Labor Rights Prescription and Employment Relationship Nature in Public EmploymentPrescripción de derechos laborales y naturaleza del vínculo en el empleo público

II.The legal institution of negative or liberatory prescription (prescripción negativa o liberatoria) is provided as one of the modes of extinguishing obligations by the passage of time, without the holder of the right having claimed it by exercising the respective action. It is only admitted in the cases established by law, and is not susceptible to extension by private parties. For purposes of resolving the matter raised, the Constitutional Chamber's Vote No. 5969, of 3:21 p.m., November 16, 1993, is relevant; through it, it was ordered that, by reason of the different position of the parties in the employment contract, due to the subordination relationship of the worker with respect to the employer, no statute of limitations or any other term of any other nature that may imply a waiver of rights on his part can run until the employment relationship ends. In that pronouncement, it was expressly stated: "The Chamber ... considers that article 602 is generic for all the rights of the parties linked to the employment relationship, whether they arise from it or are incorporated into it expressly or implicitly, even if they are not available to the parties and are imposed on them by law, whereby the prescription of article 607 would only be marginally applicable –save special provision to the contrary– according to its express text, to the rights of employers and workers not linked to a subjective relationship or employment contract ...". And it added: "The Chamber concludes that, given its impossibility of legislating, establishing a norm more in line with social justice and the guarantee of labor rights, it must choose between leaving the worker's rights indefinitely claimable or resorting to the less burdensome norm. The first solution is not feasible, since the unconstitutionality of prescription per se is not advocated here, but rather it is a matter of adapting it to the reasonable needs and limits of satisfaction and protection of the worker's rights, given that, moreover, its inalienability (irrenunciabilidad) must be understood as not only formal and express, but also substantial, referring to any form of extinction that is based on or presupposes, as in the case of short statutes of limitations, a tacit waiver or abandonment." That resolution was clarified on several occasions, namely, through votes numbers 280-I-94 of 2:33 p.m., June 7, 1994, in the sense that the declared unconstitutionality is applicable to public servants, in the absence of provisions with the rank of formal law to the contrary regulating prescription in other matters; 78-I-96 of 2:30 p.m., February 20, 1996, establishing that the defined scope had the purpose of preserving the value "legal certainty (seguridad jurídica)" regarding prescriptions that had taken effect and been formally declared, but it did not apply to rights on which no express jurisdictional or administrative pronouncement had been made, before or after July 14, 1992, in which case the prescription would occur once six months had elapsed after the termination of the employment relationship. This last resolution, in turn, was clarified through No. 308-I-97 of 2:32 p.m., July 15, 1997, in which it was established that the word "after" was deleted from its operative part. In accordance with the foregoing, we have that the labor rights of workers in both the private and public sectors –save special legal provision to the contrary– prescribe based on the provisions of article 602 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo); that is, six months after the termination of the employment relationship. In addition to the above, this Chamber has made it clear that it is not possible to apply the prescription periods contemplated in the Civil Code (Código Civil) when the labor regulations contain express norms, and that matters pertaining to general aspects are governed by the provisions of said Code, provided there is no incompatibility with what is established in the Labor Code; for article 601 expressly states that "The computation, suspension, interruption and other aspects relating to prescription shall be governed, insofar as there is no incompatibility with this Code, by what the Civil Code provides on those aspects." (see, among others, votes numbers 172 of 3:50 p.m., September 3, 1986 and 242 of 9:50 a.m., May 28, 2003). According to that norm, for the computation, suspension, interruption, and other aspects relating to prescription, the norms contained in the Civil Code must be applied, insofar as there is no incompatibility with the provisions of that normative body. It has been reiterated in many pronouncements that the interruption of negative prescription can be made, in accordance with article 876, subsection 2, of the Civil Code, by the acknowledgment the debtor makes of the obligation, in favor of the creditor, by the judicial summons, seizure or attachment notified to the debtor or, according to numeral 879 ibidem, by any judicial or extrajudicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation, from which it follows that the claim in administrative venue aimed at satisfying the rights sought constitutes a fact capable of interrupting that period provided by article 602, as it is a collection action for the fulfillment of the obligation. On the other hand, the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted and the judicial one expedited, after fifteen business days from the date of filing the claim (subsection a) of article 402 of the Labor Code, without the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber in its Vote number 3669-06, of 3:00 p.m., March 15, 2006, and Law number 8520 of June 20, 2006, having to be taken into account for the resolution of the case, as they are subsequent to the date of the facts of interest). It is an undisputed fact that the relationship came to an end as of May 31, 2002. On the following September 25, when the indicated prescription period (six months) had not yet taken effect, she filed an administrative claim aimed at exhausting that channel (folios 7 to 9). As stated, this channel must have been deemed exhausted fifteen business days later, a moment from which the six-month period began to run. It must be taken into consideration that, unlike the institution of suspension of prescription, its interruption renders the time previously elapsed useless, starting to be computed again. In this order of ideas, the filing of the lawsuit on January 30, 2003, was done in time, since, as of that date, said period had not been completed. It must be taken into account that what was resolved in the cited Vote 786, of 2:00 p.m., September 16, 2005, based on other precedents of this same body, does not have the scope intended by the appellant. That ruling did not analyze, much less deny, interruptive effects on the prescription to the action of exhausting the administrative channel; it merely analyzed the consequences of the absence of said action from a procedural standpoint; highlighting that the filing of the lawsuit interrupts the prescription regardless of whether that channel was exhausted.

III.It is not perceived that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the labor nature that bound the parties is contradictory and illegal. Regarding the first point, although it is true that in Considerando 5 it was mentioned that the provision of "professional services (servicios profesionales)" for more than one year becomes a hiring for an indefinite period under the protection of article 26 of the Labor Code; it is evident that the term was not used in a strict sense, i.e., alluding that the hiring had a civil nature, quite the opposite, it is clear that the analysis was made precisely to recognize the labor nature of the relationship, and that "professional services" was alluded to as a general description of the tasks that Ms. [Nombre1] performed. Regarding the second point, the Chamber has no doubt whatsoever that the relationship was labor-related. To determine the existence of an employment relationship we must adhere to the provisions of articles 2, 4 and 18, all of the Labor Code, which are transcribed below: "Article 2.- An employer is any natural or legal person, private or under Public Law, who uses the services of one or others, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective." "Article 4.- A worker is any natural person who provides to another or others their material, intellectual, or both types of services, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective." And, "Article 18.- An individual employment contract, whatever its denomination may be, is any contract in which a person undertakes to provide their services to another or to execute a work for them, under the permanent dependency and immediate or delegated direction of the latter, and for remuneration of any kind or form. The existence of this contract is presumed between the worker who provides their services and the person who receives them." Three characterizing elements of that relationship have been distinguished, namely: the personal rendering of the service, remuneration, and legal subordination (subordinación jurídica). As the first two are also present in other types of contracts, doctrinally and jurisprudentially, recourse has been made to the third element –legal subordination– as a distinguishing criterion, understood as the employer's power to give orders to the employee and discipline their faults, as well as to direct the tasks. This element has been defined as a state of limitation of the worker's autonomy due to the employer's power to direct and give orders regarding the tasks to be performed and their correlative obligation to obey them (CABANELLAS (Guillermo), Contrato de Trabajo, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1963, pp. 239 and 243). That is, labor subordination implicitly involves a series of powers that the employer can exercise over the worker, which are: the power to command, the inspection power, the directive power, and the disciplinary power (on this point, see the votes of this Chamber numbers 268, of 8:00 a.m., December 13, 1991; 25, of 9:00 a.m., January 24, 1992; 392, of 10:40 a.m., November 25, 1994; 235, of 10:40 a.m., October 18, 1996; 382, of 9:50 a.m., November 29, 1996; 30, of 3:40 p.m., February 12, 1997 and; 390, of 10:20 a.m., August 7, 2002). Now then, the cited numeral 18 establishes an iuris tantum presumption in favor of the labor nature of the relationship of the person who provides their services and the person who receives them. In application of article 414 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), pursuant to the provisions of numeral 452 of the Labor Code, every legal presumption exempts the party invoking it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue thereof. Nevertheless, whoever invokes it is obliged to prove the facts that serve as its basis, namely, the personal rendering of the services. It is true, as invoked in the appeal, that the plaintiff was hired following the procedures for contracting for professional services. Thus, the contested judgment held the following facts as proven, which have not been challenged in this instance: that through service order No. 150707, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant as of July 16, 1997, for an eight-month period to carry out judicial collection management tasks; that the contract was extended for four more months performing the same tasks and continued to be extended until completing a service period of four years, ten months, and fourteen days. However, it must be taken into consideration that the principle of legality under the protection of which the Administration must act (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), cannot be invoked as a basis to legitimize evident acts contrary to law and defrauding private interests. That is, it cannot be accepted from any point of view that, regardless of the reality of the contracts, the name given by the Administration to a given relationship is sufficient to deny true workers the rights enshrined in the legal system, even with constitutional rank, such as the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía); for, along that path, fraud against the law would be favored, committed by the Administration itself, which, as stated, is always obliged to obey it. In that sense, this Chamber pronounced in Vote No. 669, of 9:40 a.m., November 9, 2001: "It is important to highlight that neither in the private labor sphere, nor in the public one, are employers permitted to denature labor or public service contracts, to diminish the protection of the worker, guaranteed in the Political Constitution. In the public sector, there is no legal authorization to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent in a public labor service contract. In this case, the administrative contracting regime, by itself, does not nullify the presumption of labor nature that has been referred to; since, in the matter at hand, and in this specific case, it is not so much the form that the employer may have wanted to give to the contract that matters, but rather what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed ... It must also be indicated that the State and its institutions have the power to use, in their functioning, legal institutions other than the 'public service contract', when this is not a mechanism to evade the burdens imposed by respect for the labor rights of public servants.- ". On the other hand, it is noted that it was also held as accredited that Mrs. Montero Briceño was appointed to the position of Professional 3, from April 1 to May 30, 2002. Now, the plaintiff was hired to perform tasks related to judicial collection, which, evidently, could not be exceptional, as they are always needed, given the activity carried out by the Institute. In the very answer to the lawsuit, account was given of that need, stating: "… although the need for Judicial Collection is maintained and will be maintained forever, because it is a matter that will always have to exist, since there will always be delinquent clients who must be charged, said activity was subsumed by the professionals of the Institutional Legal Directorate, so it is no longer necessary to resort to Direct Contracting of the professionals who assisted in these proceedings, in addition to the fact that said contracting was no longer authorized by the General Comptrollership of the Republic." Although the form of contracting for professional services was resorted to, the truth is that this in no way, as stated, could have the virtue of determining the nature of the relationship, so much so that shortly before the relationship between the parties ended, she provided the same services, this time, appointed to the position of Professional 3. Neither have the facts held as proven been questioned, according to which Ms. [Nombre1] had a card given to her by the defendant, and although she performed tasks outside the Institute's facilities, she had an office (shared by ten lawyers), which was equipped with a computer, folders, stationery, a photocopier, and pens. The foregoing, far from supporting the appellant's thesis, supports that sustained in the judgment, as it constitutes indicia of labor nature, by being provided with work material and a document identifying her as an official of the Institute; aspects not characteristic of a contracting for professional services, in which, as a general rule, professionals must supply their own work material and are not identified as belonging to the organization of a specific entity. Fundamentally, the appellant is dissatisfied with the resolution, based solely on the formal aspect of the contracting, which is repeated once more, is not sufficient to contradict the presumption of labor nature of the person who provides personal services and the person who benefits from them; as well as invoking the lack of exclusivity and the provision of services outside the Institute's facilities. Regarding the latter, it is important to note that exclusivity is not an indispensable requirement of an employment relationship, nor does the provision of services outside those facilities deny that nature; much less taking into account that in the specific case, due to the functions the plaintiff performed (judicial collection), logically, she had to be moving to attend to pending processes in the courts, apart from the fact that, as indicated, she had an office in the Institute's facilities with various materials to perform her tasks. Likewise, elements denoting subordination are noted, such as subjection to a schedule, which was accepted when the dispute was entered, since, in answering the sixth fact of the lawsuit, it was stated: "Of course the professionals had to comply with an Institution schedule, it was for logical reasons, since the payment arrangements in the collections and the coordinations that had to be made with the Telephone Agencies must be done within the institution's schedule because those are the business hours for the clients …" (folio 35). That response evidences that, indeed, the tasks performed were subject to the institution's organization, that is, they depended on it; without the professional being able to freely determine when and how to carry out their work, which a professional who freely exercises their profession can do, as a general rule. The deponents [Nombre2] and [Nombre3], who were colleagues of the plaintiff, testified about the existence of the schedule; the need to submit monthly reports and follow directives, as well as the issuance of a card as ICE officials. Express mention must be made of what the first stated regarding the orders received: "Although it is true we held the special judicial representation, we were not independent because we were ordered on which processes were collectible or not, we were told from what amount, we were told how to make the commissions and notifications. We were told how to present the reports, the way they had to be done. Besides, they issued us instructions on when to end a process. We did not have the power to reach an arrangement; rather, the power was with the area manager or the judicial collection manager." She also testified that they were required to be available in case they were called; in that sense, upon any call, they had the duty to appear, and, additionally, a copy of each case file had to remain at ICE (folios 124 to 125). For their part, witnesses [Nombre4] and [Nombre5], who work in the defendant's collection management, denied the existence of a schedule and the assignment of a specific place in the defendant's facilities; which contradicts the very answer to the initial pleading (folios 126 and 128 to 129). From the above, it follows that the employer did not manage to rebut the presumption of labor nature that has been mentioned. It must be taken into consideration that the assessment of the labor nature must be done case by case, taking into account its particularities. Hence, Vote number 160, of 10:20 a.m., March 15, 2006, cited by the appellant, apart from not constituting binding jurisprudence, is not sufficient by itself to vary the resolution, because it was based on the study of the characteristics of that other relationship."

In that line of thought, the filing of the complaint on January 30, 2003, was timely, since, as of that date, said term had not yet expired. It must be taken into account that what was resolved in the cited Voto 786, at 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2005, based on other precedents of this same body, does not have the scope intended by the appellant. In that ruling, the interruptive effects of the statute of limitations were neither analyzed nor, much less, denied to the administrative exhaustion process (gestión de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), limiting itself to analyzing the consequences of the absence of said process from a procedural standpoint; highlighting that the filing of the complaint interrupts the statute of limitations regardless of whether said process was exhausted.

**III.-** No contradiction or illegality is perceived in the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the employment nature of the relationship that bound the parties. As to the first point, while it is true that in Considerando 5 it was mentioned that the provision of "*professional services*" (servicios profesionales) for more than one year becomes an indefinite-term contract (contratación por tiempo indefinida) under Article 26 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it is evident that the term was not used in a strict sense, that is, alluding to the contract having a civil nature; quite the contrary, it is clear that the analysis was made precisely to recognize the employment nature (carácter laboral) of the relationship and that reference was made to "*professional services*" (servicios profesionales) as a general description of the tasks that Ms. [Nombre1] performed. As to the second point, this Chamber has not the slightest doubt that the relationship was employment-based. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we must adhere to the provisions of Articles 2, 4, and 18, all of the Labor Code, which are transcribed below: "*Article 2.- Employer (Patrono) is any natural or legal person, private or under Public Law, who employs the services of one or more persons, by virtue of an employment contract (contrato de trabajo), express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective*". "*Article 4.- Worker (Trabajador) is any natural person who provides to another or others their material, intellectual, or both types of services, by virtue of an employment contract (contrato de trabajo), express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective*". And, "*Article 18.- An individual employment contract (Contrato individual de trabajo), whatever its denomination, is any contract in which a person obligates themselves to provide services to another or to execute a work for them, under the permanent dependence and immediate or delegated direction of the latter, and for remuneration of any kind or form. The existence of this contract is presumed between the worker who provides their services and the person who receives them*". Three characterizing elements of that relationship have been distinguished, namely: the personal provision of service, the remuneration, and legal subordination (subordinación jurídica). Since the first two also appear in other types of contracts, doctrinally and jurisprudentially, the third element—legal subordination (subordinación jurídica)—has been used as a distinguishing criterion, understood as the employer's power to give orders to the employee and discipline their faults, as well as to direct the tasks. This element has been defined as a state of limitation of the worker's autonomy due to the employer's power (potestad patronal) to direct and give orders regarding the tasks to be performed and their correlative obligation to obey them (CABANELLAS (Guillermo), Contrato de Trabajo, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1963, pp. 239 and 243). That is, employment subordination implicitly carries a series of powers that the employer can exercise over the worker, which are: the power of command, the power of oversight, the power of direction, and the disciplinary power (on this point, see the rulings of this Chamber numbers 268, at 8:00 a.m., December 13, 1991; 25, at 9:00 a.m., January 24, 1992; 392, at 10:40 a.m., November 25, 1994; 235, at 10:40 a.m., October 18, 1996; 382, at 9:50 a.m., November 29, 1996; 30, at 3:40 p.m., February 12, 1997; and 390, at 10:20 a.m., August 7, 2002). Now, the cited Article 18 establishes a rebuttable presumption (presunción *iuris tantum*) in favor of the employment character (laboralidad) of the relationship between the person who provides their services and the person who receives them. In application of Article 414 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), pursuant to the provisions of Article 452 of the Labor Code, every legal presumption exempts the party asserting it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue of the same. However, the party invoking it is obligated to prove the underlying facts, namely, the personal provision of services. It is true, as invoked in the appeal, that the plaintiff was contracted following the procedures for contracting professional services (servicios profesionales). Thus, the challenged judgment deemed the following facts proven, which have not been questioned in this instance: that through service order No. 150707, the plaintiff was contracted by the defendant starting July 16, 1997, for a period of eight months to perform judicial collection management tasks; that the contract was extended for four more months performing the same tasks and continued to be extended until completing a service period of four years, ten months, and fourteen days. However, it must be taken into consideration that the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) under which the Administration must act (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), cannot be invoked as a basis to legitimize evident acts contrary to the law and defrauding of private interests. That is, it cannot be accepted from any point of view that, regardless of the reality of the contracts, the name given by the Administration to a specific relationship is sufficient to deny true workers the rights enshrined in the legal system, even those with constitutional rank, such as the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía); because, by that path, fraud against the law, committed by the Administration itself, would be favored, an entity that, as stated, is always obligated to abide by it. In that sense, this Chamber pronounced in Voto No. 669, at 9:40 a.m., November 9, 2001: "*It is important to emphasize that neither in the private nor in the public employment sphere are employers permitted to distort employment or public service contracts to reduce the protection guaranteed to the worker in the Political Constitution. In the public sector, there is no legal authorization to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent in a public service employment contract (contratación de servicio público laboral). In this case, the administrative contracting regime, by itself, does not negate the presumption of employment character (presunción de laboralidad) that has been discussed; since, in the matter at hand, and in this specific case, the form that the employer may have wished to give the contract is not as important as what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed upon ... It must also be indicated that the State and its institutions have the power to use, in their operations, legal instruments other than the 'public service contract' when this is not a mechanism for evading the burdens imposed by respect for the labor rights of public servants.-*". On the other hand, it is noted that an appointment of Mrs. Montero Briceño to the position of Professional 3, from April 1 to May 30, 2002, was also deemed accredited. Now, the plaintiff was contracted to perform tasks related to judicial collection, which, evidently, could not be exceptional, as they are always needed, given the activity carried out by the Institute. In the very response to the complaint, this need was reported, stating: "*… even though the need for Judicial Collection remains and will remain forever because it is a matter that will always have to exist, since there will always be delinquent clients who must be collected from, said activity was subsumed by the professionals of the Institutional Legal Directorate, so it is no longer necessary to resort to the Direct Contracting (Contratación Directa) of the professionals who assisted in these procedures, in addition to the fact that said contracting was no longer authorized by the Comptroller General of the Republic*". Although the form of contracting for professional services (servicios profesionales) was used, the truth is that this could in no way, as stated, have the virtue of determining the nature of the relationship, so much so that shortly before the relationship between the parties ended, she provided the same services, this time, appointed to the position of Professional 3. Nor have the facts deemed proven been questioned, according to which Ms. [Nombre1] had an identification card given to her by the defendant and, although she performed tasks outside the Institute's facilities, she had an office (shared by ten lawyers), which was equipped with a computer, folders, stationery, a photocopier, and pens. The foregoing, far from supporting the appellant's thesis, supports the one held in the ruling, as it constitutes evidence of employment character (indicios de laboralidad), by providing her with work material and a document that identified her as an employee of the Institute; aspects that are not typical of a contract for professional services (contratación por servicios profesionales), in which, as a general rule, professionals must provide their own work material and do not identify themselves as belonging to the organization of a specific entity. Fundamentally, the appellant disagrees with the resolution, based solely on the formal aspect of the contract, which is reiterated once more, is not sufficient to contradict the presumption of employment character (presunción de laboralidad) of the one who provides personal services and the person who benefits from them; as well as invoking the lack of exclusivity and the provision of services outside the Institute's facilities. Regarding the latter, it is important to point out that exclusivity is not an indispensable requirement of an employment relationship, nor does the provision of services outside those facilities negate that character; much less taking into account that in the specific case, due to the functions the plaintiff performed (judicial collection), she logically had to be traveling to attend to pending processes in the courts, apart from the fact that, as indicated, she had an office with various materials within the Institute's facilities to perform her tasks. Likewise, elements denoting subordination are observed, such as subjection to a schedule, which was accepted when the litigation was joined, since, when answering the sixth fact of the complaint, it was stated: "*Of course the professionals had to comply with the Institution's schedule, it was for logical reasons, since the payment arrangements in collections and the coordination that had to be done with the Telephone Agencies had to be done within the institution's schedule because those are the business hours (sic) for the clients* …" (folio 35). This response shows that, indeed, the tasks performed were subject to the organization of the institution, that is, they depended on it; without the professional being able to freely determine when and how to carry out their work, something which, as a general rule, a professional who freely practices their profession can do. The deponents [Nombre2] and [Nombre3], who were colleagues of the plaintiff, testified about the existence of the schedule; the need to submit monthly reports and to follow directives, as well as the issuance of an identification card as employees of ICE. Express mention should be made of what was indicated by the first deponent, regarding the orders received: "*While it is true we held special judicial representation, we were not independent because we were ordered on which processes were collectible or not, we were told from what amount, we were told how to make the commissions and notifications. We were told how to present the reports, the form they had to take. Furthermore, they issued us instructions on when to terminate a process. We did not have the power to reach a settlement; instead, that power belonged to the area head or the judicial collection head*". Likewise, she reported that they were required to be available in case they were called; in that sense, upon any call, they had the duty to appear and, additionally, a copy of each case file had to remain at ICE (folios 124 to 125). For their part, witnesses [Nombre4] and [Nombre5], who work in the defendant's collection management, denied the existence of a schedule and the assignment of a specific place in the defendant's facilities; which contradicts the very response to the initial claim (folios 126 and 128 to 129). From the foregoing, it is deduced that the employer failed to rebut the presumption of employment character (presunción de laboralidad) that has been mentioned. It must be taken into consideration that the assessment of the employment nature must be done on a case-by-case basis, attending to its particularities. Hence, the Voto cited by the appellant, number 160 at 10:20 a.m., March 15, 2006, apart from not constituting binding jurisprudence, is by itself not sufficient to vary the ruling, because it resulted from the study of the characteristics of that other relationship." II.- The legal concept of negative or liberative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa o liberatoria) is provided as one of the modes of extinguishing obligations by the passage of time, without the right-holder having claimed it by exercising the respective action. It is only admitted in cases established by law, not being subject to extension by private parties. For purposes of resolving the matter raised, the decision of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 5969, of 3:21 p.m., November 16, 1993, is relevant, by which it was ordered that, by reason of the distinct position of the parties in the employment contract, due to the subordination relationship of the worker with respect to the employer, no statute of limitations (prescripción) term or any other nature that could imply a waiver of rights on their part can run until the employment relationship ends. In that ruling, it was expressly stated: "The Chamber ... considers that Article 602 is generic for all the rights of the parties linked to the employment relationship, whether they arise from it or are incorporated into it expressly or implicitly, even if they are not available to the parties and are imposed on them by law, whereby the statute of limitations (prescripción) of Article 607 would only be of marginal application –unless there is a special provision to the contrary' according to its express text–, to the rights of employers and workers not linked to a subjective relationship or employment contract ...". And, it added: "The Chamber concludes that, faced with its impossibility to legislate, establishing a norm more in line with social justice and the guarantee of labor rights, it must choose between leaving the worker's rights indefinitely enforceable or resorting to the least burdensome norm. The first solution is not feasible, since the unconstitutionality of the statute of limitations (prescripción) per se is not being advocated here, but rather it is a matter of adapting it to the reasonable needs and limits of satisfaction and protection of the worker's rights, given that, furthermore, its non-waivability must be understood to be not only formal and express, but also substantial, referring to any form of extinction that is based on or supposes, as in the case of short statutes of limitations, a tacit waiver or abandonment". That resolution was clarified on several occasions, namely, through decisions numbers 280-I-94 of 2:33 p.m., June 7, 1994, in the sense that the declared unconstitutionality is applicable to public servants, in the absence of provisions with the rank of formal law to the contrary regulating the statute of limitations in other matters; 78-I-96 of 2:30 p.m., February 20, 1996, establishing that the sizing was intended to preserve the value "legal certainty" referring to statutes of limitations that had occurred and been formally declared, but did not apply to rights on which no express jurisdictional or administrative pronouncement had been made, before or after July 14, 1992, in which case the statute of limitations would occur once six months had elapsed after the termination of the employment relationship. This last resolution, in turn, was clarified through No. 308-I-97 of 2:32 p.m., July 15, 1997, in which it was established that the word "after" was deleted from its operative part. In accordance with the foregoing, we have that the labor rights of workers in both the private and public sectors –unless there is a special legal provision to the contrary– are subject to statute of limitations based on the provisions of Article 602 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo); that is, six months after the termination of the employment relationship. In addition to the above, this Chamber has made it clear that it is not possible to apply the statute of limitations periods contemplated in the Civil Code (Código Civil) when labor regulations contain express norms and that matters pertaining to general aspects are governed by the provisions of said Code, provided there is no incompatibility with what is established in the Labor Code (Código Laboral); since Article 601 expressly states that "The calculation, suspension, interruption and other aspects related to the statute of limitations shall be governed, insofar as there is no incompatibility with this Code, by what is provided on those aspects in the Civil Code." (see, among others, decisions numbers 172 of 3:50 p.m., September 3, 1986 and 242 of 9:50 a.m., May 28, 2003). According to that norm, for the calculation, suspension, interruption and other aspects related to the statute of limitations, the norms contained in the Civil Code shall be applied, insofar as there is no incompatibility with what is provided in that normative body. It has been reiterated in not a few pronouncements that the interruption of the negative statute of limitations can be made, in accordance with Article 876, subsection 2, of the Civil Code, by the acknowledgment that the debtor makes of the obligation, in favor of the creditor, by the judicial summons, embargo or sequestration notified to the debtor or, according to numeral 879 ibidem, by any judicial or extrajudicial action for the collection of the debt and fulfillment of the obligation, from which it follows that the claim in administrative headquarters aimed at satisfying the intended rights constitutes an act capable of interrupting that period provided by Article 602, as it is a collection action for the fulfillment of the obligation. On the other hand, the administrative channel must be understood as exhausted and the judicial channel open, after fifteen business days have passed from the date of filing the claim (subsection a) of Article 402 of the Labor Code, without the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber in its Decision number 3669-06, of 3:00 p.m., March 15, 2006, and Law number 8520 of June 20, 2006, needing to be taken into account for the resolution of the case, as they are subsequent to the date of the relevant facts). It is an uncontested fact that the relationship came to an end as of May 31, 2002. On the following September 25, when the indicated statute of limitations period (six months) had not yet occurred, she filed an administrative claim aimed at exhausting that channel (folios 7 to 9). As stated, this must have been considered exhausted fifteen business days later, a moment from which the six-month period began to run. It must be taken into consideration that, unlike the institution of suspension of the statute of limitations, its interruption renders the time previously elapsed useless, beginning to be calculated anew. In this vein, the filing of the lawsuit on January 30, 2003, was done on time, since, by that date, said period had not been completed. It must be taken into account that the decision in the cited Decision 786, of 2:00 p.m., September 16, 2005, based on other precedents of this same body, does not have the scope sought by the appellant. In that judgment, the interruptive effects of the statute of limitations were not analyzed, much less denied, to the action for exhausting the administrative channel, limiting itself to analyzing the consequences of the absence of said action from a procedural point of view; highlighting that the filing of the lawsuit interrupts the statute of limitations independently of whether said channel was exhausted. III.- It is not observed that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the employment nature that bound the parties is contradictory and illegal. As for the first point, although it is true that in Considering 5 it was alluded that the provision of "professional services (servicios profesionales)" for more than one year becomes an indefinite-term hiring under the protection of Article 26 of the Labor Code; it is evident that the term was not used in a strict sense, that is, alluding to the fact that the hiring had a civil nature, quite the contrary, it is clear that the analysis was made precisely to recognize the employment nature of the relationship and that "professional services" was alluded to as a general description of the tasks that Mrs. [Name1] performed. As for the second point, the Chamber has no doubt whatsoever that the relationship was employment-based. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we must abide by what is established in Articles 2, 4 and 18, all of the Labor Code, which are transcribed below: "Article 2.- An employer is any individual or legal entity, private or under Public Law, that employs the services of one or more others, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective". "Article 4.- A worker is any individual who provides to another or others their material, intellectual, or both types of services, by virtue of an employment contract, express or implied, verbal or written, individual or collective". And, "Article 18.- An individual employment contract, whatever its designation may be, is any contract in which a person agrees to provide services to another or to execute a work for them, under the permanent dependency and immediate or delegated direction of the latter, and for remuneration of any kind or form. The existence of this contract is presumed between the worker who provides their services and the person who receives them". Three characteristic elements of that relationship have been distinguished, namely: the personal provision of the service, the remuneration, and legal subordination (subordinación jurídica). Since the first two are also present in other types of contracts, doctrine and jurisprudence have resorted to the third element - legal subordination - as a distinguishing criterion, understood as the employer's faculty to give orders to the employee and discipline their faults, as well as to direct the tasks. This element has been defined as a state of limitation of the worker's autonomy due to the employer's authority to direct and give orders regarding the tasks to be performed and their correlative obligation to obey them (CABANELLAS (Guillermo), Contrato de Trabajo, Volume I, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1963, pp. 239 and 243). That is, employment subordination implicitly entails a series of powers that the employer can exercise over the worker, which are: the power of command, the power of oversight, the power of direction, and the disciplinary power (on this point, the decisions of this Chamber numbers 268, of 8:00 a.m., December 13, 1991; 25, of 9:00 a.m., January 24, 1992; 392, of 10:40 a.m., November 25, 1994; 235, of 10:40 a.m., October 18, 1996; 382, of 9:50 a.m., November 29, 1996; 30, of 3:40 p.m., February 12, 1997 and; 390, of 10:20 a.m., August 7, 2002, can be consulted). Now then, the cited numeral 18 establishes a iuris tantum presumption in favor of the employment nature (laboralidad) of the relationship between the person who provides their services and the person who receives them. In application of Article 414 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), according to the provisions of numeral 452 of the Labor Code, every legal presumption exempts the party invoking it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue of the same. However, whoever invokes it is obliged to prove the facts that serve as its basis, namely, the personal provision of services. It is true, as invoked in the appeal, that the plaintiff was hired following the procedures for hiring through professional services. Thus, the contested judgment held the following facts as proven, which have not been questioned in this instance: that through service order No. 150707, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant starting July 16, 1997, for a period of eight months to carry out judicial collection management tasks; that the contract was extended for four more months performing the same tasks and continued being extended until completing a service period of four years, ten months, and fourteen days. However, it must be taken into consideration that the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) under whose protection the Administration must act (Article 11 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), cannot be invoked as a basis to legitimize evident acts contrary to the law and defrauding of private interests. That is, it cannot be accepted from any point of view that, regardless of the reality of the hirings, the name given by the Administration to a specific relationship is sufficient to deny true workers the rights enshrined in the legal system, even with constitutional rank, such as severance pay; because, through that path, fraud against the law, committed by the Administration itself, which, as stated, is always obliged to comply with it, would be favored. In that sense, this Chamber pronounced in Decision No. 669, of 9:40 a.m., November 9, 2001: "It is important to highlight that neither in the private employment sphere, nor in the public one, are employers allowed to denature employment or public service contracts, to diminish the protection guaranteed to the worker in the Political Constitution." In the public sector, there is no legal authorization to use forms of negotiation whose true purpose is to eliminate the rights inherent in a public service employment contract. In this case, the administrative contracting regime, by itself, does not distort the presumption of employment status (laboralidad) that has been discussed; since, in the matter at hand, and in this specific case, the form that the employer may have wished to give to the contract is not as important as what legally results, in the end, regarding the nature of the totality of what was expressly agreed upon ... It must also be noted that the State and its institutions have the power to use, in their operations, legal instruments other than the "public service contract," provided this is not a mechanism to evade the burdens imposed by respect for the labor rights of public servants. ". Furthermore, it is noted that an appointment of Mrs. Montero Briceño to the position of Professional 3, from April 1 to May 30, 2002, was also deemed accredited. Now, the plaintiff was contracted to perform tasks related to judicial collection, which, evidently, could not be exceptional, as they are always needed, given the activity carried out by the Institute. In the very response to the complaint, this need was acknowledged, stating: "… although the need for Judicial Collection is maintained and will be maintained forever because it is a matter that will always have to exist, since there will always be delinquent clients who must be pursued, this activity was subsumed by the professionals of the Institutional Legal Directorate, so it is no longer necessary to resort to the Direct Contracting of the professionals who collaborated in these proceedings, in addition to the fact that such contracting was no longer authorized by the Comptroller General of the Republic". Although the form of contracting for professional services was used, the truth is that this in no way, as stated, could have the virtue of determining the nature of the relationship, so much so that shortly before the link between the parties concluded, she provided the same services, this time appointed to the position of Professional 3. Nor have the facts held as proven been questioned, according to which Ms. [Name1] had a card given to her by the defendant and, although she performed work outside the Institute's facilities, she had an office (occupied by ten lawyers), which was equipped with a computer, folders, stationery, a photocopier, and pens. The foregoing, far from supporting the appellant's thesis, supports the one upheld in the judgment, as it constitutes evidence of employment status (laboralidad), by providing her with work materials and a document that identified her as an official of the Institute; aspects that are not typical of a contract for professional services, in which, as a general rule, professionals must provide their own work materials and are not identified as belonging to the organization of a specific entity. Fundamentally, the appellant is dissatisfied with what was resolved, based solely on the formal aspect of the contract, which, once again, is not sufficient to contradict the presumption of employment status (laboralidad) of a person who provides personal services and the person who benefits from them; as well as invoking the lack of exclusivity and the provision of services outside the Institute's facilities. Regarding the latter, it is important to point out that exclusivity is not an indispensable requirement of an employment relationship, nor does the provision of services outside those facilities negate that character; much less taking into account that in this specific case, due to the functions the plaintiff performed (judicial collection), she logically had to travel to attend to the pending processes in the courts, apart from the fact that, as indicated, she had an office in the Institute's facilities with various materials to perform her tasks. Likewise, elements denoting subordination are observed, such as being subject to a schedule, which was accepted when the dispute was joined, for, when responding to the sixth fact of the complaint, it was stated: "Of course the professionals had to comply with the Institution's schedule, it was for logical reasons, since the payment arrangements in the collections and the coordination that had to be done with the Telephone Agencies have to be done within the institution's schedule because those are the business hours (sic) for clients …" (folio 35). That response shows that, effectively, the tasks performed were subject to the organization of the institution, that is, they depended on it; without the professional being able to freely determine when and how to carry out their work, which, as a general rule, a professional exercising their profession freely can do. The deponents [Name2] and [Name3], who were colleagues of the plaintiff, testified about the existence of the schedule; the need to submit monthly reports and to follow directives, as well as the issuance of a card as officials of ICE. Express mention should be made of what the first one indicated, regarding the orders received: "Although it is true we held special judicial representation, we were not independent because we were ordered regarding which processes were collectible or not, we were told from what amount, we were told how to handle commissions and notifications. We were told how to present reports, the format that had to be used. Furthermore, we were given instructions on when to terminate a process. We did not have the power to reach an arrangement; rather, the power was held by the area chief or the judicial collection chief". Likewise, she reported that they were required to be available in case they were called, in that sense, upon any call, they had the duty to appear and, in addition, a copy of each case file had to remain at ICE (folios 124 to 125). For their part, witnesses [Name4] and [Name5], who work in the defendant's collection management, denied the existence of a schedule and the assignment of a specific place in the defendant's facilities; which contradicts the response to the initial complaint itself (folios 126 and 128 to 129). From the foregoing, it is inferred that the employer failed to disprove the presumption of employment status (laboralidad) to which reference has been made. It must be taken into consideration that the assessment of the employment nature must be made on a case-by-case basis, considering its particularities. Hence, the Ruling cited by the appellant, number 160 of 10:20 a.m. on March 15, 2006, apart from not constituting binding precedent, is by itself not sufficient to vary what was resolved, since it arose from the study of the characteristics of that other relationship."

"II.- El instituto jurídico de la prescripción negativa o liberatoria está previsto como uno de los modos de extinción de las obligaciones por el transcurso del tiempo, sin que el titular del derecho lo haya reclamado, ejerciendo la respectiva acción. Sólo se admite en los casos establecidos por la ley, no siendo susceptible de ampliación por los particulares. Para efectos de resolver el asunto planteado interesa el Voto de la Sala Constitucional N° 5969, de las 15:21 horas, del 16 de noviembre de 1993, mediante el cual se dispuso que en razón de la distinta posición de las partes en el contrato de trabajo, por la relación de subordinación del trabajador respecto del patrono, ningún término de prescripción ni de otra naturaleza que pueda implicar renuncia de derechos de su parte, puede correr hasta tanto termine el vínculo de trabajo. En ese pronunciamiento expresamente se indicó: “La Sala ... considera que el artículo 602 es genérico para todos los derechos de las partes vinculados a la relación laboral, sea porque nazcan de ella o porque se incorporen a ella expresa o implícitamente, aunque no sean disponibles para las partes y les están impuestos por la ley, con lo cual la prescripción del artículo 607 sólo sería de aplicación marginal –salvo disposición especial en contrario” según su texto expreso-, a los derechos de los patronos y trabajadores no vinculados a una relación subjetiva o contrato de trabajo ...”. Y, agregó: “La Sala concluye que ante, su imposibilidad de legislar, estableciendo una norma más acorde con la justicia social y la garantía a los derechos laborales, debe optar entre dejar indefinidamente exigibles los derechos del trabajador o acudir a la norma menos gravosa. La primera solución no es factible, por cuanto no se propugna aquí la inconstitucionalidad de la prescripción per se, sino que se trata de adecuarla a las necesidades y límites razonables de satisfacción y tutela de los derechos del trabajador, dado que, además, su irrenunciabilidad debe entenderse que no es solo formal y expresa, sino también sustancial, referida a cualquier forma de extinción que se base o suponga, como en el caso de las prescripciones cortas, una renuncia o abandono tácitos”. Esa resolución fue aclarada en varias oportunidades, a saber, mediante los votos números 280-I-94 de las 14:33 horas del 7 de junio de 1994, en el sentido de que la inconstitucionalidad declarada es aplicable a los servidores públicos, a falta de disposiciones con rango de ley formal en contrario que regularan la prescripción en otras materias; 78-I-96 de las 14:30 horas del 20 de febrero de 1996, fijando que el dimensionamiento establecido tenía por objeto preservar el valor “seguridad jurídica” referentes a las prescripciones operadas y formalmente declaradas, pero no se aplicaba a los derechos sobre los que no se había hecho pronunciamiento jurisdiccional o administrativo expreso, antes o después del 14 de julio de 1992, en cuyo caso la prescripción acaecería una vez transcurridos seis meses después de finalizada la relación laboral. Esta última resolución, a su vez, fue aclarada mediante la N° 308-I-97 de las 14:32 horas del 15 de julio de 1997, en la que se estableció que de su parte dispositiva se suprimía la palabra “después”. Conforme a lo expuesto, tenemos que los derechos laborales de los trabajadores tanto del sector privado como del público -salvo disposición legal especial en contrario- prescriben con base en lo dispuesto en el artículo 602 del Código de Trabajo; es decir, seis meses después de terminada la relación de trabajo. Aunado a lo anterior, esta Sala ha dejado claro que no resulta posible aplicar los plazos de prescripción que contempla el Código Civil cuando la normativa laboral contiene normas expresas y que lo tocante a los aspectos generales se rige por lo dispuesto en dicho Código, siempre que no haya incompatibilidad con lo establecido en el Código Laboral; pues, el artículo 601, en forma expresa, señala que “El cómputo, la suspensión, la interrupción y demás extremos relativos a la prescripción se regirán, en cuanto no hubiere incompatibilidad con este Código, por lo que sobre esos extremos dispone el Código Civil.” (ver, entre otros, los votos números 172 de las 15:50 horas del 03 de setiembre de 1986 y 242 de las 9:50 horas del 28 de mayo del 2003). Según esa norma, para el cómputo, la suspensión, la interrupción y demás extremos relativos a la prescripción, se deberán aplicar las normas contenidas en el Código Civil, en cuanto no hubiere incompatibilidad con lo dispuesto en ese cuerpo normativo. Se ha reiterado en no pocos pronunciamientos que la interrupción de la prescripción negativa se puede hacer, de conformidad con el artículo 876, inciso 2º, del Código Civil, por el reconocimiento que el deudor haga de la obligación, en favor del acreedor, por el emplazamiento judicial, embargo o secuestro notificado al deudor o, según el numeral 879 ibídem, por cualquier gestión judicial o extrajudicial, para el cobro de la deuda y cumplimiento de la obligación, de donde resulta que, el reclamo en sede administrativa tendente a que se satisfagan los derechos pretendidos constituye un hecho capaz de interrumpir aquel plazo dispuesto por el artículo 602, por ser una gestión cobratoria para el cumplimiento de la obligación. Por otro lado, la vía administrativa ha de entenderse agotada y expedita la judicial, pasados quince días hábiles desde la fecha de presentación del reclamo (inciso a) del artículo 402 del Código de Trabajo, sin que para la resolución del caso deba tomarse en cuenta lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional en su Voto número 3669-06, de las 15:00 horas del 15 de marzo del 2006 y la Ley número 8520 del 20 de junio del 2006, por ser posteriores a la fecha de los hechos que interesan). Es un hecho no controvertido que la relación llegó a su fin a partir del 31 de mayo del 2002. El 25 de setiembre siguiente, cuando no había operado el indicado término de prescripción (seis meses), planteó un reclamo administrativo tendente a dar por agotada esa vía (folios 7 a 9). Como se dijo, ésta debió tenerse por agotada quince días hábiles después, momento a partir del cual comenzó a correr el término de seis meses. Debe tomarse en consideración que a diferencia del instituto de la suspensión de la prescripción, su interrupción hace inútil el tiempo transcurrido con anterioridad, comenzando a computarse nuevamente. En ese orden de ideas, la interposición de la demanda el 30 de enero del 2003, se hizo en tiempo, pues, para esa data dicho término no se había cumplido. Debe tomarse en cuenta que lo resuelto en el citado Voto 786, de las 14:00 horas del 16 de setiembre del 2005, basado en otros antecedentes de este mismo órgano, no tiene los alcances pretendidos por la parte recurrente. En dicho fallo no se analizó y mucho menos se le negó efectos interruptores de la prescripción a la gestión de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, limitándose a analizar las consecuencias de la ausencia de dicha gestión desde el punto de vista procesal; resaltándose que la presentación de la demanda interrumpe la prescripción con independencia de que se agotara dicha vía. III.- No se aprecia que la conclusión vertida por el Tribunal respecto de la naturaleza laboral que vinculó a las partes sea contradictoria e ilegal. En cuanto a lo primero, si bien es cierto en el Considerando 5 se aludió que la prestación de “servicios profesionales” por más de un año se convierte en una contratación por tiempo indefinida al amparo del artículo 26 del Código de Trabajo; es evidente que el término no se utilizó en sentido estricto, es decir, aludiendo a que la contratación tenía naturaleza civil, todo lo contrario, está claro que el análisis se hizo, precisamente para reconocer el carácter laboral de la relación y que se aludió a los “servicios profesionales” a modo de descripción general de las tareas que doña [Nombre1] realizó. En cuanto a lo segundo, a la Sala no le cabe la menor duda que el vínculo fue laboral. Para determinar la existencia de una relación laboral debemos estarnos a lo establecido por los artículos 2, 4 y 18, todos del Código de Trabajo, los cuales a continuación se transcriben: “Artículo 2.- Patrono es toda persona física o jurídica, particular o de Derecho Público, que emplea los servicios de una u otras, en virtud de un contrato de trabajo, expreso o implícito, verbal o escrito, individual o colectivo”. “Artículo 4.- Trabajador es toda persona física que presta a otra u otras sus servicios materiales, intelectuales o de ambos géneros, en virtud de un contrato de trabajo, expreso o implícito, verbal o escrito, individual o colectivo”. Y, “Artículo 18.- Contrato individual de trabajo, sea cual fuere su denominación, es todo aquel en que una persona se obliga a prestar a otra sus servicios o a ejecutarle una obra, bajo la dependencia permanente y dirección inmediata o delegada de ésta, y por una remuneración de cualquier clase o forma. Se presume la existencia de este contrato entre el trabajador que presta sus servicios y la persona que los recibe”. Se han distinguido tres elementos caracterizantes de esa relación, a saber: la prestación personal del servicio, la remuneración y la subordinación jurídica. Como los dos primeros se presentan también en otro tipo de contrataciones, doctrinaria y jurisprudencialmente se ha recurrido al tercer elemento -la subordinación jurídica- como criterio de distinción, entendido éste como la facultad del empleador de dar órdenes al empleado y disciplinar sus faltas así como la de dirigir las tareas. Este elemento ha sido definido como un estado de limitación de la autonomía del trabajador con motivo de la potestad patronal, para dirigir y dar órdenes sobre las labores a desempeñar y su correlativa obligación de obedecerlas (CABANELLAS (Guillermo), Contrato de Trabajo, Volumen I, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1963, pp. 239 y 243). Es decir, la subordinación laboral lleva implícitos una serie de poderes que, el empleador, puede ejercer sobre el trabajador, cuales son: el poder de mando, el poder de fiscalización, el poder de dirección y el poder disciplinario (sobre el punto se pueden consultar los votos de esta Sala números 268, de las 8:00 horas, del 13 de diciembre de 1991; 25, de las 9:00 horas, del 24 de enero de 1992; 392, de las 10:40 horas, del 25 de noviembre de 1994; 235, de las 10:40 horas, del 18 de octubre de 1996; 382, de las 9:50 horas, del 29 de noviembre de 1996; 30, de las 15:40 horas, del 12 de febrero de 1997 y; 390, de las 10:20 horas, del 7 de agosto del 2002). Ahora bien, el numeral 18 citado establece una presunción iuris tantum a favor de la laboralidad de la relación de quien presta sus servicios y la persona que los recibe. En aplicación del artículo 414 del Código Procesal Civil, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el numeral 452 del de Trabajo, toda presunción legal exime a la parte que la alegue, de la obligación de demostrar el hecho reputado como cierto, en virtud de la misma. No obstante, se obliga a quien la invoque a demostrar los hechos que le sirven de base, a saber, la prestación personal de los servicios. Es cierto, como se invoca en el recurso, que la actora fue contratada siguiendo los procedimientos para la contratación por servicios profesionales. Así, la sentencia impugnada tuvo por probados los siguientes hechos, los cuales no han sido cuestionados en esta instancia: que mediante orden de servicio N° 150707, la actora fue contratada por el accionado a partir del 16 de julio de 1997, por un periodo de ocho meses para realizar labores de gestión de cobro judicial; que el contrato se amplió por cuatro meses más realizando las mismas labores y continuó prorrogándose hasta completar un periodo de servicio de cuatro años, diez meses y catorce días. No obstante, debe tomarse en consideración que el principio de legalidad al amparo del cual debe actuar la Administración (artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), no puede invocarse como fundamento para legitimar evidentes actos contrarios a la ley y defraudatorios de los intereses particulares. Es decir, no puede aceptarse desde ningún punto de vista que, con independencia de la realidad de las contrataciones, baste el nombre dado por la Administración a una determinada relación, para denegar a verdaderos trabajadores los derechos consagrados en el ordenamiento jurídico, incluso con rango constitucional, como lo es el auxilio de cesantía; pues, por ese camino, se estaría favoreciendo el fraude a la ley, cometido por la propia Administración, la que, como se dijo, está obligada, siempre, a acatarla. En ese sentido se pronunció esta Sala en el Voto N° 669, de las 9:40 horas, del 9 de noviembre del 2001: “Resulta importante destacar que ni en el ámbito laboral privado, ni en el público, le está permitido a los patronos desnaturalizar los contratos laborales o de servicio público, para disminuir la protección al trabajador, garantizada en la Constitución Política. En el sector público no hay ninguna autorización legal, para utilizar formas de negociación cuya verdadera finalidad sea eliminar, los derechos propios de una contratación de servicio público laboral. En este caso el régimen de contratación administrativa, por sí mismo, no desvirtúa la presunción de laboralidad de que se ha venido hablando; toda vez que, en la materia que nos ocupa, y en este caso concreto no interesa tanto la forma que el patrono haya querido darle al contrato, como, lo que jurídicamente resulte, al final, respecto de la naturaleza de la totalidad de lo expresamente pactado ... También debe indicarse que, el Estado y sus instituciones, tienen facultades para utilizar, en su funcionamiento, institutos jurídicos diversos del “contrato de servicio público”, cuando esto no sea un mecanismo de evasión de las cargas que impone el respeto a los derechos laborales, de los servidores públicos.- ". Por otro lado, se advierte que también se tuvo por acreditado un nombramiento de la señora Montero Briceño en el puesto de Profesional 3, del 1° de abril al 30 de mayo del 2002. Ahora bien, a la accionante se le contrató para realizar labores relacionadas con el cobro judicial, las que, evidentemente, no podían ser excepcionales, pues siempre se necesitan, dada la actividad realizada por el Instituto. En la propia contestación de la demanda, se dio cuenta de esa necesidad, al señalar: “… a pesar de que la necesidad del Cobro Judicial se mantiene y se mantendrá por siempre debido, a que es una materia que siempre tendrá que existir, ya que, siempre existirán clientes morosos a quienes hay que cobrarles, dicha actividad fue subsumida por los profesionales de la Dirección Jurídica Institucional, por lo que ya no es menester acudir a la Contratación Directa de los profesionales que coadyuvaron en estas diligencias, además de que dicha contratación, ya no fue más autorizada por la Contraloría General de la República”. Aunque se acudió a la forma de contratación por servicios profesionales, la verdad es que ello en modo alguno, como se dijo, podía tener la virtud de determinar la naturaleza de la relación, tan es así que faltando poco tiempo para que concluyera la vinculación entre las partes, prestó los mismos servicios, esta vez, nombrada en el puesto de Profesional 3. Tampoco se han cuestionado los hechos tenidos por probados, según los cuales doña [Nombre1] tenía un carné que le entregó el demandado y aunque realizaba labores fuera de las instalaciones del Instituto, contaba con una oficina (que ocupaban diez abogados), la cual estaba equipada con computadora, fólders, papelería, fotocopiadora y lapiceros. Lo anterior, lejos de abonar a favor de la tesis del recurrente, respalda la sostenida en el fallo, por constituir indicios de laboralidad, al proporcionársele material de trabajo y un documento que la identificaba como funcionaria del Instituto; aspectos que no son propios de una contratación por servicios profesionales, en la cual, por regla general, los profesionales se deben proveer del material de trabajo y no se identifican como pertenecientes a la organización de una determinada entidad. En lo fundamental, la parte recurrente se muestra inconforme con lo resuelto, basada tan solo en el aspecto formal de la contratación, lo que se repite una vez más, no es suficiente para contradecir la presunción de laboralidad de quien presta servicios personales y la persona que se beneficia de ellos; así como invocando la falta de exclusividad y la prestación de servicios fuera de las instalaciones del Instituto. Respecto de esto último, es importante apuntar que la exclusividad no es un requisito indispensable de una relación laboral como tampoco niega ese carácter la prestación de servicios fuera de esas instalaciones; mucho menos tomando en cuenta que en el caso concreto, por las funciones que la actora desempeñaba (cobro judicial), lógicamente, debía estarse desplazando para atender los procesos pendientes en los tribunales, aparte de que como se indicó, contaba en las instalaciones del Instituto con una oficina con diversos materiales para realizar sus tareas. Asimismo, se aprecian elementos que denotan subordinación como la sujeción a un horario, lo cual fue aceptado al trabarse la litis, pues, al contestarse el hecho sexto de la demanda se dijo: “Claro que los profesionales tenían que cumplir con un horario de la Institución, lo era por razones lógicas, pues los arreglos de pago en los cobros y las coordinaciones que debían de hacerse con las Agencias Telefónicas tienen que hacerse dentro del horario de la institución porque es las horas (sic) hábiles para los clientes …” (folio 35). Esa respuesta evidencia que efectivamente, las labores que se realizaban estaban supeditadas a la organización de la institución, es decir, dependían de ella; sin que el profesional pudiera libremente determinar cuándo y de qué forma poder llevar a cabo su trabajo, lo que sí puede hacer, por regla general, un profesional que ejerza libremente su profesión. Los deponentes [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] , quienes fueron compañeros de la accionante, declararon sobre la existencia del horario; de la necesidad de rendir informes mensuales y de acatar directrices así como de la entrega de carné como funcionarios del ICE. Cabe hacer mención expresa de lo indicado por la primera, respecto de las órdenes recibidas: “Si bien es cierto ostentábamos la representación especial judicial no éramos independientes porque se nos ordenaba sobre cuáles procesos eran cobrables o no, se nos decía a partir de qué monto, se nos decía cómo hacer las comisiones y notificaciones. Se nos decía cómo presentar los informes, la forma que debía hacerse. Además nos giraban instrucciones sobre cuándo dar por finalizado un proceso. No teníamos la potestad para llegar a un arreglo sino que la potestad era del jefe de área o el de cobro judicial”. Asimismo, dio cuenta de que les exigían estar disponibles por si los llamaban, en ese sentido ante cualquier llamada tenían el deber de presentarse y, además, de cada expediente debía permanecer una copia en el ICE (folios 124 a 125). Por su parte, los testigos [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] , quienes trabajan en la gestión de cobro del demandado, negaron la existencia de horario y la asignación de un lugar específico en las instalaciones del demandado; lo que contradice la propia contestación del libelo inicial (folios 126 y 128 a 129). De lo anterior se deduce que la parte patronal, no logró desvirtuar la presunción de laboralidad a la cual se ha hecho mención. Debe tomarse en consideración que, la valoración de la naturaleza laboral debe hacerse caso por caso, atendiendo sus particularidades. De ahí que, el Voto citado por la parte recurrente número 160 de las 10:20 horas del 15 de marzo del 2006, aparte de no constituir jurisprudencia vinculante, por sí mismo no es suficiente para variar lo resuelto, por cuanto, obedeció al estudio de las características de aquella otra vinculación."