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Res. 00788-2005 Sala Primera de la Corte · Sala Primera de la Corte · 27/10/2005
OutcomeResultado
The cassation appeal is granted, the lower court's judgment applying the frustration of purpose theory is annulled, and the share subscription contract is declared valid and enforceable.Se acoge el recurso de casación, se anula la sentencia del Tribunal que aplicó la teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato y se declara válido y exigible el contrato de suscripción de acciones.
SummaryResumen
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica reviews a cassation appeal against a judgment that applied the frustration of purpose theory to a share subscription carried out under the Tourism Incentives Law (Law 6990). The Chamber holds that the Costa Rican Civil Code does not follow a purely subjective position on the cause of contracts, but rather a dualist position that only allows examination of the parties' subjective motives when authorized by law (such as for illegality or under Article 1080 of the Civil Code regarding the sale of real estate). Therefore, the frustration of purpose theory—based on a subjective cause—is not applicable in Costa Rica. Additionally, it examines the specific case and determines that the subscription contract was pure and simple, not conditioning its validity on obtaining the tax shield; the buyer did not externalize or incorporate into the contract its purpose of obtaining the incentive. The allegedly frustrating event was foreseeable, as the tax deduction depended on administrative authorizations. The Chamber grants the appeal and confirms the validity and enforceability of the contract.La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica analiza el recurso de casación contra una sentencia que aplicó la teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato a una suscripción de acciones realizada al amparo de la Ley de Incentivos Turísticos (Ley 6990). La Sala concluye que el Código Civil costarricense no adopta una posición subjetiva pura sobre la causa del contrato, sino una posición dualista que solo permite examinar los motivos subjetivos de las partes cuando la ley lo autoriza (por ilicitud o por el artículo 1080 del Código Civil sobre venta de inmuebles). Por tanto, la teoría de la frustración del fin —basada en la causa subjetiva— no es aplicable en Costa Rica. Además, examina el caso concreto y determina que el contrato de suscripción fue puro y simple, sin condicionar su eficacia a la obtención del escudo fiscal; el comprador no exteriorizó ni incorporó al contrato su propósito de obtener el incentivo. El evento supuestamente frustrante era previsible, pues la deducción fiscal dependía de autorizaciones administrativas. La Sala declara procedente el recurso y confirma la validez y exigibilidad del contrato.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that it is not feasible to admit the application of the "frustration of purpose theory" in Costa Rican law. For further reasons, even if it were applicable, its prerequisites are not met in this case. The supervening event was not unforeseeable; the authorization to "apply" the acquisition of shares to potential tax payments by Nombre10502, because it depended on a "third party", the Commission and the tax authorities, made it absolutely foreseeable that there could be some objection to it. Also, as will be seen, no evidence indicated that the purpose sought by the acquirer of the shares was known, accepted by the debtor and determined in the contract. In this Chamber's view, a justice analysis will be possible only in cases where the purposes pursued by the parties when obligating themselves concern the legal system, that is, when the law authorizes such examination. Such is the case when the parties' purposes are contrary to law, morals or good customs (Article 627(3)) and the hypothesis of the aforementioned Article 1080. Thus, any other subjective motive of the parties shall be considered mere intimate, unperceivable and legally indifferent motivations. Except, of course, when it has been objectified by being integrated into the contractual declaration of will as an impulsive or determining cause, whereby that "accidental element" would become essential.Lo expuesto hasta aquí conduce a que no es factible admitir en el Derecho costarricense, la aplicación de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato". A mayor abundamiento de razones, aún en la hipótesis de que si lo fuera, en la especie no se cumple con los presupuestos para su aplicación. El evento sobrevenido no era impredecible, la autorización para "aplicar" la adquisición de acciones a eventuales pagos de renta por parte de Nombre10502, por depender de un "tercero", de la Comisión y de las autoridades tributarias, hacía absolutamente predecible que pudiera haber alguna objeción a ella. Tampoco, como se verá, existió prueba alguna que indique que el fin buscado por la adquirente de las acciones haya sido conocido, aceptado por el deudor de la prestación y determinado en el contenido del contrato. A criterio de esta Sala, cabrá el análisis de justicia únicamente en aquellos supuestos en que los fines perseguidos por las partes al obligarse interesen al ordenamiento jurídico, es decir, cuando éste autorice su examen. Tal es el caso cuando los propósitos de las partes sean contrarios a la ley, a la moral o las buenas costumbres (artículo 627, inciso 3º) y la hipótesis del artículo 1080 antes mencionado. De esta manera, cualquier otro móvil subjetivo de los contratantes deberá tenerse como simples motivaciones íntimas, inaprensibles e indiferentes en la vida del Derecho. Salvo, claro está, que haya sido objetivado, al ser integrado en la declaración de voluntad contractual a modo de causa impulsiva o determinante, con lo cual ese "elemento accidental", se tornaría en esencial.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"A criterio de esta Sala, cabrá el análisis de justicia únicamente en aquellos supuestos en que los fines perseguidos por las partes al obligarse interesen al ordenamiento jurídico, es decir, cuando éste autorice su examen."
"In this Chamber's view, a justice analysis will be possible only in cases where the purposes pursued by the parties when obligating themselves concern the legal system, that is, when the law authorizes such examination."
Considerando XII
"A criterio de esta Sala, cabrá el análisis de justicia únicamente en aquellos supuestos en que los fines perseguidos por las partes al obligarse interesen al ordenamiento jurídico, es decir, cuando éste autorice su examen."
Considerando XII
"No es factible admitir en el Derecho costarricense, la aplicación de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato"."
"It is not feasible to admit the application of the "frustration of purpose theory" in Costa Rican law."
Considerando XII
"No es factible admitir en el Derecho costarricense, la aplicación de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato"."
Considerando XII
"El simple acuerdo de voluntades que genera el consentimiento, es el origen del contrato, el motivo o fin particular carece de influencia para la validez del instituto, con excepción de los casos antedichos."
"The simple agreement of wills that generates consent is the origin of the contract; the particular motive or purpose has no influence on the validity of the institute, with the exception of the aforementioned cases."
Considerando XII
"El simple acuerdo de voluntades que genera el consentimiento, es el origen del contrato, el motivo o fin particular carece de influencia para la validez del instituto, con excepción de los casos antedichos."
Considerando XII
Full documentDocumento completo
"XII.- The plaintiff, as expressed in its appeal, agrees "with most of the line of thought outlined in the judgment of the Second Superior Civil Court, Second Section, ... particularly because it rejects the grievances of Nombre10502 and makes an effort to offer a clear picture of the legal transaction agreed upon between Nombre11387 and Nombre10502. But it will contest the foundations of the judgment derived from Considerandos XV to XVII, and some parts of what was stated in Considerandos IX to XIV." In summary, in the words of the cassation appellants themselves: "The problem is that the Second Civil Court, Second Section, of San José, without it ever having been raised by the parties, formulates the theory of frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato), based on a couple of works without any significance in modern civil law, unknown and old, which even they themselves indicate are applicable only to Anglo-Saxon law, and issues the judgment under appeal grounding that theory in articles 11, 21, 22, 1023 of the Civil Code; in its theoretical attempt, it links the aforementioned figure with the theory of abuse of right, but for the specific case with abuse of contractual right, giving an erroneous meaning to the judgment of the First Chamber No. 106 of 1992.
The crux of the matter is that the Court in its judgment confuses fundamental concepts such as the purpose or motive of the contract (which is subjective, internal, psychological) with the cause (la causa) (which is objective and corresponds to each legal transaction), and from there adopts an English theory that has not been successful in an environment inspired by Roman law and civil codification." It is clear, then, that the plaintiff agrees with the legal characterization given by the Court to the business relationship that operated between it and Nombre10502, that is, that it was a share subscription contract, based on an agreed capital increase. What it attacks, at this juncture, is the interpretation that the ad quem makes of it, in light of its essential elements, as well as the application to the specific case of rules pertaining to civil matters, even though the legal transaction in question is of a purely commercial, corporate, and autonomous nature.
The rules on commercial contracts constitute a relevant part of Commercial Law, whose traditional core has been formed by the Law of Obligations. The Commercial Code deals with contracts in a fragmentary manner. First, because there are many that lack regulation, such as the so-called atypical ones. Second, because the regulations for those it does discipline are incomplete; in many cases it only dictates special rules that modify the precepts of the Civil Code. So much so, that article 416 of the Commercial Code provides: "The provisions of civil law referring to the capacity of the contracting parties, to exceptions, and to the causes that rescind or invalidate contracts, by reason of capacity, shall be applicable to commercial acts and contracts, with the modifications and restrictions of this Code." However, one must go further and say that civil law is applicable not only in these cases, but in any matter of a commercial nature that lacks special regulations, because the Commercial Code authorizes it: "When there is no specific provision in this Code, nor in other commercial laws, governing a particular matter or case, the provisions of the Civil Code, usages and customs, and the general principles of law shall apply, in that order and as pertinent..." (article 2).
The share subscription contract, there is no doubt, is a commercial agreement; however, lacking its own regulation in the Commercial Code and the chapter of "general provisions" of "obligations and contracts" thereof being insufficient in relation to the topics under sub-examine, referral to the provisions of civil law is mandatory. From numerals 627 and 1007 of the Civil Code arise the requirements for the validity of the legal transaction, namely: capacity, object, cause (causa), consent of the parties, and formalities. The nature and conceptualization given to the cause element will set the standard for the resolution of the present litis. The topic of the "theory of frustration of purpose (teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)" is intimately linked to this point. The cause (causa) of contracts is one of the topics that has generated the most discussion in private law; however, its problem is one of positive law and the solution is conditioned by the specific character of each system.
Many theories have been elaborated on it; but, leaving aside secondary variants, all are linked to one of two directions called objectivist and subjectivist. The first, followed by Italian legal literature, equates the cause (causa) with the socio-economic function of the legal transaction, leaving aside the will and motivations of the parties' actions. Different socio-economic functions are thus distinguished: transfer of ownership, the most representative example of which is the sales contract; credit, as occurs with onerous loans; guarantee, through contractual types that provide security regarding the performance of another contract (e.g., surety contract); and others such as custody, cooperation, provision, recreation, etc. The second, originating in French jurisprudence and doctrine, assimilates the notion of cause (causa) with the purpose pursued by the parties, that is, the determining reason or motive of the contract; the cause (causa) then appears as subjective, concrete, and variable in each legal transaction, even in those of the same type.
Subjective, because it is linked to the purpose guiding the contracting parties. Concrete, as it attends to each particular transaction. Variable, since trying to appreciate the motive that has driven the parties will be different in each contract. Specialized doctrine agrees that "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" is a chapter inherent to the cause (causa); understood as the determining motive, raison d'être, or individual or subjective purpose that the parties had in view at the formative moment of the transaction. That is, the theory built on that concept has as its starting point the subjectivist thesis. Its origin is recognized in English law. The first outline of the proposal dates back to the 19th century, the case "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", judgment of 1863. The defendant had rented a theater for four nights to give concerts. Before the first night, a fortuitous fire destroyed the premises.
The plaintiff claimed payment of damages according to jurisprudential precedents that established a system of strict liability against what was agreed. Judge Nombre11390 rejected the claim, arguing that the contracting parties must have known from the conclusion of the agreement that its performance depended on the existence of the thing object of the contract and that, if it perished without fault of the lessee, there was no liability. In his opinion, the agreement should be considered subject to the implied condition that the parties would be released if, at the time of performance, the consideration became impossible without anyone's fault. Therefore, he resolved that the lessee should not pay the price, nor the lessor grant the use of the thing. This principle was applied in other matters such as "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394 vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "Nombre11396 vs. Union Marine Insurance Co.
Ltd.". However, the cases most often cited and that gave greater dissemination to the theory are from the beginning of the 20th century, known as the coronation cases. With these, the doctrine was outlined and strengthened. They are so called because they arose on the occasion of the celebrations to be held on June 28 and 29, 1902, for the coronation of Nombre11397, son of Queen Nombre11398, an event that generated great enthusiasm, especially due to the length of the latter's reign, which determined a special desire to observe a spectacle that had not occurred for a long time. The king fell ill and his coronation parade was suspended. This contingency gave rise to claims by those who had paid to watch the parade from certain buildings along the procession route. The most remembered precedent is "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". The defendant had rented a property with a balcony to witness the parade.
The price was agreed at 75 pounds, payable 25 in advance and 50 on the day of the parade. The lessor claimed payment of the remaining 50 pounds and the lessee the return of the 25 already paid. Although this purpose had not been mentioned in the contract, it was considered, according to the conditions and prior advertisements, which expressly offered the rental to watch the parade during those days, that this had been considered by the contracting parties as the foundation or basis of the contract. Understood this way, the Court declared that upon the frustration of purpose, without it being reasonably supposable that the contracting parties, when perfecting the contract, had contemplated the possibility that the parade would not take place, the tenant was not obliged to pay the balance of the rent. During the First and Second World Wars (1914-1917 and 1939 and 1945), numerous cases of frustration of contracts due to impossibility of performance were raised.
The decisions of the German courts took into account, in ruling for or against the configuration of the causal, whether the particular circumstances of the case justified or not the thesis of the denaturalization of the obligations contracted by the parties. Based on these jurisprudential precedents and some doctrinal elaborations of German law such as the theory of "presupposition (presuposición)" of Nombre11400 and the "bases of the legal transaction (bases del negocio jurídico)" of Nombre11401, among others, the current profile of the figure of "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" has been delineated. In Spain, the theory was first expounded by Vicente Espert Sanz in his work "La frustración del fin del contrato", in 1968, followed by authors such as De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo, De Ángel Yáguez, and Zorrilla Ruiz; however, it has not been accepted by the legislation and jurisprudence of that country, although mention has been made of the term "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" on various occasions, it has not been in the strict technical sense that doctrine has given to the figure.
In Latin America, only in the Argentine system is there a doctrinal development around the topic. Authors of the stature of Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi, and Atilio Aterini, among others, defend the thesis; however, despite several attempts to incorporate the figure into civil legislation, to date there is no specific rule determining the elements and effects of the institution. In the jurisprudence of Argentine courts, the cases in which reference has been made to the theory are scarce. In a strict sense, "(...), frustration of purpose of the contract (frustración del fin del contrato) is the factual situation in which the utility that one of the performances was supposed to provide disappears, in an absolutely unforeseeable manner, according to its nature or the unequivocal agreement of the parties (content of the contract)" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, La frustración del fin del contrato, 1st edition, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, p. 93).
It occurs then, "(...) when in a bilateral contract, of deferred or continued execution, the relevant purpose—raison d'être—known to the parties cannot be achieved—is frustrated—due to supervening reasons alien—external—to their will and without fault" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volume I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, p. 225). As presuppositions for its possible application, the following are indicated:
XIII.Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield provided in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In Act No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction entered into between the parties was recorded: "ARTICLE ONE: It is agreed to increase the company's capital stock in the sum of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at the exchange rate of today of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty cents per dollar, represents the sum of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand nominative and preferred shares called 'Preferred Series A' with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal entity identification number CED4760, which it pays through a sight bill of exchange deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on the eighteenth day of January, nineteen ninety-nine, and drawn with maturity at sight, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, which its representative accepts in a definitive and irrevocable manner." As can be seen, it was a pure and simple share subscription without a clause conditioning its effectiveness.
There is also no other document that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper, made this known: "Thirty-fifth: Did you ask any official of Nombre11387 to draft any written contract, representative of the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed was the share purchase document, which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, under article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-Sixth: Why, before doing the transaction, did you not request the drafting of a written contract? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements for developing a tourism investment, so it was not necessary to draft a contract before the first stage." It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as witness Nombre8327, who until 1998 worked for said company as financial manager and had among his functions the execution of the company's tourism investments, declared: "In some cases, practically in all cases, a private contract was signed between the tourism company and Nombre10502 Company...
While I was financial manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment for the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502 at the time the investment was signed did not pay everything in cash, so there remained the obligation of how what was still owed would be paid."
- The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or designation of the private contract.- As for the form of payment for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay income tax to the treasury, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism companies.- Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and set the guideline for how it would pay.- Nombre10502 DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT" (The capitalization and boldface are not from the original). From the foregoing statement, three extremely important aspects are extracted: first, although on other occasions, when acquiring shares in tourism companies, Nombre10502 signed additional contracts beyond the share subscription contracts, the purpose of these was solely to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case, none was signed; and third, most importantly, the defendant "DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT." That is, Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not guarantee obtaining the tax benefit, since, as already stated, Article 11 of Ley 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from income tax "upon prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission," did not subject the effectiveness of the contract to the actual obtaining of the tax shield.
In the Trust Agreement (Contrato de Fideicomiso) entered into between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by Article 11 of Ley No. 6990, it was stipulated: "The Trustee does not in any way guarantee that the Trustor will meet the requirements or be entitled to the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law (Ley de Incentivos Turísticos), its amendments, and the Regulations of said Law, which this trust pursues." Nombre10502 did not enshrine in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly led it to subscribe for shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for contracting to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it by alleging failure to achieve the expected economic benefit. This was not the first time it made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and of the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration.
If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement on its interests, it should have stated so. Nombre11387 not only had a tourism contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Ley 6990 by acquiring shares in said company, but it also possessed firm agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourism contract to carry out the planned works and authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing disproves any breach or bad faith that might have been attributed to Nombre11387. It is also important to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the rejection of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387 by the Commission. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it preferred not to exercise its rights and to fall into default in the payment of the outstanding balance.
Therefore, it cannot be said in this case that there is an "unjust" or "unlawful" cause that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor any abuse of right by the plaintiff. On the contrary, if the latter existed, it would rather be on the part of the defendant, who, aware of its breach of contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and therefore enforceable according to its terms. This being so, the Court undoubtedly incurred in the violations of the articles cited in the remedy, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application. The suggested "Theory of Frustration of the Purpose of the Contract (Teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)," as already explained, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be supported by a benevolent interpretation of the articles pointed out by the Court."
XII.The plaintiff, as expressed in its appeal, agrees "with the (sic) good part of the line of thought outlined in the judgment of the Superior Court Second Civil Division, Section Two, ... in particular because it rejects the grievances of Nombre10502 and makes an effort to offer a clear picture of the legal transaction agreed upon between Nombre11387 and Nombre10502. But it will contest the grounds of the judgment derived from Considerandos XV to XVII, and some parts of what is stated in Considerandos IX to XIV."
In summary: the simple meeting of the minds that generates consent is the origin of the contract; the particular motive or purpose has no influence on the validity of the institution, with the exception of the aforementioned cases. However, when that motive or purpose is "essential" for the parties and they expressly incorporate it into the contract, in this case, the legal transaction is concluded and acquires validity under a "condition." In that manner and only thus is the analysis of the fairness of the impulsive motive (underlying motive, causa-motivo) possible. What has been set forth thus far leads to the conclusion that it is not feasible to admit, in Costa Rican Law, the application of the "theory of frustration of purpose of the contract." For additional reasons, even under the hypothesis that it were applicable, in the specific case the prerequisites for its application are not met.
The supervening event was not unforeseeable; the authorization to "apply" the acquisition of shares to eventual rent payments by Nombre10502, because it depended on a "third party," on the Commission and on the tax authorities, made it absolutely foreseeable that there could be some objection to it. Nor, as will be seen, was there any evidence indicating that the purpose sought by the acquirer of the shares had been known and accepted by the obligor of the performance and established in the content of the contract.
Having overcome the preceding discussion, in order to resolve the merits of the matter raised, reference must necessarily be made to the origin of Law No. 6990. In developing countries with a market economy like Costa Rica, it is common for the State to implement policies aimed at stimulating the creation and development of companies through the granting of direct incentives (tax reductions or exemptions, known as tax shields, credit advantages, subsidies, etc.). This is a form of economic interventionism, through which an activity is promoted so that it is oriented toward the achievement of public objectives considered fundamental for the growth of production and the reactivation of the productive apparatus. Law No. 6990 is situated within this framework, which declared the tourism industry to be of public utility and seeks to achieve an accelerated and rational process of development of that activity.
It established a favorable tax regime for the execution of important tourism programs and projects. In its original version (the incentive regime was partially reformed and partially repealed by Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatoria y Excepciones"), which is the one relevant to the case, these incentives were granted in two directions. Thus, Article 7 established a series of benefits in favor of those natural and legal persons who developed any of the activities indicated by the legislator in Article 3 of that same law. On the other hand, Section 11 established other incentives whose beneficiaries were no longer those natural and legal persons indicated, but rather a third party, linked or not to the tourism sector, who invested in the branch: "*Article 11.- Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities among those indicated in Article 3 of this law shall be deductible from the Income Tax, subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission.
When said investment is carried out through already established companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be held in a fideicomiso (trust) in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange, for a period of no less than two years, without the possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulatory commission must be met, according to the type of investment. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income for the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted under this concept*" (the highlighting is not from the original). In the first case, the company interested in benefiting from the regime had to obtain from the Commission the qualification of its activity as touristic.
This step merely signified a recognition of the company as a potential recipient of the corresponding incentives, which materialized once that same body gave its approval to a specific project submitted for its consideration for such purposes. Once the approval was granted, a document called a "*tourism contract*" was signed, which in reality was far from being a true contract, since it did not constitute the primary source of rights and obligations between the contracting parties, but rather a concretization of the benefits provided for in Law No. 6990 in a specific tourism company regarding a specific project. That is, it was rather a unilateral act of the Administration, read ICT, which determined that the project submitted for consideration met the conditions legally established for the application of the incentive regime (act-condition). The foregoing is so, because the agreed advantages are of a tax nature, per se discriminatory, which are regulated by law and, therefore, cannot validly constitute the object of a contract.
It was, then, an objective legal situation, whose origin was exclusively normative. What the ICT did was to determine who could be recipients of the exceptional tax regime, for meeting the legally defined conditions. However, that act by itself was not sufficient to presuppose the right to the specific exoneration, because it was ultimately the responsibility of the Tax Administration, upon formal application, which after examining the petition, determined whether the circumstances existed for the exemption to operate. One must remember that tax incentives are granted by the Administration, certainly within the framework of legislative authorization but using the technique of approval. In the case of third parties who invested in tourism projects, according to the cited Section 11, to opt for the tax incentives they had to previously fulfill two requirements: 1) acquire shares of companies domiciled in the country that had a signed tourism contract and; 2) deliver the shares in a fideicomiso (trust) to a State bank or to the National Stock Exchange for a period of no less than two years.
After completing the above, they had to request from the Commission the "authorization" of the investment made for the purpose of carrying out the income tax exoneration procedure before the Tax Administration.
XIII.Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield contemplated in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In Minute No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction concluded between the parties was recorded: "*ARTICLE ONE: It is agreed to increase the corporate capital of the company in the amount of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at today's exchange rate of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty cents per dollar, represent the sum of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand nominative and preferred shares called "Preferred Series A" with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal identification number CED4760, which pays for them by means of a sight draft that is deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on the eighteenth day of January of nineteen ninety-nine and drawn with maturity at sight, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, for which it is accepted by its representative in a definitive and irrevocable manner*".
As can be observed, it was a pure and simple share subscription without any clause conditioning its effectiveness. Nor does any other document exist that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. This was observed by Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper: "*Thirty-fifth: did (sic) you ask any official of Nombre11387 to draft any written contract representing the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed (sic) was the one for the purchase of shares, which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, covered under Article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-sixth: Why did you not request the execution of a written contract before doing the transaction? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements for developing a tourism investment, therefore, the preparation of a contract before the first stage was not necessary*".
It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as witness Nombre8327, who worked for said company as financial manager until 1998 and whose duties included carrying out the company's tourism investments, declared: "*In some cases, practically in all cases, a private contract was signed between the tourism company and Nombre10502 Company ... While I was Financial Manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment for the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502, at the time the investment signing took place, did not pay everything in cash, so the obligation remained as to how what was owed would be paid. - The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or denomination of the private contract.- Regarding the method of payment for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay the income tax to the tax authority, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism companies.- Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and gave the guideline on how it was going to pay.- Nombre10502 DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT*" (The capitalization and bold print are not from the original).
From the previous statement, three aspects of utmost importance are extracted: first, although on other occasions Nombre10502, when acquiring shares of tourism companies, signed contracts additional to those of share subscription, the object of these was only to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case, none was signed and; third, and most importantly to highlight, that the defendant "DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT". That is, Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not assure the obtention of the tax benefit, since, as already stated, Article 11 of Law 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from the income tax "subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission", did not subject the effectiveness of the contract to the effective obtention of the tax shield.
In the Fideicomiso Contract concluded between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by Article 11 of Law No. 6990, it was stipulated: "*The Fiduciary does not guarantee in any way that the Trustor will meet the requirements or that it will be worthy of the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law, its reforms, and the Regulations of said Law, which this trust pursues*". Nombre10502 did not embody in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly determined it to subscribe for shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for contracting to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it, alleging it did not achieve the expected economic benefit. It was not the first time it had made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration.
If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement to its interests, it should have stated it. Nombre11387 had not only a tourism contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Law 6990 by acquiring shares of said company, but it also possessed firm agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourism contract to carry out the projected works and that authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing disproves any breach or bad faith that might be attributed to Nombre11387.
It is also important to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the rejection by the Commission of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it chose not to exercise its rights and to fall into default in the payment of the balance owed. Therefore, in this specific case, it cannot be said that there exists an "unjust" or "illicit" underlying motive that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor an abuse of right by the plaintiff. On the contrary, if such abuse of right existed, it would rather be on the part of the defendant, who, aware of the breach of its contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and, therefore, enforceable according to its terms. Thus, as things stand, the Court undoubtedly incurred violations of the articles cited in the appeal, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application.
The suggested "*Theory of frustration of purpose of the contract*", as already stated, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be sustained based on a benevolent interpretation of the articles indicated by the Court." In summary, in the words of the cassation appellants themselves: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The problem is that the Second Civil Court, Second Section, of San José, without it ever having been raised by the parties, formulates the theory of frustration of purpose of the contract, based on a couple of works without any significance in modern civil law, unknown and old, which even they themselves indicate their application only for Anglo-Saxon law, and issues the challenged judgment basing that theory on articles 11, 21, 22, 1023 of the Civil Code; in its theoretical attempt it links the aforementioned figure with the theory of abuse of rights, but for the specific case with the abuse of contractual rights, giving an erroneous meaning to the judgment of the First Chamber No. 106 of 1992.
The crux of the matter is that the Court in its judgment confuses fundamental concepts such as the purpose or motive of the contract (which is subjective, internal, psychological) with the cause (which is objective and corresponds to each legal transaction), and from there adopts an English theory that has not been successful in an environment inspired by Roman law and civil codification</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">". It is clear, then, that the plaintiff agrees with the legal characterization given by the Court to the business relationship that operated between her and Nombre10502, that is, that it was a </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">share subscription contract (contrato de suscripción de acciones)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, based on an agreed capital increase. What she attacks, at this point, is the interpretation that the ad quem makes of it, in light of its essential elements, as well as the application to the specific case of rules specific to civil matters, despite the fact that the legal transaction in question is of a purely commercial, corporate, and autonomous nature.
The rules on commercial contracts constitute a relevant part of Commercial Law, whose traditional core has been formed by the Law of Obligations. The Commerce Code deals with contracts in a fragmentary manner. In the first place, because there are many of them that lack regulation, such as the so-called atypical ones. Secondly, because the regulation of those it does discipline is incomplete, in many cases it only dictates special rules that modify the precepts of the Civil Code. So much so, that article 416 of the Commerce Code provides: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The provisions of civil law referring to the capacity of the contracting parties, to the exceptions, and to the causes that rescind or invalidate contracts, by reason of capacity, shall be applicable to commercial acts and contracts, with the modifications and restrictions of this Code</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">".</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> However, one must go further and say that it is not only in these cases that civil law is applicable, but in any matter of a commercial nature that does not have special regulation, because the Commerce Code authorizes it: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">When there does not exist in this Code, nor in other commercial laws, a concrete provision governing a specific matter or case, the provisions of the Civil Code, the uses and customs, and the general principles of law shall be applied, in order and as pertinent...</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (article 2).
The share subscription contract (contrato de suscripción de acciones), there is not the slightest doubt, is a commercial agreement; however, lacking its own regulation in the Commerce Code and the chapter of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">general provisions</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" of the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">obligations and contracts</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" thereof being insufficient in relation to the topics under examination, remission to the provisions of Civil Law is mandatory. From numerals 627 and 1007 of the Civil Code arise the validity requirements of the legal transaction, namely: capacity, object, cause, consent of the parties, and formalities. The nature and conceptualization given to the cause element will set the standard for the resolution of the present litis. The issue of the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">theory of frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" is intimately linked to the point.
The cause (causa) of contracts is one of the topics that has generated the most discussion in Private Law; however, its problematic is one of Positive Law and the solution is conditioned by the specific character of each system. Many theories have been elaborated on it; but, setting aside secondary variants, all are linked to one of two directions called objectivist and subjectivist. The first, followed by Italian legal literature, equates the cause with the socio-economic function of the legal transaction, leaving aside the will and motivations of the parties' actions. Different socio-economic functions are thus distinguished: transfer of ownership, whose most representative example is the purchase-sale contract; credit, as occurs with onerous loans; guarantee, through contractual types that provide security regarding the fulfillment of another contract (e.g., surety contract); and others such as custody, cooperation, provision, recreation, etc. The second, originating in French jurisprudence and doctrine, assimilates the notion of cause with the purpose pursued by the parties, that is, the determining reason or motive of the contract, the cause thus appearing as subjective, concrete, and variable in each legal transaction, even in those of the same species.
Subjective, because it is linked to the purpose guiding the contracting parties. Concrete, since it attends to each transaction in particular. Variable, given that trying to appreciate the motive that has driven the parties will be different in each contract.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Specialized doctrine agrees that "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" is a chapter inherent to the cause; understood as the determining motive, reason for being, or individual or subjective purpose that the parties had in view at the formative moment of the transaction. That is, the theory built on said concept has as its starting point the subjectivist thesis. Its origin is recognized in English Law. The first outline of the proposal dates back to the 19th century, case "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", judgment of 1863.
The defendant had rented a theater for four nights for the purpose of giving concerts. Before the first night, a fortuitous fire destroyed the premises. The plaintiff claimed payment of damages according to the jurisprudential precedents that established a system of strict liability against what was agreed.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Judge Nombre11390 rejected the claim, arguing for this that the contracting parties should have known since the conclusion of the agreement that its fulfillment depended on the existence of the thing object of the contract and that, if it perished without fault of the lessee, there was no liability. In his view, the agreement should be considered subject to the implied condition according to which the parties would be released if, at the time of performance, the performance became impossible without anyone's fault.
Therefore, he resolved that the lessee should not pay the price, nor the lessor grant the use of the thing. This principle was applied in other matters such as "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Nombre11396</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> vs. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.". However, the cases most frequently cited and that gave greater dissemination to the theory are from the beginning of the 20th century, known as the coronation cases. With them, the doctrine took shape and consolidated. They are called this because they arose on the occasion of the celebrations to be held on June 28 and 29, 1902, for the coronation of Nombre11397, son of Queen Nombre11398, an event that generated great enthusiasm, especially due to the length of the latter's reign, which determined a special desire to observe a spectacle that had not occurred for a long time.
The king fell ill and his coronation parade was suspended. Such contingency gave rise to claims by those who had paid to see the parade from some buildings along the route the procession was to take. The most remembered precedent is "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". The defendant had rented a property with a balcony to witness the parade. The price was agreed at 75 pounds, 25 payable in advance and 50 on the day of the parade. The lessor claimed payment of the remaining 50 pounds and the lessee the return of the 25 already paid.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Although this purpose had not been mentioned in the contract, it was considered, according to the conditions and prior advertisements, which expressly offered the rental to see the parade during the days thereof, that this had been considered by the contracting parties as the foundation or basis of the contract.
Understood thus, the Court declared that, upon frustration of the purpose, without it being reasonably assumable that the contracting parties, upon perfecting the contract, would have contemplated the possibility that the parade would not take place, the tenant should not pay the balance of the rent. During the First and Second World Wars (1914-1917 and 1939 and 1945), numerous cases of frustration of contracts due to impossibility of performance were raised. The decisions of the German courts took into account, to pronounce in favor or against the configuration of the cause, whether the particular circumstances of the case justified or not the thesis of the denaturalization of the obligations contracted by the parties. Based on these jurisprudential precedents and some doctrinal elaborations of German Law such as the theory of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">presupposition (presuposición)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" by Nombre11400 and the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">bases of the legal transaction (bases del negocio jurídico)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" by Nombre11401, among others, the current profile of the figure of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" has been outlined.
In Spain, the theory was first set forth by Vicente Espert Sanz in his work "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">La frustración del fin del contrato</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">", in 1968, followed by authors such as De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> De Ángel Yáguez, and Zorrilla Ruiz; however, it has not been adopted by the legislation and jurisprudence of that country, although it has made mention of the term "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" on various occasions, it has not been in the strict technical sense that the doctrine has given to the figure. In Latin America, only in the Argentine system is there a doctrinal development around the topic. Authors of the stature of Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi, and Atilio Aterini, among others, defend the thesis; however, despite several attempts to incorporate the figure into civil legislation, to date there is no specific norm that determines the elements and effects of the institution.
In the jurisprudence of Argentine courts, the cases in which reference has been made to the theory are scarce. Strictly speaking, "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(...), frustration of purpose of the contract is the factual scenario in which the utility that one of the performances was to provide disappears, in an absolutely unforeseeable manner, according to its nature or the unequivocal agreement of the parties (content of the contract)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">La frustración del fin del contrato</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, 1st edition, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, p. 93). It takes place then, "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(...) when in a bilateral contract, of deferred or continued performance, the relevant purpose -reason for being- and known by the parties cannot be achieved -is frustrated- for supervening reasons alien -external- to their will and without fault intervening</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volume I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, p. 225).</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> As prerequisites for its possible application, the following are indicated:
Upon approval being granted, a document called a “tourist contract (contrato turístico)” was signed, which in reality was far from being a true contract, as it did not constitute the primary source of rights and obligations between the contracting parties, but rather a concretization of the benefits provided for in Law No. 6990 in a specific tourism enterprise with respect to a specific project. In other words, it was more an unilateral act of the Administration, that is, the ICT, which determined that the project submitted for consideration met the conditions legally established for the application of the incentive regime (act-condición). The foregoing is so because the advantages agreed upon are of a tax nature, per se discriminatory, which are governed by law and, therefore, cannot validly constitute the object of a contract. It involved, then, an objective legal situation whose origin was exclusively normative.
What the ICT did was determine who could be recipients of the exceptional tax regime, by fulfilling the legally defined conditions. However, that act by itself was not sufficient to presuppose the right to a specific exemption, as it ultimately fell to the Tax Administration, upon formal request, which after examining the petition, determined whether the circumstances existed for the exemption to operate. It must be remembered that tax incentives are granted by the Administration, certainly within the framework of legislative authorization but using the technique of approval. In the case of third parties investing in tourism projects, according to the aforementioned clause 11, to opt for the tax incentives they had to first fulfill two requirements: 1) acquire shares of companies domiciled in the country that had a signed tourist contract; and 2) deliver the shares in trust (fideicomiso) to a state bank or the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) for a term of no less than two years.
After completing the above, they had to request from the Commission the “authorization (autorización)” of the investment made for the purposes of carrying out the income tax exemption process before the Tax Administration.
XIII.Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield contemplated in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In minute No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction entered into between the parties was recorded: "ARTICLE ONE: It is agreed to increase the company's capital stock in the amount of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at today's exchange rate of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty céntimos per dollar, represents the amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand registered preferred shares called "Preferred Series A" with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal identification number CED4760, which pays for them by means of a sight bill of exchange deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on January eighteenth, nineteen ninety-nine and issued with sight maturity, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, for which its representative accepts in a definitive and irrevocable manner".
As can be seen, it was a pure and simple share subscription without any clause conditioning its effectiveness. Nor is there any other document that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. This was pointed out by Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper: "Thirty-fifth: Did you ask any Nombre11387 official to draft any written contract representing the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed was the one for the purchase of shares which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, covered by article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-sixth: Why, before doing the transaction, did you not request the creation of a written contract? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements to develop a tourism investment, therefore the preparation of a contract before the first stage was not necessary".
It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as the witness Nombre8327, who until 1998 worked for said company as financial manager and whose duties included carrying out the company’s tourism investments, declared: "In some cases, practically in all cases a private contract was signed between the tourism enterprise and Nombre10502 Company ... While I was Financial Manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment of the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502, at the time the investment signing took place, did not pay everything in cash so there remained an obligation detailing how whatever was left owing would be paid. - The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or denomination of the private contract. - Regarding the payment form for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay income tax to the treasury, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism enterprises. - Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and set the guideline for how it was going to pay. - Nombre10502 DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT" (The capitalization and bold text are not from the original).
From the foregoing statement, three extremely important aspects are drawn: first, although on other occasions Nombre10502, when acquiring shares of tourism enterprises, signed additional contracts to the share subscription ones, the purpose of these was solely to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case none was signed; and third, most importantly to highlight, that the defendant "DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT". That is, that Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not assure it the obtaining of the tax benefit, since as already stated, article 11 of Law 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from income tax "upon prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission", did not subject the contract's effectiveness to the actual obtaining of the tax shield.
In the Trust Agreement (Contrato de Fideicomiso) entered into between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by article 11 of Law No. 6990, it was stipulated: "The Trustee does not in any way guarantee that the Trustor will fulfill the requirements or that it will be entitled to the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law, its amendments and the Regulation of said Law, which this trust pursues". Nombre10502 did not enshrine in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly led it to subscribe to shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for agreeing to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it by alleging not having achieved the expected economic benefit. It was not the first time it had made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and of the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration. If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement on its interests, it should have stated so.
Nombre11387 had not only a tourist contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Law 6990 by acquiring shares of said company, but also possessed final agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourist contract to carry out the planned works and that authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing refutes any breach or bad faith that one may have sought to attribute to Nombre11387. It is also interesting to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the Commission’s rejection of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it preferred not to exercise its rights and to fall into default on the payment of the remaining balance owed. It cannot, then, in this case be said that there exists an "unjust" or "unlawful" cause that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor an abuse of rights by the plaintiff.
On the contrary, if the latter exists, it would rather be by the defendant, who, aware of its breach of contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and therefore enforceable according to its terms. This being the case, the Tribunal undoubtedly incurred in the violation of the articles alluded to in the appeal, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application. The suggested "Theory of Frustration of the Purpose of the Contract (Teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)", as already set forth, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be sustained by a benevolent interpretation of the articles indicated by the Tribunal."
“XII.- La actora, tal y como lo expresa en su recurso, concuerda "con la (sic) buena parte de la línea de pensamiento esbozada en la sentencia del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda, ... en particular porque rechaza los agravios de Nombre10502 y hace un esfuerzo por ofrecer un panorama claro del negocio jurídico concordado entre Nombre11387 y Nombre10502. Pero combatirá los fundamentos de la sentencia derivados de los Considerandos XV a XVII, y algunas partes de lo acotado en los considerandos IX a XIV". En resumen, en palabras de los propios casacionistas: "El problema es que el Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda, de San José, sin haber sido planteado nunca por las partes, formula la teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato, basada en un par de obras sin ninguna trascendencia en el derecho civil moderno, desconocidas y viejas, las cuales incluso ellas mismas señalan su aplicación solo para el derecho anglosajón, y dicta la sentencia que se impugna fundando esa teoría en los artículos 11, 21, 22, 1023 del Código Civil, en su intento teórico vincula la figura anterior con la teoría del abuso del derecho, pero para el caso concreto con el abuso del derecho contractual dándole un sentido equivocado a la sentencia de la Sala Primera Nº 106 de 1992.
El meollo del asunto es que el Tribunal en su sentencia confunde conceptos fundamentales como el fin o motivo del contrato (el cual es subjetivo, interno, psicológico) con la causa (la cual es objetiva y corresponde a cada negocio jurídico), y de ahí adopta una teoría inglesa que no ha tenido éxito en el medio inspirado en el Derecho romano y la codificación civil". Queda claro, entonces, que la actora coincide con la calificación jurídica dada por el Tribunal a la relación negocial que operó entre ella y Nombre10502, es decir, que se trató de un contrato de suscripción de acciones, con base en un aumento de capital acordado. Lo que ataca, a la sazón, es la interpretación que de él hace el ad quem, a la luz de sus elementos esenciales, así como la aplicación al caso concreto de reglas propias de la materia civil, pese a que el negocio jurídico en cuestión, es de naturaleza netamente comercial, societario y autónomo.
Las normas sobre contratos mercantiles constituyen parte relevante del Derecho Comercial, cuyo núcleo tradicional lo ha formado el Derecho de las obligaciones. El Código de Comercio se ocupa de los contratos de manera fragmentaria. En primer término, porque existen muchos de ellos que no gozan de regulación, como los llamados atípicos. En segundo lugar, porque la normativa de los que sí disciplina es incompleta, en muchos casos solamente dicta normas especiales que modifican los preceptos del Código Civil. Tanto es así, que el artículo 416 del Código de Comercio dispone: "Las disposiciones del derecho civil referentes a la capacidad de los contratantes a las excepciones y a las causas que rescinden o invalidan los contratos, por razón de capacidad, serán aplicables a los actos y contratos mercantiles, con las modificaciones y restricciones de este Código". Sin embargo, hay que ir más allá y decir que no solamente en estos casos es aplicable el derecho civil, sino en cualquier asunto de naturaleza mercantil que no goce de una normativa especial, porque el Código de Comercio lo autoriza: "Cuando no exista en este Código, ni en otras leyes mercantiles, disposición concreta que rija determinada materia o caso, se aplicarán, por su orden y en lo pertinente, las del Código Civil, los usos y costumbres y los principios generales del derecho..." (artículo 2º).
El contrato de suscripción de acciones, no cabe la menor duda, es un convenio mercantil; sin embargo, al no contar con una regulación propia en el Código de Comercio y resultar insuficiente el capítulo de "disposiciones generales" de las "obligaciones y contratos" de éste, en relación a los temas objeto del subexámine, es obligada la remisión a las disposiciones del Derecho civil. De los numerales 627 y 1007 del Código Civil, nacen los requisitos de validez del negocio jurídico, a saber: capacidad, objeto, causa, consentimiento de las partes y formalidades. La naturaleza y conceptualización que se dé, al elemento causa, marcará la pauta para la solución de la presente litis. El tema de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato" está íntimamente ligado al punto. La causa de los contratos, es uno de los tópicos que más discusión ha generado en el Derecho privado, sin embargo, su problemática es de Derecho positivo y la solución está condicionada por el carácter propio de cada sistema.
Sobre ella se han elaborado muchas teorías; pero, dejando de lado variantes secundarias, todas se vinculan a una de dos direcciones llamadas objetivista y subjetivista. La primera, seguida por la literatura jurídica italiana, iguala la causa con la función socio-económica del negocio jurídico, dejando de lado la voluntad y motivaciones de la actuación de las partes. Se distinguen así distintas funciones económico-sociales: de cambio de la titularidad, cuyo ejemplo más representativo es el contrato de compraventa; de crédito, como sucede con el préstamo oneroso; de garantía, mediante tipos contractuales que brindan seguridad respecto del cumplimiento de otro contrato (v.gr. contrato de fianza); y otras como la de custodia, cooperación, previsión, recreación, etc. La segunda, originada en la jurisprudencia y doctrina francesa, asimila la noción de causa con el fin perseguido por las partes, es decir la razón o motivo determinante del contrato, apareciendo, entonces, la causa como subjetiva, concreta y variable en cada negocio jurídico, aún en los de la misma especie.
Subjetiva, porque se vincula con la finalidad que guía a los contratantes. Concreta, ya que atiende a cada negocio en particular. Variable, puesto que tratando de apreciar el móvil que ha impulsado a las partes será distinta en cada contrato. La doctrina especializada coincide en que la "frustración del fin del contrato" es un capitulo inherente a la causa; entendida esta como móvil determinante, razón de ser o fin individual o subjetivo que las partes han tenido en vista al momento formativo del negocio. Es decir, que la teoría construida sobre dicho concepto tiene como punto de partida la tesis subjetivista. Su origen se reconoce en el Derecho inglés. El primer esbozo de la propuesta se remonta al siglo XIX, caso "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", sentencia de 1863. El demandado había arrendado por cuatro noches un teatro con el fin de dar conciertos. Antes de la primera noche, un incendio fortuito destruyó el local.
El actor reclamaba el pago de daños y perjuicios conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales que establecían un sistema de responsabilidad a ultranza frente a lo pactado. El juez Nombre11390, rechazó la demanda argumentando para ello, que los contratantes debían saber desde la celebración del convenio, que su cumplimiento dependía de la existencia de la cosa objeto del contrato y que, si ésta perecía sin culpa del arrendatario, no había responsabilidad. En su criterio, el acuerdo debía considerarse sujeto a la condición implícita según la cual las partes quedarían liberadas si al tiempo de cumplimiento, la prestación resultare imposible sin culpa de nadie. Por ello, resolvió que el arrendatario no debía pagar el precio, ni el arrendador conceder el uso de la cosa. Este principio se aplicó en otros asuntos como el de "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394 vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "Nombre11396 vs. Union Marine Insurance Co.
Ltd.". Sin embargo, los casos que más se suelen citar y que dieron mayor difusión a la teoría, son de comienzos del siglo XX, conocidos como los coronation cases. Con ellos la doctrina se perfiló y afianzó. Se les llama así porque se produjeron con ocasión de las celebraciones que se iban a realizar, el 28 y 29 de junio de 1902, para la coronación de Nombre11397, hijo de la reina Nombre11398, suceso que generó gran entusiasmo, sobre todo por lo largo del reinado de ésta última, que determinó un especial deseo por observar un espectáculo que hacia tiempo no ocurría. El rey enfermó y el desfile de su coronación fue suspendido. Tal contingencia originó reclamos por parte de quienes habían pagado para ver el desfile desde algunas edificaciones por donde iba a pasar el cortejo. El precedente más recordado es "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". El demandado había alquilado un inmueble con balcón para presenciar el desfile.
El precio se convino en 75 libras, pagaderas 25 por adelantado y 50 el día del desfile. El arrendador reclamó el pago de las 50 libras faltantes y el arrendatario la devolución de las 25 ya abonadas. Aunque no se había mencionado esa finalidad en el contrato, se estimó, conforme a las condiciones y anuncios previos, los cuales ofrecían expresamente el alquiler para ver el desfile durante los días del mismo, que ésa había sido considerada por las partes contratantes como el fundamento o base del contrato. Entendido así, el Tribunal declaró que al frustrarse el fin, sin que razonablemente se pudiera suponer que los contratantes, al perfeccionarse el contrato, hubiesen contemplado la posibilidad de que el desfile no tuviera lugar, el inquilino no debía pagar el saldo del alquiler. Durante la Primera y Segunda Guerra Mundial (1914-1917 y 1939 y 1945), se plantearon numerosos casos de frustración de contratos por imposibilidad de cumplimiento.
Las decisiones de los tribunales alemanes tuvieron en cuenta, para pronunciarse a favor o en contra de la configuración de la causal, si las circunstancias particulares del caso justificaban o no la tesis de la desnaturalización de las obligaciones contraídas por las partes. Sobre la base de estos precedentes jurisprudenciales y algunas elaboraciones doctrinarias del Derecho alemán tales como la teoría de la "presuposición" de Nombre11400 y las "bases del negocio jurídico" de Nombre11401, entre otras, se ha delineado el perfil actual de la figura de la "frustración del fin del contrato". En España la teoría fue expuesta por primera vez por Vicente Espert Sanz en su obra "La frustración del fin del contrato", en el año 1968, seguido por autores como De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo, De Ángel Yáguez y Zorrilla Ruiz; sin embargo no ha sido acogida por la legislación y la jurisprudencia de aquel país, si bien ha hecho mención al término "frustración del fin del contrato" en diversas ocasiones, no ha sido en el estricto sentido técnico que la doctrina le ha dado a la figura.
En Latinoamérica, únicamente en el Sistema argentino se encuentra un desarrollo doctrinal en torno al tema. Autores de la talla de Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi y Atilio Aterini, entre otros, defienden la tesis, sin embargo, pese a varios intentos de incorporación de la figura en la legislación civil, a la fecha no existe norma específica que determine los elementos y efectos de la institución. En la jurisprudencia de los tribunales argentinos son exiguos los casos en que se a hecho referencia a la teoría. En sentido estricto, "(...), la frustración del fin del contrato es el supuesto de hecho en el cual desaparece, de modo absolutamente imprevisible, la utilidad que debía proporcionar una de las prestaciones, según la naturaleza de la mismo o el acuerdo inequívoco de las partes (contenido del contrato)" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, La frustración del fin del contrato, 1ª edición, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, pag. 93).
Tiene lugar entonces, "(...) cuando en un contrato bilateral, de ejecución diferida o continuada, la finalidad relevante -razón de ser- y conocida por las partes no puede lograrse -se ve frustrada- por razones sobrevinientes ajenas -externas- a su voluntad y sin que medie culpa" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volumen I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, pag. 225). Como presupuestos para su posible aplicación, se señalan los siguientes:
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