMM 30-2002, at folio 33). On August 19, the plaintiff sent two official letters to her immediate boss. In one, she made several requests related to the administration of the Cemetery (official letter No. 15-2002, at folio 34). In the other, she expressed that her transfer occurred arbitrarily and abruptly, without there being any questioning of her work as head of Human Resources; she gave an account of the state and conditions in which she found the office located at the Cemetery; she denounced the lack of cleaning supplies and basic provisions; she complained about the assigned material and equipment and described what happened as a clear persecution against her for not having "(…) lent herself to acts of corruption." (Official letter No. 14-2002, at folios 35-36). On October 8, the mayor informed her that as of the following 14th "(…) you must appear to clock in your entry and exit card for work at the administrative offices. After your entry clock-in, you must be on duty at the Cemetery Offices no later than 8:30 in the morning, and may leave at 15:30 to clock out." (Memorandum, at folio 38). On October 11, she stated to the Mayor that "(…) on repeated occasions, I have requested that at least once a week a colleague be sent to collect the documentation generated at the Cemetery Administration and I still have not had a response; the last time a colleague appeared was today, 22 days ago, and to date I have not even received a response from your Office to the documents sent." (Official letter No. 028-2002, at folio 39). On October 17, she sent her immediate boss a telephone bill, along with a note in which she stated the following: "(…) it is important to note that, as long as the telephone is shared with the house of the cemetery guard, I assume no responsibility for any excess that occurs (sic) in its (sic) amounts, since it is not certain that it is used solely by the Office under (sic) my charge." (Official letter No. 030-2002, at folio 40). On October 22, she made known to him that "on (…) Friday the 18th, Monday the 21st, and Tuesday the 22nd, I appeared at the Municipality to clock in, and there is no card with my name; together with the above, I have realized that I am the only one who clocks in at the Cemetery, according to what the colleagues who work in the cemetery tell me, they have never clocked in, this demonstrates once again the persecution that has been orchestrated against me by the Mayor's Office. / I consider it important to note that, if clocking in is required the same as at (sic) the Municipal Yard, a time clock should be located at the Cemetery." (Official letter No. 032-2002, at folio 41). On October 28, she commented on personnel action 507-2002 (folio 43), through which they granted her 14 days of pending vacation and which she did not want to accept, in these terms: "(…) it gives the impression that a clear persecution against me continues to exist; I ask you to also tell me on what basis (sic) I am being granted fourteen days, if according to my record, the days I have pending are two; it seems like a very suspicious situation to me." (official letter* No. 035-2002, addressed to Mr. [Nombre5], at folio 42). On that same date, the Human Resources Department informed the mayor "(…) THAT MRS. [Nombre2] IS NOTIFIED IN HER RESPECTIVE PERSONNEL ACTION OF THE GRANTING OF HER VACATION DAYS. / SAID OFFICIAL DID NOT WANT TO SIGN, THEREFORE OUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY COMPLIED, WE REQUEST AT THE EARLIEST (sic) POSSIBLE TIME TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM." (Note at folio 44). On November 7, she informed Mr. [Nombre5] "(…) that up to today I have availed myself of what the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Código Municipal [Municipal Code] establish, in relation to the five days with pay to present the Opposition to Dismissal, so I inform you that tomorrow I will report to work normally." (Note, at folio 45). On that same date, Mr. [Nombre5] responded to the previous note, indicating that, "(…) in relation to the five days with pay to present the opposition to dismissal, you are reminded that on November 28 (sic), 2002, you were notified of the taking of 14 days of vacation, which extend until November 12 of the current year, besides which (sic) on November 1st, your respective vacation payment was deposited to you." (Official letter No.* R.H.M.M. 47-2002, at folio 49). On November 8, the plaintiff responded to that official letter, indicating, in the relevant part, to her immediate boss: "6. That as you point out, on November 1st, the respective vacation payment was deposited to me without complying with the legal procedure, since there is no supporting document for such expenditure. / (…) / 8. That up to this moment I am working and I have availed myself of what is indicated in point 3, therefore I am not voluntarily taking my vacation days, nor the corresponding advance payment contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement, a right I reserve the right to use at the legally appropriate time. / 9. That until I receive a satisfactory response to this, I will continue in the performance of my duties." (Official letter No. 038-2002, at folios 46-47). On November 14, Mr.* [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio answered her that "b. The sending on vacation was by express order of the Mayor Lic. Oscar Ureña Huertas, thus the guideline of 'Grant her all the days she has as a balance, in accordance with the request of the Municipal Council' was complied with / (…) / i. According to the records of the Human Resources section, YOU were on that occasion on vacation (…). / (…) / iii. At no time is your (sic) condition as a worker being violated for taking the corresponding days for your fair defense, so being on vacation time you could assume them without any setback and at the same time have the resources assigned in the payment of your vacations. / h. The fact that you were working during your vacation time is considered very noble on your part by this Directorate, but for Administrative purposes YOU were on vacation, therefore your payment was processed one day after your start date as stated in Payroll number 13-11-02 from the 7th to the 13th of November, in order to continue with your normal function within the Administrative Office of the Cemetery." (Official letter No.* DPAMM 50-2002, from folios 64-65). On November 21, that same official stated the following to her: "(…) I again very respectfully request you prepare a work report on your management in the Administrative Office of the Cemetery, this for the purpose of providing a report to the Municipal Internal Audit. / Said report must be submitted this November 29 (sic), 2002." (Official letter No. 53-2002, at folio 66). That same day, the plaintiff informed Mr. [Nombre5] that "In relation to your note DPAMM 50-2002 and DPAMM 53-2002, I must indicate that it (sic) is one more of those I have received in recent months, as a product of a long chain of events, which clearly demonstrate the persecution that you have orchestrated against me. / (…) / (…) it is true as my colleagues can attest (sic), that I have reported to work every day, except for the five days I was entitled to in accordance with the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. / (…) The cruelty with which I have been treated is incredible, that you were capable of sending that note to swell the dismissal file, making it look like negligence on my part or an act of rebellion, alleging that I did not want to receive it, when it was totally proven that I did not receive it because it was not signed and therefore it was another draft, not an official letter, nevertheless you signed it later and attached it to the file, with which you are failing to tell the truth and altering documents and files that could lead the administration to make wrong decisions (…)." (Note at folios 67-68). By note of December 9, the plaintiff addressed the mayor to "(…) request you remove from my administrative file the documents DPAMM 50-2002, DPAMM 52-2002, DPAMM 53-2002, which are (sic) without foliation and have (sic) been added after the day of the hearing (…) the review through which I observed what was indicated was in the presence of Mrs. Roxana Vega, Raúl Gómez, [Nombre9] and [Nombre1]." (Folio 69). Finally, by note of December 17, the mayor answered her that "We have taken note of your request dated December 9, however the file is already foliated and was sent to the Labor Court of Higher Amount of the II Judicial Circuit (…)." (Folio 70). **V.-** The preceding recount allows us to conclude that, between January 14, 1998 – the date of commencement of duties – and the beginning of 2002, the plaintiff's employment situation passed without major setbacks or conflicts. Starting in February of that year, with the changes in the organizational chart and, particularly, with the creation of the Directorate of Administrative Planning and Human Resources, a conflictive situation began to arise, in which several factors combined. The job study she was responsible for carrying out in the Municipality, the pointing out of irregularities in the reclassification of the positions of service comptroller and municipal accountant, and her observations on the impropriety of the payment of the exclusive dedication bonus to her immediate boss, Mr.* [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio, mark the change in the professional and interpersonal relationship with her superiors, especially with the mayor, Lic. Óscar Ureña Huertas. Since then, her questioning of the legality of certain acts and her initial refusal to execute them was decisive for her to be professionally disrespected, isolated, and relegated. First, cordiality in communications addressed to her was broken, and they opted to omit referring to her observations and to issue precise orders with veiled threats. Then, she was excluded from the human resources unit, ordered to hand over her office, her functions were limited, and less important ones were assigned to her. Later, the functions she had been performing were changed, and she was saddled with the administrative responsibility of guiding the processing of documents at the General Cemetery of San Vicente (folio 26 and 29). And, despite these changes, she responsibly assumed her new functions and made positive observations to improve the service and attention to users. So then, to continue with the deliberate plan of isolation, the mayor ordered her removed from the municipal building and transferred to a physical space in the Cemetery, where there had never before been a processing office, which not only was not set up properly, but lacked the necessary hygienic conditions. The disrespect was such that she learned of her imminent transfer from the comments and mockery of her colleagues, who even went so far as to call her "[Nombre8]" in a derogatory tone. The conditions of the place where she was located violated her dignity and career within the institution, since, as she herself related, "The physical transfer occurred abruptly, without prior notice or coordination with the undersigned, since when I realized it, all my belongings were being transferred to the cemetery office. When I arrived at the Cemetery office, it was dirty, in a marked state of abandonment, without furniture, to the point that Mr. [Nombre10] obtained a borrowed desk. The documents were on the floor, where they still are, since there is no furniture to arrange them. The workplace was not cleaned (sic) before the transfer, and worse yet, no supplies have been provided to me to do it. Later, the undersigned, without having the responsibility for miscellaneous tasks, was responsible for cleaning everything from the floors to the windows. Nor have basic supplies (sic) such as toilet paper, soap, disinfectant, chlorine, and others been provided to me, since I have to use a sanitary service that is for the public and I am the one who has to clean it. Later I was given equipment that, as you know and can note in this document, does not meet the minimum necessary standards since it is discarded municipal equipment, which means that users must return to collect the documentation after the procedure; together with the above, a computer program was being built to have the database so that users would only go to pay at the Central Offices." (Folio 35). The testimonies taken confirm that situation. Thus, witness [Nombre11] stated: "After this is that they transferred her to the cemetery offices, which is not an office, but rather where the guard lives, and there is a room there that was set up as an office, there was only (sic) an armchair, they moved her computer, but in other respects she lacked the essentials to perform her functions. Furthermore, there had never been a person performing those functions in the cemetery, it was only when they transferred her, since once she was dismissed, they did not use it again (sic) (…). It did not have curtains, the conditions were not the most suitable for opening an office. It has a large window and Mrs. [Nombre2] had to put up a sheet to block the reflection of the tombs, and to be able to use the computer equipment. If the cemetery guard had a family and that house is occupied by his family and him (…)." (The highlighting is not from the original, folios 331-334). The deponent [Nombre1] stated: "Not being enough, the facilities in which she was installed were like something out of a horror movie, the office was dirty, I had even gone to that office and the guard had a stretcher where he was rubbing. It had a broken window, they brought her an old computer, the printer did not work (...)." (The highlighting is not from the original, folios 335-338). Such assertions were not even refuted by the defendant entity. As if that were not enough, she was ordered to report to register her attendance at the administrative offices of the Municipality twice a day: in the morning and in the afternoon: "(...) she must appear to clock in her entry and exit work card at the administrative offices. After her entry clock-in, she must be on duty at the Cemetery Offices no later than 8:30 in the morning, and may leave at 15:30 to clock out." (Folio 38). Regarding this issue, the witnesses stated: "There are some [Dirección1] from the municipality to the cemetery. The plaintiff had to clock in at the Municipality and go to the cemetery. I had to go with her so she could swipe her card and in the end they took it away from her and the guard had to sign a receipt that she had indeed shown up to sign." (Testimony of [Nombre11], at folios 331-334. The highlighting is not from the original). "The distance between the cemetery and the Municipality of Moravia is approximately one kilometer. She actually did not have to clock in for a long time, after a certain moment they made her clock in (...)." (Declaration of [Nombre1], at folios 335-338. The highlighting is not from the original.) Inexplicably, she was the only official assigned to the cemetery who was required to register her attendance at the administrative offices. The other servants did not do so (folio 41). And this Chamber does not appreciate that there were service-related reasons justifying that difference in treatment, especially considering that it implied dedicating one hour of her daily workday. Moreover, it is striking that, despite the supposed importance of the work performed at the Cemetery, no official was assigned to collect the generated documentation, to the point that the plaintiff had to warn about it. In relation to her "new" functions, it is worth highlighting what was recorded by Mr. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio in his official letter No.* DPAMM 33-2002 of July 18, 2002, transcribed above, through which he reveals not only that it was an inconvenient and capricious action, but also a demotion in her functions (see folio 33). In his official letter DPAMM 42-2002, of October 28, 2002 - questioned by the plaintiff -, Mr. [Nombre5] makes the situation crystal clear when he refers, among other things, to the following: "a. Regarding the transfer of your person to the Cemetery, this occurred due to: / i. Decision of the Municipal Mayor / ii. No (sic) study in this regard was conducted, rather the intention was to set up the Cemetery office and from there establish the necessary controls to change the precarious situation in which the cemetery had been operating. / (…) / c. Regarding working conditions, this Division is clear that the Cemetery Administration office is at a total disadvantage, since being completely outside the administrative offices, the procedures have become cumbersome, the type of work is duplicated, the service users are exposed to procedures (sic) that are not very agile and above all to traveling distances from one place to another causing discomfort among the users of this service (…). / a. Regarding the procedures being carried out from the cemetery, it is important to clarify: / i. From the moment the administration of the Cemetery was transferred to the Cemetery Office, coordination has been hindered, causing a series of disruptions in the procedures, hence what is pointed out by you in point 1-3 occurs, therefore there has been an obstruction to the processes that should be more agile and simple, as indicated by Ley 82220 (sic). / ii. I consider it opportune that the administrative office of the cemetery be moved to the [Dirección2], this in order to eliminate so much distortion that has been occurring and thus provide better user service. / (…) / a. Regarding coming to clock in the entry and exit time, this is due to a request from the Mayor, he (sic) has indicated that YOU are not exempt from the time clock. / (…) / c. Regarding the aspect that the colleagues at the cemetery do not clock in, this is due to the type of service they perform and that they have been exempt since they were dependent on DIOSMM. / (…) / 11. It is important to be clear that this Directorate is clear that the use of the telephone at the Cemetery faces the following situation: / a. A family lives in the cemetery house, which uses the telephone / (…) / c. No control has been established over the use of this resource (...)" (Folios 50-53 and 54-57).* There is, therefore, not the slightest doubt that she was the object of abusive behavior by her hierarchical superiors, who, in a systematic manner, placed her in a typical situation of moral harassment and, finally, when they observed that she was not going to leave her job, decided to initiate the disciplinary proceeding that has given rise to this matter. **VI.-** Article 72, subsection d), of the Código de Trabajo [Labor Code] prohibits "Using the tools and implements supplied by the employer for a purpose other than that for which they are normally intended (…)." Contrary to what is asserted in the appeal, the serious violation of that rule, even if it occurred only once and without prior warning, may give rise to dismissal without employer liability, under the terms of subsection l) of Article 81 ibidem, since, as a general rule, the conduct of any worker who, disregarding their labor obligations, uses work instruments for purposes other than those for which they were entrusted is reprehensible. However, in this specific matter, it is not possible to conclude, as the Tribunal did, that Mrs. [Name2]'s use of the telephone to make personal calls to her sentimental partner is of such gravity as to justify the termination of her statutory service relationship. The circumstances under which this behavior occurred mean that there is no correspondence between the committed fault and the imposed sanction, rendering the latter disproportionate. The undeniable situation of deterioration in her working conditions and of isolation from her coworkers, with whom she shared daily, to which her immediate superiors subjected her, must have caused her immense anxiety, and it is not venturesome to suppose that they destabilized her emotionally. In this context, her need for communication with a person she trusted, her partner, is understandable, and that, to satisfy it, she resorted to the telephone that had been placed at her disposal to perform her duties. Despite the gravity of what she was experiencing, it is evident from folios 98 to 109 and 119 to 129 of the file that she used it for a daily average of 19.90, 12.27, and 7.35 minutes during 9, 19, and 4 days corresponding, respectively, to the months of August, September, and October 2002. And, within the context in which they occurred, these average call durations are not, therefore, excessive and prevent concluding that the alleged abuse existed with the magnitude that has been sought to be attributed to it. So much so that there is no indication whatsoever that this conduct was observed in the period prior to the recounted events or during her stay in the central offices. In any case, the fundamental point to highlight is that this involves reactive conduct; that is, conduct sought by the very agents of the defendant entity, which, for that very reason, cannot justify a measure that is apparently legitimate but whose purpose is absolutely reprehensible. It is worth remembering that, as required by Article 21 of the Civil Code, "Rights shall be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith." and that "The law does not protect the abuse of rights or their antisocial exercise. Any act or omission in a contract, which, by the intention of its author, by its object, or by the circumstances in which it is performed, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, with damage to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding indemnification and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence in the abuse." (Article 22 ibidem). VII.- Article 11 of the Political Constitution provides that "Public officials are simple depositaries of authority and cannot arrogate powers that the law does not grant them. They must take an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public." In accordance with this high precept, the General Law of Public Administration dedicates a section, the second, of the second chapter, "Of the hierarchical relationship," of the fourth title, "Of interorganic relations," of its first book, "Of the legal regime," to regulating the so-called "duty of obedience," the purpose of which is to reconcile the necessary existence of a chain of command within any public administration with the demands inherent in legality in administrative activity. As a general rule, every person in the service of a public body or entity is obliged to obey the particular orders, instructions, or circulars of their hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (Article 107), unless their object is the performance of acts clearly unrelated to their competence or that are manifestly arbitrary by constituting a crime (Article 108). Now, when the ordered act is contrary to the legal system for any other reason, it is the obligation of the subordinate "(…) to record and send in writing their objections to the authority, who shall be obliged to acknowledge receipt." In this way, on the one hand, they ensure that the consequences of potential civil liability do not fall upon them and, on the other, they contribute to sound administration and safeguard the special link that the principle of legality entails. From this latter perspective, a kind of cross-control is established that turns the civil service into a monitor of institutional activity and seeks to prevent errors and, eventually, corruption practices that later attempt to be justified based on unawareness or ignorance. In other words, administrative obedience is not, nor can it be, blind because the primary commitment is to the entire block of legality. And this is even more true when the handling of public funds is involved. Hence, in statutory service relationships, not every questioning of the actions of a hierarchical superior can be considered, outright, as a dismissive attitude, nor is it feasible to attribute a reprehensible intention to a person who points out defects in an act. In this matter, the plaintiff was accused of repeatedly refusing to receive and sign documents and was branded as rebellious for not having wanted to take a vacation to which, according to her, she was not entitled. With the evidence provided, it is not possible to maintain that she incurred in these irregular behaviors since she merely pointed out legality problems in some decisions of her hierarchical superiors, whose nonexistence was not demonstrated in this venue. Even the reasons for her initial refusal to process the payment for exclusive dedication to [Name3] Valverde Tenorio were confirmed by the municipal accountant himself. It was also demonstrated that the personnel action ordering her to take vacation was not signed when she refused to receive it, and it was never clarified whether or not she had the right to take those days, as should have been done. If we are to stick to the indicia, it is surprising that her superiors confuse the right to a leave with full pay with the right to vacation, to the point that they considered that [the time] granted fell under this latter concept. Thus, there is no alternative but to conclude that this other fault is completely lacking in evidence, which confirms that the dismissal lacked cause. VIII.- In this Chamber's Voto 2005-655, of 14:05 hours on August 3, 2005, it was stated: "The term 'mobbing' (or moral harassment at work) (…) comes from the English verb 'to mob' which means 'to assault' or 'to harass'. ([Name12] and [Name13]. 'Mobbing. Cómo prevenir, identificar y solucionar el acoso psicológico en el trabajo'. Madrid, Ediciones Pirámide, 2003, p. 50). Moral harassment at work has been defined by Leymann as a 'situation in which a person or group of persons exerts extreme psychological violence, in a systematic and recurring manner (on average once a week) and over a prolonged period (on average around 6 months) on another person or persons, with whom an asymmetrical power relationship is maintained in the workplace, with the purpose of destroying the communication networks of the victim or victims, destroying their reputation, disturbing the performance of their duties, and finally achieving that said person or persons end up leaving the workplace'. ([Name14]. 'Extinción del contrato laboral por acoso moral –mobbing-.' Barcelona, Editorial Bosch, S.A., 2002, pp. 10-11). Harassment can be vertical, horizontal, or mixed. It is vertical when the harassing conduct comes from the authority (this modality is known as 'bossing'). It is horizontal when the harassment is caused by one's own coworkers, and mixed arises from a combination of harassment fostered by the management —by action or omission— and coworkers. According to doctrine, this latter modality is the most common (ibidem, pp. 12-13). Subsequently, several common characteristics emerge from the doctrinal conception of 'mobbing', among which are noted: a) Intentionality: its aim is to undermine the self-esteem and dignity of the harassed person. b) Repetition of the aggression: it is constant and not isolated behavior. c) Longevity of the aggression: harassment occurs over a prolonged period. d) Asymmetry of power: since the aggression comes from another or others who have the capacity to cause harm. e) The ultimate goal: the aggression aims to make the harassed worker leave their job ([Name12] and [Name13], op. cit., p. 51). These same authors point out the ten most frequent behaviors that evidence the existence of moral harassment, among which they include: 1) Assigning work with no value or use whatsoever. 2) Demeaning the person by assigning them work below their professional capacity or usual competencies. 3) Exerting undue or arbitrary pressure on the person to perform their work. 4) Evaluating their work inequitably or in a biased manner. 5) Systematically devaluing their effort or professional success or attributing it to other factors or third parties. 6) Unjustifiably amplifying and dramatizing small or insignificant errors. 7) Belittling or diminishing the person personally or professionally. 8) Assigning unreasonable execution deadlines or workloads. 9) Restricting the possibilities of communicating, speaking, or meeting with the superior. 10) Snubbing, ignoring, excluding, or giving the cold shoulder, pretending not to see them or making them 'invisible'." (López Cabarcos and Vásquez Rodríguez, op. cit., p. 57). Our legal system has not yet developed the concept of workplace harassment, although there is some legislative tendency toward its positive regulation. Despite this, the harassment situation can be subsumed under some of the rules contemplated in the Labor Code that require the employer to provide dignified treatment to the worker (articles 19, 69 subsection c), and 83)."* IX.- What happened in this case coincides with the previous description. Hence, there is not the slightest doubt that this involves typical moral harassment, which makes it imperative to declare the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal. Consequently, things must return to the state they were in before the issuance of that illegal act, to achieve which the appealed judgment must be reversed. Failing that and based on the stipulations in Article 150, subsection f), of the Municipal Code, according to which "The judgment of the labor tribunals shall resolve whether the dismissal is appropriate or the reinstatement of the employee to their position, with full enjoyment of their rights and payment of back wages. In the execution of the judgment, the municipal employee may waive reinstatement in exchange for the receipt of the amount for notice and the severance pay that may correspond to them and the amount of two months' salary as damages.", reinstatement must be granted to the position held at the time of termination, with payment of the wages not received since then, including the school salary. The claims for year-end bonuses, accumulated annual increments, raises, and any other salary supplement must also be upheld. In accordance with the last legal precept cited, the plaintiff may waive reinstatement and opt for the payment of the items of notice and severance pay and, in that case, shall also be entitled to the amount corresponding to two months' salary as damages. Legal interest is granted on the amounts owed from the enforceability of each one until their effective payment. Regarding the granted items, the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing, lack of cause, and lack of right must be denied. The claimed vacation must be denied and, regarding them, the exception of lack of right must be upheld because it is a right directly linked to the effective provision of service, a premise that has not been verified in this matter, without the causes for this being relevant. Having been unsuccessful, the defendant must bear the payment of both costs of this action, and the personal costs are set at the prudential sum of one million colones. Regarding the amounts to be paid for wages, [the defendant] must proceed to deduct the corresponding sums for social security contributions and report them as appropriate to the insuring entity. For what may correspond in law, a copy of this ruling must be sent to the Inspection Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund."* On October 17, she sent her immediate superior a telephone receipt, together with a note in which she stated the following: "(…) it is important to note that, as long as the telephone is shared with the house of the Cemetery guard, I assume no responsibility for any excess in the amounts thereof, since it is not certain that it is used solely by the Office of my position." (Official communication No. 030-2002, at folio 40). On October 22, she made known that "on Friday the 18th, Monday the 21st, and Tuesday the 22nd, I went to the Municipality to clock in and there is no card with my name; added to the above, I have realized that I am the only one who clocks in at the Cemetery, according to what the colleagues who work at the cemetery tell me, they have never clocked in; this is further evidence of the persecution that has been orchestrated against me by the Mayor's Office. / I consider it important to note that, if clocking in is required the same as at the Municipal Depot, a time clock should be placed at the Cemetery." (Official communication No. 032-2002, at folio 41). On October 28, she commented on personnel action 507-2002 (folio 43), by which she was granted 14 days of pending vacation which she refused to receive, in these terms: "(…) it gives the impression that a clear persecution against me continues to exist; I request that you also indicate to me on what basis I am being given fourteen days, if according to my records, the days I have pending are two; this seems like a very suspicious situation to me." (official communication* No. 035-2002, addressed to Mr. [Nombre5], at folio 42). On that same date, the Human Resources Department informed the mayor "THAT MRS. [Nombre2] IS BEING NOTIFIED IN HER RESPECTIVE PERSONNEL ACTION OF THE GRANTING OF HER VACATION. / SAID OFFICIAL REFUSED TO SIGN, THEREFORE OUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY FULFILLED ITS DUTY; WE REQUEST THAT THIS PROBLEM BE RESOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." (Note at folio 44). On November 7, she communicated to Mr. [Nombre5] "(…) that as of today I have availed myself of what is established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Municipal Code, regarding the five days with pay to present the Opposition to Dismissal; therefore, I inform you that tomorrow I will report to work normally." (Note, at folio 45). On that same date, Mr. [Nombre5] responded to the previous note, indicating that, "(…) regarding the five days with pay to present the opposition to dismissal, you are reminded that on November 28, 2002, you were notified of the enjoyment of 14 days of vacation which extend until November 12 of the current year; furthermore, on November 1 your respective vacation pay was deposited." (Official communication No.* R.H.M.M. 47-2002, at folio 49). On November 8, the plaintiff responded to that official communication, stating, where relevant, to her immediate superior: "6. That as you point out, on November 1st, the respective vacation pay was deposited to me without complying with the legal procedure since there is no supporting document for such disbursement. / (…) / 8. That up to this moment I am working and I have availed myself of what is indicated in point 3, therefore I am not voluntarily enjoying my vacation, nor the corresponding advance payment contemplated in the collective bargaining agreement, a right I reserve the right to use at the legally appropriate time. / 9. That until I receive a satisfactory response to this note, I will continue in the performance of my duties." (Official communication No. 038-2002, at folios 46-47). On November 14, [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio replied that: "b. The order to take vacation was by express mandate of the Mayor, Lic. Oscar Ureña Huertas; therefore, the guideline of 'Grant her all the days she has as a balance in accordance with the request of the Municipal Council' was followed. / (…) / i. According to the records of the Human Resources section, YOU were on that occasion on vacation (…). / (…) / iii. At no time is your status as a worker being violated to take the corresponding days for your just defense, as by being on vacation time you could have taken them without any setback and at the same time had the resources assigned in the payment of your vacation. / h. The fact that you were working during your vacation time is considered by this Directorate to be very noble on your part, but for Administrative purposes, YOU were enjoying vacation; therefore, you were paid one day after your start date as recorded in Payroll number 13-11-02 from the 7th to the 13th of November, in order to continue with your normal function within the Administrative Office of the Cemetery." (Official communication No.* DPAMM 50-2002, at folios 64-65). On November 21, that same official stated the following: "(…) I once again very respectfully request you to prepare a work report on your management in the Administrative Office of the Cemetery, for the purpose of providing a report to the Municipal Internal Audit. / Said report must be submitted this November 29, 2002." (Official communication No. 53-2002, at folio 66). That same day, the plaintiff communicated to Mr. [Nombre5] that: "In relation to your notes DPAMM 50-2002 and DPAMM 53-2002, I beg to inform you that they are just one more of those I have received in recent months, as a product of a long chain of events that clearly evidence the persecution you have orchestrated against me. / (…) / (…) it is true, as my colleagues can attest, that I have reported to work every day, except for the five days to which I was entitled in accordance with the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. / (…) The cruelty with which I have been treated is incredible, that you were capable of sending that note to swell the dismissal file, making it look like negligence on my part or an act of defiance by alleging that I did not want to receive it, when it was totally proven that I did not receive it because it was not signed and therefore it was another draft, not an official communication; nonetheless, you signed it later and attached it to the file, which means you are failing to tell the truth and altering documents and files that could lead the administration to make wrong decisions (…)" (Note at folios 67-68). By note of December 9, the plaintiff addressed the mayor to "(…) request that you remove from my administrative file the documents DPAMM 50-2002, DPAMM 52-2002, DPAMM 53-2002, which are unnumbered and have been added after the hearing date (…) the review through which I observed the aforementioned was in the presence of Mrs. Roxana Vega, Raúl Gómez, [Nombre9] and [Nombre1]." (Folio 69). Finally, by note of December 17, the mayor replied that "We have taken note of your request dated December 9; however, the file has already been foliated and was sent to the Labor Court of Higher Amount of the Second Judicial Circuit (…)" (Folio 70). V.- The foregoing account allows us to conclude that, between January 14, 1998—the date her work began—and the beginning of 2002, the plaintiff's employment situation passed without major setbacks or conflicts. Starting in February of that year, with the changes in the organizational chart and, particularly, with the creation of the Directorate of Administrative Planning and Human Resources, a conflictive situation began to arise, in which several factors combined. The job study she was required to carry out in the Municipality, the pointing out of irregularities in the reclassification of the positions of internal auditor and municipal accountant, and her observations on the impropriety of paying the exclusive dedication bonus to her immediate superior, [Nombre3]. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio, mark the change in the professional and interpersonal relationship with her superiors, especially with the mayor, Lic. Óscar Ureña Huertas. From then on, her questioning of the legality of certain acts and her initial refusal to execute them were decisive in causing her to be professionally disrespected, isolated, and relegated. First, the cordiality in communications addressed to her was broken, and they chose to omit referring to her observations and to issue precise orders to her with veiled threats. Then, she was excluded from the human resources unit, ordered to hand over her office, her functions were limited, and others less important were assigned to her. Later, they changed the functions she had been performing and saddled her with the administrative responsibility of guiding the processing of documents at the San Vicente General Cemetery (folio 26 and 29). And, despite these changes, she took on her new functions responsibly and made positive observations to improve the service and the attention to users. Then, to continue with the deliberate plan of isolation, the mayor ordered her removal from the municipal building and her transfer to a physical space in the Cemetery, where there had never before been a processing office, which was not only not properly conditioned as it should have been, but lacked the necessary hygiene conditions. The disrespect was such that she learned of her imminent transfer from the comments and mockery of her colleagues, who even came to call her "[Nombre8]" in a derogatory tone. The conditions of the place where she was located violated her dignity and trajectory within the institution, as she herself recounted: "The physical transfer was abrupt, without prior notice or coordination with the undersigned, because when I realized it, all my belongings were being transferred to the cemetery office. When I arrived at the Cemetery office, it was dirty in a marked state of abandonment, without furniture, to the point that Mr. [Nombre10] got a borrowed desk. The documents were on the floor, where they still are, since there is no furniture to arrange them. The workplace was not cleaned before the transfer, and worse yet, I have not been provided with any supplies to do it. Afterwards, without having responsibility for miscellaneous tasks, the undersigned had to clean from the floors to the windows. I have also not been provided with basic supplies such as toilet paper, soap, disinfectant, chlorine, and others, since I have to use a restroom that is for the public and I am the one who has to clean it. Later, they gave me equipment which, as you know and can see in this document, does not meet the minimum necessary standards since it is discarded municipal equipment, which means that users must return to collect their documentation after processing; added to the above, a computer program was being built to have the database so that users would only go to pay at the Central Offices." (Folio 35). The testimonies given confirm this situation. Thus, the witness [Nombre11] stated: "After this is when they moved her to the cemetery offices, which is not an office, but rather where the guard lives, and there is a room that was enabled as an office, there was only an armchair, they moved her computer, but otherwise she lacked the essentials to perform her functions. Furthermore, if there had never been a person performing those functions in the cemetery, it was only when they moved her, since once she was dismissed, they did not occupy it again (…). It did not have curtains; the conditions were not the most suitable for the opening of an office. It has a large window and Mrs. [Nombre2] had to put up a sheet to cover the reflection of the tombs, and to be able to use the computer equipment. If the cemetery guard had a family and that house is occupied by his family and by him (…)." (Emphasis is not from the original, folios 331-334). The deponent [Nombre1] stated: "As if that were not enough, the facilities in which she was installed were straight out of a horror movie; the office was dirty, I had even gone to that office and the guard had a stretcher where he massaged people. It had a broken window, they brought her an old computer, the printer did not work (...)." (Emphasis is not from the original, folios 335-338). Such assertions were not even refuted by the defendant entity. As if that were not enough, she was ordered to report to record her attendance at the administrative offices of the Municipality twice a day: in the morning and in the afternoon: "(...) you must report to clock your entry and exit card at the administrative offices. After clocking in, you must be on duty at the Cemetery Offices no later than 8:30 in the morning, and may leave at 3:30 p.m. in order to clock out." (Folio 38). On this matter, the witnesses stated: "There are [Dirección1] from the municipality to the cemetery. The plaintiff had to clock in at the Municipality and go to the cemetery. I had to go with her so she could swipe the card and in the end they took it away from her and the guard had to sign a voucher that she had indeed reported to sign." (Testimony of [Nombre11], at folios 331-334. Emphasis is not from the original). "The distance between the cemetery and the Municipality of Moravia is approximately one kilometer. In reality, for a long time she did not have to clock in, after a certain point they made her clock in (...)" (Declaration of [Nombre1], at folios 335-338. Emphasis is not from the original.) Inexplicably, she was the only official stationed at the cemetery who was obliged to record her attendance at the administrative offices. The other servants did not do it (folio 41). And this Chamber does not find that there were reasons inherent to the service that justify that difference in treatment, especially considering that it entailed dedicating one hour of her daily workday. On the other hand, it is striking that, despite the supposed importance of the work carried out at the Cemetery, no official was assigned to collect the generated documentation, to the extent that the plaintiff had to warn about it. In relation to her "new" functions, it is worth highlighting what was recorded by [Nombre3]. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio in his official communication No.* DPAMM 33-2002 of July 18, 2002, transcribed above, through which he reveals not only that it was an inconvenient and capricious action, but also a downgrade in her functions (see folio 33). In his official communication DPAMM 42-2002, of October 28, 2002—challenged by the plaintiff—, Mr. [Nombre5] makes the situation crystal clear when he refers, among other things, to the following: "a. Regarding your transfer to the Cemetery, this was due to: / i. Decision of the Municipal Mayor / ii. No study was conducted in this regard; rather, the intention was to enable the Cemetery office and from there establish the necessary controls to change the precarious situation in which the cemetery had been operating. / (…) / c. Regarding the working conditions, this Division is clear that the Cemetery Administration office is at a total disadvantage, since being completely outside the administrative offices, the processes have become cumbersome, the type of work is duplicated, the service users are exposed to sluggish procedures and, above all, having to travel distances from one place to another, causing discomfort among the users of this service (…) / a. Regarding the procedures being carried out from the cemetery, it is important to clarify: / i. From the moment the Cemetery administration was transferred to the Cemetery Office, coordination has been hindered, causing a series of disruptions in the procedures, hence what you point out in point 1-3 occurs, meaning there has been an obstruction to the processes that should be more agile and simple, as indicated by Ley 82220 (sic). / ii. I consider it appropriate that the administrative office of the cemetery be transferred to [Dirección2], in order to eliminate so much distortion that has been occurring and thus provide better service to the user. / (…) / a. Regarding coming to clock the time of entry and exit, this is due to the request of the Mayor, who has indicated that YOU are not exempt from clocking in. / (…) / c. Regarding the fact that the colleagues at the cemetery do not clock in, this is due to the type of service they perform and that they have been exempted since they were under DIOSMM. / (…) / 11. It is important to be clear that this Directorate is aware that the use of the telephone at the Cemetery faces the following situation: / a. A family lives in the cemetery house, which uses the telephone / (…) / c. No control has been established over the use of this resource (...)" (Folios 50-53 and 54-57).* There is therefore not the slightest doubt that she was subjected to abusive behavior by her hierarchical superiors, who systematically placed her in a typical situation of moral harassment (acoso moral) and, finally, when they observed that she was not going to leave her job, decided to initiate the disciplinary procedure against her that has given rise to this matter. VI.- Article 72, subsection d), of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) prohibits "Using the utensils and tools provided by the employer for a purpose other than that for which they are normally intended (…)". Contrary to what is stated in the appeal, a serious breach of that rule, even if it occurred once and without prior warning, may give rise to a dismissal without employer liability, under the terms of subsection l) of article 81 ibidem, since, as a general rule, the conduct of any worker who, neglecting their work obligations, uses work instruments for purposes other than those for which they were entrusted to them is reprehensible. However, in this specific matter, it is not possible to conclude, as the Tribunal did, that the use of the telephone by Mrs. [Nombre2] to make personal calls to her romantic partner is of such seriousness that it justifies the severance of her statutory service relationship. The circumstances in which this behavior occurred mean there is no correspondence between the fault committed and the sanction imposed, making the latter disproportionate. The indisputable situation of deterioration in her working conditions and isolation from her colleagues, with whom she shared daily, to which her immediate superiors subjected her, must have caused her immense anxiety, and it is not reckless to suppose that it destabilized her emotionally. In that context, her need for communication with a person she trusted, her partner, is understandable, and that, to satisfy it, she resorted to the telephone that had been placed at her disposal to carry out her work. Despite the seriousness of what she was experiencing, from folios 98 to 109 and 119 to 129 of the file it can be deduced that she used it for a daily average of 19.90, 12.27, and 7.35 minutes during 9, 19, and 4 days corresponding, in order, to the months of August, September, and October 2002. And, within the context in which they occurred, those average call duration times are not, therefore, excessive and prevent concluding that the alleged abuse existed to the magnitude that has been sought to be attributed to it. So much so that there is no indication whatsoever that this conduct was observed in the period prior to the related events or during her stay at the central offices. In any case, what is fundamental is to point out that this is a reactive behavior; that is to say, provoked by the very representatives of the defendant entity, which, for that very reason, cannot justify a measure that appears legitimate but whose purpose is absolutely reprehensible. It is appropriate not to forget that, as required by Article 21 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), "Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith." and that "The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract which, due to the intention of its author, its object, or the circumstances in which it is performed, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of such judicial or administrative measures as may prevent the persistence of the abuse." (Article 22 ibidem). VII.- Article 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) provides that "Public officials are mere depositaries of authority and may not arrogate to themselves powers that the law does not grant them. They must take an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public." In accordance with that high precept, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) dedicates a section, the second, of chapter two, "On the hierarchical relationship" (De la relación jerárquica), of title four, "On interorganic relations" (De las relaciones interorgánicas), of its first book, "On the legal regime" (Del régimen jurídico), to regulate the so-called "duty of obedience" (deber de obediencia), the purpose of which is to reconcile the necessary existence of a chain of command within any public administration with the requirements of legality in administrative work. As a general rule, every person in the service of a public organ or entity is obliged to obey the particular orders, instructions, or circulars of their hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (Article 107), unless they have as their object the performance of acts evidently outside their competence or that are manifestly arbitrary because they constitute a crime (Article 108). However, when the ordered act is contrary to the legal system for any other reason, it is the obligation of the subordinate "(…) to record and send their objections in writing to the superior, who shall have the obligation to acknowledge receipt." In this way, on the one hand, they ensure that the consequences of possible civil liability do not fall upon them and, on the other, they contribute to sound administration and protect the special bond implied by the principle of legality. From this latter perspective, a kind of cross-control is established that converts public employees into watchers of institutional work and seeks to prevent errors and, eventually, corrupt practices that later seek to be justified by lack of knowledge or ignorance. In other words, administrative obedience is not and cannot be blind because the primary commitment is to the entire legal framework. And this is even truer when the handling of public funds is involved. Hence, in statutory service relationships, not every questioning of a hierarchical superior's action can be considered, without more, a dismissive attitude, nor is it feasible to attribute a reprehensible intention to a person who points out flaws in an act. In this case, the plaintiff was accused of repeatedly refusing to receive and sign documents and was branded as rebellious for not having wanted to enjoy vacation to which, according to her, she was not entitled. With the evidence provided, it is not possible to hold that she incurred in those irregular behaviors since she merely pointed out problems of legality in some decisions of her hierarchical superiors, the nonexistence of which was not demonstrated in this venue. Moreover, the reasons for her initial refusal to process the exclusive dedication payment to [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio were confirmed by the municipal accountant himself.

It was also demonstrated that the personnel action by which she was ordered to go on vacation was not signed when she refused to accept it, and it was never clarified whether or not she had the right to enjoy those days, as should have been done. If we are to rely on the evidence, it is surprising that her superiors confuse the right to a leave of absence with pay (licencia con goce de salario) with the right to vacations, to the point that they considered those days to be within the time granted for the latter concept. Thus, there is no choice but to conclude that this other fault is completely devoid of proof, which confirms that the dismissal lacked cause. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> In Voto 2005-655 of this Chamber, issued at 14:05 on August 3, 2005, it was stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“The term ‘mobbing’ (or moral harassment at work (acoso moral en el trabajo)) (…) comes from the English verb ‘to mob’ which means ‘to assault’ or ‘to harass’. ([Nombre12]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">and [Nombre13]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. “Mobbing. Cómo prevenir, identificar y solucionar el acoso psicológico en el trabajo”. Madrid, Ediciones Pirámide, 2003, p. 50). Moral harassment at work has been defined by Leymann as a “situation in which a person or group of persons exercises extreme psychological violence, systematically and recurrently (on average once a week) and for a prolonged period (on average about 6 months) against another person or persons, with whom an asymmetric power relationship is maintained, in the workplace, with the purpose of destroying the victim’s or victims’ communication networks, destroying their reputation, disturbing the performance of their work, and ultimately ensuring that said person or persons end up leaving the workplace.” ([Nombre14]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. “Extinción del contrato laboral por acoso moral –mobbing-.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Barcelona, Editorial Bosch, S.A., 2002, pp. 10-11). Harassment (hostigamiento) can be vertical, horizontal, or mixed. It is vertical when the harassing conduct comes from the superior (this modality is known as “bossing”). It is horizontal when the harassment is caused by one's own colleagues, and mixed occurs through a combination of harassment fostered by management—by action or omission—and colleagues. According to the doctrine, this last modality is the most common (ibid., pp. 12-13). Subsequently, several common characteristics emerge from the doctrinal conception of “mobbing,” among which are noted: a) Intentionality: its goal is to undermine the self-esteem and dignity of the harassed person. b) Repetition of the aggression: it is a constant and not isolated behavior. c) Longevity of the aggression: the harassment arises over a prolonged period. d) Asymmetry of power: because the aggression comes from another or others who have the capacity to cause harm. e) The ultimate goal: the aggression is intended to make the harassed worker abandon their job ([Nombre12]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">and [Nombre13] , op. cit., p. 51). These same authors point out the ten most frequent behaviors that evidence the existence of moral harassment, among which they include: 1) Assigning tasks with no value or utility whatsoever. 2) Diminishing the person by assigning them tasks below their professional capacity or usual competencies. 3) Exerting undue or arbitrary pressure on the person to perform their work. 4) Evaluating their work inequitably or in a biased manner. 5) Systematically devaluing their effort or professional success or attributing it to other factors or third parties. 6) Unjustifiably amplifying and dramatizing small or inconsequential errors. 7) Belittling or undermining the person personally or professionally. 8) Assigning unreasonable execution deadlines or workloads. 9) Restricting the possibilities of communicating, talking, or meeting with the superior. 10) Ostracizing, ignoring, excluding, or giving the silent treatment, pretending not to see them or making them ‘invisible’.” (López Cabarcos and Vásquez Rodríguez, op. cit., p. 57).</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Our legal system has not yet developed the concept of workplace harassment (hostigamiento laboral), although there is some legislative tendency toward its positive regulation. Nevertheless, the harassment situation can be subsumed under some of the norms contemplated in the Código de Trabajo that require the employer to give dignified treatment to the worker (articles 19, 69 subsection c), and 83).”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">* </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">IX.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">- What happened in this case coincides with the above description. Hence, there is not the slightest doubt that it is a typical case of moral harassment (acoso moral), which makes it imperative to declare the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal. Consequently, things must return to the state they were in before the issuance of that illegal act, for which purpose the appealed judgment must be reversed. In its stead, and based on the provisions of Article 150, subsection f), of the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Código Municipal</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, according to which </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“The judgment of the labor courts shall resolve whether the dismissal is appropriate or the employee’s reinstatement to their position, with full enjoyment of their rights and payment of lost wages (salarios caídos). In the execution of the judgment, the municipal employee may waive reinstatement, in exchange for receiving the amount of the notice period (preaviso) and the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) that may correspond to them, plus the amount of two months’ salary for damages (daños y perjuicios).”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, reinstatement to the position held at the time of termination must be granted, with payment of the salaries left unpaid since then, including the school salary (salario escolar). Claims for year-end bonuses (aguinaldos), accumulated annuities (anualidades acumuladas), increases, and any other salary supplements must also be granted. In accordance with the last-cited legal provision, the plaintiff may waive reinstatement and opt for payment of the components of preaviso and auxilio de cesantía, and, in that case, shall also be entitled to the amount corresponding to two months’ salary for daños y perjuicios. Legal interest is granted on the sums owed from the date each became due until their effective payment. Regarding the items granted, the defenses of lack of standing to sue and to be sued (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), lack of cause (falta de causa), and lack of right (falta de derecho) must be dismissed. The claimed vacations must be denied, and with respect to them, the defense of falta de derecho must be granted because it is a right directly linked to the effective provision of service, a condition that has not been fulfilled in this matter, regardless of the reasons therefor. Having been unsuccessful, the defendant must bear the payment of both sets of costs of this action, and the personal costs (costas personales) are set at the prudential sum of one million colones. On the sums to be paid for salaries, the employer must deduct the corresponding amounts for social security contributions (cargas sociales) and report them as appropriate to the insuring entity. For whatever purposes in law it may correspond, a copy of this ruling must be sent to the Inspection Directorate of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”</span><span>*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">*</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> In the other, she informed him that her transfer had occurred arbitrarily and abruptly, without there being any questioning whatsoever of her work as the head of Human Resources; she reported on the state and conditions in which she found the office located in the Cemetery; she denounced the lack of cleaning supplies and basic provisions; she complained about the material and equipment assigned to her and described what had happened as a clear persecution against her for not having *“(…) lent herself to acts of corruption.”* (Official Communication No. 14-2002, at folios 35-36). On October 8, the mayor informed her that as of the following 14th *“(…) you must report to clock in and out with your time card at the administrative offices. After clocking in, you must be on duty at the Cemetery Offices no later than 8:30 in the morning, and you may leave at 3:30 in the afternoon in order to clock out.”* (Memorandum, at folio 38). On October 11, she stated to the Mayor that *“(…) on repeated occasions, I have requested that, at least once a week, a colleague be sent to collect the documentation generated at the Cemetery Administration and I have yet to receive a response; the last time a colleague showed up was today, 22 days ago, and to date I have not even received a response from your Office to the documents sent.”* (Official Communication No. 028-2002, at folio 39). On October 17, she sent her immediate superior a telephone bill, together with a note stating the following: *“(…) it is important to note that, as long as the telephone is shared with the house of the Cemetery guard, I assume no responsibility for any excess in its charges, since it is not certain that it is used solely by the Office under my charge.”* (Official Communication No. 030-2002, at folio 40). On October 22, she made it known to him that she had shown up *“(…) on Friday the 18th, Monday the 21st, and Tuesday the 22nd at the Municipality to clock in and there is no card with my name; in addition to the foregoing, I have realized that I am the only one who clocks in at the Cemetery, according to what the colleagues working in the cemetery tell me, they have never clocked in, this demonstrates once again the persecution that has been orchestrated against me by the Office of the Mayor. / I consider it important to note that if clocking in is required as it is at the Municipal Yard, a time clock should be placed at the Cemetery.”* (Official Communication No. 032-2002, at folio 41). On October 28, she commented on personnel action 507-2002 (folio 43), by which she was granted 14 days of pending vacation which she refused to accept, in these terms: *“(…) it appears that a clear persecution against me continues to exist; I ask you to also indicate to me on what basis I am being given fourteen days, since according to my records, the days I have pending are two; it seems like a very suspicious situation to me.”* (official communication* No. 035-2002, addressed to Mr. [Nombre5], at folio 42). On that same date, the Human Resources Department informed the mayor *“(…) THAT MRS. [Nombre2] IS BEING NOTIFIED IN HER RESPECTIVE PERSONNEL ACTION OF THE GRANTING OF HER VACATION. / SAID OFFICIAL DID NOT WISH TO SIGN, THEREFORE OUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY FULFILLED ITS DUTY; WE REQUEST THIS PROBLEM BE RESOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.”* (Note at folio 44). On November 7, she communicated to Mr. [Nombre5] *“(…) that as of today, I have availed myself of what is established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Municipal Code regarding the five days with pay to file the Opposition to Dismissal, and therefore I inform you that I will report to work normally tomorrow.”* (Note, at folio 45). On that same date, Mr. [Nombre5] responded to the previous note, stating that *“(…) in relation to the five days with pay to file the opposition to dismissal, you are reminded that on November 28, 2002 you were notified of the enjoyment of 14 days of vacation which extend until November 12 of this current year, in addition to the fact that on November 1 your respective vacation pay was deposited for you.”* (Official Communication No.* R.H.M.M. 47-2002, at folio 49). On November 8, the plaintiff responded to that official communication, stating, in relevant part, to her immediate superior *“6. That as you indicate, on November 1st the respective vacation pay was deposited without complying with the legal procedure since there is no supporting document for such disbursement. / (…) / 8. That up to this moment I find myself working and I have availed myself of what is indicated in point 3, therefore I am not voluntarily enjoying my vacation, nor the corresponding advance payment contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement, a right which I reserve the right to use at the legally appropriate time. / 9. That until I receive a satisfactory response to this communication, I will continue in the performance of my duties.”* (Official Communication No. 038-2002, at folios 46-47). On November 14, Mr. [Nombre3]*. Valverde Tenorio answered her that *“b. The sending on vacation was by express order of the Mayor, Lic. Oscar Ureña Huertas, therefore the guideline of ‘Grant her all the days she has as a balance in accordance with the request of the Municipal Council’ was followed / (…) / i. According to the records of the Human Resources section, YOU were on that occasion on vacation (…). / (…) / iii. In no way is your condition as a worker being violated regarding taking the corresponding days for your just defense; therefore, being on vacation time you could have taken them without any setback and at the same time have the resources assigned in the payment of your vacation at your disposal. / h. The fact that you were working during your vacation time is considered very noble on your part by this Department, but for Administrative purposes, YOU were enjoying vacation, therefore your pay was processed one day after your start date as recorded in Payroll number 13-11-02 from the 7th to the 13th of November, in order to continue with your normal function within the Administrative Office of the Cemetery.”* (Official Communication No.* DPAMM 50-2002, from folios 64-65). On November 21, that same official stated the following: *“(…) once again I very respectfully request you prepare a work report on your management in the Administrative Office of the Cemetery, this for the purpose of providing a report to the Municipal Internal Audit. / Said report must be submitted this November 29, 2002.”* (Official Communication No. 53-2002, at folio 66). That same day, the plaintiff informed Mr. [Nombre5] that *“In relation to your notes DPAMM 50-2002 and DPAMM 53-2002, I must point out that these are just more of the ones I have received in recent months, as a product of a long chain of events that clearly demonstrate the persecution you have orchestrated against me. / (…) / (…) it is true, as my colleagues can attest, that I have shown up to work every day, except for the five days to which I was entitled in accordance with the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. / (…) The cruelty with which I have been treated is incredible; that you were capable of sending that note to swell the dismissal file, making it look like negligence on my part or an act of defiance by claiming that I did not want to receive it, when it was fully proven that I did not receive it because it was not signed and therefore it was just another draft, not an official communication, nevertheless you subsequently signed it and attached it to the file, with which you are failing to tell the truth and altering documents and files that could lead the administration to make mistaken decisions (…)”* (Note at folios 67-68). By note of December 9, the plaintiff addressed the mayor to *“(…) request you to remove from my administrative file documents DPAMM 50-2002, DPAMM 52-2002, DPAMM 53-2002, which are unfoliated and were added after the day of the hearing (…) the review by which I observed what was indicated took place in the presence of Mrs. Roxana Vega, Raúl Gómez, [Nombre9] and [Nombre1].”* (Folio 69). Finally, by note of December 17, the mayor answered her that *“We have taken note of your request dated December 9th, however the file is now foliated and was sent to the Labor Court of Higher Amount of the Second Judicial Circuit (…)”* (Folio 70). **V.-** The foregoing account allows the conclusion that, between January 14, 1998 – the date work began – and early 2002, the plaintiff’s employment situation passed without major setbacks or conflicts. Starting in February of that year, with the changes in the organizational chart and, particularly, with the creation of the Department of Administrative Planning and Human Resources, a conflictive situation began to arise, in which several factors combine. The job study she was tasked with carrying out in the Municipality, the pointing out of irregularities in the reclassification of the positions of service comptroller and municipal accountant, and her observations on the impropriety of the exclusive dedication bonus payment to her immediate superior, Mr. [Nombre3]*. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio, mark the change in the professional and interpersonal relationship with her superiors, especially with the mayor, Licenciado Óscar Ureña Huertas. From then on, her questioning of the legality of certain acts and her initial refusal to carry them out were decisive for her being professionally disrespected, isolated, and relegated. First, the cordiality in communications addressed to her was broken, and they opted to omit referring to her observations and to issue her precise orders with veiled threats. Then, she was excluded from the human resources unit, ordered to hand over her office, had her functions limited, and was assigned other less important ones. Later, the duties she had been performing were changed and she was saddled with the administrative responsibility of guiding the processing of documents at the San Vicente General Cemetery (folio 26 and 29). And, despite those changes, she assumed her new functions responsibly and made positive observations to improve the service and attention to users. Then, to continue with the deliberate plan of isolation, the mayor ordered her to be removed from the municipal building and transferred to a physical space in the Cemetery, where there had never before been a processing office, which was not only not adapted as was appropriate, but also lacked the necessary hygiene conditions. The disrespect was such that she found out about her imminent transfer from the comments and mockery of her colleagues, who even went so far as to call her “[Nombre8]” in a derogatory tone. The conditions of the place where she was located violated her dignity and career within the institution, since, as she herself recounted, *“The physical transfer occurred abruptly, without prior notice or coordination with the undersigned, since when I realized it, all my belongings were being transferred to the cemetery office. When I arrived at the Cemetery office, it was dirty, in a marked state of abandonment, without furniture, to the point that Mr. [Nombre10] obtained a borrowed desk. The documents were on the floor, where they still are, since there is no furniture to accommodate them. The workplace was not cleaned before the transfer, and worse yet, no supplies have been provided to me to do so. Later, the undersigned, without having the responsibility for miscellaneous tasks, had to clean from the floors to the windows. Nor have basic supplies been provided to me such as toilet paper, soap, disinfectant, bleach, and others, since I have to use a restroom that is for the public and I am the one who has to clean it. Subsequently they gave me equipment that, as you know and as you can see in this document, does not meet the minimum necessary standards since it is discarded municipal equipment, which means that users must return to pick up their documentation after the transaction; in addition to the foregoing, a computer program was being built to have a database so that users would only go to pay at the Central Offices.”* (Folio 35). The testimonies given confirm that situation. Thus, the witness [Nombre11] stated: *“After this is when they transferred her to the cemetery offices, which is not an office, but is where the guard lives, and there is a room there that was set up as an office; there was only an armchair; they moved the computer to her, but otherwise she lacked the essentials to perform her functions. Furthermore, there had never been a person performing those functions in the cemetery; it was only when they transferred her, since once she was dismissed they never filled the position again (…). It did not have curtains; the conditions were not the most suitable for opening an office. It has a large window and Mrs. [Nombre2] had to put up a sheet to block the reflection of the graves, and to be able to use the computer equipment. The cemetery guard had a family and that house is occupied by his family and by him (…).”* (Highlighting is not from the original, folios 331-334). The deponent [Nombre1] stated: *“As if that were not enough, the facilities in which she was installed were like something out of a horror movie; the office was dirty; I had even gone to that office and the guard had a massage table where he gave massages. It had a broken window; they brought her an old computer; the printer did not work (...).”* (Highlighting is not from the original, folios 335-338). Such assertions were not even refuted by the defendant entity. As if that were not enough, she was ordered to report to register her attendance at the Municipality’s administrative offices twice a day: in the morning and in the afternoon: *“(...) you must report to clock in and out with your time card at the administrative offices. After clocking in, you must be on duty at the Cemetery Offices no later than 8:30 in the morning, and you may leave at 3:30 in the afternoon in order to clock out.”* (Folio 38). On this matter, the witnesses stated: *“There are some [Dirección1] from the municipality to the cemetery. The plaintiff had to clock in at the Municipality and go to the cemetery. I had to go with her so she could swipe her card, and in the end they took it away from her and the guard had to sign a voucher for her that she had indeed shown up to sign.”* (Testimony of [Nombre11], at folios 331-334. Highlighting is not from the original). *“The distance between the cemetery and the Municipality of Moravia is approximately one kilometer. She actually did not have to clock in for a long time; after a certain moment they made her clock in (...)”* (Statement of [Nombre1], at folios 335-338. Highlighting is not from the original.) Inexplicably, she was the only official assigned to the cemetery who was obligated to register her attendance at the administrative offices. The other employees did not do so (folio 41). And this Chamber does not perceive that there were reasons inherent to the service that would justify that difference in treatment, especially considering that it meant dedicating one hour of her daily workday. On the other hand, it is striking that, despite the supposed importance of the work performed at the Cemetery, no official was assigned to collect the generated documentation, to the point that the plaintiff had to point it out. In relation to her “new” functions, it is worth highlighting what was recorded by Mr. [Nombre3]. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio in his official communication No.* DPAMM 33-2002 of July 18, 2002, transcribed above, whereby he reveals not only that it was an inconvenient and arbitrary action, but also a demotion in her functions (see folio 33). In his official communication DPAMM 42-2002, of October 28, 2002 – questioned by the plaintiff –, Mr. [Nombre5] makes the situation very clear when he refers, among other things, to the following: *“a. Regarding your transfer to the Cemetery, this occurred due to: / i. Decision of the Mayor / ii. There was no study regarding this; rather, the intention was to set up the Cemetery office and from there establish the necessary controls to change the precarious situation in which the cemetery had been operating. / (…) / c. Regarding working conditions, this Division is clear that the Cemetery Administration office is at a total disadvantage, since being entirely outside the administrative offices, procedures have become cumbersome, the type of work is duplicated, users of the service are subjected to procedures that are not very agile and above all must travel distances from one place to another, causing discomfort among the users of this service (…) / a. Regarding the procedures that have been carried out from the cemetery, it is important to clarify: / i. From the moment the Cemetery administration was transferred to the Cemetery Office, coordination has been hindered, causing a series of disruptions in procedures, hence what is indicated by you in point 1-3 occurs, resulting in an obstruction of processes that should be more agile and simple, such as has been indicated by Law 82220 (sic). / ii. I consider it appropriate for the cemetery administrative office to be transferred to [Dirección2] , this in order to eliminate so much distortion that has been arising and in this way provide better attention to the user. / (…) / a. Regarding coming to clock in and out, this is due to a request from the Mayor; he has indicated that YOU are not exempt from clocking in. / (…) / c. Regarding the aspect that the cemetery colleagues do not clock in, this is due to the type of service they perform and that they have been exempt since they were under DIOSMM. / (…) / 11. It is important to be clear that this Department is clear that the use of the telephone in the Cemetery faces the following situation: / a. A family inhabits the cemetery house, which uses the telephone / (…) / c. No control has been established over the use of this resource (...)”* (Folios 50-53 and 54-57). ** Therefore, there is not the slightest doubt that she was the object of abusive behavior by her hierarchical superiors, who, systematically, placed her in a typical situation of moral harassment (acoso moral) and, finally, when they observed that she was not going to leave her job, decided to initiate the disciplinary procedure against her that has given rise to this matter. **VI.-** Article 72, subsection d), of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) prohibits *“Using the tools and instruments supplied by the employer for a purpose other than that for which they are normally intended (…).”* Contrary to what is stated in the appeal, the serious breach of that norm, even if it occurred once and without prior warning, can give rise to dismissal without employer liability, under the terms of subsection l) of article 81 ibidem, since, as a general rule, the conduct of any worker who, disregarding their work obligations, uses work instruments for purposes other than those for which they were entrusted is reprehensible. However, in this specific matter, it is not possible to conclude, as the Tribunal did, that Mrs. [Nombre2]’s use of the telephone to make personal calls to her romantic partner is of such seriousness as to justify the rupture of her statutory service relationship. The circumstances under which that behavior occurred mean there is no correspondence between the fault committed and the sanction imposed, making the latter disproportionate. The indisputable situation of deterioration in her working conditions and isolation from her work colleagues, with whom she shared daily, to which she was subjected by her immediate superiors, must have caused her immense anxiety, and it is not adventurous to suppose that it destabilized her emotionally. In that context, her need for communication with a trusted person, her partner, and that she resorted to the telephone that had been placed at her disposal to perform her duties in order to satisfy it, is understandable. Despite the seriousness of what she was experiencing, it can be deduced from folios 98 to 109 and 119 to 129 of the file that she used it for a daily average of 19.90, 12.27, and 7.35 minutes during 9, 19, and 4 days corresponding, respectively, to the months of August, September, and October 2002. And, within the context in which they occurred, those average call durations are not, therefore, excessive and prevent concluding that the alleged abuse existed with the magnitude that has been attributed to it. So much so that there is no indication whatsoever that such conduct was noted in the period prior to the related events or during her tenure in the central offices. In any case, the fundamental point is to highlight that we are in the presence of reactive conduct; that is, behavior sought by the very officials of the defendant entity, which, for that very reason, cannot justify a measure that is apparently legitimate but whose purpose is absolutely reprehensible. It is worth remembering that, as required by Article 21 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), *“Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith.”* and that *“The law does not protect the abuse of right or its antisocial exercise. Any act or omission in a contract, which by the intention of its author, by its purpose, or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse.”* (Article 22 ibidem). **VII.-** Article 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) provides that *“Public officials are mere trustees of authority and cannot arrogate to themselves powers that the law does not grant them. They must swear to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public.”* In accordance with that high precept, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) devotes a section, the second, of chapter two, *“Of the hierarchical relationship”* (*“De la relación jerárquica”*), of title four, *“Of inter-organic relationships”* (*“De las relaciones interorgánicas”*), of its book one, *“Of the legal regime”* (*“Del régimen jurídico”*), to regulating the so-called *“duty of obedience”* (*“deber de obediencia”*), the purpose of which is to reconcile the necessary existence of a chain of command within any public administration with the demands of legality in administrative activity. As a general rule, every person in the service of a public organ or entity is obliged to obey the particular orders, instructions, or circulars of their hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (article 107), unless their purpose is the performance of acts clearly outside their competence or that are manifestly arbitrary because they constitute a crime (article 108).

Now, when the ordered act is contrary to the legal system for any other reason, it is the obligation of the subordinate “(…) to record and send in writing their objections to the head, who shall have the obligation to acknowledge receipt.” In this way, on the one hand, they ensure that the consequences of potential civil liability do not fall upon them and, on the other, they contribute to sound administration and safeguard the special connection that the principle of legality entails. From this latter perspective, a kind of cross-control is established that turns the civil service into a watchdog of institutional operations and seeks to prevent errors and, eventually, corrupt practices that later seek to be justified by lack of knowledge or ignorance. In other words, administrative obedience is not and cannot be blind because the primary commitment is to the entire body of legality. And this is even more true when the handling of public funds is at stake. Hence, in statutory service relations, not every questioning of a superior’s actions can be considered, without more, a dismissive attitude, nor is it feasible to attribute a reprehensible intention to a person who points out flaws in an act. In this matter, the plaintiff was accused of repeatedly refusing to receive and sign documents and was labeled rebellious for not having wished to take a vacation to which, according to her, she was not entitled. With the evidence provided, it is not possible to maintain that she incurred in those irregular behaviors given that she limited herself to pointing out legality problems in some decisions of her hierarchical superiors, the non-existence of which was not demonstrated in this forum. Even more, the reasons for her initial refusal to process the payment for exclusive dedication to [Name3] Valverde Tenorio were confirmed by the municipal accountant himself. It was also demonstrated that the personnel action by which she was ordered to go on vacation was not signed when she refused to receive it, and it was never clarified whether or not she had the right to take those days, as should have been done. As for relying on indications, it is surprising that her superiors confuse the right to a leave with pay with the right to vacation, to the point that they considered that within the days granted for the latter concept. Thus, no other conclusion remains but that this other fault is completely lacking in evidence, which confirms that the dismissal lacked cause.

**VIII.-** In Ruling No. 2005-655 of this Chamber, at 2:05 p.m. on August 3, 2005, it was stated: *“The term ‘mobbing’ (or moral harassment at work) (…) comes from the English verb ‘to mob’ which means ‘to assault’ or ‘to harass’. ([Name12] and [Name13]. “Mobbing. Cómo prevenir, identificar y solucionar el acoso psicológico en el trabajo”. Madrid, Ediciones Pirámide, 2003, p. 50). Moral harassment at work has been defined by Leymann as a ‘situation in which a person or group of persons exercises extreme psychological violence, systematically and recurrently (on average once a week) and for a prolonged time (on average about 6 months) over another person or persons, with whom they maintain an asymmetric power relationship, in the workplace with the purpose of destroying the communication networks of the victim or victims, destroying their reputation, disturbing the exercise of their work and ultimately achieving that said person or persons end up leaving the workplace’. ([Name14]. “Extinción del contrato laboral por acoso moral –mobbing-.” Barcelona, Editorial Bosch, S.A., 2002, pp. 10-11). The harassment can be vertical, horizontal, or mixed. It is vertical when the harassing conduct comes from the head (this modality is known as ‘bossing’). It is horizontal when the harassment is caused by the coworkers themselves, and mixed occurs from a combination of harassment caused by the management – by action or omission – and the coworkers. In accordance with doctrine, this last modality is the usual one (ibidem, pp. 12-13). Subsequently, from the doctrinal conception of ‘mobbing’ several common characteristics emerge, among which are noted: a) Intentionality: its purpose is to undermine the self-esteem and dignity of the harassed person. b) Repetition of the aggression: it is a constant and not isolated behavior. c) Longevity of the aggression: the harassment arises over a prolonged period. d) Power asymmetry: because the aggression comes from another or others who have the capacity to cause harm. e) The ultimate goal: the aggression’s purpose is for the harassed worker to leave their job ([Name12] and [Name13], op. cit., p. 51). These same authors point out the ten most frequent behaviors that evidence the existence of moral harassment, among which they include: 1) Assigning tasks with no value or utility whatsoever. 2) Demeaning the person by assigning them tasks below their professional capacity or their usual competencies. 3) Exerting undue or arbitrary pressure on the person to perform their work. 4) Evaluating their work in an inequitable or biased manner. 5) Systematically devaluing their effort or professional success or attributing it to other factors or third parties. 6) Unjustifiably amplifying and dramatizing small or inconsequential errors. 7) Personally or professionally belittling or undermining the person. 8) Assigning unreasonable execution deadlines or workloads. 9) Restricting the possibilities of communicating, speaking, or meeting with the superior. 10) Ignoring, excluding, or freezing out, pretending not to see them or making them ‘invisible’.” (López Cabarcos and Vásquez Rodríguez, op. cit., p. 57). Our legal system has not yet developed the figure of workplace harassment, although there is some legislative tendency toward its positive regulation. Despite this, the situation of harassment can be subsumed under some of the norms provided in the Labor Code that require the employer to give dignified treatment to the worker (Articles 19, 69 subsection c) and 83).”* **IX.**- What happened in this case coincides with the above description. Hence, there is not the slightest doubt that we are in the presence of a typical case of moral harassment, which makes it imperative to declare the nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal. Consequently, things must return to the state they were in before the issuance of that illegal act, to achieve which the appealed judgment must be overturned. In its absence and based on the provisions of Article 150, subsection f), of the *Municipal Code*, according to which *“The judgment of the labor courts shall decide whether the dismissal is proper or the reinstatement of the employee to their position, with full enjoyment of their rights and payment of back wages. In the enforcement of judgment, the municipal employee may waive reinstatement, in exchange for the receipt of the amount of the advance notice and the severance pay that may correspond to them and the amount of two months’ salary as damages.”*, the reinstatement to the position held at the time of termination must be granted, with the payment of wages not received since then, including the school bonus. The claims for Christmas bonuses, accumulated annual increments, salary increases, and any other salary supplement must also be granted. In accordance with the last cited legal precept, the plaintiff may waive reinstatement and opt for the payment of the amounts for advance notice and severance pay and, in that case, shall also be entitled to the amount corresponding to two months’ salary as damages. Legal interest is granted on the amounts owed from the date each became due and until its effective payment. Regarding the granted amounts, the defenses of lack of active and passive standing, lack of cause, and lack of right must be denied. The claimed vacations must be denied and, regarding them, the defense of lack of right must be accepted since it is a right directly linked to the effective provision of service, a requirement that has not been verified in this matter, the causes for which are not relevant. For having been defeated, the defendant must bear the payment of both sets of costs of this action, and the personal costs are set at the prudent sum of one million colones. Regarding the sums to be paid as wages, it must proceed to deduct the corresponding social charges and report them, as appropriate, to the insuring entity. For whatever is proper under the law, a copy of this ruling must be sent to the Inspection Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social).”

“III.- Como acertadamente evidenciaron las autoridades de primera y segunda instancias, el punto a dilucidar no es la existencia de las llamadas telefónicas atribuidas como falta, pues, tanto en el procedimiento administrativo como en esta sede, la demandante aceptó haberlas hecho. En efecto, en su escrito de oposición al propósito de despido, fechado 7 de octubre de 2002, expresó: “De la anterior lista debo reconocer las llamadas a los números: / A.- 380-66-27……SR [Nombre1] ……462.87 MIN. / B.- (…) EL SEÑALADO CON LA LETRA – A – TAL COMO LO EXPRESE (sic) ES DEL SR [Nombre1] , COMPAÑERO AFECTIVO DE MI PERSONA, AL CUAL ACUDO POR RAZONES DE AFINIDAD, EN BUSCA DE APOYO PUESTO QUE CONSIDERO SUFRO DE PERSECUCIÓN LABORAL, POR PARTE DE LA ALCALDÍA MUNICIPAL. ME MUESTRO EN UN TOTAL ACUERDO DE RETRIBUIR EL COSTO OCASIONADO DE LAS LLAMADAS. / LO SEÑALADO CON LA LETRA –B– SE REFIEREN (sic) A LLAMADAS DE ESTRICTO ORDEN LABORAL, LOS CUATRO PRIMEROS COMPAÑEROS DE LABORES Y EL ÚLTIMO DE LA CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. / (…) DE LA ANTERIOR LISTA DE LLAMADAS DEBO RECONOCER LAS EFECTUADAS AL SEÑOR [Nombre1] EN TOTAL 174 MINUTOS, LAS CUALES ESTOY DISPUESTA A CANCELAR EN EL MOMENTO QUE SU AUTORIDAD ASI LO DECIDA. / De lo anterior se deduce, que si bien es cierto la suscrita realizó llamadas, también es notorio, que no sólo mi persona tenía acceso a la línea telefónica y, por ende tratar de endilgarme la responsabilidad en su totalidad no es justo ni equitativo. El resarcir el daño causado, es una forma evidente de buena fe, que da lugar a reconocer el error cometido. / (…) / Reconocí en líneas anteriores, la responsabilidad que me ocupa con relación a las llamadas al celular 380-66-27, responsabilidad que me obliga a cancelar lo debido por dichas llamadas, pero que no acarrea en su magnitud dimensionada una sanción tan incriminante* (sic) como el despido pretendido.” (La negrita es agregada, folios 104, 109 y 111). Lo que se debe determinar es, entonces, si esa conducta es lo suficientemente grave como para que la sanción impuesta pueda ser considerada acorde con los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. Para alcanzar ese objetivo, conviene hacer un recuento cronológico de los acontecimientos relevantes acaecidos durante el tiempo que la actora prestó sus servicios al ente accionado. IV.- Doña [Nombre2] comenzó a trabajar para la Municipalidad de Moravia, como oficinista 3, el 14 de marzo de 1998. Entre otras tareas, le correspondía elaborar acciones de personal y de vacaciones y tramitar pagos, incapacidades y permisos laborales. A mediados de 1999, con el aval de la Contraloría General de la República, fue recalificada a técnica y profesional 1 y se le designó como encargada de Recursos Humanos. Aunque ese cargo no estaba contemplado dentro de la organización de la entidad accionada, lo desempeñó adscrito al despacho del alcalde. En enero de 2002 el ente corporativo adoptó una nueva nomenclatura y, en virtud de ella, su puesto y perfil fueron encasillados como “Técnica 5”. Ese mismo año se creó la División de Planificación Administrativa y Recursos Humanos y se designó al [Nombre3]. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio como su director. Como parte de esa División, se estableció la Unidad de Recursos Humanos y la demandante se hizo cargo de ella (contestación afirmativa de los hechos de la demanda, folios 2 y 311). A solicitud del [Nombre3][Nombre5]. , ella efectuó un estudio de puestos en la Municipalidad, gracias al cual determinó que los cargos de contralor de servicios y contador municipal, ocupados, respectivamente, por los señores [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , habían sido reclasificados a profesional 2, sin que sus titulares reunieran los requisitos exigidos, a saber: el grado académico de Bachiller profesional y su incorporación al Colegio respectivo. El resultado de ese estudio fue hecho del conocimiento del señor [Nombre5] , quien lo elevó al alcalde, licenciado Óscar Ureña Huertas. El 6 de febrero siguiente, en oficio N° 12-2002 dirigido a su jefe inmediato, ella documentó su oposición a lo actuado por la corporación en lo relativo a esos cargos y advirtió sobre las consecuencias de una eventual auditoria, a efecto de salvar su responsabilidad. Además, rechazó la solicitud de pago por dedicación exclusiva planteada por su superior (demanda a folios 2 y 3 y folios 10 y 11). El 18 de febrero, el alcalde le ordenó tramitar ese pago, responsabilizándola de cualquier atraso (memorando N°* DAMM 092-2002, a folio 12); le informó que, de acuerdo con el nuevo organigrama aprobado por el Concejo y refrendado por la Contraloría, las funciones de Recursos Humanos eran de resorte exclusivo y quedaban bajo la responsabilidad del Director de la División de Planificación Administrativa, quien sería el responsable de las relaciones internas o externas en el área de recursos humanos y de la representación del ente en la Comisión de Carrera Municipal y le ordenó hacer entrega formal de su oficina antes del martes siguiente, para destinarla al área de cómputo y acatar las directrices de su jefe inmediato, el cual le detallaría sus funciones como técnica 5 en la Dirección de Planificación Administrativa (oficio N°* DAMM 093-2002 a folio 13). El día siguiente, el [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio le* delimitó sus funciones* (oficio N°* DPAMM 02- 2002, títulado “Definición de competencias”, a folios 14-16), en tanto que el contador municipal, señor [Nombre7] , le informó que el pago por dedicación exclusiva al [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] no fue incluido en el presupuesto ordinario del período 2002 (nota de folio 17). El 22 de abril, el señor [Nombre5] le pidió realizar los cambios y formular las recomendaciones necesarias en la distribución del capital humano municipal para poder contar con una mejor política en el manejo del personal (oficio N°* DPAMM 15-2002, a folios 20-21). El 3 de mayo, ella le solicitó al [Nombre3]*. Valverde Tenorio la aclaración de las incongruencias que, a su juicio, contenía el oficio DPAMM 15-2002 y formuló una serie de observaciones en relación con la problemática presentada con las vacaciones de períodos anteriores aún no disfrutadas por el personal (nota de folios 22-23). El 13 de mayo, en nota dirigida a ese mismo funcionario, se refirió a los errores en la confección de planillas, planteados por el contador municipal y rechazó las afirmaciones de este (folios 24-25). El 10 de junio, don [Nombre4] le comunicó que la Dirección de Planificación Administrativa y Recursos Humanos asumía la administración del Cementerio Municipal y que, por haber intervenido en la consecución de materiales y equipo para ese servicio, a partir de esa fecha ella asumiría la responsabilidad administrativa de orientar la tramitación de los documentos para su buen manejo. Además, le recomendó realizar un inventario y determinar sus principales necesidades (oficio N°* DPARHMM 26-2002, denominado “entrega de activo 991/B”, a folio 26). El 28 de junio, la actora le comunicó al señor [Nombre5] sus observaciones sobre las prioridades y necesidades del cementerio y sugirió confeccionar un plano catastrado, elaborar los avalúos, realizar un diagnóstico de las necesidades de las instalaciones, la situación de los derechos y las condiciones de los funcionarios que ahí colaboran y recavar información sobre los procesos y trámites anteriores, con la finalidad de contar con una base de datos organizada para atender eficientemente las consultas de las personas usuarias (oficio N° 44-2002, a folios 27-28). El 5 de julio, el alcalde le indicó al Lic. José Luis Ocampo, Jefe de Recursos Humanos, lo siguiente “Del Memorando # 044-2002, que envió la funcionaria [Nombre2] [Nombre2] (adjunto), sobre el Cementerio pude interpretar que este programa requiere de especial atención, por lo que le sugiero que a partir de hoy la funcionaria en mención se dedique en forma exclusiva a ese importante tema del Cementerio que requiere algún funcionario a tiempo completo.” (Memorandum* N°* DAMM 463-2002, a folio 29). El 15 de julio, el [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] le comunicó al auditor interno que los errores en las planillas presentadas al Departamento de Contabilidad se debían a la forma rudimentaria de confeccionarlas y que se estaban haciendo los esfuerzos necesarios para eliminarlos mediante una aplicación informática. Además, le puntualizó que la planilla oficial es la presentada al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, la cual, al haber sido depurada y firmada por los respectivos responsables, no contiene errores ni presenta situaciones anómalas (oficio N°* DPAMM 30-2002, a folios 30-31). El 18 de julio, la accionante le indicó al [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] lo siguiente: “En forma verbal me he enterado de mi traslado a trámites del Cementerio, por decisión del señor Alcalde. / De la manera más atenta, le solicito se me envíe por escrito dicho nombramiento, ya que hasta este momento no he recibido notificación alguna ni de su oficina ni del Despacho del Alcalde, excepto la burla de todos los compañeros que me llaman *‘[Nombre8]*’.” (Nota a folio 32). En esa misma fecha, por oficio N°* DPAMM 33-2002, el [Nombre3]. [Nombre5] le comunicó que: “En atención al oficio D.A.M.M 488-2002, donde indica que la funcionaria [Nombre2] "seguirá encargándose de lo relativo a los trámites administrativos del Cementerio Municipal", le indico que acogiéndome a la Ley General de Administración Pública, en su Título V, Sección Segunda, artículos 107,108,109,110, la funcionaria mencionada será trasladada. /* No omito manifestarle que en conversación sostenida el día lunes 16 de julio del año en curso, en la reunión de jefaturas, le mencione (sic) que no era conveniente actuar de esa manera, ya que la funcionaria se encuentra calificada y capacitada para realizar las funciones y competencias de Recursos Humanos. / En acatamiento de su mandato le indico que a partir de esta fecha la colaboradora [Nombre2] , no laborara (sic) para Recursos Humanos, designando las competencias al Lic. José Luis Ocampo Rojas y al señor Roque Solís Castro como Planillero.” (Oficio N°* DPAMM 30-2002, a folio 33). El 19 de agosto la actora le remitió dos oficios a su jefe inmediato. En uno le formulaba varias peticiones relacionadas con la administración del Cementerio (oficio N° 15-2002, a folio 34). En el otro le exteriorizaba que su traslado se dio de manera arbitraria y abrupta, sin que existiera cuestionamiento alguno de sus labores como encargada de Recursos Humanos; daba cuenta del estado y condiciones en que encontró la oficina situada en el Cementerio; denunciaba la falta de implementos de aseos y suministros básicos; se quejaba del material y equipo asignados y calificaba lo sucedido como una clara persecución en su contra por no haberse “(…) prestado a actos de corrupción.” (Oficio N° 14-2002, a folios 35-36). El 8 de octubre, el alcalde le comunicó que a partir del 14 siguiente “(…) usted deberá presentarse a marcar su tarjeta de entrada y salida de labores en las oficinas administrativas. Posterior a su marca de ingreso, deberá estar en funciones en las Oficinas del Cementerio a más tardar a las 8:30 horas de la mañana, pudiendo retirarse a las 15:30 horas a efectos de marcar la salida.” (Memorandum, a folio 38). El 11 de octubre, ella le manifestó al Alcalde que “(…) en reiteradas ocasiones, he solicitado que por lo menos, una vez por semana se envíe un compañero a retirar la documentación que se genera en la Administración del Cementerio y aun no he tenido respuesta, la última vez que se presentó un compañero fue hoy hace 22 días, y hasta la fecha ni siquiera he recibido respuesta de su Oficina a los documentos enviados.” (Oficio N° 028-2002, a folio 39). El 17 de octubre, le remitió a su jefe inmediato un recibo telefónico, junto con una nota en la que manifestó lo siguiente: “(…) es importante hacer notar que, mientras el teléfono sea compartido con la casa del guarda del Cementerio, no asumo ninguna responsabilidad por el exceso que se de (sic) en los montos del mismo (sic), ya que no es seguro que se utilice únicamente por la Oficina de (sic) mi cargo.” (Oficio N° 030-2002, a folio 40). El 22 de octubre hizo de su conocimiento que se presentó “(…) el viernes 18, lunes 21 y martes 22, a la Municipalidad a marcar y no existe tarjeta con mi nombre, unido a lo anterior, me he dado cuenta, que la única que marca en el Cementerio soy yo, según me comentan los compañeros que laboran en el cementerio, ellos nunca han marcado, esto evidencia una vez más, la persecución que se ha orquestado contra mí, por parte del Despacho del Alcalde. / Considero importante hacer notar, que si se requiere la marca igual que en (sic) Plantel Municipal, debería ubicarse un reloj marcador en el Cementerio.” (Oficio N° 032-2002, a folio 41). El 28 de octubre se pronunció sobre la acción de personal 507-2002 (folio 43), mediante la cual le otorgaban 14 días de vacaciones pendientes y que no quiso recibir, en estos términos: “(…) da la impresión que sigue existiendo una clara persecución en mi contra, le solicito que también me indique con base en que (sic) se me están dando catorce días, si según mi registro, los días que me quedan pendientes son dos, me parece una situación muy sospechosa.” (oficio* N° 035-2002, dirigido al señor [Nombre5] , a folio 42). En esa misma fecha, el Departamento de Recursos Humanos le informó al alcalde “(…) QUE SE LE NOTIFICA A LA SRA. [Nombre2] EN SU RESPECTIVA ACCIÓN DE PERSONAL EL ENVÍO DE SUS VACACIONES. / DICHA FUNCIONARIA NO QUISO FIRMAR, POR LO QUE NUESTRO DEPARTAMENTO DE RECURSOS HUMANOS YA HIZO EL CUMPLIMIENTO, SOLICITAMOS A MAYOR (sic) BREVEDAD SOLUCIONAR ESTE PROBLEMA.” (Nota a folio 44). El 7 de noviembre, ella le comunicó al señor [Nombre5] “(…) que hasta el día de hoy me he acogido a lo que establece la Convención Colectiva y el Código Municipal, con relación a los cinco días con goce de salario para presentar la Oposición al Despido, por lo que le indico que mañana me presentaré a laborar normalmente.” (Nota, a folio 45). En esa misma fecha, el señor [Nombre5] le respondió la nota anterior, indicándole que, “(…) con relación a los cinco días con goce de salario para presentar la oposición al despido, se le recuerda que el día 28 de noviembre del (sic) 2002 se le notificó sobre el disfrute de 14 días de vacaciones los cuales se extienden hasta el 12 de noviembre del año en curso, además del (sic) que el 1 de noviembre se le depositó su respectivo pago de sus vacaciones.” (Oficio N°* R.H.M.M. 47-2002, a folio 49). El 8 de noviembre, la actora respondió ese oficio, indicándole, en lo conducente, a su jefe inmediato “6. Que como lo señala usted, el día 1 de noviembre se me depositó el respectivo pago de vacaciones sin cumplir con el procedimiento legal ya que no existe el documento de respaldo para tal egreso. / (…) / 8. Que hasta este momento me encuentro laborando y me he acogido a lo señalado en el punto 3, por lo que no estoy de manera voluntaria disfrutando de mis vacaciones, ni al pago correspondiente por adelanto que contempla la convención colectiva, derecho que me reservo a ser utilizado en el momento que legalmente corresponda. / 9. Que hasta no recibir una respuesta satisfactoria a la presente, continuaré en el desempeño de mis funciones.” (Oficio N° 038-2002, a folios 46-47). El 14 de noviembre, el [Nombre3]*. Valverde Tenorio le contestó que “b. El envío a vacaciones, fue por mandato expreso del señor Alcalde Lic. Oscar Ureña Huertas, por lo que se acató el lineamiento de “Otorgarle todos los días que tenga como saldo de acuerdo con la solicitud del Concejo Municipal” / (…) / i. Según los registros de la sección de Recursos Humanos, UD estaba en dicha ocasión en vacaciones (…). / (…) / iii. En ningún momento se le esta (sic) violando su condición de trabajadora para tomar los días correspondientes para su justa defensa, por lo que al estar en tiempo de vacaciones pudo asumirlos sin ningún contratiempo y a la vez disponer de los recursos asignados en el pago de sus vacaciones. / h. El hecho de que estuvo trabajando durante su tiempo de vacaciones, por esta Dirección es considerado muy noble por parte suya, pero para efectos Administrativos UD. se encontraba gozando de vacaciones, por lo que se procedió a pagarle un día después de su ingreso según consta en la Planilla número 13-11-02 del 07 al 13 de noviembre, a fin de seguir con su normal función dentro de la Oficina Administrativa del Cementerio”. (Oficio N°* DPAMM 50-2002, de folios 64-65). El 21 de noviembre, ese mismo funcionario le manifestó lo siguiente: “(…) nuevamente le solicito muy respetuosamente realizar informe de labores sobre su gestión en la Oficina Administrativa del Cementerio, esto con el fin de brindar informe a la Auditoría Interna Municipal. / Dicho informe deberá ser presentado este 29 de noviembre del (sic) 2002.” (Oficio N° 53-2002, a folio 66). Ese mismo día, la actora le comunicó al señor [Nombre5] que “En relación con su nota DPAMM 50-2002 y DPAMM 53-2002, me permito indicarle que la misma (sic) es una más de las que he recibido en los últimos meses, como producto de una larga cadena de hechos, que evidencian claramente la persecución que ustedes han orquestado en mi contra. / (…) / (…) es cierto como le (sic) consta a mis compañeros, que me he presentado todos los días a laborar, excepto los cinco días a que tenía derecho de conformidad con la Convención Colectiva vigente. / (…) Es increíble la crueldad con que he sido tratada, que usted fue capaz de enviar esa nota para engrosar el expediente de despido, haciéndolo ver como una negligencia de mi parte o un acto de rebeldía aduciendo que no lo quise recibir, cuando quedó totalmente probado, que no lo recibí por no estar firmado y por lo tanto era un borrador más, no un oficio, no obstante usted lo firmó posteriormente y lo adjunto al expediente, con lo cual usted está faltando a la verdad y alterando documentos y expedientes que pueden llevar a la administración a tomar decisiones equivocadas (…)” (Nota de folios 67-68). Por nota del 9 de diciembre, la actora se dirigió al alcalde para “(…) solicitarle retirar de mi expediente administrativo los documentos DPAMM 50-2002, DPAMM 52-2002, DPAMM 53-2002, que se encuentra (sic) sin foliar y ha (sic) sido agregados posteriormente al día de la audiencia (…) la revisión mediante la cual observé lo señalado fue en presencia de la señora Roxana Vega, Raúl Gómez, [Nombre9] y [Nombre1] .” (Folio 69). Finalmente, mediante nota del 17 de diciembre, el alcalde le contestó que “Hemos tomado nota de su solicitud de fecha 9 de diciembre, sin embargo ya el expediente se encuentra foliado y se remitió al Juzgado Laboral de Mayor Cuantía del II Circuito Judicial (…)” (Folio 70). V.- El recuento que antecede permite concluir que, entre el 14 de enero de 1998 –fecha de inicio de labores– y principios del año 2002, la situación laboral de la actora transcurrió sin mayores contratiempos o conflictos. A partir de febrero de ese año, con los cambios en el organigrama y, particularmente, con la creación de la Dirección de Planificación Administrativa y Recursos Humanos, se comienza a generar una situación conflictiva, en la cual se conjugan varios factores. El estudio de puestos que le correspondió efectuar en la Municipalidad, el señalamiento de irregularidades en la reclasificación de los cargos de contralor de servicios y contador municipal y sus observaciones sobre la improcedencia del pago del plus de dedicación exclusiva a su jefe inmediato, [Nombre3]*. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio, marcan el cambio en la relación profesional e interpersonal con sus superiores, en especial con el alcalde, licenciado Óscar Ureña Huertas. Desde entonces, su cuestionamiento de la legalidad de ciertos actos y su negativa inicial a ejecutarlos fue determinante para que se le irrespetara profesionalmente, se le aislara y se le relegara. Primero, se rompió la cordialidad en las comunicaciones dirigidas a ella y se optó por omitir referirse a sus observaciones y girarle órdenes precisas con amenazas solapadas. Luego, se le excluyó de la unidad de recursos humanos, se le ordenó entregar su oficina, se le limitaron sus funciones y se le asignaron otras menos importantes. Más tarde, le variaron las que venía desempeñando y le endosaron la responsabilidad administrativa de orientar la tramitación de los documentos en el Cementerio General de San Vicente (folio 26 y 29). Y, a pesar de esos cambios, ella asumió con responsabilidad sus nuevas funciones y realizó observaciones positivas para mejorar el servicio y la atención a las personas usuarias. Entonces, para continuar con el plan deliberado de aislamiento, el alcalde ordenó sacarla del edificio municipal y trasladarla a un espacio físico en el Cementerio, en donde nunca antes había existido oficina de trámite, que no solo no fue acondicionado como correspondía, sino que carecía de las condiciones de higiene necesarias. El irrespeto era tal que de su inminente traslado se enteró por los comentarios y burlas de sus compañeros y compañeras, quienes llegaron, incluso, a llamarla “[Nombre8]” en tono despectivo. Las condiciones del lugar en donde fue ubicada atentaban contra su dignidad y trayectoria dentro de la institución, pues, como ella misma relató, “El traslado físico se dio de manera abrupta, sin previo aviso ni coordinación con la suscrita, ya que cuando me di cuenta todas mis pertenencias estaban siendo trasladadas a la oficina del cementerio. Cuando llegué la oficina del Cementerio, estaba sucia en un marcado estado de abandono, sin mobiliario, al punto de que el señor [Nombre10] consiguió un escritorio prestado. Los documentos estaban en el suelo, donde aún se encuentran, ya que no hay mobiliario donde acomodarlos. El sitio de trabajo no se aseo (sic) antes del traslado, y peor aún no se me ha facilitado ningún suministro para hacerlo. Después la suscrita sin tener la responsabilidad de labores misceláneas, le correspondió limpiar desde los pisos hasta los vidrios. Tampoco se me ha (sic) facilitado suministros básicos como papel higiénico, jabón, desinfectante, cloro y otros, ya que tengo que utilizar un servicio sanitario que es para el público y soy yo quien tiene que asearlo. Posteriormente me dieron un equipo que como usted sabe y en el presente documento lo puede notar, no cumple con los estándares mínimos necesarios ya que es equipo de desecho municipal, lo que implica que los usuarios deben regresar para recoger la documentación posterior al trámite, unido a lo anterior se estaba construyendo un programa de cómputo para tener la base de datos y que los usuarios fueran únicamente a pagar a las Oficinas Centrales”. (Folio 35). Los testimonios evacuados confirman esa situación. Así, la testigo [Nombre11] expresó: “Después de esto es que la pasaron a las oficinas del cementerio, que no es oficina, sino es donde vive el guarda, y ahí hay un aposento que se habilitó como oficina, sólo (sic) había un sillón, le trasladaron la computadora, pero en lo demás ella carecía de lo indispensable para realizar sus funciones. Además si nunca había habido una persona realizando esas funciones en el cementerio, únicamente fue cuando la pasaron a ella, ya que una vez que fue despedida no la volvieron a ocuparla (sic) (…). No contaba con cortinas, las condiciones no eran las más indicadas para la apertura de una oficina. Tiene un ventanal grande y la señora [Nombre2] tuvo que poner una sábana para tapar el reflejo de las tumbas, y para poder utilizar el equipo de cómputo. Si el guarda del cementerio tenía una familia y esa casa es ocupada por su familia y por él (…).” (Lo destacado no es del original, folios 331-334). El deponente [Nombre1] manifestó: “No siendo eso poco, las instalaciones en las que se le instaló a ella eran propias de una película de miedo, la oficina estaba sucia, había ido yo inclusive a esa oficina y tenía el guarda una camilla donde sobaba. Tenía un vidrio quebrado, le llevaron un computadora vieja, la impresora no funcionaba (...).” (Lo destacado no es del original, folios 335-338). Tales aseveraciones ni siquiera fueron refutadas por el ente demandado. Como si eso fuese poco, se le ordenó presentarse a registrar su asistencia a las oficinas administrativas de la Municipalidad dos veces al día: en la mañana y en la tarde: “(...) deberá presentarse a marcar su tarjeta de entrada y salida de labores en las oficinas administrativas. Posterior a su marca de ingreso, deberá estar en funciones en las Oficinas del Cementerio a más tardar a las 8:30 horas de la mañana, pudiendo retirarse a las 15:30 horas a efectos de marcar la salida”. (Folio 38). Sobre el particular, los testigos expresaron: “Hay unos [Dirección1] de la municipalidad hasta el cementerio. La actora tenía que marcar en la Municipalidad e irse al cementerio. Yo tenía que pasar con ella a que pasara la tarjeta y al final se la quitaron y el guarda tenía que firmarle un vale que sí se había presentado a firmar.” (Testimonio de [Nombre11] , a folios 331-334. Lo destacado no es del original). “La distancia entre el cementerio y la Municipalidad de Moravia es de aproximadamente un kilómetro. Ella en realidad mucho tiempo no tuvo que marcar, después de cierto momento la pusieron a marcar (...)” (Declaración de [Nombre1] , a folios 335-338. Lo destacado no es del original.) Inexplicablemente, era la única funcionaria destacada en el cementerio que estaba obligada a registrar su asistencia en las oficinas administrativas. Los otros servidores no lo hacían (folio 41). Y la Sala no aprecia que hubiese razones propias del servicio que justifiquen esa diferencia de trato, sobre todo si se toma en cuenta que implicaba dedicar una hora de su jornada diaria. Por otra parte, llama la atención que, pese a la supuesta trascendencia de la labor realizada en el Cementerio, no se le asignó a ningún funcionario retirar la documentación generada, al grado que la actora debió advertirlo. En relación con sus “nuevas” funciones, cabe destacar lo consignado por el [Nombre3]. [Nombre4] Valverde Tenorio en su oficio N°* DPAMM 33-2002 del 18 de julio de 2002, antes transcrito, mediante el cual revela no solo que se trató de una actuación inconveniente y antojadiza, sino también de un descenso en sus funciones (ver folio 33). En su oficio DPAMM 42-2002, del 28 de octubre de 2002 - cuestionado por la actora-, el señor [Nombre5] deja clarísima la situación cuando se refiere, entre otras cosas, a lo siguiente: “a. En cuanto al traslado de su persona al Cementerio, esto se dio por: / i. Decisión del señor Alcalde Municipal / ii. No medio (sic) un estudio al respecto, sino que la intención era habilitar la oficina del Cementerio y desde ahí se establecieran los controles necesarios para variar la situación precaria en que se venía desenvolviendo el cementerio. / (…) / c. En cuanto a las condiciones laborales, esta División tiene claro que se encuentra en total desventaja la oficina de Administración del Cementerio, ya que al estar totalmente fuera de las oficinas administrativas, los trámites se han vuelto engorrosos, se duplica el tipo de trabajo, los usuarios del servicio se ven expuestos a tramites (sic) poco ágiles y sobre todo recorrer distancias de un sitio a otro provocando malestar entre los usuarios de este servicio (…) / a. Con respecto a los trámites que se vienen realizando del cementerio, es importante aclarar: / i. Desde el momento que la administración del Cementerio fue trasladada a la Oficina del Cementerio, se ha entorpecido la coordinación, provocando una serie de trastornos en los trámites, de ahí que suceda lo señalado por su parte en el punto 1 -3, por lo que se ha dado un entrabamiento a los procesos que deberían ser más ágiles y simples, tales como lo ha señalado la Ley 82220 (sic). / ii. Considero oportuno que la oficina administrativa del cementerio se traslade al [Dirección2] , esto con el fin de eliminar tanta distorsión que se ha venido presentando y de este modo brindar una mejor atención al usuario. / (…) / a. En cuanto a venir a marcar la hora de entrada y salida, esto se debe a solicitud del Señor Alcalde, el (sic) ha indicado que UD no está exonerada de la marca del reloj. / (…) / c. En cuanto al aspecto que los compañeros del cementerio no marcan, esto se debe al tipo de atención que realizan y que han estado exonerados desde que estuvieron dependiendo de la DIOSMM. / (…) / 11. Es importante tener claro que esta Dirección tiene claro que el uso del teléfono en el Cementerio se enfrenta a la siguiente situación: / a. Habita una familia en la casa del cementerio, la cual utiliza el teléfono / (…) / c. No se ha establecido un control sobre el uso de este recurso (...)” (Folios 50-53 y 54-57).* No cabe, entonces, la menor duda de que ella fue objeto de un comportamiento abusivo por parte de sus superiores jerárquicos, quienes, de manera sistemática, la fueron colocando en una típica situación de acoso moral y, finalmente, cuando observaron que no iba a dejar su trabajo, decidieron iniciarle el procedimiento disciplinario que ha dado lugar a este asunto. VI.- El artículo 72, inciso d), del Código de Trabajo prohíbe “Usar los útiles y herramientas suministrados por el patrono, para objeto distinto de aquél a que están normalmente destinados (…)”. En contra de lo que se afirma en el recurso, el grave quebrantamiento de esa norma, aunque se haya verificado una vez y no haya habido apercibimiento previo, puede dar lugar al despido sin responsabilidad patronal, en los términos del inciso l) del ordinal 81 ibídem, toda vez que, como regla general, resulta censurable la conducta de toda persona trabajadora que, desatendiendo sus obligaciones laborales, ocupe los instrumentos de trabajo en finalidades distintas a aquellas para las cuales se le han confiado. Sin embargo, en este asunto concreto, no es posible concluir, como lo hizo el Tribunal, que el uso del teléfono por parte de la señora [Nombre2] , para realizar llamadas personales a su compañero sentimental, sea de tal gravedad que justifique la ruptura de su relación estatutaria de servicio. Las circunstancias en que se verificó ese comportamiento provocan que no haya correspondencia entre la falta cometida y la sanción impuesta, con lo cual esta resulta desproporcionada. La indiscutible situación de desmejora en sus condiciones laborales y de aislamiento de sus compañeros y compañeras de trabajo, con quienes compartía a diario, a la que la sometieron sus superiores inmediatos, debieron provocarle muchísima ansiedad y no es aventurado suponer que la desestabilizaron emocionalmente. En ese contexto, es compresible su necesidad de comunicación con una persona de su confianza, su compañero y que, para satisfacerla, recurriera al teléfono que había sido puesto a su disposición para ejecutar sus labores. No obstante la gravedad de lo que vivía, de los folios 98 a 109 y 119 a 129 del expediente se desprende que ella lo utilizó un promedio diario de 19,90, 12,27 y 7,35 minutos durante 9, 19 y 4 días correspondientes, por su orden, a los meses de agosto, septiembre y octubre de 2002. Y, dentro del contexto en que se dieron, esos tiempos promedios de duración de las llamadas no resultan, pues, excesivos e impiden concluir que el abuso acusado existiese con la magnitud que ha querido atribuírsele. Tanto es así que no existe indicio alguno de que esa conducta se apreciara en el período anterior a los hechos relatados o durante su permanencia en las oficinas centrales. En todo caso, lo fundamental es destacar que se está en presencia de una conducta reactiva; es decir, buscada por los propios personeros de la entidad demandada, que, por eso mismo, no puede justificar una medida en apariencia legítima pero cuya finalidad es absolutamente reprochable. Conviene no olvidar que, como lo exige el artículo 21 del Código Civil, “Los derechos deberán ejercitarse conforme con las exigencias de la buena fe.” y que “La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste. Todo acto u omisión en un contrato, que por la intención de su autor, por su objeto o por las circunstancias en que se realice, sobrepase manifiestamente los límites normales del ejercicio de un derecho, con daño para tercero o para la contraparte, dará lugar a la correspondiente indemnización y a la adopción de las medidas judiciales o administrativas que impidan la persistencia en el abuso.” (Artículo 22 ibídem). VII.- El artículo 11 de la Constitución Política dispone que “Los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad y no pueden arrogarse facultades que la ley no les concede. Deben prestar juramento de observar y cumplir esta Constitución y las leyes. La acción para exigirles la responsabilidad penal de sus actos es pública.” En concordancia con ese alto precepto, la Ley General de la Administración Pública dedica una sección, la segunda, del capítulo segundo, “De la relación jerárquica”, del título cuarto, “De las relaciones interorgánicas”, de su libro primero, “Del régimen jurídico”, a regular el denominado “deber de obediencia”, cuya finalidad es conciliar la necesaria existencia de una línea de mando al interior de cualquier administración pública con las exigencias propias de la legalidad en el quehacer administrativo. Por regla general, toda persona al servicio de un órgano o ente público está obligado a obedecer las órdenes particulares, instrucciones o circulares de su superior jerárquico, sea o no inmediato (artículo 107), salvo que tengan por objeto la realización de actos evidentemente extraños a su competencia o que sean manifiestamente arbitrarios por constituir delito (artículo 108). Ahora bien, cuando el acto ordenado sea contrario al ordenamiento jurídico por cualquier otro concepto, es obligación del o de la inferior “(…) consignar y enviar por escrito sus objeciones al jerarca, quien tendrá la obligación de acusar recibo.” De esa manera, por un lado, logra que no recaiga sobre él o ella las consecuencias de una eventual responsabilidad civil y, por el otro, contribuye con una sana administración y se resguarda la especial vinculación que supone el principio de legalidad. Desde esta última perspectiva, se establece una suerte de control cruzado que convierte al funcionariado en vigilante del quehacer institucional y busca prevenir errores y, eventualmente, prácticas de corrupción que luego pretenden justificarse en desconocimiento o ignorancia. En otras palabras, la obediencia administrativa no es ni puede ser ciega porque el primer compromiso es con el bloque de legalidad en su conjunto. Y ello es más cierto cuando está de por medio el manejo de fondos públicos. De ahí que, en las relaciones estatutarias de servicio, no todo cuestionamiento de la actuación del superior jerárquico puede considerarse, sin más, como una actitud displicente, ni sea factible atribuirle a una persona que señala vicios en un acto una intención reprochable. En este asunto, se acusó a la actora de haberse negado reiteradamente a recibir y firmar documentos y se le calificó de rebelde por no haber querido disfrutar de unas vacaciones a las que, según ella, no tenía derecho. Con la prueba aportada, no es posible sostener que haya incurrido en esos comportamientos irregulares toda vez que se limitó a señalar problemas de legalidad en algunas decisiones de sus superiores jerárquicos cuya inexistencia no fue demostrada en esta sede. Incluso, las razones de su negativa inicial a tramitar el pago por dedicación exclusiva al [Nombre3]. Valverde Tenorio fueron confirmadas por el propio contador municipal. También se demostró que la acción de personal mediante la cual se le ordenaba irse de vacaciones no estaba firmada cuando se negó a recibirla y nunca se aclaró si tenía o no derecho a disfrutar esos días, como correspondía haberlo hecho. Si de atenerse a los indicios se trata, sorprende que sus superiores confundan el derecho a una licencia con goce de salario con el derecho a vacaciones, al punto de que hayan considerado que dentro de los días otorgados por este último concepto. Así las cosas, no queda más que concluir que esta otra falta está completamente ayuna de prueba, lo que confirma que el despido careció de causa. VIII.- En el voto de esta Sala Nº 2005-655, de las 14:05 horas del 3 de agosto de 2005, se indicó: “El término “mobbing” (o acoso moral en el trabajo) (…) procede del verbo inglés “to* mob” que significa “asaltar” o “acosar”. ([Nombre12] y [Nombre13] . “Mobbing. Cómo prevenir, identificar y solucionar el acoso psicológico en el trabajo”. Madrid, Ediciones Pirámide, 2003, p. 50). El acoso moral en el trabajo ha sido definido por Leymann, como una “situación en la que una persona o grupo de personas ejercen una violencia psicológica extrema, de forma sistemática y recurrente (como media una vez por semana) y durante un tiempo prolongado (como media durante unos 6 meses) sobre otra persona o personas, respecto de las que mantiene una relación asimétrica de poder, en el lugar de trabajo con la finalidad de destruir las redes de comunicación de la víctima o víctimas, destruir su reputación, perturbar el ejercicio de sus labores y lograr que finalmente esa persona o personas acaben abandonando el lugar de trabajo”. ([Nombre14] . “Extinción del contrato laboral por acoso moral –mobbing-.” Barcelona, Editorial Bosch, S.A., 2002, pp. 10-11). El hostigamiento puede ser vertical, horizontal o mixto. Es vertical cuando la conducta hostigadora proviene del jerarca (esta modalidad se conoce como “bossing”). Es horizontal cuando el acoso es provocado por los propios compañeros y el mixto se da por una combinación entre el acoso propiciado por la jefatura –por acción u omisión- y los compañeros. De conformidad con la doctrina, esta última modalidad es la habitual (ídem, pp. 12-13). Luego, de la concepción doctrinal del “mobbing” se desprenden varias características comunes, entre las que se señalan: a) La intencionalidad: tiene como fin minar la autoestima y la dignidad del acosado. b) La repetición de la agresión: se trata de un comportamiento constante y no aislado. c) La longevidad de la agresión: el acoso se suscita durante un período prolongado. d) La asimetría de poder: pues la agresión proviene de otro u otros quienes tienen la capacidad de causar daño. e) El fin último: la agresión tiene como finalidad que el o la trabajadora acosada abandonen su trabajo ([Nombre12] y [Nombre13] , op. cit., p. 51). Estas mismas autoras señalan los diez comportamientos más frecuentes que evidencian la existencia del hostigamiento moral, entre los que incluyen: 1) Asignar trabajos sin valor o utilidad alguna. 2) Rebajar a la persona asignándole trabajos por debajo de su capacidad profesional o sus competencias habituales. 3) Ejercer contra la persona una presión indebida o arbitraria para realizar su trabajo. 4) Evaluar su trabajo de manera inequitativa o de forma sesgada. 5) Desvalorar sistemáticamente su esfuerzo o éxito profesional o atribuirlo a otros factores o a terceros. 6) Amplificar y dramatizar de manera injustificada errores pequeños o intrascendentes. 7) Menospreciar o menoscabar personal o profesionalmente a la persona. 8) Asignar plazos de ejecución o cargas de trabajo irrazonables. 9) Restringir las posibilidades de comunicarse, hablar o reunirse con el superior. 10) Ningunear, ignorar, excluir o hacer el vacío, fingir no verle o hacerle 'invisible'”. (López Cabarcos y Vásquez Rodríguez, op. cit., p. 57). Todavía nuestro ordenamiento jurídico no ha desarrollado la figura del hostigamiento laboral, aunque existe alguna tendencia legislativa a su regulación positiva. No obstante ello, la situación del hostigamiento puede subsumirse en algunas de las normas contempladas en el Código de Trabajo que le exigen al empleador dar un trato digno al trabajador (artículos 19, 69 inciso c) y 83).”* IX.- Lo sucedido en este caso, coincide con la descripción anterior. De ahí que no quepa la menor duda de que está en presencia de un típico acoso moral, que hace imperativo declarar la nulidad del despido de la actora. En consecuencia, las cosas deben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de la emisión de ese acto ilegal, por lograr lo cual se ha de revocar la sentencia recurrida. En su defecto y con base en lo estipulado en el artículo 150, inciso f), del Código Municipal, a cuyo tenor “La sentencia de los tribunales de trabajo resolverá si procede el despido o la restitución del empleado a su puesto, con el pleno goce de sus derechos y el pago de salarios caídos. En la ejecución de sentencia, el servidor municipal podrá renunciar a ser reinstalado, a cambio de la percepción del importe del preaviso y el auxilio cesantía que puedan corresponderle y el monto de dos meses de salario por concepto de daños y perjuicios.”, se debe otorgar la reinstalación en el puesto ocupado al momento del cese, con el pago de los salarios dejados de percibir desde entonces, incluido el salario escolar. También deben acogerse los reclamos de aguinaldos, anualidades acumuladas, aumentos y cualquier otro plus salarial. De conformidad con el último precepto legal citado, la actora podrá renunciar a la reinstalación y optar por el pago de los extremos de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía y, en ese caso, tendrá, además, derecho al monto correspondiente a dos meses de salario por concepto de daños y perjuicios. Sobre las sumas adeudadas se otorgan los intereses legales desde la exigibilidad de cada una y hasta su efectivo pago. Respecto de los extremos acordados se han de denegar las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de causa y falta de derecho. Las vacaciones reclamadas deben ser denegadas y, respecto de ellas, se ha de acoger la excepción de falta de derecho por cuanto se trata de un derecho vinculado directamente a la prestación efectiva del servicio, presupuesto que no se ha verificado en este asunto sin que sean relevantes las causas para ello. Por haber resultado vencida, a la demandada le corresponde asumir el pago de ambas costas de esta acción y se fijan las personales en la suma prudencial de un millón de colones. Sobre las sumas a pagar por concepto de salarios, esa debe proceder a rebajar lo correspondiente por cargas sociales y reportarlas como corresponde a la entidad aseguradora. Para lo que en derecho corresponda, se debe remitir copia de este pronunciamiento a la Dirección de Inspección de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.”* *