Civil liability of banks and insurers for third-party crime on their premisesResponsabilidad civil de bancos y aseguradoras por delito de terceros en sus instalaciones

**VII.- Regarding the civil liability of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros:** Attorney Federico Torrealba alleges the misapplication of Article 1025 of the Civil Code concerning the alleged lack of passive standing of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. He considers that the lower court erred in stating that there is no direct action against the insurer by virtue of the principle of contractual privity (Article 1025 of the Civil Code). He states that in the contract-tender concluded between the […] (folio 1275), an insurance policy issued by the insurer is recorded, valid from 12 July 2004 to 12 July 2005, with coverage of up to one hundred and five million colones, covering the liability of the direct insured for damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to third parties. In accordance with the provisions of Article 13, subsection f, of the Ley 8395 de Servicios de Seguridad Privados, the policy is an obligation for the exercise of such activity. Consequently, unlike voluntary civil liability insurance where the legal cause is the patrimonial indemnity of the insured, in compulsory insurance it is the compensation of the potential victim. In his opinion, it is not necessary for the legislator to expressly state that the potential victim can sue the INS, because there is no right without action; that is, if the potential victims of a risky activity have a right established by the legislator to be protected and compensated under an insurance policy that must be taken out by whoever carries out that activity, they naturally also have the right to the corresponding action. It is not necessary to create an action every time the legislator recognizes a right. The claim is not admissible. On this point, this Chamber considers it important to highlight the analysis conducted by the lower court regarding the main arguments by which it determined that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros lacks passive standing to respond to the civil claims of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the Tribunal reasons: “…it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the insurer does not have passive standing to respond to the civil claims filed against it. In the specific case, the civil actors who sued the Instituto Nacional de Seguro seek to derive their right against this autonomous institution from the insurance contract that the […] signed. However, we must indicate that the insurance contract, like contracts in general, is governed by the principle of privity. This means that the contractual relationship only binds the parties involved in its execution, because the contract, as a legal transaction (negocio jurídico), has no effect regarding third parties. Ultimately, our legal system establishes the cited principle in Article 1025 of the Civil Code, which states: 'Contracts produce no effect except between the contracting parties; they do not harm third parties, just as they do not benefit them, except as provided in the following articles.' In other words, the contract only deploys its effectiveness with respect to the parties that have intervened in its execution. Precisely, the Mazeauds, referring to the scope of Article 1165 of the French Civil Code, state: 'The drafters of the French Civil Code, as a result of a lack of method that has been pointed out on several occasions, considered in Article 1165 of the legal text only conventions and conventional obligations. But the principle established by them is valid both for non-contractual obligations (obligaciones extracontractuales) and for contractual obligations. Every obligation, whatever it may be, binds only the creditor and the debtor designated by the contract or the law; it does not reach third parties.' (MAZEAUD, Henri, León and Jean. Lecciones de Derecho Civil, Part Two, Volume III, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1969, pp. 34-35). In this same vein, the cited authors state: 'The obligatory bond does not reach third parties, who can neither demand the fulfillment of the obligation nor be subject to fulfilling it.' (Ibidem. p. 35). Consequently, it can be stated that in our legal context, the civil liability insurance contract is characterized by its privity. Therefore, that contract will deploy all its effectiveness between the contracting parties. In our context, the insurance contract, even civil liability insurance, does not grant a direct action to the potential injured party to directly sue the insurer. In this sense, Francesco Messineo explains to us: 'Therefore, the fundamental characteristic that differentiates civil liability insurance from other types of damage insurance lies in the fact that the object of the insurance — that is, the risk — is precisely civil liability, that is, potentially, the entire patrimony of the liable person, as the latter must compensate the injured third party for all the damage caused, whereas, in other types, the risk threatens one or more specific things, that is, one or more given elements of that patrimony, and the loss necessarily has limited effects. / The injured third party can, by acting in subrogation (accionando en subrogatoria), substitute the negligent insured and request the insurer to fulfill its obligation. He could not do so directly, because he has a right of his own, not against the insurer, but only against the person responsible for the damage (the insured).' (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Volume IV, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 173). Consequently, we would have that in the case under study, those affected by the conduct carried out by the defendant and civil respondent, E, have no direct action against the insurer. In any case, it must be noted that in the case under study, Attorney Federico Torrealba Navas, in his capacity as special judicial representative of the Succession of ML, EM, JL, J, MV and M, these three […], has alleged that the insurance contract must be homologated with a stipulation in favor of a third party, which is why the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in its capacity as insurer, is directly obligated to the beneficiary of the stipulation derived from the business relationship. This position is not acceptable. In this sense, we consider it appropriate to turn to French doctrine, given that the Code de Napoléon was a primary source of our Civil Code. Precisely, the Mazeauds, regarding the insurance contract, state: \"A motorist insures himself, by paying premiums, against the damages he may cause with his car; by this liability insurance contract, the insurer obliges itself, if an accident occurs, to pay the insured the sum necessary to compensate the victim. If the general principles of law were applied, the victim, creditor of the motorist, would have action only against the latter; moreover, the insured's credit against the insurer would constitute a common pledge of the insured's creditors; the victim would thus be, even regarding this credit, in competition with the other creditors of the tortfeasor, and would thus risk not being fully compensated. A disconcerting result, because the credit arises in favor of the insured by reason of the harm suffered by the victim; thus, it is appropriate to prevent other creditors from indirectly benefiting from the consequences of the accident by being paid from the sum paid by the insurer. / To achieve this, one could have attempted to discover in the liability insurance contract a stipulation for the benefit of a third party and for the benefit of the eventual victim; but this analysis would not take into account the real will of the parties: the insured wants to free himself from the pecuniary consequences of his liability, and not to stipulate in favor of the victims. / The intervention of the legislator has avoided this adventurous construction. The law of 13 July 1930 (art. 53), by extending to all terrestrial liability insurances the limited provisions of the law of 19 February 1889 (fires) and of the law of 28 May 1913 (... accidents), grants the victim a direct right over the sum owed by the insurer: the victim is directly a creditor of the insurer; they possess a direct action against them...\" (MAZEAUD, Henri, León and Jean. Op. cit. pp. 93-94). Precisely, the author Carlos Domínguez Domínguez shows us how, in the Spanish legal system, the intervention of the legislator was required in order to admit the direct action of the injured party against the insurer. In that sense, the cited author writes: “Art. 76 of the Ley de Contrato de Seguro, of 8 October 1980, institutionalizes the so-called ‘direct action,’ by virtue of which, the person injured by an action generating civil liability, despite not having been a party to the contract signed between the insurer and the policyholder, by reason of which the former assumed on its patrimony the risk that weighed on that of the insured in exchange for the corresponding premium, has standing to proceed against the former in claiming the corresponding compensation. / Thus are overcome the traditional drawbacks of the principle of privity of contracts — Art. 1257 of the C.C. — which obligated the injured party to have to resort to exercising actions against the debtor (direct action against this responsible party and the revocatory action against the latter and third parties affected by acts of the former carried out in fraud of creditors), or in substitution of the same (subrogatory action supplementing their inactivity in the defense of their rights), but which, precisely because of this marginality in the insurance contract, prevented them from proceeding directly against the insurer. / It is a matter, in the words of our Jurisprudence (42), of allowing the victims of losses derived from risks covered by the policy, to enforce, through the direct action against the insurance company, the rights that protect the insured themselves by virtue of the contract, because the interest of the injured third party breaks into the typical contractual scheme, causing the traditional rule res inter alios acta to break, on an exceptional basis.” (El Seguro de Responsabilidad Civil y Profesionales, Derecho de Seguros, Spain, Consejo General del Poder General, 1995, pp. 487 to 517). As can be observed, for the direct action (sic) sought by the representative of the aforementioned civil actors to arise against the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the existence of a legal norm that so establishes it is required. Based on the foregoing, this Tribunal concludes that in the case under study, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros does not have passive standing to respond to the claim presented…” (see folios 1913-1917).- Having analyzed the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the lower court does not err in determining the existence of a lack of passive standing of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, without prejudice to other instances ruling on its — eventual — obligation to assume the pecuniary consequences that may be attributed to the insured company if it is declared civilly liable. Under this same line of analysis, it is of special importance to indicate that the nature of the relationship that exists between the insurer with respect to the case in question does not allow affirming the presence of a direct link of civil liability, subjective or objective, with respect to the harmful consequences produced, since the only existing link arises from acting as the insurer of the defendant security company. On this point, it is indifferent whether what was acquired by the company is “voluntary or compulsory insurance,” since the nature of the liability that obligates said entity to fulfill a compensatory payment in this case is only “the insurance contract” signed with the company […] S.A. (see case file labeled number 4, of the tender process number 1776-2004, referring to the contracting of security and surveillance services for branches, agencies and offices of the […], folios 1254-1295) and not the law alleged by the appellant. There is no legal norm that empowers third parties to proceed directly against the insurer, by reason of a supposed fault committed by one of its insureds, since the cited regulation is limited — solely — to establishing, among the requirements for forming security companies, the possession of an insurance policy, which is binding only for those interested in providing the private security service. Specifically, regarding what is relevant, the Ley de Regulación de los Servicios de Seguridad Privados, in Article 13 subsection f), indicates: “The natural persons (personas físicas) or legal entities (personas jurídicas) that provide the services described in Article 2 of this Law must meet the following minimum requirements… to subscribe with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros the corresponding occupational risks policy and a civil liability policy. The minimum legal amount for legal entities is the equivalent of fifty times the legal minimum wage for natural persons, as defined in the ordinary budget law in force at the time of submitting the application. Applicants who work independently may subscribe the occupational risks policy, if they wish…”. That is, said legal guideline does not in itself imply a right in favor of third parties that empowers them to a direct action against the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, since its condition is never understood as a civilly liable party under any scenario (except for damage or loss caused by its direct operation), but rather that the compensatory payment is assumed by said entity by reason of an existing contract in which a policy is granted to the contracting party whose coverage spans a percentage of the damages and losses that the insured, who possesses the status of civilly liable party, must pay. Hence, its obligation to third parties does not derive from the law, or, in the words of the appellant, “from a compulsory insurance,” but rather its relationship is purely contractual and, in accordance with Article 1025 of the Civil Code, only binds the acting parties, and if any type of liability on the part of the insured entity can be determined, it will be the latter who must respond directly, or failing that, decide whether to execute the corresponding policy within the limits of its coverage. Thus, having determined the contractual nature of the relationship signed by […] S.A. with the insurer institute, it is necessary to note that the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been very clear in indicating that: “…Integrating the transcribed norms, it is inferred that the accessoriness (accesoriedad) of the civil action is manifested in the necessary judicial investigation of a punishable act, and has as its purpose ordering the compensation for the damages occurring as a result of it; however, the basis for, in effect, ordering the compensation or restitution does not lie in proving the existence of the crime, but rather, even if there is no conduct deserving of that classification, the duty to compensate can be imposed, applying the norms that, directly, order it (e.g.: civil wrong, strict liability, etc.). In both cases, the object of the dispute (litis) is constituted by non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) and it is this limit that defines the competence and attributions of the criminal judge in their knowledge of the civil action. What the appellant seeks is the annulment, within this process, of a clause of a contract signed between their represented party (vehicle rental company) and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. As can be seen, the pronouncement requested is, in essence, on purely contractual aspects, which exceed the competence assigned to the Chamber (and to criminal courts, in general), since, despite the undeniable link of that clause with the compensation to be made as a result of the punishable act that was investigated, the truth is that the source of the liability of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros derives solely from an agreement, that is, we are facing liability arising from contract and not from the punishable act itself. The latter constitutes nothing more than the ‘loss,’ ‘risk,’ or ‘contingency’ provided for in the agreement, consisting of a generating precondition for the consequences contractually provided to take effect, but not the legal source of these consequences. In other terms, from the investigated crime itself, no liability arises for the insurer entity, but rather its source is of completely contractual origin. Now then, criminal courts, when defining the ‘civilly liable party,’ can only resort to what has been established in legal norms. …In the present case, we are facing a similar situation, because if the contract signed by the civil plaintiff with the insurer entity is the direct source of the liability of the latter, and the agreement, for its part, contains a clause that exonerates it in certain circumstances, the point that the appellant requests to elucidate shifts from the extreme of liability (contractual, in any case) and focuses on that of the validity of an agreement. That is, the purity and legality of the very source of the obligation is being discussed, an aspect that, definitively, corresponds to be heard in other venues, different from the criminal one, if said validity is not affected by a crime being ventilated in the same process…” (Sala Tercera. Voto 53-98 of 9:45 a.m. on 16 January 1998). In accordance with the foregoing, the present claim is declared without merit, as it is deemed that the Tribunal correctly determined the lack of passive standing of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as a civil defendant.

**VIII.- Regarding the civil liability of the State:** In the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by attorneys William Guido Madriz and Andrés Arnoldo Pérez González, the non-observance of Articles 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 11, 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política, 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is alleged. In support of the foregoing, they point out that the Judge erred in considering that the State was not civilly liable for the events that occurred. The appellants consider that there was a clear violation of the Constitución Política and the Ley General de Policía, which safeguards, as a social guarantee, citizen surveillance and security, which were neglected in the town of […] (with approximately five thousand inhabitants), as it had only four police officers and a motorcycle in poor condition to deal with the different types of criminality that the area suffers due to the great tourist and commercial development that has characterized it in recent years. Furthermore, the appellant states that the State acted with lack of skill (impericia) and imprudence in addressing the hostage crisis that occurred inside the […] agency, especially since there was already news that near the mountains of Santa Elena, a gang of assailants had entered through the {…], which officers of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial were aware of and that this fact had also been made known to the Security authorities of the […] and the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública itself; however, inexplicably, the Trial Court considered that the assault and its unfortunate consequences were the product of the acts of a third party, in which case the State was exempted from liability. The claim is not admissible: It is commonly accepted that the State has the obligation to regulate the performance of all those activities from whose exercise dangerous consequences for citizens may arise, as well as the fact that it is only through a policy of state prevention and control of crime, and its respective repression, that the existence of the different police forces makes sense. However, there is a social consensus to assume, within the normal daily life of the integral development of every human being, various activities that are risky in themselves, which prevent the State from avoiding every negative consequence, by reason of the balancing of the benefits they generate, and which form part of what in civil matters is called “the general risk of life” (In this regard, see Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Volume II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p. 153. Likewise, Matthias Madrich. “Das allgemeine Lebenzrisiko: Ein Beitrag Zur Lehre Von Der Haftugnsbegrenzung Im Schadensersatzrecht” Editorial Duncker y Humblot, pp. 13, 14, 41. Cited by Reyes Alvarado Yesid. Imputación Objetiva. 2005. p. 92). However, this so-called “general risk of life” does not exclude, per se, the state obligation to respond for the breach of its obligations towards the citizen, for the consequences caused by its lawful or unlawful operation. Given such circumstances, in the present case, the appellant seeks to attribute the civil liability for the damages and losses that occurred in the Agency of the […] to the Administration, by reason of the defective exercise of police functioning, which — in the opinion of the undersigned — is not admissible, due to the lack of a verifiable causal link between the role of the police and the damages produced. Article 4 of the Ley General de Policía states: “The police forces shall be at the service of the community; they shall be responsible for monitoring, preserving public order, preventing manifestations of crime, and cooperating to repress them in the manner determined in the legal system.” In the pursuit of the welfare of the community and the safeguarding of the rights and personal guarantees of all human beings, the State carries out a constant and endless struggle against criminality, the latter of which has been increasing its offensive power day by day in evident contempt for the different legal interests protected by our legal system, whether by professionalizing the illicit activity in accordance with different technological means, or through the formation of networks and organizations duly structured under a high degree of violence and disrespect for the rights of others. However, the purpose of ending crime does not exempt the State from liability for the damages it produces by reason of its deficient operation, provided it can be proven that said result is effectively attributable to a poor service of the Administration or its officials. The non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) of the State is framed within a strict liability (régimen objetivo) system, which essentially seeks compensatory reparation for those who have suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. In this regard, the doctrine states: “…The damage is no longer perceived as a product of misfortune or destiny. This leads to the idea that for each damage produced, there must be a responsible party. With this, the sphere of influence of ‘destiny,’ ‘chance,’ or ‘bad luck’ is reduced and tends to disappear, at least in the legal field, and its place is occupied by the duty to compensate or repair the damage…” (Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marco. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Volume II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p. 39). In accordance with this new approach, the Administration will be liable whenever its normal or abnormal operation causes damage that the victim does not have the duty to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial (extrapatrimonial), regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, complying, of course, with the indispensable prerequisite of the causal link. This conception of state liability was clearly defined in the judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia number 132 of 3:00 p.m. on 14 August 1991, in which it was stated: " …to thus establish the direct liability of the State without needing to previously prove that the damage was caused by fault of the official or the Administration, demanding for the admissibility of the compensation that the damage suffered be effective, evaluable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group — Article 196—. It established that the Administration would be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party — Article 190—; and the obligation to repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even if for purposes or activities or acts alien to said mission — Article 191—..." (In this same sense, see, among many others, the judgments of said Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on 23 August; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on 6 November, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on 29 May 1996 and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on 4 July 1997.) Under this strict liability system, the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or fault attributable to public servants is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by its operation to arise. However, this liability of the Administración Pública, which has clear constitutional basis (In this regard, see votes number 5207-2004, of 2:55 p.m. on 18 May 2004, in the same sense see vote 211-05 of 9:40 a.m. on 7 April 2005 of the Sala Constitucional), cannot be interpreted either as an unrestricted compensatory duty applicable to all hypotheses of injury, as that would be an irrational system. Therefore, one of the limits for the attribution of strict civil liability is the necessary demonstration of a causal link. In this regard, Article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública refers that the damage must be due to the “operation of the Administration,” for which it is essential to determine if the harmful result is a product of state operation. In the specific case, it was held as proven that the harmful and injurious result was due to the attack caused by E and company in the facilities of the […] (see folios 1796-1801), defining without a doubt the criminal and civil (subjective) liability of the defendant as a subject totally alien to the Administración Pública. Now then, the appellant argues that the consequences produced were due to an act of omission (acto omisivo) by the State for not providing the necessary resources to prevent crime in the area and the lack of expertise in how to address a crisis like the one that occurred. It is worth clarifying that within the “operation” referred to in Article 190 of the cited Law lies the possibility of contemplating acts of mere inactivity. So states the jurisprudence of the Sala Primera, stating: “Currently, the conduct of omission (conducta omisiva), called ‘inactivity of the Administration,’ both in its formal aspect (insofar as it results in a deemed act by administrative silence) and material aspect (referred basically to the benefit-providing sphere of the administrative organization).

In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in the fulfillment of a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside of an administrative procedure, the Administration fails, by omission, to fulfill an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding mechanism, such as an act of its own making or consensual instruments, directly harming a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, there being for the public entity or body an obligation to give or do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision of its own, outside or inside an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective…” (Sala Primera, voto 74-F-2007, of 10:15 hours on February 2, 2007). Having clarified the possibility of understanding omissive acts, within the postulates contemplated in the regulations corresponding to the objective liability of the State, in this gradual examination of the basis of the present claim, it is appropriate to analyze whether the alleged pathological administrative-police inactivity influenced the harm that occurred. In the production of the harmful result, several factors frequently concur, within which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (on the proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, one may consult the already cited judgment of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 252-F-01, of 16 hours 15 minutes on March 28, 2001), in order to determine who is liable for the harm that occurred. In the present case, objective civil liability cannot be attributed to the State, in accordance with the arguments presented, since the number of personnel assigned to said delegation, as well as the condition of the means of transport available to them, are focused mainly on the reasonable requirement of prevention that can be demanded of the police, given the crisis previously provoked by such a criminal organization. That is, even starting from the hypothesis that the police delegation of […], at the time of the events, had a greater number of officers and suitable vehicles for their transport, the criminal attack could not have been avoided and consequently, it must be understood that the supposed omissive act of state functioning cannot be considered as the cause of the lamentable outcome, since its due or expected activity in light of a criterion of reasonableness is impossible to interpret as a suitable mechanism to prevent, foresee, or dismantle any attempted altercation before it happens. Otherwise, the Administration would be required to answer for any harm produced within the national territory, caused or not by its functioning, which would indeed exceed the normative scope established in the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). In this regard, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has indicated: “…In our legal system, the specific point then consists of determining when we are faced with the 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning' of the Administration and when, consequently, we must consider the harm produced as a result of said activity... the core point lies in determining the scope and the correct interpretation that must be given to the causal relationship, that is, the indissoluble causal link between the harm and the activity or functioning of the Administration, essential for attributing liability, for such harm, to the public power. This is the key to giving the correct, reasonable, and guarantee-oriented scope expected of the institution of the State's patrimonial liability...” (Sala Tercera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolution No. 432-f-98 of fifteen hours ten minutes on May eleven, nineteen ninety-eight). Consequently, despite the objective approach that governs state civil liability, independent of the conduct of its officials, one cannot ignore that the norm requires determining whether the effective harm was produced by its “functioning,” and if it is proven that the result is due to causes foreign to state competence, it would be improper to attribute any type of civil liability to the Administration, without the presence of a causal link between its action or omission and the result produced. Therefore, this claim is declared without merit.

IX.- Regarding the civil liability of […]. […] Before entering into its analysis, it is pertinent to make some considerations regarding consumer rights and defense, as well as the applicable liability regime. In this line of thought, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has stated: “The discovery of new materials, the implementation of new manufacturing methods, the development of means of communication, the expansion and liberalization of markets, the appearance of new sales methods, mass contracting, new contracting modalities, among other factors, have caused substantial changes in the market. Local markets of scarce dimensions have disappeared to give way to a mass market, where what matters to producers of goods and service providers is optimizing their profits, inciting the citizen, through product diversification and information manipulation, to indiscriminate and irrational consumption, a situation that produces true situations of superiority of the former over the latter, leading to an abuse of their situation to achieve their ends. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: ‘II...it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods he needs to acquire for his personal satisfaction, and his participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but to the constant celebration of contracts in a personal capacity. Therefore, his relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of goods and services, so that before expressing his contractual consent, he has all the necessary elements of judgment that allow him to express it freely, and this implies full knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included by what has been expressed, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as the state's concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposition of their assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relationships among the interested parties, the standardization of international commercial practices to the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence...’ (Voto No. 1441-92 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, of 15:45 hrs. on June 2, 1992). Faced with this situation of imbalance in consumer relations between entrepreneurs and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments are not very satisfactory for protecting consumer interests, so the legislator, to avoid or at least mitigate as far as possible that disadvantageous situation for the citizen-consumer, has created various legal defense systems trying to find a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers, thus supplying, in a certain way, certain functional deficiencies of the market in the economic order. In that line of thought, by Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) was reformed, introducing into it a new fair economic right alongside the freedom of enterprise and as a delimiter of it: consumer protection. (...) As a development of this new economic right and in compliance with this constitutional mandate, we have Law No. 7472, Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), of December 20, 1994, published in La Gaceta No. 14 of January 19, 1995, which contains a series of substantial and procedural rights in favor of consumers and users. Article 29 of said regulations states: 'Without prejudice to what is established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, uses, and customs, the following are fundamental and non-waivable rights of the consumer: a)- Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment. b)- Protection of their legitimate economic and social interests. (...) f)- Effective mechanisms of access for the administrative and judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the harm to these, as appropriate. (...)' Among these rights, and insofar as it matters for resolving the present matter, it is important to highlight the rights of consumers or users to protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and environment, and to the repair of the damage caused by the harm to these legal interests (subsections a and f). For the effective protection of these rights, the legislator adopted a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), with the clear interest of preventing victims of manufacturing and commercial business activities—activities inherently generating risks to physical integrity or the property of others—from being left unprotected due to practically insurmountable evidentiary difficulties: 'The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Only he who proves that he was not involved in the harm is released. The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are liable for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production and control are jointly and severally liable, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer' (Article 32, cited Law No. 7472. Bold is not in the original). VII.- Strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), has been described by this Chamber as: 'It is the result of a review of the liability institution that became necessary when it was realized that the mold of fault was too narrow to contain the aspirations of justice that clamored in an increasingly complex world. The demands of reality, the multiplication of dangers and harms typical of modern life, justified that in certain situations liability be treated as a credit of the victim that the defendant must refute. The theory of risk, according to which whoever carries out or benefits from an activity with elements potentially dangerous to others must also bear its inconveniences, permeated most legislations and in the case of Costa Rica gave rise to paragraph V of this commentary. This theory is also called the created harm theory, whose paradigm of imputation, as referred to by Professor Alterini, '... lies in attributing the harm to everyone who introduces into society a virtual element of producing it... it, he adds, ...' dispenses with the subjectivity of the agent, and centers the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it to him without more. The production of the harmful result suffices; it does not require the configuration of an illicit act through the traditional elements...' (Alterini, Atilio. Responsabilidad Civil, Abeledo Perrot, III Edic., Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). Consequently, the source of the obligation, in strict liability, is not the fault, negligence, etc., of the agent. Therefore, to refute liability it is of no importance that he manages to prove that he was not imprudent, negligent, or inexperienced' (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 61, of 14:50 hours on June 19, 1997). (...) In strict liability or liability for created risk '... the element of fault as a criterion of imputation is dispensed with, focusing on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the launching of a dangerous activity, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation for this liability is the created risk, or the risk-creating conduct. Therefore, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness...' (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 376 of 14:40 hours on July 9, 1999). In it, the starting point is the hypothesis that the source of obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, which, by the mere fact of causing harm, oblige the person who uses them to repair the harm caused. Three elements comprise this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing harm of a patrimonial nature; and c) the cause-effect relationship or link between the act and the harm. In summary '...in strict civil liability there must be a causal link between the risky activity launched by the agent and the harm caused' (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 354 of 10 hours on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view—says Costa Rican jurist Víctor Pérez Vargas—'...strict liability is summed up as an advantage in favor of the injured party that signifies a partial inversion (sic) of the burden of proof, in the sense that he is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (negligence or intent) of the person causing the harm, and the latter's attempt to prove his lack of fault would be futile...' (Pérez Vargas, Víctor, Derecho Privado, I Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, p. 417). That is, it corresponds to the person or company to whom liability is attributed to prove that the damages were produced by force majeure or by the fault of the victim (doctrine informing numerals 32, second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph of the Civil Code (Código Civil))” (Resolution number 646-F-2001 of 16 hours 45 minutes on August 22, 2001).- Under the protection of what has been stated, it is important to specify the scope of the service provided by the […], to determine the civil liability regime applicable in the present case. In this same intellectual operation, the lower court estimated the following: “...In that order of things, this sentencing body considers that in the case under study, as was alleged by the legal representation of the defendant entity, the damages suffered by the civil plaintiffs do not derive from the financial intermediation services offered by the […] to its clients or users. Precisely, Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) provides: 'The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks.- Only he who proves that he was not involved in the harm is released.- The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are liable for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production and control are jointly and severally liable, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer. (As modified in its numbering by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law (Ley de Contingencia Fiscal), which moved it from 32 to 35)'. In accordance with the transcribed legal provision, and adjusting its scope to the specific case, the liability of the […] would be compromised if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed under the following assumptions: a-) By reason of the financial intermediation service offered by it. Indeed, we must remember that the 'current level of banking development allows distinguishing various types of banks, generally identified by their specialty or function. There are deposit banks, development banks, agricultural and livestock banks, popular banks, rediscount banks, etc. All of them, whether or not classified as such by their corporate names and insofar as they professionally develop the function of financial intermediaries, can be called and are in fact classified as 'banking entities or institutions.' (RODRÍGUEZ AZUERO, Sergio. Contratos Bancarios. Su significación en América Latina. Bogotá, Biblioteca Felaban, Fourth Edition, 1990, p. 3). Ultimately, in his conclusions, Licenciado Andrés Pérez González was clear in indicating that according to the website of the […], its function is to provide financial services to its clients. In other words, the patrimonial liability of the defendant bank as a consequence of its condition as a merchant or provider would be compromised if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed as a direct consequence of the financial intermediation service offered by it. In the case under study, it is evident that this has not occurred. b-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information regarding the financial intermediation service provided. From our perspective, in the case under study, by reason of the factual circumstances generating the claimed damages, it can be affirmed without fear of error that the civil plaintiffs did not suffer any impairment by reason of inadequate or insufficient information from the […] regarding its financial intermediation services. c-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information about the use or risks derived from its financial intermediation services. Ultimately, we must indicate that none of the civil plaintiffs has suffered harm from the […] as a consequence of a lack of information regarding the use of the financial intermediation services offered to them by the defendant banking entity. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal is convinced that in the case under study it cannot be considered that we are in one of the scenarios contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) as generating civil liability for the merchant or the provider. This is so, because as we have demonstrated, the damages that the civil plaintiffs seek to be compensated for derive from the actions of a third party with no organic link to the defendant bank, nor any legal link to the financial intermediation service offered by the banking entity. From our perspective, in the specific case we are in one of the cases of exclusion of liability contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor). Indeed, the already cited Article 35, in its second paragraph, provides that 'only he who proves that he was not involved in the harm is released.' In accordance with that provision, we consider that in the specific case the […] was not involved in the harm caused by E to the civil plaintiffs. Without a doubt, as we have stated, the commission of an assault by a third party with no connection whatsoever to the services offered by the merchant or provider breaks the causal link between the activity and the harm caused. Having said the above, we must determine whether in the case under study the liability of the […] no longer derives from the service itself but from the faults imputed to it by the civil plaintiffs in their respective conclusions…” (see folios 1956-1957). Contrary to this position stated in the lower court’s judgment, this Chamber agrees with the appellants that the Tribunal made an incorrect application and interpretation of the “Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor)” by considering that the damages caused did not occur by reason of the service provided by the banking entity, and that their origin derives from the action of a third party with no organic link to the Bank. Such interpretation is due to an erroneous equation of criminal causality (which seeks to define the efficient cause of the crime) with the examination of the causal link arising between the crime and the damages caused, which is specific to civil law. On the first point, as is clear from the facts that the Tribunal held as proven, the criminal liability resulting from the perpetrated qualified homicides was attributed to the accused E, and even the subjective civil liability coincides in the same person. However, to determine the possibility of ruling on possible strict liability, the formula to be applied transcends beyond the subjective or individual analysis, as the causal link is determined by analyzing whether the damages resulting from the illicit act are framed within the objective sphere of a consumer relationship, use, or enjoyment of a certain good or service, without this ruling out the possibility that such liability may coincide with or differ from the subject upon whom the criminal liability falls. In this sense, this Chamber has indicated: "This is a clear case of so-called strict liability or no-fault liability. In the present case, it is necessary to determine the existence of a causal relationship between the mere provision of a service, namely, the provision of private educational services, and the damages suffered by the aggrieved parties. If we were to hypothetically remove the provision of the service to the victims, the result would not have occurred, so in applying the theory of conditio sine qua non, we can conclude that there is a causal relationship between that provision and the harmful result. This means that the damages were produced, precisely, on the occasion of the service provided." (Sala Tercera. Voto 2005-1117, of 16:25 hours on September 29, 2005). Given this perspective, regarding the specific case, one might ask what the people present on the day of the altercation at the Branch of the […] were doing, if not waiting to receive a service (whatever it might be), in those facilities. It is irrelevant to determine whether they had already been attended to, were being attended to, or were going to be attended to at the moment of being attacked, or the nature of the act to be carried out (financial, informational, statistical, economic), because, contrary to what the lower court (a quo) stated, the institution's specialization in a determined area does not rule out its general banking nature. In this regard, the Sala Primera has recently indicated that: “...In the opinion of this Chamber, the simple fact of not acquiring a product, or requesting a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, supplier, or merchant from liability, in those cases where the user is harmed by reason of the good or service received. The term 'consumer', referring to the legal situation of the plaintiff when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of buyer. In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application to persons who require special protection in this matter. It is not limited to a 'consumer contract', because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Decision-Making Body, is that it be conceived of as a client, understood as someone who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer—and not an effective buyer—of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. He acquires a good or service by means of a typical legal relationship, such as a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but can potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety. Thus, the specific needs of protection for Mr. Erick Streber Umaña originate from his condition as a user of a parking lot offered as part of the supermarket's services for its clients, regardless of whether he purchased something or not. In the case at hand, as already stated, the necessary characteristics to impute that liability have been demonstrated, i.e., a creator of danger or risk was used that is part of the defendant's economic structure—parking lot of the Hipermás supermarket in San Sebastián—; harm was generated as determined by the injury suffered to the plaintiff's legal sphere—dispossession or loss of his vehicle, license plates […]—; and the cause-effect relationship between the act and the harm—theft or robbery of the automobile in the parking lot of the CSU—. In short, that injury was the product of the robbery of the asset that was in the parking lot of the Hipermás supermarket in San Sebastián…” (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto: 000295-F-2007 of 10:45 hours on April 26, 2007). In this line of thought, it is considered proven that the people who attended that institution that day did so as a "user" or "consumer" of the banking services offered at the Branch of the […], in which location, in accordance with the institutional policy of said entity, security service is provided to anyone who enters its facilities to carry out any errand, by reason of the high risk that a commercial activity of a monetary nature signifies, even more so, starting from the assumption that the institution lacked such security mechanisms, its obligation to answer for what happened inside its facilities is imminent from the moment it undertakes the performance of a banking commercial activity intended for service to the general public, regardless of whether its nature is public or private. Starting from the previous premise, using logic and reason, it must be understood that if banking services (of any nature) were not offered at that location, there would be no reason for persons external to the company to be in such facilities; however, in the specific case, even understanding that the criminal action was the product of a third party external to the financial entity, the exception of liability contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), which states: "...Only he who proves that he was not involved in the harm is released," does not apply, because attributing the criminal action to a subject other than the merchant does not necessarily exclude the latter from being civilly liable, since what is important is to determine whether the harm is produced within the sphere of the service provided. In a comparative analysis of the present case with the position set forth by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia in the aforementioned ruling, it is observed that in the opinion of said judicial authority, the criminal act committed by a criminal with no relation to the defendant Supermarket does not rule out the strict civil liability of the latter for the damages caused, by reason of having occurred within the sphere of the service provided to the user, without needing to consider whether the client completed any purchase, or whether the vehicle parking service falls within the commercial nature of a supermarket.

It is specifically stated: “…The objection raised by the appellant that in that zone the service of vehicle custody is not provided, that it is not a public parking lot nor are physical spaces rented, is not admissible, as it contravenes articles 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor). From the interplay of these precepts arises the guiding principle that establishes an objective liability regime in consumer relations, which in turn correspond to a special regime. Matters pertaining to the nature of the parking lot do not exclude its scope of application, because that service forms an integral part of the economic and logistical structure of the commercial establishment that originated its use… Liability exists for the owner of the business that offers parking to its clients, potential consumers, despite any warnings it may have posted to the contrary. The thesis that its use is free and furthermore corresponds to a service independent from the sale of the products offered in the supermarket contravenes the protective principles of the consumer and user… This accessory service constitutes a duty of protection for the merchant, which creates an obligation toward those who park in that place. That is to say, it is obligated to guard, keep custody of, and return the vehicle (articles 698 and 1349 of the Civil Code), as a derivation proper to the objective liability imposed by law. In harmony with what has been indicated, it is irrelevant whether or not the plaintiff made an actual purchase in the supermarket, hence the alleged violations are not present, and therefore the reproach must be dismissed…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Voto: 000295-F-2007 of 10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007). Likewise, in the case at hand, the crime is committed by a subject with no connection to the […]; however, the latter's relationship with the damage is undeniable, due to the service it provides to its users, including among these, the security service, whose analysis will be revisited in the following recital (considerando). Consequently, this ground is granted, and the judgment is partially annulled, solely concerning the civil liability of the […]. In application of article 35 of the Law 7472 for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley 7472 de Promoción de la Competencia y la Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), the […] is civilly convicted, based on the objective liability that concerns it, to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) duly determined in the judgment in favor of those whose civil actions were granted, for which reason the corresponding remand proceeding is omitted. An express ruling on the other specific grounds tending to demonstrate the liability of the banking entity, or to evidence the intellectual and evaluative errors of the judgment, regarding the point in question, is omitted as unnecessary.

X.- On the civil liability of the company “[…]” […] On the matter in question, this Chamber considers that, effectively, the company “[…] S.A.” is civilly liable but for reasons different from those alleged by the appealing parties; however, Licenciado Torrealba Navas is not mistaken in highlighting the effective cause of liability of said company, affirming that it is an integral part within the entities responsible for providing the service offered at the banking institution. Doctrinally, it is established: “…economically efficient contractual networks are phenomena that cannot be considered as simple obligatory contractual relations, since their density is such that the network presents itself before third parties as a unit… In these cases, it is evident that it is necessary to introduce the principle of the liability of the entire contractual network, which can be reached through the theory of double imputation. The central idea is, then, that what appears as a unit in the commerce of men must be held, in the legal sphere, as a unit. The collective must respond, then, as a whole. Later, the risks can be distributed internally.” (RIVERO SANCHEZ, Juan Marcos. “Civil Liability. Volume II”. Second Edition, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). According to this approach, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the actions of the persons in charge of bank security, whether there was fault (culpa), negligence, lack of skill, or a contractual breach, as the appellants seek to demonstrate in their arguments, since what is important in the case is the role played by the security company in question, as part of “an economically efficient contractual network.” This position finds support in the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), which in its article 32 indicates: “The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond, concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks.” That is to say, as dictated by this rule, every participant in the chain of production of the good or service possesses an objective liability (liability regardless of fault), and at the same time joint and several liability (concurrently) among them and before the consumer or recipient of the service. Applying the above to the specific case, it is clear that the […], by reason of the risky activity it carries out (because it implicitly involves the movement of large amounts of capital within its facilities intended for public service), has the obligation to respond for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to its users while they are inside the branch office. For the foregoing, it is irrelevant whether it had sufficient material and human resources in terms of security; whether the choice of protection mechanisms was correct; whether actions were contrary to what was stipulated in a possible action protocol for attacks such as the one that occurred; or whether the banking entity had notice of the increased risk promoted by local crime, since it has been made clear that all the persons who were in the banking facilities at that moment expected to receive a service from that institution. Now then, there exists a contract-bid (Expediente de licitación pública number 1776-2004) entered into between the […] S.A., which, far from being understood within the framework of the principle of “privity of contracts,” is a means that allows confirmation that the latter acts as a provider of a service (security service) that the former provides to the user. That is, it is clear that they are two entities of a different nature (legal, organizational, and operational), but that both form part of the chain of production of a service, or rather of an “economically efficient contractual network,” and consequently, are seen as “a unit” before the recipient of the service. In that regard, article 2 of the cited Law states: “(…) For the purposes of this Law, the producer, as a supplier of goods, is also obligated to the consumer, to respect their rights and legitimate interests (…).” In other words, the law empowers the consumer, user, or final recipient of a good or service to bring an action against the merchant, producer, or provider interchangeably, understanding the latter as members of the so-called “chain of production,” so that they assume responsibility for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by reason of the goods and services provided by them, regardless of whether these are their principal or accessory activity. On this plane, it is clear that although the damages (daños y perjuicios) arise from the unlawful act perpetrated by the accused, the truth is that this occurs within the sphere of the banking service provided at the Branch of the […], in whose establishment the defendant company was committed to providing the efficient mechanisms to guarantee the security and integrity of the users by reason of the contract that governed between both sued institutions, thereby forming an intrinsic part within the civilly liable unit and, as such, legally legitimated to respond according to Law 7472. Based on the foregoing, this claim is granted, the judgment is annulled regarding the acquittal of civil liability in favor of the security company […] S.A., and in its place, it is declared jointly and severally civilly liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) whose amounts to be indemnified were established in the judgment in favor of the duly legitimated civil plaintiffs. The remand is omitted because there exists a pecuniary liquidation made by the a quo, when civilly convicting the accused E, for which the civilly convicted parties must respond jointly and severally, through the corresponding legal channel.” There is no legal rule that empowers third parties to bring a direct action against the insurer, by reason of an alleged fault committed by one of its insureds, since the cited provisions are limited solely to establishing, among the requirements for forming security companies, the possession of an insurance policy, which is binding only for those interested in providing private security services. Specifically, regarding what is relevant, the Law for the Regulation of Private Security Services, in article 13 subsection f), states: “*Natural or legal persons that provide the services described in article 2 of this Law must comply with the following minimum requirements…execute with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros the corresponding workers' compensation (riesgos del trabajo) policy and a civil liability (responsabilidad civil) policy. The minimum legal amount for legal persons and the equivalent of fifty times the legal minimum wage for natural persons, as defined in the ordinary budget law in force at the time of filing the application. Independent applicants may execute the workers' compensation policy, if they wish…*”. That is to say, this legal guideline does not in itself imply a right in favor of third parties that empowers them to bring a direct action against the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, since its condition is never understood as that of a civilly liable party under any scenario (except for damage or harm caused by its direct operation), but rather the indemnity payment is assumed by said entity by reason of an existing contract in which a policy is granted to the contracting party whose coverage encompasses a percentage of the damages that the insured party who holds the status of civilly liable party must pay. Hence, its obligation to third parties does not derive from the law, or, in the words of the appellant, “from a compulsory insurance,” but rather its relationship is purely contractual and, in accordance with article 1025 of the Civil Code, binds only the acting parties; and should any type of liability on the part of the insured entity be determined, it will be the latter that must respond directly, or failing that, decide whether to execute the corresponding policy within the limits of its coverage. Thus, the contractual nature of the relationship entered into by […] S.A. with the insurance institute having been determined, it is necessary to note that the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been very clear in stating that: “*…Integrating the transcribed norms, it is inferred that the accessory nature (accesoriedad) of the civil action is manifested in the necessary judicial investigation of a punishable act, and its purpose is to provide for the compensation of damages occurring as a result of it; however, the basis for actually ordering the indemnity or restitution does not rest on proving the existence of the crime, but rather, even if there is no conduct deserving that classification, the duty to compensate may be imposed, applying the norms that directly order it (e.g., civil wrong, strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), etc.). In both scenarios, the object of the litigation is constituted by tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual), and this is the limit that defines the jurisdiction and powers of the criminal judge in hearing the civil action. What the appellant seeks is to have the clause of a contract executed between his represented party (a vehicle rental company) and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros annulled within this proceeding. As can be seen, the ruling requested is, in essence, on purely contractual aspects, which exceed the jurisdiction assigned to this Chamber (and to criminal courts in general), since, despite the undeniable link of that clause with the compensation to be made as a result of the punishable act that was investigated, the fact is that the source of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros’s liability derives only from an agreement, that is, we are facing liability arising from contract and not from the punishable act itself. The latter constitutes merely the “accident (siniestro),” “risk (riesgo),” or “contingency (contingencia)” provided for in the agreement; it constitutes a triggering prerequisite for the contractually stipulated consequences to take effect, but not the legal source of these. In other words, from the investigated crime, in itself, no liability arises for the insurance entity; rather, its source is entirely contractual in origin. Now, criminal courts, when defining the ‘civilly liable party,’ can only resort to what has been established in legal norms.* …In the present case, we find ourselves in a similar situation, because if the contract executed by the civil plaintiff with the insurance entity is the direct source of the latter’s liability, and the agreement, for its part, contains a clause that exonerates it under certain circumstances, the point that the appellant asks to be elucidated shifts from the matter of liability (contractual, in any case) and focuses on the validity of an agreement. That is, the purity and legality of the very source of the obligation are discussed, an aspect that ultimately falls to be heard in other forums, distinct from the criminal one, if said validity is not affected by a crime being aired in the same proceeding…” (Sala Tercera. Voto 53-98 of 9:45 a.m. on January 16, 1998). In accordance with the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit, as it is considered that the Trial Court correctly found the lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as a civil defendant.

**VIII.- *On the civil liability of the State:* ** In the cassation appeal filed by attorneys William Guido Madriz and Andrés Arnoldo Pérez González, the failure to observe articles 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 11, 39, and 41 of the Constitución Política; 8.1 of the Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos; and 14 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos is alleged. In support of the foregoing, they argue that the Judge erred in considering that the State was not civilly liable for the events that occurred. The appellants consider that there was a clear violation of the Constitución Política and the Ley General de Policía, which safeguards as a social guarantee the surveillance and security of citizens, guarantees that were neglected in the locality of […] (with approximately five thousand inhabitants), by having only four police officers and a motorcycle in poor condition to confront the different types of criminality suffered by the area given the great tourist and commercial development that has characterized it in recent years. On the other hand, the appellant states that the State acted with lack of skill (impericia) and imprudence in confronting the hostage crisis that occurred inside the agency of the […], especially because there was already news that near the mountains of Santa Elena, a gang of robbers was roaming that had entered through the {…], of which officers of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial had knowledge and that this fact had also been brought to the attention of the Security authorities of the […] and of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública itself; however, inexplicably the Trial Court considered that the assault and its regrettable consequences were the product of acts of a third party, in which case the State was exempted from liability. **The claim is not admissible:** It is commonly accepted that the State has the obligation to regulate the performance of all activities whose exercise may result in dangerous consequences for citizens, as well as the fact that it is only through a state policy of crime prevention and control, and its respective repression, that the existence of the various police forces makes sense. However, there is a social consensus in assuming, within the normal everyday life of the integral development of every human being, various inherently risky activities that prevent the State from avoiding every negative consequence, by reason of weighing the benefits they generate, and which form part of what in civil matters is called “the general risk of life” (In this regard, see Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marcos. *“Responsabilidad Civil”.* Tomo II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p. 153. Likewise, Matthias Madrich. *“Das allgemeine Lebensrisiko: Ein Beitrag Zur Lehre Von Der Haftungsbegrenzung Im Schadensersatzrecht”* Editorial Duncker y Humblot, p.13, 14, 41. Cited by Reyes Alvarado Yesid. *Imputación Objetiva.* 2005. p.92). However, this so-called “general risk of life” does not exclude, per se, the state obligation to respond for the breach of its obligations to the citizen, for the consequences caused by its lawful or unlawful operation. In view of such circumstances, in the present case, the appellant seeks to attribute the civil liability for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that occurred in the Agencia of the […], to the Administración, by reason of the defective exercise of police functioning, which —in the opinion of the undersigned— is not admissible, due to the lack of a verifiable causal link (nexo causal) between the role of the police and the damages produced. Article 4 of the Ley General de Policía states: *“The police forces shall be at the service of the community; they shall be responsible for monitoring, preserving public order, preventing manifestations of criminality, and cooperating to repress them in the manner determined in the legal system.”* In the pursuit of community well-being and the protection of the personal rights and guarantees of all human beings, the State wages a constant and endless struggle against criminality, the latter which has been increasing its offensive power day by day in evident contempt for the various legal interests protected by our legal system, whether by professionalizing the illicit activity through different technological means, or by forming duly structured networks and organizations under the cover of a high degree of violence and disrespect for the rights of other persons. However, the purpose of ending crime does not exempt the State from liability for the damages it produces by reason of its deficient functioning, provided that it can be proven that said result is effectively attributable to poor service by the Administración or its officials. The tort liability of the State falls within a strict liability regime, which essentially seeks compensatory reparation for someone who has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. In this regard, the doctrine states: “*…Damage is no longer perceived as a product of misfortune or destiny. This leads to the idea that for every damage produced there must be a responsible party. This reduces and tends to eliminate the sphere of influence of ‘destiny,’ ‘chance,’ or ‘bad luck,’ at least in the legal field, and its place is occupied by the duty to compensate or repair the damage…”* (Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marco. *“Responsabilidad Civil”.* Tomo II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p.39). In accordance with this new approach, there will be liability of the Administración, whenever its normal or abnormal functioning causes damage that the victim does not have a duty to bear, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary (extrapatrimonial), regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, provided, of course, the essential prerequisite of the causal link (nexo causal) is met. This conception of state liability was clearly defined in judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia number 132 of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, which stated: “*…to thereby establish the direct liability of the State without the need to previously prove that the damage was caused by the fault of the official or the Administración, requiring for the admissibility of the indemnity that the damage suffered be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group —article 196—. It established that the Administración would be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate functioning, normal or abnormal, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party —article 190—; and the obligation to repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its employees committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even if for purposes or activities or acts unrelated to said mission —article 191—…*” (In this same sense, see, among many others, judgments of said Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996; and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.) Under this system of strict liability, it is not necessary for there to be intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) attributable to public officials for the duty to compensate for the damages caused by its operation to arise. However, this liability of the Administración Pública, which has a clear constitutional basis (In this regard, see votes number 5207-2004, of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004; in the same sense see vote 211-05 of 9:40 a.m. on April 7, 2005 of the Sala Constitucional), cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted compensatory (resarcitorio) duty applicable to all hypotheses of injury, as that would be an irrational system. Therefore, one of the limits for attributing strict civil liability is the necessary demonstration of a causal link. In this regard, article 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública states that the damage must be due to the “functioning of the Administración,” for which it is essential to determine whether the harmful result is the product of state functioning. In the specific case, it was considered proven that the harmful and damaging result was due to the attack caused by E and company on the premises of the […] (see folios 1796-1801), definitively determining the criminal and civil (subjective) liability of the accused as a subject completely unrelated to the Administración Pública. Now, the appellant argues that the consequences produced were due to an act of omission (acto omisivo) by the State for not providing the necessary resources to prevent crime in the area and a lack of expertise in how to handle a crisis like the one that occurred. It is worth clarifying that within the “functioning” referred to in article 190 of the cited Law, the possibility of contemplating acts of mere inactivity exists. This is expressed in the jurisprudence of the Sala Primera, which states: “*Currently, the act of omission (conducta omisiva), called ‘inactivity of the Administración,’ both in its formal aspect (insofar as it results in a presumed act due to administrative silence) and its material aspect (basically referring to the service-provision (prestacional) sphere of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in fulfilling a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside of an administrative procedure, the Administración breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other mechanism of self-binding (autovinculación), such as its own act or consensual instruments, directly harming a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship or not. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, for the entity or public body, there exists an obligation to give or to do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision of its own, inside or outside an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity that brings the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective*...” (Sala Primera, vote 74-F-2007, of 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007). Having clarified the possibility of understanding acts of omission (actos omisivos) within the postulates contemplated in the norms corresponding to the strict liability of the State, in this gradual examination of the basis of the present claim, it is appropriate to analyze whether the alleged pathological administrative-police inactivity influenced the damage that occurred. In the production of the harmful result, several factors frequently concur, among which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (regarding proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, see the already cited judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. N° 252-F-01, of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001), in order to determine the party responsible for the damage that occurred. In the present case, strict civil liability cannot be attributed to the State, in accordance with the arguments presented, since the number of personnel assigned to said delegation, as well as the condition of the means of transport they had, are mainly focused on the reasonable demand for prevention that can be made of the police, in the face of a crisis previously caused by such a criminal organization.

That is to say, even assuming the hypothesis that the police delegation of […] had, at the time of the events, a larger number of officials and suitable vehicles for their transport, the criminal attack could not have been avoided, and consequently, it must be understood that the alleged act of omission (acto omisivo) by the state's functioning cannot be considered the cause of the lamentable outcome, since its required or expected activity, in light of a reasonableness (razonabilidad) criterion, is impossible to interpret as a suitable mechanism to impede, foresee, or dismantle any attempted altercation before it occurs. Otherwise, the Administration would be required to answer for any impairment produced in the national territory, caused or not by its functioning, which would indeed be an overreach of the normative scope established in the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has indicated: "…In our legal system, the specific point then consists of determining when we are facing the 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning' of the Administration and when, consequently, to consider the damage produced as a result of that activity... the core point lies in determining the scope and the correct interpretation that must be given to the causal relationship (relación de causalidad), that is, the indissoluble causal link between the damage and the activity or functioning of the Administration, essential for imputing liability for such damages to the public power. Herein lies the key to giving it the correct, reasonable, and rights-guaranteeing (garantista) scope expected of the institute of the State's patrimonial liability..." (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution N°432-f-98 at fifteen hours and ten minutes of May eleventh, nineteen ninety-eight). Consequently, despite the objective approach governing State civil liability, independently of the conduct of its officials, it cannot be overlooked that the rule requires determining whether the effective damage was produced by its "functioning," and if it is proven that the result is due to causes external to the State's competence, it would be inappropriate to attribute any type of civil liability to the Administration, without the presence of a causal link between its action or omission and the result produced. Therefore, the present claim is declared without merit.

**IX**.- **On the civil liability of the […].** [...] Before proceeding to its analysis, it is pertinent to make some considerations regarding consumer rights and defense, as well as the applicable liability regime. In this vein, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: *“The discovery of new materials, the implementation of new manufacturing methods, the development of communication media, the expansion and liberation of markets, the appearance of new sales methods, mass contracting, new contracting modalities, among other factors, have caused substantial changes in the market. Local markets of scarce dimensions have disappeared to make way for a mass market, where what matters to producers of goods and service providers is optimizing their profits, inciting the citizen, through product diversification and information manipulation, to consumption in an indiscriminate and irrational manner, a situation that produces true situations of superiority of the former over the latter, leading to an abuse of their situation to achieve their ends. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber has stated: 'II...it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of consumer goods that they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant conclusion of contracts in a personal capacity. Therefore, their relationship in this commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies full knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included herein, in a harmonious mixture, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private parties' free disposition of their assets with the concurrence of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relationships among interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices to the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence...' (Vote N° 1441-92 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 3:45 p.m. on June 2, 1992). Faced with this situation of imbalance in consumer relations between businesspersons and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments prove unsatisfactory for protecting consumer interests, so the legislator, to avoid or at least mitigate as much as possible that disadvantageous situation of the citizen-consumer, has created diverse legal defense systems, trying to find a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers, thus compensating, in a certain way, for certain functional deficiencies of the market in the economic order. In this vein, through Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, article 46 of the Political Constitution was reformed, introducing a new fair economic right alongside the freedom of enterprise and as a delimiter thereof: consumer protection. (…) As a development of this new economic right and in compliance with this constitutional mandate, we have Law N° 7472, Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, of December 20, 1994, published in La Gaceta N° 14 of January 19, 1995, which contains a series of substantial and procedural rights in favor of consumers and users. Article 29 of said regulation states: ‘Without prejudice to what is established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary internal legislation, regulations, general principles of law, usages, and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a)- Protection against risks that may affect their health, their safety, and the environment. b)- The protection of their legitimate economic and social interests. (…) f)- Effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury thereof, as appropriate. (…) Among these rights, and in what is relevant to resolve this matter, it is important to highlight the rights of consumers or users to protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and environment, and to the repair of damage produced by the injury to these legal interests (subsections a and f). For the effective protection of these rights, the legislator adopted a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), with the clear interest of preventing victims of business manufacturing and commerce activities—activities per se generators of risks to physical integrity or the property of others—from potentially being left unprotected due to practically insurmountable evidentiary difficulties: ‘The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Only one who demonstrates that they have been uninvolved in the damage is released. The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as applicable, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production and control, respond jointly and severally, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer’ (Article 32, Law N° 7472 cited. Boldface not from the original). VII.- Strict liability, this Chamber has stated: ‘It is the result of a review of the institute of liability that became necessary when awareness was gained that the mold of fault was too narrow to contain the aspirations for justice crying out in an increasingly complex world. Demands of reality, the multiplication of dangers and damages characteristic of modern life, justified that in certain situations liability be treated as a credit of the victim that the defendant must rebut. The theory of risk, according to which whoever exercises or benefits from an activity with elements potentially dangerous to others must also bear its inconveniences, permeated most legislations and, in the case of Costa Rica, originates the fifth paragraph of this commentary. This theory is also called the theory of created risk, whose paradigm of imputation, as Professor Alterini refers, ‘...consists of attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it... it, he adds, ...’ dispenses with the subjectivity of the agent, and centers the problem of repair and its limits around material causation, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it to them without more. The production of the harmful result is sufficient for it; it does not require the configuration of an illicit act through traditional elements...’ (Alterini, Atilio. Responsabilidad Civil, Abeledo Perrot, III Ed., Buenos Aires, 1987, page 106). Consequently, the source of the obligation, in strict liability, is not the fault, negligence, etc., of the agent. Therefore, to rebut liability, it is of no importance that the latter manages to demonstrate that they were not imprudent, negligent, or inexperienced.’ (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, N° 61, at 2:50 p.m. on June 19, 1997). (…) In strict liability or liability for created risk ‘... the element of fault as a criterion of imputation is dispensed with, focusing on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the initiation of a dangerous activity, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation for this liability is the created risk, or the risk-creating conduct. For this reason, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and illegality...’ (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 376 at 2:40 p.m. on July 9, 1999). It starts from the hypothesis that the source of obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, which, by the mere fact of causing damage, obligate whoever uses them to repair the damage caused. There are three elements that make up this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing property damage; and c) the causal relationship or link (nexo de causa efecto) between the act and the damage. In summary ‘...in strict civil liability, there must be a causal link between the risky activity initiated by the agent and the damage caused’ (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 354 at 10:00 a.m. on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view—says the Costa Rican jurist Victor Pérez Vargas—‘...strict liability is summarized as an advantage in favor of the injured party, which means a partial reversal of the burden of proof, in the sense that they are exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (fault or fraud) of the party causing the damage, and any attempt by the latter to prove their lack of fault would be in vain...’ (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Private Law, I Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, page 417). That is, it is up to the person or company to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by the fault of the victim (a doctrine that informs numerals 32, second paragraph of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph of the Civil Code)” (Resolution number 646-F-2001 at 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001).- Under the protection of the foregoing, it is important to specify what the scope of the service provided by the […] is, in order to determine the civil liability regime applicable in the present case. In this same intellectual operation, the Trial Court held the following: *“…In that order of things, this adjudicating body considers that in the case under study, as was alleged by the legal representation of the defendant entity, the damages suffered by the civil plaintiffs do not derive from the financial intermediation services offered by the […] to its clients or users. Precisely, article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense prescribes: ‘The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks.- Only one who demonstrates that they have been uninvolved in the damage is released.- The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as applicable, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or facts or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. The technicians, those in charge of production and control, respond jointly and severally, when appropriate, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer. (Thus, its numbering modified by article 80 of Law N° 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 32 to 35)’.- According to the transcribed legal provision, and adjusting its scope to the specific case, the liability of the […] would be engaged if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed in the following scenarios: a-) By reason of the financial intermediation service offered by it. Indeed, we must remember that ‘the current level of banking development allows distinguishing diverse types of banks, generally individualized by their specialty or function. There are deposit banks, development banks, agricultural and livestock banks, popular banks, rediscount banks, etc. All of them, whether or not they are so qualified by their corporate names and insofar as they professionally develop the function of financial intermediaries, can be called and are in fact qualified as 'banking entities or institutions.'' (RODRÍGUEZ AZUERO, Sergio. Contratos Bancarios. Su significación en América Latina. Bogotá, Biblioteca Felaban, Fourth Edition, 1990, p. 3). Ultimately, in his conclusions, Mr. Andrés Pérez González was clear in indicating that, according to the […]'s website, its function is to provide financial services to its clients. In other terms, the patrimonial liability of the defendant bank as a consequence of its condition as a merchant or supplier would be engaged if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed as a direct consequence of the financial intermediation service offered by it. In the case under study, it is evident that this has not occurred. b-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information regarding the financial intermediation service provided. From our perspective, in the case under study, due to the factual circumstances generating the claimed damages, it can be affirmed without fear of error that the civil plaintiffs did not suffer any impairment by reason of inadequate or insufficient information from the […] regarding its financial intermediation services. c-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information about the use or risks derived from its financial intermediation services. Ultimately, we must indicate that none of the civil plaintiffs has been caused damage by the […] as a consequence of a lack of information regarding the use of the financial intermediation services offered to them by the defendant banking entity. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal arrives at the conviction that in the case under study, it cannot be considered that we are in one of the scenarios contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense as generating civil liability for the merchant or supplier. This is so, because as we have deemed proven, the damages that the civil plaintiffs seek to have compensated derive from the action of a third party with no organic link to the defendant bank, nor any legal connection with the financial intermediation service offered by the banking entity. From our perspective, in the specific case, we are in one of the exclusion of liability cases contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. Indeed, the aforementioned article 35, in its second paragraph, provides that ‘only one who demonstrates that they have been uninvolved in the damage is released.’ In accordance with that provision, we consider that in the specific case, the […] is uninvolved in the damage caused by E to the civil plaintiffs. Without a doubt, as we have stated, the commission of an assault by a third party without any link to the services offered by the merchant or supplier breaks the causal link between the activity and the damage caused. Having said the above, we must determine if, in the case under study, the liability of the […] does not derive from the service itself but from the faults that have been imputed to it by the civil plaintiffs in their respective conclusions…" (see folios 1956-1957).* Contrary to this position set forth in the lower court’s judgment, this Chamber agrees with the appellants that the Tribunal made an incorrect application and interpretation of the “Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense” by holding that the damages caused did not occur by reason of the service provided by the banking entity and that their origin derives from the action of a third party without organic link to the Bank.

That interpretation stems from an erroneous equation of criminal causation (which seeks to define the efficient cause of the crime) with the examination of the causal link (nexo causal) arising between the crime and the damages caused, which is a matter of civil law. On the first point, as can be inferred from the facts the Court deemed proven, the criminal liability resulting from the qualified homicides perpetrated was attributed to the defendant E, and the subjective civil liability even coincides with the same person. However, to determine the possibility of establishing a potential strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), the formula to be applied transcends subjective or individual analysis, since the causal link (nexo causal) is determined by analyzing whether the damages arising from the unlawful act fall within the objective sphere of a consumption, use, or enjoyment relationship of a given good or service, without this ruling out the possibility that such liability may coincide with, or differ from, the subject upon whom criminal liability falls. In this regard, this Chamber has stated: “This is a clear case of so-called strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) or liability without fault. In the present case, it is necessary to determine the existence of a causal relationship between the mere provision of a service, namely, the provision of private educational services, and the damages suffered by the offended parties. If we were to hypothetically eliminate the provision of the service to the victims, the result would not have occurred, so that in applying the conditio sine qua non theory, we can conclude that there is a causal relationship between that provision and the harmful result. This means that the damages were produced precisely on the occasion of the service provided.” (Third Chamber. Vote 2005-1117, at 16:25 hours on September 29, 2005). In light of this perspective, regarding the specific case, one must ask what the people who were at the Branch of […] on the day of the altercation were doing, if not waiting to receive a service (whatever it may be) at said premises. It is irrelevant to determine whether they had already been served, were being served, or were going to be served at the moment they were attacked, or the nature of the act to be performed (financial, informational, statistical, economic), because contrary to what the lower court (a quo) stated, the institution's specialization in a specific area does not rule out its general banking nature. In this regard, the First Chamber recently indicated: “…In the opinion of this Chamber, the mere fact of not acquiring a product, or requesting a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, supplier, or merchant from liability in those cases where the user is injured as a result of the good or service received. The term ‘consumer,’ referring to the plaintiff’s legal status when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of purchaser. In accordance with the constitutional standard, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application for persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not contingent upon a ‘consumer contract,’ because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who buys or contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they be conceived of as clients, understood as those who participate in commercial activities in the position of potential acquirers—and not effective buyers—of goods and services from the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract the good or service but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety. Thus, the specific needs for protection for Mr. Erick Streber Umaña originate from his status as a user of a parking lot offered as part of the supermarket's services for its clients, regardless of whether he made a purchase or not. In the present case, the necessary elements to impute that liability have been demonstrated, as already stated: a means creating danger or risk was used that is part of the defendant's economic structure—the Hipermás supermarket parking lot in San Sebastián; damage was caused that is determined by the injury suffered to the plaintiff's legal sphere—the dispossession or loss of vehicle license plate […] owned by him; and the cause-and-effect relationship between the act and the damage—the theft or robbery of the motor vehicle in the CSU parking lot. In short, that injury was the product of the theft of the good that was located in the Hipermás supermarket parking lot in San Sebastián…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote: 000295-F-2007 at 10:45 hours on April 26, 2007). In this line of reasoning, it is deemed proven that the people who came to that institution that day did so in their capacity as “users” or “consumers” of the banking services offered at the Branch of […], where, in accordance with the institutional policy of said entity, security service is provided to everyone who enters its premises to carry out any transaction, due to the high risk involved in a commercial activity of a monetary nature. Furthermore, even assuming that the institution did not have such security mechanisms, its obligation to answer for what occurred within its premises is imminent from the moment it undertakes the performance of a banking commercial activity intended for service to the general public, regardless of whether its nature is public or private. Based on the preceding premise, using logic and reason, it must be understood that if banking services (of any nature) were not offered at that location, there would be no reason for persons unrelated to the company to be on such premises. However, in the specific case, even understanding that the criminal action was the product of a third party unrelated to the financial entity, the exception to liability contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense does not apply, which states: “…Only one is released who proves that they were unrelated to the damage,” because attributing the criminal action to a subject other than the merchant does not necessarily exclude the latter from being civilly liable, as what is important is to determine whether the damage is produced within the sphere of the service provided. In a comparative analysis of the present case with the position expressed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in the judgment previously cited, it is observed that in the opinion of that judicial authority, the criminal act committed by an antisocial element with no relationship to the sued Supermarket does not rule out the latter's strict civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) for the damages produced, by reason of having occurred within the sphere of the service provided to the user, without needing to consider whether the client completed a purchase, or whether the vehicle parking service falls within the commercial nature of a supermarket. It is specifically stated: “…The objection raised by the appellant that vehicle custody service is not provided in that area, that it is not a public parking lot, and that physical spaces are not rented, is not admissible, as it contravenes Articles 46 of the Political Constitution and 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. From the relationship between these precepts, the guiding principle arises that establishes a strict liability regime (régimen objetivo de responsabilidad) in consumer relations, which in turn correspond to a special regime. The matter concerning the nature of the parking lot does not exclude its scope of application, because that service forms an integral part of the economic and logistical structure of the commercial establishment that originated its use… The owner of the business offering the parking facility to its clients, potential consumers, is liable, despite any warnings they might have posted to the contrary. The thesis that its use is free and, moreover, corresponds to a service independent of the sale of the products offered in the supermarket, contravenes the protective principles of the consumer and user… This ancillary service constitutes a duty of protection for the merchant, creating an obligation towards those who park in that place. That is, they are obligated to guard, keep, and return the vehicle (Articles 698 and 1349 of the Civil Code), as a direct derivation of the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) imposed by law. In harmony with what has been indicated, it is inconsequential whether the plaintiff made an effective purchase in the supermarket or not; therefore, the accused violations do not occur, and the objection must be dismissed…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote: 000295-F-2007 at 10:45 hours on April 26, 2007). Likewise, in the case at bar, the crime is committed by a subject with no link to […]; however, the latter's relationship to the damage is undeniable, by reason of the service it provides to its users, including among these the security service, the analysis of which will be resumed in the following recital (considerando). Consequently, this ground for appeal is granted; the judgment is partially annulled, solely concerning the civil liability of […]. In application of Article 35 of Law 7472 on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, […] is civilly condemned, based on the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) incumbent upon it, to pay the damages duly determined in the judgment to those whose civil actions were upheld, which is why the corresponding remand judgment is omitted. An express ruling on the other specific grounds aimed at demonstrating the liability of the banking entity, or evidencing the intellectual evaluative errors of the judgment with respect to the point in question, is omitted as unnecessary.

X.- On the civil liability of the company “[…]” […] On the issue in question, this Chamber considers that the company “[…] S.A.” is indeed civilly liable, but for reasons different from those alleged by the appealing parties. However, Lic. Torrealba Navas is not mistaken in highlighting the effective cause of said company's liability, affirming that it is an integral part within the entities responsible for providing the service offered at the banking institution. Doctrinally it is established: “…economically efficient contractual networks are phenomena that cannot be considered as simple obligatory contractual relationships, since their density is such that the network presents itself to third parties as a unit… In these cases, it is evident that it is necessary to introduce the principle of the contractual network's liability, which can be reached through the theory of double imputation. The central idea is, then, that what in the commerce of men appears as a unit must be considered, on the legal plane, as a unit. The collective must answer, therefore, as a whole. The risks can then be distributed internally.” (RIVERO SANCHEZ, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil. Tomo II”. Second Edition, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). In accordance with this approach, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the action of the persons in charge of banking security, whether there was fault, negligence, lack of skill, or a contractual breach, as the appellants seek to demonstrate in their arguments, since what is important in the present case is the role that the security company in question plays as part of an “efficiently contractual network.” This position finds support in the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, which in its Article 32 states: “The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must answer, concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, by inadequate or insufficient information about them, or by their use and risks.” That is, as dictated by this rule, every intervenor in the chain of production of the good or service possesses strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) (independently of fault), and simultaneously joint, several, and concurrent liability (responsabilidad solidaria) among themselves and toward the consumer or recipient of the service. Applying the foregoing to the specific case, it is clear that […], by reason of the risky activity it conducts (because it implicitly involves the movement of large economic capital within its premises intended for public service), has the obligation to answer for the damages caused to its users while they are inside the branch. For this, it is irrelevant whether it had sufficient material and human resources in terms of security; whether the choice of protection mechanisms was correct; whether actions were taken contrary to what was indicated by a possible action protocol in the face of attacks like the one that occurred; or whether the banking entity was aware of the increased risk posed by local crime, since it has been clearly established that all the people who were in the banking premises at that moment were expecting to receive a service from said institution. Now then, there exists a contract-bid (Public Bid Record number 1776-2004) signed between […] and […] S.A., which, far from being understood within the framework of the principle of “privity of contracts,” is a means that allows for verifying that the latter serves as a provider of a service (security) that the former provides to the user. That is, it is clear that they are two entities of a different nature (legal, organizational, and operational), but that both form part of the production chain of a service, or rather, of an “economically efficient contractual network,” and consequently, viewed as “a unit” before the recipient of the service. In this regard, Article 2 of the cited Law states: “(…) For the purposes of this Law, the producer, as a supplier of goods, is also obligated toward the consumer, to respect their rights and legitimate interests (…).” In other words, the law empowers the consumer, user, or final recipient of a good or service to bring action against the merchant, producer, or supplier indiscriminately, understanding the latter as members of the so-called “chain of production,” so that they assume liability for the damages caused by reason of the goods and services provided by them, regardless of whether these are their primary or ancillary activity. On this level, it is clear that although the damages arise from the unlawful act perpetrated by the defendant, the fact is that this occurs within the sphere of the banking service provided at the Branch of […], in which establishment the sued company was committed to providing efficient mechanisms to guarantee the security and integrity of the users by reason of the contract existing between both sued institutions, thus forming an intrinsic part within the civilly liable unit and, as such, legally legitimized to answer according to Law 7472. Based on the foregoing, this claim is granted; the judgment is annulled regarding the dismissal of civil liability in favor of the security company […] S.A.; instead, it is declared civilly liable jointly and severally (en forma solidaria) for the damages whose sums to be indemnified were established in the judgment in favor of the duly legitimized civil plaintiffs. Remand is omitted because a monetary liquidation exists, carried out by the lower court (a quo), upon condemning defendant E civilly, for which the civilly condemned parties must answer jointly and severally (en forma solidaria) through the corresponding legal channel.” **VII.-** **<u>Regarding the Civil Liability of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros:</u>** Attorney Federico Torrealba alleges the improper application of Article 1025 of the Civil Code concerning the purported lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. He considers that the lower court (a quo) erred in stating there is no direct action against the insurer by virtue of the principle of privity of contract (relatividad contractual) (Article 1025 of the Civil Code). He states that in the contract-tender agreed between the […] (folio 1275), there is an insurance policy (póliza de seguros) issued by the insurer, effective from July 12, 2004, to July 12, 2005, with coverage up to one hundred five million colones, covering the liability of the direct insured for damages caused to third parties. In accordance with the provisions of Article 13, subsection f, of Law 8395 on Private Security Services, the policy is an obligation for the exercise of such activity. Consequently, unlike voluntary civil liability insurance where the legal cause is the patrimonial indemnity of the insured, in mandatory insurance, it is the compensation of the potential victim. In his view, it is not necessary for the legislator to expressly state that the potential victim can sue the INS, because there is no right without an action, meaning that if the potential victims of a risky activity have a right established by the legislator to be protected and compensated under an insurance policy that the person conducting that activity must obtain, they naturally also have the corresponding right of action. It is not necessary to create an action every time the legislator recognizes a right. **The claim is not admissible.** On this point, this Chamber considers it important to highlight the analysis conducted by the lower court (a quo) regarding the main arguments by which it found that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros lacked passive standing to face the civil claims of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the Tribunal reasons: *“…it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the insurer does not have passive standing to respond with respect to the civil claims filed against it. In the specific case, the civil plaintiffs who sued the Instituto Nacional de Seguro seek to derive their right against this autonomous institution from the insurance contract that the […] subscribed to. However, we must state that the insurance contract, like contracts in general, is governed by the principle of privity. This means that the contractual relationship only binds the parties involved in its execution, as the contract, as a legal transaction (negocio jurídico), has no effect with respect to third parties. Ultimately, our legal system establishes the cited principle in Article 1025 of the Civil Code which states: “Contracts produce effect only between the contracting parties; they do not harm third parties, nor do they benefit them, except as provided in the following articles.” In other terms, the contract only deploys its efficacy with respect to the parties that have intervened in its execution. Precisely, the Mazeauds, referring to the scope of Article 1165 of the French Civil Code, state: “The drafters of the French Civil Code, as a result of a lack of method that has been pointed out on various occasions, considered in Article 1.165 of the legal text only conventions and conventional obligations. But the principle established by them is valid for extracontractual obligations as well as for contractual obligations. Every obligation, whatever it may be, binds only the creditor and debtor designated by the contract or the law; it does not extend to third parties.” (MAZEAUD, Henri, León and Jean. Lecciones de Derecho Civil, Part Two, Tome III, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1969, p. 34-35). In this same vein, the cited authors assert: “The legal bond does not extend to third parties, who can neither demand the fulfillment of the obligation nor be subject to fulfilling it.” (Ibidem. p. 35). Consequently, it can be stated that in our jurisdiction, the civil liability insurance contract is characterized by its privity. Therefore, that contract will deploy all its efficacy between the contracting parties. In our jurisdiction, the insurance contract, even civil liability insurance, does not grant a direct action to the potential injured party to sue the insurer directly. In this sense, Francesco Messineo explains: “Therefore, the fundamental characteristic that differentiates civil liability insurance from other types of damage insurance lies in the fact that the object of the insurance – that is, the risk – is precisely the civil liability, that is, potentially, the entire assets of the responsible party, who must compensate the injured third party for all the damages caused, whereas, in other types, the risk threatens one or more specific things, that is, one or more given elements of those assets, and the loss necessarily has limited effects. / The injured third party can, by acting in subrogation, substitute the negligent insured and ask the insurer for the fulfillment of its obligation. They could not do so directly, because they have a right of their own, not against the insurer, but only against the person responsible for the damage (insured).” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tome IV, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 173). Consequently, we would have that in the case under study, the parties affected by the conduct displayed by the defendant (encartado) and civil defendant, E, do not have a direct action against the insurer. In any case, it is necessary to state that in the case under study, Attorney Federico Torrealba Navas, acting as special judicial attorney for the Estate (Sucesión) of ML, EM, JL, J, MV, and M, the latter three being […], has alleged that the insurance contract must be treated as a stipulation for the benefit of a third party (estipulación a favor de tercero), which is why the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as the insurer, is directly bound to the beneficiary of the stipulation derived from the business relationship. Said position is not acceptable. In this sense, we consider it appropriate to resort to French doctrine, given that the Napoleonic Code was the primary source of our Civil Code. Precisely, the Mazeauds, regarding the insurance contract, state: "An automobile driver insures himself, through the payment of premiums, against the damages he may cause with his car; through that liability insurance contract, the insurer obligates itself, if an accident occurs, to pay the insured the sum that would be necessary to compensate the victim. If the general principles of law were applied, the victim, creditor of the automobile driver, would only have an action against the latter; moreover, the insured's credit against the insurer would constitute security for the general creditors of the insured; the victim would therefore find themselves, even for this credit, in competition with the other creditors of the person causing the damage, and would thus run the risk of not being fully compensated. A disconcerting result, because the credit arises in favor of the insured by reason of the harm suffered by the victim; thus, it is appropriate to prevent other creditors from indirectly benefiting from the consequences of the accident by being paid from the sum paid by the insurer. / To achieve this, one could have tried to discover in the liability insurance contract a stipulation for the benefit of a third party and for the benefit of the potential victim; but that analysis would not take into account the real will of the parties: the insured wants to free himself from the pecuniary consequences of his liability, and not stipulate for the benefit of the victims. / The intervention of the legislator has avoided that adventurous construction. The law of July 13, 1930 (art. 53), by extending to all terrestrial liability insurance the limited provisions of the law of February 19, 1889 (fires) and of the law of May 28, 1913 (... accidents), grants the victim a direct right over the sum owed by the insurer: the victim is directly a creditor of the insurer; they possess a direct action against them..." (MAZEAUD, Henri, León and Jean. Op. cit. p. 93-94). Precisely, the author Carlos Domínguez Domínguez shows us how, in the Spanish legal system, the intervention of the legislator was required to admit the direct action of the injured party against the insurer. In that sense, the cited author writes: “Art. 76 of the Insurance Contract Law of October 8, 1980, institutionalizes the so-called ‘direct action’, by virtue of which, the party injured by an action generating civil liability, despite not having been a party to the contract signed between the insurer and the policyholder, by reason of which the former assumed on its assets the risk that fell on that of the insured in exchange for the corresponding premium, has standing to proceed against the former to claim the corresponding compensation. / The traditional inconveniences of the principle of privity of contracts are thus overcome - art.

1.257 of the C.C.-, which obliged the injured party to have to resort to bringing actions against the debtor (direct action against this responsible party and the revocatory action against him and third parties affected by acts of the former carried out in fraud of creditors), or in substitution of the same (subrogatory action (acción subrogatoria) supplementing his inactivity in the defense of his rights), but which, precisely because of that marginality in the insurance contract, prevented them from proceeding directly against the insurer. / It is, in the words of our Case Law (42), a matter of allowing the victims of losses arising from risks covered by the policy, to enforce through the direct action against the insurance company, the rights that protect the insureds themselves by virtue of the contract, because the interest of the injured third party breaks into the typical contractual scheme, causing the traditional rule res inter alios acta to be broken, on an exceptional basis.” (Professional and Civil Liability Insurance, Insurance Law, Spain, Consejo General del Poder General, 1995, p. 487 a 517). As can be observed, for the direct action (sic) sought by the representative of said civil plaintiffs to arise against the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the existence of a legal rule that so establishes is required. Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that in the case under study, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros lacks passive standing to answer for the claim raised…” (see folios 1913-1917).- Having analyzed the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the lower court does not err in finding a lack of passive standing on the part of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, without prejudice to the fact that in other instances its obligation – eventual – to assume the pecuniary consequences that may be attributed to the insured company if it is declared civilly liable may be determined. Under this same line of analysis, it is of special importance to indicate that the nature of the relationship that exists between the insuring entity with respect to the case in question does not allow affirming the presence of a direct link of civil liability, subjective or objective, with respect to the harmful consequences produced, since the only existing link arises by reason of its acting as the insurer of the sued security company. On this point, it is irrelevant whether what was acquired by the company is “voluntary or mandatory insurance” (seguro voluntario u obligatorio), since the nature of the liability that obligates said entity to fulfill an indemnity payment in this case is solely “the insurance contract” signed with the company […] S.A. (see labeled file number 4, of bidding process number 1776-2004, regarding the contracting of security and surveillance services for branches, agencies, and offices of […], folios 1254-1295) and not the law cited by the appellant. There is no legal rule that empowers third parties to bring a direct action against the insuring entity by reason of an alleged fault committed by one of its insureds, since the regulation cited is limited –only– to establishing, within the requirements for forming security companies, the need to have an insurance policy, which is binding only for those interested in providing private security services. Specifically, as relevant here, the Law for the Regulation of Private Security Services (Ley de Regulación de los Servicios de Seguridad Privados), in subsection 13 f), states: “Individuals or legal entities that provide the services described in Article 2 of this Law must meet the following minimum requirements… subscribe with the Instituto Nacional de Seguros the corresponding occupational risk insurance policy and a civil liability insurance policy. The legal minimum amount for legal entities is equivalent to fifty times the legal minimum wage for individuals, as defined in the ordinary budget law in force at the time of submitting the application. Applicants who work independently may subscribe the occupational risk insurance policy if they wish…”. That is to say, said legal guideline does not itself imply a right in favor of third parties that empowers them to bring a direct action against the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, since the condition of the same is never understood as civilly liable under any assumption (except for damage or harm caused by its direct operation), but rather the indemnity payment is assumed by said entity by reason of an existing contract in which a policy is granted to the contracting party, the coverage of which encompasses a percentage of the damages and losses that the insured who holds the status of civilly liable party must pay. Hence, its obligation toward third parties does not derive from the law, or, in the words of the appellant, “from mandatory insurance,” but rather, its relationship is merely contractual and, pursuant to Article 1025 of the Civil Code, only binds the acting parties, and in the event of determining any type of liability on the part of the insured entity, it will be the latter who must respond directly, or failing that, decide whether to execute the corresponding policy within the limits of its coverage. Thus, having determined the contractual nature of the relationship entered into by […] S.A. with the insurance institute, it is necessary to note that the case law of this Chamber has been very clear in stating that: “…Integrating the transcribed rules, it is inferred that the accessory nature (accesoriedad) of the civil action is manifested in the necessary judicial investigation of a punishable act, and its purpose is to order compensation for the damages that occurred as a result of it; however, the basis for effectively ordering the indemnity or restitution does not lie in proving the existence of the crime, but rather, even in the event that there is no conduct deserving that classification, the duty to compensate may be imposed, applying the rules that directly order it (e.g.: civil wrong, strict liability, etc.). In both assumptions, the object of the litigation is constituted by extracontractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) and it is this limit that defines the jurisdiction and powers of the criminal judge in hearing the civil action. What the appellant seeks is to annul, within this proceeding, a clause of a contract entered into between his represented party (vehicle rental company) and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. As can be seen, the ruling requested is, in essence, on purely contractual aspects that exceed the jurisdiction assigned to this Chamber (and to criminal courts, in general), since, despite the undeniable link of that clause with the compensation to be made as a result of the punishable act that was investigated, the truth is that the source of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros’ liability derives only from an agreement, that is, we are dealing with a liability arising from contract and not from the punishable act itself. The latter constitutes only the “claim,” “risk,” or “contingency” provided for in the agreement, it consists of a generating prerequisite for the contractually provided consequences to take effect, but not the legal source of these. In other terms, from the investigated crime itself, no liability arises for the insuring entity, but rather its source is of completely contractual origin. Now, criminal courts, when defining the ‘civilly liable party,’ can only resort to what has been established in the legal rules. …In the present case, we are dealing with a similar situation, because if the contract signed by the civil plaintiff with the insuring entity is the direct source of the latter's liability, and the agreement, for its part, contains a clause that exonerates it in certain circumstances, the point that the appellant requests to be elucidated shifts from the aspect of liability (contractual, in any case) and focuses on the validity of an agreement. That is to say, the purity and legality of the very source of the obligation are being discussed, an aspect that, definitively, must be heard in other venues, different from the criminal one, if said validity is not affected by a crime being ventilated in the same proceeding…” (Sala Tercera. Voto 53-98 of 9:45 a.m. on January 16, 1998). In accordance with the foregoing, the present claim is declared without merit, as it is considered that the Court correctly found a lack of passive standing of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as a civil defendant.

VIII.- Regarding the civil liability of the State: In the cassation appeal filed by attorneys William Guido Madriz and Andrés Arnoldo Pérez González, the failure to observe articles 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 11, 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política, 8.1 of the Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is alleged. In support of the foregoing, he points out that the Judge erred in considering that the State was not civilly liable for the events that occurred. The appellants consider that there was a clear violation of the Constitución Política and the Ley General de Policía, which safeguards as a social guarantee the surveillance and citizen security, which were neglected in the locality of […] (of approximately five thousand inhabitants), as it had only four police officers and a motorcycle in poor condition to face the different types of criminality suffered by the area given the great tourist and commercial development that has characterized it in recent years. On the other hand, the appellant states that the State acted with lack of skill and imprudence in confronting the hostage crisis that occurred inside the agency of the […], especially because there was already news that near the mountains of Santa Elena, a gang of assailants who had entered via the {…] was roaming, of which officials of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial had news and that they had also made this fact known to the Security authorities of the […] and the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública itself; however, in an inexplicable manner, the Trial Court considered that the assault and its lamentable consequences were the product of acts of a third party, in which case the State was exempted from liability. The claim is not admissible: It is commonly accepted that the State has the obligation to regulate the performance of all those activities from the exercise of which dangerous consequences for citizens may derive, as well as the fact that it is only through a policy of State prevention and control of delinquency, and its respective repression, that the existence of the different police forces makes sense. However, there is a social consensus in assuming, within the normal daily life of the integral development of every human being, different activities that are inherently risky, which prevent the State from avoiding every negative consequence, due to the weighing of the benefits they generate, and which form part of what in civil matters is called “the general risk of life” (In this regard, see Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Volume II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p. 153. Similarly, Matthias Madrich. “Das allgemeine Lebenzrisiko: Ein Beitrag Zur Lehre Von Der Haftugnsbegrenzung Im Schadensersatzrecht” Editorial Duncker y Humblot, p.13, 14, 41. Cited by Reyes Alvarado Yesid. Imputación Objetiva. 2005. p.92). However, this so-called “general risk of life” does not exclude per se the State's obligation to respond for the breach of its obligations toward the citizen, for the consequences caused by its lawful or unlawful operation. In view of such circumstances, in the present case, the appellant seeks to attribute the civil liability for the damages and losses that occurred in the Agencia of the […] to the Administración, by reason of the defective exercise of police operation, which –in the opinion of the undersigned– is not admissible, due to the lack of a verifiable causal link (nexo causal) between the role of the police and the damages produced. Article 4 of the Ley General de Policía states: “The police forces shall be at the service of the community; they shall be responsible for watching over, preserving public order, preventing manifestations of delinquency and cooperating to repress them in the manner determined in the legal system.” In the pursuit of the well-being of the community and the safeguarding of the rights and personal guarantees of all human beings, the State wages a constant and endless struggle against criminality, which, day by day, has been increasing its offensive power in evident disregard for the different legal interests protected by our legal system, whether by professionalizing the illicit activity in accordance with different technological means, or through the formation of networks and organizations duly structured under the protection of a high degree of violence and disrespect for the rights of other people. Notwithstanding, the purpose of ending delinquency does not exempt the State from liability for the damages it produces by reason of its deficient operation, provided that it can be proven that said result is effectively attributable to a poor service from the Administración or its officials. The extracontractual civil liability of the State falls within an strict liability (régimen objetivo) regime, which essentially seeks the compensatory reparation for whoever has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. In this regard, the doctrine states: “…Damage is no longer perceived as a product of misfortune or destiny. This leads to the idea that for every damage produced there must be a responsible party. With this, the sphere of influence of ‘destiny,’ ‘chance,’ or ‘bad luck’ is reduced and tends to disappear, at least in the legal field, and its place is occupied by the duty to compensate or repair the damage…” (Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marco. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Volume II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p.39). According to this new approach, there will be liability of the Administración whenever its normal or abnormal operation causes damage that the victim does not have the duty to bear, whether economic or non-economic (extrapatrimonial), independently of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, obviously fulfilling the essential prerequisite of the causal link (nexo causal). This concept of State liability was clearly defined in the judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia number 132 of 3 p.m. on August 14, 1991, in which it was stated: “…to thus establish the direct liability of the State without the need to previously prove that the damage was caused by the fault of the official or the Administración, requiring for the applicability of the indemnity that the damage suffered be effective, assessable and individualizable (individualizable) in relation to a person or group - Article 196-. It established that the Administración would be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party - Article 190-; and the obligation to repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even when for purposes or activities or acts extraneous to said mission - Article 191-...” (In this same sense, see, among many others, the judgments of said Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996 and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.) Under this strict liability system, the existence of intentional misconduct or fault attributable to public servants is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by their operation to arise. However, this liability of the Administración Pública, which has a clear constitutional basis (In this regard, see votes number 5207-2004, of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004; in the same sense, see vote 211-05 of 9:40 a.m. on April 7, 2005 of the Sala Constitucional), cannot be interpreted either as an unrestricted compensatory (resarcitorio) duty applicable to all hypotheses of injury, as that would be an irrational system. Therefore, one of the limits of the imputation of strict civil liability is the necessary demonstration of a causal link (nexo causal). In this regard, subsection 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública states that the damage must be due to the “operation of the Administración,” for which it is essential to determine if the harmful result is the product of State operation. In the specific case, it was considered proven that the harmful and injurious result was due to the attack perpetrated by E and company on the premises of the […] (see folios 1796-1801), defining without a doubt the criminal and civil (subjective) liability of the accused as a subject totally extraneous to the Administración Pública. Now, the appellant argues that the consequences produced were due to an omission (omisivo) by the State for not providing the necessary resources to prevent delinquency in the area and the lack of skill in the manner of addressing a crisis like the one that occurred. It is worth clarifying that within the “operation” referred to in Article 190 of the Law cited, the possibility of contemplating acts of mere inactivity is included. This is expressed by the case law of the Sala Primera, stating: “At present, the omission (omisiva) conduct, called ‘inactivity of the Administración,’ both in its formal aspect (to the extent that it results in a presumed act due to administrative silence) and material aspect (referring basically to the service-providing (prestacional) sphere of the administrative organization).

Thus, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission to fulfill a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside of an administrative procedure, the Administration fails, by omission, to comply with an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding (autovinculación) mechanism, such as its own act or consensual instruments, with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, an obligation to give or to do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision of the public entity or body exists, whether outside or within an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective..." (First Chamber, vote 74-F-2007, at 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007). Having clarified the possibility of understanding acts of omission (actos omisivos) within the postulates contemplated in the regulations corresponding to the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the State, in this gradual examination of the basis of the present claim, it is appropriate to analyze whether the alleged pathological administrative-police inactivity influenced the damage that occurred. In the production of the harmful result, several factors frequently concur, within which it is necessary to determine those that are directly or indirectly the efficient (eficiente) and adequate (adecuada) cause of the harm caused (regarding the proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, see the aforementioned judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. No. 252-F-01, at 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001), in order to determine the party responsible for the damage that occurred. In the present case, strict civil liability cannot be attributed to the State, in accordance with the allegations presented, since the quantity of personnel assigned to said delegation, as well as the condition of the means of transport available to them, primarily relate to the reasonable requirement of prevention that can be demanded of the police, given the crisis previously provoked by said criminal organization. That is to say, even assuming that the police delegation of [...], had at the time of the events, a greater number of officers and suitable vehicles for their transport, the criminal attack could not have been prevented, and consequently, it must be understood that the alleged omission (acto omisivo) in State functioning cannot be considered the cause of the unfortunate outcome, since its due or expected activity in light of a standard of reasonableness (razonabilidad) is impossible to interpret as a suitable mechanism to impede, foresee, or dismantle any attempt at an altercation before it occurs. Otherwise, the Administration would be required to answer for any impairment produced in the national territory, whether or not caused by its functioning, which would truly be exceeding the normative scope established in the General Law of the Public Administration. In this regard, the case law of this Chamber has indicated: "...In our legal system, the concrete point then consists in determining when we are facing the 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning' of the Administration and when, consequently, to consider the damage produced as a result of said activity... the core point lies in determining the scope and in the correct interpretation that must be given to the causal relationship, that is, the inseparable causal link (nexo causal) between the damage and the activity or functioning of the Administration, essential for imputing liability, for such damages, to the public authority. Herein lies the key to giving it the correct, reasonable, and rights-guaranteeing (garantista) scope expected of the institute of the State's patrimonial liability ..." (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution No. 432-F-98 at three ten p.m. on May eleventh, nineteen ninety-eight). Consequently, despite the strict liability approach that governs State civil liability, regardless of the actions of its officials, it cannot be overlooked that the law requires determining whether the effective damage was produced by its "functioning," and if it is proven that the result is due to causes beyond State competence, it would be improper to attribute any type of civil liability to the Administration, without the presence of a causal link between its action or omission and the result produced. Therefore, the present claim is declared without merit.

IX.- On the civil liability of the [...]. [...] Before proceeding to its analysis, it is pertinent to make some considerations regarding consumer rights and protection, as well as the applicable liability regime. In this line of thought, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "The discovery of new materials, the implementation of new manufacturing methods, the development of communication media, the expansion and liberalization of markets, the appearance of new sales methods, mass contracting, new modalities of contracting, among other factors, have caused substantial changes in the market. Local markets of scarce dimensions have disappeared to make way for a mass market, where what matters to producers of goods and service providers is optimizing their profits, inciting the citizen, through diversification of products and manipulation of information, to indiscriminate and irrational consumption, a situation that produces genuine situations of superiority of the former over the latter, leading to an abuse of their position to achieve their ends. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber has stated: 'II... it is notorious that the consumer finds themselves at the extreme end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they require to acquire for their personal satisfaction and their participation in this process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant execution of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship in this commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it with full freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included by the above, in a harmonious blend, are several constitutional principles, such as the State's concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private individuals the free disposition of their assets with the concurrence of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relationships among interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices to the domestic system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence...' (Vote No. 1441-92 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 3:45 p.m. on June 2, 1992). Faced with this situation of imbalance in consumer relations between entrepreneurs and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments prove insufficient to protect consumer interests, so the legislator, to avoid or at least mitigate as much as possible that disadvantageous situation of the citizen-consumer, has created various legal defense systems trying to find a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers, thus compensating, in a certain way, for certain functional deficiencies of the market in the economic order. In that line of thought, through Law No. 7607 of May 29, 1996, Article 46 of the Political Constitution was reformed, introducing a new fair economic right alongside the freedom of enterprise and as a delimiter thereof: consumer protection. (...) As a development of this new economic right and in compliance with this constitutional mandate, we have Law No. 7472, Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, of December 20, 1994, published in La Gaceta No. 14 of January 19, 1995, which contains a series of substantive and procedural rights in favor of consumers and users. Article 29 of said regulation states: 'Without prejudice to the provisions of international treaties, conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, uses, and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a)- Protection against risks that may affect their health, their safety, and the environment. b)- Protection of their legitimate economic and social interests. (...) f)- Effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, which lead to adequately preventing, promptly sanctioning, and repairing the injury thereof, as applicable. (...) Among these rights, and with regard to what is relevant for resolving the present matter, it is important to highlight the rights of consumers or users to protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment, and to the reparation of the damage caused by the injury to these legal interests (subsections a and f). For the effective protection of these rights, the legislator adopted a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), with the clear interest of preventing the victims of manufacturing and commercial business activities—activities per se generating risks to physical integrity or the property of others—from being left unprotected due to practically insurmountable evidentiary difficulties: 'The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. Only one who demonstrates that they have been unconnected to the damage is released. The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or deeds or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. Technicians, those in charge of preparation and control respond jointly and severally, when applicable, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer' (Article 32, Law No. 7472 cited. Bold is not from the original). VII.- Strict liability, this Chamber has stated: 'It is the result of a review of the institute of liability that became necessary when the realization dawned that the mold of fault was too narrow to contain the aspirations of justice that clamored in an increasingly complex world. Demands of reality, the multiplication of the dangers and damages inherent in modern life, justified that in certain situations liability be treated as a credit of the victim that the defendant had to rebut. The theory of risk, according to which whoever exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements for others must also bear its inconveniences, permeated most legislation, and in the case of Costa Rica, it gives rise to paragraph V of the commentary. This theory is also called the theory of created damage, whose paradigm of imputation, as Professor Alterini states, '...rests on attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element of producing it... it,' he adds, '...dispenses with the subjectivity of the agent, and centers the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it without further ado. The production of the harmful result is sufficient; it does not require the configuration of an illicit act through the traditional elements...' (Alterini, Atilio. Responsabilidad Civil, Abeledo Perrot, III Ed., Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). Consequently, the source of the obligation, in strict liability, is not the fault, negligence, etc., of the agent. Therefore, to rebut liability, it is of no importance that the latter manages to demonstrate that they were not imprudent, negligent, or inexperienced' (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 61, at 2:50 p.m. on June 19, 1997). (...) In strict liability or liability for created risk '... the element of fault is dispensed with as a criterion of imputation, focusing on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the setting in motion of a dangerous activity, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation for this liability is the created risk, or the risk-creating conduct. Therefore, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness (antijuricidad)...' (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 376 at 2:40 p.m. on July 9, 1999). It is based on the hypothesis that the source of obligations is the lawful use of dangerous things, which, by the fact of causing damage, oblige the one who makes use of them to repair the damage caused. There are three elements that comprise this type of liability, namely: a) the use of things that entail danger or risk; b) causing damage of a patrimonial nature; and c) the relationship or causal link (nexo de causa efecto) between the act and the damage. Summarizing '...in strict civil liability there must be a causal link between the risky activity set in motion by the agent and the damage caused' (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 354 at 10 a.m. on December 14, 1990). From a practical point of view—says the Costa Rican jurist Victor Pérez Vargas—"...strict liability is summed up as an advantage in favor of the injured party that means a partial reversal of the burden of proof, in the sense that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (fault or fraud) of the party causing the damage, and the attempt by the latter to prove their lack of fault would be in vain..." (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Derecho Privado, I Edition, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, p. 417). That is, it corresponds to the person or company to whom liability is attributed to demonstrate that the damages were produced by force majeure or by the fault of the victim (doctrine informing numerals 32, second paragraph, of Law No. 7472 and 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code)" (Resolution number 646-F-2001 at 4:45 p.m. on August 22, 2001).- Under the protection of the foregoing, it is important to specify what the scope is of the service provided by the [...], in order to determine the civil liability regime applicable in the present case. In this same intellectual operation, the Trial Court considered the following: "...In that order of things, this deciding body considers that in the case under study, as was alleged by the legal representation of the defendant entity, the damages suffered by the civil plaintiffs do not derive from the financial intermediation services offered by the [...] to its clients or users. Precisely, Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense prescribes: 'The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks.- Only one who demonstrates that they have been unconnected to the damage is released.- The legal representatives of commercial establishments or, as the case may be, those in charge of the business are responsible for their own acts or deeds or for those of their dependents or auxiliaries. Technicians, those in charge of preparation and control respond jointly and severally, when applicable, for violations of this Law to the detriment of the consumer. (Thus modified its numbering by Article 80 of Law No. 8343 of December 27, 2002, Fiscal Contingency Law, which moved it from 32 to 35).'- In accordance with the legal provision transcribed, and adjusting its scope to the specific case, the liability of the [...] would be compromised if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed under the following assumptions: a-) By reason of the financial intermediation service offered by it. Indeed, we must remember that the 'current level of banking development allows for distinguishing various types of banks, generally individualized by their specialty or their function. There are deposit banks, development banks, agricultural and livestock banks, popular banks, rediscount banks, etc. All of them, whether or not they qualify as such by their trade names and insofar as they professionally develop the function of financial intermediaries, may be called and are in fact classified as 'banking entities or institutions.' (RODRÍGUEZ AZUERO, Sergio. Contratos Bancarios. Su significación en América Latina. Bogotá, Biblioteca Felaban, Fourth Edition, 1990, p. 3). Ultimately, in his conclusions, Licentiate Andrés Pérez González was clear in indicating that according to the [...]'s website, its function is to provide financial services to its clients. In other terms, the patrimonial liability of the defendant bank as a consequence of its condition as a merchant or provider would be compromised if the civil plaintiffs had been harmed as a direct consequence of the financial intermediation service offered by it. In the case under study, it is evident that this has not occurred. b-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information regarding the financial intermediation service provided. From our perspective, in the case under study, due to the factual circumstances generating the claimed damages, it can be stated without fear of error that the civil plaintiffs suffered no impairment whatsoever by reason of inadequate or insufficient information on the part of the [...] regarding its financial intermediation services. c-) By reason of inadequate or insufficient information about the use or risks derived from its financial intermediation services.

Ultimately, we must indicate that none of the civil claimants have suffered harm by the […] as a consequence of a lack of information regarding the use of the financial intermediation services offered to them by the defendant banking entity. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court reaches the conviction that in the case under study, it cannot be considered that we are in one of the scenarios contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) as generating civil liability for the merchant or provider. This is so because, as we have held as proven, the damages that the civil claimants seek to be compensated for derive from the actions of a third party with no organic link to the defendant bank, nor any legal connection whatsoever with the financial intermediation service offered by the banking entity. From our perspective, in the specific case, we are in one of the cases of exclusion of liability contemplated by the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor). Indeed, the aforementioned Article 35, in its second paragraph, provides that ‘only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the harm is released’. In accordance with that provision, we consider that in the specific case, the […] is unrelated to the harm caused by E to the civil claimants. Without a doubt, as we have said, the commission of an assault by a third party with no connection whatsoever to the services offered by the merchant or provider breaks the causal link between the activity and the harm caused. Having said the foregoing, we must determine whether in the case under study, the liability of the […] no longer derives from the service itself but from the faults attributed to it by the civil claimants in their respective conclusions…” (see folios 1956-1957). Contrary to this position set forth in the lower court's judgment, this Chamber agrees with the appellants that the Court made an incorrect application and interpretation of the “Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor)” by considering that the damages caused did not occur due to the service provided by the banking entity, and that their origin derives from the action of a third party with no organic link to the Bank. Such interpretation stems from an erroneous equation of criminal causation (which seeks to define the efficient cause of the crime) with the examination of the causal link arising between the crime and the damages caused, which is inherent to civil law. On the first point, as is evident from the facts the Court held as proven, the criminal liability resulting from the perpetrated qualified homicides was attributed to the defendant E, and even the subjective civil liability coincides in the same person. However, to determine the possibility of establishing a possible strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), the formula to be applied transcends beyond the subjective or individual analysis, given that the causal link is determined by analyzing whether the damages resulting from the illicit act are framed within the objective sphere of a consumer relationship, use, or enjoyment of a specific good or service, without this ruling out the possibility that such liability may coincide with or differ from the subject upon whom criminal liability falls. In this regard, this Chamber has indicated: “This is an evident case of so-called strict liability or liability without fault (responsabilidad objetiva o responsabilidad sin culpa). In the present case, it is necessary to determine the existence of a causal relationship between the mere provision of a service, namely, the provision of private educational services, and the damages suffered by the victims. If we were to hypothetically remove the provision of the service to the victims, the result would not have occurred, such that in application of the theory of conditio sine qua non, we can conclude that there is a causal relationship between that provision and the harmful result. This means that the damages were produced, precisely, on the occasion of the service provided.” (Third Chamber. Voto 2005-1117, of 16:25 hours on September 29, 2005). Given such perspective, regarding the specific case, it is worth asking what the people present on the day of the altercation at the Branch (Sucursal) of the […] were doing, if not waiting to receive a service (whatever that may be) in said facilities. It is irrelevant to determine whether they had already been attended to, were being attended to, or were going to be attended to at the moment of being attacked, or the nature of the act to be carried out (financial, informational, statistical, economic), for, contrary to what was stated by the lower court, the institution's specialization in a specific area does not rule out its general banking nature. In this respect, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has recently indicated that: “…In the opinion of this Chamber, the simple fact of not purchasing a product, or requesting a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, provider, or merchant from liability, in those cases where the user is injured by reason of the good or service received. The term ‘consumer (consumidor),’ referring to the legal situation of the claimant when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of buyer. In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application for persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not contingent on a ‘consumer contract (contrato de consumo)’, because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they are conceived of as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer—and not an effective buyer—of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a juridical consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the focus of legal protection in the area of consumer safety. Thus, the specific needs for protection of Mr. Erick Streber Umaña originate in his condition as a user of a parking lot offered as part of the supermarket’s services for its clients, regardless of whether he made a purchase or not. In the present case, as already stated, the necessary characteristics to impute that liability have been demonstrated, that is, a means creating danger or risk was used that is part of the economic structure of the defendant—the parking lot of the Hipermás supermarket in San Sebastián; harm was generated that is determined by the injury suffered to the legal sphere of the claimant—dispossession or loss of the vehicle with plates […] owned by him; and the cause-and-effect relationship between the event and the harm—the removal or theft of the motor vehicle in the parking lot of the CSU. In short, that injury was the product of the theft of the property that was located in the parking lot of the Hipermás supermarket in San Sebastián…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Voto: 000295-F-2007 of 10:45 hours on April 26, 2007). In this line of thought, it is considered proven that the persons who attended that institution that day did so in their capacity as “users” or “consumers” of the banking services offered at the Branch (Sucursal) of the […], in which place, in accordance with the institutional policy of said entity, the security service is provided to all those who enter its facilities to carry out any transaction, given the high risk that a commercial activity of a monetary nature entails. Moreover, assuming that the institution did not have such security mechanisms, its obligation to answer for what occurs within its facilities is imminent from the moment it undertakes a banking commercial activity intended for service to the general public, regardless of whether its nature is public or private. Based on the foregoing premise, by use of logic and reason, it must be understood that if banking services (of any nature) were not offered in that place, there would be no reason for persons unrelated to the company to be in such facilities. However, in the specific case, even understanding that the criminal action was the product of a third party unrelated to the financial entity, the exception to liability contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) does not apply, which states: “…Only one who demonstrates that they were unrelated to the harm is released,” because attributing the criminal action to a subject distinct from the merchant does not necessarily exclude the latter from being civilly liable, as what is important is to determine whether the harm is produced within the sphere of the service being provided. In a comparative analysis of the present case with the position set forth by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) in the previously cited ruling, it is observed that in the opinion of said judicial authority, the criminal act carried out by an antisocial person with no relationship whatsoever to the defendant Supermarket does not rule out the strict civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) of the latter for the damages produced, by reason of having occurred within the sphere of the service provided to the user, without the need to consider whether the client completed a purchase, or whether the vehicle parking service falls within the commercial nature of a supermarket. Specifically, it is pointed out: “…The objection raised by the appellant that in that area no vehicle custody service is provided, that it is not a public parking lot nor are physical spaces rented, is not admissible, as it contravenes Articles 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor). From the relationship of these precepts, the guiding principle is born that establishes a strict liability regime (régimen objetivo de responsabilidad) in consumer relationships, which in turn correspond to a special regime. The matter concerning the nature of the parking lot does not exclude its scope of application, because that service forms a unitary part of the economic and logistical structure of the commercial establishment that originated its use… The owner of the business that offers the parking service to its clients, potential consumers, bears liability, despite any warnings it may have posted to the contrary. The thesis that its use is free of charge and also corresponds to a service independent of the sale of the products offered in the supermarket contravenes the principles protecting the consumer and user… This accessory service constitutes a duty of protection on the part of the merchant, creating an obligation towards those who park in that place. That is, it is obliged to guard, keep, and return the vehicle (Articles 698 and 1349 of the Civil Code), as a proper derivation of the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) imposed by law. In harmony with what has been indicated, it is irrelevant whether the claimant made an effective purchase in the supermarket or not; hence, the alleged infractions do not exist, and therefore the challenge must be dismissed…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Voto: 000295-F-2007 of 10:45 hours on April 26, 2007). In the same manner, in the case at hand, the crime is committed by a subject with no link to the […]; however, the connection of the latter with the harm is undeniable, by reason of the service it provides to its users, including among these, the security service, the analysis of which will be revisited in the following recital. Consequently, the present ground of appeal is granted, and the judgment is partially annulled, solely with regard to the civil liability of the […]. In application of Article 35 of Ley 7472 for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y la Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), the […] is civilly condemned, based on the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) that pertains to it, to pay the damages duly determined in the judgment in favor of those whose civil claims were upheld, for which reason the corresponding remand proceeding is omitted. An express pronouncement is omitted on the other specific grounds aimed at demonstrating the liability of the banking entity, or evidencing the intellectual evaluative errors of the judgment, with respect to the point in question, as they are considered unnecessary.

X.- Regarding the civil liability of the company “[…]” […] On the matter in question, this Chamber considers that, effectively, the company “[…] S.A.” is civilly liable, but for reasons different from those alleged by the appellant parties; however, Attorney Torrealba Navas is not mistaken in highlighting the effective cause of liability of said company, affirming that it is an integral part within the entities responsible for providing the service offered in the banking institution. Doctrine establishes: “…economically efficient contractual networks are phenomena that cannot be considered as simple obligatory contractual relationships, since their density is such that the network presents itself to third parties as a unit... In these cases, it is evident that it is necessary to introduce the principle of liability of the entire contractual network, which can be arrived at through the theory of double imputation. The central idea is, then, that what appears as a unit in the commerce of men must be considered, in the legal sphere, as a unit. The collective must answer, then, as a whole. Later, the risks can be distributed internally.” (RIVERO SANCHEZ, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil. Tomo II”. Second Edition, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). In accordance with this focus, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the actions of the persons in charge of bank security, whether there was fault, negligence, lack of skill, or a contractual breach, as the appellants seek to demonstrate in their arguments, since what is important in the case is the role played by the security company in question as part of an “economically efficient contractual network.” This position finds support in the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), which in its Article 32 states: “The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond, concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, by inadequate or insufficient information about them, or by their use and risks.” That is, as set forth by this rule, every intervener in the production chain of the good or service possesses strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) (independently of fault), and at the same time joint and several liability (concurrently) among themselves and towards the consumer or recipient of the service. Applying the foregoing to the specific case, it is clear that the […], by reason of the risky activity it carries out (because it implicitly involves the movement of large economic capital within its facilities intended for public service), has the obligation to answer for the damages caused to its users while they are inside the agency. For the foregoing, it is irrelevant whether it had sufficient material and human resources in security matters; whether the choice of protective mechanisms was correct; whether it acted contrary to what was indicated by a possible action protocol for attacks like the one that occurred; or whether the banking entity was aware of the increased risk caused by crime in the area, since it has become clear that all the persons who were in the banking facilities at that moment were waiting to receive a service from said institution. Now, there is a public tender contract (Expediente de licitación pública número 1776-2004) signed between the […] S.A., which, far from being understood within the framework of the principle of “privity of contracts,” is a means that allows verification that the latter acts as a provider of a service (security) that the former provides to the user. That is, it is clear that they are two entities of a different nature (legal, organizational, and operational), but that both form part of the production chain of a service, or of an “economically efficient contractual network,” and consequently, are seen as “a unit” towards the recipient of the service. In this regard, Article 2 of the cited Law states: “(…) For the purposes of this Law, the producer, as a provider of goods, is also obligated towards the consumer to respect their legitimate rights and interests (...).” In other words, the law empowers the consumer, user, or final recipient of a good or service to take action against the merchant, producer, or provider indistinctly, understanding the latter as members of the so-called “production chain,” so that they are held liable for the damages caused by reason of the goods and services provided by them, regardless of whether these are their main or accessory activity. On this level, it is clear that although the damages arise from the illicit act perpetrated by the defendant, what is certain is that this occurs within the sphere of the banking service provided at the Branch (Sucursal) of the […], in whose establishment the defendant company was committed to providing efficient mechanisms to guarantee the safety and integrity of the users, by reason of the contract governing between both sued institutions, thus forming an intrinsic part within the civilly liable unit and as such, legally entitled to respond according to Ley 7472. Based on the foregoing, the present claim is granted, the judgment is annulled insofar as it pertains to the acquittal of civil liability in favor of the security company […] S.A., and in its place, it is declared civilly liable in a joint and several manner, for the damages whose amounts to be compensated were established in the judgment in favor of the duly entitled civil claimants. The remand is omitted as there exists a monetary settlement carried out by the lower court when civilly condemning the defendant E, for which the civilly condemned parties must respond jointly and severally, through the corresponding avenue.”

“VII.- Sobre la responsabilidad Civil del Instituto Nacional de Seguros: El licenciado Federico Torrealba, alega la aplicación indebida del artículo 1025 del Código Civil en cuanto a la supuesta falta de legitimación pasiva del Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Considera que el a quo, yerra al decir que no hay acción directa contra el asegurador en virtud del principio de relatividad contractual (artículo 1025 del Código Civil). Expresa que en el contrato-licitación concertado entre el […] (folio 1275), consta una póliza de seguros expedida por el ente asegurador, con vigencia desde el 12 de julio de 2004 hasta el 12 de julio de 2005, con una cobertura de hasta ciento cinco millones de colones, que cubre la responsabilidad del asegurado directo por daños y perjuicios causados a terceros. De conformidad con lo preceptuado en el artículo 13, inciso f, de la Ley 8395 de Servicios de Seguridad Privados, la póliza es una obligación para el ejercicio de tal actividad. Por consiguiente, a diferencia de los seguros voluntarios de responsabilidad civil donde la causa jurídica es la indemnidad patrimonial del asegurado, en los seguros obligatorios es la indemnización de la potencial víctima. A su criterio no es necesario que el legislador diga expresamente que la potencial víctima puede demandar al INS, porque no hay derecho sin acción, es decir, si las víctimas potenciales de una actividad riesgosa tienen derecho estatuido por el legislador, de ser protegidos e indemnizados al amparo de una póliza de seguros que ha de tomar quien desarrolle esa actividad, naturalmente también tienen derecho a la acción correspectiva. No es necesario crear una acción cada vez que el legislador reconozca un derecho. El reclamo no es procedente. Sobre el presente punto, esta Cámara considera importante resaltar el análisis realizado por el a quo, sobre los principales argumentos por los que estimó que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros no cuenta con legitimación pasiva para hacer frente a las pretensiones civiles de los demandantes. En tal sentido, razona el Tribunal: “…es criterio de este Tribunal que el ente asegurador no se encuentra legitimado pasivamente para responder con respecto a las pretensiones civiles formuladas en su contra. En el caso concreto, los actores civiles que demandaron al Instituto Nacional de Seguro pretenden derivar su derecho en contra de esta institución autónoma del contrato de seguro que el […] suscribió. Sin embargo, hemos de indicar que el contrato de seguro, como los contratos en general, se encuentra regido por el principio de relatividad. Ello significa que la relación contractual solo vincula a las partes que intervienen en su celebración pues el contrato, como negocio jurídico, no tiene eficacia con respecto a los terceros. A la postre, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico establece el citado principio en el artículo 1025 del Código Civil el cual establece: “Los contratos no producen efecto sino entre las partes contratantes; no perjudican a terceros, así como no les aprovechan, salvo lo dispuesto en los artículos siguientes”. En otros términos, el contrato solo despliega su eficacia con respecto a las partes que han intervenido en su celebración. Precisamente, los Mazeaud refiriéndose al alcance del artículo 1165 del Código Civil francés indican: “Los redactores del Código civil francés, como resultado de una falta de método que se ha señalado en diversas oportunidades, no consideraron en el artículo 1.165 del texto legal más que las convenciones y las obligaciones convencionales. Pero el principio establecido por ellos es válido tanto para las obligaciones extracontractuales como para las obligaciones contractuales. Toda obligación, sea cual sea no vincula más que al acreedor y al deudor designados por el contrato o la ley; no alcanza a los terceros.” (MAZEAUD, Henri, León y Jean. Lecciones de Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, Tomo III, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, Buenos Aires, 1969, p. 34-35). En ese mismo orden de cosas, los autores citados aseguran: “El vinculo obligatorio no alcanza a los terceros, que no pueden ni exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación ni quedar sujetos a cumplirla.” (Ibidem. p. 35). En consecuencia, puede afirmarse que en nuestro medio el contrato de seguro de responsabilidad civil se encuentra caracterizado por su relatividad. Por lo tanto, ese contrato desplegará toda su eficacia entre las partes contratantes. En nuestro medio, el contrato de seguro, aun el seguro por responsabilidad civil, no concede una acción directa al posible damnificado para demandar directamente al ente asegurador. En este sentido, Francesco Messineo nos explica: “Por tanto el carácter fundamental que diferencia el seguro de responsabilidad civil de las otras figuras de seguros contra los daños está en el hecho de que el objeto del seguro –o sea el riesgo- es precisamente la responsabilidad civil, o sea, potencialmente, el patrimonio entero del responsable, debiéndose resarcir por éste al tercero-lesionado todo el daño originado, mientras que, en las otras figuras, el riesgo amenaza a una o más cosas determinadas, o sea a uno o más elementos dados de aquel patrimonio, y el siniestro tiene, necesariamente, efectos limitados. / El tercero-lesionado puede, accionando en subrogatoria, sustituirse al asegurado negligente y pedir al asegurador el cumplimiento de su obligación. No podría hacerlo en vía directa, porque él tiene un derecho propio, no frente al asegurador, sino solamente frente al responsable del daño (asegurado). (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo IV, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 173). En consecuencia, tendríamos que en el caso de estudio los afectados por la conducta desplegada por el encartado, y demandado civil, E no tienen acción directa en contra del ente asegurador. En todo caso, es preciso indicar que en el supuesto de estudio el Licenciado Federico Torrealba Navas, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de la Sucesión de ML, EM, JL, J, MV y M, estos tres […], ha alegado que el contrato de seguro debe ser homologado con una estipulación a favor de tercero razón por la cual el Instituto Nacional de Seguros en su condición de asegurador se encuentra obligado directamente con el beneficiario de la estipulación derivada de la relación negocial. Dicha posición no es aceptable. En este sentido, consideramos oportuno recurrir a la doctrina francesa dado que el Code de Napoléon fue fuente primordial de nuestro Código Civil. Precisamente, los Mazeaud con respecto al contrato de seguro indican: "Un automovilista se asegura, mediante el pago de primas, contra los daños que pueda causar con su coche; por ese contrato de seguro de responsabilidad, el asegurador se obliga, si se produce un accidente, a pagarle al asegurado la suma que le sería necesaria para indemnizar a la víctima. Si se aplicaran los principios generales del derecho, la víctima, acreedora del automovilista, no tendría acción sino contra éste; por otra parte, el crédito del asegurado contra el asegurador constituiría una prenda común de los acreedores del asegurado; la víctima se encontraría, pues, incluso para con este crédito, en concurrencia con los restantes acreedores del autor del daño, y correría así el riesgo de no ser resarcida integralmente. Resultado desconcertante, porque el crédito surge a favor del asegurado por razón del perjuicio sufrido por la víctima; así pues, conviene impedir que otros acreedores se beneficien indirectamente de las consecuencias del accidente al hacerse pago sobre la suma abonada por el asegurador. / Para conseguirlo, se habría podido pretender descubrir en el contrato de seguro de responsabilidad una estipulación a favor de tercero y en provecho de la víctima eventual; pero ese análisis no tendría en cuenta la voluntad real de las partes: el asegurado quiere librarse de las consecuencias pecuniarias de su responsabilidad, y no estipular a favor de las víctimas. / La intervención del legislador ha evitado esa construcción aventurada. La ley del 13 de julio de 1930 (art. 53), al extender a todos los seguros terrestres de responsabilidad las disposiciones limitadas de la ley del 19 de febrero de 1889 (incendios) y de la ley del 28 de mayo de 1913 (... accidentes), concede a la víctima un derecho directo sobre la suma debida por el asegurador: la víctima es directamente acreedora del asegurador; posee contra él una acción directa..." (MAZEAUD, Henri, León y Jean. Op. cit. p. 93-94). Precisamente, el autor Carlos Domínguez Domínguez nos hace ver como en el ordenamiento jurídico español se requirió la intervención del legislador a efectos de admitir la acción directa del perjudicado con respecto al asegurador. En ese sentido, el autor citado escribe: “El art. 76 de la Ley de Contrato de Seguro, de 8 de octubre de 1980, institucionaliza la llamada ‘acción directa’, por cuya virtud, el perjudicado por una acción generadora de responsabilidad civil, a pesar de no haber sido parte en el contrato suscrito entre el asegurador y el tomador del seguro, en razón del cual el primero asumía sobre su patrimonio el riesgo que gravitaba sobre el del asegurado a cambio de la correspondiente prima, está legitimado para dirigirse contra aquél en reclamación de la indemnización correspondiente. / Se superan así los tradicionales inconvenientes del principio de la relatividad de los contratos -art. 1.257 del C.C.-, que obligaba al perjudicado a tener que recurrir al ejercicio de acciones contra el deudor (acción directa contra este responsable y la revocatoria contra éste y los terceros afectados por actos del primero efectuados en fraude de acreedores), o en sustitución del mismo (acción subrogatoria supliendo su inactividad en la defensa de sus derechos), pero que, precisamente por esa marginalidad en el contrato de seguro, le impedían dirigirse directamente contra el asegurador. / Se trata, en palabras de nuestra Jurisprudencia (42), de permitir a las víctimas de los siniestros derivados de riesgos cubiertos por la póliza, hacer valer a través de la acción directa contra la compañía de seguros, los derechos que amparan en virtud del contrato a los propios asegurados, porque el interés del tercero perjudicado irrumpe en el esquema contractual típico, haciendo quebrar, con carácter de excepcionalidad, la regla tradicional res inter alios acta.” (El Seguro de Responsabilidad Civil y Profesionales, Derecho de Seguros, España, Consejo General del Poder General, 1995, p. 487 a 517). Como puede observarse, para que la acción directa (sic) pretendida por el representante de los actores civiles dichos surja contra el Instituto Nacional de Seguros se requiere la existencia de una norma legal que así lo establezca. Con base en lo expuesto, concluye este Tribunal que en el caso de estudio el Instituto Nacional de Seguros no se encuentra legitimado pasivamente para responder de la pretensión planteada…” (ver folios 1913-1917).- Analizado lo anterior, esta Sala considera que el a quo, no yerra al estimar la existencia de una falta de legitimación pasiva del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, sin perjuicio de que en otras instancias se dictamine su obligación –eventual- de asumir las consecuencias pecuniarias que le puedan ser atribuidas a la empresa asegurada si es declarada civilmente responsable. Bajo esta misma línea de análisis, es de especial importancia indicar, que la naturaleza de la relación que existe entre el ente asegurador con respecto al caso en cuestión, no permite afirmar la presencia de un vínculo directo de responsabilidad civil, subjetiva ni objetiva, con respecto a las consecuencias dañosas producidas, puesto que el único ligamen existente se da en razón de fungir como aseguradora de la empresa de seguridad demandada. Sobre este particular, es indiferente si lo adquirido por la empresa es un “seguro voluntario u obligatorio”, puesto que la naturaleza de la responsabilidad que obliga a dicho ente, cumplir con un pago indemnizatorio en este caso, es únicamente “el contrato de seguros” suscrito con la empresa de […] S.A. (ver referente a la contratación de servicios de seguridad y vigilancia para sucursales, agencias y oficinas del […], folios 1254-1295) y no la ley que aduce el recurrente. No existe una norma legal que faculte a terceros, el accionar en forma directa contra el ente asegurador, en razón de una supuesta falta cometida por uno de sus asegurados, ya que la normativa citada, se limita –únicamente– a establecer dentro de los requisitos para conformar empresas de seguridad, el contar con una póliza de seguros, lo cual es vinculante sólo para los interesados en brindar el servicio de seguridad privada. Propiamente, en lo que interesa la Ley de Regulación de los Servicios de Seguridad Privados, en el numeral 13 inciso f), indica: “Las personas físicas o jurídicas que presten los servicios descritos en el artículo 2 de esta Ley, deberán cumplir los siguientes requisitos mínimos…suscribir ante el Instituto Nacional de Seguros la correspondiente póliza de riesgos del trabajo y una póliza de responsabilidad civil. El monto mínimo legal para las personas jurídicas y el equivalente a cincuenta veces el salario mínimo legal para las personas físicas, según se defina en la ley de presupuesto ordinario vigente al momento de presentar la solicitud. Los solicitantes que trabajen en forma independiente, podrán suscribir la póliza de riesgos del trabajo, si lo desean…”. Es decir, dicha pauta legal, no implica por sí misma un derecho a favor de terceros, que les faculte un accionar directo en contra del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, puesto que la condición del mismo, nunca es entendida como responsable civil bajo ningún supuesto (excepto por un daño o perjuicio causado por su funcionamiento directo), sino que el pago indemnizatorio es asumido por dicha entidad en razón de un contrato existente en el que se otorga una póliza al contratante cuya cobertura abarca un porcentaje de los daños y perjuicios que corresponda pagar al asegurado que posea la condición de responsable civil. De ahí que, su obligación frente a terceros, no deriva de la ley, o bien, en palabras del recurrente “de un seguro obligatorio”, sino que, su relación es meramente contractual y conforme al artículo 1025 del Código Civil, únicamente, vincula a las partes actuantes, y en caso de lograr determinar algún tipo de responsabilidad por parte del ente asegurado, será éste último quien deberá responder directamente, o en su defecto, decidir si ejecuta la póliza correspondiente dentro de los límites de su cobertura. Así, determinada la naturaleza contractual de la relación suscrita por […] S.A. con el instituto asegurador, es preciso acotar que la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, ha sido muy clara, al indicar que: “…Integrando las normas transcritas, se colige que la accesoriedad de la acción civil se manifiesta en la necesaria investigación judicial de un hecho punible, y tiene como propósito disponer el resarcimiento de los daños acaecidos como resultado de él; sin embargo, el fundamento para que, en efecto, se ordene la indemnización o restitución, no estriba en que se compruebe la existencia del delito, sino que, aun en caso de que no exista conducta que merezca ese calificativo, puede imponerse el deber de resarcir, aplicando las normas que, de modo directo, lo ordenen (v. gr.: ilícito civil, responsabilidad objetiva, etc.). En ambos supuestos, el objeto de la litis está constituido por la responsabilidad extracontractual y es éste el límite que define la competencia y atribuciones del juzgador penal, en su conocimiento de la acción civil. Lo pretendido por el recurrente es que se anule, dentro de este proceso, la cláusula de un contrato suscrito entre su representada (empresa de alquiler de vehículos) y el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Como puede verse, el pronunciamiento que se pide es, en esencia, sobre aspectos puramente contractuales, que desbordan la competencia fijada a la Sala (y a los tribunales penales, en general), ya que, no obstante el innegable vínculo de esa cláusula con el resarcimiento que haya de hacerse a raíz del hecho punible que se investigó, lo cierto es que la fuente de la responsabilidad del Instituto Nacional de Seguros no deriva más que de un convenio, es decir, nos hallamos ante una responsabilidad surgida de contrato y no del hecho punible en sí. Éste no constituye más que el “siniestro”, “riesgo” o “contingencia”, previsto en el acuerdo, consiste en un presupuesto generador para que tengan eficacia las consecuencias dispuestas contractualmente, pero no en la fuente legal de éstas. En otros términos, del delito investigado, en sí, no surge ninguna responsabilidad para la entidad aseguradora, sino que su fuente es de origen completamente contractual. Ahora bien, los tribunales penales, a la hora de definir al ‘civilmente responsable’, solo pueden recurrir a lo que se haya establecido en las normas jurídicas. …En el presente caso, nos hallamos ante una situación similar, pues si el contrato suscrito por la actora civil con la entidad aseguradora es la fuente directa de la responsabilidad de esta última, y el convenio, por su parte, contiene una cláusula que la exonera en ciertas circunstancias, el punto que quien recurre solicita dilucidar se desplaza del extremo de la responsabilidad (contractual, en todo caso) y se centra en el de la validez de un convenio. Es decir, se discute la pureza y legalidad de la fuente misma de la obligación, aspecto que, en definitiva corresponde conocer en otras vías, distintas de la penal, si dicha validez no está afectada por un delito que se ventile en el mismo proceso…” (Sala Tercera. Voto 53-98 de las 9:45 horas del 16 de enero de 1998). De conformidad con lo anterior, se declara sin lugar el presente reclamo, por estimarse que el Tribunal en forma acertada estimó la falta de legitimación pasiva del Instituto Nacional de Seguros como demandado civil.

VIII.- Sobre la responsabilidad civil del Estado: En el recurso de casación interpuesto por los licenciados William Guido Madriz y Andrés Arnoldo Pérez González, se alega la inobservancia de los artículos 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 11, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 8.1 de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos y 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. En sustento de lo anterior, señala que el Juez se equivocó al considerar que el Estado no era responsable civilmente por los hechos ocurridos. Los recurrentes consideran que se dio una clara violación a la Constitución Política y a la Ley General de Policía, que resguarda como garantía social, la vigilancia y seguridad ciudadana, mismas que se vieron desatendidas en la localidad de […] (de aproximadamente cinco mil habitantes), al contar únicamente con cuatro policías y una motocicleta en mal estado, para hacer frente a los distintos tipos de criminalidad que padece la zona ante el gran desarrollo turístico y comercial que la ha caracterizado en los últimos años. Por otro lado, el recurrente expresa que el Estado actuó con impericia e imprudencia al afrontar la crisis de rehenes que se produjo a lo interior de la agencia del […], sobre todo porque ya se tenía noticia de que cerca de las montañas de Santa Elena, merodeaba una banda de asaltantes que se habían introducido por los {…], de lo cual oficiales del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, tenían noticia y que este hecho lo habían puesto también en conocimiento de las autoridades de Seguridad del […] y del propio Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, sin embargo, en forma inexplicable el Tribunal de Juicio consideró que el asalto y sus lamentables consecuencias fueron producto de hechos de un tercero, en cuyo caso se eximía de responsabilidad al Estado. El reclamo no es procedente: Es comúnmente aceptado que el Estado tiene la obligación de regular el desempeño de todas aquellas actividades de cuyo ejercicio puedan derivarse consecuencias peligrosas para los ciudadanos, así como el hecho de que sólo mediante una política de prevención y control estatal de la delincuencia, y su respectiva represión, es que tiene sentido la existencia de los distintos cuerpos policiales. Sin embargo, existe un consenso social, en asumir dentro de la cotidianeidad normal del desarrollo integral de todo ser humano, distintas actividades de por sí riesgosas, que impiden al Estado evitar toda consecuencia negativa, en razón de la ponderación de los beneficios que generan, y que forman parte de lo que en materia civil se denomina “el riesgo general de la vida” (Al respecto, ver Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Tomo II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p. 153. De igual manera, Matthias Madrich. “Das allgemeine Lebenzrisiko: Ein Beitrag Zur Lehre Von Der Haftugnsbegrenzung Im Schadensersatzrecht” Editorial Duncker y Humblot, p.13, 14, 41. Citado por Reyes Alvarado Yesid. Imputación Objetiva. 2005. p.92). Sin embargo, este denominado “riesgo general de vida”, no excluye per se, la obligación estatal de responder por el incumplimiento de sus obligaciones con respecto al ciudadano, por las consecuencias provocadas por su funcionamiento lícito o ilícito. Ante tales circunstancias, en el presente caso, el recurrente pretende atribuir la responsabilidad civil de los daños y perjuicios acaecidos en la Agencia del […], a la Administración, en razón del ejercicio defectuoso del funcionamiento policial, lo cual –a criterio de los suscritos– no es procedente, por la falta de un nexo causal constatable entre el papel de la policía con los daños producidos. El artículo 4 de la Ley General de Policía expresa. “Las fuerzas de policía estarán al servicio de la comunidad; se encargarán de vigilar, conservar el orden público, prevenir las manifestaciones de delincuencia y cooperar para reprimirlas en la forma en que se determina en el ordenamiento jurídico.” En la búsqueda del bienestar de la comunidad y el resguardo de los derechos y garantías personales de todos los seres humanos, el Estado, desarrolla una lucha constante e interminable con la criminalidad, última que día con día ha venido aumentando su poder ofensivo en evidente menosprecio a los diferentes bienes jurídicos que resguarda nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, ya sea profesionalizando la actividad ilícita conforme a los distintos medios tecnológicos, o bien, mediante las conformaciones de redes y organizaciones debidamente estructuradas al amparo de un alto grado de violencia e irrespeto a los derechos de las demás personas. No obstante, el propósito de acabar con la delincuencia, no exime de responsabilidad al Estado, por los daños que produzca en razón de su deficiente funcionamiento, siempre y cuando se logre acreditar que dicho resultado es atribuible efectivamente a un mal servicio de la Administración o de sus funcionarios. La responsabilidad civil extracontractual del Estado, se enmarca, dentro de un régimen objetivo, que procura esencialmente, la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha sufrido una lesión atribuible a la organización pública como centro de autoridad. Al respecto señala la doctrina: “…El daño no se percibe ya mas como un producto de la desgracia o del destino. Ello lleva a la idea de que por cada daño producido tiene que haber un responsable. Con ello se reduce y tiende a desaparecer el ámbito de influencia del ‘destino’ del ‘azar’ o de la ‘mala suerte’, por lo menos en el terreno jurídico, y su puesto es ocupado por el deber de resarcir o reparar el daño…” (Rivero Sánchez, Juan Marco. “Responsabilidad Civil”. Tomo II, ediciones jurídicas ARETE, San José, Costa Rica. 2001. p.39). De conformidad con este nuevo enfoque, habrá responsabilidad de la Administración, siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva y la titularidad o condición de poder que ostente, cumpliendo claro está, con el presupuesto imprescindible del nexo causal. Esta concepción de la responsabilidad estatal fue definida con claridad en la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 132 de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 1991, en la que se dijo: " …para establecer así la responsabilidad directa del Estado sin necesidad de probar previamente que el daño se produjo por culpa del funcionario o de la Administración, exigiendo para la procedencia de la indemnización que el daño sufrido sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo -artículo 196-. Estableció que la Administración sería responsable por todos los daños que causara su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero -artículo 190-; y la obligación de reparar todo daño causado a los derechos subjetivos ajenos por faltas de sus servidores cometidas durante el desempeño de los deberes del cargo o con ocasión del mismo, utilizando las oportunidades o medios que ofrece, aún cuando sea para fines o actividades o actos extraños a dicha misión -artículo 191-..." (En este mismo sentido, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias de dicha Sala números 138 de las 15:05 hrs. del 23 de agosto; 192 de las 14:15 hrs. del 6 de noviembre, ambas de 1991; 48 de las 14:10 hrs. del 29 de mayo de 1996 y 55 de las 14:30 hrs. del 4 de julio de 1997.) Bajo este sistema de responsabilidad objetiva, no es necesaria la existencia del dolo o la culpa imputable a los servidores públicos para que surja el deber de resarcir los daños y perjuicios causados por su funcionamiento. Sin embargo, esta responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, que cuenta con claro fundamento constitucional (Al respecto, ver votos número 5207-2004, de las 14: 55 minutos del 18 de mayo de 2004, en el mismo sentido ver voto 211-05 de las 9:40 horas del 7 de abril de 2005 de la Sala Constitucional), no puede interpretarse tampoco como un deber resarcitorio irrestricto aplicable para todas las hipótesis de lesión, pues sería un sistema irracional. Por ello uno de los límites de imputación de responsabilidad civil objetiva, es la necesaria demostración de un nexo causal. Al respecto, el numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública refiere que el daño debe obedecer al “funcionamiento de la Administración”, para lo cual es indispensable determinar si el resultado dañoso es producto del funcionamiento estatal. En el caso concreto, se tuvo por demostrado que el resultado lesivo y dañoso se debió al ataque provocado por E y compañía en las instalaciones del […] (ver folios 1796-1801), definiendo sin lugar a dudas, la responsabilidad penal y civil (subjetiva) del imputado como un sujeto totalmente ajeno a la Administración Pública. Ahora bien, el recurrente plantea que las consecuencias producidas, se debieron a un acto omisivo del Estado por no proveer de los recursos necesarios para evitar la delincuencia en la zona y la falta de pericia en la forma de abordar una crisis como la ocurrida. Vale aclarar que dentro del “funcionamiento” que refiere el artículo 190 de la Ley citada, cabe la posibilidad de contemplar actos de mera inactividad. Así lo expresa la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera, al decir: “En la actualidad, la conducta omisiva, llamada “inactividad de la Administración”, tanto en su vertiente formal (en la medida en que se revierte en un acto presunto por silencio administrativo) como material (referida básicamente al ámbito prestacional de la organización administrativa). De esta manera, ha de entenderse la inactividad material administrativa como aquella derivada de la omisión en el cumplimiento de una obligación jurídica preestablecida, que se produce cuando, fuera de un procedimiento administrativo, la Administración incumple, por omisión, una obligación impuesta por el Ordenamiento Jurídico o por cualquier otro mecanismo de autovinculación, como es el caso de un acto propio o de los instrumentos consensúales, con lesión directa de un interés legítimo o de un derecho subjetivo, ya sea que altere o no una relación jurídico-administrativa preexistente. Más simple, hay inactividad de este tipo cuando existiendo para el ente u órgano público una obligación de dar o hacer impuesta por el ordenamiento jurídico o por una previa decisión suya, fuera o dentro de un procedimiento administrativo, no se despliega la debida actividad fáctica o jurídica que lleve a buen término la función otorgada, con detrimento de los derechos o intereses de uno o varios sujetos pasivos, ya sean privados o públicos, individuales o colectivos...” (Sala Primera, voto 74-F-2007, de las 10:15 horas del 2 de febrero de 2007). Aclarada la posibilidad de entender actos omisivos, dentro de los postulados contemplados en la normativa correspondiente a la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado, en este examen gradual del fundamento del presente reclamo, procede analizar si la patológica inactividad administrativa-policial alegada influyó en el daño acaecido. En la producción del resultado lesivo, suelen concurrir con frecuencia varios factores, dentro de los cuales es preciso determinar aquellos que directa o indirectamente son causa eficiente y adecuada del mal causado (sobre la causa próxima, adecuada y eficiente, puede consultarse la sentencia ya citada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. N° 252-F-01, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 28 de marzo del 2001), para poder determinar el responsable del daño acaecido. En el presente caso, no se le puede atribuir responsabilidad civil objetiva al Estado, de conformidad con los alegatos expuestos, puesto que la cantidad del personal destacado en dicha delegación, así como el estado de los medios de transporte que disponían, se enfocan principalmente a la exigencia razonable de prevención que puede hacérsele a la policía, ante la crisis previamente provocada por tal organización delictiva. Es decir, aún partiendo de la hipótesis de que la delegación de policía de […], contara para el momento de los hechos, con un mayor número de funcionarios y los vehículos idóneos para su transporte, el ataque delictivo no se hubiera podido evitar y por consiguiente, debe entenderse que el supuesto acto omisivo del funcionamiento estatal, no puede ser considerado como causa del lamentable desenlace, puesto que su actividad debida o esperada a la luz de un criterio de razonabilidad, es imposible de interpretar como un mecanismo idóneo para impedir, prever o desarticular cualquier intento de altercado antes de que el mismo suceda. De lo contrario, se estaría exigiendo a la Administración responder por cualquier menoscabo producido en el territorio nacional, causado o no por su funcionamiento, lo cual sí sería extralimitar los alcances normativos establecidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al respecto, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha indicado: “…En nuestro ordenamiento, el punto concreto consiste entonces, en determinar cuándo estamos frente al “funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal” de la Administración y cuándo, en consecuencia, estimar al daño producido como resultado de dicha actividad... el punto medular está en la determinación de los alcances y en la correcta interpretación que ha de darse a la relación de causalidad, sea, al indisoluble nexo causal entre el daño y la actividad o funcionamiento de la Administración, esenciales para imputar la responsabilidad, por tales daños, al poder público. En ello está la clave para darle el correcto, razonable y garantista alcance que se espera del instituto de la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado ...” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución N°432-f-98 de las quince horas diez minutos del once de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). Por consiguiente, a pesar del enfoque objetivo que rige la responsabilidad civil estatal, con independencia de la actuación de sus funcionarios, no se puede obviar que la norma exige determinar si el daño efectivo fue producido por su “funcionamiento” y de comprobarse que el resultado obedece a causas ajenas a la competencia estatal, sería improcedente atribuirle cualquier tipo de responsabilidad civil a la Administración, sin la presencia de un nexo causal entre su acción u omisión con el resultado producido. Por ende, se declara sin lugar el presente reclamo.

IX.- Sobre la responsabilidad civil del […]. […] De previo a ingresar a su análisis, interesa hacer algunas consideraciones en torno a los derechos y defensa de los consumidores, así como del régimen de responsabilidad aplicable. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha señalado: “El descubrimiento de nuevas materias, la puesta en práctica de nuevos métodos de fabricación, el desarrollo de los medios de comunicación, la ampliación y liberación de mercados, la aparición de nuevos métodos de ventas, la contratación masiva, las nuevas modalidades de contratación, entre otros factores, han provocado cambios sustanciales en el mercado. Los mercados locales de escasas dimensiones han desaparecido para dar cabida a un mercado de masas, en donde lo que interesa a los productores de bienes y a los prestadores de servicios es el optimizar sus ganancias, incitando al ciudadano, mediante diversificación de productos y manipulación de la información, al consumo en una forma indiscriminada e irracional, situación que produce verdaderas situaciones de superioridad de aquéllos frente a éstos, que conducen a un abuso en su situación para el logro de sus fines. Al respecto la Sala Constitucional ha dicho: ‘II...es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal y su participación en este proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello su relación, en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos que de previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan expresarlo con toda libertad y ello implica el conocimiento cabal de los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluidos por lo preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor conocimiento posible del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cuando esté involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia...’ (Voto N° 1441-92 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 15:45 hrs. del 2 de junio de 1992). Ante esta situación de desequilibrio en las relaciones de consumo entre empresarios y consumidores o usuarios, los instrumentos jurídicos tradicionales resultan poco satisfactorios para proteger los intereses de los consumidores, por lo que el legislador, para evitar o al menos paliar en la medida de lo posible esa situación desventajosa del ciudadano-consumidor, ha creado diversos sistemas jurídicos de defensa tratando de encontrar un justo equilibrio entre los intereses recíprocos de consumidores y productores, supliendo así, en cierto modo, determinadas deficiencias funcionales del mercado en el orden de la economía. En ese orden de ideas, mediante Ley No. 7607 de 29 de mayo de 1996 se reformó el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, introduciéndose en él un nuevo derecho económico justo al lado de la libertad de empresa y como delimitador de ésta: la protección del consumidor. (…) Como desarrollo de este nuevo derecho económico y en cumplimiento de éste mandato constitucional, tenemos la Ley N° 7472, Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, de 20 de diciembre de 1994, publicada en La Gaceta N° 14 del 19 de enero de 1995, que contiene una serie de derechos sustanciales y procesales a favor de los consumidores y usuarios. Señala el artículo 29 de dicha normativa: “Sin perjuicio de lo establecido en tratados, convenciones internacionales de las que Costa Rica sea parte, legislación interna ordinaria, reglamentos, principios generales de derecho, usos y costumbres, son derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables del consumidor, los siguientes: a)- La protección contra los riesgos que puedan afectar su salud, su seguridad y el medio ambiente. b)- La protección de sus legítimos intereses económicos y sociales. (…) f)- Mecanismos efectivos de acceso para la tutela administrativa y judicial de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, que conduzcan a prevenir adecuadamente, sancionar y reparar con prontitud la lesión de estos, según corresponda. (…) Entre estos derechos, y en lo que importa para resolver el presente asunto, interesa destacar los derechos de los consumidores o usuarios a la protección contra los riesgos que puedan afectar su salud, seguridad y medio ambiente, y a la reparación del daño producidos por la lesión de estos bienes jurídicos ( incisos a y f). Para la tutela efectiva de estos derechos, el legislador adoptó un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva, con el claro interés de evitar que por dificultades probatorias prácticamente insalvables puedan quedar desamparadas las víctimas de las actividades empresariales de fabricación y comercio, actividades per se generadoras de riesgos para la integridad física o el patrimonio ajeno: “El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos. Solo se libera quien demuestra que ha sido ajeno al daño. Los representantes legales de los establecimientos mercantiles o, en su caso, lo encargados del negocio son responsables por los actos o los hechos propios o por los de sus dependientes o auxiliares. Los técnicos, los encargados de la elaboración y el control responden solidariamente, cuando así corresponda, por las violaciones a esta Ley en perjuicio del consumidor” (Artículo 32, Ley N° 7472 citada. La negrita no es del original). VII.- La responsabilidad objetiva, ha dicho esta Sala: ‘Es el resultado de una revisión del instituto de la responsabilidad que vino a ser necesaria cuando se tomó conciencia que el molde de la culpa era estrecho para contener las aspiraciones de justicia que clamaban en un mundo cada vez más complejo. Exigencias de la realidad, la multiplicación de los peligros y daños propios de la vida moderna, justificaron que en determinadas situaciones la responsabilidad fuese tratada como un crédito de la víctima que el demandado debía desvirtuar. La teoría del riesgo, según la cual quien ejerce o se aprovecha de una actividad con elementos potencialmente peligrosos para los demás, debe también soportar sus inconveniencias, permeó la mayor parte de las legislaciones y en el caso de Costa Rica origina el párrafo V de comentario. Esta teoría es también denominada del daño creado, cuyo paradigma de imputación, según lo refiere el Profesor Alterini, ‘... estriba en atribuir el daño a todo el que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo... ella, agrega, ...’ prescinde de la subjetividad del agente, y centra el problema de la reparación y sus límites en torno de la causalidad material, investigando tan solo cual hecho fue, materialmente, causa del efecto, para atribuírselo sin más. Le basta la producción del resultado dañoso, no exige la configuración de un acto ilícito a través de los elementos tradicionales..’ (Alterini, Atilio. Responsabilidad Civil, Abeledo Perrot, III Edic., Buenos Aires, 1987, pág 106). Consecuentemente, la fuente de la obligación, en la responsabilidad objetiva, no es la culpa, la negligencia, etc., del agente. Por eso para desvirtuar la responsabilidad ninguna importancia tiene que éste logre demostrar que no fue imprudente, negligente o inexperto’ (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N° 61, de las 14:50 horas del 19 de junio de 1997). (…) En la responsabilidad objetiva o por riesgo creado “... se prescinde del elemento culpa como criterio de imputación, enfocándose en una conducta o actividad de un sujeto físico o jurídico, caracterizada por la puesta en marcha de una actividad peligrosa, o la mera tenencia de un objeto de peligro. El elemento de imputación de esta responsabilidad es el riesgo creado, o la conducta creadora de riesgo. Por ello, se afirma, la noción de riesgo sustituye los conceptos de culpa y antijuricidad...” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 376 de las 14:40 horas del 9 de julio de 1999). En ella se parte de la hipótesis de que la fuente de obligaciones es el uso lícito de cosas peligrosas, que por el hecho de causar daño, obligan al que se sirve de ellas, a reparar el daño causado. Tres son los elementos que conforman éste tipo de responsabilidad, a saber: a) el empleo de cosas que conlleven peligro o riesgo; b) causar un daño de carácter patrimonial; y c) la relación o nexo de causa efecto entre el hecho y el daño. Resumiendo “...en la responsabilidad civil objetiva debe existir un nexo causal entre la actividad riesgosa puesta en marcha por el agente y el daño ocasionado” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 354 de las 10 horas del 14 de diciembre de 1990). Desde el punto de vista práctico -dice el jurista costarricense Victor Pérez Vargas- “...la responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una parcial inversión la (sic) de la prueba, en el sentido de que ésta queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa (culpa o dolo) del causante del daño y vano sería el intento de éste de probar su falta de culpa...” (Pérez Vargas, Victor, Derecho Privado , I Edición, Editorial Publitex, San José, Costa Rica, 1988, pag. 417). Sea, le corresponde a la persona o empresa a quien se le atribuye la responsabilidad, demostrar que los daños se produjeron por fuerza mayor o por culpa de la víctima (doctrina que informa los numerales 32 párrafo segundo de la Ley No.7472 y el 1048 párrafo quinto del Código Civil) ” (Resolución número 646-F-2001 de las 16 horas 45 minutos del 22 de agosto de 2001).- Al amparo de lo expuesto, es importante precisar cuáles son los alcances del servicio que brinda el […], para determinar el régimen de responsabilidad civil que corresponde aplicar en el presente caso. En esta misma operación intelectiva el Tribunal de mérito estimó lo siguiente: “…En ese orden de cosas, este órgano sentenciador considera que en el caso de estudio, tal y como fuese alegado por la representación judicial del ente demandado, los daños sufridos por los actores civiles no derivan de los servicios de intermediación financiera ofrecidos por el […] a sus clientes o usuarios. Precisamente, el artículo 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor preceptúa: ‘El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos.- Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño.- Los representantes legales de los establecimientos mercantiles o, en su caso, los encargados del negocio son responsables por los actos o los hechos propios o por los de sus dependientes o auxiliares. Los técnicos, los encargados de la elaboración y el control responden solidariamente, cuando así corresponda, por las violaciones a esta Ley en perjuicio del consumidor. (Así modificada su numeración por el artículo 80 de la ley N° 8343 de 27 de diciembre del 2002, Ley de Contingencia Fiscal, que lo pasó del 32 al 35)’.- De acuerdo con la disposición legal transcrita, y ajustando su alcance al caso concreto, la responsabilidad del […] se encontraría comprometida si los actores civiles hubiesen resultado perjudicados en los siguientes supuestos: a-) Por razón del servicio de intermediación financiera por él ofrecidos. En efecto debemos recordar que el ‘actual nivel de desarrollo de la banca permite distinguir diversos tipos de bancos, individualizados generalmente por su especialidad o su función. Bancos hay de depósito, de fomento, agrícolas y ganaderos, populares, de redescuento, etc. Todos ellos, califíquense o no así por sus razones sociales y en cuanto desarrollen profesionalmente la función de intermediarios financieros, pueden denominarse y de hecho se califican como 'entidades o instituciones bancarias.’ (RODRÍGUEZ AZUERO, Sergio. Contratos Bancarios. Su significación en América Latina. Bogotá, Biblioteca Felaban, Cuarta Edición, 1990, p. 3). A la postre, en sus conclusiones el Licenciado Andrés Pérez González fue claro al indicar que de acuerdo con la página web del […] su función es la de brindar servicios financieros a sus clientes. En otros términos, la responsabilidad patrimonial del banco demandado como consecuencia de su condición de comerciante o proveedor se vería comprometida si los actores civiles hubiesen resultado perjudicados como consecuencia directa del servicio de intermediación financiera por él ofrecido. En el caso de estudio, es evidente que ello no ha ocurrido. b-) Por razón de información inadecuada o insuficiente con respecto al servicio de intermediación financiera brindada. Desde nuestra perspectiva, en el caso de estudio, en razón de las circunstancias fácticas generadoras de los daños reclamados, puede afirmarse sin temor a equívocos que los actores civiles no sufrieron menoscabo alguno en razón de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes por parte del […] con respecto a sus servicios de intermediación financiera. c-) Por razón de información inadecuada o insuficiente sobre la utilización o riesgos derivados de sus servicios de intermediación financiera. A la postre, hemos de indicar que a ninguno de los actores civiles se le ha causado un daño por parte del […] como consecuencia de falta de información con respecto a la utilización de los servicios de intermediación financiera a ellos ofrecidos por la entidad bancaria demandada. Con fundamento en las anteriores consideraciones, este Tribunal llega al convencimiento de que en el caso de estudio no puede considerarse que estemos en uno de los supuestos contemplados por la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor como generador de responsabilidad civil para el comerciante o el proveedor. Ello es así, por cuanto como hemos tenido por demostrado los daños que pretenden los actores civiles les sean resarcidos derivan de la actuación de un tercero sin vinculación orgánica con el banco demandado, ni vinculación jurídica alguna con el servicio de intermediación financiera ofrecido por la entidad bancaria. Desde nuestra perspectiva, en el caso concreto estamos en uno de los casos de exclusión de responsabilidad contemplados por la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. En efecto, el artículo 35 ya citado, en su párrafo segundo, dispone que ‘sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño’. En concordancia con esa disposición, consideramos que en el caso concreto el […] es ajeno al daño que se causó por E a los actores civiles. Sin lugar a dudas, como hemos dicho la comisión de un asalto por parte de un tercero sin ligamen alguno con los servicios ofrecidos por el comerciante o proveedor rompe el nexo causal entre la actividad y el daño causado. Dicho lo anterior, hemos de determinar si en el caso de estudio la responsabilidad del [….] ya no deriva del servicio mismo sino de las faltas que se le han imputado por parte de los actores civiles en sus respectivas conclusiones…” (ver folios 1956-1957). Contrario a esta posición expuesta en sentencia del a-quo, esta Sala, concuerda con los recurrentes, en que el Tribunal realizó una incorrecta aplicación e interpretación de la “Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor” por estimar que los daños causados no se dieron en razón del servicio brindado por la entidad bancaria, y que su origen deriva de la acción de un tercero sin vinculación orgánica con el Banco. Tal interpretación, obedece a una errónea equiparación de la causalidad penal (que busca definir cuál es la causa eficiente del delito), con el examen del nexo causal surgido entre el delito y los daños y perjuicios provocados, propio del derecho civil. Sobre el primer punto, según se desprende de los hechos que el Tribunal tuvo por demostrados, la responsabilidad penal producto de los homicidios calificados perpetrados, le fue atribuida al imputado E, e inclusive, la responsabilidad civil subjetiva coincide en la misma persona. No obstante, para determinar la posibilidad de dictaminar una posible responsabilidad objetiva, la fórmula a aplicar trasciende más allá del análisis subjetivo o individual, siendo que el nexo causal se determina al analizar si los daños y perjuicios producto del ilícito se encuentran enmarcados dentro de la esfera objetiva de una relación de consumo, uso o disfrute de determinado bien o servicio, sin que esto descarte la posibilidad de que tal responsabilidad pueda coincidir o bien diferir del sujeto sobre el que recae la responsabilidad penal. En tal sentido esta Sala ha indicado: “Se trata de un caso evidente de la denominada responsabilidad objetiva o responsabilidad sin culpa. En el presente caso, es necesario determinar la existencia de una relación de causalidad entre la mera prestación de un servicio, a saber, la prestación de servicios educativos privados, y los daños sufridos por las ofendidas. Si suprimiéramos hipotéticamente la prestación del servicio a las víctimas, el resultado no se hubiera producido, de manera que en aplicación de la teoría de la conditio sine qua non, podemos concluir que hay una relación de causalidad entre esa prestación y el resultado lesivo. Esto significa que los daños fueron producidos, precisamente, con ocasión del servicio brindado”. (Sala Tercera. Voto 2005-1117, de las 16:25 horas del 29 de setiembre de 2005). Ante tal perspectiva, sobre el caso concreto cabe preguntarse, qué hacían las personas que se encontraban el día del altercado en la Sucursal del […], sino en espera de recibir un servicio (cualquiera qué este sea), en dichas instalaciones. Es indiferente determinar sí ya había sido atendido, si lo estaba siendo, o lo iba a ser, al momento de ser atacados, o bien la naturaleza del acto que se fuera a realizar (financiero, informativo, estadístico, económico), pues contrario, a lo área, no descarta su naturaleza bancaria en general. Al respecto la Sala Primera recientemente ha indicado que: “…En criterio de esta Sala, el simple hecho de no adquirir un producto, o requerir un servicio, no es un motivo jurídicamente aceptable para eximir de responsabilidad al productor, proveedor o comerciante, en aquellos supuestos en donde el usuario resulte lesionado en razón del bien o servicio recibido. El término ‘consumidor’, referido a la situación jurídica del actor cuando ingresó al supermercado, corresponde a un concepto más amplio que el de comprador. En concordancia con el parámetro constitucional, consumidor, debe entenderse en un planteamiento expansivo respecto al ámbito de aplicación de las personas que requieran de una especial protección en esta materia. No se supedita a un ‘contrato de consumo’, porque significaría aplicarla de forma restringida y limitada a aquella persona que compra, o que contrata. La posición del derecho moderno, según este Órgano decidor, es que se le conciba como cliente, entendido a quien participa en las actividades comerciales en la posición de potencial adquiriente -y no comprador efectivo-, de bienes y servicios con el titular de la oferta. Dependiendo de la etapa del proceso, se puede distinguir entre contratante y cliente. El primero, se denomina consumidor jurídico. Adquiere un bien o servicio mediante una relación jurídica típica, como por ejemplo, la compra. El segundo es el consumidor material, quien no contrata el bien o servicio, puede potencialmente adquirirlo o utilizarlo. Este último es el centro de protección jurídica en el ámbito de la seguridad de los consumidores. Así, las necesidades específicas de amparo al señor Erick Streber Umaña, se originan en su condición de usuario de un parqueo que se ofrece como parte de los servicios del supermercado, para sus clientes, al margen de que haya comprado o no. En la especie se han demostrado, como ya se dijo, los caracteres necesarios para imputar esa responsabilidad, es decir, se utilizó un medio creador de peligro o riesgo que es parte de la estructura económica de la demandada -estacionamiento del supermercado Hipermás en San Sebastián-; se generó un daño que se determina con la lesión que sufrió la esfera jurídica del actor -despojo o pérdida del vehículo placas […] de su propiedad-; y la relación causa efecto entre el hecho y el daño -sustracción o robo del automotor en el aparcamiento del CSU-. En definitiva, aquella lesión fue producto del robo del bien que se encontraba en el parqueo del supermercado Hipermás en San Sebastián…” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto: 000295-F-2007 de las 10:45 horas del 26 de abril de 2007). En este orden de ideas, se tiene por demostrado que las personas que ese día acudieron a dicha institución, fue en calidad de “usuario” o “consumidor” de los servicios bancarios que son ofrecidos en la Sucursal del […], en cuyo lugar, conforme a la política institucional de dicho ente, se brinda el servicio de seguridad a todo aquel que ingrese a sus instalaciones a realizar cualquier gestión, en razón del alto riesgo que significa una actividad comercial de naturaleza monetaria, aún más, partiendo del supuesto que la institución no contara con tales mecanismos de seguridad, su obligación de responder por lo ocurrido dentro de sus instalaciones es inminente desde que asume la realización de una actividad comercial bancaria destinada al servicio del público en general, sin importar si su naturaleza es pública o privada. Partiendo de la anterior premisa, en uso de la lógica y la razón, debe entenderse que si en dicho lugar no se ofrecieran servicios bancarios (de cualquier naturaleza), no habría razón para que existan personas ajenas a la empresa en tales instalaciones, sin embargo, en el caso concreto, aún entendiendo que la acción delictiva fue producto de un tercero ajeno al ente financiero, no concurre la excepción de responsabilidad contemplada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, que expresa: “…Sólo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño”, pues no necesariamente el atribuir la acción delictiva a un sujeto distinto al comerciante, excluye que éste último sea responsable civilmente, ya que lo importante es determinar si el daño es producido dentro de la esfera del servicio que se brinda. En un análisis comparativo del presente caso, con la posición plasmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en el fallo anteriormente citado, se observa que a criterio de dicha autoridad judicial, el hecho delictivo realizado por un antisocial sin relación alguna con el Supermercado demandado, no descarta la responsabilidad civil objetiva del último por los daños producidos, en razón de haber ocurrido dentro de la esfera del servicio que se brinda al usuario, sin necesidad de contemplar si el cliente concretó alguna compra, o bien si el servicio de parqueo vehicular entra dentro de la naturaleza comercial de un supermercado. Propiamente se señala: “…La objeción planteada por la recurrente de que en esa zona no se brinda el servicio de custodia de vehículos, que no es un parqueo público ni tampoco se alquilan espacios físicos, no es procedente, al contravenir los artículos 46 de la Constitución Política y 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. De la relación de estos preceptos, nace el principio rector que establece un régimen objetivo de responsabilidad en las relaciones de consumo, las cuales a su vez, corresponden a un régimen especial. Lo tocante a la naturaleza del parqueo, no excluye su ámbito de aplicación, por cuanto ese servicio forma parte unitaria de la estructura económica y logística del establecimiento comercial que originó su uso… Existe responsabilidad del titular del comercio que ofrece el estacionamiento a sus clientes, potenciales consumidores, pese a las advertencias que pudiera haber puesto en sentido contrario. La tesis de que su uso es gratuito y además corresponde a un servicio independiente de la venta de los productos que se ofrecen en el supermercado, contraviene los principios protectores del consumidor y usuario… Esta prestación accesoria, configura un deber de protección del comerciante, que le crea una obligación frente a quienes aparquen en ese lugar. Es decir, está obligado a guardar, custodiar y restituir el vehículo (artículos 698 y 1349 del Código Civil), como derivación propia de la responsabilidad objetiva impuesta por la ley. En armonía con lo que se ha indicado, resulta intrascendente que el actor hiciera o no una compra efectiva en el supermercado, de ahí que no se den las infracciones acusadas, por lo que el reproche habrá de desestimarse…” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto: 000295-F-2007 de las 10:45 horas del 26 de abril de 2007). De igual manera, en el caso de marras, el delito es cometido por un sujeto sin ningún vínculo con el […], no obstante, la relación de este último con el daño es innegable, en razón del servicio que brinda a sus usuarios, incluyendo entre estos, el servicio de seguridad, cuyo análisis será retomado en el siguiente considerando. En consecuencia se declara con lugar el presente motivo, se anula parcialmente la sentencia, únicamente en lo concerniente a la responsabilidad civil del […]. En aplicación del artículo 35 de la Ley 7472 de Promoción de la Competencia y la Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, se condena civilmente al […], con base en la responsabilidad objetiva que le atañe, a pagar los daños y perjuicios debidamente determinados en la sentencia a favor de aquellos cuyas acciones civiles fueron acogidas, razón por la que se omite realizar el juicio de reenvío correspondiente. Se omite pronunciamiento expreso sobre los demás motivos específicos tendientes a demostrar la responsabilidad de la entidad bancaria, o evidenciar los yerros intelectivos valorativos de la sentencia, en lo referente al punto en cuestión por considerarse innecesarios.

X.- Sobre la responsabilidad civil de la empresa “[…]” […] Sobre el tema en cuestión, esta Sala considera que, efectivamente la empresa “[…] S.A.” es responsable civilmente pero por motivos distintos a los que alegan las partes recurrentes, sin embargo, el Licenciado Torrealba Navas no se equivoca, al resaltar la causa efectiva de responsabilidad de dicha empresa, afirmando que ésta es parte integral dentro de los entes encargados de rendir el servicio que se brinda en la institución bancaria. Doctrinalmente se establece: “…las redes contractuales económicamente eficientes se tratan de fenómenos que no pueden ser considerados como simples relaciones contractuales obligatorias, ya que su densidad es tal que la red se presenta frente a terceros como una unidad...En estos casos resulta evidente que es necesario introducir el principio de la responsabilidad de toda red contractual, al que se puede llegar por medio de la teoría de la doble imputación.- La idea central es, entonces que lo que en el comercio de los hombres aparece como una unidad, debe tenerse, en el plano jurídico, como una unidad. Lo colectivo debe responder, entonces, como un todo. Luego pueden repartirse internamente los riesgos”.(RIVERO SANCHEZ, Juan Marcos. “Responsabilidad Civil. Tomo II”. Segunda Edición, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). Conforme a este enfoque, no es necesario determinar los alcances de la actuación de las personas a cargo de la seguridad bancaria, si medió culpa, negligencia, impericia o un incumplimiento contractual, como pretenden demostrar los recurrentes en sus alegatos, ya que lo importante en la especie, es el papel que juega la empresa de seguridad en cuestión, como parte de “una red contractualmente eficiente”. Dicha posición encuentra respaldo en la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, que en su artículo 32 indica: “El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder, concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos”. Es decir, conforme lo dicta esta norma, todo interviniente en la cadena de producción del bien o el servicio, posee una responsabilidad objetiva (independientemente de la culpa), y a la vez solidaria (concurrentemente) entre si y frente al consumidor o destinatario del servicio. Aplicado lo anterior al caso concreto, es claro que el […], en razón de la actividad riesgosa que desarrolla (por llevar implícito el movimiento de grandes capitales económicos dentro de sus instalaciones destinadas al servicio público), tiene la obligación de responder por los daños y perjuicios causados a sus usuarios mientras se encuentren dentro de la agencia. Para lo anterior, es indiferente si contaba con los suficientes recursos materiales y humanos en materia de seguridad; si la elección de los mecanismos de protección fueron los correctos; si se actuó contrario a lo señalado por un posible protocolo de actuación frente a atentados como el ocurrido; o si la entidad bancaria tenía noticia del aumento del riesgo promovido por la delincuencia del lugar, ya que ha quedado claro que todas las personas que se encontraban en las instalaciones bancarias en ese momento, esperaban recibir un servicio de dicha institución. Ahora bien, existe un contrato-licitación (Expediente de licitación pública número 1776-2004) suscrito entre el […] S.A., que lejos de ser entendido en el marco del principio de “relatividad de los contratos”, es un medio que permite constatar que la segunda funge como proveedor de un servicio (de seguridad) que brinda la primera al usuario. Es decir, se tiene claro que son dos entidades de distinta naturaleza (jurídica, organizacional y operacional), pero que ambas forman parte de la cadena de producción de un servicio, o bien de una “red contractual económicamente eficiente”, y por consiguiente, vistas como “una unidad” frente al destinatario del servicio. En tal sentido, el artículo 2 de la citada Ley los efectos de esta Ley, el productor, como proveedor de bienes, también está obligado con el consumidor, a respetarle sus derechos e intereses legítimos (...)”. En otras palabras, la ley faculta al consumidor, usuario o destinatario final de un bien o servicio, accionar en contra del comerciante, productor o proveedor indistintamente, entendiendo a estos últimos como miembros de la denominada “cadena de producción”, para que se responsabilicen por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados en razón de los bienes y servicios brindados por ellos, sin importar si estos son su actividad principal o bien accesoria. En este plano, queda claro que si bien los daños y perjuicios surgen del ilícito perpetrado por el imputado, lo cierto es que esto ocurre dentro de la esfera del servicio bancario brindado en la Sucursal del […], en cuyo establecimiento, la empresa demandada se encontraba comprometida a proveer los mecanismos eficientes para garantizar la seguridad e integridad de los usuarios en razón del contrato que regía entre ambas instituciones accionadas, conformando de tal manera parte intrínseca dentro de la unidad civilmente responsable y por tal, legalmente legitimada para responder de acuerdo a la Ley 7472. Con base a lo anterior, se declara con lugar el presente reclamo, se anula la sentencia en lo referente a la absolutoria de responsabilidad civil a favor de la empresa de seguridad […] S.A., en su lugar se le declara civilmente responsable en forma solidaria, por los daños y perjuicios cuyos montos a indemnizar fueron establecidos en sentencia a favor de los actores civiles debidamente legitimados. Se omite el reenvío por existir una liquidación pecuniaria realizada por el a quo, al condenar civilmente al imputado E, de la cual deberán responder los condenados civiles en forma solidaria, mediante la vía correspondiente.”