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Res. 00215-2007 Tribunal Agrario · Tribunal Agrario · 14/03/2007
OutcomeResultado
The Agrarian Court upheld the IDA resolution that declared unjustified abandonment of an allocated plot and ordered its revocation, because the required agricultural activity was not maintained in the non-forested portion of the property.El Tribunal Agrario confirmó la resolución del IDA que declaró el abandono injustificado de una parcela adjudicada y ordenó su revocatoria, por no haberse mantenido la actividad agropecuaria requerida en la parte no boscosa del predio.
SummaryResumen
The Agrarian Court upheld the revocation and annulment of an IDA plot allocation title due to unjustified abandonment, in a case where the allocatees claimed their agricultural inactivity was an 'ecological possession' aimed at conserving existing forest. The Court distinguished between the forested part of the property, which must be protected under environmental law, and the 4 hectares originally allocated for cattle ranching, which the allocatees left unexploited without authorization, resulting in secondary forest. It held that IDA allocation contracts obligate the maintain agricultural activity in non-forested areas, so passivity in that sector did constitute abandonment, absent the institution's approval to cease production. The Court rejected 'passive possession' as a defense, emphasizing that while sustainable development allows balancing conservation with production, the allocatees failed to prove they had sought environmental services program support or shown their omission was intentional rather than simple neglect.El Tribunal Agrario confirmó la revocatoria y nulidad de un título de adjudicación de una parcela del IDA por abandono injustificado, en un caso donde los adjudicatarios alegaron que su inactividad agraria constituía una 'posesión ecológica' destinada a conservar el bosque existente. El Tribunal distinguió entre la parte boscosa del predio, que debe ser protegida conforme a la normativa ambiental, y las 4 hectáreas que habían sido originalmente destinadas a ganadería, las cuales los adjudicatarios dejaron de explotar sin autorización, generando un proceso de regeneración natural que las convirtió en tacotales. Concluyó que la normativa de contratos de adjudicación del IDA obliga a mantener la actividad agraria en las áreas no boscosas, por lo que la pasividad en ese sector sí configuraba abandono, al no haber obtenido el 'visto bueno' institucional para detener la explotación. Rechazó la 'posesión pasiva' como eximente, señalando que aunque el desarrollo sostenible permite compatibilizar conservación y producción, los adjudicatarios debieron probar gestiones para acogerse a programas de servicios ambientales o al menos demostrar que su omisión era intencional y no un simple descuido.
Key excerptExtracto clave
According to this, the passive attitude of the allocatees in not allocating that sector to agriculture could not be classified as 'abandonment,' as their representative argues in the appeal; however, this is not considered to have been the Institution's assessment in the appealed resolution. The approach the entity presents when alluding to abandonment is directed at that portion of the plot that the appeal admits is 4 hectares allocated from the moment of adjudication to livestock activity. If so, and given the conditions imposed by the Institute under the Land and Colonization Law, it was not an option for the allocatees to leave that part of the plot in what they describe as 'passive possession,' intending it to regenerate naturally over time, unless they had the Institution's approval. Given the lack of evidence, and the forest being there, at best it can be concluded that they intended to protect the forest; but that is insufficient to depart from the IDA's conclusion that the plot was abandoned, since the part that could have been exploited agriculturally, consistently with sustainable development, has turned into secondary forest.De acuerdo a ello, no podría catalogarse de "abandono" la actitud pasiva de los adjudicatarios al no destinar ese sector a la agricultura, como lo señala el representante de éstos en la apelación; sin embargo, no se considera esa haya sido la apreciación del Instituto en la resolución recurrida. El enfoque que el ente expone al hacer alusión al abandono está dirigido a aquel sector de la parcela que en el recurso se admite es de 4 hectáreas destinadas desde el momento de la adjudicación a la actividad ganadera. De ser así, y ante las condiciones impuestas por el Instituto propias de la normativa expuesta en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, no era opción de los adjudicatarios dejar esa parte de la parcela en lo que él cataloga de "posesión pasiva" queriendo asimilarlo al interés de que se generara con el paso del tiempo en un proceso de regeneración natural, a menos que contara con el visto bueno de la Institución. Al no aportarse prueba, y estando ahí el bosque, en el mejor de los casos se puede concluir que se pretendía proteger el bosque; pero eso no es suficiente para separarse de la conclusión a la que arribó el IDA en el sentido de que la parcela estaba en abandono, pues la parte que se pudo haber explotado agrariamente, de manera acorde con el desarrollo sostenible, se han convertido en tacotales.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Ante esta situación, lo procedente es que tanto el Instituto como los adjudicatarios respetaran dicho recurso y no hicieran cambios de uso, pues les es aplicable toda la normativa ambiental, sin que resulte excluida solo por formar parte de un programa de asignación de tierras por parte de un ente cuyos fines son la producción y la distribución de tierras."
"Given this situation, the proper course is for both the Institute and the allocatees to respect that resource and not change land use, since all environmental regulations apply to them, and they are not excluded merely by being part of a land allocation program run by an entity whose purposes are land production and distribution."
Considerando IV
"Ante esta situación, lo procedente es que tanto el Instituto como los adjudicatarios respetaran dicho recurso y no hicieran cambios de uso, pues les es aplicable toda la normativa ambiental, sin que resulte excluida solo por formar parte de un programa de asignación de tierras por parte de un ente cuyos fines son la producción y la distribución de tierras."
Considerando IV
"El enfoque que el ente expone al hacer alusión al abandono está dirigido a aquel sector de la parcela que en el recurso se admite es de 4 hectáreas destinadas desde el momento de la adjudicación a la actividad ganadera."
"The Institution's approach when referring to abandonment is directed at that sector of the plot which the appeal admits is 4 hectares allocated since the moment of adjudication to livestock activity."
Considerando IV
"El enfoque que el ente expone al hacer alusión al abandono está dirigido a aquel sector de la parcela que en el recurso se admite es de 4 hectáreas destinadas desde el momento de la adjudicación a la actividad ganadera."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
"II.- The Court concurs with the list of facts deemed proven in the appealed decision, as they are consistent with the evidence and proceedings contained in the record, and adds the following fact of the same nature: D.- Upon being awarded the parcel, Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla and María Lorelly Morales Figueroa proceeded to lease it to third parties so that they could introduce cattle into the part of the parcel that was not forested; they later discontinued that activity on the property, to such an extent that the area became scrubland or secondary forest (bosque secundario) (statement of José Joaquín Calderón at folio 18 and witness statements of Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez at folios 25 and 23).- III.- Attorney Fabián Jiménez Valverde, special judicial attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial judicial) for María Lorelly Morales Figueroa and Víctor Manuel Calderón Chinchilla, the latter acting as general attorney-in-fact with full powers and no monetary limitation (apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma) for José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla, filed an appeal before the nonhierarchical superior authority (jerarca impropio) against the decision issued by the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, hereinafter IDA, at 10:00 hours on August 8, 2006, in a brief submitted to the regional office of the Dirección Brunca on October 2 of that year (folio 70).
In essence, the appellant argues as follows: After providing an extensive discussion of what he describes as a "retrospective view of the concept of agricultural holding (fundo agrario) and social function (función social)," as well as of the "modern trends" concerning those concepts, and a partial transcription of judgment number 229, issued at 15:00 hours on July 20, 1990, by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, the appellant states that the decision issued by IDA reflects outdated policies concerning the concept of an agricultural holding. He argues that possession of a property suited for agricultural use (fundo con vocación agraria) is no longer the traditional form of active possession, which entails continuous animal or plant production for a social purpose, coupled with the fact that this field also refers to the matter of "possessory interests (posesiones)," some of which are characteristic of "forest reserve" areas.
Accordingly, he states, "ecological possession (posesión ecológica)" must be protected in the case of agricultural land reserves, without ceasing to fulfill the social function sought, "... because although it is no longer the means of supporting a family through agriculture as it was previously, a somewhat more modern social purpose prevails, namely the conservation of a healthy and balanced environment, which takes precedence over any other." (folio 66). Based on the foregoing, he concludes that "... possession of properties suited for agricultural use does not entail only active production activities, since other forms have emerged which, contrary to the foregoing, permit omissive or passive possession (posesión omitiva o pasiva)." (folio 66), additionally citing in support thereof this Court's decision issued at 11:00 hours on April 30, 1998, as well as a doctrinal reference by Costa Rican author Jorge Cabrera Medaglia in the article entitled "Las relaciones entre el derecho Ambiental y del derecho Agrario," published in Revista de Los Tribunales Agrarios number 12, May and August 1996, pages 133 to 135 and 137 to 138.
The appellant contends that conservation entails the provision of an environmental service (servicio ambiental), namely preventing soil erosion that could eventually have negative consequences for production, regulating microclimates, absorbing carbon dioxide to prevent harms associated with global atmospheric warming, including loss of production and damage to ecosystems, maintaining an important genetic reserve for future agricultural improvements, and enabling enjoyment of services derived from protected areas, among others. The foregoing discussion, which has been summarized in the cited lines, serves as the basis for the appellant's conclusion that the possession exercised by his principals over the property was incorrectly assessed in this case. He contends that both the witness evidence and the field inspections established that most of the property consists of mountainous land covered by primary forest (bosque primario), of whose total area only 4 hectares are suitable for agricultural use, particularly cattle raising.
Nevertheless, he states, "... The possessory acts (actos posesorios) of my principals have consisted of conserving the land in its entirety. At one point, they faced the choice between conserving the primary forest, which covers some thirty hectares and consists of a range of wild flora and fauna native to the area and worthy of conservation, including endangered animal species ... or sacrificing it in favor of cattle production, which, it should be noted, is unlikely because of the physical conditions of the land and the presence of wild animals that pose a serious danger to livestock ... in the area where cattle raising could have been carried out on a minimal scale, there are two streams with a fairly significant flow, and they therefore merit special protection ..." (folio 61). He objects to the field inspection on the ground that it is "... deficient, perfunctory, and inconsistent" (folio 61), since it characterizes as abandonment such circumstances as the property's excellent state of conservation and the fact that it is properly demarcated by cleared boundary paths.
Regarding the witness evidence, he states that both Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montenegro Martínez testified consistently with the foregoing, in the sense that his principals' possession of the property has been passive since IDA awarded them the parcel because they considered conservation of the natural resources more beneficial. He argues that abandonment is not established because it presupposes an absence of possessory acts, as though the parcel had become "... no man's land ..." (folio 59), which he believes did not occur in this case because the local residents themselves know that the land belongs to his principals.- IV.- The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario initiated this administrative proceeding on the ground of unjustified abandonment (abandono injustificado), which is governed by Article 68, subsection 4), paragraph b). On appeal, the awardees' representative maintains that, from the time IDA assigned them the parcel, they faced the choice of using it for agricultural activities or protecting its natural resources and chose conservation, including conservation of the 4 hectares that they state had been intended for cattle raising.
Regarding sustainable development (desarrollo sostenible), particularly on farms awarded by IDA, the Sala Constitucional stated in Voto Nº 1763, issued at 16:45 hours on April 13, 1994: "PROTECTION OF A HEALTHY AND BALANCED ENVIRONMENT: As relevant to this matter, namely the protection of environmental rights, this Chamber stated in the aforementioned decision number 3705-93: "Before addressing the strictly substantive considerations, the Chamber considers it important to develop a general analysis establishing the constitutional framework and the circumstances and interests now giving rise to environmental conservation, since the study thereof is a development of this past century. It is essential to recall that for many centuries humankind believed that it should dominate the forces of nature and place them at its service, since natural resources were considered, to some extent, inexhaustible and industrialization was deemed a desirable objective per se, without assessing the impact that economic activity would have on the environment.
Indeed, the distinction between renewable and nonrenewable natural resources is modern, since even economics, which concerns itself with managing the surroundings in order to maximize the satisfaction of human needs with limited resources, did not incorporate environmental depletion and deterioration as a tool of economic analysis until very recently... The environment must therefore be understood as a development resource to be used appropriately, requiring an integrated approach to its natural, sociocultural, technological, and political relationships; otherwise, its productivity is degraded for the present and the future, and the heritage of future generations could be placed at risk. The origins of environmental problems are complex and reflect an interaction between natural and social processes within the model of socioeconomic development adopted by the country. Environmental problems arise, for example, when methods of exploiting natural resources cause ecosystems to deteriorate beyond their capacity for regeneration, resulting in harm to broad sectors of the population and generating substantial environmental and social costs that lead to a decline in quality of life; indeed, the primary objective of using and protecting the environment is to achieve development and progress favorable to human beings.
Environmental quality is a fundamental parameter of that quality of life; other parameters of no less importance are health, food, employment, housing, education, and so forth. More important, however, is to understand that although human beings have the right to use the environment for their own development, they also have a duty to protect and preserve it for present and future generations. This is not particularly novel, because it is merely the application to this subject matter of the principle of 'injury (lesión),' already well established in ordinary law, under which the lawful exercise of a right has two essential limits: on the one hand, the equal rights of others and, on the other, the rational exercise and beneficial enjoyment of the right itself..." III.- This Chamber has also recognized that both the right to health and the right to an environment free from pollution, without which the former could not be made effective, are fundamental rights; the State is therefore obligated to protect them, whether through general policies intended to achieve that purpose or through specific acts by the Administration.
Sustainable development is one of those general policies established by the State to broaden the opportunities for everyone to fulfill their aspirations for a better life by increasing productive capacity or expanding the possibilities of achieving equitable progress between population growth, or between such growth and natural systems. Sustainable development is the process of transformation in the use of resources, the direction of investments, the channeling of technological development, institutional changes, and everything else that contributes to meeting present and future human needs.
IV.Although it is true that the respondent authorities assert that the project for the subdivision (parcelación) of the lands of the property known as Salinas II—acquired by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario on veintitrés de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete—which are encompassed by the Área Protectora de Tivives, pursuant to the terms of Decreto Ejecutivo número 17023 del seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis, complies with the law even after those regulations entered into force, first, because that property cannot be deemed to have become part of the State Forest Estate (patrimonio forestal del Estado) until the autonomous institution they represent has been compensated in the corresponding amount so that the property may be deemed expropriated, and second, because they have always had authorization from the Dirección General Forestal to carry out the agricultural, livestock, or forestry activities established in artículo 3 del Decreto número 17023, which declares the territories comprising the Mata de Limón and Tivives mangroves, as well as the remnant of tropical dry forest located on the Hoja Cartográfica de Barranca, to be a Protected Zone (Zona Protectora); the argument put forward by the respondent entity is invalid because, under artículos 32 y 34 de la Ley Forestal, the State Forest Estate consists of all forests and forestlands within national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its name, and those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other agencies of the Public Administration.
Consequently, no agency of the Public Administration—centralized or decentralized—may expropriate, exchange, transfer, or dispose of under any title, deliver, or lease rural lands owned or administered by it unless they have first been classified by the Dirección General Forestal; if that Directorate considers them suitable for forestry, they shall immediately be incorporated into the State Forest Estate. Therefore, if Decreto número 17023 affected part of the property acquired at the time by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the terms of those regulations, as well as the cited articles of the Ley Forestal, apply immediately, and the respondent entity is not authorized to disregard them on the grounds that no purchase process involving the corresponding compensation has taken place. Thus, from the moment the repeatedly cited Decreto entered into force, the lands of the Salinas II property affected by the Zona de Conservación de Tivives automatically became part of the State Forest Estate; these are rules of immediate application.
Accordingly, from that moment onward, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario was barred from disposing of those lands and continuing the subdivision project, except with respect to any awards (adjudicaciones) agreed upon before the promulgation of the land, since in that event the beneficiaries’ parcels must be purchased or expropriated unless, at the request of the Dirección General Forestal, their owners agree to submit to the corresponding forestry regime (régimen forestal) (artículo 37 párrafo 2 de la Ley Forestal). Awards granted by the respondent institution after the cited Decreto entered into force concerning lands encompassed by the Tivives natural conservation zone are invalid because, since that date—seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis—the institution has lacked authority to dispose freely of those properties, as their administration falls to the Dirección General Forestal, in coordination with the Municipalidad de Esparza and the Centros Agrícolas: Regional Pacífico Central y Cantonal de Esparza.
Accordingly, permits granted by the Directorate to conduct agricultural activities in those territories do not constitute authorization to transfer or lease them, nor do they create any real property right (derecho real) in the property in favor of the concessionaire (artículo 41 de la Ley Forestal). In other words, the respondent authority cannot exempt itself from mandatory compliance with the rules declaring the automatic incorporation into the State Forest Estate of properties classified as suitable for forestry, since those provisions apply immediately due to the public interest embodied in their purpose: the conservation of natural resources through their sustainable and rational use (artículo 1 de la Ley Forestal). Therefore, all awards granted after seis de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis up to the present are null and void because lands subject to forest protection were improperly disposed of.
V.If the respondent authorities believe that artículo 34 de la Ley Forestal is contrary to the Constitution because it provides, without justification, that lands owned by a Public Administration agency automatically become part of the State Forest Estate from the moment they are declared suitable for forestry and, consequently, of public interest for conservation, without any compensation being paid to that agency, they must raise that claim through the corresponding constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), since review of the constitutionality of laws is not exercised through an amparo proceeding (amparo), but through the procedural avenue previously indicated. ...”
Of the foregoing, the Chamber’s binding statement regarding sustainable development is particularly relevant: if the parcel contains forest, that forest must be respected; consequently, neither that entity nor the allottees (adjudicatarios) may avoid applying the regulations concerning the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), of which the parcel becomes a part by virtue of its nature. On this latter point, reference may be made to Opinión Jurídica de la Procuraduría General de la República Nº 129-2002 del 12 de setiembre del 2002, which, although not binding on this body, is relevant because it states that the allottee must protect the environment jointly with the IDA. The analysis in this case shall be limited to the matters challenged, since the legal implications concerning whether this parcel may form part of the State Natural Heritage and, consequently, whether its administration does not necessarily belong to that entity must be resolved in another forum and through a different type of proceeding.
It is important to highlight the Chamber’s statement regarding the possibility that these parcels contained forest at the time of the award, as is the case with the parcel at issue, where, according to the evidence submitted, a significant forested area exists. In this situation, both the Instituto and the allottees were required to respect that resource and refrain from making land-use changes (cambios de uso), since all environmental regulations apply to them and are not excluded merely because the parcel forms part of a land-allocation program administered by an entity whose purposes are production and land distribution. Accordingly, the allottees’ passive conduct in not devoting that area to agriculture could not be classified as “abandonment,” as their representative asserts in the appeal; however, this does not appear to have been the Instituto’s assessment in the challenged decision.
In referring to abandonment, the entity’s position concerns the portion of the parcel that, as acknowledged in the appeal, consists of 4 hectáreas devoted to livestock activity since the time of the award. If that is so, and given the conditions imposed by the Instituto under the regulations set forth in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, the allottees did not have the option of leaving that part of the parcel under what their representative describes as “passive possession,” seeking to equate it with an intention that, over time, it undergo a process of natural regeneration, unless they had the Institution’s approval. Under the conditions imposed in contracts of this kind, pursuant to which parcels are awarded so that they may provide a means of subsistence for individuals or families without access to private property, the allottees were required, in order to comply with those conditions, to maintain the agricultural or livestock activity previously conducted on part of the land.
They did not do so, as the appellant admits in the appeal by stating that, since the award was made, the persons he represents engaged in what they describe as passive possession. It is also important to clarify that, under the meaning of “sustainable development” used by the Sala Constitucional in the decision partially described above, the allottees could have continued the existing agricultural activity on the portion of the parcel that was not forested, thereby fulfilling the Institution’s purposes, provided that they respected the portion that still retained trees. In any event, the record contains no application by the allottees seeking recognition by the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía as beneficiaries of the environmental services program (programa de servicios ambientales), through which their means of subsistence could have been increased, despite their claim that the small area they could devote to agricultural activity did not allow them to conduct it profitably.
The arguments concerning the presence in the area of wild animals characteristic of forested areas, which could endanger the livestock, are insufficient to justify abandoning agricultural activity and allowing that small area to become secondary forest (bosque secundario). It is true that the witnesses presented by the private parties, Vicente Granda Obando and Agripino Montegro Martínez, identically testified that José Joaquín Calderón, without mentioning the female allottee, had devoted the parcel to pastureland but left it so that it would become brushland (tacotal), while maintaining the boundary lanes (folios 25 y 23). At first glance, his conduct in conserving natural resources might be considered commendable. In this Tribunal’s view, however, it was not, because the record lacks sufficient objective evidence to support that conclusion. Note that the first witness stated that Mr. Calderón “… hace tiempo había sacado un management plan (plan de manejo) de la montaña.” (folio 25), which was not submitted as evidence.
The existence of that management plan, far from being considered detrimental to natural resources, would have supported the conclusion that, while protecting the existing forest, one of the allottees undertook procedures to increase his income by obtaining financial resources to ensure his subsistence. It was not established, however, that he completed that procedure, which is relevant because the allottees were required to demonstrate that their omissions were genuinely intentional and not acts of abandonment. Because no evidence was submitted and the forest remains there, it may at best be concluded that the intention was to protect the forest; but that is insufficient to depart from the IDA’s conclusion that the parcel had been abandoned, since the portion that could have been used for agricultural purposes in a manner consistent with sustainable development has become brushland.
With respect to these areas, neither the justification offered by the representative of the awardees (adjudicatarios), much less the witnesses’ statements that the Ministry of Environment and Energy would not permit their exploitation, is persuasive, since vegetation growing through a process of natural regeneration (regeneración natural) can be classified as scrubland (tacotales) only once it has reached a certain level of development. For it to reach that maturity requires an evident passive attitude on the part of the awardees, which in this particular case amounts to abandonment, because it was a sector of the plot (parcela) devoted to agricultural activity, and that was the purpose that should have been maintained on the plot in order to remain consistent with the conditions governing the award (adjudicación), since this is a special contract in this field. The situation would have been different if the awardees had demonstrated in the record that they had the Institution’s approval, at the time the award was made, to leave the plot undergoing natural regeneration without any agricultural exploitation; or if, when the allocation was made, the entire plot had consisted of forest, in which case a land-use change (cambio de uso) would have contravened the applicable forestry regulations.
The current condition of the plot, with a large area of forest and a sector of scrubland or secondary forest (bosque secundario), must be addressed by the Institution in accordance with its designated use, while complying with environmental regulations, once this decision becomes final, under its responsibility and in accordance with the Constitutional Chamber’s holding in the cited decision. That determination is outside the Tribunal’s purview insofar as the relevant issue is whether the awardees did in fact abandon the property. As to this latter issue, this Tribunal agrees with the IDA’s decision for the reasons stated above, together with the fact that José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla himself, when testifying before the IDA as part of the administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo), admitted that he had left the plot generally abandoned for many years: “... It has been almost twelve years since I left the place; it was at the beginning of 1994 ...
I gave a neighbor permission to keep cattle there; I gave him the grass, and in exchange he would occasionally clear the firebreaks (rondas); at other times I did it myself or paid someone to do it. ... I had to leave because I leased the farm in Rancho Quemado.” (folio 18). For that reason, there is likewise no basis for finding that the field inspection (inspección de campo) conducted by Institute personnel did not reflect the actual conditions.- V.- For the foregoing reasons, insofar as appealed, the appealed decision must be affirmed. On its own motion (de oficio), the awardees’ right to have the IDA compensate them for any necessary and useful improvements (mejoras necesarias y útiles) that they prove they made to the plot must be recognized, pursuant to Article 66 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización.”
"II.- El Tribunal comparte el elenco de hechos tenidos por probados en la resolución recurrida al ser acordes con las probanzas y tramitación constantes en autos, adicionándose de tal naturaleza lo siguiente: D.- Que Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla y María Lorelly Morales Figueroa, al adjudicárseles la parcela, procedieron a alquilar a terceras personas para que introdujeran ganado en la parte de ésta que no tenía bosque, y luego, descontinuaron dicha actividad en el fundo a tal punto que ese sector se convirtió en tacotales o bosque secundario (declaración de José Joaquín Calderón de folio 18 y declaraciones testimoniales de Vicente Granda Obando y Agripino Montenegro Martínez de folios 25 y 23).- III.- El licenciado Fabián Jiménez Valverde, apoderado especial judicial de María Lorelly Morales Figueroa y de Víctor Manuel Calderón Chinchilla, actuando este último como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de José Joaquín Calderón Chinchilla, interpuso recurso de apelación ante el jerarca impropio contra la resolución dictada por la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en adelante IDA, a las 10 horas del 8 de agosto del 2006, en memorial presentado a la sede regional de la Dirección Brunca el 2 de octubre del citado año (folio 70).
En lo medular, alega el recurrente: Luego de hacer una amplia exposición de lo que cataloga es una "visión retrospectiva del concepto de fundo agrario y función social" así como de las "tendencias modernas" de tales conceptos, y una transcripción parcial de la sentencia número 229 de las 15 horas del 20 de julio de 1990 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el recurrente señala que la resolución dictada por el IDA responde a las políticas desfazadas sobre el concepto de fundo agrario. Argumenta que la posesión sobre un fundo con vocación agraria ya no es la tradicional forma de posesión activa, que implica la producción animal o vegetal constante con el fin social, aunado al hecho de que en esta materia también se hace alusión al tema de "las posesiones" algunas de ellas propias de las zonas de "reserva forestal". Por ello dice, debe tutelarse la "posesión ecológica" cuando se trata de reservas de fundos agrarios sin dejar de cumplir con la función social que se busca "... pues aunque ya no es el sostén de una familia a raíz de la agricultura como era anteriormente, impera un fin social un poco más moderno, el cual es la conservación de un ambiente sano y equilibrado el cual se sobrepone a cualquier otro." (folio 66).
Con fundamento en lo anterior, concluye que "... la posesión sobre fundos con vocación agrarios (sic), no implica solamente los ejercicios activos de producción, pues otras modalidades han surgido, que a contrariedad de lo anterior permiten una posesión omitiva (sic) o pasiva." (folio 66), citando como argumento adicional de esto último lo resuelto por este Tribunal en resolución de las 11 horas del 30 de abril de 1998, así como una referencia doctrinaria del escritor nacional Jorge Cabrera Medaglia en el artículo titulado "Las relaciones entre el derecho Ambiental y del derecho Agrario" publicado en la Revista de Los Tribunales Agrarios número 12 de mayo y agosto de 1996, páginas 133 a 135 y 137 a 138. Aduce el recurrente que la conservación implica la prestación de un servicio ambiental cual es evitar la erosión de los suelos que eventualmente tendrá consecuencias negativas para la producción, regular microclimas, absorver dióxido de carbono para evitar los perjuicios vinculados al calentamiento global de la atmósfera, entre ellos la pérdida de producción y la afectación de los ecosistemas, el mantenimiento de una reserva genética de importancia para futuros mejoramientos agrícolas, la posibilidad de disfrutar de servicios provenientes de áreas protegidas, entre otros.
La anterior exposición, que ha sido sintetizada a las líneas citadas, sirve de base para el recurrente a fin de concluir se dio en este caso una incorrecta apreciación de la posesión ejercida por sus representados en el fundo. Aduce, fue acreditado tanto por la prueba testimonial como por las inspecciones de campo que el inmueble en su mayor parte está constituido por montaña compuesta por bosque primario, de cuya área total sólo 4 hectáreas son susceptibles de explotación agrícola, especialmente para cría de ganado. No obstante señala, "... Los actos posesorios por parte de mis representados han consistido en conservar el terreno en su totalidad. Pues en cierto momento se presento (sic) la disyuntiva entre conservar el bosque primario que asciende a unas treinta hectáreas, compuesto por una gama de flora y fauna salvaje propios de la zona y dignos de conservación que incluso abarca especies de animales en peligro de extinción ... o sacrificarlo en pro de la producción ganadera, que valga decirles poco probable por las condiciones físicas del terreno y la presencia de animal salvaje de alto peligro para el ganado ... en la zona en la cual se pudo haber explotado de manera mínima la crianza de ganado, existen dos quebradas las cuales cuentan con un afluente bastante importante, por lo que merece una especial protección ..." (folio 61).Objeta de la inspección de campo el hecho de que es "... pobre, complaciente e inconsistente" (folio 61) dado que califica de estado de abandono aspectos tales como el perfecto estado de conservación y que el fundo está debidamente deslindado mediante carriles.
En cuanto a la testimonial señala, tanto Vicente Granda Obando como Agripino Montenegro Martínez declararon de manera acorde con lo expuesto en el sentido de que la posesión de sus representados sobre el fundo ha sido pasiva desde que el IDA les adjudicó la parcela pues consideraron es más beneficiosa la conservación de los recursos naturales. Alega, no se configura el abandono pues éste supone la ausencia de actos posesivos como si la parcela pasara a "... ser tierra de nadie ..." (folio 59) lo cual considera no se da en este caso pues los vecinos mismos de la localidad conocen que el terreno le pertenece sus representados.- IV.- El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario dio inicio a este proceso administrativo por la causal de abandono injustificado, la cual se encuentra regulada en el artículo 68 inciso
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