Inapplicability of Frustration of Purpose in Share Subscription Under Tourism IncentivesImprocedencia de la frustración del fin del contrato en suscripción de acciones con incentivos turísticos

"XII.- The plaintiff, as expressed in its appeal, agrees "with most of the line of thought outlined in the judgment of the Second Superior Civil Court, Second Section, ... particularly because it rejects the grievances of Nombre10502 and makes an effort to offer a clear picture of the legal transaction agreed upon between Nombre11387 and Nombre10502. But it will contest the foundations of the judgment derived from Considerandos XV to XVII, and some parts of what was stated in Considerandos IX to XIV." In summary, in the words of the cassation appellants themselves: "The problem is that the Second Civil Court, Second Section, of San José, without it ever having been raised by the parties, formulates the theory of frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato), based on a couple of works without any significance in modern civil law, unknown and old, which even they themselves indicate are applicable only to Anglo-Saxon law, and issues the judgment under appeal grounding that theory in articles 11, 21, 22, 1023 of the Civil Code; in its theoretical attempt, it links the aforementioned figure with the theory of abuse of right, but for the specific case with abuse of contractual right, giving an erroneous meaning to the judgment of the First Chamber No. 106 of 1992. The crux of the matter is that the Court in its judgment confuses fundamental concepts such as the purpose or motive of the contract (which is subjective, internal, psychological) with the cause (la causa) (which is objective and corresponds to each legal transaction), and from there adopts an English theory that has not been successful in an environment inspired by Roman law and civil codification." It is clear, then, that the plaintiff agrees with the legal characterization given by the Court to the business relationship that operated between it and Nombre10502, that is, that it was a share subscription contract, based on an agreed capital increase. What it attacks, at this juncture, is the interpretation that the ad quem makes of it, in light of its essential elements, as well as the application to the specific case of rules pertaining to civil matters, even though the legal transaction in question is of a purely commercial, corporate, and autonomous nature. The rules on commercial contracts constitute a relevant part of Commercial Law, whose traditional core has been formed by the Law of Obligations. The Commercial Code deals with contracts in a fragmentary manner. First, because there are many that lack regulation, such as the so-called atypical ones. Second, because the regulations for those it does discipline are incomplete; in many cases it only dictates special rules that modify the precepts of the Civil Code. So much so, that article 416 of the Commercial Code provides: "The provisions of civil law referring to the capacity of the contracting parties, to exceptions, and to the causes that rescind or invalidate contracts, by reason of capacity, shall be applicable to commercial acts and contracts, with the modifications and restrictions of this Code." However, one must go further and say that civil law is applicable not only in these cases, but in any matter of a commercial nature that lacks special regulations, because the Commercial Code authorizes it: "When there is no specific provision in this Code, nor in other commercial laws, governing a particular matter or case, the provisions of the Civil Code, usages and customs, and the general principles of law shall apply, in that order and as pertinent..." (article 2). The share subscription contract, there is no doubt, is a commercial agreement; however, lacking its own regulation in the Commercial Code and the chapter of "general provisions" of "obligations and contracts" thereof being insufficient in relation to the topics under sub-examine, referral to the provisions of civil law is mandatory. From numerals 627 and 1007 of the Civil Code arise the requirements for the validity of the legal transaction, namely: capacity, object, cause (causa), consent of the parties, and formalities. The nature and conceptualization given to the cause element will set the standard for the resolution of the present litis. The topic of the "theory of frustration of purpose (teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)" is intimately linked to this point. The cause (causa) of contracts is one of the topics that has generated the most discussion in private law; however, its problem is one of positive law and the solution is conditioned by the specific character of each system. Many theories have been elaborated on it; but, leaving aside secondary variants, all are linked to one of two directions called objectivist and subjectivist. The first, followed by Italian legal literature, equates the cause (causa) with the socio-economic function of the legal transaction, leaving aside the will and motivations of the parties' actions. Different socio-economic functions are thus distinguished: transfer of ownership, the most representative example of which is the sales contract; credit, as occurs with onerous loans; guarantee, through contractual types that provide security regarding the performance of another contract (e.g., surety contract); and others such as custody, cooperation, provision, recreation, etc. The second, originating in French jurisprudence and doctrine, assimilates the notion of cause (causa) with the purpose pursued by the parties, that is, the determining reason or motive of the contract; the cause (causa) then appears as subjective, concrete, and variable in each legal transaction, even in those of the same type. Subjective, because it is linked to the purpose guiding the contracting parties. Concrete, as it attends to each particular transaction. Variable, since trying to appreciate the motive that has driven the parties will be different in each contract. Specialized doctrine agrees that "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" is a chapter inherent to the cause (causa); understood as the determining motive, raison d'être, or individual or subjective purpose that the parties had in view at the formative moment of the transaction. That is, the theory built on that concept has as its starting point the subjectivist thesis. Its origin is recognized in English law. The first outline of the proposal dates back to the 19th century, the case "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", judgment of 1863. The defendant had rented a theater for four nights to give concerts. Before the first night, a fortuitous fire destroyed the premises. The plaintiff claimed payment of damages according to jurisprudential precedents that established a system of strict liability against what was agreed. Judge Nombre11390 rejected the claim, arguing that the contracting parties must have known from the conclusion of the agreement that its performance depended on the existence of the thing object of the contract and that, if it perished without fault of the lessee, there was no liability. In his opinion, the agreement should be considered subject to the implied condition that the parties would be released if, at the time of performance, the consideration became impossible without anyone's fault. Therefore, he resolved that the lessee should not pay the price, nor the lessor grant the use of the thing. This principle was applied in other matters such as "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394 vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "Nombre11396 vs. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.". However, the cases most often cited and that gave greater dissemination to the theory are from the beginning of the 20th century, known as the coronation cases. With these, the doctrine was outlined and strengthened. They are so called because they arose on the occasion of the celebrations to be held on June 28 and 29, 1902, for the coronation of Nombre11397, son of Queen Nombre11398, an event that generated great enthusiasm, especially due to the length of the latter's reign, which determined a special desire to observe a spectacle that had not occurred for a long time. The king fell ill and his coronation parade was suspended. This contingency gave rise to claims by those who had paid to watch the parade from certain buildings along the procession route. The most remembered precedent is "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". The defendant had rented a property with a balcony to witness the parade. The price was agreed at 75 pounds, payable 25 in advance and 50 on the day of the parade. The lessor claimed payment of the remaining 50 pounds and the lessee the return of the 25 already paid. Although this purpose had not been mentioned in the contract, it was considered, according to the conditions and prior advertisements, which expressly offered the rental to watch the parade during those days, that this had been considered by the contracting parties as the foundation or basis of the contract. Understood this way, the Court declared that upon the frustration of purpose, without it being reasonably supposable that the contracting parties, when perfecting the contract, had contemplated the possibility that the parade would not take place, the tenant was not obliged to pay the balance of the rent. During the First and Second World Wars (1914-1917 and 1939 and 1945), numerous cases of frustration of contracts due to impossibility of performance were raised. The decisions of the German courts took into account, in ruling for or against the configuration of the causal, whether the particular circumstances of the case justified or not the thesis of the denaturalization of the obligations contracted by the parties. Based on these jurisprudential precedents and some doctrinal elaborations of German law such as the theory of "presupposition (presuposición)" of Nombre11400 and the "bases of the legal transaction (bases del negocio jurídico)" of Nombre11401, among others, the current profile of the figure of "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" has been delineated. In Spain, the theory was first expounded by Vicente Espert Sanz in his work "La frustración del fin del contrato", in 1968, followed by authors such as De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo, De Ángel Yáguez, and Zorrilla Ruiz; however, it has not been accepted by the legislation and jurisprudence of that country, although mention has been made of the term "frustration of purpose (frustración del fin del contrato)" on various occasions, it has not been in the strict technical sense that doctrine has given to the figure. In Latin America, only in the Argentine system is there a doctrinal development around the topic. Authors of the stature of Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi, and Atilio Aterini, among others, defend the thesis; however, despite several attempts to incorporate the figure into civil legislation, to date there is no specific rule determining the elements and effects of the institution. In the jurisprudence of Argentine courts, the cases in which reference has been made to the theory are scarce. In a strict sense, "(...), frustration of purpose of the contract (frustración del fin del contrato) is the factual situation in which the utility that one of the performances was supposed to provide disappears, in an absolutely unforeseeable manner, according to its nature or the unequivocal agreement of the parties (content of the contract)" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, La frustración del fin del contrato, 1st edition, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, p. 93). It occurs then, "(...) when in a bilateral contract, of deferred or continued execution, the relevant purpose—raison d'être—known to the parties cannot be achieved—is frustrated—due to supervening reasons alien—external—to their will and without fault" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volume I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, p. 225). As presuppositions for its possible application, the following are indicated: a) A validly executed contract, which distinguishes it from defects leading to nullity; b) That it is a bilateral contract, which also implies onerousness; c) It is necessary that the contract has prolongation in time, deferred execution, successive performance, or continued execution, that is, it is not of instantaneous performance, because the alteration of the purpose must appear in the performance stage; the performance whose utility was frustrated must be pending; it is necessary that said performance is not fully executed; d) The event causing the frustration, therefore, must be supervening; these are circumstances subsequent to the execution of the contract; arising from events beyond the field of foresight; alien to the will of the parties, with no fault; e) The contractual performance is still feasible; the event does not cause its total and definitive impossibility; f) The utility or result of the performance expected by its creditor, initially considered as the reason or motive for contracting, ceases to subsist. A very important aspect of the figure, especially for the purposes of the case under examination, is the contractual exteriorization of the motive that drove the agreement. It is not enough that the creditor of the performance communicated to the debtor the purpose it had projected with it, "...it is necessary that there be an agreement of the parties, express or tacit, but always unequivocal, about the specific utility expected by one of them. It is necessary that the counterparty made such ulterior purpose its own; that both parties took it into account to determine the contractual content, having influenced the performance or the amount of the counter-performance. Only then can it be affirmed that the specific purpose properly forms part of the content of the transaction" (Gianfelici, op.cit., p. 82). On the other hand, it is also of interest to delve into the presupposition of foreseeability. It is said that not any change in circumstances, affecting the achievement of the purpose that the creditor of the performance proposed, affects the effectiveness of the contract, but only those alterations that were absolutely unforeseeable at the time of contracting. Mutations that are objectively foreseeable must be borne by the party suffering them, because by virtue of the principle of private self-responsibility, the contracting parties have the duty to foresee the variations in circumstances that could harm them, and if they did not do so, even if due to excusable error, it is something attributable to them. It remains to be said that doctrine distinguishes the "theory of frustration of contract (teoría de la frustración del contrato)" from unforeseeability (imprevisión), impossibility of performance, fortuitous event (caso fortuito), force majeure (fuerza mayor), error, and the resolutory clause, by reason of it being an autonomous institute that affects the survival of the contract because it has been left without cause (causa). From this the consequence of frustration is extracted, which is not invalidity, implying nullity, but the supervening ineffectiveness of the contract, a presupposition for the resolutory action. The theory under study has not been exempt from criticism. It is objected, firstly, that it is a notion still in formation, without a defined and specific profile, a product of mixing ideas and doctrines from a legal system, like the English one, very different from the Roman-based one. Likewise, it is said that it shares in the imprecisions of another legal concept, the cause (causa), with which it is intimately related. It is also reproached for putting legal certainty at very serious risk, by offering an easy pretext to escape pacta sunt servanda, the faithful fulfillment of one's pledged word. It is further pointed out that it attempts to burden the counterparty's shoulders or distribute the risk inherent in any transaction, namely that it does not turn out well, that it fails. In that same vein, it is criticized for constituting a reward for the negligent, careless, unforeseeing contracting party and for belatedly bringing up issues not ventilated in the negotiation—personal matters, specific to one of the parties, normally irrelevant regarding the effectiveness of the contract. Finally, it is held that under the pretext of equity, a freely entered agreement is violated, and an adjustment of effects, an adaptation or distribution of consequences, is undertaken, which has little to do with what was wanted by the parties. Now then, the question to answer is: Which theory on cause (causa) does the Costa Rican Civil Code follow? This, in order to ascertain the possibility of applying the theory in question. The aforementioned article 627 requires the existence of "just cause (causa justa)" in obligations. That is, for there to be a contract, the requirement of a cause (causa) must concur; but for its validity it is not enough that an objective or typified one exists, for example, a sale or donation, but rather it demands a "just (justa)" cause (causa), a term that must be understood as a synonym of licit, that is, not contrary to law or good customs. For this qualification, the conduct of each of the parties is considered. In other words, according to said numeral, the purpose of the parties must be taken into account, as something that gives nuance to the cause (causa); thus, the validity and effectiveness of the transaction are made dependent on it. In that same line, article 1080 of the Civil Code, in the event of a deficit in area, in the case of the sale of real estate, confers on the buyer the possibility of demanding the resolution of the contract: "(...) if the property had been purchased for a determined purpose known to the seller, and the deficit made it unsuitable for that purpose." In light of the foregoing, it is not possible to affirm that the national Legal System follows a pure objective position, nor a subjective one either. It can be said that it follows a "dualist" position on the cause (causa), or rather, that it admits a double facet or projection of the figure. Its objective aspect offers no major problem; the Legal System recognizes that generic or immediate purpose, specific and uniform, the same for all contracts of the same nature, from the outset, authorizing the choice of the type, nominate or innominate. In its subjective aspect, it is different, dealing with the individual, concrete motives of the contracting parties in each contract executed, variable from one agreement to another and even within each of the intervening parties. In the opinion of this Chamber, the analysis of justice will only be appropriate in those cases where the purposes pursued by the parties upon binding themselves interest the legal system, that is, when it authorizes their examination. Such is the case when the purposes of the parties are contrary to law, morality, or good customs (article 627, subsection 3) and the hypothesis of the aforementioned article 1080. In this way, any other subjective motive of the contracting parties should be considered as mere intimate motivations, ungraspable and indifferent in the life of the Law. Except, of course, when it has been objectified, by being integrated into the contractual declaration of will as an impulsive or determining cause (causa), whereby that "accidental element" becomes essential. In summary: the simple agreement of wills that generates consent is the origin of the contract; the particular motive or purpose lacks influence on the validity of the institute, with the exception of the aforementioned cases. However, when that motive or purpose is "essential" for the parties and they expressly incorporate it into the contract, in this case, the legal transaction is executed and acquires validity under a "condition". In that form, and only in that way, is the analysis of the justice of the impulsive motive (causa-motivo (causa-motivo)) appropriate. What has been explained so far leads to the conclusion that it is not feasible to admit in Costa Rican law the application of the "theory of frustration of purpose (teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)". For greater abundance of reasons, even in the hypothesis that it were possible, in this species the presuppositions for its application are not met. The supervening event was not unpredictable; the authorization to "apply" the acquisition of shares to eventual rental payments by Nombre10502, because it depended on a "third party", on the Commission and the tax authorities, made it absolutely predictable that there might be some objection to it. Nor, as will be seen, did any evidence exist indicating that the purpose sought by the acquirer of the shares was known, accepted by the debtor of the performance, and determined in the content of the contract. Having overcome the previous discussion, in order to resolve the merits of the matter raised, reference must necessarily be made to the origin of Law no. 6990. In developing countries with a market economy like Costa Rica, it is common for the State to implement policies aimed at stimulating the creation and development of companies through the granting of direct incentives (tax reductions or exemptions, known as tax shields, credit advantages, subsidies, etc.). This is a form of economic interventionism, through which an activity is promoted so that it orients itself toward the achievement of public objectives considered fundamental for the growth of production and the reactivation of the productive apparatus. Within this scheme lies Law no. 6990, which declared the tourism industry of public utility and seeks to achieve an accelerated and rational process of development of that activity. It established a favorable fiscal regime for the realization of important tourism programs and projects. In its original version (the incentive regime was partially reformed and partially repealed by Law no. 7293 of April 3, 1992, "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatoria y Excepciones"), which is the one relevant to this case, these incentives were granted in two directions. Thus, article 7 established a series of benefits in favor of those individuals and legal entities that developed any of the activities indicated by the legislator in article 3 of that same law. On the other hand, numeral 11 established other stimuli whose beneficiaries were no longer those indicated individuals and legal entities, but a third party linked or not to the tourism sector, who invested in the field: "Article 11.- Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities listed in article 3 of this law shall be deductible from Income Tax, subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission. When said investment is carried out through already constituted companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of corporations domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be placed in trust in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange, for a period of not less than two years, without the possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded by the tourism regulatory commission in each case, according to the type of investment, must be met. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income for the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted under this concept" (highlighting is not from the original). In the first case, the company interested in benefiting from the regime had to obtain from the Commission the classification of its activity as touristic. This step only signified a recognition of the company as a possible recipient of the corresponding incentives, which materialized once that same instance gave its approval to a specific project submitted for its consideration for such purposes. Once the approval was granted, a document called a "tourism contract (contrato turístico)" was signed, which in reality was far from being a true contract, as it did not constitute the primary source of rights and obligations between the contracting parties, but rather a concretion of the benefits provided in Law no. 6990 for a specific tourism company regarding a specific project. That is, it was more of a unilateral act of the Administration, i.e., ICT, which determined that the project submitted for consideration met the conditions legally established for the application of the incentive regime (act-condition). This is so, because the agreed advantages are of a tax nature, per se discriminatory, which are regulated by law and, therefore, cannot validly constitute the object of a contract. It was, then, an objective legal situation, whose origin was exclusively normative. What the ICT did was to determine who could be recipients of the exceptional fiscal regime, for meeting the legally defined conditions. However, that act by itself was not sufficient to presuppose the right to the specific exoneration, because it ultimately fell to the Tax Administration, upon formal request, after examining the petition, to determine if the circumstances concurred for the exemption to operate. It must be remembered that tax incentives are agreed upon by the Administration, certainly within the framework of a legislative authorization but using the approval technique. In the case of third parties investing in tourism projects, according to the cited numeral 11, to opt for the tax incentives they had to previously fulfill two requirements: 1) acquire shares of companies domiciled in the country that had a signed tourism contract (contrato turístico); and 2) deliver the shares in trust to a State bank or the National Stock Exchange for a period of not less than two years. After doing the above, they had to request from the Commission the "authorization" of the investment made in order to carry out the income tax exemption procedure before the Tax Administration.

XIII.- Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield provided in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In Act No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction entered into between the parties was recorded: "ARTICLE ONE: It is agreed to increase the company's capital stock in the sum of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at the exchange rate of today of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty cents per dollar, represents the sum of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand nominative and preferred shares called 'Preferred Series A' with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal entity identification number CED4760, which it pays through a sight bill of exchange deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on the eighteenth day of January, nineteen ninety-nine, and drawn with maturity at sight, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, which its representative accepts in a definitive and irrevocable manner." As can be seen, it was a pure and simple share subscription without a clause conditioning its effectiveness. There is also no other document that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper, made this known: "Thirty-fifth: Did you ask any official of Nombre11387 to draft any written contract, representative of the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed was the share purchase document, which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, under article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-Sixth: Why, before doing the transaction, did you not request the drafting of a written contract? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements for developing a tourism investment, so it was not necessary to draft a contract before the first stage." It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as witness Nombre8327, who until 1998 worked for said company as financial manager and had among his functions the execution of the company's tourism investments, declared: "In some cases, practically in all cases, a private contract was signed between the tourism company and Nombre10502 Company... While I was financial manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment for the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502 at the time the investment was signed did not pay everything in cash, so there remained the obligation of how what was still owed would be paid." - The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or designation of the private contract.- As for the form of payment for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay income tax to the treasury, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism companies.- Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and set the guideline for how it would pay.- Nombre10502 DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT" (The capitalization and boldface are not from the original). From the foregoing statement, three extremely important aspects are extracted: first, although on other occasions, when acquiring shares in tourism companies, Nombre10502 signed additional contracts beyond the share subscription contracts, the purpose of these was solely to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case, none was signed; and third, most importantly, the defendant "DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT." That is, Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not guarantee obtaining the tax benefit, since, as already stated, Article 11 of Ley 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from income tax "upon prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission," did not subject the effectiveness of the contract to the actual obtaining of the tax shield. In the Trust Agreement (Contrato de Fideicomiso) entered into between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by Article 11 of Ley No. 6990, it was stipulated: "The Trustee does not in any way guarantee that the Trustor will meet the requirements or be entitled to the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law (Ley de Incentivos Turísticos), its amendments, and the Regulations of said Law, which this trust pursues." Nombre10502 did not enshrine in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly led it to subscribe for shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for contracting to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it by alleging failure to achieve the expected economic benefit. This was not the first time it made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and of the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration. If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement on its interests, it should have stated so. Nombre11387 not only had a tourism contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Ley 6990 by acquiring shares in said company, but it also possessed firm agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourism contract to carry out the planned works and authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing disproves any breach or bad faith that might have been attributed to Nombre11387. It is also important to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the rejection of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387 by the Commission. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it preferred not to exercise its rights and to fall into default in the payment of the outstanding balance. Therefore, it cannot be said in this case that there is an "unjust" or "unlawful" cause that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor any abuse of right by the plaintiff. On the contrary, if the latter existed, it would rather be on the part of the defendant, who, aware of its breach of contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and therefore enforceable according to its terms. This being so, the Court undoubtedly incurred in the violations of the articles cited in the remedy, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application. The suggested "Theory of Frustration of the Purpose of the Contract (Teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)," as already explained, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be supported by a benevolent interpretation of the articles pointed out by the Court." **XII.-** The plaintiff, as expressed in its appeal, agrees "with the (sic) good part of the line of thought outlined in the judgment of the Superior Court Second Civil Division, Section Two, ... in particular because it rejects the grievances of Nombre10502 and makes an effort to offer a clear picture of the legal transaction agreed upon between Nombre11387 and Nombre10502. But it will contest the grounds of the judgment derived from Considerandos XV to XVII, and some parts of what is stated in Considerandos IX to XIV." In summary: the simple meeting of the minds that generates consent is the origin of the contract; the particular motive or purpose has no influence on the validity of the institution, with the exception of the aforementioned cases. However, when that motive or purpose is "essential" for the parties and they expressly incorporate it into the contract, in this case, the legal transaction is concluded and acquires validity under a "condition." In that manner and only thus is the analysis of the fairness of the impulsive motive (underlying motive, causa-motivo) possible. What has been set forth thus far leads to the conclusion that it is not feasible to admit, in Costa Rican Law, the application of the "theory of frustration of purpose of the contract." For additional reasons, even under the hypothesis that it were applicable, in the specific case the prerequisites for its application are not met. The supervening event was not unforeseeable; the authorization to "apply" the acquisition of shares to eventual rent payments by Nombre10502, because it depended on a "third party," on the Commission and on the tax authorities, made it absolutely foreseeable that there could be some objection to it. Nor, as will be seen, was there any evidence indicating that the purpose sought by the acquirer of the shares had been known and accepted by the obligor of the performance and established in the content of the contract.

Having overcome the preceding discussion, in order to resolve the merits of the matter raised, reference must necessarily be made to the origin of Law No. 6990. In developing countries with a market economy like Costa Rica, it is common for the State to implement policies aimed at stimulating the creation and development of companies through the granting of direct incentives (tax reductions or exemptions, known as tax shields, credit advantages, subsidies, etc.). This is a form of economic interventionism, through which an activity is promoted so that it is oriented toward the achievement of public objectives considered fundamental for the growth of production and the reactivation of the productive apparatus. Law No. 6990 is situated within this framework, which declared the tourism industry to be of public utility and seeks to achieve an accelerated and rational process of development of that activity. It established a favorable tax regime for the execution of important tourism programs and projects. In its original version (the incentive regime was partially reformed and partially repealed by Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatoria y Excepciones"), which is the one relevant to the case, these incentives were granted in two directions. Thus, Article 7 established a series of benefits in favor of those natural and legal persons who developed any of the activities indicated by the legislator in Article 3 of that same law. On the other hand, Section 11 established other incentives whose beneficiaries were no longer those natural and legal persons indicated, but rather a third party, linked or not to the tourism sector, who invested in the branch: "*Article 11.- Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities among those indicated in Article 3 of this law shall be deductible from the Income Tax, **subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission**. When said investment is carried out through already established companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be held in a fideicomiso (trust) in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange, for a period of no less than two years, without the possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulatory commission must be met, according to the type of investment. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income for the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted under this concept*" (the highlighting is not from the original). In the first case, the company interested in benefiting from the regime had to obtain from the Commission the qualification of its activity as touristic. This step merely signified a recognition of the company as a potential recipient of the corresponding incentives, which materialized once that same body gave its approval to a specific project submitted for its consideration for such purposes. Once the approval was granted, a document called a "*tourism contract*" was signed, which in reality was far from being a true contract, since it did not constitute the primary source of rights and obligations between the contracting parties, but rather a concretization of the benefits provided for in Law No. 6990 in a specific tourism company regarding a specific project. That is, it was rather a unilateral act of the Administration, read ICT, which determined that the project submitted for consideration met the conditions legally established for the application of the incentive regime (act-condition). The foregoing is so, because the agreed advantages are of a tax nature, per se discriminatory, which are regulated by law and, therefore, cannot validly constitute the object of a contract. It was, then, an objective legal situation, whose origin was exclusively normative. What the ICT did was to determine who could be recipients of the exceptional tax regime, for meeting the legally defined conditions. However, that act by itself was not sufficient to presuppose the right to the specific exoneration, because it was ultimately the responsibility of the Tax Administration, upon formal application, which after examining the petition, determined whether the circumstances existed for the exemption to operate. One must remember that tax incentives are granted by the Administration, certainly within the framework of legislative authorization but using the technique of approval. In the case of third parties who invested in tourism projects, according to the cited Section 11, to opt for the tax incentives they had to previously fulfill two requirements: 1) acquire shares of companies domiciled in the country that had a signed tourism contract and; 2) deliver the shares in a fideicomiso (trust) to a State bank or to the National Stock Exchange for a period of no less than two years. After completing the above, they had to request from the Commission the "**authorization**" of the investment made for the purpose of carrying out the income tax exoneration procedure before the Tax Administration.

**XIII.-** Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield contemplated in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In Minute No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction concluded between the parties was recorded: "***ARTICLE ONE:** It is agreed to increase the corporate capital of the company in the amount of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at today's exchange rate of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty cents per dollar, represent the sum of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand nominative and preferred shares called "Preferred Series A" with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by **Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima,** a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal identification number CED4760, which pays for them by means of a sight draft that is deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on the eighteenth day of January of nineteen ninety-nine and drawn with maturity at sight, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, for which it is accepted by its representative in a definitive and irrevocable manner*". As can be observed, it was a pure and simple share subscription without any clause conditioning its effectiveness. Nor does any other document exist that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. This was observed by Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper: "*Thirty-fifth: did (sic) you ask any official of Nombre11387 to draft any written contract representing the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed (sic) was the one for the purchase of shares, which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, covered under Article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-sixth: Why did you not request the execution of a written contract before doing the transaction? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements for developing a tourism investment, therefore, the preparation of a contract before the first stage was not necessary*". It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as witness Nombre8327, who worked for said company as financial manager until 1998 and whose duties included carrying out the company's tourism investments, declared: "*In some cases, practically in all cases, a private contract was signed between the tourism company and Nombre10502 Company ... While I was Financial Manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment for the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502, at the time the investment signing took place, did not pay everything in cash, so the obligation remained as to how what was owed would be paid. - The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or denomination of the private contract.- Regarding the method of payment for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay the income tax to the tax authority, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism companies.- Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and gave the guideline on how it was going to pay.- Nombre10502 **DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT***" (The capitalization and bold print are not from the original). From the previous statement, three aspects of utmost importance are extracted: first, although on other occasions Nombre10502, when acquiring shares of tourism companies, signed contracts additional to those of share subscription, the object of these was only to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case, none was signed and; third, and most importantly to highlight, that the defendant "**DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT**". That is, Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not assure the obtention of the tax benefit, since, as already stated, Article 11 of Law 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from the income tax "**subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission**", did not subject the effectiveness of the contract to the effective obtention of the tax shield. In the Fideicomiso Contract concluded between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by Article 11 of Law No. 6990, it was stipulated: "*The Fiduciary does not guarantee in any way that the Trustor will meet the requirements or that it will be worthy of the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law, its reforms, and the Regulations of said Law, which this trust pursues*". Nombre10502 did not embody in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly determined it to subscribe for shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for contracting to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it, alleging it did not achieve the expected economic benefit. It was not the first time it had made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration. If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement to its interests, it should have stated it. Nombre11387 had not only a tourism contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Law 6990 by acquiring shares of said company, but it also possessed firm agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourism contract to carry out the projected works and that authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing disproves any breach or bad faith that might be attributed to Nombre11387.

It is also important to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the rejection by the Commission of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it chose not to exercise its rights and to fall into default in the payment of the balance owed. Therefore, in this specific case, it cannot be said that there exists an "unjust" or "illicit" underlying motive that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor an abuse of right by the plaintiff. On the contrary, if such abuse of right existed, it would rather be on the part of the defendant, who, aware of the breach of its contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and, therefore, enforceable according to its terms. Thus, as things stand, the Court undoubtedly incurred violations of the articles cited in the appeal, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application. The suggested "*Theory of frustration of purpose of the contract*", as already stated, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be sustained based on a benevolent interpretation of the articles indicated by the Court." In summary, in the words of the cassation appellants themselves: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The problem is that the Second Civil Court, Second Section, of San José, without it ever having been raised by the parties, formulates the theory of frustration of purpose of the contract, based on a couple of works without any significance in modern civil law, unknown and old, which even they themselves indicate their application only for Anglo-Saxon law, and issues the challenged judgment basing that theory on articles 11, 21, 22, 1023 of the Civil Code; in its theoretical attempt it links the aforementioned figure with the theory of abuse of rights, but for the specific case with the abuse of contractual rights, giving an erroneous meaning to the judgment of the First Chamber No. 106 of 1992. The crux of the matter is that the Court in its judgment confuses fundamental concepts such as the purpose or motive of the contract (which is subjective, internal, psychological) with the cause (which is objective and corresponds to each legal transaction), and from there adopts an English theory that has not been successful in an environment inspired by Roman law and civil codification</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">". It is clear, then, that the plaintiff agrees with the legal characterization given by the Court to the business relationship that operated between her and Nombre10502, that is, that it was a </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">share subscription contract (contrato de suscripción de acciones)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, based on an agreed capital increase. What she attacks, at this point, is the interpretation that the ad quem makes of it, in light of its essential elements, as well as the application to the specific case of rules specific to civil matters, despite the fact that the legal transaction in question is of a purely commercial, corporate, and autonomous nature. The rules on commercial contracts constitute a relevant part of Commercial Law, whose traditional core has been formed by the Law of Obligations. The Commerce Code deals with contracts in a fragmentary manner. In the first place, because there are many of them that lack regulation, such as the so-called atypical ones. Secondly, because the regulation of those it does discipline is incomplete, in many cases it only dictates special rules that modify the precepts of the Civil Code. So much so, that article 416 of the Commerce Code provides: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The provisions of civil law referring to the capacity of the contracting parties, to the exceptions, and to the causes that rescind or invalidate contracts, by reason of capacity, shall be applicable to commercial acts and contracts, with the modifications and restrictions of this Code</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">".</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> However, one must go further and say that it is not only in these cases that civil law is applicable, but in any matter of a commercial nature that does not have special regulation, because the Commerce Code authorizes it: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">When there does not exist in this Code, nor in other commercial laws, a concrete provision governing a specific matter or case, the provisions of the Civil Code, the uses and customs, and the general principles of law shall be applied, in order and as pertinent...</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (article 2). The share subscription contract (contrato de suscripción de acciones), there is not the slightest doubt, is a commercial agreement; however, lacking its own regulation in the Commerce Code and the chapter of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">general provisions</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" of the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">obligations and contracts</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" thereof being insufficient in relation to the topics under examination, remission to the provisions of Civil Law is mandatory. From numerals 627 and 1007 of the Civil Code arise the validity requirements of the legal transaction, namely: capacity, object, cause, consent of the parties, and formalities. The nature and conceptualization given to the cause element will set the standard for the resolution of the present litis. The issue of the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">theory of frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" is intimately linked to the point. The cause (causa) of contracts is one of the topics that has generated the most discussion in Private Law; however, its problematic is one of Positive Law and the solution is conditioned by the specific character of each system. Many theories have been elaborated on it; but, setting aside secondary variants, all are linked to one of two directions called objectivist and subjectivist. The first, followed by Italian legal literature, equates the cause with the socio-economic function of the legal transaction, leaving aside the will and motivations of the parties' actions. Different socio-economic functions are thus distinguished: transfer of ownership, whose most representative example is the purchase-sale contract; credit, as occurs with onerous loans; guarantee, through contractual types that provide security regarding the fulfillment of another contract (e.g., surety contract); and others such as custody, cooperation, provision, recreation, etc. The second, originating in French jurisprudence and doctrine, assimilates the notion of cause with the purpose pursued by the parties, that is, the determining reason or motive of the contract, the cause thus appearing as subjective, concrete, and variable in each legal transaction, even in those of the same species. Subjective, because it is linked to the purpose guiding the contracting parties. Concrete, since it attends to each transaction in particular. Variable, given that trying to appreciate the motive that has driven the parties will be different in each contract.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Specialized doctrine agrees that "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" is a chapter inherent to the cause; understood as the determining motive, reason for being, or individual or subjective purpose that the parties had in view at the formative moment of the transaction. That is, the theory built on said concept has as its starting point the subjectivist thesis. Its origin is recognized in English Law. The first outline of the proposal dates back to the 19th century, case "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", judgment of 1863. The defendant had rented a theater for four nights for the purpose of giving concerts. Before the first night, a fortuitous fire destroyed the premises. The plaintiff claimed payment of damages according to the jurisprudential precedents that established a system of strict liability against what was agreed.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Judge Nombre11390 rejected the claim, arguing for this that the contracting parties should have known since the conclusion of the agreement that its fulfillment depended on the existence of the thing object of the contract and that, if it perished without fault of the lessee, there was no liability. In his view, the agreement should be considered subject to the implied condition according to which the parties would be released if, at the time of performance, the performance became impossible without anyone's fault. Therefore, he resolved that the lessee should not pay the price, nor the lessor grant the use of the thing. This principle was applied in other matters such as "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Nombre11396</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> vs. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.". However, the cases most frequently cited and that gave greater dissemination to the theory are from the beginning of the 20th century, known as the coronation cases. With them, the doctrine took shape and consolidated. They are called this because they arose on the occasion of the celebrations to be held on June 28 and 29, 1902, for the coronation of Nombre11397, son of Queen Nombre11398, an event that generated great enthusiasm, especially due to the length of the latter's reign, which determined a special desire to observe a spectacle that had not occurred for a long time. The king fell ill and his coronation parade was suspended. Such contingency gave rise to claims by those who had paid to see the parade from some buildings along the route the procession was to take. The most remembered precedent is "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". The defendant had rented a property with a balcony to witness the parade. The price was agreed at 75 pounds, 25 payable in advance and 50 on the day of the parade. The lessor claimed payment of the remaining 50 pounds and the lessee the return of the 25 already paid.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Although this purpose had not been mentioned in the contract, it was considered, according to the conditions and prior advertisements, which expressly offered the rental to see the parade during the days thereof, that this had been considered by the contracting parties as the foundation or basis of the contract. Understood thus, the Court declared that, upon frustration of the purpose, without it being reasonably assumable that the contracting parties, upon perfecting the contract, would have contemplated the possibility that the parade would not take place, the tenant should not pay the balance of the rent. During the First and Second World Wars (1914-1917 and 1939 and 1945), numerous cases of frustration of contracts due to impossibility of performance were raised. The decisions of the German courts took into account, to pronounce in favor or against the configuration of the cause, whether the particular circumstances of the case justified or not the thesis of the denaturalization of the obligations contracted by the parties. Based on these jurisprudential precedents and some doctrinal elaborations of German Law such as the theory of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">presupposition (presuposición)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" by Nombre11400 and the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">bases of the legal transaction (bases del negocio jurídico)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" by Nombre11401, among others, the current profile of the figure of "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" has been outlined. In Spain, the theory was first set forth by Vicente Espert Sanz in his work "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">La frustración del fin del contrato</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">", in 1968, followed by authors such as De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> De Ángel Yáguez, and Zorrilla Ruiz; however, it has not been adopted by the legislation and jurisprudence of that country, although it has made mention of the term "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">frustration of purpose of the contract</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" on various occasions, it has not been in the strict technical sense that the doctrine has given to the figure. In Latin America, only in the Argentine system is there a doctrinal development around the topic. Authors of the stature of Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi, and Atilio Aterini, among others, defend the thesis; however, despite several attempts to incorporate the figure into civil legislation, to date there is no specific norm that determines the elements and effects of the institution. In the jurisprudence of Argentine courts, the cases in which reference has been made to the theory are scarce. Strictly speaking, "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(...), frustration of purpose of the contract is the factual scenario in which the utility that one of the performances was to provide disappears, in an absolutely unforeseeable manner, according to its nature or the unequivocal agreement of the parties (content of the contract)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">La frustración del fin del contrato</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, 1st edition, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, p. 93). It takes place then, "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(...) when in a bilateral contract, of deferred or continued performance, the relevant purpose -reason for being- and known by the parties cannot be achieved -is frustrated- for supervening reasons alien -external- to their will and without fault intervening</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volume I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, p. 225).</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> As prerequisites for its possible application, the following are indicated: a) A validly concluded contract, thereby distinguishing it from defects that lead to nullity; b) That it is a bilateral contract, which also implies onerosity; c) It is necessary that the contract has extension in time, deferred performance, successive dealings, or continued performance, that is, that it is not of instantaneous fulfillment, since the alteration of the purpose must appear in the performance stage; the performance whose utility was frustrated must be pending, it is necessary that said performance is not fully executed; d) The event causing the frustration must, then, be supervening, involving circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the contract; arising from events outside the field of foresight; alien to the will of the parties, there being no fault; e) Contractual performance is still feasible, the event does not cause its total and definitive impossibility; f) The cessation of the utility or result of the performance expected by the obligee thereof, initially considered as the reason or motive for contracting.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> A very important aspect of the figure, especially for the purposes of the case under examination, is the contractual externalization of the motive that drove one to agree. It is not enough that the obligee of the performance informed the obligor of the purpose it had planned with it, "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">...it is necessary that there be an agreement of the parties, express or tacit, but always unequivocal, regarding the specific utility expected by one of them. It is essential that the counterparty has adopted such ulterior purpose as its own; that both parties have taken it into account to determine the contractual content, because it influenced the performance or the amount of the counter-performance. Only thus can it be affirmed that the specific purpose properly integrates the content of the transaction</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (Gianfelici, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">op.cit.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, p. 82). On the other hand, it is also of interest to delve deeper into the prerequisite of foreseeability. It is said that not any change in circumstances, which affects the achievement of the purpose the obligee of the performance proposed, affects the effectiveness of the contract, but only those alterations absolutely unforeseeable at the time of contracting. Changes that are objectively foreseeable must be borne by the party suffering them, since by virtue of the principle of private self-responsibility, the contracting parties have the duty to foresee variations in circumstances that could prejudice them, and if they did not do so, even due to excusable error, it is something attributable to them. It remains to be said that doctrine distinguishes the "theory of frustration of contract" from unforeseeability (imprevisión), from impossibility of performance, fortuitous event, from force majeure (fuerza mayor), from error, and from the resolutory clause, by reason of it being an autonomous institute that affects the survival of the contract for having been left without cause. From this, the consequence of frustration is extracted, which is not invalidity, which implies nullity, but the supervening ineffectiveness of the contract, a prerequisite for the resolutory action. The theory under study has not been exempt from criticism. It is objected, in the first place, that it is a notion still in formation, without a defined and specific profile, a product of a mixture of ideas and doctrines from a legal system, like the English, very different from the Roman-based one. Likewise, it is said that it shares the imprecisions of another legal concept, the cause, with which it is intimately related. It is also reproached for putting legal certainty at very serious risk, by providing an easy pretext to escape from pacta sunt servanda, from the faithful fulfillment of the pledged word. It is pointed out, moreover, that it seeks to load onto the shoulders of the counterparty or to distribute the risk inherent in any business, such as that it may not turn out well, that it may fail.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In that same sense, it is criticized for becoming a reward for the negligent, careless, improvident contractor and for belatedly bringing up issues not aired in the negotiation, personal issues, belonging to one of the parties, normally unimportant regarding the contract's effectiveness. Finally, it is argued that under the pretext of equity, a freely concluded agreement is violated and one enters into a readjustment of effects, an adaptation or distribution of consequences, which has little to do with what was intended by the parties.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Now then, the question to answer is: Which theory on cause does the Costa Rican Civil Code follow? This, in order to assess the possibility of applying the theory in question.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The aforementioned article 627 requires the existence of a "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">just cause (causa justa)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" in obligations. That is, for there to be a contract, the requirement of a cause must concur; but for its validity it is not enough that an objective or typified one exists, for example, being a sale or donation, but rather it demands a "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">just</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" cause, a word that must be understood as synonymous with licit, that is, not contrary to law or good customs. For this qualification, attention is paid to the conduct of each of the parties. In other words, according to said numeral, the purpose of the parties must be taken into account, as something that nuances the cause; thereby making the validity and effectiveness of the transaction depend upon him/it. Along the same lines, article 1080 of the Civil Code, in the face of a deficit in area in the sale of real estate, confers on the buyer the possibility of claiming the resolution of the contract: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(...) if the real estate had been bought for a specific purpose known to the seller, and the deficit made it unsuitable for that purpose</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">".</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> In light of the foregoing, it is not possible to affirm that the national Legal System follows a pure objective position, but neither a subjective one. It can be said that it follows a "dualist" position of the cause, or rather, that it admits a double facet or projection of the figure. Its objective aspect offers no major problem; the Legal System recognizes that generic or immediate purpose, characteristic and uniform, the same for all contracts of the same nature, from the outset, authorizing the choice of the type, nominate or innominate. In its subjective aspect, it is different, dealing with the individual, concrete motives of the contracting parties in each concluded contract, variable from one agreement to another and even for each of the intervening parties. In the opinion of this Chamber, the analysis of justness shall only be possible in those cases where the ends pursued by the parties upon binding themselves are of interest to the legal system, that is, when it authorizes their examination. Such is the case when the purposes of the parties are contrary to the law, morality, or good customs (article 627, subsection 3) and the hypothesis of article 1080 mentioned above. In this way, any other subjective motive of the contracting parties must be considered as simple intimate motivations, ungraspable and indifferent in the life of the Law. Except, of course, when it has been objectified, by being integrated into the declaration of contractual will as an impulsive or determining cause, whereby that "accidental element" would become essential. Summarizing: the simple agreement of wills that generates consent is the origin of the contract; the particular motive or purpose lacks influence for the validity of the institute, with the exception of the aforementioned cases. However, when that motive or purpose is "essential" for the parties and they expressly incorporate it into the contract, in this case, the legal transaction is concluded and acquires validity under a "condition". In that form and only thus is the analysis of the justness of the impulsive motive (causa-motive) possible. What has been set forth up to here leads to the conclusion that it is not feasible to admit the application of the "theory of frustration of purpose of the contract" in Costa Rican Law. For further abundance of reasons, even in the hypothesis that it were possible, in the present case the prerequisites for its application are not met. The supervening event was not unpredictable; the authorization to "apply" the acquisition of shares to eventual income tax payments by Nombre10502, since it depended on a "third party", on the Commission and the tax authorities, made it absolutely predictable that there could be some objection to it. Nor, as will be seen, was there any proof indicating that the purpose sought by the acquirer of the shares was known, accepted by the obligor of the performance, and determined in the content of the contract. Having overcome the foregoing discussion, in order to resolve the merits of the matter raised, reference must necessarily be made to the origin of Law No. 6990. In developing countries with a market economy like Costa Rica, it is common for the State to instrument policies aimed at stimulating the creation and development of companies through the granting of direct incentives (tax reductions or exemptions, known as tax shields, credit advantages, subsidies, etc.). It is a form of economic interventionism, by means of which an activity is promoted so that it is oriented towards the achievement of public objectives considered fundamental for the growth of production and the reactivation of the productive apparatus. Within this scheme is located Law No. 6990, which declared the tourism industry to be of public utility and seeks to achieve an accelerated and rational process of development of that activity. It established a favorable tax regime for the realization of important tourism programs and projects. In its original version (the incentive regime was partially reformed and partially repealed by Law No. 7293 of April 3, 1992, "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatoria y Excepciones"), which is the one relevant to the case, these incentives were granted in two directions. Thus, article 7 established a series of benefits in favor of those natural and legal persons who developed any of the activities indicated by the legislator in article 3 of that same law. On the other hand, numeral 11 instituted other stimuli whose beneficiaries were no longer those indicated natural and legal persons, but a third party, linked or not to the tourism sector, who invested in the field: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Article 11.- Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities of those indicated in article 3 of this law shall be deductible from Income Tax, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">with prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. When said investment is carried out through already constituted companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be placed in trust in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange, for a term of no less than two years, with no possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulatory commission must be met, according to the type of investment.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Notwithstanding, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income of the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted for this concept</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">" (emphasis is not from the original). In the first case, the company interested in benefiting from the regime had to obtain from the Commission the qualification of its activity as tourism-related. This step only signified a recognition of the company as a possible recipient of the corresponding incentives, which were materialized once that same body gave its approval to a specific project submitted for its consideration for such purposes.

Upon approval being granted, a document called a “tourist contract (contrato turístico)” was signed, which in reality was far from being a true contract, as it did not constitute the primary source of rights and obligations between the contracting parties, but rather a concretization of the benefits provided for in Law No. 6990 in a specific tourism enterprise with respect to a specific project. In other words, it was more an unilateral act of the Administration, that is, the ICT, which determined that the project submitted for consideration met the conditions legally established for the application of the incentive regime (act-condición). The foregoing is so because the advantages agreed upon are of a tax nature, per se discriminatory, which are governed by law and, therefore, cannot validly constitute the object of a contract. It involved, then, an objective legal situation whose origin was exclusively normative. What the ICT did was determine who could be recipients of the exceptional tax regime, by fulfilling the legally defined conditions. However, that act by itself was not sufficient to presuppose the right to a specific exemption, as it ultimately fell to the Tax Administration, upon formal request, which after examining the petition, determined whether the circumstances existed for the exemption to operate. It must be remembered that tax incentives are granted by the Administration, certainly within the framework of legislative authorization but using the technique of approval. In the case of third parties investing in tourism projects, according to the aforementioned clause 11, to opt for the tax incentives they had to first fulfill two requirements: 1) acquire shares of companies domiciled in the country that had a signed tourist contract; and 2) deliver the shares in trust (fideicomiso) to a state bank or the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) for a term of no less than two years. After completing the above, they had to request from the Commission the “authorization (autorización)” of the investment made for the purposes of carrying out the income tax exemption process before the Tax Administration.

**XIII.-** Nombre10502, with the intention of benefiting from the tax shield contemplated in Law 6990, acquired shares of Nombre11387. In minute No. 6 of the Session of the Board of Directors of the latter, dated January 18, 1999, the legal transaction entered into between the parties was recorded: "**ARTICLE ONE:** It is agreed to increase the company's capital stock in the amount of nine million three hundred seventy-six thousand eight hundred thirty-two dollars and eighty-four cents, which at today's exchange rate of two hundred seventy-two colones and eighty céntimos per dollar, represents the amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, which is represented by two million five hundred fifty-eight thousand registered preferred shares called "Preferred Series A" with a nominal value of one thousand colones each, which are subscribed by **Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima,** a company domiciled in San Antonio de Belén, legal identification number CED4760, which pays for them by means of a sight bill of exchange deemed as cash, identified with number CED4761, for an amount of two billion five hundred fifty-eight million colones, drawn and accepted by Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, on January eighteenth, nineteen ninety-nine and issued with sight maturity, to the order of Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, for which its representative accepts in a definitive and irrevocable manner". As can be seen, it was a pure and simple share subscription without any clause conditioning its effectiveness. Nor is there any other document that must be understood as incorporated into that contract. This was pointed out by Mr. Ernesto Góchez Staben, in his capacity as representative of the defendant Nombre10502 Paper: "Thirty-fifth: Did you ask any Nombre11387 official to draft any written contract representing the transaction being made? Admitted. NO, the document that was developed was the one for the purchase of shares which is the first step or requirement of a tourism investment, covered by article 11 of Law 6990... Thirty-sixth: Why, before doing the transaction, did you not request the creation of a written contract? Admitted. Law 6990 regulates and controls the requirements to develop a tourism investment, therefore the preparation of a contract before the first stage was not necessary". It was not that Nombre10502 did not customarily do so, as the witness Nombre8327, who until 1998 worked for said company as financial manager and whose duties included carrying out the company’s tourism investments, declared: "In some cases, practically in all cases a private contract was signed between the tourism enterprise and Nombre10502 Company ... While I was Financial Manager, the tourism investments were always recorded in Accounting and the payment of the share subscription was always recorded; normally Nombre10502, at the time the investment signing took place, did not pay everything in cash so there remained an obligation detailing how whatever was left owing would be paid. - The contract that was signed was different from the share subscription contract. - I do not remember the name or denomination of the private contract. - Regarding the payment form for the share subscription, Nombre10502 normally paid as it had to pay income tax to the treasury, so on those dates when it had to pay the tax, it paid the tourism enterprises. - Nombre10502 did not impose, but it did negotiate and set the guideline for how it was going to pay. - Nombre10502 **DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT**" (The capitalization and bold text are not from the original). From the foregoing statement, three extremely important aspects are drawn: first, although on other occasions Nombre10502, when acquiring shares of tourism enterprises, signed additional contracts to the share subscription ones, the purpose of these was solely to regulate the payment of the balance; second, in this case none was signed; and third, most importantly to highlight, that the defendant "**DID NOT CONDITION THE PAYMENT OF THE SHARE SUBSCRIPTION ON A SUBSEQUENT EVENT**". That is, that Nombre10502, despite knowing that the share subscription did not assure it the obtaining of the tax benefit, since as already stated, article 11 of Law 6990 established that the amount invested in tourism activities would be deductible from income tax "**upon prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission**", did not subject the contract's effectiveness to the actual obtaining of the tax shield. In the Trust Agreement (Contrato de Fideicomiso) entered into between the defendant and the Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., in fulfillment of the other requirement established by article 11 of Law No. 6990, it was stipulated: "The Trustee does not in any way guarantee that the Trustor will fulfill the requirements or that it will be entitled to the benefits of the Tourism Incentives Law, its amendments and the Regulation of said Law, which this trust pursues". Nombre10502 did not enshrine in the legal transaction the purposes that particularly led it to subscribe to shares of Nombre11387. It did not elevate its motives for agreeing to an "essential element" of the contract. It did not condition its effectiveness on the actual granting of the tax benefit in its favor; consequently, it cannot now deny it by alleging not having achieved the expected economic benefit. It was not the first time it had made an investment of this nature, so it could not claim ignorance of the procedures and of the subordination of the tax incentive to the approval of the Commission and the Tax Administration. If it had wanted to condition the effectiveness of the agreement on its interests, it should have stated so.

Nombre11387 had not only a tourist contract that enabled Nombre10502 to benefit from the incentive regime created by Law 6990 by acquiring shares of said company, but also possessed final agreements from the Commission that approved the expansion of the tourist contract to carry out the planned works and that authorized the capital increase carried out and the public sale of shares resulting from the equity increase. The foregoing refutes any breach or bad faith that one may have sought to attribute to Nombre11387. It is also interesting to highlight the passive attitude of the defendant in the face of the Commission’s rejection of its request for approval of the purchase of two thousand five hundred fifty-eight shares of Nombre11387. Faced with the possibility of challenge, it preferred not to exercise its rights and to fall into default on the payment of the remaining balance owed. It cannot, then, in this case be said that there exists an "unjust" or "unlawful" cause that renders the contract in question ineffective, nor an abuse of rights by the plaintiff. On the contrary, if the latter exists, it would rather be by the defendant, who, aware of its breach of contractual obligations, has refused to honor its debts. The contract in question is valid and effective and therefore enforceable according to its terms. This being the case, the Tribunal undoubtedly incurred in the violation of the articles alluded to in the appeal, both those cited for improper application and for lack of application. The suggested "Theory of Frustration of the Purpose of the Contract (Teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato)", as already set forth, is not expressly provided for in the Costa Rican Legal System, nor can it be sustained by a benevolent interpretation of the articles indicated by the Tribunal."

“XII.- La actora, tal y como lo expresa en su recurso, concuerda "con la (sic) buena parte de la línea de pensamiento esbozada en la sentencia del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda, ... en particular porque rechaza los agravios de Nombre10502 y hace un esfuerzo por ofrecer un panorama claro del negocio jurídico concordado entre Nombre11387 y Nombre10502. Pero combatirá los fundamentos de la sentencia derivados de los Considerandos XV a XVII, y algunas partes de lo acotado en los considerandos IX a XIV". En resumen, en palabras de los propios casacionistas: "El problema es que el Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda, de San José, sin haber sido planteado nunca por las partes, formula la teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato, basada en un par de obras sin ninguna trascendencia en el derecho civil moderno, desconocidas y viejas, las cuales incluso ellas mismas señalan su aplicación solo para el derecho anglosajón, y dicta la sentencia que se impugna fundando esa teoría en los artículos 11, 21, 22, 1023 del Código Civil, en su intento teórico vincula la figura anterior con la teoría del abuso del derecho, pero para el caso concreto con el abuso del derecho contractual dándole un sentido equivocado a la sentencia de la Sala Primera Nº 106 de 1992. El meollo del asunto es que el Tribunal en su sentencia confunde conceptos fundamentales como el fin o motivo del contrato (el cual es subjetivo, interno, psicológico) con la causa (la cual es objetiva y corresponde a cada negocio jurídico), y de ahí adopta una teoría inglesa que no ha tenido éxito en el medio inspirado en el Derecho romano y la codificación civil". Queda claro, entonces, que la actora coincide con la calificación jurídica dada por el Tribunal a la relación negocial que operó entre ella y Nombre10502, es decir, que se trató de un contrato de suscripción de acciones, con base en un aumento de capital acordado. Lo que ataca, a la sazón, es la interpretación que de él hace el ad quem, a la luz de sus elementos esenciales, así como la aplicación al caso concreto de reglas propias de la materia civil, pese a que el negocio jurídico en cuestión, es de naturaleza netamente comercial, societario y autónomo. Las normas sobre contratos mercantiles constituyen parte relevante del Derecho Comercial, cuyo núcleo tradicional lo ha formado el Derecho de las obligaciones. El Código de Comercio se ocupa de los contratos de manera fragmentaria. En primer término, porque existen muchos de ellos que no gozan de regulación, como los llamados atípicos. En segundo lugar, porque la normativa de los que sí disciplina es incompleta, en muchos casos solamente dicta normas especiales que modifican los preceptos del Código Civil. Tanto es así, que el artículo 416 del Código de Comercio dispone: "Las disposiciones del derecho civil referentes a la capacidad de los contratantes a las excepciones y a las causas que rescinden o invalidan los contratos, por razón de capacidad, serán aplicables a los actos y contratos mercantiles, con las modificaciones y restricciones de este Código". Sin embargo, hay que ir más allá y decir que no solamente en estos casos es aplicable el derecho civil, sino en cualquier asunto de naturaleza mercantil que no goce de una normativa especial, porque el Código de Comercio lo autoriza: "Cuando no exista en este Código, ni en otras leyes mercantiles, disposición concreta que rija determinada materia o caso, se aplicarán, por su orden y en lo pertinente, las del Código Civil, los usos y costumbres y los principios generales del derecho..." (artículo 2º). El contrato de suscripción de acciones, no cabe la menor duda, es un convenio mercantil; sin embargo, al no contar con una regulación propia en el Código de Comercio y resultar insuficiente el capítulo de "disposiciones generales" de las "obligaciones y contratos" de éste, en relación a los temas objeto del subexámine, es obligada la remisión a las disposiciones del Derecho civil. De los numerales 627 y 1007 del Código Civil, nacen los requisitos de validez del negocio jurídico, a saber: capacidad, objeto, causa, consentimiento de las partes y formalidades. La naturaleza y conceptualización que se dé, al elemento causa, marcará la pauta para la solución de la presente litis. El tema de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato" está íntimamente ligado al punto. La causa de los contratos, es uno de los tópicos que más discusión ha generado en el Derecho privado, sin embargo, su problemática es de Derecho positivo y la solución está condicionada por el carácter propio de cada sistema. Sobre ella se han elaborado muchas teorías; pero, dejando de lado variantes secundarias, todas se vinculan a una de dos direcciones llamadas objetivista y subjetivista. La primera, seguida por la literatura jurídica italiana, iguala la causa con la función socio-económica del negocio jurídico, dejando de lado la voluntad y motivaciones de la actuación de las partes. Se distinguen así distintas funciones económico-sociales: de cambio de la titularidad, cuyo ejemplo más representativo es el contrato de compraventa; de crédito, como sucede con el préstamo oneroso; de garantía, mediante tipos contractuales que brindan seguridad respecto del cumplimiento de otro contrato (v.gr. contrato de fianza); y otras como la de custodia, cooperación, previsión, recreación, etc. La segunda, originada en la jurisprudencia y doctrina francesa, asimila la noción de causa con el fin perseguido por las partes, es decir la razón o motivo determinante del contrato, apareciendo, entonces, la causa como subjetiva, concreta y variable en cada negocio jurídico, aún en los de la misma especie. Subjetiva, porque se vincula con la finalidad que guía a los contratantes. Concreta, ya que atiende a cada negocio en particular. Variable, puesto que tratando de apreciar el móvil que ha impulsado a las partes será distinta en cada contrato. La doctrina especializada coincide en que la "frustración del fin del contrato" es un capitulo inherente a la causa; entendida esta como móvil determinante, razón de ser o fin individual o subjetivo que las partes han tenido en vista al momento formativo del negocio. Es decir, que la teoría construida sobre dicho concepto tiene como punto de partida la tesis subjetivista. Su origen se reconoce en el Derecho inglés. El primer esbozo de la propuesta se remonta al siglo XIX, caso "Nombre11388 vs. Nombre11389", sentencia de 1863. El demandado había arrendado por cuatro noches un teatro con el fin de dar conciertos. Antes de la primera noche, un incendio fortuito destruyó el local. El actor reclamaba el pago de daños y perjuicios conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales que establecían un sistema de responsabilidad a ultranza frente a lo pactado. El juez Nombre11390, rechazó la demanda argumentando para ello, que los contratantes debían saber desde la celebración del convenio, que su cumplimiento dependía de la existencia de la cosa objeto del contrato y que, si ésta perecía sin culpa del arrendatario, no había responsabilidad. En su criterio, el acuerdo debía considerarse sujeto a la condición implícita según la cual las partes quedarían liberadas si al tiempo de cumplimiento, la prestación resultare imposible sin culpa de nadie. Por ello, resolvió que el arrendatario no debía pagar el precio, ni el arrendador conceder el uso de la cosa. Este principio se aplicó en otros asuntos como el de "Nombre11391 vs. Nombre11392" (1867), "Nombre11393 vs. Holywell Railway Co." (1867), "Nombre11394 vs. Nombre11395" (1871), "Nombre11396 vs. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.". Sin embargo, los casos que más se suelen citar y que dieron mayor difusión a la teoría, son de comienzos del siglo XX, conocidos como los coronation cases. Con ellos la doctrina se perfiló y afianzó. Se les llama así porque se produjeron con ocasión de las celebraciones que se iban a realizar, el 28 y 29 de junio de 1902, para la coronación de Nombre11397, hijo de la reina Nombre11398, suceso que generó gran entusiasmo, sobre todo por lo largo del reinado de ésta última, que determinó un especial deseo por observar un espectáculo que hacia tiempo no ocurría. El rey enfermó y el desfile de su coronación fue suspendido. Tal contingencia originó reclamos por parte de quienes habían pagado para ver el desfile desde algunas edificaciones por donde iba a pasar el cortejo. El precedente más recordado es "Nombre11399 vs. Nombre4916". El demandado había alquilado un inmueble con balcón para presenciar el desfile. El precio se convino en 75 libras, pagaderas 25 por adelantado y 50 el día del desfile. El arrendador reclamó el pago de las 50 libras faltantes y el arrendatario la devolución de las 25 ya abonadas. Aunque no se había mencionado esa finalidad en el contrato, se estimó, conforme a las condiciones y anuncios previos, los cuales ofrecían expresamente el alquiler para ver el desfile durante los días del mismo, que ésa había sido considerada por las partes contratantes como el fundamento o base del contrato. Entendido así, el Tribunal declaró que al frustrarse el fin, sin que razonablemente se pudiera suponer que los contratantes, al perfeccionarse el contrato, hubiesen contemplado la posibilidad de que el desfile no tuviera lugar, el inquilino no debía pagar el saldo del alquiler. Durante la Primera y Segunda Guerra Mundial (1914-1917 y 1939 y 1945), se plantearon numerosos casos de frustración de contratos por imposibilidad de cumplimiento. Las decisiones de los tribunales alemanes tuvieron en cuenta, para pronunciarse a favor o en contra de la configuración de la causal, si las circunstancias particulares del caso justificaban o no la tesis de la desnaturalización de las obligaciones contraídas por las partes. Sobre la base de estos precedentes jurisprudenciales y algunas elaboraciones doctrinarias del Derecho alemán tales como la teoría de la "presuposición" de Nombre11400 y las "bases del negocio jurídico" de Nombre11401, entre otras, se ha delineado el perfil actual de la figura de la "frustración del fin del contrato". En España la teoría fue expuesta por primera vez por Vicente Espert Sanz en su obra "La frustración del fin del contrato", en el año 1968, seguido por autores como De Cossío, De Castro y Bravo, De Ángel Yáguez y Zorrilla Ruiz; sin embargo no ha sido acogida por la legislación y la jurisprudencia de aquel país, si bien ha hecho mención al término "frustración del fin del contrato" en diversas ocasiones, no ha sido en el estricto sentido técnico que la doctrina le ha dado a la figura. En Latinoamérica, únicamente en el Sistema argentino se encuentra un desarrollo doctrinal en torno al tema. Autores de la talla de Mosset Iturrape, Rubén Stiglitz, José María Gastaldi y Atilio Aterini, entre otros, defienden la tesis, sin embargo, pese a varios intentos de incorporación de la figura en la legislación civil, a la fecha no existe norma específica que determine los elementos y efectos de la institución. En la jurisprudencia de los tribunales argentinos son exiguos los casos en que se a hecho referencia a la teoría. En sentido estricto, "(...), la frustración del fin del contrato es el supuesto de hecho en el cual desaparece, de modo absolutamente imprevisible, la utilidad que debía proporcionar una de las prestaciones, según la naturaleza de la mismo o el acuerdo inequívoco de las partes (contenido del contrato)" (Gianfelici, Mario Cesar, La frustración del fin del contrato, 1ª edición, Editoral Hamurabi SRL, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004, pag. 93). Tiene lugar entonces, "(...) cuando en un contrato bilateral, de ejecución diferida o continuada, la finalidad relevante -razón de ser- y conocida por las partes no puede lograrse -se ve frustrada- por razones sobrevinientes ajenas -externas- a su voluntad y sin que medie culpa" (Gastaldi, José María, Contratos, Editorial, Abeledo-Perrot, volumen I, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994, pag. 225). Como presupuestos para su posible aplicación, se señalan los siguientes: a) Contrato válidamente celebrado, de donde se distingue de los vicios que llevan a la nulidad; b) Que se trate de un contrato bilateral, lo que implica también onerosidad; c) Es necesario que el contrato tenga prolongación en el tiempo, de ejecución diferida, de trato o ejecución continuada, es decir, que no sea de cumplimiento instantáneo, pues la alteración de la finalidad debe aparecer en la etapa de cumplimiento, la prestación cuya utilidad se frustró debe hallarse pendiente, es menester que dicha prestación no se halle íntegramente ejecutada; d) El acontecimiento que origina la frustración, entonces, debe ser sobreviniente, se trata de circunstancias posteriores a la celebración del contrato; provenir de acontecimientos ajenos al campo de la previsión; ajeno a la voluntad de las partes, no habiendo culpa; e) La prestación contractual es aún factible, el evento no ocasiona la imposibilidad total y definitiva de ella; f) Insubsistencia de la utilidad o resultado de la prestación esperado por el acreedor de ella, inicialmente considerada como la razón o motivo para contratar. Un aspecto importantísimo de la figura, sobre todo a efectos del caso en examen, es la exteriorización contractual del motivo que impulsó a convenir. No basta que el acreedor de la prestación haya comunicado al deudor la finalidad que tenía proyectada con ella, "...es necesario que medie acuerdo de partes, expreso o tácito, pero siempre inequívoco, acerca de la utilidad específica esperada por uno de ellos. Es menester que la contraparte haya hecho suya tal finalidad ulterior; que ambas partes la hayan tenido en cuenta para determinar el contenido contractual, por haber influido en la prestación o en la cuantía de la contraprestación. Sólo así cabe afirmar que propiamente la finalidad específica integra el contenido del negocio" (Gianfelici, op.cit., pag. 82). Por otro lado, interesa ahondar también, sobre el presupuesto de previsibilidad. Se dice, que no cualquier cambio de las circunstancias, que incida en obtención del fin que el acreedor de la prestación se propuso, afecta la eficacia del contrato, sino solo las alteraciones absolutamente imprevisibles al momento de contratar. Las mutaciones que de manera objetiva son previsibles deben ser soportadas por la parte que las sufre, pues en virtud del principio de autoresponsabilidad privada, las contratantes tienen el deber de prever las variaciones de las circunstancias que podrían perjudicarlas, y si no lo hicieron así, aunque fuere por error excusable, es algo imputable a ellas. Resta decir, que la doctrina distingue la "teoría de la frustración del contrato" de la imprevisión, de la imposibilidad de cumplimiento, caso fortuito, de la fuerza mayor, del error y de la cláusula resolutoria, en razón de tratarse de un instituto autónomo que afecta la supervivencia del contrato por haberse quedado sin causa. De ello se extrae la consecuencia de la frustración que no es la invalidez, que implica nulidad, sino la ineficacia sobrevenida del contrato, presupuesto para la acción resolutiva. La teoría en estudio no ha estado exenta de críticas. Se objeta, en primer lugar, que se trata de una noción aún en formación, sin un perfil definido y propio, producto de un entremezclado de ideas y doctrinas de un sistema jurídico, como el inglés, muy distinto al de base romanizada. Asimismo, se dice que participa de las imprecisiones de otro concepto jurídico, la causa, con la cual está íntimamente relacionada. Se le reprocha también poner en gravísimo riesgo la seguridad jurídica, al brindar un pretexto fácil para escapar a la pacta sunt servanda, al cumplimiento fiel de la palabra empeñada. Se apunta, además, que pretende cargar sobre las espaldas de la contraparte o repartir el riesgo propio de todo negocio, como es que no resulte bueno, que fracase. En ese mismo sentido, se le recrimina constituirse en un premio al contratante negligente, despreocupado, imprevisor y traer tardíamente cuestiones no ventiladas en la negociación, personales, propias de una de las partes, normalmente intrascendentes respecto de la eficacia del contrato. Por último, se sostiene, que con el pretexto de la equidad se vulnera un convenio libremente celebrado y se entra a un reajuste de los efectos, a una adaptación o distribución de las consecuencias, que poco tiene que ver con lo querido por las partes. Ahora bien, la pregunta a responder es: ¿Cuál teoría sobre la causa sigue el Código Civil costarricense?. Esto, a efecto de advertir la posibilidad de aplicación de la teoría en cuestión. El artículo 627 antes citado exige la existencia de "causa justa" en las obligaciones. Es decir, que para que haya contrato ha de concurrir el requisito de una causa; pero para su validez no basta con que exista una objetiva o tipificada, ser por ejemplo venta o donación, sino que exige una causa "justa", vocablo que debe ser entendido como sinónimo de lícita, es decir, no opuesta a la ley o a las buenas costumbres. Para esta calificación se atiende a la conducta de cada una de las partes. O sea, que según dicho numeral, habrá que tenerse en cuenta el propósito de las partes, como algo que da matiz a la causa; con lo que de él se hace depender la validez y eficacia del negocio. En esa misma línea, el artículo 1080 del Código Civil, ante un déficit en la cabida, tratándose de venta de inmuebles, le confiere al comprador la posibilidad de demandar la resolución del contrato: "(...) si el inmueble hubiese sido comprado para un fin determinado conocido del vendedor, y el déficit lo hiciera impropio para ese fin". A la luz de lo anterior, no es posible afirmar que el Ordenamiento Jurídico patrio siga una posición objetiva pura, pero tampoco una subjetiva. Se puede decir que sigue una posición "dualista" de la causa, o más bien, que admite una doble faceta o proyección de la figura. Su aspecto objetivo, no ofrece mayor problema, el Ordenamiento Jurídico reconoce esa finalidad genérica o inmediata, propia y uniforme, igual para todos los contratos de la misma naturaleza, desde un principio, autorizando la elección del tipo, nominado o innominado. En su aspecto subjetivo resulta distinto, tratándose de los motivos individuales, concretos, de los contratantes en cada contrato que se celebra, variable de un convenio a otro y aun en cada una de las partes intervinientes. A criterio de esta Sala, cabrá el análisis de justicia únicamente en aquellos supuestos en que los fines perseguidos por las partes al obligarse interesen al ordenamiento jurídico, es decir, cuando éste autorice su examen. Tal es el caso cuando los propósitos de las partes sean contrarios a la ley, a la moral o las buenas costumbres (artículo 627, inciso 3º) y la hipótesis del artículo 1080 antes mencionado. De esta manera, cualquier otro móvil subjetivo de los contratantes deberá tenerse como simples motivaciones íntimas, inaprensibles e indiferentes en la vida del Derecho. Salvo, claro está, que haya sido objetivado, al ser integrado en la declaración de voluntad contractual a modo de causa impulsiva o determinante, con lo cual ese "elemento accidental", se tornaría en esencial. Resumiendo: el simple acuerdo de voluntades que genera el consentimiento, es el origen del contrato, el motivo o fin particular carece de influencia para la validez del instituto, con excepción de los casos antedichos. Sin embargo, cuando aquel motivo o fin es "esencial" para la partes y lo incorporan expresamente al contrato, en este caso, el negocio jurídico se celebra y adquiere validez bajo "condición". En esa forma y solamente así cabe el análisis de la justicia del motivo impulsivo (causa-motivo). Lo expuesto hasta aquí conduce a que no es factible admitir en el Derecho costarricense, la aplicación de la "teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato". A mayor abundamiento de razones, aún en la hipótesis de que si lo fuera, en la especie no se cumple con los presupuestos para su aplicación. El evento sobrevenido no era impredecible, la autorización para "aplicar" la adquisición de acciones a eventuales pagos de renta por parte de Nombre10502, por depender de un "tercero", de la Comisión y de las autoridades tributarias, hacía absolutamente predecible que pudiera haber alguna objeción a ella. Tampoco, como se verá, existió prueba alguna que indique que el fin buscado por la adquirente de las acciones haya sido conocido, aceptado por el deudor de la prestación y determinado en el contenido del contrato. Superada la anterior discusión, a efecto de resolver el fondo del asunto planteado, debe hacerse, necesariamente, referencia al origen de la Ley no. 6990. En países en vías de desarrollo con una economía de mercado como Costa Rica, es común que el Estado instrumente políticas encaminadas a estimular la creación y desarrollo de empresas mediante el otorgamiento de incentivos directos (reducciones o exenciones impositivas, conocidas como escudos fiscales, ventajas crediticias, subsidios, etc). Se trata de una forma de intervencionismo económico, por medio del cual se fomenta una actividad para que se oriente a la consecución de objetivos públicos considerados fundamentales para el crecimiento de la producción y reactivación del aparato productivo. Dentro de este esquema se ubica la Ley no. 6990, que declaró de utilidad pública la industria del turismo y, procura lograr un proceso acelerado y racional del desarrollo de esa actividad. Estableció un régimen fiscal favorable para la realización de programas y proyectos turísticos importantes. En su versión original (el régimen de incentivos fue reformado en parte y derogado en otra por la Ley no. 7293 del 3 de abril de 1992 "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatoria y Excepciones), que es la que interesa al caso, estos incentivos se otorgaban en dos direcciones. Así, el artículo 7º estableció una serie de beneficios a favor de aquellas personas físicas y jurídicas que desarrollaran alguna de las actividades indicadas por el legislador en el artículo 3 de esa misma ley. Por otra parte, el numeral 11 instauró otros estímulos cuyos beneficiados ya no esas personas físicas y jurídicas señalas, sino un tercero vinculado o no al sector turístico, que invirtiera en el ramo: "Artículo 11.- Será deducible del Impuesto sobre la Renta, el cincuenta por ciento del monto invertido en actividades turísticas de las señaladas en el artículo 3º de esta ley, previa autorización de la comisión reguladora de turismo. Cuando dicha inversión se lleve a cabo a través de empresas ya constituidas, la inversión deberá realizarse por medio de compra de acciones nominativas de sociedades domiciliadas en el país con contrato turístico firmado. Las acciones así adquiridas deberán quedar en fideicomiso en un banco del Estado o en la Bolsa Nacional de Valores, por un plazo no menor de dos años, sin posibilidad de disponer más que los dividendos que produzcan. Cuando la inversión se realice en empresas nuevas, se deberá cumplir con los requisitos que en cada caso exija la comisión reguladora de turismo, de acuerdo con el tipo de inversión. En todo caso, no podrá deducirse por este concepto más de un veinticinco por ciento de la renta bruta del período en que se realice la inversión indicada" (el destacado no es del original). En el primer caso, la empresa interesada en beneficiarse del régimen, debía obtener de la Comisión la calificación de su actividad como turística. Este paso, únicamente significaba un reconocimiento de la compañía como posible receptora de los incentivos correspondientes, los cuales se concretaban una vez que esa misma instancia le daba su venia a un proyecto específico sometido a su consideración para tales efectos. Otorgada la aprobación, se procedía a firmar un documento llamado "contrato turístico", que en realidad distaba mucho de ser un verdadero contrato, pues no constituía la fuente primaria de derechos y obligaciones entre las partes contratantes, sino una concreción de los beneficios previstos en la Ley no.6990 en una empresa turística determinada respecto de un proyecto concreto. Es decir, se trataba más bien de un acto unilateral de la Administración, léase ICT, que determinaba que el proyecto sometido a consideración cumplía con las condiciones establecidas legalmente para la aplicación del régimen de incentivos (acto-condición). Lo anterior es así, por cuanto las ventajas acordadas son de naturaleza tributaria, per se discriminatorias, las cuales son normadas por ley y, por tanto, no puede constituir válidamente el objeto de un contrato. Se trataba, entonces, de una situación jurídica objetiva, cuyo origen era exclusivamente normativo. El ICT lo que hacía era determinar, quienes podían ser destinatarios del régimen fiscal de excepción, por cumplir las condiciones legalmente definidas. Sin embargo, ese acto por si mismo, no era suficiente para presuponer el derecho a la exoneración concreta, pues en definitiva correspondía, a la Administración Tributaria, ante la solicitud formal, quien luego de examinar la petición, determinaba si concurrían las circunstancias para que operara la exención. Hay que recordar que los incentivos fiscales son acordados por la Administración, ciertamente dentro del marco de una autorización legislativa pero utilizando la técnica de la aprobación. En el caso de terceros que invirtieran en proyectos turísticos, de acuerdo con el citado numeral 11, para optar por los incentivos fiscales debían previamente cumplir con dos requisitos: 1) adquirir acciones de sociedades domiciliadas en el país que contaran con contrato turístico firmado y; 2) entregar en fideicomiso a un banco del Estado o a la Bolsa Nacional de Valores las acciones por un plazo no menor a dos años. Luego de efectuar lo anterior, debía requerir de la Comisión la "autorización" de la inversión realizada a efectos de llevar a cabo ante la Administración Tributaria el trámite de exoneración del impuesto sobre la renta. XIII.- Nombre10502, con la intención de beneficiarse del escudo fiscal contemplado en la Ley 6990, adquirió acciones de Nombre11387. En el acta Nº6 de la Sesión de la Junta Directiva de esta última, de fecha 18 de enero de 1999, se asentó el negocio jurídico suscrito entre las partes: "ARTICULO PRIMERO: Se acuerda aumentar el capital social de la empresa en la suma de nueve millones trescientos setenta y seis mil ochocientos treinta y dos dólares ochenta y cuatro centavos, los que al tipo de cambio del día de hoy de doscientos setenta y dos colones ochenta céntimos por dólar, representan la suma de dos mil quinientos cincuenta y ocho millones de colones, el cual está representado por dos millones quinientas cincuenta y ocho mil acciones nominativas y preferidas denominadas "Preferentes Serie A" con un valor nominal de mil colones cada una, las cuales son suscritas por Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, sociedad domiciliada en San Antonio de Belén, cédula de persona jurídica número CED4760, las cuales paga mediante una letra de cambio a la vista que se reputa como dinero efectivo, identificada con el número CED4761, por un monto de dos mil quinientos cincuenta y ocho millones de colones, librada y aceptada por Nombre10502 Company de Costa Rica, Sociedad Anónima, el día dieciocho de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve y girada con vencimiento a la vista, a la orden de Corporación Nombre11387 Sociedad Anónima, por la que acepta su representante en forma definitiva e irrevocable". Como se observa, se trató de una suscripción de acciones pura y simple sin cláusula que condicionara su eficacia. Tampoco existe otro documento que deba entenderse incorporado a ese contrato. Así lo hizo ver el señor Ernesto Góchez Staben, en su calidad de representante de la demandada Nombre10502 Paper: "Trigésima quinta ¿pidió a (sic) usted a algún funcionario de Nombre11387 redactar algún contrato por escrito, representativo del negocio que se estaba haciendo? Admitida. NO, el documento que se desarrollo (sic) fue el de la compra de las acciones que es el primer paso o requisito de una inversión turística, amparada en el artículo 11 de la ley 6990...Trigésima Sexta ¿Por qué usted antes de hacer el negocio, no pidió la realización de un contrato por escrito? Admitida. La ley 6990 regula y controla los requerimiento para desarrollar una inversión turística, por lo cual no era necesario la elaboración de un contrato antes de la primera etapa". No era que Nombre10502 no acostumbrara hacerlo, pues el testigo Nombre8327, quien hasta 1998 laboró para dicha empresa como gerente financiero y tenía dentro de sus funciones la realización de las inversiones turísticas de la compañía, declaró: "En algunos casos, prácticamente en todos los casos se firmaba un contrato privado entre la empresa turística y Nombre10502 Company ...Mientras yo fui Gerente financiero las inversiones turísticas siempre se registraban en Contabilidad y siempre se registraba el pago de la suscripción de las acciones, normalmente Nombre10502 en el momento en que se hacía la firma de la inversión no pagaba todo en efectivo por lo que quedaba la obligación de cómo se pagaba lo que se quedara debiendo. - El contrato que se firmaba era diferente al contrato de la suscripción de acciones. - No me acuerdo del nombre o denominación del contrato privado.- La forma de pago de la suscripción de las acciones normalmente Nombre10502 pagaba conforme tenía que ir pagando el impuesto de renta al fisco, así en esas fechas que tenía que pagar el impuesto, le pagaba a las empresas turísticas.- Nombre10502 no imponía, pero si negociaba y daba la pauta de cómo iba a pagar.- Nombre10502 NO CONDICIONABA EL PAGO DE LA SUSCRIPCIÓN DE LAS ACCIONES A UN EVENTO POSTERIOR" (La mayúscula y la negrita no son del original). De la declaración anterior, se extraen tres aspectos de suma importancia: primero, si bien en otras ocasiones Nombre10502, a la hora de adquirir acciones de empresas turísticas, firmaba contratos adicionales a los de suscripción de acciones, el objeto de estos solamente era regular el pago del saldo; segundo, en este caso no se firmó ninguno y; tercero, lo más importante a destacar, que la demandada "NO CONDICIONABA EL PAGO DE LA SUSCRIPCIÓN DE LAS ACCIONES A UN EVENTO POSTERIOR". Es decir, que Nombre10502, pese a saber de que la suscripción de acciones no le aseguraba la obtención del beneficio fiscal, pues según ya se dijo, el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990 establecía que el monto invertido en actividades turísticas sería deducible del impuesto sobre la renta "previa autorización de la comisión reguladora de turismo", no sujetó la eficacia del contrato a la efectiva obtención del escudo fiscal. En el Contrato de Fideicomiso suscrito entre la demandada y la Bolsa Nacional de Valores S.A., en cumplimiento del otro requisito establecido por el artículo 11 de la Ley no. 6990, se estipuló: "La Fiduciaria no garantiza de ninguna forma que el Fideicomitente cumplirá con los requisitos o que sea acreedora de los beneficios, de la Ley de Incentivos Turísticos, sus reformas y el Reglamento de dicha Ley, que persigue este fideicomiso". Nombre10502 no plasmó en el negocio jurídico los fines que particularmente lo determinaron a suscribir acciones de Nombre11387. No elevó a "elemento esencial" del contrato sus motivos para convenir. No condicionó su eficacia al otorgamiento real del beneficio fiscal a su favor, en consecuencia, no puede ahora negarla alegando no haber logrado el beneficio económico esperado. No era la primera vez que realizaba una inversión de esta naturaleza, así que no podía invocar desconocimiento de los procedimientos y de la subordinación del incentivo fiscal a la aprobación de la Comisión y de la Administración Tributaria. Si husiese querido condicionar la eficacia del convenio a sus intereses, debió consignarlo. Nombre11387 contaba no solo con un contrato turístico que posibilitaba a Nombre10502 beneficiarse del régimen de incentivos creado por la Ley 6990, adquiriendo acciones de dicha empresa, sino también poseía acuerdos firmes de la Comisión que aprobaron la ampliación del contrato turístico para efectuar las obras proyectadas y que autorizaron el aumento de capital realizado y la venta pública de acciones producto del incremento patrimonial. Lo anterior desvirtúa cualquier incumplimiento o mala fe que se le haya querido atribuir a Nombre11387. Interesa también destacar la actitud pasiva de la demandada ante el rechazo de su solicitud de aprobación de la compra de dos mil quinientas cincuenta y ocho acciones de Nombre11387 por parte de la Comisión. Ante la posibilidad de impugnación, prefirió no ejercer sus derechos y caer en mora en el pago del saldo adeudado. No puede, entonces, en la especie decirse que existe una causa "injusta" o "ilícita" que torne ineficaz el contrato de marras, ni de un abuso del derecho por parte de la actora. Por el contrario, de existir éste último, lo sería más bien de la demandada, quien sabedora del incumplimiento de sus obligaciones contractuales se ha negado a honrar sus deudas. El contrato en cuestión es válido y eficaz y por lo tanto exigible a su tenor. Así las cosas, indudablemente, incurrió el Tribunal en las violación de los artículos aludidos en el recurso, tanto los citados por aplicación indebida como por falta de aplicación. La sugerida "Teoría de la frustración del fin del contrato", como ya fue expuesto, no está prevista expresamente en el Ordenamiento Jurídico costarricense, ni puede sustentarse en una interpretación benévola de los artículos señalados por el Tribunal.”