Prohibition pay does not constitute a vested right after unconstitutionality rulingPago por prohibición no constituye derecho adquirido tras inconstitucionalidad

III.- ON THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE FOR BETTER PROVISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR PROVEER). Evidence for better provision is a discretionary power of the judge, so that he may order, on his own motion or at the request of a party, the taking of other evidence, aimed at clarifying a disputed point. Such power should not serve to remedy the parties' neglect or to correct procedural errors. In accordance with the provisions of Article 561 of the Labor Code, before this Chamber it is not feasible to propose or admit any evidence, nor may evidence be ordered with that character, unless it is absolutely indispensable to correctly decide the disputed point. The appellant offers at this stage copies of the minutes of session 5235, held on June 15, 2005. However, it is not admissible, since it refers to pension matters, different from the one at hand.

IV.- The appellant accuses the vice of incongruence, arguing that what is indicated in the reasoning part of the judgment compelled that the lawsuit be granted in its main claim. This Chamber has interpreted that this is a procedural vice and not one of substance. In this regard, in Voto N° 304 of 9:00 a.m. on May 6, 2005, it was indicated: “…II.- … The vice of ultra petita, which affects that principle of congruence, is an error in procedendo, not of substance, incurred by the judge when he grants, in a judgment, matters superior to or beyond the parties' claims" (on this matter, see ARAGONESES ALONSO (Pedro) CONGRUENT SENTENCES, Madrid, 1957, Editorial Aguilar, 250 p). Consequently, it is not appropriate to hear this reproach, since based on the provisions of numeral 559 of the Labor Code, in this matter the appeal is admissible only for reasons of substance and not of form.

V.- In a brief filed on April 12, 2007, before this Chamber, Mr. [Nombre1] states that another case filed by him, file No. 02-001976-0166 (Internal No. 07-95), has already been resolved by this body. The present lawsuit was filed on January 10, 2001; and the other, previously mentioned, on February 6, 2002. As for the second, already resolved lawsuit, its object sought a judgment declaring: “that the Banco Central de Costa Rica is obliged to adjust the payment it made to me for benefits, taking into account the difference it unilaterally eliminated without following the due process prescribed by law, as well as to pay me the corresponding costs, which I hereby request be set at the legal maximum, given the circumstances under which this litigation arose.” The Chamber, in resolution No. 2007-000095 of 9:50 a.m. on February 16, revoked the ad quem judgment and confirmed that of the Trial Court, which granted the lawsuit and imposed on the defendant the obligation to recognize to the plaintiff and readjust the payment for benefits, considering the difference for the so-called "prohibition" or "exclusive dedication", in the case of the items of notice, severance pay, vacation, and year-end bonus. Regarding the lawsuit heard in this present proceeding and filed previously by Mr. [Nombre1], it is noted that its main object is to have it declared that the salary bonus or additional salary (sobresueldo) that the Banco Central paid him for more than 10 years, as a "prohibition" (prohibición), constitutes a vested right (derecho adquirido) and as such forms part of his assets, specifically, of the salary for services rendered. This Chamber is therefore not unaware of the relationship between both proceedings. However, the decision in this matter should not be conditioned by the one already resolved, since the claims are different and, regarding the merits, there could be no contradiction. From an exhaustive examination of the essential issue debated regarding the potential vested right derived from the plaintiff's legal situation with the defendant Bank, the decision of this Chamber on that point is the one developed in this judgment.

VI.- OF PROHIBITION AS A VESTED RIGHT. The present claim originated because the Bank unilaterally ordered the elimination of the additional salary for the concept of "prohibition" (prohibición) that the plaintiff had been receiving since September 21, 1989, which represents 65% of his base salary, which was communicated to him in official communication number Subg.-087 of April 14, 2000 (fact 6 of the lawsuit, page 2). The Banco Central justified the elimination of the "prohibition" (prohibición) regime on the grounds that the employees of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, a deconcentrated body of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law (Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario) No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the economic compensation ceased in execution of the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, Nos. 4647 of 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999, and 6327 of 10:03 a.m. on August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic of 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law of 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, with retroactive annulment to the effective date of such norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith under the validity of said norms.

VII.- The appellant invokes the violation of Article 34 of the Constitution regarding the doctrine of vested rights and consolidated legal situations, since he considers that if the additional salary for "prohibition" (prohibición) was paid to him for several years, it constituted an integral part of his assets, and should be considered as incorporated into the individual employment contract. The Chamber considers that it is not appropriate to consider the "prohibition" (prohibición) that was being paid to the plaintiff as a vested right. Article 27 of the "Party Agreement" (Convenio de Partes) signed between the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its workers in 1988, which provides the basis for the payment of the "prohibition regime" (régimen de prohibición), provides: “… The Bank would require, according to the nature of the functions of those job classes where it deems convenient that their holders cannot externally exercise functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank shall economically compensate them according to the percentage scale applied to the prohibition base governing the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos but extensible to other lower-level positions to which a proportional prohibition percentage fixed by the Bank shall be recognized" (pages 000161 to 000163 of the administrative file). Upon the annulment, by ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 04647 of 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, of Articles 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law number 7015 of November twenty-second, nineteen eighty-five, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic of nineteen eighty-five, number 6982 of December nineteenth, nineteen eighty-four, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, number 7018 of December twentieth, nineteen eighty-five, which included the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos, whose declaration was ordered retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, the "Party Agreement" (Convenio de Partes) lost effect, and consequently, the Banco Central could not continue paying the additional salary for prohibition, as it was prevented by the principle of legality (Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), according to which in matters of public employment, where salaries are paid with public resources, the public entity's budget is a limit for the use and disposition of State resources, and all expenditure must be budgetarily authorized. Its activity in this matter is conditioned by the pre-existence of a formal law, the Budget Law, that authorizes the expenditure, and its content can only be modified by formal law (Articles 176 et seq. of the Political Constitution) (Regarding this principle, see rulings of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1536-95, 2634-97, and 5500-2000). It is relevant to note that in the cited ruling No. 04647-99, it was considered: “… II.- On the merits: It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain general norms unrelated to budget matters. That is, the inclusion of "atypical" norms that deal with matters proper to ordinary legislation, whether for its creation or modification, is not valid. According to the express text of the challenged norms, whose transcription follows, it is clearly noted that the matter they regulate is not budgetary matter, and therefore their unconstitutionality is evident. The challenged norms state: "Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 stating: 'The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos'."- "Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law." "Article 14 of the Budget Law for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ... 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditorships of the National Banking System." Indeed, since the precedent set in judgment number 000121-89, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been uniform in pointing out that the Budget Law cannot modify ordinary legislation. In this regard, the Chamber considered: "... the Budget of the Republic is a formal and material law but special due to the matter that constitutes it and the procedure already discussed. From the texts cited above, it is clear that the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Legislative Assembly over such important matter is to establish in the budgets the probable revenues and authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for their modifications and for extraordinary budgets. Consequently, the Legislative Power cannot, under the stated budget authority, regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty. The foregoing is consistent with the exclusive attribution of the Executive Power to prepare the ordinary budget bill and the initiative for its modifications and extraordinary ones, as well as that of the Legislative Assembly regarding its enactment, also with the modality already analyzed that the Executive Power has no veto power over its approval, pursuant to numeral 125 of the Fundamental Charter ..." When the judgment number 4647-99 was consulted by way of addition and clarification, the phrase of the operative part "without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith" was elucidated in ruling No. 6327 of 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, which held: “… Regarding the request of the Procurador General, it is considered that there is no omission or ambiguity in judgment number 4647-99 of 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, that should be added to or clarified. The resolution is clearly clear in that, although the nullity pronounced due to the unconstitutionality of the norms is absolute and, therefore, retroactive to the date they took effect, such effect of the declaration cannot harm rights acquired in good faith. Defining whether the rights of the officials linked to the norms are acquired or not, and the action the Administration should take in the face of a conclusion of that nature, falls outside the work corresponding to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, so the request must be rejected ..." VIII.- The survival or continuity of the payment of the "prohibition" (prohibición) could only be sustained if it is accepted that it is a vested right (derecho adquirido), or a consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution. It would be to accept that the conditions of the "Party Agreement" (Convenio de Partes) remain unalterable over time, until the extinction of the worker-employer relationship, despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the cited norms. In relation to the vested right and the consolidated legal situation, the Constitutional Chamber, in ruling No. 2765 of 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, concerning the right of educators who suffered a disabling illness to a leave of absence and payment of an aid equivalent to the salary, repealed by Law No. 7531, stated: “… II.- … The concepts of "vested right" (derecho adquirido) and "consolidated legal situation" (situación jurídica consolidada) appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It is possible to affirm that, in general terms, the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing - material or immaterial, whether a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right - has entered into (or impacted upon) the patrimonial sphere of the person, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the "consolidated legal situation" (situación jurídica consolidada) represents not so much a patrimonial addition but a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even when these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but that - by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared - a clear and defined rule has already emerged into legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type «if..., then...»; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the "consolidated legal situation" (situación jurídica consolidada) implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (vested right or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects - making it intangible - the situation of he who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the good or right already acquired from the person's assets, or of causing that if the factual premise existed prior to the legal reform, the consequence (beneficial, it is understood) that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now then, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a "right to the immutability of the legal system", that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not mean that, once born into legal life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm; what it means is that - as explained - if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the power to prevent the conditioned effect that was expected under the former norm's rule from arising. This is so because, it was said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs that the person enjoyed was already defined in terms of its elements and effects, even though these are still being produced or have not even begun to be produced. Thus, what the person is entitled to is the consequence, not the rule. d) Application to the specific case. In the sub examine, it is feasible to exemplify the previous concepts starting, precisely, from the elements of the specific case. Under the rule of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, there existed a legal rule, created by the legislator: in the presence of a disabling illness (conditioning fact), the male or female teacher who suffered it would be entitled to a leave of absence and the payment of an aid equivalent to the total salary, for the entire period of the disability - which could even be indefinite - although subject to annual revalidations, upon prior medical certification (conditioned effect). This rule disappeared by virtue of the repeal of those norms carried out by Law No. 7531, which also ordered that, within the non-extendable period of six months from its effective date, the beneficiaries of the leaves had to opt for a disability pension or return to work. Then, exemplifying - and, at the same time, applying - the elements of judgment set forth supra, it can be said that: 1. The protection of vested rights means, in this case, that notwithstanding the elimination of the norms, all amounts received until then as aid must be considered non-reimbursable. To the extent they had definitively entered the assets of the interested parties prior to the legal reform, it would be absurd - and unconstitutional - to pretend that they must be returned, or something similar. And, 2. The protection of consolidated legal situations implies that, although the interested parties could not claim that the norms in question (and, with them, the rule they created) could never again be subject to reform or even, as happened, repeal, they did have the right to expect that, with respect to themselves and all other persons subject to the same state of affairs, the consequence they anticipated would occur or would continue to occur. That state of affairs was characterized by the rule that causally connected their factual situation (disabling illness) with the effect provided for in the law (the enjoyment, even for an indefinite period, of a leave of absence and the payment of the corresponding pecuniary aid). The fact that the rule has disappeared - something the legislator undoubtedly has the power to do - cannot have the power to cause that the consequence to which they were already entitled no longer arises for them. This could only occur, ex nunc, for those who, at the date of the legal reform, had not acquired that title. Specifically: the transitory provision of numeral 2 of Law No. 7531 of July 10, 1995, is not unconstitutional for having repealed the cited precepts of the Civil Service Statute; but it is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law (Article 34 of the Political Charter), to the detriment of the plaintiffs and all those who held the same condition on the effective date of that law, to the extent that it sought to disadvantageously transform what for them was already a consolidated legal situation. III.- Conclusion. Based on what is stated in the preceding Considering, the action must be granted, declaring the challenged norm unconstitutional. This judgment does not have the effect of reversing the repeal of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, but it is clear that such elimination shall have effects only with respect to those who did not have vested rights under the former regime …” In the case under study, according to the "Party Agreement" (Convenio de Partes), the right to the "prohibition regime" (régimen de prohibición) depends on the nature of the functions of those job classes where it was deemed convenient that their holders could not externally exercise functions related to their position, that is, it is a job condition, a technical requirement of the exercise of public function, which prevents the official subject to that condition from practicing his profession, in order to guarantee impartiality and transparency, and to avoid incurring a conflict of interest, and not of the official's own work situation, since when the position he occupies is excluded from that regime, the right ceases. This excludes that it is a right incorporated into the worker's salary, a vested right to permanence in the former regime. There is no proof that the "prohibition" (prohibición) paid to the plaintiff in the position he occupied was due to technical reasons, since the record shows that he occupied the position with location code CED1, category 10, assigned to the Supply Department. Therefore, the Chamber considers that in this case, the rights acquired in good faith are the additional salaries received for the concept of "prohibition" (prohibición) during the legal validity of that regime, without those future ones being able to be protected. It is relevant to add that the Constitutional Chamber, in ruling No. 6391, of 9:31 a.m. on July 21, 2000, upon hearing the Amparo Appeal filed by the plaintiff and other workers against the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, resolved: “… I.- Sole. The claim formulated by the appellants based on the elimination of the salary economic compensation for the concept of the prohibition regime, an agreement communicated to them via official communication number G/N 126-2000 of April fourteenth, two thousand, is completely outside the competence of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, since determining whether the protected parties should maintain said salary bonus or not is a matter that the appealed authority must resolve, or failing that, the labor jurisdiction through the procedure established for that purpose, so that it would be there where, at the instance of the protected parties, the appropriateness or not of the payment of the salary bonus that was eliminated from them would be resolved (in the same sense, see resolution number 6327-99 of ten hours three minutes on August 13, 1999). Therefore, the appeal is inadmissible and must be so declared …" IX.- Consequently, the claimed violation of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, regarding the doctrine of vested rights and consolidated legal situations, has not occurred, nor of Article 74 of the Constitution, regarding the non-waivability thereof, since the plaintiff did not occupy a position whose demands and technical requirements justified the payment of the prohibition, so its cessation does not generate any compensation. The violation of numeral 11 of the Labor Code, concerning waivers made by workers of the provisions of the Labor Code and its related laws, is not receivable, since the cessation of the payment of the "prohibition regime" (régimen de prohibición) is based on the declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm that supported it. The provision contained in Article 15 ibidem and the protective principle established in 17 ibidem have not been breached either, as this principle applies in the case of reasonable doubt, a situation that does not exist in the case under study.

X.- The appellant reproaches that when the Bank's Board of Directors decided to eliminate the additional salary for "prohibition" (exclusive dedication), it agreed to increase the regular scale by six categories, but that in the plaintiff's case that increase did not occur because it referred to categories 13 and above, and he was in category 10, thus violating the principles of equality and non-discrimination. With the elimination of the prohibition regime, the Bank's professional sector fell below those prevailing in the Financial Sector, which prompted the Board of Directors, in session 5019 of January 13, 2000, to adopt the agreement to increase the regular scale by six categories, thereby raising, through a mechanism of new positioning within that scale, the basic salaries of that sector by 55%, thus preserving the competitiveness of those salaries with respect to related sectors of the country's salary market, not to replace the eliminated "prohibition" figure and the payment corresponding to it. The plaintiff was not reached by this decision, by virtue of the fact that he did not occupy a professional position within the Institution's organizational structure, which at that time was located from category 13 onwards, while Mr. [Nombre1] was in the [Dirección1] CED2, category 10, assigned to the Supply Department, whose base salary was in line with the equivalents of the country's financial sector, sufficient reason for not making the increase. According to a technical note on the calculation of the Regular Salary Scales, New Regular Salary Scale, and Management Salary Scale of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, Administrative Division, it was done based on a new regular salary scale that did not include the prohibition bonus. For this, the salary of a category 13 position as of December 31, 1999, was taken as a base, with the following characteristics: 65% prohibition, a salary of ¢65,898.64 with five years of seniority. For the elaboration of the scale, category 13 was used as the starting point, using a correction factor of 55%, whereby category 25 was placed at a base as of December 31, 1999, of ¢117,385.00. A cost of living increase of 5.24% as of June 30, 2000, was considered, a figure calculated by the Economic Division of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, according to document DE-009 of January 12, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, the new scale was adjusted by that percentage, reaching the base of category 25 at ¢123,536. To the previous data, the methodology established by the Bank for the representativeness of the basic salary scale in relation to total salaries was applied. The conceptual framework of salary policy and the methodology applied by the Banco Central in this matter was provided to the Contraloría General de la República, with official communication RH-1998 of December 3, 1999 (pages 56 to 63 of the administrative file). Based on the foregoing, if the plaintiff was not reached by the salary increase for objective and technical reasons, not due to non-compliance with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, the violation of Article 33 of the Political Constitution, insofar as it enshrines these principles, has not occurred. Nor has Article 41 of the Constitution, insofar as it establishes the right to be compensated for injury to property rights or moral interests, since the "prohibition" (prohibición) is inherent to the conditions of a specific position. Likewise, the breach of numeral 19 of the Labor Code is not configured, since it has not been demonstrated that the plaintiff was given different treatment compared to those who were in a work situation equal to his.

XI.- As a corollary of the foregoing, the appealed judgment must be confirmed." **IV.-** The appellant alleges the defect of incongruence, arguing that what is indicated in the recital section of the ruling required the claim to be granted in its main petition. This Chamber has interpreted that this is a procedural defect and not one of substance. In this regard, in Vote No. 304 at 9:00 a.m. on May 6, 2005, it was stated: "…II.- … The defect of *ultra petita*, which affects that principle of congruence, is an error *in procedendo*, not one of substance, incurred by the judge when granting, in the judgment, matters exceeding or beyond the claims of the parties" (on this point, see ARAGONESES ALONSO (Pedro) SENTENCIAS CONGRUENTES, Madrid, 1957, Editorial Aguilar, 250 p). Consequently, it is not appropriate to hear this objection, since based on the provisions of Section 559 of the Labor Code, in this matter the appeal is admissible only for reasons of substance and not of form.

**V.-** In a brief filed on April 12, 2007, before this Chamber, Mr. [Name1] states that another case filed by him, case file No. 02-001976-0166 (Internal No. 07-95), has already been resolved by this body. The present claim was filed on January 10, 2001; and the other aforementioned one on February 6, 2002. Regarding the second claim already resolved, its object sought to have it declared in the judgment: "*that the Central Bank of Costa Rica is obliged to adjust the payment it made to me for employment benefits, taking into account the difference it unilaterally eliminated without following the due process prescribed by law, as well as to pay the corresponding costs, which I hereby request be set at the legal maximum, given the circumstances under which this litigation arose*." The Chamber, in resolution No. 2007-000095 at 9:50 a.m. on February 16, reversed the judgment of the *ad quem* court and confirmed that of the Trial Court, which granted the claim and imposed on the defendant the obligation to recognize and readjust the payment to the plaintiff for employment benefits, considering the difference for the so-called "prohibition" or "exclusive dedication," in the case of the items of notice, severance pay, vacation, and Christmas bonus. With respect to the claim heard in the present process and previously filed by Mr. [Name1], it is noted that its main object is to have it declared that the salary bonus or supplementary salary (sobresueldo) that the Central Bank paid him for over 10 years, under the concept of "prohibition," constitutes a vested right (derecho adquirido) and as such forms part of his assets, specifically, of the salary for the services rendered. This Chamber therefore does not ignore the relationship that exists between both processes. However, it should not condition the decision on this matter on the one already resolved, because the claims are different and, regarding the substance, there could be no contradiction. From an exhaustive examination of the essential issue debated concerning the possible vested right (derecho adquirido) derived from the legal situation of the plaintiff with the defendant Bank, this Chamber's decision on that point is the one developed in this ruling.

**VI.- OF PROHIBITION AS A VESTED RIGHT (DERECHO ADQUIRIDO).** The present claim originated because the Bank unilaterally decided to eliminate the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for the concept of "prohibition" that the plaintiff had been receiving since September 21, 1989, representing 65% of his base salary, which was communicated to him in official letter number Subg.-087 of April 14, 2000 (fact 6 of the claim, folio 2). The Central Bank justified the elimination of the "prohibition" regime on the grounds that the employees of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities, a deconcentrated body of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the economic compensation ceased in execution of the votes of the Constitutional Chamber, Nos. 4647 at 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999, and 6327 at 10:03 a.m. on August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic of 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law of 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, with the annulment being retroactive to the entry into force of such rules, without prejudice to vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith under the validity of those rules.

**VII.-** The appellant claims the violation of Article 34 of the Constitution in that it enshrines the doctrine of vested rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations, as he considers that if for several years he was paid the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for "prohibition," the same constituted an integral part of his assets, and must be considered as incorporated into the individual employment contract. The Chamber considers that it is not appropriate to consider the "prohibition" that was being paid to the plaintiff as a vested right (derecho adquirido). Article 27 of the "Parties' Agreement" entered into between the Central Bank of Costa Rica and its workers in 1988, which provides the basis for the payment of the "prohibition regime," states: "*… The Bank would require, in accordance with the nature of the functions of those classes of positions where it deems convenient that their holders cannot externally exercise functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank will compensate them economically in accordance with the percentage scale applied to the prohibition base that governs for officials of the General Auditing Office of Banks but extensible to other lower-level positions to which a proportional prohibition percentage will be recognized as set by the Bank*" (folios 000161 to 000163 of the administrative file). When Articles 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law number 7015 of November twenty-second, nineteen hundred eighty-five, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic of nineteen hundred eighty-five, number 6982 of December nineteenth, nineteen hundred eighty-four, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986, number 7018 of December twentieth, nineteen hundred eighty-five, which included the technical personnel of the General Auditing Office of Banks, were annulled by vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 04647 at 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, whose declaration was ordered retroactive to the date of validity of the annulled rules, without prejudice to vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith, the "Parties' Agreement" lost its validity, and consequently, the Central Bank could not continue paying the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for prohibition, as prevented by the principle of legality (Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), according to which in matters of public employment, where salaries are paid with public funds, the budget of the public entity is a limit for the use and disposition of State resources, and every expense must be authorized by the budget. Its activity in this matter is conditioned by the pre-existence of a formal law, a Budget Law, that authorizes the expense, and its content can only be modified by a formal law (Articles 176 and following of the Political Constitution) (In relation to this principle, see votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1536-95, 2634-97, and 5500-2000). It is pertinent to note that in the cited Vote No. 04647-99, it was considered: "… II.- On the merits: It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain general rules, foreign to the budget matter. That is, the inclusion of 'atypical' rules that deal with matters proper to ordinary legislation, whether for its creation or modification, is not valid. According to the express text of the challenged rules, whose transcription follows, it is clearly noted that the matter they regulate is not a budgetary matter, and therefore their unconstitutionality is evident. The challenged rules state: 'Article 14, Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 stating: "The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the General Auditing Office of Banks"'. - 'Article 101, Extraordinary Budget Law, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the General Auditing Office of Banks shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments subject to the prohibitions of said law.' 'Article 14, Budget Law for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ... 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditing Offices of the National Banking System.' Indeed, from the precedent established in judgment number 000121-89, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been uniform in stating that the Budget Law cannot modify ordinary legislation. In this regard, the Chamber considered: '... the budget of the Republic is a formal and material law but special due to the matter it constitutes and the procedure already discussed. From the texts cited above, it follows that the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Legislative Assembly regarding such an important matter is to fix in the budgets the probable revenues and authorized expenses of the Public Administration with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for its modifications and for extraordinary budgets. Consequently, the Legislative Power cannot, under the indicated budgetary power, regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty. The foregoing is consistent with the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to draft the ordinary budget bill and the initiative for its modifications and for extraordinary ones, as well as that of the Legislative Assembly regarding its enactment, also with the already analyzed modality that the Executive Branch has no veto power over its approval, pursuant to Section 125 of the Fundamental Charter...' When, by way of addition and clarification, judgment number 4647-99 was consulted, the phrase in the operative part 'without prejudice to vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith' was elucidated, in Vote No. 6327 at 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, it was held: '… Regarding the petition of the Attorney General, it is considered that there is no omission or ambiguity in judgment number 4647-99 at 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, that needs to be added to or clarified. The resolution is clearly clear in that, although the nullity pronounced by the unconstitutionality of the rules is absolute and, therefore, retroactive to the date they entered into force, such effect of the declaration cannot prejudice vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith. Defining whether the rights of the officials linked to the rules are vested or not, and the action the Administration must take in light of such a conclusion, escapes the work corresponding to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, for which reason the petition must be rejected ...'" **VIII.-** The survival or continuity of the payment of the "prohibition" could only be sustained if it is accepted that it is a vested right (derecho adquirido), or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution. It would be to accept that the conditions of the "Parties' Agreement" remain unalterable over time, until the extinction of the employer-employee relationship, despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the cited rules. In relation to the vested right (derecho adquirido) and the consolidated legal situation, the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 2765 at 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, regarding the right of educators who suffered a disabling illness to a leave and payment of an aid equivalent to their salary, repealed by Law No. 7531, stated: "… II.- … The concepts of 'vested right' (derecho adquirido) and 'consolidated legal situation' appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It can be affirmed that, in general terms, the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing - material or immaterial, whether a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right - has entered into (or affected) the person's asset sphere, so that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much an asset increase, but a state of affairs fully defined regarding its legal characteristics and effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still last or not, but that - by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared - a rule, clear and defined, has already come into legal existence, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type 'if..., then...'; that is: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the 'consolidated legal situation' implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (vested right (derecho adquirido) or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects - making it intangible - the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the already acquired good or right from the person's assets, or of causing that, if the factual premise had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (presumably beneficial) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now then, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system,' that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist in that, once born into legal life, the rule that connects the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a later norm; what it means is that - as explained - if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the previous norm from arising. This is so because, it is said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs the person enjoyed was already defined regarding its elements and effects, even if these are still being produced or, even, have not yet begun to be produced. In this way, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule. d) Application to the specific case. In the sub examine, it is viable to exemplify the previous concepts starting, precisely, from the elements of the specific case. Under the rule of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, there existed a legal rule, created by the legislator: in the presence of a disabling illness (conditioning fact), the male or female teacher suffering from it would be entitled to a leave and the payment of an aid equivalent to the entirety of the salary, for the entire period of the disability - which could be even indefinite - although subject to annual revalidations, upon prior medical certification (conditioned effect). This rule disappeared by virtue of the repeal of those rules carried out by Law No. 7531, which also ordered that, within the non-extendable period of six months from its effective date, the beneficiaries of the leaves had to opt for a disability pension or return to work. So, exemplifying - and, at the same time, applying - the elements of judgment set forth supra, it can be said that: 1. The protection of vested rights (derechos adquiridos) means, in this case, that despite the elimination of the rules, all amounts received until then for the concept of aid must be considered unrepeatable. To the extent that they had definitively entered the assets of the interested parties prior to the legal reform, it would be absurd - and unconstitutional - to claim that they must be returned, or something similar. And, 2. The protection of consolidated legal situations implies that, while the interested parties could not claim that the rules in question (and, with them, the rule they created) could never again be subject to reform or even, as occurred, to repeal, they did have the right to expect that, with respect to themselves and all other persons who were subject to the same state of affairs, the consequence they anticipated would occur or does occur. That state of affairs was characterized by the rule that causally connected their factual situation (disabling illness) with the effect provided for in the law (the enjoyment, for an indefinite period, of a leave and the payment of the corresponding pecuniary aid). The fact that the rule has disappeared - something the legislator has undoubted power to do - cannot have the virtue of causing that for them the consequence to which they were already entitled no longer arises. This could only occur, ex nunc, for those who, at the date of the legal reform, had not acquired that title. Specifically: the transitional provision of Section 2 of Law No. 7531 of July 10, 1995, is not unconstitutional for having repealed the cited precepts of the Civil Service Statute; but it is for infringing the guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law (Article 34 of the Political Charter), to the detriment of the plaintiffs and all those who held the same condition at the date of the effective date of that law, to the extent that it sought to disadvantageously transform what was already a consolidated legal situation for them. III.- Conclusion. Based on what is stated in the preceding Recital, the action must be granted, declaring the challenged rule unconstitutional. This judgment does not have the effect of reversing the repeal of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, but it is clear that such elimination will have effects only with respect to those who did not have vested rights (derechos adquiridos) under the previous regime …" In the case under study, according to the "Parties' Agreement," the right to the "prohibition regime" depends on the nature of the functions of those classes of positions where it was deemed convenient that their holders could not externally exercise functions related to their position, that is, it is a labor condition of the position, a technical requirement of the exercise of the public function, which prevents the official subject to that condition from practicing their profession, in order to guarantee impartiality and transparency, and avoid a conflict of interests, and not a condition of the official's own labor situation, since when the position occupied is excluded from that regime, the right ceases. This excludes it from being a right incorporated into the worker's salary, a vested right (derecho adquirido) to permanence in the previous regime. There is no proof that the "prohibition" paid to the plaintiff in the position he occupied was due to technical reasons, as it is evident from the record that he occupied the position with location code CED1, category 10, assigned to the Procurement Department. Therefore, the Chamber considers that in this case, the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of good faith are the supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) received for the concept of "prohibition" during the legal validity of that regime, without being able to protect future ones. It is pertinent to add that the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 6391, at 9:31 a.m. on July 21, 2000, when hearing the Amparo Appeal filed by the plaintiff and other workers against the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, resolved: "… I.- Sole. The claim made by the appellants based on the elimination of the salary economic compensation for the concept of the prohibition regime, an agreement that was communicated to them by official letter number G/N 126-2000 of April fourteenth, two thousand, is completely foreign to the competence of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, since determining whether or not said salary bonus must be maintained for the amparo petitioners is a matter that must be resolved by the respondent authority, or failing that, by the labor jurisdiction through the procedure established for that purpose, so that it would be there, at the instance of the amparo petitioners, where the appropriateness or not of the payment of the salary bonus that was eliminated would be resolved (in the same sense, see resolution number 6327-99 at ten hours and three minutes on August 13, 1999). Therefore, the appeal is inadmissible and must be so declared ..." **IX.-** Consequently, the alleged violation of Article 34 of the Political Constitution does not occur, in that it enshrines the doctrine of vested rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations, nor of Article 74 of the Constitution, in relation to the non-waivability thereof, since the plaintiff did not occupy a position whose demands and technical requirements justified the payment of the prohibition, so its cessation does not generate any indemnity. The infringement of Section 11 of the Labor Code, relating to waivers made by workers of the provisions of the Labor Code and its related laws, is not admissible, since the cessation of the payment of the "prohibition regime" is based on the declaration of unconstitutionality of the rule that supported it. The provision contained in Article 15 ibidem and the protective principle established in Article 17 ibidem have also not been breached, as this principle is applied in cases of reasonable doubt, a circumstance that does not exist in the case under study.

**X.-** The appellant objects that the Board of Directors of the Bank, when it decided to eliminate the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for "prohibition" (exclusive dedication), agreed to increase the regular scale by six categories, but that in the plaintiff's case this increase did not occur because it was referred to categories 13 and above, and he was in category 10, thereby violating the principles of equality and non-discrimination. With the elimination of the prohibition regime, the Bank's professional sector fell below those prevailing in the Financial Sector, which prompted the Board of Directors in session 5019 of January 13, 2000, to adopt the agreement to increase the regular scale by six categories, thereby raising, through a repositioning mechanism within that scale, the basic salaries of that sector by 55%, thus preserving the competitiveness of those salaries with respect to related sectors of the country's salary market, not to replace the eliminated "prohibition" figure and the corresponding payment for it. The plaintiff was not reached by such decision, by virtue of the fact that he did not hold a professional position within the organizational structure of the Institution, which at that time was located at category 13 and above, while Mr. [Name1] was in the [Directorate1] CED2, category 10, assigned to the Procurement Department, where his base salary was in line with the equivalents in the country's financial sector, sufficient reason not to make the increase. According to a technical note on the calculation of the Regular Salary Scales, New Regular Salary Scale, and Managerial Salary Scale of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, Administrative Division, it was made based on a new regular salary scale that did not include the prohibition bonus. For this, the salary of a category 13 position as of December 31, 1999, was taken as a basis, with the following characteristics: 65% prohibition, a salary of ¢65,898.64 with five years of seniority. To prepare the scale, starting from category 13, a correction factor of 55% was used, whereby category 25 was placed at a basic salary as of December 31, 1999, of ¢117,385.00. A 5.24% increase in the cost of living as of June 30, 2000, was considered, a figure that was calculated by the Economic Division of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, according to document DE-009 of January 12, 2000. Pursuant to the above, the new scale was adjusted by that percentage, reaching the basic salary for category 25 of ¢123,536. To the above data, the methodology established by the Bank for the representativeness of the basic salary scale, in relation to total salaries, was applied.

The conceptual framework of wage policy and the methodology applied by the Banco Central in this matter was provided to the Contraloría General de la República, by official letter RH-1998 of December 3, 1999 (folios 56 to 63 of the administrative record).

Based on the foregoing, if the claimant was not reached by the salary increase for objective and technical reasons, and not due to a breach of the principles of equality and non-discrimination, there is no violation of Article 33 of the Constitución Política, insofar as it enshrines these principles.

Nor of Article 41 of the Constitution, insofar as it establishes the right to be compensated for injury to property rights or moral interests, since the “prohibition” is inherent to the conditions of a specific position. Likewise, the breach of numeral 19 of the Código de Trabajo is not established, since it has not been demonstrated that the claimant was treated differently from those who were in a labor situation equal to his own.

**XI.-** As a corollary of what has been set forth, the appealed judgment must be confirmed.

**III.- OF THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER PROVISION.** The evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor proveer) is a discretionary power of the judge, such that they may order, on their own motion or at the request of a party, the taking of other evidence, intended to clarify some disputed point.

Such power should not serve to remedy the negligence of the parties or to correct procedural errors.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 561 of the Código de Trabajo, it is not feasible before this Chamber to propose or admit any evidence, nor may evidence be ordered with that character, unless it is absolutely indispensable to correctly decide the disputed point.

The appellant offers at this instance, copies of the minutes of session 5235, held on June 15, 2005. However, it is not admissible, since it refers to pension matters, different from the one dealt with here.

**IV.-** The appellant alleges the defect of incongruence, arguing that what is indicated in the recital section of the ruling obligated it to grant the claim in its main prayer.

This Chamber has interpreted that this is a procedural defect and not a substantive one.

In this regard, in Voto N° 304 of 9:00 a.m. of May 6, 2005, it was indicated: “…II.- … The defect of ultra petita, which affects that principle of congruence, is an error in procedendo, not of substance, incurred by the judge when granting in the judgment, matters exceeding or foreign to the claims of the parties" (on this matter, one may consult ARAGONESES ALONSO (Pedro) SENTENCIAS CONGRUENTES, Madrid, 1957, Editorial Aguilar, 250 p). Consequently, it is not appropriate to hear this complaint, since based on the provisions of numeral 559 of the Código de Trabajo, in this matter the appeal is admissible only for substantive reasons and not procedural ones.

**V.-** In a brief filed on April 12, 2007 before this Chamber, Mr. [Name1] states that another case filed by him, case file No. 02-001976-0166 (Internal No. 07-95), has already been decided by this body.

The present lawsuit was filed on January 10, 2001; and the other mentioned above on February 6, 2002.

Regarding the second lawsuit already resolved, its object sought that the judgment declare: “*that the Banco Central de Costa Rica is obliged to adjust the payment it made to me for employment benefits, taking into account the difference it unilaterally eliminated without following the due process prescribed by law, as well as to pay the corresponding costs, which from now on I request be set at the maximum allowed by law, given the circumstances under which this litigation arose*”.

The Chamber, in resolution No. 2007-000095 of 9:50 a.m. of February 16, reversed the judgment of the *ad quem* and confirmed that of the Trial Court, which granted the lawsuit and imposed on the defendant the obligation to acknowledge and readjust the payment to the claimant for employment benefits, considering the difference for the so-called “prohibition” or “exclusive dedication”, in the case of the items of pre-notice, severance assistance, vacation pay, and year-end bonus.

With respect to the lawsuit heard in the present proceeding and previously filed by Mr. [Name1], it is noted that its main object is to declare that the salary supplement or additional salary (sobresueldo) paid to him by the Banco Central for more than 10 years, as “prohibition”, constitutes an acquired right (derecho adquirido) and as such forms part of his assets, specifically, of the salary for services rendered.

This Chamber is therefore not unaware of the relationship between both processes.

However, it must not condition the decision in this matter on the one already resolved, since the claims are different and with respect to the substance there could be no contradiction.

From an exhaustive examination of the essential issue debated regarding the possible acquired right derived from the claimant's legal situation with the defendant Bank, this Chamber's decision on that point is the one developed in this ruling.

**VI.- OF THE PROHIBITION AS AN ACQUIRED RIGHT.** The present claim originated because the Bank unilaterally ordered the elimination of the additional salary for “prohibition” that the claimant had been receiving since September 21, 1989, representing 65% of his base salary, which was communicated to him in official letter number Subg.-087 of April 14, 2000 (fact 6° of the lawsuit, folio 2). The Banco Central justified the elimination of the “prohibition” regime on the grounds that the servants of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, a deconcentrated body of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based that payment on Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República No. 6982 of December 19, 1984 and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985; and that the economic compensation ceased in execution of the rulings of the Sala Constitucional, No. 4647 of 4:20 p.m. of June 16, 1999 and No. 6327 of 10:03 a.m. of August 13 of the same year, which declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario de la República 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and Article 14 subsection 17 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, with retroactive annulment to the effective date of such norms, without prejudice to the acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) in good faith under the validity of those norms.

**VII.-** The appellant invokes the violation of Article 34 of the Constitution insofar as it enshrines the doctrine of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, since he considers that if the additional salary for “prohibition” was paid to him for several years, it constituted an integral part of his assets, and must be considered as incorporated into the individual employment contract.

The Chamber considers that it is not appropriate to consider the “prohibition” that had been paid to the claimant as an acquired right. Article 27 of the “Convenio de Partes” signed between the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its workers in 1988, which provides the basis for the payment of the “prohibition regime”, states: *“… The Bank would demand, in accordance with the nature of the functions of those classes of positions in which it deems convenient that their holders cannot exercise externally functions related to their position. In these cases, the Bank will compensate them economically in accordance with the percentage scale applied to the base of the prohibition that governs for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos but extensible to other positions of lower level to which a proportional prohibition percentage fixed by the Bank will be recognized"* (folios 000161 to 000163 of the administrative record).

When the Sala Constitucional, by ruling No. 04647 of 4:12 p.m. of June 16, 1999, annulled Articles 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario number 7015 of November twenty-second, nineteen eighty-five, 14 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República for nineteen eighty-five, number 6982 of December nineteenth, nineteen eighty-four, and 14 subsection 17 of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, number 7018 of December twentieth, nineteen eighty-five, which included the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos, the declaration of which was ordered retroactive to the date of validity of the annulled norms, without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith, the “Convenio de Partes” lost its validity, and consequently, the Banco Central could not continue paying the additional salary for prohibition, as prohibited by the principle of legality (principle of legality) (Article 11 of the Ley General de Administración Pública), according to which in matters of public employment, where salaries are paid with public resources, the budget of the public entity is a limit for the use and disposition of State resources, and all expenditure must be budgetarily authorized.

Its activity in this matter is conditioned by the preexistence of a formal law, the Ley de Presupuesto, which authorizes the expenditure, and its content can only be modified by formal law (Articles 176 and following of the Constitución Política) (In relation to this principle, the rulings of the Sala Constitucional No. 1536-95, 2634-97 and 5500-2000 may be consulted). It is relevant to note that in the cited Voto No. 04647-99, it was considered: “… II.- On the merits: It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Ley de Presupuesto cannot validly contain norms of a general nature, unrelated to budget matters. That is, the inclusion of 'atypical' norms that deal with matters proper to ordinary legislation, whether for its creation or modification, is not valid. According to the express text of the challenged norms, transcribed below, it is clearly noted that the matter they regulate is not budgetary, and therefore their unconstitutionality is evident. The challenged norms state: 'Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 stating: “The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos.”- 'Article 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos will receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975 and its amendments subject to the prohibitions of said law.' 'Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ... 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditing Departments of the National Banking System.' Indeed, from the antecedent given in judgment number 000121-89, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been uniform in indicating that the Ley de Presupuesto cannot modify ordinary legislation. In this regard, the Chamber considered: '... the budget of the Republic is a formal and material law, but special due to the matter that constitutes it and the procedure already discussed. From the texts cited above, it follows that the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Asamblea Legislativa over such an important matter is to set in the budgets the probable revenues and authorized expenditures of the Public Administration with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for its modifications and for extraordinary budgets. Consequently, the Legislative Power cannot, under the budgetary authority indicated, regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty. The foregoing is consistent with the exclusive attribution of the Executive Power to prepare the draft ordinary budget and the initiative for its modifications and extraordinary ones, as well as that of the Asamblea Legislativa regarding its enactment, in addition to the already analyzed modality that the Executive Power has no veto authority over its approval, pursuant to numeral 125 of the Carta Fundamental...' When, by means of addition and clarification, judgment number 4647-99 was consulted, it clarified the phrase in the operative part 'without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith', in Voto No. 6327 of 10:03 a.m. of August 13, 1999, it considered: '… Regarding the petition of the Procurador General, it is estimated that there is no omission or ambiguity in judgment number 4647-99 of 4:12 p.m. of June 16, 1999 that must be added to or clarified. The resolution is manifestly clear that, despite the fact that the nullity pronounced by the unconstitutionality of the norms is absolute and, therefore, retroactive to the date they came into effect, such effect of the declaration cannot harm the rights acquired in good faith. Defining whether the rights of the officials linked to the norms are or are not acquired, and the action the Administration must take in light of such a conclusion, escapes the task corresponding to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, for which reason the petition must be rejected...'” **VIII.-** The survival or continuity of the payment of the “prohibition” could only be sustained if it is accepted that it is an acquired right, or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution.

It would be to accept that the conditions of the “Convenio de Partes” remain unalterable over time, until the extinguishment of the worker-employer relationship, despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the cited norms.

In relation to the acquired right and the consolidated legal situation, the Sala Constitucional, in Voto No. 2765 of 3:03 p.m. of May 20, 1997, concerning the right of educators who suffer an incapacitating illness to a leave and payment of aid equivalent to salary, repealed by Law No. 7531, stated: “… II.- … The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' appear closely related in constitutional doctrine.

It can be affirmed that, in general terms, the former denotes a consummated circumstance in which a thing—material or immaterial, whether a previously alien good or a previously nonexistent right—has entered into (or had an impact upon) the person’s patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the "consolidated legal situation" (situación jurídica consolidada) represents not so much a patrimonial gain, but rather a state of affairs fully defined with respect to its legal characteristics and effects, even if those effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant concerning the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but that—by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared—a clear and defined rule has already emerged into legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person’s situation is given by a logical proposition of the type «if..., then...»; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (acquired right or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects—rendering it intangible—the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of withdrawing the good or the right already acquired from the person’s patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual premise had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (profitable, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada) no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a "right to the immutability of the legal system," that is, that the rules never change. For that reason, the constitutional precept does not consist of the idea that, once born into legal life, the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot be modified or even suppressed by a later norm; what it means is that—as was explained—if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the previous norm from arising. This is so because, it was said, what is relevant is that the state of affairs the person enjoyed was already defined regarding its elements and effects, even if those effects are still occurring or have not even begun to occur. Thus, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule. d) Application to the specific case. In the sub examine, it is feasible to exemplify the foregoing concepts precisely from the elements of the specific case. Under the rule of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, there existed a legal rule, created by the legislator: in the presence of an incapacitating illness (conditioning fact), the male or female teacher suffering from it would be entitled to a leave and to the payment of an assistance equivalent to the totality of the salary, for the entire duration of the incapacity—which could be even indefinite—though subject to annual revalidations, upon medical certification (conditioned effect). This rule disappeared by virtue of the repeal of those norms carried out by Law No. 7531, which also ordered that, within the unextendable period of six months from its entry into force, the beneficiaries of the leaves had to opt for an invalidity pension or return to work. Thus, exemplifying—and, at the same time, applying—the elements of judgment set forth supra, it can be said that: 1. The protection of acquired rights means, in this case, that notwithstanding the elimination of the norms, all amounts received until then by way of assistance must be deemed non-recoverable. To the extent that they had definitively entered the patrimony of the interested parties prior to the legal reform, it would be absurd—and unconstitutional—to seek that they be returned, or anything similar. And, 2. The protection of consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) implies that, although the interested parties could not claim that the norms in question (and, with them, the rule they created) could never again be the object of reform or even, as occurred, of repeal, they did have the right to expect that, with respect to themselves and all other persons who were subject to the same state of affairs, the consequence they anticipated would arise or does arise. That state of affairs was characterized by the rule that causally connected their factual situation (incapacitating illness) with the effect provided for in the law (the enjoyment, for up to an indefinite period, of a leave and the payment of the corresponding pecuniary assistance). The fact that the rule has disappeared—a thing the legislator undoubtedly has the power to do—cannot have the virtue of bringing about that the consequence to which they already had a right no longer arises for them. This could only occur, ex nunc, for those who, on the date of the legal reform, had not acquired that title. Specifically: the transitory provision of numeral 2 of Law No. 7531 of July 10, 1995, is not unconstitutional for having repealed the cited precepts of the Civil Service Statute; but it is unconstitutional for infringing the guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law (Article 34 of the Political Charter), to the detriment of the plaintiffs and all those who held the same condition as them on the date of that law’s entry into force, to the extent that it sought to transform disadvantageously what for them was already a consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada). III.- Conclusion. Based on what was stated in the preceding Considerando, the action must be granted, declaring the challenged norm unconstitutional. This judgment does not have the effect of reversing the repeal of Articles 167 to 169 of the Civil Service Statute, but it is clear that that elimination will have effects only with respect to those who did not have acquired rights under the prior regime …” In the case under study, according to the “Convenio de Partes,” the right to the “prohibition regime” (régimen de prohibición) depends on the nature of the functions of those classes of positions in which it was deemed convenient that their holders not be able to externally exercise functions related to their post, that is, it is a labor condition of the position, a technical requirement of the exercise of the public function, which prevents the official subject to that condition from exercising their profession, for the purpose of guaranteeing impartiality and transparency, and avoiding a conflict of interest, and not from the official’s own labor situation, since when the position they occupy is excluded from that regime, the right ceases. This excludes that it is a right incorporated into the worker’s salary, an acquired right to permanence in the prior regime. There is no proof that the “prohibition” (prohibición) paid to the plaintiff in the position they occupied was due to technical reasons, since it is on the record that they occupied the position with location code CED1, category 10, assigned to the Department of Procurement (Departamento de Proveeduría). For this reason, the Chamber considers that in this case, the rights acquired in good faith are the additional salary perceived by way of “prohibition” (prohibición) during the legal validity of that regime, without being able to protect future ones. It is relevant to add that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Voto N° 6391, at 9:31 a.m. on July 21, 2000, when hearing the Recurso de Amparo filed by the plaintiff and other workers against the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica), resolved: “… I.- Single. The claim brought by the appellants based on the elimination of the salary-based economic compensation by way of the prohibition regime (régimen de prohibición), an agreement that was communicated to them through official letter number G/N 126-2000 of April fourteenth, two thousand, is entirely outside the competence of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, since determining whether or not that salary supplement should be maintained for the amparados is a matter that must be resolved by the appealed authority, or failing that, by the labor jurisdiction through the procedure established for that purpose, so that it would be there, at the instance of the amparados, where the appropriateness or not of the payment of the salary supplement that was eliminated to them would be resolved (in that same sense see resolution number 6327-99 at ten hours and three minutes of August 13, 1999). Based on the foregoing, the recurso is inadmissible and must be so declared ...” IX.- Consequently, the alleged violation of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, insofar as it enshrines the doctrine of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), does not occur, nor does that of Article 74 of the Constitution, in relation to their inalienability, since the plaintiff did not occupy a position whose demands and technical requirements justified the payment of the prohibition (prohibición), so its cessation does not generate any indemnification. The infringement of numeral 11 of the Labor Code, concerning waivers made by workers of the provisions of the Labor Code and its related laws, is not acceptable, since the cessation of the payment of the “prohibition regime” (régimen de prohibición) finds its basis in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm that supported it. The provision contained in Article 15 of the same code and the protective principle set forth in Article 17 of the same code have likewise not been breached, since this principle applies in the case of reasonable doubt, a circumstance that does not arise in the case under study. X.- The appellant reproaches that the Bank’s Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), when it decided to eliminate the additional salary for “prohibition” (prohibición) (exclusive dedication), agreed to increase the regular scale by six categories, but that in the plaintiff’s case that increase did not occur because it was limited to category 13 and above, and they were at category 10, thereby violating the principles of equality and non-discrimination. With the elimination of the prohibition regime (régimen de prohibición), the professional sector of the Bank fell below those prevailing in the Financial Sector, which led the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), in session 5019 of January 13, 2000, to adopt the agreement to increase the regular scale by six categories, thereby raising, through a repositioning mechanism within that scale, the base salaries of that sector by 55%, thus preserving the competitiveness of those salaries with respect to related sectors of the country’s salary market, not to replace the eliminated "prohibition" (prohibición) figure and the corresponding payment for it. The plaintiff was not reached by such decision, by virtue of the fact that they did not occupy a professional position within the organizational structure of the Institution, which at that time was situated at category 13 and above, while Mr. [Name1] was at the [Directorate1] CED2, category 10, assigned to the Department of Procurement (Departamento de Proveeduría), in which their base salary was commensurate with the equivalents of the country’s financial sector, sufficient reason not to make the increase. According to the technical note on the calculation of the Regular Salary Scales, New Regular Salary Scale, and Managerial Salary Scale of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica), Administrative Division (División Administrativa), it was done based on a new regular salary scale that did not include the prohibition (prohibición) supplement. For this purpose, the salary of a position category 13 as of December 31, 1999, was taken as the basis, with the following characteristics: 65% prohibition (prohibición), a salary of ¢65,898.64 with five years of seniority. For the preparation of the scale, the starting point was category 13, using a correction factor of 55%, whereby category 25 was placed at a base salary as of December 31, 1999, of ¢117,385.00. A 5.24% increase in the cost of living as of June 30, 2000, was considered, a figure that was calculated by the Economic Division (División Económica) of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica), according to document DE-009 of January 12, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, the new scale was adjusted by that percentage, with the base salary of category 25 reaching ¢123,536. To the preceding data, the methodology established by the Bank for the representativeness of the base salary scale, in relation to total salaries, was applied. The conceptual framework of salary policy and the methodology applied by the Central Bank in this matter was provided to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), via official letter RH-1998 of December 3, 1999 (folios 56 to 63 of the administrative expediente). Based on the foregoing, if the plaintiff was not reached by the salary increase for objective and technical reasons, and not because of a breach of the principles of equality and non-discrimination, the violation of Article 33 of the Political Constitution, insofar as it enshrines these principles, does not occur. Nor does Article 41 of the Constitution, insofar as it establishes the right to be indemnified for injury to property rights or moral interests, since the “prohibition” (prohibición) is inherent to the conditions of a specific position. Likewise, the breach of numeral 19 of the Labor Code is not established, since it has not been demonstrated that the plaintiff was treated differently with respect to those in an equal labor situation as theirs. XI.- As a corollary of what has been stated, the appealed judgment must be confirmed.”

“III.- DE LA NATURALEZA DE LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR PROVEER. La prueba para mejor proveer es una facultad discrecional del juzgador, de forma que puede disponer, de oficio o a petición de parte, la evacuación de otras pruebas, tendientes a aclarar algún punto controvertido. Tal potestad no debe servir para solventar la incuria de las partes o para subsanar yerros de orden procesal. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 561 del Código de Trabajo, ante esta Sala no es factible proponer ni admitir prueba alguna y tampoco pueden ordenarse pruebas con ese carácter, salvo que sean absolutamente indispensables para decidir con acierto el punto controvertido. La parte recurrente ofrece en esta instancia, copias del acta de la sesión 5235, celebrada el 15 de junio de 2005. Sin embargo, no resulta admisible, ya que se refiere a materia de pensiones, distinta a la que aquí se trata. IV.- El recurrente acusa el vicio de incongruencia, pues aduce que con lo que se indica en la parte considerativa del fallo, obligaba a declarar con lugar la demanda en su petitoria principal. Esta Sala ha interpretado que se trata de un vicio procesal y no de fondo. Al respecto en el Voto N° 304 de las 9 horas del 6 de mayo de 2005, se indicó: “…II.- … El vicio de ultra petita, que afecta aquel principio de congruencia es un yerro in procedendo, no de fondo, en que incurre el juzgador, cuando otorga en sentencia, extremos superiores o ajenos a las pretensiones de las partes" (sobre el particular se puede consultar ARAGONESES ALONSO (Pedro) SENTENCIAS CONGRUENTES, Madrid, 1957, Editorial Aguilar, 250 p). En consecuencia, no es procedente conocer de este reproche, ya que con fundamento en lo dispuesto en el numeral 559 del Código de Trabajo, en esta materia el recurso es procedente únicamente por razones de fondo y no de forma. V.- En escrito presentado el 12 de abril de 2007 ante esta Sala, el señor [Nombre1] , manifiesta que otro caso interpuesto por él, expediente Nº 02-001976-0166 (Interno Nº 07-95), ya fue resuelto por este órgano. La presente demanda se interpuso el 10 de enero de 2001; y la otra antes mencionada el 6 de febrero de 2002. Tocante a la segunda demanda ya resuelta, se tiene que su objeto propendía a que en sentencia se declarara: “que el Banco Central de Costa Rica está en la obligación de ajustarme el pago que me hizo en concepto de prestaciones, tomando en cuenta la diferencia que me eliminó unilateralmente y sin seguirse el debido proceso prescrito por la ley, así como de pagarme las correspondientes costas, que desde ahora solicito fijar en el máximo de ley, dadas las circunstancias bajo las cuales ha nacido ese litigio”. La Sala en resolución Nº 2007-000095 de 9:50 horas de 16 de febrero, revocó la sentencia del ad quem y confirmó la del Juzgado que declaró con lugar la demanda e impuso al demandado la obligación de reconocer al actor y reajustarle el pago por concepto de prestaciones, considerando la diferencia por la mal llamada “prohibición” o “dedicación exclusiva”, en el caso de los extremos de preaviso, auxilio de cesantía, vacaciones y aguinaldo. Respecto de la demanda conocida en el presente proceso y presentada con anterioridad por el señor [Nombre1] , se advierte que su objeto principal es para que se declare que el plus salarial o sobresueldo que le pagó el Banco Central durante más de 10 años, en concepto de “prohibición” constituye un derecho adquirido y como tal forma parte de su patrimonio, en concreto, del salario por los servicios prestados. Esta Sala no desconoce por lo tanto la relación que existe entre ambos procesos. Sin embargo, no debe condicionar la decisión de este asunto al que ya se encuentra resuelto, por cuanto las pretensiones son distintas y en relación con el fondo no podría haber contradicción. De un examen exhaustivo del tema esencial debatido sobre el eventual derecho adquirido derivado de la situación jurídica del actor con el Banco demandado, la decisión de esta Sala sobre ese punto es la que se desarrolla en este fallo. VI.- DE LA PROHIBICIÓN COMO DERECHO ADQUIRIDO. El presente reclamo se originó porque el Banco en forma unilateral dispuso la eliminación del sobresueldo por concepto de “prohibición” que percibía el actor desde el 21 de septiembre de 1989, que representa un 65% de su salario base, lo que le fue comunicado en oficio número Subg.-087 del 14 de abril de 2000 (hecho 6° de la demanda, folio 2). El Banco Central justificó la eliminación del régimen de “prohibición”, en que los servidores de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, órgano desconcentrado del Banco Central de Costa Rica, fundaban ese pago en el artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario N° 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985, 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República N° 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984 y 14 inciso 17 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, N° 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985; y en que la compensación económica cesó en ejecución de los votos de la Sala Constitucional, N°s 4647 de las 16:20 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 y 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto del mismo año, que declararon inconstitucionales y anularon el artículo 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario de la República 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985, 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985, N° 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984, y 14 inciso 17 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario de 1986, N° 7018 del 20 de diciembre de 1985, anulación retroactiva a la entrada en vigencia de tales normas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe al amparo de la vigencia de tales normas. VII.- El casacionista invoca la trasgresión del artículo 34 constitucional en cuanto consagra la doctrina de los derechos adquiridos y de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, ya que considera que si durante varios años le fue pagado el sobresueldo por “prohibición”, el mismo constituía parte integral de su patrimonio, y se debe tener como incorporado al contrato individual de trabajo. La Sala estima que no es procedente considerar la “prohibición” que se le venía pagando al actor, como un derecho adquirido. El artículo 27 del “Convenio de Partes” suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus trabajadores en el año de 1988, que da base al pago del “régimen de prohibición”, dispone: “… El Banco exigiría de acuerdo con la naturaleza de las funciones de aquellas clases de puestos en que estime conveniente que sus titulares no puedan ejercer externamente funciones afines a su cargo. En estos casos el Banco le compensará económicamente de acuerdo con la escala porcentual aplicada a la base de la prohibición que rige para los funcionarios de la Auditoría General de Bancos pero extensible a otros puestos de menor nivel a los cuales se les reconocerá un porcentaje de prohibición proporcional fijado por el Banco" (folios 000161 a 000163 del expediente administrativo). Al anularse por voto de la Sala Constitucional N° 04647 de las 16:12 del 16 de junio de 1999, los artículos 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario número 7015 del veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, 14 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, número 6982 del diecinueve de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro, y 14 inciso 17 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986, número 7018 de veinte de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, que incluía al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos, cuya declaratoria se dispuso retroactiva a la fecha de vigencia de las normas anuladas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, el “Convenio de Partes” perdió vigencia, y en consecuencia, el Banco Central no podía continuar pagando el sobresueldo por prohibición, por impedirlo el principio de legalidad (artículo 11 de la Ley General de Administración Pública), según el cual en materia de empleo público, donde los salarios se pagan con recursos públicos, el presupuesto del ente público es un límite para el uso y disposición de los recursos del Estado, y todo gasto, debe estar autorizado presupuestariamente. Su actividad en esta materia está condicionada por la preexistencia de ley formal, Ley de Presupuesto, que autorice el gasto, y su contenido solo puede ser modificado por ley formal (artículos 176 y siguientes de la Constitución Política) (En relación a este principio pueden consultarse los votos de la Sala Constitucional N° 1536-95, 2634-97 y 5500-2000). Interesa indicar que en el Voto N°04647-99 citado, se consideró: “… II.-Sobre el fondo: Ha sido criterio reiterado de esta Sala, que la Ley de Presupuesto, no puede válidamente contener normas de carácter general, ajenas a la materia de presupuesto. Es decir, no es válida la inclusión de normas "atípicas" que versen sobre materia propia de la legislación ordinaria, ya sea para la creación o modificación de ésta. Según el texto expreso de las normas impugnadas, cuya transcripción se hace de seguido, se nota claramente, que la materia que regulan no es materia presupuestaria, y por lo tanto su inconstitucionalidad resulta evidente. Las normas impugnadas señalan: "Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982 de 19 diciembre 1984. Agréguese un párrafo al artículo 1 de la Ley 5867 que diga: "Los beneficios y prohibiciones que se indican en este artículo, incluyen al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos".- "Artículo 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, número 7015 del 22 noviembre 1985.- El personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos recibirá los beneficios económicos de la Ley 5867 de 15 de diciembre de 1975 y sus reformas sujeto a las prohibiciones de dicha ley." "Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 número 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985.- 1. ... 17. Las prohibiciones y beneficios contenidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 5867 15 de diciembre de 1975, son aplicables a las Auditorías del Sistema Bancario Nacional." En efecto, desde el antecedente dado en sentencia número 000121-89 la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha sido uniforme en señalar que la Ley de Presupuesto no puede modificar la legislación ordinaria. Al respecto la Sala consideró: "... el presupuesto de la República es una ley formal y material pero especial por la materia que la constituye y por el procedimiento ya comentado. De los textos antes citados se desprende que la competencia o legitimación que constitucionalmente se atribuye a la Asamblea Legislativa sobre tan importante materia, es para fijar en los presupuestos los ingresos probables y los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública con las modalidades que para sus modificaciones y para presupuestos extraordinarios la misma Constitución señala. No puede en consecuencia, el Poder Legislativo bajo la potestad presupuestaria que se apunta, regular materias de diferente naturaleza o contenido de esa especialidad. Lo expresado es congruente con la atribución exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo de elaboración del proyecto de presupuesto ordinario y la iniciativa de sus modificaciones y de los extraordinarios, así como la de la Asamblea Legislativa en cuanto a su dictado, además con la modalidad ya analizada de que el Poder Ejecutivo no tiene atribución de veto sobre su aprobación, a tenor del numeral 125 de la Carta Fundamental ..." Al consultarse por vía de adición y aclaración la sentencia número 4647-99, se dilucidara la frase de la parte dispositiva "sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe", en Voto N° 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto de 1999, estimó: “… Sobre la gestión del Procurador General, se estima que no existe una omisión o ambigüedad en la sentencia número 4647-99 de las 16:12 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 que deba adicionarse o aclararse. La resolución es palmariamente clara en cuanto a que, a pesar de que la nulidad pronunciada por la inconstitucionalidad de las normas es absoluta y, por ende, retroactiva a la fecha en que ellas entraron en vigencia, tal efecto de la declaratoria no puede perjudicar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Definir si los derechos de los funcionarios vinculados a las normas son o no adquiridos, y la acción que debe tomar la Administración frente a una conclusión de esa índole, escapa a la labor que corresponde a la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por lo que la gestión debe rechazarse ...” VIII.- La pervivencia o continuidad del pago de la “prohibición” solo podría sostenerse si se acepta que se trata de un derecho adquirido, o de una situación jurídica consolidada garantizados por el artículo 34 Constitucional. Sería aceptar que las condiciones del “Convenio de Partes” se mantienen inalterables en el tiempo, hasta la extinción de la relación obrero-patronal, a pesar de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas citadas. En relación al derecho adquirido y la situación jurídica consolidada, la Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 2765 de las 15:03 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997, relativo al derecho de los educadores que sufrieran una enfermedad incapacitante, a una licencia y pago de un auxilio equivalente al salario, derogado por Ley N° 7531, expresó: “… II.- … Los conceptos de "derecho adquirido" y "situación jurídica consolidada" aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa - material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la "situación jurídica consolidada" representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que -por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado). Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo «si..., entonces...»; vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la "situación jurídica consolidada" implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado. En ambos casos (derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada), el ordenamiento protege -tornándola intangible- la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y de certeza jurídica. En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un "derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que -como se explicó- si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla. d) Aplicación al caso concreto. En el sub examine , es viable ejemplificar los conceptos anteriores a partir, precisamente, de los elementos del caso concreto. Bajo el imperio de los artículos 167 a 169 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, existía una regla jurídica, creada por el legislador: en presencia de una enfermedad incapacitante (hecho condicionante), el maestro o maestra que la sufriese tendría derecho a una licencia y al pago de un auxilio equivalente a la totalidad del salario, por todo el plazo de la incapacidad -que podría ser incluso indefinido- aunque sujeto a revalidaciones anuales, previa constancia médica (efecto condicionado). Esta regla desapareció en virtud de la derogatoria que de esas normas realizó la ley Nº 7531, la cual ordenaba además que, dentro del improrrogable lapso de seis meses a partir de su vigencia, los beneficiarios de las licencias debían optar por una pensión de invalidez o bien reintegrarse al trabajo. Entonces, ejemplificando -y, a la vez, aplicando- los elementos de juicio expuestos supra , se puede decir que: 1. La protección de los derechos adquiridos significa, en este caso, que no obstante la eliminación de las normas, todos los montos recibidos hasta entonces por concepto de auxilio, deben estimarse irrepetibles. En la medida en que habían ingresado definitivamente al patrimonio de los interesados con anterioridad a la reforma legal, resultaría absurdo -e inconstitucional- pretender que deban ser devueltos, o cosa semejante. Y, 2. La tutela de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas implica que, si bien los interesados no podían pretender que las normas en cuestión (y, con ellas, la regla que creaban) no pudiesen ser nunca más objeto de reforma o incluso, como ocurrió, de derogatoria, sí tenían derecho a esperar que, respecto de ellos mismos y de todas las demás personas que estuviesen sometidas al mismo estado de cosas, se produjese o produzca la consecuencia que anticipaban. Ese estado de cosas estaba caracterizado por la regla que conectaba causalmente su situación fáctica (enfermedad incapacitante) con el efecto previsto en la ley (el disfrute, hasta por lapso indefinido, de una licencia y el pago del auxilio pecuniario correspondiente). El hecho de que la regla haya desaparecido -cosa que el legislador tiene potestad indudable para hacer- no puede tener la virtud de producir que para ellos ya no surja la consecuencia a la que ya tenían derecho. Esto sólo podría ocurrir, ex nunc , para quienes, a la fecha de la reforma legal, no hubiesen adquirido ese título. Concretamente: el transitorio del numeral 2 de la ley nº 7531 de 10 de julio de 1995 no es inconstitucional por haber derogado los citados preceptos del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; pero sí lo es por infringir la garantía de la irretroactividad de la ley (artículo 34 de la Carta Política), en daño de los accionantes y de todos los que ostentaran su misma condición a la fecha de la vigencia de esa ley, en la medida en que pretendió transformar desventajosamente lo que para ellos era ya una situación jurídica consolidada. III.- Conclusión. Con base en lo enunciado en el Considerando anterior, se debe estimar la acción, declarando inconstitucional la norma impugnada. Esta sentencia no tiene el efecto de revertir la derogatoria de los artículos 167 a 169 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, pero es claro que esa eliminación tendrá efectos únicamente respecto de quienes no tuvieran derechos adquiridos conforme al régimen anterior …” En el caso en estudio, de acuerdo con el “Convenio de Partes”, el derecho al “régimen de prohibición” depende de la naturaleza de las funciones de aquellas clases de puestos en que se estimara conveniente que sus titulares no pudieran ejercer externamente funciones afines a su cargo, o sea, es una condición laboral del puesto, una exigencia técnica del ejercicio de la función pública, que impide al funcionario sujeto a esa condición, ejercer su profesión, con el objeto de garantizar la imparcialidad y la transparencia, y evitar se incurra en un conflicto de intereses, y no de la situación laboral propia del funcionario, pues cuando el puesto que ocupa es excluido de ese régimen, el derecho cesa. Esto excluye que se trate de un derecho incorporado al salario del trabajador, de un derecho adquirido a la permanencia en el régimen anterior. No hay prueba de que la “prohibición” que se pagaba al actor en el puesto que ocupaba, obedeciera a razones técnicas, pues en autos consta que ocupaba la plaza código de ubicación CED1, categoría 10, adscrita al Departamento de Proveeduría. Por ello, la Sala considera que en este caso, los derechos adquiridos de buena fe son los sobresueldos percibidos por concepto de “prohibición” durante la vigencia jurídica de ese régimen, sin que se puedan amparar aquellos futuros. Interesa agregar, que la Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 6391, de las 9:31 horas del 21 de julio de 2000, al conocer del Recurso de Amparo interpuesto por el actor y otros trabajadores contra la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica, resolvió: “… I.- Único. El reclamo formulado por los recurrentes sustentado en la eliminación de la compensación económica salarial por concepto del régimen de prohibición , acuerdo que les fue comunicado mediante oficio número G/N 126-2000 del catorce de abril del dos mil, es por completo ajeno a la competencia de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que determinar si a los amparados se les debe mantener o no dicho plus salarial, es un asunto que debe solucionar la autoridad recurrida, o en su defecto, la jurisdicción laboral mediante el procedimiento establecido al efecto, de modo que sería allí, donde se resolvería a instancia de los amparados, sobre la procedencia o no del pago del plus salarial que les fue eliminado (en ese mismo sentido ver la resolución número 6327-99 de la diez horas con tres minutos del 13 de agosto de 1999). Por lo expuesto el recurso es inadmisible y así debe declararse ...” IX.- En consecuencia, no se da la trasgresión que se acusa del artículo 34 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto consagra la doctrina de los derechos adquiridos y de las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, ni del 74 constitucional, en relación con la irrenunciabilidad de los mismos, ya que el actor no ocupaba un puesto cuyas exigencias y requerimientos técnicos justificaran el pago de la prohibición, por lo que su cese no genera indemnización alguna. La infracción del numeral 11 del Código de Trabajo, relativa a las renuncias que hagan los trabajadores de las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo y sus leyes conexas, no es de recibo, ya que el cese del pago del “régimen de prohibición” encuentra fundamento en la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma que le daba soporte. La disposición contenida en el artículo 15 ibídem y el principio protector establecido en el 17 ibídem, tampoco se han quebrantado, pues este principio se aplica en el caso de duda razonable, supuesto que no se da en el caso en estudio. X.- Reprocha el recurrente que la Junta Directiva del Banco cuando decidió eliminar el sobresueldo por “prohibición” (dedicación exclusiva), acordó aumentar en seis categorías la escala regular, pero que en el caso del demandante ese aumento no ocurrió pues estuvo referido a las categorías 13 en adelante, y se encontraba en la 10, por lo que se trasgredieron los principios de igualdad y no discriminación. Con la eliminación del régimen de prohibición, el sector profesional del Banco quedó por debajo de los que regían en el Sector Financiero, lo que motivó que la Junta Directiva en sesión 5019 del 13 de enero de 2000, tomara el acuerdo de aumentar en seis categorías la escala regular, con lo que elevaría mediante un mecanismo de nuevo posicionamiento dentro de esa escala, los salarios básicos de ese sector en un 55%, conservando así la competitividad de esos salarios con respecto a sectores afines del mercado salarial del país, no para sustituir la figura de la "prohibición" eliminada y el pago correspondiente a ella. Al actor no lo alcanzó tal decisión, en virtud de que no ocupaba un puesto profesional dentro de la estructura organizacional de la Institución, que para entonces se ubicaba de la categoría 13 en adelante, mientras que el señor [Nombre1] estaba en la [Dirección1] CED2 , categoría 10, adscrita al Departamento de Proveeduría, en que su salario base estaba acorde con los equivalentes del sector financiero del país, motivo suficiente para no efectuar el incremento. Según nota técnica sobre el cálculo de las Escalas Salarial Regular, Nueva Escala Salarial Regular y Escala Salarial Gerencial del Banco Central de Costa Rica, División Administrativa, se hizo con fundamento en una nueva escala salarial regular que no incluyera el plus de prohibición. Para ello se tomó como base el salario de una plaza categoría 13 al 31 de diciembre de 1999, con las siguientes características: 65% de prohibición, un salario de ¢65.898,64 con una antigüedad de cinco años. Para la elaboración de la escala, se partió de la categoría 13, utilizando un factor de corrección del 55%, con lo cual la categoría 25 se ubicó en un básico al 31 de diciembre de 1999, de ¢117.385,00. Se consideró un incremento del 5.24% en el costo de vida al 30 de junio de 2000, cifra que fue calculada por la División Económica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, según documento DE-009 del 12 de enero de 2000. Conforme lo anterior, la nueva escala se ajustó en ese porcentaje, alcanzando el básico de la categoría 25 ¢123.536. Al dato anterior, se le aplicó la metodología establecida por el Banco para la representatividad de la escala de salarios básicos, en relación con los salarios totales. El marco conceptual de política salarial y la metodología que aplica el Banco Central en esta materia fue suministrada a la Contraloría General de la República, con oficio RH-1998 del 3 de diciembre de 1999 (folios 56 a 63 del expediente administrativo). Con fundamento en lo expuesto, si al actor no lo alcanzó el aumento salarial por razones objetivas y técnicas, no por el incumplimiento de los principios de igualdad y no discriminación, no se da la trasgresión del artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto consagra estos principios. Tampoco el 41 constitucional, en el tanto establece el derecho a ser indemnizado por lesión en los derechos a la propiedad o intereses morales, por cuanto la “prohibición” es propia de las condiciones de un puesto determinado. Asimismo, el quebranto del numeral 19 del Código de Trabajo no se configura, ya que no se ha demostrado que al actor se le diera un trato distinto respecto de quienes se encontraban en una situación laboral igual a la suya. XI.- Como corolario de lo que viene expuesto, se debe confirmar la sentencia recurrida.”