Legal nature of property sale by state bank and scope of negative silenceNaturaleza contractual de la venta de inmuebles por banco estatal y alcances del silencio negativo

**IV.- On the scope of the transaction entered into. Capacity of the Administration. Legal regulation of the sale.** One of the relevant aspects of this case lies in determining what kind of relationship arose between the litigants. This is fundamental in order to assume the implications and consequences of that transaction. The plaintiff company argues that this is a purchase-sale (compraventa), from which the obligation, now of the State, to transfer ownership of the property under dispute is derived. On the other hand, the representative of the Administration affirms that the acceptance of the offer on which the plaintiff relies did not perfect the aforementioned contract, but rather, at most, must be considered a pre-contract, preparatory acts for entering into a future agreement that ultimately did not materialize. The Trial Court, accepting the defendant's thesis, ruled that there was no perfected sale, as a result of which it ordered the return of the down payment (prima) that the proposer had paid. For its part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the cited contractual type had been configured in this case, since it was proven that there was a convergence of agreement regarding the thing and the price, which, within the dynamics of the system of bare consent (nudo consenso), followed by national legislation, the inter partes agreement was sufficient for that, regardless of whether that agreement was not recorded in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad). The appellant for cassation reproaches that this case is not governed by Civil Law, but by the rules that the defunct Banco Anglo had established for purposes of property transfer. Having analyzed the pieces of evidence in the case file, this Chamber considers that the assessments rendered by the Ad quem are in accordance with the merits of the case file and duly reflect the legal nature of the relationship entered into. Before addressing the reasons supporting this conclusion, it should be noted that, contrary to what the defendant alleges, the public nature of the banking entity does not make it impossible to apply the private norms and postulates that regulate the transfer of ownership through a purchase-sale agreement. In this regard, it should be noted, as the A quo rightly pointed out, that the actions undertaken by the Bank in this case were carried out in the exercise of its private law capacity, and not in its administrative function with the exercise of its powers of imperium. The dual capacity to act (public and private) that has been conferred upon the State and its institutions by the Legal System is beyond all doubt. This capacity, which operates at a dual level, finds its normative basis in the wording of the first canon of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes: “The Public Administration shall be constituted by the State and other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law.” Such particularity allows it, within the scope of its public capacity, to operate in the exercise of its powers of imperium, which empower it to intervene in various spheres of life in society, in order to ensure the satisfaction of public interests, within the context and content of Article 113 of that same legal body, in harmony with the principle of legality (positive and negative) and respecting the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the individual. But at the same time, in its other aspect (the private one), it lays the foundations for the State and its institutions to venture into commerce and, therefore, into the development of business activities typical of the economic market and the intermediation of goods and/or services, no longer as a public authority, but as just another person. The usual way is for this manifestation of dual capacity to be deployed through public entities whose creation and structure serve that purpose. In these cases, public norms converge with those of private law to regulate, to a greater or lesser degree, aspects derived from the relationships that the Administration undertakes in these "private" activities. State banks are an example of this. They constitute public enterprises whose operation takes place within the financial and stock market framework. Their guiding principle involves activities typical of an eminently private sphere (offering financial services), which means that relationships with clients (external linkages) are regulated through mechanisms and legal forms typical of private law. The foregoing despite the fact that in some areas, e.g., at an internal level, they are regulated by public law, as a result of acts that imply an exercise of their public capacity. The very essence of their nature justifies this phenomenon. The opposite, that is, subjecting them to public procurement processes, despite this private dynamic, would imply a limitation on the exercise of their functions and would disrupt their purpose. However, it is clear that in their conduct there is no total disconnection from Public Law, given that internally, they are subject to a set of administrative norms that regulate their operation, decision-making, procurement mechanisms, among others. Sometimes, these are acts preceding private contracting (which the doctrine has called "severable acts" – "actos separables"), which serve as its basis, but which do not have the virtue of modifying the private nature of the relationship with the third party. For example, a specific procedure for the sale of assets that the law imposes on banks could not be dispensed with under the pretext that it is not provided for by private regulations. Of course, the applicable regime depends on the nature and scope of each particular relationship. The sale of properties obtained by a State banking entity through judicial auction (remate judicial) for unsatisfied obligations, as an external activity that implies a legal relationship carried out within the framework of its private commercial business, is fundamentally governed by private norms. This is because its essential function is not the holding of assets, but the recovery of credits and generation of income. In this sense, see section 72 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), No. 1644. The ownership that Banco Anglo held over the asset in dispute is not a factor that allows a different criterion from the one stated, since the incorporation of that object into its assets was due to a collection process. Subsequently, by virtue of the lack of payment, it decides to alienate the asset to recover the amount lent to the debtor who did not comply. Nor is the carrying out of a public sale procedure so, for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, the establishment within the competitive bidding process (concurso) of some particularities specific to the contracting cannot be considered a cause that allows affirming that it was not subject to the set of precepts that common legislation establishes. Of course, these conditions constitute the manifestation of the pre-contractual will of the Institution, that is, the manner in which the seller offers to contract. However, this does not imply that for this sole reason the essential aspects of the purchase-sale should have a different normative treatment. The various clauses related to factors such as the term and form of payment of the agreed price, causes for resolution, to name a few, are particular aspects of the contracting, which arise from the will of the parties and which, if agreed upon, become law between the parties. Yet, these consensuses, although they impose a particular regime on the specificity of the contract execution, do not prevent the private legal norms related to the constitution and perfection phase of the transaction from being applicable to the case and transferred to said relationship. It is for this reason that it cannot be affirmed, as the appellant for cassation does, that the private law norms regulating essential aspects of that contract cannot be applicable to the purchase-sale under study. Moreover, the exercise of exorbitant clauses by the banking entity is not evidenced in this case, ergo, it is a contract of the Administration, undertaken within the framework of its private capacity. This type of provision, which is habitual and foreseeable in administrative contracts, insofar as they arise from the powers of imperium that the Legal System assigns to the State, is abnormal and unforeseeable in the private contracts of the Administration. Hence, in addition to what has already been said, the absence of clauses of this nature in this case determines the contractual characterization referred to. Nor can it be affirmed that the procedure (formal element) used to sell the asset determines a different contractual nature, since it is a formal aspect insufficient to establish the characterization of the administrative contract. Although it is a preparatory procedure that enables the transaction and lays its foundations, it strictly does not set the content of the agreement, which does occur with the act of award or selection of the offer. **V.- On the type of transaction entered into. Purchase-sale contract. Scope of the acceptance of the submitted offer.** Now then, having clarified the foregoing, it is appropriate to delve into whether in this case the sale of the real estate was perfected or if, on the contrary, what was carried out between the parties were preparatory acts or pre-contractual phases. This is essential to establish the effects and implications of the acts that each party adopted within the relationship analyzed herein. In this case, as can be inferred from the case file, the defunct Banco Anglo acquired through judicial auction the land registered under folio number 49.513-000 (matrícula 49.513-000) of the San José registry section (partido de San José), as a result of the foreclosure for breach of a credit by the company Garaje Conejo S.A., in which that real estate served as real guarantee (garantía real). That procedure was not definitively registered in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad), for reasons that are not relevant here. However, it opted to alienate that property, for which, in accordance with the applicable legislation, it decided to hold a competitive bidding process to establish which bidder offered the most favorable conditions for selling the asset. The plaintiff company submitted a formal offer in which it proposed a purchase value of ¢5,500,000.00 to be paid as follows: an initial payment of ¢1,500,000.00, to be made in three installments of ¢500,000.00 each, and the remainder (¢4,000,000.00) to be paid through financing to be granted by the Institution. In the event that the applicant did not qualify as a credit subject, it was established that the entity would grant a period of eight calendar days to pay the balance in cash. If this was not done, the eventual sale would be annulled, without any liability for the Bank. Ultimately, by official letter SC-1203-91, the collections section approved the offer of Rosejo Comercial S.A., establishing the down payment (prima) in the terms formulated by the plaintiff, who deposited that sum on May 22, 1992. The Trial Court considered that the purchase-sale had not occurred because the relationship had not been formalized. For its part, the Ad quem considered that this bond had indeed been perfected, since by virtue of the system of bare consent (nudo consenso), there had been an agreement between the parties that allowed that legal effect. This Chamber shares the conclusions on which the Court of Appeals bases its criterion. Indeed, the legal relationship entered into between the parties is far from being a preparatory act for an eventual contract, and on the contrary, the examination of the details of the case leads to the conclusion that it is a purchase-sale contract that has been duly perfected. The detailed analysis of what occurred, the evidence, and the case file itself leads this collegiate body to conclude that between the litigating parties there was an agreement regarding the thing and the price, elements that were duly agreed upon. In accordance with section 1049 of the Civil Code, the sale, as a contract capable of generating obligations, is perfected between the parties from the moment the thing and price are agreed upon. It aims at the transfer of a specific asset in exchange for the value set between the parties. The perfection of the contract, therefore, is subject to the fulfillment of the various requirements imposed by the Legal System, making the determination and consent of the thing object of the transaction and the price at which the alienation has been agreed upon fundamental. Regarding this, the price must be determined by the parties, however, it is sufficient that it be determinable, in which case, the means by which it can be quantified or concretized later must be established; that is, the price does not need to be set at the time of contracting in all cases, as can be deduced from canon 1056 of the Civil Code. Nor is it necessary for the fulfillment of the obligation to be generated at the act itself, as conditions can well be imposed that tend towards its payment within a certain period, or else, through a financing system, by virtue of which the amount (with or without interest produced by the passage of time) is paid in previously agreed installments or quotas. Therefore, the payment of the considerations, that is, the delivery of the price and the transfer of ownership of the asset, may be subject to the occurrence of a future and certain event. It should be noted that this contract can be civil or commercial. In the latter case, in the scenarios provided for by article 438 of the Commercial Code. On the distinction between the two, see judgment No. 104 of 2:40 p.m. on July 3, 1992, from this Chamber. From this perspective, regarding what is relevant to the case, when the price for the transmission of the thing has been established by mutual agreement, a perfected sale exists, even though its payment is arranged for a later moment, whether through its full satisfaction in the future, or under a credit or financing system. In this case, this Chamber considers that the existence of that agreement is unquestionable. The Bank offered for sale a property that, although not registered in its name in the Real Estate Registry (Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble), had been acquired by judicial auction. It has been proven (an aspect that the State representation has not been able to refute), that Banco Anglo, through its Collections Section, assented to the proposal formulated by the plaintiff. In fact, it issued a receipt stating that it had received the monies corresponding to the agreed down payment (prima). This express manifestation of acceptance determines the perfection of the contract, insofar as it implies a mutual agreement not only on the asset transacted, but, even more relevantly, on the price of the thing. The fact that the way in which the remainder of ¢4,000,000.00 would be paid was pending is not an obstacle to this, because although initially the possibility of granting a credit was proposed, which implied that this payment would be made through the payment of monthly installments with their respective interest, the solution was also foreseen in case the buyer was not a credit subject. In this last scenario, as indicated, the acquirer had to pay the entire amount due within a period of eight calendar days following the rejection of its financing application. Ultimately, the sale amount was already agreed upon, leaving only the need to define the way in which the money for the payment of the balance would be obtained. Ergo, the purchase-sale was perfected from the moment the conditions proposed by the plaintiff entity were accepted and the offer was approved. The appellant for cassation's thesis that this acceptance must be considered a preparatory act for the legal transaction is not acceptable. Once the offer is assented to, it ceases to be a proposal and becomes part of the content of the agreement, at least as far as that element is concerned. Now then, the possibility of ordering the annulment of the award act if the financing application was not approved and if the buyer did not deposit the rest of the amount does not constitute a limitation for the perfection of the contract. Its content evidences an express condition subsequent (condición resolutoria expresa), which establishes the legal consequence that the parties set in advance for the breach of one of the agreed stipulations. But in no way, in the opinion of this collegiate body, can it be understood as a condition preventing the agreement reached from deploying its effects, nor can it constitute grounds for supervening nullity of the act that determined the assent to the proposer's offer. The disregard of a duty assumed by virtue of a contract empowers the resolution of the agreement, in this case, due to the breach consisting of the failure to pay the price, which has been expressly set, but this does not affect nor have any implication on the concretion of the transaction, nor does it in this specific case. In any event, some brief reflections on this subject will be made later. Nor does the circumstance that the purchase-sale was not formalized support a contrary conclusion. The registration of the title on which the transfer of property is based (or its presentation to the Registry) is what allows that transfer to have effects with respect to third parties, according to the provisions of article 455 of the Civil Code. However, in line with the system of bare consent (nudo consenso), between the contracting parties, the agreement takes effect, it is reiterated, from the moment there is an agreement whose object is the transmission of property, with the setting of the price, as provided by canon 480 in relation to 1049, both of that same Code. Thus, formalization or registration is not necessary for the transaction to be perfected between the parties who have agreed upon it, since, as already stated, it reached that state from the moment Banco Anglo accepted the plaintiff's proposal to acquire the asset for an amount of ¢5,500,000.00, even though the amount had not been paid. **VI.- On the scope of the non-approval of the credit.** On the other hand, it is argued that the Ad quem assumed that the financing application had been approved, which it deduced from the testimonial evidence, even though under the protection of Article 351 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), that type of evidence is inadmissible to prove a legal agreement. The determination of whether the credit had been approved or not, based on the depositions of the witnesses, is only useful to establish whether the plaintiff breached or not its duty to pay the rest of the price within the period of eight business days. This would make sense to establish the possible application of the fourth clause, which provided for "annulment" (understood as resolution) in the event of lack of payment. However, as the Court rightly appreciated, the defendant did not invoke in any instance of the proceeding any defense related to a possible breach by the plaintiff, nor did it invoke that provision of the offer. If the State considered that the disregard by the awardee allowed the agreement to be resolved, it should have alleged it, formulating the appropriate exceptions, or else, filing the respective counterclaim. It did not do so. In this sense, in accordance with canon 608 of the civil procedural regulations, only those issues that have been timely debated by the litigants may be the subject of the cassation appeal. Ergo, those that have not been are outside its scope of coverage. Seen this way, since it is an aspect that was not addressed by the appellant at the proper procedural moment (as has been noted), it cannot be formulated in this instance, which entails, under the protection of the aforementioned mandate, the rejection of the count. Notwithstanding the above, for greater abundance of reasons, it should be noted that irrespective of how interesting the specific point may be, the substance of the matter now raised has no relevance whatsoever within the context of this resolution. Due to the way it is resolved, it is an aspect that would not produce any variation in the ruling on the merits and which therefore has no utility for purposes of quashing the judgment. Therefore, it is not important in this approach whether the credit was approved or not, since ultimately, it is an element that has no impact, as it relates to an alleged breach of the agreed duties. In sum, there would be no useful cassation in the counts related to this thematic axis, whereby their rejection is imposed. **VII.- On the negative silence.** On the other hand, the appellant for cassation indicates that in the absence of a response from the Bank regarding the financing request, the figure of negative silence (silencio negativo) should have been applied, ergo, that the procedure should be understood as rejected. It considers the criterion of the Ad quem erroneous insofar as it indicates that the Bank had to previously communicate the denial to grant the credit. In relation to this, it should be noted once again that the aspect being analyzed relates to a possible breach by the plaintiff, a subject which, in accordance with what is stated in the preceding recital (considerando), was not timely invoked in the course of the proceeding, which, in line with Article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), curtails the possibility of this Chamber entering to examine it. Notwithstanding the above, for greater exposition of reasons, it is worth noting that the plaintiff party certainly included within its offer a clause that established its duty to pay the amount of ¢4,000,000.00 within the period of eight calendar days if it did not qualify as a credit subject. However, it is clear from the case file that the plaintiff, insistently and constantly, promoted repeated actions to obtain said credit, without the banking institution giving a response. The proven facts added by the Court of Appeals show this circumstance. The scope of the legal relationship that bound both parties, in accordance with the principles of contractual good faith, required, in this case, that the entity expressly communicate to the acquirer its decision not to grant the financing facilities, for not considering it a credit subject or for any other reason. This communication was fundamental for the plaintiff to be in a position to adopt the actions it deemed appropriate in order to duly fulfill the commitment assumed to pay the remainder in a single installment within the already mentioned timeframe. Within the framework of that good faith, the parties must undertake the due conduct that allows the execution and fulfillment of the contract. Evasive actions that seek to place the contracting party in stages of uncertainty and potential breaches of its duties violate this contractual equity. The aforementioned fourth clause not only contains a requirement charged to the acquirer. In its correct dimension, within this alluded context, it must be understood that the conduct of the acquirer is subject to the decision of the seller, in the sense of whether it opted or not to finance the remainder of the alienation price, that is, only upon the clear definition of the credit option could the awardee decide the actions to undertake to pay the balance as agreed. Therefore, the acceptance of the offer produces as an effect the duty of the alienator to communicate the rejection of the credit (if that was the case). In this way, there is no error whatsoever in the weighing of that documentary evidence. Certainly, the Bank was not obliged to grant the credit, but it was obliged, within the principle of good faith in contractual execution, to communicate to its counterpart the result of its request, which is not evidenced in this case. The credit application as such is one more expression of a contract governed by private norms, since in this case, the entity acts as a private subject that offers financial services and not as an administrative unit vested with powers of imperium. For this reason, the use of negative silence (silencio negativo), as a legal fiction that presumes the tacit rejection of a specific request filed before the State, has no place within the framework of these relationships. In any case, it should be noted that this figure aims to serve as an auxiliary mechanism for the individual, who, faced with the Administration's inertia in providing the due response, obtains the legal possibility of undertaking the paths of the appeal regime that would allow them to obtain a ruling from a superior, or else, seek judicial protection if they so wish. In this sense, sections 261.3 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and 19 and 37.2 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa) are expressed. Seen this way, the presumption of rejection in question does is open the possibility to file administrative appeals or formulate the contentious-administrative action, as the case may be. However, this makes sense in public legal relationships undertaken with the State in its role as public authority, but not in its private sphere, in which it operates, in principle, as just another person under the law. Therefore, the figure is not useful for the procedure to be understood as denied within that framework. In any case, negative silence (silencio negativo) does not release the State from the duty to issue its express, duly reasoned response, to which it is obliged by force of law, even within the year following the moment in which the negative silence can be understood to have occurred. This Chamber does not consider that the figure of silence can be applied to the sub judice in the terms alleged by the appellant. The nature of the relationship entered into imposed on the banking entity the commitment to rule on that request, as an elementary prerequisite to then be able to enforce the oft-mentioned fourth clause of the offer. Regardless of whether there is reasonable doubt that the credit was approved or not, the fact of the matter is that the evidence shows that it was not expressly rejected, an effect that in this case cannot be derived from the so-called negative silence (silencio negativo) either. In sum, for the reasons given, the count must be rejected. **VIII.- On the possibility of recognizing the plaintiff's right.** In its second objection, the appellant for cassation alleges a breach of precepts 10.1, 18, 22, 23, 24, 59.1, and 60 subsection f), all of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), norms that in their integrated interpretation lead to the conclusion that a declaratory claim (pretensión declarativa) such as that formulated by the plaintiff is not possible in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (sede contenciosa administrativa). The foregoing since the nullity of any administrative act was not aired. It asserts that this is not a civil treasury case. Once again, the present allegation refers to issues that were not debated at the proper procedural moment by the State representative. Indeed, the arguments now put forth by the appellant were part of the grounds on which it supported the response to the lawsuit filed by Rosejo Comercial S.A. (folios 148-157). But in addition, they were the basic grounds on which it supported its preliminary defense of formal defects that prevent rendering a pronouncement on the merits (folios 109 to 119). This exception was timely rejected by the Trial Court through resolution No. 374-2001 of 1:00 p.m. on June 8, 2001, visible on folio 187. Before the first-instance judgment that upheld the subsidiary claim raised by the plaintiff, the Administration made no objection whatsoever regarding the alleged inadmissibility of recognizing a specific legal situation without having raised the annulment claim, nor regarding the nature of this proceeding. In its challenge brief, the State's attorney limited itself to questioning what was ordered by the A quo regarding the duty to refund the down payment (prima) paid by the plaintiff and the payment of the respective interest on the amount paid. Seen this way, what is stated in this count concerns matters that were not debated when they should have been, a situation that, in accordance with the provisions of section 608 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), determines its rejection. Notwithstanding the above, for greater abundance of reasons, it should be noted that the objection would not be admissible on the merits either. The contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa) finds its source of creation and objective within the framework of the Political Constitution. In this sense, section 49 of the Magna Carta constitutes not only the norm that gives basis to this jurisdiction, but also establishes and specifies its object, gives it its substantial content, and sets its intrinsic purpose. In what is relevant, that mandate establishes "...with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, of its institutions, and of any other public law entity." (Highlighting is ours). The use of the term "administrative function" composes an opening that at a conceptual level encompasses all legal and non-legal forms through which the Administration manifests its conduct. It therefore includes not only express and written acts, as a concretion of formal activity, but also any type of material action (legitimate or illegitimate), as well as inactivity, whether formal or material, and in turn de facto actions (vías de hecho).

It is a broad concept that allows the judge to venture into the review, in accordance with the Legal System, of any action or omission, activity or inactivity, function or dysfunction of the State and its institutions. The constitutional norm is the incontrovertible pillar so that this jurisdiction can exercise full and universal control over said public function, which expressly includes all facets in which administrative will may be expressed. The breadth of the term and the very essence of this avenue of control eliminate and exclude the possibility of spaces of immunity for state conduct within the administrative sphere. Note that the framers opted for a broad oversight formula, all-encompassing of the totality of the administrative function, breaking with any limitations built around the object of the contentious-administrative process. Likewise, it seeks to protect, at a minimum, the individual rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the administered parties. Ergo, any type of expression of public will that produces impairment in this existential sphere of the person may be susceptible to judicial control. It thus constitutes the very foundation of the postulates of effective judicial protection, universal control of public function, and the subjection of the State to the Law. Such breadth allows the framework of the claims formulated by those who feel affected by the functioning or dysfunctionality of the public apparatus not to be exhausted in a simple request for a declaration of nullity of the act, since not infrequently the breach of the legal order does not come from a formal expression, but from material actions or as a result of indolence and neglect, i.e., inaction. In this sense, Article 1 of the Regulatory Law of that jurisdiction establishes that it is the “… responsible for hearing the claims that are deduced in relation to the legality of the acts and provisions of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law.” As can be observed, the law allows all those claims that are necessary to seek the protection of the individual rights and legitimate interests of the person, which in some way may be compromised or affected, directly or indirectly, by public acts or actions. From this plane, although it is true that the content of the cited law presents a preeminently objective regime, of legality control of the act, it is also true that it has been nuanced by the very content of that normative set, by incorporating the possibility of protecting the legal situation (active, passive, complex, or advantageous). Note that that legal body allows requesting the recognition, restitution, or modification of a determined legal situation (even an advantageous one) that has been curtailed, denied, or altered by a conduct of the State – Article 23 ibidem -. It is clear that the appropriateness or not of that requirement must be subject to careful examination in each case. At times, granting it is unfeasible without first eliminating an administrative act; however, this does not imply that in all cases, without any distinction, that recognition or declaration is subject to the formulation of an annulment claim, since indeed, they do not bear an unrestricted accessory relationship. The recognition or restoration of the legal situation may well be required without needing to request nullity. When the injury comes from inactivity, that claim could be entertained, from which it follows that there is no subjection between the two. In the species, what is sought is precisely the protection of a legal situation generated by the sale of real property (bien inmueble), concerning the breach of what was agreed with the State, denying the plaintiff her right to hold ownership over the property that she acquired by virtue of a public tender (concurso público). A declaration in this sense is not limited or conditioned to an annulment claim of any act, since what is intended is the deployment of the effects of the adopted contract and its fulfillment by the State. In any case, it should be noted that unlike what was argued by the appellant in cassation, this is a civil process of the treasury (proceso civil de hacienda). It has already been established that the legal relationship entered into between the parties is a contract of sale (compraventa), carried out in the exercise of the private capacity of the banking entity, so that under the protection of constitutional numeral 49, and in accordance with canon 110 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), its cognizance falls to said jurisdiction. In this sense, it is worth bringing up what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling no. 5623-99 of 19 hours 54 minutes of July 20, 1999, handed down within the amparo action filed by the plaintiff company here against the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) and in which the act of that ministry that rejected the request to formalize the deed of sale of farm 49.513-000 of San José was challenged. In that opportunity, that Court stated the eminently contractual nature of this legal relationship (see folio 138 of the principal). Seen thus, it is improper to condition the protection of what the actor considers a legal situation in its favor, on the petition for the nullity of an act, since certainly, the claim for its recognition does not depend on the annulment claim. Therefore, no illegality is observed that deserves to be corrected. Things being thus, the interpretation and scope that the appellant gives to the norms on which he bases his grievances are not admissible, in view of which they must be rejected. IX.- Based on the foregoing, the alleged illegalities are not observed. Therefore, the appeal must be declared without merit, with its costs to be borne by the promoting party, under the protection of the provisions of Article 611 of the Civil Procedure Code.” **IV.- On the scope of the business entered into. Capacity of the Administration. Legal regulation of the sale.** One of the relevant aspects of this case lies in determining what kind of relationship arose between the litigants. This is fundamental to being able to assume the implications and consequences of that business. The plaintiff company argues that this is a purchase-sale, from which derives the obligation, now of the State, to transfer ownership of the property under dispute. On the other hand, the representative of the Administration affirms that the acceptance of the offer on which the plaintiff relies did not perfect the aforementioned contract, but at most, should be considered a pre-contract, preparatory acts to carry out a future agreement that ultimately was not finalized. The Trial Court, accepting the defendant's thesis, ordered that there was no perfect sale, as a result of which it ordered the return of the earnest money (prima) that the proposer had paid. For its part, the Superior Court concluded that in this case the cited contractual type had been configured, since the convergence of agreement between thing and price was held to be proven, which within the dynamics of the bare consensus system, followed by national legislation, the inter-partes agreement was sufficient for this, regardless of whether that agreement was not recorded in the Public Property Registry. The appellant claims that this case is not governed by Civil Law, but by the rules that the extinct Banco Anglo had established for property transfer purposes. Once the pieces in the case file have been analyzed, this Chamber considers that the assessments made by the Ad quem are adjusted to the merits of the case record and duly reflect the legal nature of the relationship entered into. Before addressing the reasons that support this conclusion, it should be noted that unlike what the defendant alleges, the public nature of the banking entity does not make it impossible to apply the private rules and postulates that govern the transfer of ownership through the purchase-sale agreement. In this regard, it should be noted, as the A quo rightly pointed out, that the actions undertaken by the Bank in this case were in the exercise of its private-law capacity and not in its administrative function through the exercise of its public authority powers (potestades de imperio). The dual capacity to act (public and private) that has been conferred on the State and its institutions by the Legal Order is beyond any doubt. This capacity, which operates on a dual level, finds its normative foundation in the letter of article one of the General Law of Public Administration, which establishes: “*The Public Administration shall be constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with legal personality and public and private law capacity.*” This particularity allows it, within the scope of its public capacity, to function in the exercise of its public authority powers, which empower it to intervene in various areas of social life, in order to seek the satisfaction of public interests, within the context and content of article 113 of that same legal body, in harmony with the principle of legality (positive and negative) and respecting the individual rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the person. But in turn, in its other aspect (the private one), it lays the foundations for the State and its institutions to engage in commerce and, therefore, in the development of business activities, typical of the economic market and intermediation of goods and/or services, no longer as a public authority, but as just another person. It is usual for this manifestation of dual capacity to be deployed through public entities whose creation and structure serves that purpose. In these cases, public rules converge with those of private law to regulate, to a greater or lesser degree, aspects that derive from the relationships that the Administration undertakes in those "private" activities. State banks are an example of what has been indicated. They constitute public enterprises whose operation takes place within the financial and stock market framework. Their north is activities typical of an eminently private sphere (offer of financial services), which means that relationships with clients (external links) are regulated through mechanisms and legal forms typical of private law. This is despite the fact that in some areas, e.g., internally, they are regulated by public law, as a result of acts that involve an exercise of their public capacity. The very essence of their nature justifies this phenomenon. The opposite, that is, subjecting them to public procurement processes, despite that private dynamic, would imply a limitation on the exercise of their functions and would disrupt their purpose. However, it is clear that in their conduct, a total dissociation from Public Law does not operate, as internally, they are subject to a set of administrative rules that regulate their operation, decision-making, procurement mechanisms, among others. Sometimes, these are acts preceding private contracting (which legal doctrine has called "separable acts"), which serve as a basis for it, but which do not have the power to modify the private nature of the relationship with the third party.

In its correct dimension, within this alluded context, it must be understood that the conduct of the acquirer is subject to the seller's decision, in the sense of whether or not it opted to finance the remainder of the sale price, that is, only with the clear definition of the credit option could the awarded party decide the actions to undertake to pay the balance according to what was agreed. Therefore, the acceptance of the offer has the effect of imposing on the seller (enajenante) the duty to communicate the rejection of the credit (if that was the case). Thus, there is no error whatsoever in the weighting of that documentary evidence. Certainly, the Bank was not obliged to grant the credit, but it was obliged, within the principle of good faith in contractual execution, to communicate to its counterpart the result of its request, which is not evident in this case. The credit application as such is just another expression of a contract governed by private rules, since in this case, the entity acts as a private subject that offers financial services and not as an administrative unit vested with public authority powers (potestades de imperio). For this reason, the use of negative silence, as a legal fiction that presupposes the tacit rejection of a specific application made to the State, has no place within the framework of these relationships. In any case, it is worth noting that this figure is intended to serve as an aid mechanism for the individual, who, when faced with the Administration's inaction in the required response, obtains the legal possibility of undertaking the paths of the recourse regime (régimen recursivo) that allow them to obtain a ruling from a superior, or to seek judicial protection if they so desire. In this sense, articles 261.3 of the General Law of Public Administration, 19 and 37.2 of the Law Regulating the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction are expressed. Seen in this way, the presumption of rejection in question opens up the possibility of filing administrative remedies or formulating a contentious action (acción contenciosa), as the case may be. However, this makes sense in public legal relationships undertaken with the State in its role as a public authority, but not in its private sphere, in which, as a matter of principle, it operates as one more legal person. Therefore, the figure is not useful for the management to be understood as denied within that framework. In any case, negative silence does not release the State from the duty to issue its express response, duly grounded, to which it is bound by legal mandate, even within the year following the moment in which negative silence can be understood to have occurred. This Chamber does not consider that the silence figure can be applied to the sub judice case in the terms argued by the appellant. The nature of the signed relationship imposed on the banking entity the commitment to declare itself on that request, as an elementary precondition to then be able to make effective the so often mentioned fourth clause of the offer. Regardless of the reasonable doubt as to whether the credit was approved or not, the truth of the matter is that the evidence reflects that it was not expressly rejected, an effect that in this particular case cannot be derived from what is called negative silence either. In summary, for the reasons given, the grievance must be rejected.

**VIII.- On the possibility of recognizing the plaintiff's right.** In his second grievance, the appellant alleges a breach of precepts 10.1, 18, 22, 23, 24, 59.1 and 60 subsection f), all of the Law Regulating the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction, rules which in their integrated interpretation lead to the conclusion that a declaratory claim like the one formulated by the plaintiff is not possible in the administrative contentious venue. This is so since the nullity of any administrative act was not at issue. He asserts that this is not a civil treasury (civil de hacienda) case. Once again, the present argument refers to matters that were not debated at the appropriate procedural time by the state representative. Indeed, the arguments now put forward by the appellant were part of the grounds on which he based his response to the lawsuit filed by Rosejo Comercial S.A. (folios 148-157). But in addition, they were the basic causes on which he based his prior defense of formal defects preventing a decision on the merits (folios 109 to 119). This preliminary objection was timely rejected by the Trial Court through resolution no. 374-2001 at 1:00 p.m. on June 8, 2001, visible at folio 187. In the face of the first-instance judgment that upheld the subsidiary claim raised by the plaintiff, the Administration made no objection whatsoever regarding the supposed impropriety of recognizing a specific legal situation without having raised the annulment claim (pretensión anulatoria), nor about the nature of this process. In its appeal brief, the State's representative limited himself to questioning what was ordered by the A quo regarding the duty to refund the earnest money (prima) paid by the plaintiff and the payment of the respective interest on the amount paid. Seen in this way, what is stated in this grievance deals with points that were not debated when they should have been, a situation which, according to what is established by article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, determines its rejection. Without prejudice to the foregoing, for further abundance of reasons, it should be noted that the grievance would not be admissible on its merits either. The administrative contentious jurisdiction finds its source of creation and objective within the framework of the Political Constitution. In this sense, article 49 of the Magna Carta is not only the rule that gives basis to this jurisdiction, but also fixes and specifies its object, gives it its substantial content, and sets its intrinsic purpose. As relevant here, that mandate establishes “*…with the object of guaranteeing the legality **of the administrative function** of the State, of its institutions and of any other entity of public law.*” (The highlighting is ours). The use of the term "administrative function" (función administrativa) constitutes an opening that at a conceptual level encompasses all the legal and non-legal forms through which the Administration manifests its conduct. It therefore includes not only express and written acts, as a concretion of formal activity, but also any type of material action (legitimate or illegitimate), as well as inactivity, whether formal or material, and in turn, de facto actions (vías de hecho). It is a broad concept that allows the judge to review, in accordance with the Legal Order, any action or omission, activity or inactivity, function or dysfunction of the State and its institutions. The constitutional rule is the incontrovertible pillar so that this jurisdiction can exercise full and universal control over said public function, which expressly includes all facets in which administrative will can be externalized. The breadth of the term and the very essence of this control pathway eliminates and excludes the possibility of spaces of immunity for state behavior within the administrative area. Note that the constituent body opted for a broad judicial review formula, all-encompassing of the entirety of the administrative function, breaking with any limitation built around the object of the contentious process. Likewise, it seeks to protect, **at least**, the individual rights and legitimate interests of the administered. Ergo, any type of manifestation of public will that produces impairment in this existential sphere of the person can be susceptible to judicial control. It thus forms the very foundation of the postulates of effective judicial protection, universal control of the public function, and the submission of the State to the Law. Such breadth allows that the framework of claims formulated by those who feel affected by the functioning or dysfunctionality of the public apparatus is not exhausted in a simple request for a declaration of nullity of the act, since not infrequently the breach of the legal order does not come from a formal externalization, but from material actions or as a result of indolence and negligence, that is, inactivities. In this sense, the first article of the Law Regulating that jurisdiction establishes that it is “*… in charge of hearing the claims that are deduced in relation to the legality of the acts and provisions of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law*.” As can be observed, the law allows all those claims that are necessary to seek the protection of the individual rights and legitimate interests of the person, which in some way may be compromised or affected, directly or indirectly, by public acts or actions. From this perspective, although it is true that the content of the cited law presents a preeminently objective regime, of control of the legality of the act, it is also true that it has been nuanced by the very content of that normative set, by incorporating the possibility of protecting the legal situation (situación jurídica) (active, passive, complex, or of advantage). Note that this legal body allows requesting the recognition, restoration, or modification of a specific legal situation (even of advantage) that has been curtailed, denied, or altered by conduct of the State –article 23 ibidem-. It is clear that the appropriateness or not of that request must be carefully examined in each case. On occasions, granting it is unfeasible without first eliminating an administrative act; however, that does not imply that in all cases, without any distinction, that recognition or declaration is subject to the formulation of an annulment claim, since certainly, they do not bear an unrestricted accessorial relationship. The recognition or restoration of the legal situation may well be requested without the need to request nullity. When the injury comes from inactivity, that claim could be granted, from which it follows that there is no subjection between the two. In this particular case, what is sought is precisely the protection of a legal situation generated by the sale of real property, regarding the breach of what was agreed with the State, denying the plaintiff her right to hold ownership over the estate she acquired by virtue of a public tender. A declaration in this sense is not limited to or conditioned upon an annulment claim of any act, since what is sought is the deployment of the effects of the adopted contract and its fulfillment by the State. In any case, it should be noted that unlike what is argued by the appellant, this is a civil treasury (civil de hacienda) process. It has already been established that the legal relationship signed between the parties is a purchase-sale contract, carried out in the exercise of the private capacity of the banking entity, so that under the protection of constitutional article 49, and in accordance with canon 110 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, its jurisdiction falls to said jurisdiction. In this sense, it is worth bringing up what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling no. 5623-99 at 7:54 p.m. on July 20, 1999, issued within the amparo appeal filed by the plaintiff company here against the Ministry of Finance and in which the act of that ministry rejecting its request to formalize the deed of sale of farm 49,513-000 of San José was challenged. On that occasion, that Court stated the eminently contractual nature of this legal relationship (see folio 138 of the main file). Seen in this way, it is improper to condition the protection of what the actor considers a legal situation in its favor on the request for the nullity of an act, since certainly, the claim for its recognition does not depend on the annulment claim. Therefore, no illegality whatsoever requiring correction is observed. Thus, the interpretation and scope that the appellant gives to the rules on which he bases his grievances are not acceptable, and therefore, must be rejected.

**IX.-** Based on the foregoing, the alleged illegalities are not observed. Therefore, the appeal must be declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the promoting party, under the protection of the provisions of article 611 of the Civil Procedure Code.” For example, it would not be possible to dispense with a specific procedure for the sale of assets that the law imposes on banks, under the pretext that it is not provided for in private regulations. Of course, the applicable regime depends on the nature and scope of each particular relationship. The sale of properties obtained by a state banking entity through judicial auction for unsatisfied obligations, as an external activity that implies a legal relationship carried out within the framework of its private commercial activity, is fundamentally governed by private rules. This is because its essential function is not the holding of assets, but the recovery of credits and generation of income. In this regard, see numeral 72 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, No. 1644. The ownership that the Banco Anglo held over the property in dispute is not a factor that supports a criterion different from the one stated, since the incorporation of that object into its assets resulted from a collection process. Subsequently, by virtue of the lack of payment, it decides to alienate the asset to recover the amount loaned to the debtor who did not comply. Neither is the carrying out of a public sale procedure, for the reasons already indicated. On the other hand, the establishment within the tender of some particularities inherent to the contracting cannot be considered a cause that allows affirming that it was not subject to the set of precepts established by common legislation. Of course, these conditions constitute the manifestation of the Institution's pre-contractual will, that is, the form in which the seller offers to agree. However, that does not imply that for this sole reason the essential aspects of the sale were given a different normative treatment. The various clauses related to factors such as the term and form of payment of the agreed price, causes for termination, to cite a few, are particular aspects of the contracting, arising from the will of the parties, and if agreed upon, they have the force of law between them. However, these consensuses, although they impose a particular regime on the specificity of the contract's execution, do not prevent the private legal rules pertaining to the phase of formation and perfection of the transaction from being applicable to the case and transferred to said relationship. For this reason, it cannot be affirmed, as the appellant does, that the sale under study cannot be subject to private law rules that regulate essential aspects of that contract. Furthermore, the exercise of exorbitant clauses by the banking entity is not evident in this case; ergo, it is a contract of the Administration, undertaken within the framework of its private capacity. These types of provisions, which are common and foreseeable in administrative contracts, as they arise from the sovereign powers that the Legal System assigns to the State, are abnormal and unforeseeable in private contracts of the Administration. Hence, in addition to what has already been said, the absence of clauses of this nature in this case determines the contractual characterization referred to. Nor can it be affirmed that the procedure (formal element) used to sell the asset determines a different contractual nature, since it is a formal aspect insufficient to establish the characterization of an administrative contract. Although it is a preparatory procedure that enables the transaction and lays its foundations, it does not strictly set the content of the agreement, which does occur with the act of awarding or selecting the offer.

V.- Regarding the type of transaction entered into. Contract of sale. Scope of the acceptance of the offer submitted.

Now then, having clarified the above, it is necessary to determine whether, in this case, the sale of the property has been perfected or whether, on the contrary, what took place between the parties were preparatory acts or pre-contractual phases. This is fundamental to establishing the effects and implications of the acts that each party adopted within the relationship analyzed here. In this case, as deduced from the case file, the defunct Banco Anglo acquired, through judicial auction, the land registered under folio 49,513-000 of the San José registry, as a result of the execution for non-compliance with a credit given to the company Garaje Conejo S.A., in which that property served as a real guarantee. This proceeding was ultimately not registered in the Public Property Registry, for reasons that are not relevant here. However, it opted to alienate that property, for which, in accordance with the applicable legislation, it decided to hold a tender to establish which bidder offered the most favorable conditions for selling the asset. The plaintiff company submitted a formal offer in which it proposed a purchase value of ¢5,500,000.00 to be paid as follows: an initial payment of ¢1,500,000.00, to be made in three installments of ¢500,000.00 each, and the remainder (¢4,000,000.00) to be settled through financing to be granted by the Institution. If the applicant did not qualify as a credit subject, it was established that the entity would grant a term of eight calendar days to pay the balance in cash. Failing that, the eventual sale would be annulled, without any liability for the Bank. Ultimately, by official communication SC-1203-91, the collections section approved the offer of Rosejo Comercial S.A., establishing the premium in the terms formulated by the plaintiff, who deposited that sum on May 22, 1992. The Trial Court considered that the sale had not occurred because the relationship had not been formalized. For its part, the Ad quem estimated that this link had been perfected, given that by virtue of the mere consensus system, the agreement between the parties that allows that legal effect had occurred. This Chamber shares the conclusions on which the Court bases its criterion. Indeed, the legal relationship entered into between the parties is far from being a preparatory act for an eventual contract; on the contrary, the examination of the details of the case leads to the conclusion that it is a contract of sale that has been duly perfected. The detailed analysis of what occurred, the evidence, and the case files themselves lead this collegiate body to conclude that between the litigating parties there was an agreement on the object and the price, elements that were duly agreed upon. In accordance with numeral 1049 of the Civil Code, the sale, as a contract capable of generating obligations, is perfected between the parties from the moment they agree on the object and the price. Its purpose is the transfer of a specific asset in exchange for the value established between the parties. The perfection of the contract, therefore, is subject to the fulfillment of the various prerequisites imposed by the Legal System, making the determination of and consent to the object of the transaction and the price at which the alienation has been agreed upon fundamental. On this matter, the price must be determined by the parties; however, it is sufficient for it to be determinable, in which latter case, the means by which it can be quantified or specified later must be established, that is, not in all cases must the price be set at the time of contracting, as derived from canon 1056 of the Civil Code. It is also not necessary for the performance of the obligation to occur at the time of the act, as conditions may well be imposed aimed at its settlement within a certain period, or through a financing system, by virtue of which the amount (with or without interest accrued over time) is paid in previously agreed installments or quotas. Therefore, the payment of the obligations, that is, the delivery of the price and the transfer of ownership of the asset, may be subject to the occurrence of a future and certain event. It should be noted that this contract can be civil or commercial. In the latter case, under the scenarios provided for by ordinal 438 of the Commercial Code. On the distinction between the two, see this Chamber's judgment No. 104 of 2:40 p.m. on July 3, 1992. From this perspective, in what is relevant to the case, when the price for the transfer of the object has been established by mutual agreement, a perfected sale exists, even though its settlement is arranged for a later moment, whether through its total satisfaction in the future, or under a credit or financing system. In this case, this Chamber considers that the existence of that agreement is unquestionable. The Bank offered for sale a property that, although not registered in its name in the Real Property Registry, had been acquired through judicial auction. It has been considered proven (an aspect that the state representation has not managed to refute) that the Banco Anglo, through its Collections Section, approved the proposal made to it by the plaintiff. In fact, it issued a receipt stating it had received the money corresponding to the agreed premium. This express manifestation of acceptance determines the perfection of the contract, as it implies mutual agreement not only on the transacted asset but, even more relevantly, on the price of the object. For this, it is not an obstacle that the form in which the remainder of ¢4,000,000.00 would be paid was pending, since although a credit possibility was initially proposed, implying that this settlement would occur through the payment of monthly installments with their respective interest, the solution in the event the buyer was not a credit subject was also provided for. In this latter scenario, as indicated, the acquirer had to pay the entire amount owed within the term of eight calendar days following the rejection of its financing application. Ultimately, the sale amount was already agreed upon, leaving only the definition of the means by which the money for the settlement of the balance would be obtained. Ergo, the sale was perfected from the moment the conditions proposed by the plaintiff entity were accepted and the offer was approved. The appellant's thesis that this acceptance should be considered a preparatory act for the legal transaction is not receivable. Once the offer is approved, it ceases to be a proposal and comes to form the content of the agreement, at least as far as that element is concerned. Now, the possibility of declaring the annulment of the award act if the financing application was not approved and if the buyer did not deposit the rest of the amount does not constitute a limitation on the perfection of the contract. Its content demonstrates an express condition subsequent, which establishes the legal consequence that the parties set in advance for the non-compliance with one of the stipulated agreements. But on no plane, in the judgment of this collegiate body, can it be understood as a condition preventing the agreement reached from deploying its effects, nor can it constitute a cause for supervening nullity of the act that determined the assent to the proponent's proposal. The neglect of a duty assumed by virtue of a contract empowers the termination of the agreement, in this case, for non-compliance consisting of the failure to pay the price, which has been expressly stipulated, but this does not affect nor have any implication on the consummation of the transaction, nor in the specific case. In any case, some brief reflections on this topic will be made later. Nor does the circumstance that the sale was not formalized support a contrary argument. The registration of the deed on which the transfer of ownership is recorded (or its presentation to the Registry) is what allows that transfer to have effects regarding third parties, as stipulated by ordinal 455 of the Civil Code. However, in accordance with the mere consensus system, between the contracting parties, the agreement has effects, it is reiterated, from the moment there is an agreement whose object is the transfer of ownership, with the price fixed, as stipulated by canon 480 in relation to 1049, both of that same Code. In this way, formalization or registration is not necessary for the transaction to be perfected between the parties who have agreed upon it, since, as already stated, it reached that state from the moment the Banco Anglo accepted the plaintiff's proposal to acquire the asset for an amount of ¢5,500,000.00, even if the amount had not been fully paid.

VI.- Regarding the scope of the non-approval of the credit.

On the other hand, it is argued that the Ad quem assumed the financing application had been approved, which it deduced from testimonial evidence, even though, under Article 351 of the Civil Procedure Code, that type of evidence is inadmissible to prove a legal agreement. The determination of whether the credit had been approved or not, based on the witnesses' depositions, is only useful for establishing whether the plaintiff breached its duty to pay the rest of the price within the term of eight business days. This would be relevant to establish the possible application of the fourth clause, which provided for the “annulment” (understood as termination) in the event of non-payment. However, as the Court correctly appreciated, the defendant did not invoke, in any instance of the proceedings, any defense related to a possible breach by the plaintiff, nor did it invoke that provision of the offer. If the State considered that the awardee's neglect allowed it to terminate the agreement, it should have so alleged, formulating the pertinent exceptions, or filing the respective counterclaim. This was not done. In this sense, in accordance with canon 608 of the civil procedure regulations, only those issues that have been timely debated by the litigants may be the object of a cassation appeal. Ergo, those that have not been are outside its scope of coverage. Thus, as this is an aspect not addressed by the appellant at the due procedural moment (as noted), it is not capable of being formulated in this instance, which entails, under the aforementioned mandate, the rejection of the charge. Notwithstanding the foregoing, by further elaboration of reasons, it should be noted that irrespective of how interesting this particular point may be, the substance of the matter now raised is of no relevance within the context of this ruling. Given the manner in which it is resolved, it is an aspect that would not produce any variation in the ruling on the merits and which therefore is not useful for overturning the judgment. For this reason, it is not important in this approach whether the credit was approved or not, since, in the end, it is an element that has no impact, as it relates to a supposed breach of established duties. In summary, there would be no useful cassation in the charges related to this thematic axis, and thus, their rejection is imperative.

VII.- Regarding the negative silence.

On the other hand, the appellant indicates that in the absence of a response from the Bank regarding the financing request, the figure of negative silence should have been applied; ergo, the application should be understood as rejected. It considers the Ad quem's criterion regarding the Bank having to previously communicate the denial of the credit to be erroneous. In relation to this, it should be noted that, again, the aspect being analyzed relates to a possible breach by the plaintiff, a topic which, according to what was stated in the preceding recital, was not timely invoked during the course of the proceedings, which, in accordance with Article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, curtails the possibility of this Chamber examining it. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for further elaboration of reasons, it is worth indicating that the plaintiff did indeed include in its offer a clause establishing its duty to pay the amount of ¢4,000,000.00 within the period of eight calendar days if it did not qualify as a credit subject. However, it is clear from the case file that the plaintiff, insistently and constantly, promoted repeated actions to obtain the aforementioned credit, without the banking institution giving a response. The proven facts added by the Court account for this circumstance. The scope of the legal relationship that linked both parties, in accordance with the principles of contractual good faith, required, in this case, that the entity expressly communicate to the acquirer its decision not to grant the financing facilities, for not considering it a credit subject or for any other reason. This communication was fundamental for the plaintiff to be able to adopt the actions it deemed appropriate in order to duly fulfill the commitment assumed to pay the remainder in a single installment within the aforementioned timeframe. Within the framework of that good faith, the parties must undertake the required conducts that allow for the execution and fulfillment of the contract. Evasive actions that seek to place the contracting party in states of uncertainty and potential breaches of its duties violate this contractual equity. The mentioned fourth clause not only contains a requirement on the part of the acquirer. In its correct dimension, within this alluded context, it must be understood that the acquirer's conduct is subject to the seller's decision, regarding whether it opted to finance or not the remainder of the sale price, that is, only upon the clear definition of the credit option could the awardee decide the actions to undertake to pay the balance in accordance with what was agreed. Therefore, the acceptance of the offer produces as an effect the duty of the seller to communicate the rejection of the credit (if that was the case). In this way, there is no error whatsoever in the weighing of that documentary evidence. The Bank was certainly not obligated to grant the credit, but it was obliged, within the principle of good faith in contractual execution, to communicate the result of its request to its counterpart, which is not recorded in this case. The credit application as such is one more expression of a contract governed by private rules, since in this case, the entity acts as a private subject that offers financial services and not as an administrative unit vested with sovereign powers. For this reason, the use of negative silence, as a legal fiction that presumes the tacit rejection of a specific application filed before the State, has no place within the framework of these relationships. In any case, it is worth noting that this figure aims to serve as a mechanism of assistance to the individual, who, in the face of the Administration's inertia in providing the due response, obtains the legal possibility of undertaking the paths of the appellate regime that allows for a pronouncement from a superior, or to seek judicial protection if they so desire. In this sense, numerals 261.3 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 19 and 37.2 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction so indicate. Thus, the presumption of rejection in question opens the possibility to file administrative appeals or formulate a contentious-administrative action, as the case may be. However, this makes sense in public legal relationships undertaken with the State in its role as public authority, but not in its private sphere, in which it develops, in principle, as any other legal person. Therefore, the figure is not useful for the application to be understood as denied within that framework. In any case, negative silence does not release the State from the duty to issue its express, duly grounded response, to which it is obliged by mandate of law, even within the year following the moment in which the negative silence can be considered to have occurred. This Chamber does not consider that the figure of silence can be applied to the sub judice in the terms argued by the appellant. The nature of the relationship entered into imposed on the banking entity the commitment to pronounce on that petition, as an elementary prerequisite to subsequently being able to enforce the oft-mentioned fourth clause of the offer. Regardless of whether there is reasonable doubt as to whether the credit was approved or not, the fact of the matter is that the evidence reflects that it was not expressly rejected, an effect which, in this case, cannot be derived from the so-called negative silence either. In summary, for the reasons given, the charge must be rejected.

VIII.- Regarding the possibility of recognizing the plaintiff's right.

In its second objection, the appellant alleges a breach of precepts 10.1, 18, 22, 23, 24, 59.1, and 60 subsection f), all of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, rules which in their integrated interpretation lead to the conclusion that a declaratory claim like the one made by the plaintiff is not possible in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. This is because the nullity of any administrative act was not contested. It asserts that this is not a civil treasury case. Once again, the present argument refers to issues that were not debated at the appropriate procedural moment by the state representative. Indeed, the arguments that the appellant now presents were part of the grounds on which it based its response to the lawsuit filed by Rosejo Comercial S.A. (folios 148-157). But they were also the basic causes on which it relied for its preliminary defense of formal defects that prevent a ruling on the merits (folios 109 to 119). This exception was timely rejected by the Trial Court through resolution No. 374-2001 of 1:00 p.m. on June 8, 2001, visible at folio 187. Faced with the first-instance judgment that upheld the subsidiary claim brought by the plaintiff, the Administration did not make any objection regarding the alleged inadmissibility of recognizing a specific legal situation without having raised an annulment claim, nor about the nature of this proceeding. In its challenge brief, the State's attorney limited itself to questioning what the A quo had ordered regarding the duty to refund the premium paid by the plaintiff and the payment of the respective interest on the paid amount. Thus, what is stated in this charge concerns matters that were not debated when they should have been, a situation which, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, determines its rejection. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for further elaboration of reasons, it should be noted that the objection would not be receivable on the merits either. The contentious-administrative jurisdiction finds its source of creation and purpose within the framework of the Political Constitution. In this sense, numeral 49 of the Magna Carta is constituted not only as the rule that provides the basis for this jurisdiction but also sets and specifies its purpose, provides its substantial content, and sets its intrinsic goal. In what is relevant, that mandate establishes: “…with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other public law entity.” (Emphasis added). The use of the term “administrative function” constitutes an opening that, on a conceptual level, encompasses all legal and non-legal forms through which the Administration expresses its conduct. It therefore includes not only express and written acts, as a realization of formal activity, but also any type of material action (legitimate or illegitimate), as well as inactivity, whether formal or material, and, in turn, de facto actions. It is a broad concept that allows the judge to delve into the review, in accordance with the Legal System, of any action or omission, activity or inactivity, function or dysfunction of the State and its institutions. The constitutional norm is the unquestionable pillar so that this jurisdiction can exercise full and universal control over said public function, which expressly includes all facets in which the administrative will can be externalized. The breadth of the term and the very essence of this control mechanism eliminate and exclude the possibility of areas of immunity for state conduct within the administrative sphere. Note that the constituent opted for a broad, all-encompassing oversight formula covering the entirety of the administrative function, breaking with any limitations built around the object of the contentious-administrative process. Likewise, it seeks to protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered. Ergo, any type of manifestation of public will that causes detriment to this existential sphere of the person may be subject to judicial control. It thus constitutes the very foundation of the postulates of effective judicial protection, universal control of the public function, and the State's subjection to the Law. Such breadth allows that the framework of claims formulated by those who feel affected by the functioning or dysfunctionality of the public apparatus is not exhausted in a simple request for a declaration of nullity of the act, because not infrequently the breach of the legal order does not come from a formal externalization but from material actions or as a result of indolence and neglect, i.e., inactivity. In this sense, the first article of the Regulatory Law of that jurisdiction establishes that it is “…responsible for hearing the claims that are deduced in relation to the legality of the acts and provisions of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law.” As can be observed, the law permits all those claims that are necessary to seek the protection of the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the person, which in some way may be compromised or affected, directly or indirectly, by public acts or actions. From this perspective, although it is true that the content of the cited law presents a predominantly objective regime of legality control of the act, it is also true that it has been nuanced by the very content of that regulatory body, by incorporating the possibility of protecting the legal situation (active, passive, complex, or of advantage). Note that this legal body allows requesting the recognition, restitution, or modification of a specific legal situation (even one of advantage) that has been curtailed, denied, or altered by a State proceeding – Article 23 ibidem -. It is clear that the appropriateness or not of that requirement must be carefully examined in each case. On occasions, granting it is unfeasible without first eliminating an administrative act; however, that does not imply that in all cases, without any distinction whatsoever, such recognition or declaration is subject to the formulation of an annulment claim, since they certainly do not maintain a relationship of unrestricted accessoriness. The recognition or restoration of the legal situation may well be required without the need to request nullity. When the injury originates from inactivity, that claim could be sustained, from which it follows that there is no strict link between the two. In this case, what is sought is precisely the protection of a legal situation generated by the sale of a real estate property, regarding the State's non-compliance with what was agreed, denying the plaintiff its right to hold ownership over the property it acquired by virtue of a public tender. A declaration in this sense is not limited or conditioned upon an annulment claim for any act, given that what is intended is the deployment of the effects of the adopted contract and its compliance by the State. In any case, it should be noted that, contrary to what the appellant argues, the present case is a civil treasury proceeding. It has already been established that the legal relationship entered into between the parties is a contract of sale, carried out in the exercise of the private capacity of the banking entity; therefore, under numeral 49 of the Constitution, and in accordance with canon 110 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, its hearing falls to said jurisdiction. In this sense, it is worth bringing up what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No.

...in case file 5623-99 at 19:54 hours on July 20, 1999, issued within the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by the plaintiff company here against the Ministry of Finance and in which the act of that ministry that rejected its request to formalize the deed of sale for property 49.513-000 of San José was challenged. On that occasion, that Court stated the eminently contractual nature of this legal relationship (see folio 138 of the principal case). Seen in this way, it is improper to condition the protection of what the plaintiff considers a legal situation in its favor upon the request for the nullity of an act, since indeed, the claim for its recognition does not depend on the annulment action. Therefore, no illegality whatsoever meriting correction is observed. Thus, the interpretation and scope that the appellant gives to the norms on which it bases its grievances are not receivable, and consequently, they must be rejected. IX.- Based on the foregoing, the illegalities alleged are not observed. Therefore, the appeal must be declared without merit, with its costs borne by the promoting party, pursuant to the provisions of Article 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil).”

“IV.- Sobre los alcances del negocio suscrito. Capacidad de la Administración. Regulación jurídica de la venta. Uno de los aspectos relevantes de este caso, estriba en determinar qué clase de relación se suscitó entre los litigantes. Esto es fundamental para poder asumir las implicaciones y consecuencias de ese negocio. La empresa actora aduce que se está frente a una compraventa, de lo que se desprende la obligación, ahora del Estado, de transmitir el dominio de la finca objeto de controversia. Por otro lado, el mandatario de la Administración afirma que la aceptación de la oferta en que se sustenta la actora, no perfeccionaba el contrato aludido, sino a lo sumo, debe tenerse como un precontrato, actos preparatorios para realizar a futuro un pacto que a la postre no llegó a concretarse. El Juzgado, acogiendo la tesis del demandado, dispuso que no existía venta perfecta, producto de lo cual ordenó el reintegro de la prima que había cancelado el proponente. Por su parte, el Tribunal concluyó que en la especie se había configurado el citado tipo contractual, toda vez que se tuvo por demostrada la convergencia de acuerdo entre cosa y precio, lo que dentro de la dinámica del sistema de nudo consenso, seguido por la legislación nacional, el pacto interpartes era suficiente para ello, al margen de que ese acuerdo no constara en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. El casacionista reprocha que este caso no se rige por el Derecho Civil, sino por las reglas que para efectos de transferencia de propiedad, tenía establecidas el extinto Banco Anglo. Una vez analizadas las piezas que obran en el expediente, esta Sala estima que las apreciaciones vertidas por el Ad quem se encuentran ajustadas al mérito de los autos y reflejan de manera debida la naturaleza jurídica de la relación entablada. De previo a abordar las razones que sustentan esta conclusión, cabe precisar que a diferencia de lo que alega el demandado, la naturaleza pública de la entidad bancaria, no hace imposible aplicar las normas privadas y postulados que regulan la transferencia de dominio mediante el pacto de compraventa. Sobre ese aspecto cabe indicar, como bien lo señaló el A quo, las actuaciones emprendidas por el Banco en este caso lo fueron en ejercicio de su capacidad de derecho privado, no así en su función administrativa con el ejercicio de sus potestades de imperio. La doble capacidad de obrar (pública y privada) que ha sido conferida al Estado y sus instituciones por parte del Ordenamiento Jurídico, se encuentra fuera de toda duda. Esta capacidad que opera en un doble nivel, encuentra su fundamento normativo en la letra del canon primero de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que establece: “La Administración Pública estará constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos, cada uno con personalidad jurídica y capacidad de derecho público y privado.” Tal particularidad le permite, en el ámbito de su capacidad pública, desplegar un funcionamiento en ejercicio de sus potestades de imperio, que le facultan para irrumpir en diversos ámbitos de la vida en sociedad, con el fin de procurar la satisfacción de los intereses públicos, en el contexto y contenido del artículo 113 de ese mismo cuerpo legal, en armonía con el principio de legalidad (positivo y negativo) y en respeto de los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de la persona. Pero a su vez, en su otra vertiente (la privada), sienta las bases para que el Estado y sus instituciones puedan incursionar en el comercio y por ende, en el desarrollo de actividades empresariales, propias del mercado económico e intermediación de bienes y/o servicios, ya no como autoridad pública, sino como una persona más. Lo usual es que esta manifestación de doble capacidad sea desplegada a través de entes públicos cuya creación y estructura atiende a esa finalidad. En estos casos, las normas públicas convergen con las del derecho privado para regular, en mayor o menor grado, aspectos que se derivan de las relaciones que la Administración emprende en esas actividades “privadas”. Los bancos del Estado son ejemplo de lo indicado. Constituyen empresas públicas cuyo funcionamiento se da en el marco del mercado financiero y bursátil. Tienen por norte actividades propias de un ámbito eminentemente privado (oferta de servicios financieros), lo que hace que las relaciones con los clientes (vinculaciones externas), se regulen a través de mecanismos y formas jurídicas típicas del derecho privado. Lo anterior pese a que en algunas áreas, v.gr., a nivel interno, se encuentren regulados por el ordenamiento público, producto de actos que suponen un ejercicio de su capacidad pública. La esencia misma de su naturaleza, justifica este fenómeno. Lo contrario, esto es, someterlos a procesos públicos de contratación, no obstante esa dinámica privada, implicaría una limitante en el ejercicio de sus funciones y trastornaría su finalidad. Con todo, es claro que en su proceder no opera una desvinculación total con el Derecho Público, siendo que a lo interno, está sujeto a un conjunto de normas administrativas que regulan su funcionamiento, toma de decisiones, mecanismos de contratación, entre otros. En ocasiones, se trata de actos precedentes a lo contratación privada (que la doctrina ha denominado “actos separables”), que le sirven de base, pero que no tienen la virtud de modificar la naturaleza privada de la relación con el tercero. Por ejemplo, no podría prescindirse de un procedimiento específico para la venta de bienes que la ley le imponga a los bancos, con el pretexto de no estar previsto por la normativa privada. Claro está que el régimen aplicable depende de la naturaleza y alcances de cada relación en particular. La venta de propiedades obtenidas por una entidad bancaria del Estado mediante remate judicial por obligaciones insatisfechas, en tanto actividad externa que implica una relación jurídica desplegada en el marco de su giro comercial privado, se rige, en lo fundamental, por las normas privadas. Esto ya que su función esencial no es la tenencia de bienes, sino la recuperación de los créditos y generación de rentas. En este sentido véase el numeral 72 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, no. 1644. La titularidad que sobre el bien objeto de conflicto ostentaba el Banco Anglo no es un factor que permita sostener un criterio distinto al expuesto, pues la incorporación de ese objeto dentro de sus haberes, obedeció a un proceso cobratorio. Luego, en virtud de la falta de pago, decide enajenar el bien para recuperar el monto prestado al deudor que no cumplió. Tampoco lo es la realización de un procedimiento público de venta por las razones ya señaladas. Por otro lado, la fijación dentro del concurso de algunas particularidades propias de la contratación, no puede considerarse como una causa que permita afirmar que no estaba afecto al conjunto de preceptos que la legislación común establece. Desde luego que estas condiciones constituyen la manifestación de la voluntad pre-negocial de la Institución, es decir, la forma en que se ofrece pactar por parte del vendedor. No obstante, eso no implica que por esa sola razón los aspectos esenciales de la compraventa tuvieran un tratamiento normativo diferente. Las diversas cláusulas relacionadas con factores tales como plazo y forma de pago del precio pactado, causas de resolución, para citar algunas, son aspectos particulares de la contratación, que surgen de la voluntad de las partes y que en caso de que sean convenidas pasan a tener fuerza de ley entre las partes. Empero, esos consensos, si bien imponen un régimen particular en la especificidad de la ejecución del contrato, no hacen que las normas jurídicas privadas atinentes a la fase de constitución y perfeccionamiento del negocio, no puedan ser aplicables al caso y trasladarse a dicha relación. Es por ello que no puede afirmarse como hace el casacionista, que a la compraventa en estudio, no puedan serle aplicables normas del derecho privado que regulan aspectos esenciales de ese contrato. Por otra parte, no se evidencia en la especie el ejercicio de cláusulas exorbitantes por parte de la entidad bancaria, ergo, se trata de un contrato de la Administración, emprendido en el marco de su capacidad privada. Este tipo de disposiciones, que son habituales y previsibles en los contratos administrativos, por cuanto surgen de los poderes de imperio que el Ordenamiento Jurídico asigna al Estado, son anormales e imprevisibles en los contratos privados de la Administración. De ahí que además de lo ya dicho, la ausencia de cláusulas de esta índole en este caso, determina la caracterización contractual referida. Tampoco puede afirmarse que el procedimiento (elemento formal) utilizado para vender el bien determine una naturaleza contractual distinta, toda vez que se trata de un aspecto formal insuficiente para establecer la caracterización del contrato administrativo. Si bien es un trámite preparatorio que permite el negocio y sienta sus bases, no fija en estricto el contenido del convenio, lo que si ocurre con el acto de adjudicación o selección de la oferta. V.- Sobre el tipo de negocio suscrito. Contrato de compraventa. Alcances de la aceptación de la oferta cursada. Ahora bien, aclarado lo anterior cabe ingresar a dilucidar si en la especie se ha perfeccionado la venta del inmueble o si por el contrario, lo realizado entre las partes fueron actos preparatorios o fases pre- contractuales. Esto es elemental para establecer los efectos e implicaciones de los actos que cada parte adoptó dentro de la relación que aquí se analiza. En la especie, según se colige de los autos, el extinto Banco Anglo adquirió mediante remate judicial, el terreno matrícula 49.513-000 del partido de San José, producto de la ejecución por incumplimiento de un crédito de la empresa Garaje Conejo S.A., en el cual ese inmueble fungía como garantía real. Esa gestión no fue en definitiva inscrita en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, por causas que aquí no resultan relevantes. Sin embargo, optó por enajenar esa propiedad, para lo cual, de conformidad con la legislación aplicable, decidió la realización de un concurso que permitiera establecer cual oferente ofrecía las condiciones más favorables para vender el bien. La empresa actora presentó formal oferta en la que proponía un valor de compra de ¢5.500.000,00 a pagar de la siguiente forma: un pago inicial de ¢1.500.000,00, a realizar en tres tractos de ¢500.000,00 cada uno, y el remanente (¢4.000.000,00) a cancelar mediante financiamiento que otorgaría la Institución. En caso de que el postulante no calificare como sujeto de crédito, se establecía que la entidad le otorgaría un plazo de ocho días naturales para cancelar el saldo de contado. De no hacerlo así, la eventual venta se anularía, sin responsabilidad alguna para el Banco. En definitiva, por oficio SC-1203-91, la sección de cobros aprobó la oferta de Rosejo Comercial S.A., estableciendo la prima en los términos formulados por la actora, quien realizó el depósito de esa suma el 22 de mayo de 1992. El Juzgado consideró que no se había producido la compraventa pues la relación no se había formalizado. Por su parte, el Ad quem estimó que sí se había perfeccionado ese vínculo, siendo que en virtud del sistema del nudo consenso, se había dado el acuerdo entre las partes que permite ese efecto jurídico. Esta Sala participa de las conclusiones en que el Tribunal fundamenta su criterio. En efecto, la relación jurídica suscrita entre las partes dista de ser un acto preparatorio de un eventual contrato y por el contrario, el examen de los pormenores del caso, hacen concluir que se trata de un contrato de compraventa que se ha perfeccionado debidamente. El análisis pormenorizado de lo acaecido, las probanzas y los autos mismos llevan a este órgano colegiado a concluir que entre las parte litigantes medió acuerdo entre cosa y precio, elementos que fueron debidamente convenidos. De conformidad con el numeral 1049 del Código Civil, la venta, como contrato susceptible de generar obligaciones, es perfecta entre las partes desde que se conviene en cosa y precio. Con ella se pretende la transferencia de un determinado bien a cambio del valor fijado entre las partes. La perfección del contrato, por ende, está sujeta al cumplimiento de los diversos presupuestos que impone el Ordenamiento Jurídico, siendo entonces fundamental la determinación y consentimiento de la cosa objeto de transacción y el precio en que se ha pactado la enajenación. Sobre el particular, el precio debe ser determinado por las partes, empero, basta con que sea determinable, caso, debiéndose fijar en este último supuesto, el medio por el cual puede cuantificarse o concretarse posteriormente, es decir, no en todos los casos el precio debe fijarse en el acto de la contratación, según se desprende del canon 1056 del Código Civil. Tampoco es necesario que el cumplimiento de la obligación se genere en el acto, pues bien pueden imponerse condiciones que propendan a su cancelación en un determinado lapso, o bien, mediante un sistema de financiamiento, en virtud del cual, el monto (con o sin intereses que produzca el decurso del tiempo) sea pagado en tractos o cuotas previamente convenidas. Por ello, el pago de las prestaciones, sea, la entrega del precio y el traslado de dominio del bien, pueden estar supeditada al acaecimiento de un hecho futuro y cierto. Cabe indicar que este contrato puede ser civil o mercantil. En este último caso, en los supuestos previstos por el ordinal 438 del Código de Comercio. Sobre la distinción entre ambas, véase de esta Sala sentencia no. 104 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 3 de julio de 1992. Desde este plano, en lo que viene relevante al caso, cuando el precio por la transmisión de la cosa se ha establecido de común acuerdo, existe venta perfecta, no obstante que su cancelación se disponga para un momento posterior, sea mediante su satisfacción total a futuro, o bien bajo un sistema de de crédito o financiamiento. En la especie, considera esta Sala que es incuestionable la existencia de ese acuerdo. El Banco ofreció en venta un inmueble que si bien no se encontraba inscrito a su nombre en el Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble, había sido adquirido por remate judicial. Se ha tenido por comprobado (aspecto que no ha logrado desvirtuar la representación estatal), que el Banco Anglo, mediante su Sección de Cobros, asintió la propuesta que le formulare la actora. De hecho, emitió recibo en el constaba haber recibido el monetario correspondiente a la prima pactada. Esa manifestación expresa de aceptación determina el perfeccionamiento del contrato, en tanto supone un acuerdo mutuo no solo en el bien transado, sino, aún más relevante, en el precio de la cosa. Para ello no es óbice que la forma en que se pagaría el remanente de ¢4.000.000,00 estuviera pendiente, pues si bien en un inicio se planteaba la posibilidad de otorgar un crédito, lo que implicaba que esa cancelación se daría mediante el pago de cuotas mensuales con sus respectivos intereses, también estaba prevista la solución en caso de la compradora no fuese sujeto de crédito. En este último escenario, como se ha indicado, la adquirente debía cancelar la totalidad de lo debido, dentro del plazo de ocho días naturales posteriores al rechazo de su solicitud de financiamiento. En definitiva, el monto de la venta estaba ya convenido, restando únicamente por definir la forma en que se obtendría el dinero para la cancelación del saldo. Ergo, la compraventa se perfeccionó desde el momento en que se aceptaron las condiciones propuestas por la entidad demandante y se aceptó la oferta. No es de recibo la tesis del casacionista de que esa aceptación debe ser considerada como un acto preparatorio del negocio jurídico. Una vez que el ofrecimiento es asentido, deja de ser propuesta, y pasa a configurar el contenido del acuerdo, al menos en lo que a ese elemento se refiere. Ahora bien, la posibilidad de dictar la anulación del acto adjudicatorio en caso de no aprobarse la solicitud de financiamiento y de que el comprador no depositara el resto del monto, no constituye una limitante para el perfeccionamiento del contrato. Su contenido evidencia una condición resolutoria expresa, que establece la consecuencia jurídica que las partes de antemano fijan por el incumplimiento de una de las estipulaciones pactadas. Pero desde ningún plano, a juicio de este órgano colegiado, puede entenderse como un condicionante a que el acuerdo asumido pueda desplegar sus efectos, ni puede constituirse en motivo de nulidad sobreviniente en el acto que determinó asentir la propuesta del proponente. La desatención de un deber asumido en virtud de un contrato, faculta la resolución del convenio, en este caso, por el incumplimiento consistente en la falta de pago del precio, lo que se ha fijado de manera expresa, más ello no incide ni tiene implicación alguna en la concreción del negocio, ni en el caso concreto. En todo caso, sobre ese tema se harán algunas breves reflexiones más adelante. Tampoco permite sostener lo contrario, la circunstancia de que la compraventa no se haya formalizado. La inscripción del título en el cual se asienta el traspaso de propiedad (o su presentación al Registro), lo que permite es que esa transferencia surta efectos respecto de terceros, según lo estatuido por el ordinal 455 del Código Civil. Sin embargo, a tono con el sistema de nudo consenso, entre las partes contratantes, el pacto surte efectos, se reitera, desde que existe el convenio que tenga por objeto la transmisión de la propiedad, con fijación del precio, según lo dispone el canon 480 en relación al 1049, ambos de ese mismo Código. De este modo, la formalización o inscripción no es necesaria para que el negocio se perfeccione entre las partes que lo han acordado, pues, según se dijo ya, alcanzó ese estado desde el momento en que el Banco Anglo aceptó la propuesta de la actora para adquirir el bien por un monto de ¢5.500.000,00, aún cuando no se hubiera cancelado el monto. VI.- Sobre los alcances de la no aprobación del crédito. Por otro lado, se esgrime, el Ad quem asumió que la solicitud de financiamiento se había aprobado, lo que dedujo de la prueba testimonial, aún y cuando al amparo del artículo 351 del Código Procesal Civil, ese tipo de probanza es improcedente para acreditar un convenio jurídico. La determinación de si el crédito se había aprobado o no, con sustento en las deposiciones de los testigos, sólo tiene utilidad para establecer si la actora incumplió o no su deber de cancelar el resto del precio dentro del plazo de ocho días hábiles. Esto tendría sentido para establecer la posible aplicación de la cláusula cuarta, que disponía la “anulación” (entiéndase resolución) ante la falta de pago. Sin embargo, como con buen tino lo apreció el Tribunal, el demandado no invocó en ninguna instancia del proceso, defensa alguna relacionada con un eventual incumplimiento por parte de la actora, ni invocó aquella disposición de la oferta. Si el Estado consideraba que la desatención de la adjudicataria permitía resolver el pacto, así debió alegarlo, formulando las excepciones de rigor, o bien, planteando la contrademanda respectiva. No se hizo de esa manera. En este sentido, de conformidad con el canon 608 de la normativa procesal civil, podrán ser objeto del recurso de casación, solo aquellas cuestiones que hayan sido oportunamente debatidas por los litigantes. Ergo, las que no lo hayan sido, están fuera de su espectro de cobertura. Así visto, al tratarse de un aspecto que no fue abordado por el recurrente en el momento procesal debido (como se ha señalado), no es pasible de ser formulado en esta instancia, lo que conlleva, al amparo del mandato aludido, el rechazo del cargo. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado, a mayor abundamiento de razones cabe señalar que al margen de lo interesante que pueda resultar el punto en particular, el fondo del asunto que ahora se plantea no guarda relevancia alguna dentro del contexto de esta resolución. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se trata de un aspecto que no produciría variación alguna en el pronunciamiento de fondo y que por tanto no ostenta utilidad para efectos de quebrar el fallo. Por ello, no guarda importancia en este enfoque, si el crédito fue aprobado o no, toda vez que a la postre, es un elemento que no tiene incidencia, siendo que se relaciona con un supuesto quebranto a los deberes acordados. En suma, no habría casación útil en los cargos relacionados con este eje temático, ante lo cual, se impone su rechazo. VII.- Sobre el silencio negativo. Por otro lado, el casacionista indica que a falta de respuesta del Banco en torno a la petición de financiamiento, debió aplicarse la figura del silencio negativo, ergo, que la gestión se entendía rechazada. Considera errado el criterio del Ad quem en cuanto indica que el Banco tuvo que comunicarle previamente la denegatoria a otorgar el crédito. En relación, cabe señalar que de nuevo, el aspecto que se analiza se relaciona con un eventual incumplimiento de la actora, tema que conforme a lo expuesto en el considerando precedente, no fue oportunamente invocado en el curso del proceso, lo que a tono con el artículo 608 del Código Procesal Civil cercena la posibilidad de que esta Sala ingrese a su examen. Al margen de lo anterior, a mayor exposición de razones, merece indicarse que ciertamente la parte accionante incluyó dentro de su oferta una cláusula que establecía su deber de cancelar el monto de ¢4.000.000,00 en el período de ocho días naturales si no resultaba ser sujeto de crédito. No obstante, de los autos se desprende que la actora, de manera insistente y constante, promovió reiteradas acciones para obtener el citado crédito, sin que la institución bancaria diera respuesta. Los hechos probados que adiciona el Tribunal dan cuenta de esa circunstancia. Los alcances de la relación jurídica que vinculaba a ambas partes, de conformidad con los principios de buena fe contractual, exigían, en este caso, que la entidad comunicara de manera expresa al adquirente su decisión de no otorgarle las facilidades de financiamiento, por no considerarlo sujeto de crédito o por cualquier otra razón. Este comunicado era fundamental para que la actora estuviera en posibilidad de adoptar las acciones que estimase adecuadas a fin de dar cumplimiento debido al compromiso asumido de pagar el remanente en un solo tracto dentro del espacio temporal ya referido. En el marco de esa buena fe, las partes deben emprender las conductas debidas que permitan la ejecución y el cumplimiento del contrato. Acciones evasivas que busquen colocar al contratante en estadios de incertidumbre y potenciales quebrantos a sus deberes atentan contra esta equidad contractual. La cláusula cuarta mencionada no solo contiene una exigencia a cargo de la adquirente. En su correcta dimensión, dentro de este contexto aludido, debe entenderse que la conducta del adquirente está sujeta a la decisión del vendedor, en el sentido de si optó por financiar o no el remanente del precio de enajenación, es decir, solo ante la definición clara de la opción de crédito podía la adjudicataria decidir las acciones a emprender para pagar el saldo conforme a lo pactado. Por ende, la aceptación de la oferta produce como efecto el deber del enajenante de comunicar el rechazo del crédito (si así fue). De este modo, no existe yerro alguno en la ponderación de esa prueba documental. Ciertamente no era obligado al Banco otorgar el crédito, más si lo era, dentro del principio de buena fe en la ejecución contractual, comunicar a su contraparte el resultado de su petición, lo cual no consta en este caso. La solicitud de crédito como tal, es una expresión más de un contrato regido por las normas privadas, pues en este caso, la entidad funge como sujeto privado que ofrece servicios financieros y no como unidad administrativa revestida de potestades de imperio. Por tal motivo, el uso del silencio negativo, como ficción jurídica que presupone el rechazo tácito de una determinada solicitud formulada ante el Estado, no tiene cabida dentro del marco de estas relaciones. En todo caso, cabe acotar que esta figura tiene por fin servir de mecanismo de auxilio al particular, quien ante la inercia de la Administración en la respuesta debida, obtiene la posibilidad jurídica de emprender las sendas del régimen recursivo que le permita contar con un pronunciamiento del superior, o bien, buscar la tutela jurisdiccional si así lo desea. En este sentido se manifiestan los numerales 261.3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 19 y 37.2 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa. Así visto, la presunción de rechazo de marras, lo que hace es abrir la posibilidad para interponer los recursos administrativos o formular de la acción contenciosa, según sea el caso. Sin embargo, esto tiene sentido en relaciones jurídico públicas que se emprendan con el Estado en su rol de autoridad pública, no así en su ámbito privado, en el cual, se desenvuelve, en tesis de principio, como una persona de derecho más. Por ello, la figura no es de utilidad para que dentro de ese marco, la gestión pueda entenderse denegada. En todo caso, el silencio negativo no libera al Estado del deber de dictar su respuesta expresa, debidamente fundada, a la que viene obligado por imperio de ley, incluso dentro del año posterior al momento en que puede entenderse por ocurrido el silencio negativo. No considera esta Sala que la figura del silencio pueda ser aplicada al subjudice en los términos que aduce el recurrente. La naturaleza de la relación suscrita le imponía al ente bancario el compromiso de manifestarse sobre ese pedimento, como presupuesto elemental para luego poder hacer efectiva la tantas veces mencionada cláusula cuarta de la oferta. Al margen de que exista duda razonable de que el crédito se haya aprobado o no, lo cierto del caso es que las probanzas reflejan que no fue rechazado de manera expresa, efecto que en la especie, tampoco puede derivarse del denominado silencio negativo. En suma, por las razones dadas, el cargo debe ser rechazado. VIII.- Sobre la posibilidad de reconocer el derecho de la actora. En su segundo reparo, el casacionista aduce quebranto de los preceptos 10.1, 18, 22, 23, 24, 59.1 y 60 inciso f), todos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, normas que en su interpretación integrada llevan a concluir que una pretensión declarativa como la formulada por la actora, no es posible en sede contenciosa administrativa. Lo anterior ya que no se ventiló la nulidad de acto administrativo alguno. Asevera que este no es un caso civil de hacienda. Una vez más, el presente alegato se refiere a cuestiones que no fueron debatidas en el momento procesal oportuno por el mandatario estatal. En efecto, los argumentos que ahora expone el recurrente fueron parte de los motivos en que sustentó la contestación a la demanda incoada por Rosejo Comercial S.A. (folios 148-157). Pero además, fueron las causas básicas en que sustentó su defensa previa de defectos formales que impiden verter pronunciamiento en cuanto al fondo (folios 109 a 119). Esta excepción fue oportunamente rechazada por el Juzgado mediante la resolución no. 374-2001 de las 13 horas del 8 de junio del 2001, visible a folio 187. Ante la sentencia de primera instancia que acogía la pretensión subsidiaria planteada por la accionante, la Administración no hizo reparo alguno en torno a la supuesta improcedencia de reconocer una determinada situación jurídica sin haberse planteado la pretensión anulatoria, ni sobre la naturaleza de este proceso. En su escrito de impugnación el apoderado del Estado se limitó a cuestionar lo dispuesto por el A quo en cuanto al deber de reintegro de la prima cancelada por la actora y el pago de los intereses respectivos monto cancelado. Así visto, lo expuesto en este cargo se trata de extremos que no fueron debatidos cuando correspondía, situación que conforme a lo estatuido por el numeral 608 del Código Procesal Civil, determina su rechazo. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado, a mayor abundamiento de razones, cabe acotar que tampoco por el fondo el reparo sería de recibo. La jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa encuentra su fuente de creación y objetivo en el marco de la Constitución Política. En este sentido, el numeral 49 de la Carta Magna, se constituye no solo en la norma que da base a esta jurisdicción, sino, fija y precisa el objeto de aquella, le da su contenido sustancial y fija su finalidad intrínseca. En lo relevante, ese mandato establece “…con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público.” (El destacado es propio). El uso del término “función administrativa”, compone una apertura que a nivel conceptual engloba todas las formas jurídicas y no jurídicas mediante las cuales la Administración manifiesta su conducta. Incluye por ende no solo los actos expresos y escritos, como concreción de la actividad formal, sino además, cualquier tipo de actuación material (legítima o ilegítima), así como la inactividad, sea formal o material, y a su vez las vías de hecho. Se trata de un concepto amplio que permite al juez incursionar en la revisión de conformidad con el Ordenamiento, de cualquier acción u omisión, actividad o inactividad, función o disfunción del Estado y sus instituciones. La norma constitucional es el pilar incontrovertible para que esta jurisdicción pueda ejercer un control pleno y universal sobre dicha función pública, lo que incluye de manera expresa todas las facetas en que la voluntad administrativa pueda exteriorizarse. La amplitud del término y la esencia misma de esta vía de control, elimina y excluye la posibilidad de espacios de inmunidad del comportamiento estatal dentro del área administrativa. Nótese que el constituyente optó por una fórmula de fiscalización amplia, omnicomprensiva de la totalidad de la función administrativa, rompiendo con cualquier limitante edificada en torno al objeto del proceso contencioso. Así mismo, busca tutelar, al menos, los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de los administrados. Ergo, cualquier tipo de manifestación de voluntad pública que produzca menoscabo en esta esfera existencial de la persona, puede ser susceptible de control judicial. Conforma por tal, el cimiento mismo de los postulados de la tutela judicial efectiva, control universal de la función pública y el sometimiento del Estado al Derecho. Tal amplitud permite que el marco de las pretensiones formuladas por quienes se sientan afectados por el funcionamiento o la disfuncionalidad del aparato público, no se agoten en una simple solicitud de declaratoria de nulidad del acto, pues no en pocas ocasiones el quebranto al orden jurídico no proviene de una exteriorización formal, sino de actuaciones materiales o bien como resultado de la indolencia y la desidia, sea, inactividades. En este sentido, el artículo primero de la Ley Reguladora de esa jurisdicción, establece que es la “… encargada de conocer de las pretensiones que se deduzcan en relación con la legalidad de los actos y disposiciones de la Administración Pública sujetos al Derecho Administrativo”. Como puede observarse, la ley permite todas aquellas pretensiones que sean necesarias para procurar la protección de los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de la persona, que de alguna manera puedan verse comprometidos o afectados, directa o indirectamente, con actos o actuaciones públicas. Desde este plano, si bien es cierto el contenido de la ley de cita presenta un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, de control de legalidad del acto, es lo cierto que ha sido matizado por el mismo contenido de ese conjunto normativo, al incorporar la posibilidad de tutelar la situación jurídica (activa, pasiva, compleja o de ventaja). Nótese que ese cuerpo legal permite requerir el reconocimiento, restitución o modificación de una determinada situación jurídica (incluso de ventaja) que le ha sido cercenada, negada o alterada por un proceder del Estado –artículo 23 ibidem-. Es claro que la procedencia o no de ese requerimiento debe ser de cuidadoso examen en cada caso. En ocasiones, conferirlo es inviable sin antes eliminar un acto administrativo, empero, ello no implica que en todos los casos, sin distingo alguno, ese reconocimiento o declaración esté sujeto a la formulación de una pretensión anulatoria, pues ciertamente, no guardan una relación de accesoriedad irrestricta. Bien puede requerirse el reconocimiento o restablecimiento de la situación jurídica sin necesidad de solicitar la nulidad. Cuando la lesión provenga de una inactividad, aquella pretensión podría ser estimada, de lo que se desprende que no existe una sujeción entre ambas. En la especie, lo que se busca es precisamente la protección de una situación jurídica generada por la venta de un bien inmueble, a propósito del incumplimiento de lo convenido con el Estado, negándole a la actora su derecho de ostentar la propiedad sobre la heredad que adquirió en virtud de un concurso público. Una declaratoria en este sentido no está limitada o condicionada a una pretensión anulatoria de acto alguno, siendo que lo pretendido es el despliegue de los efectos del contrato adoptado y su cumplimiento por parte del Estado. En todo caso, cabe señalar que a diferencia de lo argüido por el casacionista, el presente se trata de un proceso civil de hacienda. Ya se ha establecido que la relación jurídica suscrita entre las partes se trata de un contrato de compraventa, llevada a cabo en el ejercicio de la capacidad privada de la entidad bancaria, por lo que al amparo del numeral 49 constitucional, y de conformidad con el canon 110 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, su conocimiento incumbe a dicha jurisdicción. En este sentido, cabe traer a colación lo indicado por la Sala Constitucional en el fallo no. 5623-99 de las 19 horas 54 minutos del 20 de julio de 1999, dictado dentro del recurso de amparo presentado por la empresa aquí actora contra el Ministerio de Hacienda y en el cual se impugnaba el acto de esa cartera que le rechazó la solicitud de formalizar la escritura de venta de la finca 49.513-000 de San José. En esa oportunidad, ese Tribunal manifestó la naturaleza eminentemente contractual esta relación jurídica (ver folio 138 del principal). Así visto, resulta improcedente condicionar la protección de lo que el actor considera una situación jurídica a su favor, al pedimento de la nulidad de un acto, pues ciertamente, la pretensión de su reconocimiento no depende de la anulatoria. Por ende, no se observa ilegalidad alguna que merezca ser corregida. Así las cosas, la interpretación y alcance que da el recurrente a las normas en que sustenta sus agravios no resultan de recibo, frente a lo cual, deben rechazarse. IX.- Con fundamento en lo anterior, no se observan las ilegalidades que se acusan. Por ende, se debe declarar sin lugar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo de la parte promovente, al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 611 del Código Procesal Civil.”