Tribunal Agrario upholds IDA plot revocation for abandonment, rejecting 'ecological possession' defenseConfirma revocatoria de parcela del IDA por abandono sin justificar la omisión como posesión ecológica

**II.-** The Tribunal shares the enumeration of facts held as proven in the appealed resolution, as they are consistent with the evidence and proceedings in the case file, additionally establishing the following as such: D.- That Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla and María Lorelly Morales Figueroa, upon being allocated the plot, proceeded to rent it out to third parties so they could introduce livestock on the part of it without forest, and subsequently discontinued that activity on the agricultural property (fundo) to such an extent that this sector became overgrown scrubland (tacotales) or secondary forest (bosque secundario) (statement of José Joaquín Calderón on folio 18 and testimonial statements of Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez on folios 25 and 23).- **III.-** Licentiate Fabián Jiménez Valverde, judicial special representative of María Lorelly Morales Figueroa and of Víctor Manuel Calderón Chinchilla, the latter acting as unlimited general representative of José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla, filed an appeal before the improper hierarch against the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), hereinafter IDA, at 10:00 a.m. on August 8, 2006, in a brief filed at the regional office of the Brunca Directorate on October 2 of said year (folio 70). In essence, the appellant argues: After providing an extensive exposition of what he classifies as a "retrospective vision of the concept of agricultural property (fundo agrario) and social function (función social)" as well as the "modern tendencies" of such concepts, and a partial transcription of judgment number 229 issued at 3:00 p.m. on July 20, 1990, by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the appellant points out that the resolution issued by the IDA responds to outdated policies regarding the concept of agricultural property. He argues that possession (posesión) of a property with agricultural vocation is no longer the traditional form of active possession, which implies constant animal or plant production for a social purpose, in addition to the fact that in this area reference is also made to the topic of "possessions," some of them characteristic of "forest reserve (reserva forestal)" zones. For this reason, he says, "ecological possession (posesión ecológica)" must be protected when dealing with reserves of agricultural properties, without ceasing to fulfill the social function sought "... because although it is no longer the support of a family through agriculture as it was formerly, a slightly more modern social purpose prevails, which is the conservation of a healthy and balanced environment which overrides any other." (folio 66). Based on the foregoing, he concludes that "... possession of properties with agricultural vocation does not only imply active exercises of production, since other modalities have emerged, which contrary to the foregoing allow an omissive or passive possession." (folio 66), citing as an additional argument for the latter what was resolved by this Tribunal in a resolution issued at 11:00 a.m. on April 30, 1998, as well as a doctrinal reference by the national writer Jorge Cabrera Medaglia in the article titled "The Relations between Environmental Law and Agricultural Law" published in Revista de Los Tribunales Agrarios No. 12, May and August 1996, pages 133 to 135 and 137 to 138. The appellant argues that conservation implies the provision of an environmental service (servicio ambiental), which is to prevent soil erosion that will eventually have negative consequences for production, regulate microclimates, absorb carbon dioxide to avoid the damages linked to global atmospheric warming, including loss of production and the impact on ecosystems, the maintenance of a genetic reserve of importance for future agricultural improvements, the possibility of enjoying services from protected areas, among others. The previous exposition, which has been summarized in the lines cited, serves as the basis for the appellant to conclude that there was an incorrect assessment of the possession exercised by his represented parties on the agricultural property. He argues that it was proven, both by testimonial evidence and field inspections, that the real estate is mostly composed of mountainous terrain made up of primary forest, of whose total area only 4 hectares are susceptible to agricultural exploitation, especially for livestock raising. Nevertheless, he points out, "... The possessory acts by my represented parties have consisted of conserving the land in its entirety. For at a certain moment, the dilemma arose between conserving the primary forest that amounts to some thirty hectares, composed of a range of wild flora and fauna characteristic of the area and worthy of conservation that even includes species of animals in danger of extinction ... or sacrificing it for the sake of livestock production, which, it must be said, is unlikely due to the physical conditions of the land and the presence of wild animals highly dangerous to livestock ... in the area where cattle raising could have been minimally exploited, there are two creeks (quebradas) which have a fairly important flow, for which it deserves special protection ..." (folio 61). He objects to the field inspection on the grounds that it is "... poor, complacent, and inconsistent" (folio 61), given that it classifies as a state of abandonment aspects such as the perfect state of conservation and that the agricultural property is duly demarcated by cleared boundary strips (carriles). Regarding the testimonial evidence, he points out that both Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez testified consistently with what was stated, in the sense that the possession of his represented parties over the agricultural property has been passive since the IDA allocated the plot to them, because they considered the conservation of natural resources to be more beneficial. He alleges that abandonment (abandono) is not configured, since this presupposes the absence of possessory acts as if the plot became "... no man's land ..." (folio 59), which he considers does not occur in this case because the very neighbors of the locality know that the land belongs to his represented parties.- **IV.-** The Institute of Agrarian Development initiated this administrative proceeding on the grounds of unjustified abandonment, which is regulated in Article 68, subsection 4), paragraph b). The representative of the allocatees in the appeal maintains that since the IDA assigned the plot, they, faced with the dilemma of exploiting it for agricultural activities or protecting the natural resources, opted for conservation, even the 4 hectares they say were destined for livestock activity. On the subject of sustainable development, particularly on farms allocated by the IDA, the Constitutional Chamber in Voto Nº 1763 issued at 4:45 p.m. on April 13, 1994, stated: "PROTECTION OF A HEALTHY AND BALANCED ENVIRONMENT: As is relevant to this matter, namely, the protection of environmental rights, this Chamber in the aforementioned ruling number 3705-93, affirmed: 'It is important for the Chamber to elaborate, prior to the strictly substantive considerations, a general analysis that establishes the constitutional framework and the conditions and interests that environmental conservation awakens today, as its study constitutes a novelty of this last century. It is essential to remember that for many centuries man believed he had to dominate the forces of nature and put them at his service, since it was considered, to some extent, that natural resources were inexhaustible and that industrialization was per se a desirable objective, without evaluating what the impact of economic activity on the environment would be. In fact, the division between renewable and non-renewable natural resources is modern, since even economic science, which concerns itself with the management of the environment to achieve the maximum satisfaction of human needs with limited resources, did not incorporate the wear and tear and deterioration of the environment as a tool of economic analysis until very recently... The environment, therefore, must be understood as a development potential to be used appropriately, and actions must be taken in an integrated manner regarding its natural, sociocultural, technological, and political relations, since, otherwise, its productivity is degraded for the present and the future and the heritage of future generations could be put at risk. The origins of environmental problems are complex and correspond to an articulation of natural and social processes within the framework of the socioeconomic development style adopted by the country. For example, environmental problems occur when the modalities of exploiting natural resources give rise to a degradation of ecosystems exceeding their regeneration capacity, which leads to broad sectors of the population being harmed and generates a high environmental and social cost that results in a deterioration of the quality of life; precisely, the primary objective of the use and protection of the environment is to obtain development and evolution favorable to human beings. Environmental quality is a fundamental parameter of that quality of life; other no less important parameters are health, food, work, housing, education, etc., but more important than that is to understand that although man has the right to make use of the environment for his own development, he also has the duty to protect it and preserve it for the use of present and future generations, which is not so novel, because it is nothing more than the translation into this matter of the principle of "injury", already consolidated in common law, by virtue of which the legitimate exercise of a right has two essential limits: On the one hand, the equal rights of others, and, on the other, the rational exercise and useful enjoyment of the right itself...' IIIo.- This Chamber has also recognized that both the right to health and the right to an environment free from contamination, without which the former could not be effective, are fundamental rights, so that it is the State's obligation to provide for their protection, whether through general policies seeking that end or through specific acts by the Administration. Sustainable development is one of those general policies that the State dictates to expand the possibilities for everyone to fulfill their aspirations for a better life, by increasing production capacity or expanding the possibilities of achieving equitable progress between demographic growth or between this and natural systems. Sustainable development is the process of transformation in the use of resources, the direction of investments, the channeling of technological development, institutional changes, and everything that contributes to meeting the human needs of the present and the future. IVo.- Although it is true that the appealed authorities affirm that the subdivision (parcelación) project for the lands of the farm called Salinas II -acquired by the Institute of Agrarian Development on December 23, 1977-, which are encompassed by the Tivives Protective Zone (Área Protectora de Tivives), in accordance with the terms of Decreto Ejecutivo número 17023 of May 6, 1986, is in accordance with the law, even after the entry into force of that regulation, since in the first instance it cannot be considered that said property became part of the State forest heritage while the autonomous institution they represent has not been compensated the corresponding amount in order to consider that real estate expropriated, and in the second term, because they have always had the authorization of the Directorate General of Forestry to carry out agricultural, livestock, or forestry activities established by Article 3 of Decreto número 17023 which declares as a Protective Zone the territories encompassing the mangroves of Mata de Limón and Tivives, as well as the remnant of tropical dry forest located on the Barranca Topographic Sheet; the argument outlined by the appealed entity is not valid, since in accordance with Articles 32 and 34 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), the State forest heritage is constituted by all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of areas declared inalienable, of farms registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration organisms; for this reason, no Public Administration organism -central or decentralized- may expropriate, swap, assign, or alienate, under any title, deliver, or lease rural lands owned or under its administration, without them having been previously classified by the Directorate General of Forestry, in which case, if it considers them of forest aptitude (aptitud forestal), they will be immediately incorporated into the State forest heritage. For this reason, if Decreto número 17023 affected part of the farm acquired by the Institute of Agrarian Development in its time, the application of the terms of that regulation as well as the cited articles of the Forestry Law is immediate, so the appealed entity is not authorized to disregard them under the justification that there has been no purchase process involving the corresponding compensation. Thus, from the moment the Decree so many times cited entered into force, the lands of the Salinas II farm affected by the Tivives Conservation Zone automatically became part of the State forest heritage; they are norms of immediate application, which is why from that moment the Institute of Agrarian Development was unable to dispose of those lands and continue with the subdivision project, except in the case of all those allocations (adjudicaciones) that had been agreed upon prior to the promulgation of the regulation, since in that case the properties of the beneficiaries must be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the request of the Directorate General of Forestry, their owners agree to submit to the respective forestry regime (Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Forestry Law); the allocations agreed upon by the appealed institution after the entry into force of the cited Decree on the lands encompassed by the Tivives natural conservation zone are not valid, since from that date -May 6, 1986-, it is not authorized to freely dispose of those properties, since their administration corresponds to the Directorate General of Forestry, in coordination with the Municipality of Esparza and the Agricultural Centers: Central Pacific Regional and Cantonal of Esparza. Therefore, the permits it grants to develop agricultural-type activities in those territories does not imply an authorization to alienate or rent them, nor does it originate any real right over the real estate in favor of the concessionaire (Article 41 of the Forestry Law); in other words, the appealed authority cannot refrain from mandatorily complying with the norms that declare the automatic incorporation into the State forest heritage of those real estate properties classified as having forest aptitude, since these provisions are of immediate application due to the public interest their content holds, which is the conservation of natural resources through their sustained and rational use (Article 1 of the Forestry Law). Therefore, any allocation agreed upon after May 6, 1986, up to the present, is null and void, by virtue of having improperly disposed of forest-protected lands. Vo.- If the appealed authorities consider that the provisions of Article 34 of the Forestry Law are contrary to the Constitution, because it unjustifiably establishes that lands owned by a Public Administration organism automatically become part of the State forest heritage, from the very moment the forest aptitude of the same is declared and consequently the public interest in conserving them, without any compensation in their favor, this must be alleged through the corresponding action of unconstitutionality, since the control of the constitutionality of laws is not exercised via amparo but through the procedural means indicated previously. ... " From the foregoing, it is worth highlighting, due to its binding nature, what was stated by the Chamber regarding the possibility that, in light of the issue of sustainable development, if the plot has forest, this must be respected and, therefore, neither said entity nor the allocatees can refrain from applying the regulations related to the Natural Heritage of the State of which it becomes a part, given its nature. On this last point, the Legal Opinion of the Attorney General's Office No. 129-2002 of September 12, 2002, can be reviewed, which, although not binding for this instance, is of interest since it alludes to the fact that the allocatee must, together with the IDA, protect the environment. The analysis in this case will be limited to what is the object of grievances, since the legal implications regarding the possibility that this plot forms part of the Natural Heritage of the State and therefore its administration does not necessarily correspond to said entity must be elucidated in another venue and through another type of proceeding. It is of interest to highlight what the Chamber stated regarding the possibility that forest exists on these plots at the time of allocation, a situation that occurs on the plot under litigation, in which, according to the evidence provided, there is a significant forest sector. Faced with this situation, the proper course is for both the Institute and the allocatees to respect said resource and not make land-use changes (cambios de uso), since all environmental regulations are applicable to them, without being excluded merely for forming part of a land assignment program by an entity whose purposes are agricultural production and the distribution of lands. Accordingly, the passive attitude of the allocatees in not allocating that sector to agriculture could not be classified as "abandonment," as their representative points out in the appeal; however, it is not considered that this was the Institute's assessment in the appealed resolution. The focus that the entity sets forth when alluding to abandonment is directed at that sector of the plot which in the appeal is admitted to be 4 hectares destined from the moment of allocation to livestock activity. If so, and given the conditions imposed by the Institute under the regulations set forth in the Law on Lands and Colonization (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), it was not an option for the allocatees to leave that part of the plot in what he classifies as "passive possession," trying to equate it to the interest that it would generate over time through a process of natural regeneration, unless they had the approval of the Institution. In accordance with the conditions imposed in that type of contracts, according to which plot allocations are made so that these constitute the means of subsistence for persons or families who do not have access to private property, the allocatees, in order to comply with them, should have taken care to maintain the agricultural or livestock activity that part of the land had, which in effect was not done and is admitted by the appellant in the appeal when indicating that since the allocation was made, his represented parties took care to exercise a possession they classify as passive. Likewise, it is important to clarify that according to the scope of the term "sustainable development" used by the Constitutional Chamber in the partially described resolution, it is possible in this case that the allocatees could have maintained the existing agricultural activity on the part of the plot without forest, thus fulfilling the purposes of the Institution, provided they respected the part that still preserved trees. In any event, there is no record in the case file of any action by the allocatees aimed at having the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) consider them as beneficiaries of the program of Payment for Environmental Services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales, PSA), through which their means of subsistence could have been increased, given their allegation that the scarce area they could indeed allocate to agricultural activity did not allow them to develop it profitably. The arguments presented regarding the existence of wild animals typical of forested areas, present in that zone, which could threaten the lives of livestock, are not sufficient to justify abandoning agricultural activity and allowing that small sector to become secondary forest (bosque secundario). Certainly, the witnesses offered by the administered parties, Messrs. Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez, testified identically that Mr. José Joaquín Calderón, without citing the allocatee, had destined the plot for pastureland but left them to become overgrown scrubland (tacotal) while maintaining the boundary strips (carriles) of the adjoining properties (folios 25 and 23), which in principle could be considered praiseworthy for their attitude of conserving natural resources. In reality, it is not so for this Tribunal, because there is insufficient objective evidence to conclude that. Note that the first deponent mentions that Mr. Calderón "... a while ago had developed a management plan for the mountainous area (plan de manejo de la montaña)." (folio 25), which was not provided as evidence. The existence of this management plan, far from being considered an affectation of natural resources, would have allowed the conclusion that by protecting the existing forest, one of the allocatees took steps to increase their income by obtaining economic resources to ensure their subsistence, but it was not proven that this procedure was carried out, which is relevant because the allocatees should have proven that their omissions were really intentional and not acts of abandonment. Given that no evidence was provided, and the forest being there, in the best of cases it can be concluded that the intention was to protect the forest; but this is not sufficient to depart from the conclusion reached by the IDA that the plot was in abandonment, since the part that could have been agriculturally exploited, in accordance with sustainable development, has turned into overgrown scrubland (tacotales). Regarding these, the justification by the allocatees' representative is also not valid, and even less so the statements by the witnesses that the Ministry of Environment and Energy would not permit their exploitation, since it is only up to a certain level of vegetation development that grows through a process of natural regeneration that it can be classified as overgrown scrubland, which, to reach that maturity, requires an evident passive attitude by the allocatees, which translates as abandonment in this particular case, since it was a sector of the plot dedicated to agricultural activity, this being the purpose that should have been maintained on the plot to be consistent with the conditions that governed the allocation, as this is a special contract in this area. The situation would have been different if the allocatees had demonstrated in the case file that they had the approval of the Institution so that, at the time the allocation was made, they would leave the plot in a process of natural regeneration without any agricultural exploitation, or that, even when the assignment was made, it was entirely forest, in which case a land-use change would have contravened the forestry regulations in force. The current situation of the plot, with a large part as forest and a sector of overgrown scrubland or secondary forest, must be defined by the Institution according to its purpose, respecting environmental regulations, after this resolution becomes final, under its responsibility, in accordance with what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited resolution. That decision is foreign to the Tribunal insofar as what matters is to determine if abandonment indeed occurred on the part of the allocatees. On this last point, the decision of the IDA is shared in this Venue for the reasons noted above, coupled with the fact that José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla himself, when testifying before the IDA as part of the administrative proceeding, admitted the state of abandonment in which he left the plot in general for many years: "... That approximately almost twelve years ago I left the place, it was at the beginning of 1994 ... I gave permission to a neighbor to keep livestock there, I gave him the pasture, and in exchange, from time to time he cleaned the firebreaks (rondas), other times I did it myself or I paid someone to do it. ... Because I rented the Rancho Quemado farm, I had to leave there." (folio 18). For this reason, it is not considered that the field inspection carried out by Institute officials does not reflect reality.- **V.-** Therefore, regarding what was appealed, the appealed resolution must be confirmed. On the Court's own motion (de oficio), the right of the allocatees must be recognized that the IDA acknowledge the necessary and useful improvements (mejoras necesarias y útiles) that they demonstrate having introduced to the plot, in accordance with Article 66 of the Law on Lands and Colonization." Therefore, it states, “ecological possession” must be protected when dealing with reserves of agricultural properties without ceasing to fulfill the social function sought "... for although it is no longer the support of a family based on agriculture as it was previously, a somewhat more modern social purpose prevails, which is the conservation of a healthy and balanced environment that overrides any other." (folio 66). On the basis of the foregoing, it concludes that "... possession over properties with an agricultural vocation (sic) does not imply only active production exercises, since other modalities have emerged, which, contrary to the foregoing, allow for an omissive (sic) or passive possession." (folio 66), citing as an additional argument for the latter the decision of this Court in the ruling of 11:00 a.m. on April 30, 1998, as well as a doctrinal reference by the national writer Jorge Cabrera Medaglia in the article titled "The relations between Environmental Law and Agrarian Law" published in the Journal of the Agrarian Courts, issue number 12, May and August 1996, pages 133 to 135 and 137 to 138. The appellant argues that conservation implies the provision of an environmental service, which is to prevent soil erosion that will eventually have negative consequences for production, regulate microclimates, absorb carbon dioxide to avoid the damages linked to global atmospheric warming, among them the loss of production and the impact on ecosystems, the maintenance of a genetic reserve of importance for future agricultural improvements, the possibility of enjoying services from protected areas, among others. The preceding exposition, which has been synthesized into the cited lines, serves as the basis for the appellant to conclude that there was an incorrect assessment of the possession exercised by its represented parties over the property in this case. It argues that both the testimonial evidence and the field inspections demonstrated that the property is mostly composed of mountain consisting of primary forest, of whose total area only 4 hectares are susceptible to agricultural exploitation, especially for cattle raising. However, it points out, "... The possessory acts on the part of my represented parties have consisted of conserving the land in its entirety. For at a certain moment the dilemma arose between conserving the primary forest that amounts to some thirty hectares, composed of a range of wild flora and fauna typical of the area and worthy of conservation that even encompasses species of animals in danger of extinction ... or sacrificing it in favor of livestock production, which, it is worth telling you, is unlikely due to the physical conditions of the land and the presence of wild animals highly dangerous to cattle ... in the zone where cattle raising could have been exploited to a minimal extent, there are two streams which have a quite significant flow, for which reason it merits special protection ..." (folio 61). It objects to the field inspection on the grounds that it is "... poor, complacent, and inconsistent" (folio 61) because it describes aspects such as the perfect state of conservation and the fact that the property is duly demarcated by lanes as a state of abandonment. Regarding the testimonial evidence, it points out that both Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez testified in accordance with what was stated, in the sense that the possession of its represented parties over the property has been passive since the IDA adjudicated the plot to them, since they considered the conservation of natural resources to be more beneficial. It alleges that abandonment is not configured because this presupposes the absence of possessory acts as if the plot became "... no man's land ..." (folio 59), which it considers does not occur in this case because the neighbors of the locality themselves know that the land belongs to its represented parties.- <b>IV.-</b> The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario initiated this administrative proceeding based on the ground of unjustified abandonment, which is regulated in Article 68, subsection 4), paragraph b). The representative of the adjudicatees on appeal maintains that since the IDA assigned the plot, they, faced with the dilemma of exploiting it in agricultural activities or protecting the natural resources, opted for conservation, even of the 4 hectares that they say were destined for livestock activity. On the topic of sustainable development, particularly on farms adjudicated by the IDA, the Constitutional Chamber, in Voto Nº 1763 of 4:45 p.m. on April 13, 1994, stated: "PROTECTION OF A HEALTHY AND BALANCED ENVIRONMENT: In what is relevant to this matter, that is, the protection of environmental rights, this Chamber, in the aforementioned ruling number 3705-93, affirmed: 'It is important for the Chamber to elaborate, prior to strictly substantive considerations, a general analysis that establishes the constitutional framework and the conditions and interests that environmental conservation arouses today, since its study constitutes a novelty of this last century. It is essential to recall that for many centuries, man believed that he had to dominate the forces of nature and place them at his service, since it was believed, to some extent, that natural resources were inexhaustible and that industrialization was per se a desirable objective, without evaluating what the impact of economic activity on the environment would be. In fact, the distinction between renewable and non-renewable natural resources is modern, since even economic science, which concerns itself with the management of the environment to achieve the maximum satisfaction of human needs with limited resources, did not incorporate the wear and tear and deterioration of the environment as a tool for economic analysis until very recently... The environment, therefore, must be understood as a development potential to be used appropriately, and action must be taken in an integrated manner within its natural, sociocultural, technological, and political relationships, since otherwise, its productivity is degraded for the present and future, and the heritage of future generations could be put at risk. The origins of environmental problems are complex and correspond to a linkage of natural and social processes within the framework of the socio-economic development style adopted by the country. For example, environmental problems occur when the exploitation methods of natural resources give rise to ecosystem degradation beyond their regeneration capacity, which leads to broad sectors of the population being harmed and a high environmental and social cost being generated, resulting in a deterioration of the quality of life; precisely because the primary objective of the use and protection of the environment is to obtain development and evolution favorable to human beings. Environmental quality is a fundamental parameter of that quality of life; other no less important parameters are health, food, work, housing, education, etc., but more important than that is understanding that although man has the right to use the environment for his own development, he also has the duty to protect and preserve it for the use of present and future generations, which is not so novel, because it is nothing more than the translation to this matter of the principle of 'lesión', already consolidated in common law, by virtue of which the legitimate exercise of a right has two essential limits: On one hand, the equal rights of others, and on the other, the rational exercise and useful enjoyment of the right itself...' IIIo.- This Chamber has also recognized that both the right to health and the right to a pollution-free environment, without which the former could not be made effective, are fundamental rights, so it is the obligation of the State to provide for their protection, whether through general policies to achieve that purpose or through concrete acts by the Administration. Sustainable development is one of those general policies that the State dictates to broaden the possibilities for everyone to fulfill their aspirations for a better life, increasing production capacity or expanding the possibilities of achieving equitable progress between demographic growth or between the latter and natural systems. Sustainable development is the process of transformation in the use of resources, direction of investments, channeling of technological development, institutional changes, and everything that contributes to meeting the human needs of the present and the future. IVo.- While it is true that the respondent authorities affirm that the parceling project for the lands of the farm called Salinas II – acquired by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario on December twenty-third, nineteen seventy-seven – which are included within the Tivives Protective Zone, in accordance with the terms of Decreto Ejecutivo number 17023 of May sixth, nineteen eighty-six, is in accordance with the law, even after the entry into force of that regulation, since in the first instance it cannot be considered that the said estate has become part of the State forest heritage while the autonomous institution they represent is not compensated the corresponding amount in order to consider that property expropriated, and secondly, because they have always had the authorization of the Dirección General Forestal to carry out the agricultural, livestock, or forestry activities established in Article 3 of Decreto number 17023, which declares the territories comprising the mangroves of Mata de Limón and Tivives, as well as the tropical dry forest remnant located on the Barranca Cartographic Sheet, as a Protective Zone; the argument outlined by the respondent entity is not valid, since according to Articles 32 and 34 of the Ley Forestal, the State forest heritage is constituted by all forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other agencies of the Public Administration, for this reason, no agency of the Public Administration – centralized or decentralized – may expropriate, exchange, transfer, or dispose of, under any title, hand over, or lease rural lands of its property or under its administration, without them having previously been classified by the Dirección General Forestal, in which case if the latter considers them to have forest aptitude, they will immediately be incorporated into the State forest heritage. For this reason, if Decreto number 17023 affected part of the farm acquired by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in due time, the application of the terms of that regulation, as well as the cited articles of the Ley Forestal, is immediate, so the respondent entity is not empowered to disapply them under the justification that a purchase process involving the corresponding compensation has not occurred. Thus, from the moment the repeatedly cited Decreto entered into force, the lands of the Salinas II farm affected by the Tivives Conservation Zone automatically became part of the State forest heritage; they are therefore rules of immediate application, which is why from that moment on, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario was unable to dispose of those lands and continue with the parceling project, except in the case of all those adjudications that had been agreed upon prior to the promulgation of the land regulation, since in that case the beneficiaries' properties must be bought or expropriated, unless, at the request of the Dirección General Forestal, their owners agree to submit to the respective forest regime (Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Ley Forestal); the adjudications agreed upon by the respondent institution after the entry into force of the cited Decreto over the lands included within the Tivives natural conservation zone are not valid, since from that date – May sixth, nineteen eighty-six – it is not empowered to freely dispose of those estates, given that the administration of the same is the responsibility of the Dirección General Forestal, in coordination with the Municipality of Esparza and the Agricultural Centers: Central Pacific Regional and Cantonal of Esparza. Therefore, the permits that the latter grants to develop agricultural activities in those territories do not imply authorization to transfer or lease them, nor do they give rise to any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire (Article 41 of the Ley Forestal); in other words, the respondent authority cannot avoid mandatorily complying with the rules that declare the automatic incorporation into the State forest heritage of those properties that are classified as having forest aptitude, since those provisions are of immediate application due to the public interest their content represents, which is the conservation of natural resources through their sustained and rational use (Article 1 of the Ley Forestal). Therefore, any adjudication that was agreed upon after May sixth, nineteen eighty-six, up to the present, is null, by virtue of having improperly disposed of forest-protected lands. Vo.- If the respondent authorities consider that the provisions of Article 34 of the Ley Forestal are contrary to the Fundamental Charter, since it unjustifiably establishes that lands owned by an agency of the Public Administration automatically become part of the State forest heritage from the very moment the forest aptitude of the same is declared and, consequently, the public interest in conserving them, without any compensation being given in their favor, this must be alleged through the corresponding unconstitutionality action, since the control of the constitutionality of laws is not exercised through an amparo action but through the procedural means indicated previously. ... " From what has been stated, what was stated by the Chamber regarding the possibility that, concerning the topic of sustainable development, if the plot has forest it must be respected, and therefore, neither the said entity nor the adjudicatees can avoid applying the regulations related to the State Natural Heritage, of which it becomes a part given its nature, is salvageable for its binding character. On this latter point, the Legal Opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República Nº 129-2002 of September 12, 2002, can be reviewed, which, although not binding on this instance, is of interest given that it alludes to the fact that the adjudicatee must, together with the IDA, protect the environment. The analysis in this case will be limited to what is the subject of the grievances, since the legal implications regarding the possibility that this plot forms part of the State Natural Heritage and, therefore, its administration does not necessarily correspond to the said entity, must be elucidated in another venue and through another type of proceeding. It is of interest to rescue what was stated by the Chamber in relation to the possibility that on these plots there is forest at the moment of adjudication, a situation that occurs on the plot in litigation, in which, according to the evidence provided, there is an important forest sector. Given this situation, the proper course is for both the Institute and the adjudicatees to respect that resource and not make land-use changes, since all environmental regulations are applicable to them, without these being excluded solely because they are part of a land allocation program by an entity whose purposes are production and land distribution. According to this, the passive attitude of the adjudicatees in not dedicating that sector to agriculture could not be classified as "abandonment," as their representative states on appeal; however, it is not considered that this was the assessment of the Institute in the appealed resolution. The approach that the entity sets forth when alluding to abandonment is directed at that sector of the plot that the appeal admits is 4 hectares destined from the moment of adjudication to livestock activity. If this is so, and given the conditions imposed by the Institute, characteristic of the regulations set forth in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, it was not an option for the adjudicatees to leave that part of the plot in what it classifies as "passive possession," attempting to equate it with interest in generating, with the passage of time, a process of natural regeneration, unless they had the approval of the Institution. According to the conditions imposed in that type of contract, according to which the adjudications of plots are made so that they constitute the means of subsistence for persons or families who do not have access to private property, the adjudicatees, in order to comply with them, should have taken care to maintain the agricultural or livestock activity that part of the land had, which was indeed not done and is admitted by the appellant on appeal when indicating that since the adjudication was made, their represented parties took care to exercise possession that they classify as passive. Likewise, it is important to clarify that according to the scope of the term "sustainable development" used by the Constitutional Chamber in the partially described resolution, it is possible in this case for the adjudicatees to have maintained the agricultural activity existing on the part of the plot that did not have forest, thus fulfilling the purposes of the Institution, provided they respected the part that still preserved trees. In any case, the case file does not contain any action by the adjudicatees aimed at having the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía consider them as beneficiaries of the Pago de Servicios Ambientales program through which their means of subsistence would have been increased, in the face of their allegation that the scarce area that they could dedicate to agricultural activity did not allow them to develop it profitably. The arguments presented regarding the existence of wild animals typical of forest areas, existing in that zone, which could threaten the lives of the cattle, are not sufficient to justify the abandonment of the agricultural activity and allowing that small sector to become secondary forest (bosque secundario). Certainly, the witnesses offered by the administered parties, Messrs. Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montegro Martínez, identically declared that Mr. José Joaquín Calderón, without citing the female adjudicatee, had destined the plot for pasture but left it so that it would become brushland (tacotal), maintaining the boundary lanes (folios 25 and 23), which in principle could be considered commendable, their attitude of conserving natural resources. In reality, it is not so for this Court, since there is insufficient objective evidence to conclude that. Note that the first deponent states that Mr. Calderón "... long ago had drawn up a forest management plan (plan de manejo) for the mountain." (folio 25), which was not provided as evidence. The existence of that forest management plan, far from being considered an impact on natural resources, would have allowed the conclusion that, by protecting the existing forest, one of the adjudicatees took steps to increase their earnings by obtaining economic resources to ensure their subsistence, but it was not proven that this procedure was carried out, which is relevant because the adjudicatees should have proven that their omissions were truly intentional and not acts of abandonment. Since no evidence was provided, and the forest being there, in the best of cases it can be concluded that the intention was to protect the forest; but this is not sufficient to depart from the conclusion reached by the IDA to the effect that the plot was in abandonment, because the part that could have been agriculturally exploited, in a manner consistent with sustainable development, has been converted into brushland (tacotales). Regarding the latter, neither is the justification of the representative of the adjudicatees acceptable, much less what was said by the witnesses to the effect that the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía would not permit their exploitation, since it is only up to a certain level of development of the vegetation that grows through a natural regeneration process that it can be classified as brushland (tacotal), which, to reach that maturity, requires an evident passive attitude on the part of the adjudicatees, which translates as abandonment in this particular case because it was a sector of the plot dedicated to agricultural activity, that being the purpose that should have been maintained on the plot to be consistent with the conditions that mediated the adjudication, as this is a special contract in this matter. The situation would have been different if the adjudicatees had demonstrated in the case file that they had the approval of the Institution so that, at the time the adjudication was made, they would leave the plot in a natural regeneration process without any agricultural exploitation, or that, even when the allocation was made, it was entirely forest, in which case a land-use change would have contravened the prevailing forestry regulations. The current situation of the plot, with a large part of forest and a sector of brushland (tacotales) or secondary forest (bosque secundario), must be defined by the Institution according to its purpose, respecting environmental regulations, after this resolution becomes final, under its responsibility, in accordance with what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited resolution. That decision is beyond this Court to the extent that what is relevant to determine is whether abandonment by the adjudicatees indeed occurred. On this last point, the decision of the IDA is shared in this Venue for the reasons pointed out above, coupled with the fact that José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla himself, when testifying before the IDA as part of the administrative proceeding, admitted the state of abandonment in which he left the plot in general for many years: "... Approximately almost twelve years ago I left the place, it was at the beginning of 1994 ... I gave permission to a neighbor to keep cattle there, I gave him the grass, and he in exchange would clean the firebreaks from time to time, other times I did it or paid someone to do it. ... Because I rented the Rancho Quemado farm, I had to leave there." (folio 18). For this reason, it is also not considered that the field inspection carried out by representatives of the Institute does not correspond to reality.-</span><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN;"> </span><b><span lang="EN" style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN">V.-</span></b><span lang="EN" style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN"> On the above grounds, the appealed resolution must be confirmed in what was appealed.</span> Ex officio, the right of the awardees must be recognized for the IDA to acknowledge the necessary and useful improvements that they prove to have introduced to the parcel, in accordance with Article 66 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización." The existence of that management plan, far from being considered an impact on natural resources, would have allowed the conclusion that by protecting the existing forest, one of the awardees took steps to increase their earnings by obtaining economic resources to ensure their subsistence, but it was not proven that this procedure was carried out. This is relevant because the awardees should have proven that their omissions were truly intentional and not acts of abandonment. In the absence of evidence, and with the forest still there, at best it can be concluded that they intended to protect the forest; but that is not sufficient to depart from the conclusion reached by the IDA to the effect that the parcel was abandoned, since the part that could have been exploited agriculturally, in a manner consistent with sustainable development, has become scrubland (tacotales). Regarding these, the justification offered by the awardees' representative is also inapplicable, even less so the testimony given by the witnesses to the effect that the Ministry of Environment and Energy would not permit their exploitation, since vegetation growing through a process of natural regeneration can only be classified as scrubland (tacotales) up to a certain level of development. For it to reach that maturity requires an obvious passive attitude on the part of the awardees, which translates as abandonment in this particular case, since it was a sector of the parcel dedicated to agricultural activity, this being the purpose that should have been maintained on the parcel to be consistent with the conditions that governed the award, given that this is a special contract in this matter. The situation would have been different if the awardees had demonstrated in the proceedings that they had the institution's approval, at the time the award was made, to leave the parcel in a process of natural regeneration without any agricultural exploitation, or that, even when the assignment was made, it was entirely forest, in which case a land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) would have contravened the forestry regulations in force. The current situation of the parcel, with a large part of forest and a sector of scrubland (tacotales) or secondary forest, must be defined by the Institution according to its purpose, respecting environmental regulations, after this resolution becomes final, under its responsibility, in accordance with what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited resolution. That decision is beyond the scope of this Tribunal insofar as what is relevant is to determine whether abandonment by the awardees effectively occurred. Regarding this latter point, the decision by the IDA is shared by this Court for the reasons indicated above, coupled with the fact that José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla himself, when testifying before the IDA as part of the administrative procedure, admitted the state of abandonment in which he generally left the parcel for many years: "... That I left the place approximately almost twelve years ago, it was at the beginning of 1994 ... I would give permission to a neighbor to keep cattle there, I would give him the pasture, and in exchange he would occasionally clean the firebreaks, other times I would do it or pay someone to do it. ... Because I rented the Rancho Quemado farm, I had to leave there." (folio 18). For this reason, it is also not considered that the field inspection carried out by officials of the Institute does not reflect reality.- **V.-** For the foregoing reasons, the appealed resolution shall be confirmed regarding the part appealed. On the Court's own motion, the right of the awardees for the IDA to recognize the necessary and useful improvements (mejoras) that they demonstrate having introduced to the parcel must be acknowledged, in accordance with Article 66 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización."

"II.- El Tribunal comparte el elenco de hechos tenidos por probados en la resolución recurrida al ser acordes con las probanzas y tramitación constantes en autos, adicionándose de tal naturaleza lo siguiente: D.- Que Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla y María Lorelly Morales Figueroa, al adjudicárseles la parcela, procedieron a alquilar a terceras personas para que introdujeran ganado en la parte de ésta que no tenía bosque, y luego, descontinuaron dicha actividad en el fundo a tal punto que ese sector se convirtió en tacotales o bosque secundario (declaración de José Joaquín Calderón de folio 18 y declaraciones testimoniales de Vicente Granda Obando y Agripino Montenegro Martínez de folios 25 y 23).- III.- El licenciado Fabián Jiménez Valverde, apoderado especial judicial de María Lorelly Morales Figueroa y de Víctor Manuel Calderón Chinchilla, actuando este último como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla, interpuso recurso de apelación ante el jerarca impropio contra la resolución dictada por la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en adelante IDA, a las 10 horas del 8 de agosto del 2006, en memorial presentado a la sede regional de la Dirección Brunca el 2 de octubre del citado año (folio 70). En lo medular, alega el recurrente: Luego de hacer una amplia exposición de lo que cataloga es una "visión retrospectiva del concepto de fundo agrario y función social" así como de las "tendencias modernas" de tales conceptos, y una transcripción parcial de la sentencia número 229 de las 15 horas del 20 de julio de 1990 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el recurrente señala que la resolución dictada por el IDA responde a las políticas desfazadas sobre el concepto de fundo agrario. Argumenta que la posesión sobre un fundo con vocación agraria ya no es la tradicional forma de posesión activa, que implica la producción animal o vegetal constante con el fin social, aunado al hecho de que en esta materia también se hace alusión al tema de "las posesiones" algunas de ellas propias de las zonas de "reserva forestal". Por ello dice, debe tutelarse la "posesión ecológica" cuando se trata de reservas de fundos agrarios sin dejar de cumplir con la función social que se busca "... pues aunque ya no es el sostén de una familia a raíz de la agricultura como era anteriormente, impera un fin social un poco más moderno, el cual es la conservación de un ambiente sano y equilibrado el cual se sobrepone a cualquier otro." (folio 66). Con fundamento en lo anterior, concluye que "... la posesión sobre fundos con vocación agrarios (sic), no implica solamente los ejercicios activos de producción, pues otras modalidades han surgido, que a contrariedad de lo anterior permiten una posesión omitiva (sic) o pasiva." (folio 66), citando como argumento adicional de esto último lo resuelto por este Tribunal en resolución de las 11 horas del 30 de abril de 1998, así como una referencia doctrinaria del escritor nacional Jorge Cabrera Medaglia en el artículo titulado "Las relaciones entre el derecho Ambiental y del derecho Agrario" publicado en la Revista de Los Tribunales Agrarios número 12 de mayo y agosto de 1996, páginas 133 a 135 y 137 a 138. Aduce el recurrente que la conservación implica la prestación de un servicio ambiental cual es evitar la erosión de los suelos que eventualmente tendrá consecuencias negativas para la producción, regular microclimas, absorver dióxido de carbono para evitar los perjuicios vinculados al calentamiento global de la atmósfera, entre ellos la pérdida de producción y la afectación de los ecosistemas, el mantenimiento de una reserva genética de importancia para futuros mejoramientos agrícolas, la posibilidad de disfrutar de servicios provenientes de áreas protegidas, entre otros. La anterior el recurrente a fin de concluir se dio en este caso una incorrecta apreciación de la posesión ejercida por sus representados en el fundo. Aduce, fue acreditado tanto por la prueba testimonial como por las inspecciones de campo que el inmueble en su mayor parte está constituido por montaña compuesta por bosque primario, de cuya área total sólo 4 hectáreas son susceptibles de "... Los actos posesorios por parte de mis representados han consistido en conservar el terreno en su totalidad. Pues en cierto momento se presento (sic) la disyuntiva entre conservar el bosque primario que asciende a unas treinta hectáreas, compuesto por una gama de flora y fauna salvaje propios de la zona y dignos de conservación que incluso abarca especies de animales en peligro de extinción ... o sacrificarlo en pro de la producción ganadera, que valga decirles poco probable por las condiciones físicas del terreno y la presencia de animal salvaje de alto peligro para el ganado ... en la zona en la cual se pudo haber explotado de manera mínima la crianza de ganado, existen dos quebradas las cuales cuentan con un afluente bastante importante, por lo que merece una especial protección ..." (folio 61).Objeta de la inspección de campo el hecho de que es "... pobre, complaciente e inconsistente" (folio 61) dado que califica de estado de abandono aspectos tales como el perfecto estado de conservación y que el fundo está debidamente deslindado mediante carriles. En cuanto a la testimonial señala, tanto Vicente Granda Obando como Agripino Montenegro Martínez declararon de manera acorde con lo expuesto en el sentido de que la posesión de sus representados sobre el fundo ha sido pasiva desde que el IDA les adjudicó la parcela pues consideraron es más beneficiosa la conservación de los recursos naturales. Alega, no se configura el abandono pues éste supone la ausencia de actos posesivos como si la parcela pasara a "... ser tierra de nadie ..." (folio 59) lo cual considera no se da en este caso pues los vecinos mismos de la localidad conocen que el terreno le pertenece sus representados.- IV.- El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario dio inicio a este proceso administrativo por la causal de abandono injustificado, la cual se encuentra regulada en el artículo 68 inciso 4) apartado b). El representante de los adjudicatarios en la apelación, sostiene que desde que el IDA asignó la parcela, éstos, ante la disyuntiva de por la conservación, aún de las 4 hectáreas que dicen, estaban destinadas a la actividad ganadera. Sobre el tema del desarrollo sostenible, particularmente en fincas adjudicadas por el IDA, la Sala Constitucional en Voto Nº 1763 de las 16 horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del 13 de abril de 1994, indicó: "PROTECCIÓN AL AMBIENTE SANO Y EQUILIBRADO: En lo que interesa a este asunto, sea, la protección de los derechos ambientales, esta Sala en el ya citado pronunciamiento número 3705-93, afirmó: "Resulta importante para la Sala elaborar, de previo a las consideraciones estrictamente de fondo, un análisis general que establezca el marco constitucional y las condiciones e intereses que hoy en día despierta la conservación del ambiente, pues su estudio se constituye en una novedad de esta última centuria. Es primordial recordar que durante muchos siglos el hombre creyó que debía dominar las fuerzas de la naturaleza y ponerlas a su servicio, ya que se consideraba, en alguna medida, que los recursos naturales eran inagotables y que la industrialización era per se un objetivo deseable, sin que se evaluara cuál sería el impacto de la actividad económica sobre el ambiente. De hecho, la división entre recursos naturales renovables y no renovables es moderna, pues aún la ciencia económica, que se preocupa de la administración del entorno para lograr la satisfacción al máximo de las necesidades humanas con recursos limitados, no incorporó el desgaste y deterioro del medio como herramienta del análisis económico, sino hasta en fecha muy reciente...El ambiente, por lo tanto, debe ser entendido como un potencial de desarrollo para utilizarlo adecuadamente, debiendo actuarse de modo integrado en sus relaciones naturales, socioculturales, tecnológicas y de orden político, ya que, en caso contrario, se degrada su productividad para el presente y el futuro y podría ponerse en riesgo el patrimonio de las generaciones venideras. Los orígenes de los problemas ambientales son complejos y corresponden a una articulación de procesos naturales y sociales en el marco del estilo de desarrollo socioeconómico que adopte el país. Por ejemplo, se producen problemas ambientales cuando las modalidades de explotación de los recursos naturales dan lugar a una degradación de los ecosistemas superior a su capacidad de regeneración, lo que conduce a que amplios sectores de la población resulten perjudicados y se genere un alto costo ambiental y social que redunda en un deterioro de la calidad de vida; pues precisamente el objetivo primordial del uso y protección del ambiente es obtener un desarrollo y evolución favorable al ser humano. La calidad ambiental es un parámetro fundamental de esa calidad de vida; otros parámetros no menos importantes son salud, alimentación, trabajo, vivienda, educación, etc., pero más importante que ello es entender que si bien el hombre tiene el derecho de hacer uso del ambiente para su propio desarrollo, también tiene el deber de protegerlo y preservarlo para el uso de las generaciones presentes y futuras, lo cual no es tan novedoso, porque no es más que la traducción a esta materia, del principio de la "lesión", ya consolidado en el derecho común, en virtud del cual el legítimo ejercicio de un derecho tiene dos límites esenciales: Por un lado, los iguales derechos de los demás y, por el otro, el ejercicio racional y el disfrute útil del derecho mismo..." IIIo.- Esta Sala también ha reconocido, que tanto el derecho a la salud como a un ambiente libre de contaminación, sin el cual el primero no podría hacerse efectivo, son derechos fundamentales, de modo que, es obligación del Estado proveer a su protección, ya sea a través de políticas generales para procurar ese fin o bien, a través de actos concretos por parte de la Administración. El desarrollo sostenible es una de esas políticas generales que el Estado dicta para ampliar las posibilidades de que todos puedan colmar sus aspiraciones a una vida mejor, incrementando la capacidad de producción o bien, ampliando las posibilidades de llegar a un progreso equitativo entre un crecimiento demográfico o entre éste y los sistemas naturales. Es el desarrollo sostenible, el proceso de transformación en la utilización de los recursos, orientación de las inversiones, canalización del desarrollo tecnológico, cambios institucionales y todo aquello que coadyuve para atender las necesidades humanas del presente y del futuro. IVo.- Si bien es cierto las autoridades recurridas afirman que el proyecto de parcelación de los terrenos de la finca denominada Salinas II -adquiridos por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario el veintitrés de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete-, que se encuentran comprendidos por el área Protectora de Tivives, de conformidad con los términos del Decreto Ejecutivo número 17023 del seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis, está ajustado a derecho, aún despúes de la entrada en vigencia de esa normativa, puesto que en primer instancia no puede considerarse que aquella heredad haya pasado a formar parte del patrimonio forestal del Estado mientras no se le indemnice a la institución autónoma que representan el monto correspondiente a fin de tener por expropiado ese inmueble, y en segundo término, por cuanto siempre han contado con la autorización de la Dirección General Forestal para llevar a cabo las actividades agrícolas, ganaderas o forestales que establece el artículo 3 del Decreto número 17023 que declara como Zona Protectora los territorios que comprenden los manglares de Mata de Limón y Tivives, así como el reducto de bosque tropical seco ubicado en la Hoja Cartográfica de Barranca; no resulta válido el argumento esbozado por la entidad recurrida, toda vez que de acuerdo con los artículos 32 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, el patrimonio forestal del Estado está constituido por todos los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a las municipalidades, a las instituciones autónomas y a los demás organismos de la Administración Pública, por esa razón, ningún organismo de la Administración Pública -central o desecentralizada- podrá arrendamiento, terrenos rurales de su propiedad o bajo su administración, sin que previamente hayan sido clasificados por la Dirección General Forestal, en cuyo caso si ésta los considerara de aptitud forestal quedarán inmediatamente incorporados al patrimonio forestal del Estado, por ese motivo si el Decreto número 17023 afectó parte de la finca adquirida por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en su oportunidad, la aplicación de los términos de aquella normativa así como de los artículos citados de la Ley Forestal, es inmediata, por lo que el ente recurrido no esta facultado para desaplicarlos bajo la justificación de que no ha mediado un proceso de compra que conlleve la indemnización correspondiente. Así pues, desde el momento en que el Decreto tantas veces citado entró en vigencia, los terrenos de la finca Salinas II afectados por la Zona de Conservación de Tivives, pasaron a formar parte del patrimonio forestal del Estado automáticamente, son pues normas de aplicación inmediata, motivo por el cual desde ese momento el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario se encontraba imposibilitado para disponer de esos terrenos y continuar con el proyecto de parcelación, excepto en el supuesto de todas aquellas adjudicaciones que se hubieran acordado con anterioridad a la promulgación del terreno, pues en ese caso los predios de los beneficiarios se deberán comprar o expropiar, salvo que a requerimiento de la Dirección General Forestal, sus propietarios acepten someterse al régimen forestal respectivo (artículo 37 párrafo 2 de la Ley Forestal); no resultan válidas las adjudicaciones acordadas por la institución recurrida con posterioridad a la entrada en vigencia del Decreto de cita sobre los terrenos comprendidos por la zona de conservación natural de Tivives, toda vez que desde esa fecha -seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis-, no está facultada para disponer libremente de esas heredades, puesto que la administración de las mismas compete a la Dirección General Forestal, en coordinación con la Municipalidad de Esparza y los Centros Agrícolas: Regional Pacífico Central y Cantonal de Esparza, por ello los permisos que ésta conceda a fin de desarrollar actividades de índole agrario en esos territorios no implica una autorización para enajenar o rentar aquellos, ni tampoco originan derecho real alguno sobre el inmueble a favor del concesionario (artículo 41 de la Ley Forestal); en otras palabras, la autoridad recurrida no puede abstraerse de acatar obligatoriamente las normas que declaran la incorporación automática al patrimonio forestal del Estado de aquellos inmuebles que se les califique como de aptitud forestal, pues esas disposiciones son de aplicación inmediata por el interés público que reviste su contenido, cual es la conservación de los recursos naturales a través del aprovechamiento sostenido y racional de los mismos (artículo 1 de la Ley Forestal), por ello toda adjudiciación que se haya acordado con posterioridad al seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis hasta la actualidad, son nulas, en virtud de que se ha dispuesto de manera indebida sobre terrenos forestalmente protegidos. Vo.- Si las autoridades recurridas estiman que lo dispuesto en el artículo 34 de la Ley Forestal es contrario a la Carta Fundamental, pues establece de manera injustificada que los terrenos cuyo titular sea un organismo de la Administración Pública pasan a formar parte automáticamente al patrimonio forestal del Estado, desde el mismo instante en que se declare la aptitud forestal de los mismos y en consecuencia el interés público por conservarlos, sin que medie indemnización alguna a su favor, ello deberá alegarlo a través de la acción de inconstitucionalidad correspondiente, ya que el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes no se ejerce por la vía de amparo sino por el medio procesal indicado con anterioridad. ... " De lo expuesto es rescatable por su carácter vinculante, lo expuesto por la Sala en torno a la posibilidad de que ante el tema del desarrollo sostenible, si la parcela tiene bosque éste debe respetarse y por ende, ni dicho ente ni los adjudicatarios pueden abstraerse de aplicar la normativa relacionada con el Patrimonio Natural del Estado del cual pasa a formar parte dada su naturaleza. Sobre esto último puede revisarse la Opinión Jurídica de la Procuraduría General de la República Nº 129-2002 del 12 de setiembre del 2002, la cual, aunque no es vinculante para esta instancia, si es de interés dado que hace alusión a que el adjudicatario debe en conjunto con el IDA proteger el medio ambiente. El análisis en este caso se limitará a lo que es objeto de agravios, puesto que las implicaciones jurídicas en torno a la posibilidad de que esta parcela forme parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado y por ende, su administración no necesariamente corresponde a dicho ente, deberán dilucidarse en otra sede y mediante otro tipo de proceso. Es de interés rescatar lo expuesto por la Sala en relación con la posibilidad de que en estas parcelas exista bosque en el momento de la adjudicación, situación que se da en la parcela en litis en la que de acuerdo a las probanzas aportadas existe un importante sector de bosque. Ante esta situación, lo procedente es que tanto el Instituto como los adjudicatarios respetaran dicho recurso y no hicieran cambios de uso, pues les es aplicable toda la normativa ambiental, sin que resulte excluida solo por formar parte de un programa de asignación de tierras por parte de un ente cuyos fines son la producción y la distribución de tierras. De acuerdo a ello, no podría catalogarse de "abandono" la actitud pasiva de los adjudicatarios al no destinar ese sector a la agricultura, como lo señala el representante de éstos en la apelación; sin embargo, no se considera esa haya sido la apreciación del Instituto en la resolución recurrida. El enfoque que el ente expone al hacer alusión al abandono está dirigido a aquel sector de la parcela que en el recurso se admite es de 4 hectáreas destinadas desde el momento de la adjudicación a la actividad ganadera. De ser así, y ante las condiciones impuestas por el Instituto propias de la normativa adjudicatarios dejar esa parte de la parcela en lo que él cataloga de "posesión pasiva" queriendo asimilarlo al interés de que se generara con el paso del tiempo en un proceso de regeneración natural, a menos que contara con el visto bueno de la Institución. De acuerdo a las condiciones impuestas en ese tipo de contratos, según los cuales las adjudicaciones de parcelas se hacen para que éstas constituyan el medio de subsistencia de personas o familias que no tienen acceso a propiedad privada, debieron los adjudicatarios a fin de cumplir con las mismas, ocuparse de mantener la actividad agrícola o ganadera que parte del terreno tenía, lo cual en efecto no se hizo y es admitido por el recurrente en la apelación al indicar que desde que se generó la adjudicación sus representados se ocuparon de ejercer una posesión que catalogan de pasiva. Así mismo, es importante aclarar que de acuerdo a los alcances del término de "desarrollo sostenible" que utiliza la Sala Constitucional en la resolución parcialmente descrita, es posible en este caso que los adjudicatarios mantuvieran la actividad agraria existente en la parte de la parcela que no tenía bosque, cumpliendo así con los fines de la Institución, siempre y cuando respetaran la parte que aún conservaba árboles. De toda forma, no consta en autos gestión alguna de los adjudicatarios tendiente a que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía los tuviera como beneficiarios del programa de servicios ambientales mediante el cual sus medios de subsistencia se vieran incrementados, ante el alegato de éstos en el sentido de que la escasa área que sí podían destinar a la actividad agraria no les permitía desarrollar ésta en forma rentable. Los argumentos expuestos en torno a la existencia de animales salvajes propios de áreas con bosque, existentes en esa zona, que podrían poner en amenaza la vida de los semovientes no es suficiente para tener por justificado el abandonar la actividad agraria y dejar que ese pequeño sector se convirtiera en bosque secundario. Ciertamente, los testigos ofrecidos por los administrados, señores Vicente Granda Obando y Agripino Montegro Martínez, de manera idéntica declararon que el señor José Joaquín Calderón, sin citar a la adjudicataria, tenía destinada la parcela a pastizales pero los dejó para que se convirtieran en tacotal manteniendo los carriles de las colindancias (folios 25 y 23), lo cual en principio podría considerarse es loable su actitud de conservar los recursos naturales. En realidad no lo es así para este Tribunal, pues no constan elementos objetivos suficientes para concluir eso. Nótese, el primer deponente cita que el señor Calderón "... hace tiempo había sacado un plan de manejo de la montaña." (folio 25), el cual no fue aportado como prueba. La existencia de ese plan de manejo, lejos de ser considera una afectación a los recursos naturales, hubiera permitido concluir que protegiendo el bosque existente, uno de los adjudicatarios hizo trámites para incrementar sus ganancias mediante la obtención de recursos económicos para asegurar su subsistencia pero no se acredito se hiciera ese trámite lo cual es relevante pues los adjudicatarios debieron acreditar que sus omisiones realmente eran intencionales y no actos de abandono. Al no aportarse prueba, y estando ahí el bosque, en el mejor de los casos se puede concluir que se pretendía proteger el bosque; pero eso no es suficiente para separarse de la conclusión a la que arribó el IDA en el sentido de que la parcela estaba en abandono, pues la parte que se pudo haber explotado agrariamente, de manera acorde con el desarrollo sostenible, se han convertido en tacotales. Respecto a éstos, tampoco cabe la justificación del representante de los adjudicatarios, menos aún lo dicho por los testigos en el sentido de que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía no permitiría la explotación de los mismos, puesto que es hasta cierto nivel de desarrollo de la vegetación que crece mediante un proceso de regeneración natural puede catalogarse como de tacotales, el cual para que llegue a esa madurez requiere de una evidente actitud pasiva de los adjudicatarios, la cual se traduce como abandono en este caso en particular pues era un sector de la parcela dedicado a la actividad agraria, siendo ese el fin que debió mantenerse en la parcela para ser conteste con las condiciones que mediaron en la adjudicación, al ser éste un contrato especial en esta materia. Diferente hubiera sido la situación si los adjudicatarios hubieran demostrado en autos, contaban con el visto bueno de la Institución para que, al momento en que se generó la adjudicación, éstos dejaran la parcela en proceso de regeneración natural sin explotación agraria alguna, o bien, que aún cuando se hizo la asignación, ésta en su totalidad era de bosque en cuyo caso un cambio de uso hubiera contravenido la normativa forestal vigente. La situación actual de la parcela, con gran parte de bosque y un sector de tacotales o de bosque secundario deberá ser definida por la Institución conforme a su destino, respetando la normativa ambiental, luego de la firmeza de esta resolución, bajo su responsabilidad, de conformidad con lo expuesto por la Sala Constitucional en la resolución citada. Esa decisión es ajena al Tribunal en la medida de que lo que interesa determinar es si en efecto medio abandono por parte de los adjudicatarios. Sobre esto último, lo resuelto por el IDA es compartido en esta Sede por las razones apuntadas líneas atrás, aunado al hecho de que el propio José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla al declarar ante el IDA como parte del procedimiento administrativo admitió el estado de abandono en que dejó la parcela en general por muchos años:"... Que hace aproximadamente casi doce años que me vine del lugar, fue a inicios del año 1994 ... le daba permiso a un vecino para que tuviera ganado ahí, yo le regalaba el pasto, y él a cambio de vez en cuando limpiaba las rondas, otras veces lo hacía yo o le pagaba a alguien para que lo hiciera. ... Debido a que alquilé la finca de Rancho Quemado es que tuve que venirme de ahí." (folio 18). Por esa razón tampoco se considera la inspección de campo realizada por personeros del Instituto no responda a la realidad.- V.- Por lo expuesto, en lo apelado deberá confirmarse la resolución apelada. De oficio, ha de reconocerse el derecho de los adjudicatarios de que el IDA les reconozca las mejoras necesarias y útiles que éstos demuestren haber introducido a la parcela, de conformidad con el artículo 66 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización."