Municipal Executive labor relationship is fixed-term and does not require due process for removalRelación laboral del Ejecutivo Municipal es a plazo fijo y no requiere debido proceso para su remoción

IV.- First, it is necessary to determine whether a single service relationship existed between the parties, whether two distinct relationships can be identified, or whether it involves a single relationship modified over time due to the acceptance of a position for a fixed term. Article 169 of the Constitución Política states: “The administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body, composed of municipal council members elected by popular vote, and an executive official to be designated by law” (emphasis added). Under the former Código Municipal (Ley 4574 of May 4, 1970), that executive official is precisely the Ejecutivo Municipal (now Alcalde). As relevant, regarding the same, Articles 55, 58, and 156 of that regulatory body, in order, stated: “Article 55.- The appointment of the Executive shall be made by the Council in the second half of the month of June following its installation. No one who is a council member or trustee, principal or alternate, may be appointed as Executive./ The Executive shall be appointed for four years, counted from the first of July immediately following the installation of the respective municipality and may be reelected…” (emphasis added). “Article 58.- The Executive may only be removed or suspended from office by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the council members that make up the Council.” “Article 156.- The provisions contained in this Title regarding appointment and removal procedures shall not apply to officials who depend directly on the Council, nor to temporary employees hired against the Special Services or Wages budget items./ Labor actions affecting officials who depend directly on the Council shall be agreed upon by it.” Although a new Código Municipal repealing the former one was enacted by Ley 7794 of April 30, 1998, its Transitorio II provided: “TRANSITORIO II.- For the 1998-2002 municipal period, the municipal executive appointed by the respective Concejo Municipal shall automatically become, at the time this law takes effect, the municipal mayor with all his duties and powers. For said official to be removed or suspended from office, a minimum vote of two-thirds of the council members that make up the Council shall be required./ The municipal mayor shall remain in office until the mayors elected in 2002 take office…”. As provided, that regulatory body took effect two months after its publication, which occurred on May 18, 1998, therefore it governs as of the following July 18. The claimant’s situation falls within the scenario contemplated in that transitional rule; given that, in the first fact of the complaint, Mr. [Nombre1] indicated that he began working for the Municipalidad de Puntarenas on March 8, 1964, in various administrative positions, being appointed provisionally as Ejecutivo Municipal as of April 10, 1997, then permanently as of the following September 19, and pursuant to the provisions of the new Código Municipal on June 16, 1998, he was permanently appointed, this time as Alcalde for the period between July 18, 1998, and February 3, 2003. From this perspective, it is important to recount the relevant rulings issued by the Sala Constitucional related to the special relationship between the municipal entity and the Ejecutivo Municipal –now Alcalde–, because although some of them were issued long before the plaintiff’s appointment as Ejecutivo Municipal and, therefore, long before the aforementioned legal reform, they are applicable to the specific case, in light of the mentioned transitional rule. Through Voto of that body No. 1119-90 of 14:00 hours on September 18, 1990, an action of unconstitutionality was resolved against Articles 55 and 58 of the former Código Municipal (Ley 4574). In that precedent, it was considered: “III.- … It is true that the Código de Trabajo provides that fixed-term contracts shall be deemed as indefinite-term contracts when, upon expiration of the term, the causes that gave rise to them and the subject matter of the work persist. But this provision cannot prevail when the fixing of the term is of legal, and not conventional, origin, since in these cases it will involve (when truly justified, as previously stated) exceptions to the special regime that the Constitution authorizes by law. IV.- … the Ejecutivo Municipal is a public servant whose service relationship is regulated in a special manner in the Código Municipal, which excludes him from the guarantee of job stability (labor stability, estabilidad laboral) (which does protect the rest of the municipal employees) in two senses: on the one hand, it authorizes a fixed-term appointment, for four years; on the other, it exempts his appointment and removal from the procedures indicated for that purpose in Title V of the Code regarding municipal officials who do not depend directly on the Council. In this case, the guarantee of stability granted to public servants in the Constitution becomes limited by law, as it restricts it to the requirement of a qualified vote (two-thirds of the members of the Council) for his removal before the expiration of the term, without requiring just cause. With even greater reason, the expiration of the term operates as a cause for legal termination of the relationship, without thereby violating Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, since it authorizes such limitations, according to what has been set forth herein.” Based on that, it reached the conclusion that the challenged norms were not contrary to the Fundamental Charter, precisely because the position of Ejecutivo Municipal had a special nature “… it involves a form of service characterized by a dual relationship with the superior body, the Concejo Municipal, which appoints and removes him, but which is not a hierarchical superior properly speaking. Between the executive and the Council there exists, by virtue of their respective powers, rather a relationship of trust, compatible with its discretion in complying with the instructions it receives from it. More than subject to the Council’s orders, the executive is subject to its directives. (See La Municipalidad en Costa Rica, Eduardo Ortiz, Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, Madrid, 1987, p. 130). It is, in short, a very special relationship, which amply justifies the exclusion from the common regime for public servants. The case is even more qualified since the Constitution itself granted a different rank and character to the entire Municipal Regime, granting it autonomy, and merely pointed out that the administration of local interests and services shall be the responsibility of the municipal government (municipal council members elected by popular vote) and an executive official to be designated by law. (Constitutional Art. 169). The framers did not even want to give a denomination (and thereby a specific regime) to the executive official, and provided that the law would do so. (Acta Asamblea Constituyente No. 80 art. 3). It is clear that this is an official of special rank, of a sui generis nature, who, although he may be considered a public servant, is one of the cases of exception authorized by the Constitution, and which are outside the Civil Service Statute or Regime (Estatuto o Régimen de Servicio Civil); as a special case, even the Constitution itself treats him in the title dedicated to the Municipal Regime.” Subsequently, the constitutionality of Article 156 of that same legal body was challenged, giving rise to Voto No. 2859 of 14:45 hours on September 8, 1992, in which the considerations expressed in that judgment 1119-90 were reiterated, adding: “II- Article 169 of the Constitución Política indicates that the administration of municipal interests and services is the responsibility of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body elected by popular vote and an executive official designated by law, which in this particular case, is the Código Municipal. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the Executive is not just another municipal official, but also a true political agent, responsible for the executive branch of that autonomous government unit called the Municipality. His powers are broad and his responsibilities, therefore, are great, both from a legal standpoint, and because he is the principal depositary of public trust for the correct administration and resolution of communal needs, a trust that is transmitted to him by the delegation he receives from the Constitution itself in the norm commented on here and from the corporation itself, by virtue of the mandate he receives in the act of his appointment made by the Council. As general administrator and head of the municipal departments, in charge of organization, operation, and coordination, as well as the correct execution of the Council’s agreements (Art. 57 Código Municipal), he has political, executive, and administrative functions and is subordinate only to the law in the exercise of his functions and to the Council itself, regarding compliance with plans, goals, and objectives, the application of internal regulations and norms, and budget execution, powers that all emanate from the Council as a manifestation of its own autonomy. Therefore, under no concept can it be understood that he is a simple subordinate of the municipal council members, who can only indicate the limits of his actions, through agreements adopted in prior deliberation, but never individually or outside the solemnity of the session. That is, the municipal council members exercise the functions of Local Government entrusted to them by the direct vote of the citizens, only when they concur with their votes in the adoption of decisions concerning the entire municipality, in the course of a session legally convened for those purposes. Consequently, the relationship of the Ejecutivo Municipal with the Council is not properly hierarchical, because the essential administrative functions under his purview are exercised exclusively and to the exclusion of the Council itself; in summary, he forms the "executive" part of the Municipal Government and, therefore, the ordinary regulations of the other employees and officials referred to in Articles 149 and 154 of the Code on that matter do not apply to him in his relationship with the Municipality.” In Voto No. 1613-93 of 9:39 hours on April 2, 1993, the considerations expressed in the aforementioned precedents 1119-90 and 2859-92 were reiterated regarding the nonexistence of the obligation to follow due process for confidential officials (funcionarios de confianza), a group in which the Ejecutivo Municipal was placed. For its part, in judgment number 425-95 of 9:39 hours on January 20, 1995, an amparo appeal was rejected on the grounds that the dismissal of a municipal executive only requires the favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council, without the need to follow due process (On the non-necessity of following a prior process for the dismissal of the Ejecutivo Municipal –now Alcalde– the Votos of the Sala Constitucional numbers 177-93 of 10:06 hours on January 15, 1993; 177-94 of 17:42 hours on January 11, 1994; 7483-99 of 18:21 hours on September 28, 1999; 9309-2000 of 9:28 hours on October 20, 2000; and 10628-2001 of 9:47 hours on October 19, 2001, may also be consulted). On the other hand, it is of interest to bring up the reasoning set forth in Voto No. 788-2000 of 17:03 hours on January 25, 2000, to reject an amparo appeal on the merits, which responded to a situation resembling the one at hand: “I.- The appellants allege that for the dismissal of the protected party from the position of Alcalde Municipal of [Nombre2] y Parrita, the due process contained in the new Código Municipal, Ley 7794, articles 149 et seq., should have been followed, since by not having done so, his fundamental rights are violated. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate to the appellants, firstly, that Articles 149 et seq. of the current Código Municipal were established as a procedural guarantee in favor of the corporation’s officials or subordinates of the different municipality departments, but not regarding the Alcalde Municipal who, due to the special nature of his position, must be removed by a procedure different from that established in those numerals. Thus, in articles 18 and 19 of the Código Municipal, a procedure for removal or loss of credentials of the Alcalde Municipal is established, which must be observed by the Concejo Municipal in order to dismiss said official from his position who -for all purposes- holds a position and a function distinct from that of the other lower-ranking municipal officials. Notwithstanding this and, secondly, it is necessary to clarify to the petitioners that the case now resolved is not framed within the legal assumptions demanded by the new Código Municipal regarding his removal, for the following reason. As observed from the documentation attached to the file (folio 16), his appointment occurred under the former formulas for election of the Ejecutivo Municipal, contained in Ley 4574 of May four, nineteen seventy, articles 55 to 59, for which reason his appointment and removal are the exclusive competence of the Concejo Municipal. This is reaffirmed by Ley 7794 in its Transitorio II, first paragraph. On the other hand, and not having been appointed by popular election, pursuant to the provisions of article 14, third paragraph, the procedural requirement of article 19, and regarding the plebiscite, would only be indispensable under that scenario, a situation that did not occur in the present case and, therefore, said procedure is unnecessary, being sufficient solely for this specific case, the agreement of the Concejo Municipal adopted by no fewer than two-thirds of the council members that compose it, all according to what is provided in article 58 of the former Código Municipal and Transitorio II of the new Código Municipal. II.- For the reasons stated in the preceding considering, and by virtue of the fact that, as can be deduced from the certification attached to the file on folio 16, the protected party was appointed to the position of Alcalde Municipal of [Nombre2] y Parrita, as of July first, nineteen ninety-eight, meaning that prior to his dismissal, due process, in accordance with the new provisions governing the matter, should not have been guaranteed, but rather, in accordance with the agreement adopted by the Concejo Municipal, -as occurred in this case-, consequently, the Chamber warns that if the protected parties consider that the reasons and grounds put forth in the agreement for his dismissal are improper, that disagreement, by its nature, must be resolved -if the petitioners deem it appropriate- through the corresponding ordinary proceeding (vía ordinaria), since regarding this matter, this Tribunal lacks any competence. For the foregoing, the appeal is improper and must be so declared.” Finally, it should be reviewed that in Voto of this other Chamber number 78 of 10:10 hours on February 11, 2004, in light of the precedents issued by the constitutionality review body, not only was the thesis regarding the need to follow due process for the termination of the Ejecutivo Municipal’s position not endorsed, but also it was added: “… although the plaintiff was appointed Ejecutivo Municipal for the period from July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2002, that is, during the transition period referred to in Transitorio II of the current Código Municipal (Ley No. 7794 of April 30, 1998) which took effect on July 18, 1998 (two months after its publication in La Gaceta No. 94 of May 18, 1998), for which the name of his position changed to that of Alcalde, that does not mean that he became covered by the specific causes and dismissal procedure, particularly through a prior plebiscite, established in articles 14 in fine, 18 and 19 of the current Código Municipal, since his appointment did not occur by popular election but rather he was designated, as Ejecutivos Municipales were appointed until then, that is, by the Concejo Municipal and in a discretionary, free, and direct manner. Without any prior competitive process. The cited jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional being binding and applicable in his case, according to which, because he is a confidential official subject to free removal, no prior procedure was required before dismissal. Consequently, his allegation of violation of due process is not admissible…”. Taking into account these precedents that are binding for this other Chamber (article 13 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional), in order to resolve the case, one must adhere to the special relationship between the parties as of the permanent appointment of Mr. [Nombre3] as Ejecutivo Municipal. In that line of thought, in application of the transitional rule to which reference has been made, one must start from the power of the Concejo Municipal to freely elect and remove the Alcalde (who had been occupying the position of Ejecutivo Municipal), without being subject to following a due process for that purpose, given the nature of a confidential official, a favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council being sufficient. And, furthermore, based on the content of the cited Voto 1119-90, one must reach the conclusion that between the person occupying the executive body (be it called Ejecutivo Municipal or Alcalde) of the Municipality and the latter, there exists a relationship for a fixed term by provision of law and not for an indefinite term. This has been reiterated by the Chamber based on that pronouncement: “… , given that the Sala Constitucional determined that the contract binding an Ejecutivo Municipal to his municipality is for a fixed term and not for an indefinite term; the legal point must be understood in that way, because, as indicated, not only the jurisprudence but even the simple precedents emanating from that high Court are binding, since they produce erga omnes effects.” (voto number 285 of 10:40 hours on November 25, 1998) (on this point, one can also consult, among others, judgments number 27 of 8:30 hours on January 26, 1996, and 260 of 10:20 hours on May 16, 2001). From the foregoing, it is inferred that, in the scenario where a public servant linked to the Administration –in this case to the municipal entity– through a relationship for an indefinite term, opts for or accepts a confidential position, subject to a fixed term by provision of law, the relationship becomes one for a fixed term, with distinct and special characteristics. In Voto No. 791 of 14:30 hours on December 18, 2003, the opportunity arose to analyze a similar situation, this time, of a female official of the Contraloría General de la República, who had been linked for a considerable number of years through a relationship for an indefinite term only to later accept the position of Subcontralora General de la República, provided for by law as being for a fixed term. In resolving that matter, the content of the aforementioned Voto 1119-90 was again relied upon, in order to consider: “… the plaintiff decided to resign from her permanent position, as Director of the Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos, which she held within the Contraloría General de la República itself, in order to continue performing her duties as Subcontralora. Consequently, another person was permanently appointed in her place. The plaintiff seeks payment of the unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía); however, as argued by the State’s legal representative, we are not in the presence of the factual scenarios that allow granting that right; because the appointment of the plaintiff to the position of Subcontralora General de la República was for a fixed term, as expressly provided by the Constitución Política. Indeed, by constitutional provision (see Article 183), it is clear that appointment to the positions of Contralor and Subcontralor Generales de la República is made for a term of eight years, without prejudice to a possible reelection, which in the specific case did not occur. Thus, as set forth in the previous considerations, regardless of the permanent nature of the functions performed by the plaintiff, the position she held must be considered as one for a fixed term, by express normative provision; for, precisely, in Article 183 of the Constitución Política, a specific and fixed term of appointment was established for that position; although renewable. Her relationship was a single one, only that from a given moment it ceased to be for an indefinite term and became, upon changing positions, a fixed-term one, optionally renewable for the employer. Therefore, the natural indemnities or those inherent to an indefinite-term contract cannot legally be granted to the plaintiff; given that her position as Subcontralora General de la República was a position she assumed for a fixed term, by express normative provision. For the reasons stated, the plaintiff cannot validly seek payment of unemployment assistance; because, from the moment she was appointed to the indicated position, she had knowledge of the termination date of her functions; as well as the legal consequences entailed by the resignation she made from the permanent position she held as Director of the Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos, also within the Contraloría General de la República”.- V. [...] In no way could one admit the thesis, according to which, two distinct and separate relationships existed between the parties with a break in continuity, one until April 10, 1997, and another, as of that moment, as is invoked in the appeal, therefore it is also not true that the rights should have been claimed “… when the nature of the contract conditions changed.” The foregoing, because, as already explained citing Voto number 791 of year 2003, although it is true that initially the relationship was for an indefinite term, later, upon permanently appointing Mr. [Nombre1] as Ejecutivo Municipal, the relationship changed in nature to become a relationship for a fixed term [...] VII.- For the defendant, Article 31 of the Código de Trabajo was violated “… since, in the face of any fixed-term contract, as is the appointment of Alcaldes, what is appropriate in cases like the present is to apply the indemnity for early termination (cesación anticipada), which this article regulates.” The first-instance judgment considered that the plaintiff was a career civil servant, whose relationship with the Municipality was suspended upon being appointed as Alcalde, and lacking evidence to conclude the existence of a reinstatement to his previous position or the payment of items proper to a dismissal with employer liability, taking into account the plaintiff’s average salary prior to his appointment as Alcalde, it recognized, among other items, the notice period (preaviso) and the unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía). The contested judgment indicated that since there was no dismissal at the time Mr. [Nombre1] was appointed Ejecutivo Municipal, one might think those items were not due to him; but it did not analyze the point since its granting was not the subject of grievance, merely, in the appeal, affirming that the right to collect them had prescribed. It adds that “… the defendant conformed to the ruling, except regarding the mathematical calculations verified by the a quo for notice period, unemployment assistance, Christmas bonus, and vacation days for the first part of the relationship, which contrary to what was stated, turn out to be correct.” In accordance with what was analyzed in Considerando II of this judgment, Mr. [Nombre3], upon accepting a permanent position for a fixed term by provision of law, by his own will caused his relationship, until then for an indefinite term, to become a fixed-term one and hence, in no way could he seek entitlement to the indemnities of notice period and unemployment assistance proper to that other nature; and he could only opt for the items provided for in Article 31 of the Código de Trabajo. However, it is observed that the point was not the subject of analysis by the Court, alleging limitations in the appeal. That reasoning is not contested in this instance and for that reason the Chamber cannot take cognizance of it (Article 560 of the Código de Trabajo) [...]. XVII.- Regarding the average salary taken into account to calculate the items of notice period and unemployment assistance, the appellant argues that if the plaintiff worked uninterruptedly for the Municipality from March 8, 1964, to January 24, 2002, it is neither logical, reasonable, nor legal for the award of payment for notice period and unemployment assistance to be made in breach of subparagraph b) of Article 30 of the Código de Trabajo by not valuing the average of the last six months of salary earned, using a legal fiction not contemplated in that norm to calculate them. Consequently, it requests that the amounts granted for those concepts be revoked or modified and ordered to be calculated based on the average salary earned during the six months prior to January 24, 2002. Also alternatively, it requests that the calculations be made on the basis of a monthly average of two hundred fifty-one thousand five hundred twenty-one colones with forty-nine céntimos. That request cannot be endorsed by this body. In a case like the present, the recognition of said items would not be proper, and if the Chamber does not revoke their recognition by the instance judges, it is simply due to a matter of procedural preclusion (see Considerando VII). In any case, as observed, said items were granted for the period worked at the Municipality before being appointed as Alcalde Municipal and hence, indeed, a salary corresponding to positions held subsequently cannot be taken into account; for, it is repeated, compensation is being provided for a period of work, understanding that during that period the relationship was for an indefinite term, subsequently transitioning to a fixed-term relationship.” Although Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, enacted a new Municipal Code that repealed the previous one, its Transitory Provision II stipulated: “TRANSITORIO II.- For the 1998-2002 municipal term, the municipal executive appointed by the respective Municipal Council will automatically become, upon this law’s entry into force, the municipal mayor (alcalde municipal) with all duties and powers. To remove or suspend this official, a vote of at least two-thirds of the council members (regidores) comprising the Council is required. / The municipal mayor shall remain in office until the mayors elected in 2002 take office…”. As stipulated, that regulatory body entered into force two months after its publication, which occurred on May 18, 1998, and therefore took effect as of July 18 of that same year. The plaintiff’s situation falls within the scenario contemplated in that transitory rule; given that, in the first fact of the complaint, Mr. [Name1] indicated that he began working at the Municipality of Puntarenas on March 8, 1964, in various administrative positions, was appointed on an interim basis as Municipal Executive (Ejecutivo Municipal) effective April 10, 1997, then with full tenure (en propiedad) as of the following September 19, and under the provisions of the new Municipal Code, on June 16, 1998, he was appointed with full tenure, this time as Mayor (Alcalde) for the period from July 18, 1998, to February 3, 2003. From this perspective, it is important to review the relevant pronouncements issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) regarding the special relationship between the municipal entity and the Municipal Executive—now Mayor—because, although some of them were issued long before the plaintiff’s appointment as Municipal Executive and, therefore, long before the aforementioned legal reform, they are applicable to the specific case, in light of the mentioned transitory rule. Through Vote No. 1119-90 at 2:00 p.m. on September 18, 1990, that body resolved an unconstitutionality action against Articles 55 and 58 of the former Municipal Code (Law No. 4574). In that precedent, it was considered: “III.- … It is true that the Labor Code stipulates that fixed-term contracts shall be deemed to be of indefinite duration when, upon expiration of the term, the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work subsist. However, this provision cannot prevail when the setting of the term is of legal, not contractual, origin, since in these cases it will be a matter (when truly justified, as previously stated) of exceptions to the special regime that the Constitution authorizes by law. IV.- … the Municipal Executive is a public servant whose employment relationship is specially regulated in the Municipal Code, which excludes him from the guarantee of job stability (estabilidad laboral) (which does protect the rest of the municipal employees) in two senses: on the one hand, it authorizes a fixed-term appointment, for four years; on the other, it exempts his appointment and removal from the procedures indicated for this purpose in Title V of the Code for municipal officials not directly dependent on the Council. In this case, the guarantee of stability granted to public servants in the Constitution is limited by law, as it restricts it to the requirement of a qualified vote (two-thirds of the Council members) for his removal before the term expires, without requiring just cause. With all the more reason, the expiration of the term operates as a cause for legal extinction of the relationship, without thereby violating Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, since it authorizes such limitations, as stated thus far.” Based on this, it reached the conclusion that the challenged rules were not contrary to the Constitution, precisely because the position of Municipal Executive had a special nature: “… it is a form of service characterized by a dual relationship with the superior body, the Municipal Council, which appoints and removes him, but which is not a hierarchical superior per se. Between the executive and the Council, by effect of their respective powers, there exists rather a relationship of trust, compatible with his discretion in fulfilling the instructions received from it. More than being under orders from the Council, the executive is subject to its directives. (See la Municipalidad en Costa Rica, Eduardo Ortiz, Instituto de Estudios de Administración Laboral, Madrid, 1987, p. 130). It involves, in short, a highly special relationship, which amply justifies the exclusion from the common regime of public servants. The case is even more qualified since the Constitution itself gave a different rank and character to the entire Municipal Regime, granting it autonomy, and merely limiting itself to indicating that the administration of local interests and services shall be in charge of the municipal government (popularly elected municipal council members) and an executive official designated by law. (Art. 169 of the Constitution). The constituent assembly members did not even wish to give a name (and with it a specific regime) to the executive official, and provided that this would be done by law. (Minutes of the Constituent Assembly No. 80, art. 3). It is clear that this is an official of special rank, of a sui generis nature, who, although he may be considered a public servant, is one of the exception cases authorized by the Constitution, and who falls outside the Civil Service Statute or Regime; the Constitution itself, in the title dedicated to the Municipal Regime, treats him as a special case.” Later, the constitutionality of Article 156 of that same legal body was questioned, giving rise to Vote No. 2859 at 2:45 p.m. on September 8, 1992, in which the considerations set forth in that ruling No. 1119-90 were reiterated, adding: “II- Article 169 of the Political Constitution states that the administration of municipal interests and services is in charge of the Municipal Government, formed by a popularly elected deliberative body and an executive official designated by law, which in this particular case, is the Municipal Code. From the above it can be inferred that the Executive is not merely just another municipal official, but also a true political agent, responsible for the executive branch of that autonomous unit of government called the Municipality. His powers are broad and his responsibilities great, therefore, both from a legal standpoint, and as the principal depositary of popular trust for the correct administration and solution of communal needs, trust that is transmitted to him by the delegation he receives from the Constitution itself in the rule commented on here and from the corporation itself, by virtue of the mandate received in the act of his appointment made by the Council. As general administrator and head of the municipal departments, in charge of organization, operation, and coordination, as well as the correct execution of the Council’s agreements (Art. 57 Municipal Code), he has political, executive, and administrative functions and is subordinate only to the law in the exercise of his functions and to the Council itself, concerning the fulfillment of plans, goals, and objectives, the application of internal regulations and rules, and budget execution, powers that all emanate from the Council as a manifestation of its own autonomy. Therefore, under no concept can it be understood that he is a simple subordinate of the municipal council members, who can only indicate the limits of his actions, by means of agreements adopted after prior deliberation, but never individually or outside the solemnity of a session. That is, the municipal council members exercise the Local Government functions entrusted to them by the direct vote of citizens, only when they concur with their votes in adopting decisions pertaining to the entire municipality, in the course of a session legally convened for those purposes. Consequently, the relationship of the Municipal Executive with the Council is not strictly hierarchical, because the essential administrative functions within his purview are exercised by him exclusively and to the exclusion of the Council itself; in summary, he constitutes the “executive” part of the Municipal Government, and therefore the ordinary regulations applicable to other employees and officials referred to in Articles 149 and 154 of the Code on that matter do not apply to him in his connections with the Municipality.” In Vote No. 1613-93 at 9:39 a.m. on April 2, 1993, the considerations expressed in the aforementioned precedents Nos. 1119-90 and 2859-92 were reiterated, concerning the non-existence of an obligation to follow due process for trust-based officials, a group in which the Municipal Executive was placed. For its part, in ruling No. 425-95 at 9:39 a.m. on January 20, 1995, an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) was rejected on the grounds that the dismissal of a municipal executive only requires the assenting vote of two-thirds of the Council members, without it being necessary to follow due process (Regarding the non-necessity of following a prior process for the dismissal of the Municipal Executive—now Mayor—see also Constitutional Chamber Votes Nos. 177-93 at 10:06 a.m. on January 15, 1993; 177-94 at 5:42 p.m. on January 11, 1994; 7483-99 at 6:21 p.m. on September 28, 1999; 9309-2000 at 9:28 a.m. on October 20, 2000; and 10628-2001 at 9:47 a.m. on October 19, 2001). On the other hand, it is pertinent to bring into account the reasoning set forth in Vote No. 788-2000 at 5:03 p.m. on January 25, 2000, to reject an amparo appeal on its merits, which responded to a situation resembling the one at hand: “I.- The appellants allege that for the dismissal of the protected party from the position of Municipal Mayor of [Name2] and Parrita, the due process contained in the new Municipal Code, Law 7794, Articles 149 and following, should have been followed, since by not having done so, his fundamental rights were violated. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate to the appellants, first, that Articles 149 and following of the current Municipal Code were instituted as a procedural guarantee in favor of the corporation’s officials or subordinates in the various municipal departments, but not regarding the Municipal Mayor who, due to the special nature of his post, must be removed by a procedure different from that established in said articles. Thus, in Articles 18 and 19 of the Municipal Code, a procedure for removal or loss of credentials of the Municipal Mayor is established, which must be observed by the Municipal Council in order to dismiss said official from his position, who—for all purposes—holds a position and a function distinct from that of the other lower-ranking municipal officials. Notwithstanding this and, secondly, it is necessary to clarify for the petitioners that the case now being resolved is not framed within the legal requirements demanded by the new Municipal Code regarding his removal, for the following reason. As observed from the documentation attached to the case file, (folio 16), his appointment occurred under the old selection methods for the Municipal Executive, contained in Law 4574 of May 4, 1970, Articles 55 to 59, which is why his appointment and removal are the exclusive competence of the Municipal Council. Law 7794 reaffirms this in its Transitory Provision II, first paragraph. Moreover, and not having been appointed by popular election, under the terms stipulated in Article 14, third paragraph, the procedural requirement of Article 19, regarding the plebiscite, would only be indispensable under that scenario, a situation that did not occur in this case and, therefore, such a procedure is unnecessary, being sufficient for this specific case, the agreement of the Municipal Council adopted by no less than two-thirds of the council members comprising it, all according to the provisions of Article 58 of the former Municipal Code and Transitory Provision II of the new Municipal Code. II.- For the reasons stated in the preceding considering clause, and given that, as shown by the certification attached to the case file at folio 16, the protected party was appointed to the position of Municipal Mayor of [Name2] and Parrita, effective July 1, 1998, which implies that prior to his dismissal, due process did not have to be guaranteed, pursuant to the new provisions governing the matter, but rather, pursuant to the agreement adopted by the Municipal Council—as occurred in this case—, consequently, the Chamber notes that if the protected parties believe that the motives and grounds invoked in the agreement for his dismissal are improper, that disagreement, by its nature, must be resolved—if the petitioners so deem appropriate—in the corresponding ordinary jurisdiction (vía ordinaria), since this Court lacks jurisdiction on that matter. For the reasons stated, the appeal is improper and must be so declared.” Finally, it is worth noting that in Vote No. 78 of this other Chamber at 10:10 a.m. on February 11, 2004, in light of the precedents emanating from the constitutionality oversight body, not only was the thesis about the necessity of following due process for the termination of the Municipal Executive’s position not endorsed, but it was further added: “… even though the plaintiff was appointed Municipal Executive for the period from July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2002, that is, during the transition period referred to in Transitory Provision II of the current Municipal Code (Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998) which entered into force on July 18, 1998 (two months after its publication in La Gaceta No. 94 of May 18, 1998), whereby the title of his position changed to that of Mayor, that does not mean he became covered by the specific causes and dismissal procedure, particularly by prior plebiscite, established in Articles 14 in fine, 18, and 19 of the current Municipal Code, since his appointment did not occur through popular election but rather he was designated, as Municipal Executives were appointed until then, that is, by the Municipal Council in a discretionary, free, and direct manner. Without any prior competitive selection procedure. The cited jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber being binding and applicable in his case, according to which, being a trust-based official subject to free removal, no prior procedure was required before dismissal. Consequently, his allegation of violation of due process is not acceptable …”. Taking into account these precedents, which are binding for this other Chamber (Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law), to resolve the case, one must abide by the special relationship between the parties starting from the full-tenure appointment of Mr. [Name3] as Municipal Executive. In that vein, in application of the transitory rule to which reference has been made, one must start from the power of the Municipal Council to freely choose and remove the Mayor (who had been holding the position of Municipal Executive), without being subject to following due process for such purpose, given his nature as a trust-based official, the assenting vote of two-thirds of the Council members being sufficient. And, furthermore, attending to the content of the cited Vote No. 1119-90, one must reach the conclusion that between the person occupying the executive body (be it called Municipal Executive or Mayor) of the Municipality and the latter, there exists a relationship for a determined time by provision of law and not for an indefinite time. This Chamber has so reiterated based on that pronouncement: “… , in view that the Constitutional Chamber determined that the contract binding a Municipal Executive to his municipality is for a fixed term and not for an indefinite time; that is how the legal point must be understood, because, as indicated, not only the jurisprudence but even the simple precedents emanating from that high Court are binding, as they produce erga omnes effects.” (vote number 285 at 10:40 a.m. on November 25, 1998) (on this point, see also, among others, rulings number 27 at 8:30 a.m. on January 26, 1996, and 260 at 10:20 a.m. on May 16, 2001). From the foregoing it is deduced that, in the scenario where a public servant linked to the Administration—in this case to the municipal entity—through a relationship for an indefinite time, opts for or accepts a trust-based position, subject to a determined time by provision of law, the relationship becomes one for a determined time, with distinct and special characteristics. In Vote No. 791 at 2:30 p.m. on December 18, 2003, an opportunity arose to analyze a similar situation, this time, of a female official of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), who was linked for a considerable number of years through an indefinite-term relationship and then accepted a position as Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic (Subcontralora General de la República), which by law was for a determined time. For the resolution of that matter, the content of the aforementioned Vote No. 1119-90 was again invoked, to consider: “… the plaintiff decided to resign from her full-tenure position as Director of the General Directorate of Legal Affairs, which she held within the Comptroller General of the Republic itself, in order to continue performing her role as Deputy Comptroller. Consequently, another person was appointed with full tenure in her place. The plaintiff seeks payment of severance pay (auxilio de cesantía); however, just as the State’s legal representative argues, we are not in the presence of the factual scenarios that permit the granting of that right; because the plaintiff’s appointment to the position of Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic was for a determined time, as expressly stipulated by the Political Constitution. Indeed, by constitutional provision (see Article 183), it is clear that appointments to the positions of Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic are made for a term of eight years, without prejudice to a possible re-election, which did not occur in the specific case. In this way, as stated in the previous considerations, regardless of the permanent nature of the functions performed by the plaintiff, the position she held must be considered as one for a determined time, by express regulatory provision; because precisely in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, a concrete and determined appointment term was established for said position; although extendable. Her relationship was a single one, only that from a certain moment it ceased to be for an indefinite time and became, upon changing positions, one for a fixed term, optionally renewable by the employer. Therefore, the natural or typical indemnities of an indefinite-term contract cannot legally be granted to the plaintiff; given that her post as Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic was a position she assumed for a determined time, by express regulatory provision. For the reasons stated, the plaintiff cannot validly claim payment of severance pay; because from the moment she was appointed to the indicated position, she was aware of the date her functions would end; as well as the legal consequences entailed by the resignation she made from the full-tenure position she held as Director of the General Directorate of Legal Affairs, also at the Comptroller General of the Republic.” - V. [...] In no way could the thesis be admitted, according to which, two distinct and separate relationships with a break in continuity existed between the parties, one up to April 10, 1997, and another, from that moment on, as invoked in the appeal, nor is it therefore true that he should have claimed rights “… when the nature of the contract conditions changed.” The foregoing, because, as already explained with citation from Vote number 791 of 2003, although it is true that the initial relationship was for an indefinite time, later, upon appointing Mr. [Name1] with full tenure as Municipal Executive, the relationship changed its nature to become a relationship for a determined time [...] VII.- The defendant claims that Article 31 of the Labor Code was violated “… because in any fixed-term contract, such as the appointment of Mayors, what is appropriate in cases like the present is to apply the indemnity for early termination that this article regulates.” The first-instance judgment considered that the plaintiff was a career official, whose relationship with the Municipality was suspended upon being appointed Mayor, and lacking evidence to conclude the existence of reincorporation to his previous position or payment of the items typical of dismissal with employer liability, taking into account the plaintiff’s average salary prior to his appointment as Mayor, it granted, among other items, notice pay (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía). The challenged judgment indicated that as no dismissal occurred at the time Mr. [Name1] was appointed Municipal Executive, one might think those items did not correspond to him; but, it did not analyze the point because their granting was not a cause for grievance, limiting itself in the appeal to asserting that the right to collect them had expired. It adds that “… the defendant acquiesced to the ruling, except regarding the mathematical calculations verified by the lower court for notice pay, severance pay, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), and vacation pay (vacaciones) for the first part of the relationship, which, contrary to what was stated, turn out to be correct.” In accordance with what was analyzed in Considering Clause II of this decision, Mr. [Name3], upon accepting a full-tenure position for a determined time by provision of law, by his own will caused his relationship, until then for an indefinite time, to become for a determined time, and hence, in no way could he claim the right to indemnities for notice pay and severance pay typical of that other nature; and he could only opt for the items provided for in Article 31 of the Labor Code. However, it is noted that the point was not analyzed by the Court, which alleged limitations in the appeal. That reasoning is not contested at this instance, and for that reason, this Chamber cannot take cognizance of it (Article 560 of the Labor Code) [...]. XVII.- Regarding the average salary taken into account to calculate the items of notice pay and severance pay, the appellant argues that if the plaintiff worked uninterruptedly for the Municipality from March 8, 1964, to January 24, 2002, it is not logical, reasonable, or legal for the order to pay notice pay and severance pay to be made in violation of subsection b) of Article 30 of the Labor Code by not evaluating the average salary of the last six months earned, using a fiction not contemplated in said rule to calculate them. Consequently, it requests the revocation or modification of the amounts granted for those concepts and to order that they be calculated based on the average salary earned during the six months prior to January 24, 2002. Also, in a subsidiary manner, it requests that calculations be made based on a monthly average of two hundred fifty-one thousand five hundred twenty-one colones and forty-nine céntimos. This petition cannot be endorsed by this body. In a case like the present, the recognition of said items would not be appropriate, and if the Chamber does not revoke their recognition by the instance judges, it is simply due to a matter of procedural preclusion (ver Considerando VII). In any case, as observed, said items were granted for the period worked at the Municipality before being appointed as Municipal Mayor, and hence, indeed, a salary corresponding to positions held subsequently cannot be taken into account; for, it is repeated, a work period is being indemnified on the understanding that during that period the relationship was for an indefinite time, to later become related for a determined time.” **IV.-** It is necessary first to determine whether between the parties there existed a single service relationship, whether two distinct relationships can be identified, or whether it is a matter of a single one modified over time due to having accepted a position for a determined term. Article 169 of the Political Constitution states: "The administration of local interests and services in each canton shall be the responsibility of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body, composed of popularly elected municipal council members (*regidores municipales*), and an executive official designated by law" (emphasis added). According to the former Municipal Code (Law No. 4574 of May 4, 1970), that executive official is precisely the Municipal Executive (*Ejecutivo Municipal*, now Mayor). In this regard, Articles 55, 58, and 156 of that regulatory body, in order, stated: "Article 55.- The appointment of the Executive (*Ejecutivo*) shall be made by the Council (*Concejo*) in the second half of June following its installation. No person who is a council member (*regidor*) or trustee (*síndico*), principal or alternate, may be appointed Executive./ The Executive shall be appointed for four years, counted from the first of July immediately following the installation of the respective municipality and may be re-elected…" (emphasis added). "Article 58.- The Executive may only be removed or suspended from office by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the council members comprising the Council." "Article 156.- The provisions contained in this Title regarding appointment and removal procedures shall not apply to officials who report directly to the Council, nor to occasional employees hired against the budget items for Special Services or Day Laborers./ Labor actions affecting officials who report directly to the Council shall be decided by the Council." Although by Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, a new Municipal Code was enacted repealing the former one, its Transitory Provision II provided: "TRANSITORY PROVISION II.- For the 1998-2002 municipal term, the municipal executive (*ejecutivo municipal*) appointed by the respective Municipal Council shall automatically become, upon the entry into force of this law, the municipal mayor (*alcalde municipal*) with all his duties and powers. In order for said official to be removed or suspended from office, a minimum vote of two-thirds of the council members comprising the Council shall be required./ The municipal mayor shall remain in office until the mayors elected in 2002 take office…". As provided, that regulatory body entered into force two months after its publication, which was verified on May 18, 1998, and therefore it has been in effect since the following July 18. The plaintiff's situation falls within the scenario contemplated in that transitory provision; given that, in the first fact of the complaint, Mr. [Name1] stated that he began working at the Municipality of Puntarenas on March 8, 1964, in various administrative positions, being appointed provisionally as Municipal Executive as of April 10, 1997, then permanently as of the following September 19, and pursuant to the provisions of the new Municipal Code, on June 16, 1998, he was permanently appointed, this time as Mayor for the period between July 18, 1998, and February 3, 2003. From this perspective, it is important to review the relevant pronouncements issued by the Constitutional Chamber (*Sala Constitucional*) related to the special link between the municipal entity and the Municipal Executive – now Mayor – because although some of them were issued long before the plaintiff's appointment as Municipal Executive and, therefore, long before the aforementioned legal reform, they are applicable to the specific case in light of the mentioned transitory provision.

Through Decision No. 1119-90 of 14:00 hours, of September 18, 1990, that body resolved an action of unconstitutionality against Articles 55 and 58 of the former Municipal Code (Law No. 4574). In that precedent, it was considered: "III.- … It is true that the Labor Code (*Código de Trabajo*) provides that fixed-term contracts shall be deemed indefinite when, upon expiration of the term, the causes that gave rise to it and the subject matter of the work persist. But this provision cannot prevail when the establishment of the term is of legal, and not conventional, origin, as in these cases it will be a matter (when truly justified, as previously stated) of exceptions to the special regime that the Constitution authorizes by law. IV.- … the Municipal Executive is a public servant whose service relationship is specially regulated in the Municipal Code, which excludes him from the guarantee of employment stability (*estabilidad laboral*) (which does protect the rest of the municipal employees) in two senses: on the one hand, it authorizes a fixed-term appointment, for four years; on the other, it exempts his appointment and removal from the procedures indicated for this purpose in Title V of the Code regarding municipal officials who do not report directly to the Council. In this case, the guarantee of stability granted to public servants in the Constitution ends up being limited by law, as it restricts it to the requirement of a qualified vote (two-thirds of the members of the Council) for his removal before the expiration of the term, without requiring just cause. With greater reason, the expiration of the term operates as a legal cause for the extinction of the relationship, without violating Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, as it authorizes such limitations, according to what has been set forth herein." Based on this, it reached the conclusion that the challenged provisions were not contrary to the Constitution, precisely because the position of Municipal Executive had a special nature "… it is a form of service characterized by a dual relationship with the superior body, the Municipal Council, which appoints and removes him, but which is not a hierarchical superior properly speaking. Between the executive and the Council, by effect of their own powers, there is rather a relationship of trust, compatible with his discretion in fulfilling the instructions received from it. More than under the orders of the Council, the executive is subject to its directives. (See La Municipalidad en Costa Rica, Eduardo Ortiz, Instituto de Estudios de Administración Laboral, Madrid, 1987, p. 130). It is, in short, a most special relationship, which amply justifies the exclusion from the common regime of public servants. The case is even more qualified given that the Constitution itself gave a different rank and character to the entire Municipal Regime, granting it autonomy, and limiting itself to merely indicating that the administration of local interests and services shall be the responsibility of the municipal government (popularly elected municipal council members) and an official or executive designated by law. (Constitutional Art. 169). The constituents did not even wish to give a denomination (and with it a concrete regime) to the executive official, and they provided that the law would do so. (Records of the Constituent Assembly No. 80 art. 3). It is clear that he is an official of special rank, of *sui generis* character, who even though he may be considered a public servant, is one of the cases of exception authorized by the Constitution, and who is outside the Civil Service Statute or Regime; even the Constitution itself treats him as a special case in the title dedicated to the Municipal Regime." Subsequently, the constitutionality of Article 156 of that same body of law was questioned, which gave rise to Decision No. 2859 of 14:45 hours of September 8, 1992, in which the considerations expressed in that Judgment 1119-90 were reiterated, adding: "II- Article 169 of the Political Constitution indicates that the administration of municipal interests and services is the responsibility of the Municipal Government, formed by a deliberative body of popular election and an executive official designated by law, which in this particular case is the Municipal Code. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the Executive is not just one more municipal official, but also a true political agent, responsible for the executive branch of that autonomous unit of government called the Municipality. His powers are broad and his responsibilities, therefore, are great, both from the legal standpoint and as the primary repository of public trust for the correct administration and solution of community needs, trust that is transmitted to him by the delegation he receives from the Constitution itself in the provision commented on here, and from the same corporation, by virtue of the mandate he receives in the act of his appointment made by the Council. As general administrator and head of municipal departments, in charge of organization, operation, and coordination, as well as the correct execution of the Council's agreements (Art. 57 Municipal Code), he has political, executive, and administrative functions and is not subordinate except to the law in the exercise of his functions and to the Council itself, in what pertains to the fulfillment of plans, goals, and objectives, the application of internal regulations and rules, and budget execution, powers that all emanate from the Council as a manifestation of its own autonomy. Therefore, under no circumstances can it be understood that he is a simple subordinate of the municipal council members, who can only indicate to him the limits of his actions, by means of agreements adopted in prior deliberation, but never individually or outside the solemnity of the session. That is to say, the municipal council members exercise the Local Government functions entrusted to them by the direct vote of citizens, only when they concur with their votes in the adoption of decisions that concern the entire municipality, in the course of a legally convened session for those purposes. Consequently, the relationship of the Municipal Executive with the Council is not properly hierarchical, because the essential administrative functions within his purview are exercised exclusively and to the exclusion of the Council itself; in summary, he constitutes the 'executive' part of the Municipal Government, and therefore, the ordinary regulations of the other employees and officials referred to in Articles 149 and 154 of the Code on that matter do not apply to him in his links with the Municipality." In Decision No. 1613-93 of 9:39 hours of April 2, 1993, the considerations expressed in the aforementioned precedents 1119-90 and 2859-92 were reiterated, regarding the non-existence of the obligation to follow due process for trust officials, a group in which the Municipal Executive was placed. For its part, in ruling number 425-95 of 9:39 hours of January 20, 1995, an amparo appeal (*recurso de amparo*) was rejected on the grounds that the dismissal of a municipal executive only requires the conforming vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council, without the need to follow due process (On the lack of necessity to follow a prior process for the dismissal of the Municipal Executive – now Mayor – one may also consult Constitutional Chamber Decisions numbers 177-93 of 10:06 hours of January 15, 1993; 177-94 of 17:42 hours of January 11, 1994; 7483-99 of 18:21 hours of September 28, 1999; 9309-2000 of 9:28 hours of October 20, 2000; and 10628-2001 of 9:47 hours of October 19, 2001). On the other hand, it is pertinent to bring to bear the reasoning set forth in Decision No. 788-2000 of 17:03 hours of January 25, 2000, to reject an amparo appeal on the merits, which responded to a situation similar to the one at hand: "I.- The appellants allege that for the removal of the protected party from the position of Municipal Mayor of [Name2] and Parrita, the due process contained in the new Municipal Code, Law 7794, articles 149 and following, should have been followed, since not having done so violates his fundamental rights. In this regard, it is necessary to state to the appellants, first, that articles 149 and following of the current Municipal Code were established as a procedural guarantee in favor of the officials of the corporation or subordinates of the different municipal departments, but not with respect to the Municipal Mayor who, due to the special nature of his position, must be removed by a procedure different from that established in said numerals. Thus, in articles 18 and 19 of the Municipal Code, a procedure for the removal or loss of credentials of the Municipal Mayor is established, which must be observed by the Municipal Council in order to remove said official from his position who - for all purposes - holds a position and function distinct from those of the other lower-ranking municipal officials. Notwithstanding this and, secondly, it is necessary to clarify to the petitioners that the case now decided is not framed within the legal prerequisites required by the new Municipal Code regarding his removal, for the following reason. As observed from the documentation submitted to the record, (folio 16), his appointment occurred under the old formulas for the election of the Municipal Executive, contained in Law 4574 of May fourth, nineteen seventy, articles 55 to 59, which is why his appointment and removal are the exclusive competence of the Municipal Council. Transitory Provision II, first paragraph, of Law 7794 reaffirms this. Moreover, and not having been named by popular election, pursuant to the provisions of article 14, third paragraph, the procedural requirement of article 19, and regarding the plebiscite, would only be indispensable under that scenario, a situation that did not occur in the present case and, therefore, said procedure is unnecessary, merely requiring for this specific case, the agreement of the Municipal Council adopted by no less than two-thirds of the council members comprising it, all according to the provisions of article 58 of the previous Municipal Code and Transitory Provision II of the new Municipal Code. II.- Based on the foregoing consideration, and by virtue of the fact that as inferred from the certification attached to the record at folio 16, the protected party was appointed to the position of Municipal Mayor of [Name2] and Parrita, beginning July first, nineteen ninety-eight, which implies that prior to his dismissal, due process should not have been guaranteed according to the new provisions governing the matter, but on the contrary, according to the agreement adopted by the Municipal Council - as occurred in this case -, consequently, the Chamber warns that if the protected parties consider the reasons and grounds adduced in the agreement for his dismissal to be improper, that disagreement by its nature must be resolved - if the petitioners deem it appropriate - in the corresponding ordinary jurisdiction, as this Court lacks any jurisdiction in that regard. Based on the foregoing, the appeal is improper and must be declared so." Finally, it is worth outlining that in Decision number 78 of 10:10 hours of February 11, 2004, from this other Chamber (*Sala*), in light of the precedents issued by the constitutionality review body, not only was the thesis regarding the necessity of following due process for the cessation of the position of Municipal Executive not endorsed, but also, it was added: "… although the plaintiff was appointed Municipal Executive for the period from July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2002, that is, during the transition period referred to in Transitory Provision II of the current Municipal Code (Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998) which entered into force on July 18, 1998 (two months after its publication in La Gaceta No. 94 of May 18, 1998), whereby the denomination of his position changed to that of Mayor, this does not mean that he became protected by the specific causes and procedure for dismissal, in particular by prior plebiscite, established in articles 14 *in fine*, 18 and 19 of the current Municipal Code, since his appointment did not occur by popular election but rather he was designated, as Municipal Executives were appointed until then, that is, by the Municipal Council and in a discretionary, free, and direct manner. Without any prior selection process. The cited jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber being binding and applicable in his case, according to which, being a trust official and freely removable, no prior procedure for dismissal was required. Consequently, his allegation of violation of due process is not receivable…".

Taking into account those precedents, which are binding for this other Chamber (Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law), to resolve the case, the special relationship between the parties must be relied upon from the permanent appointment of Mr. [Name3] as Municipal Executive. In this regard, in application of the transitory provision to which reference has been made, one must start from the power of the Municipal Council to freely elect and remove the Mayor (who had been holding the position of Municipal Executive), without being subject to following due process for such purpose, given the nature of a trust official, a conforming vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council being sufficient. And, furthermore, taking into account the content of the cited Decision 1119-90, one must reach the conclusion that between the person occupying the executive body (whether called Municipal Executive or Mayor) of the Municipality and the latter, there exists a relationship for a determined term by provision of law, and not for an indefinite term. This has been reiterated by the Chamber based on that pronouncement: "…, in view that the Constitutional Chamber determined that the contract binding a Municipal Executive to his municipality is for a fixed term and not for an indefinite period; the legal point must be understood in that manner, as, as indicated, not only the jurisprudence but even the simple precedents emanating from that high Court are binding, as they produce *erga omnes* effects." (decision number 285 of 10:40 hours of November 25, 1998) (on this point, one may also consult, among others, judgments numbers 27 of 8:30 hours of January 26, 1996, and 260 of 10:20 hours of May 16, 2001). From the foregoing, it is inferred that, in the event that a public servant linked to the Administration – in this case to the municipal entity – through an indefinite-term relationship, opts for or accepts a trust position, subject to a determined term by provision of law, the relationship becomes one for a determined term, with distinct and special characteristics. In Decision No. 791 of 14:30 hours of December 18, 2003, there was an opportunity to analyze a similar situation, this time, of a female official of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (*Contraloría General de la República*), who had been linked for a considerable number of years through an indefinite-term relationship and then accepted a position as Assistant Comptroller General of the Republic, a position provided by law to be for a determined term. To resolve that matter, recourse was again made to the content of the aforementioned Decision 1119-90, to consider: "… the plaintiff decided to resign from her permanent position, as Director of the General Directorate of Legal Affairs, which she held at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic itself, in order to continue performing her position as Assistant Comptroller. Consequently, another person was permanently appointed in her place.

The plaintiff seeks payment of the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía); however, as argued by the State's legal representative, the factual circumstances that would allow the granting of that right are not present, because the plaintiff's appointment to the position of Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic (Subcontralora General de la República) was for a fixed term (por tiempo determinado), as expressly provided by the Political Constitution. Indeed, by constitutional mandate (see Article 183), it is clear that the appointment to the positions of Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic is made for an eight-year term, without prejudice to possible re-election, which did not occur in this specific case. Thus, as set forth in the preceding considerations, regardless of the permanent nature of the duties performed by the plaintiff, the position she held must be considered a fixed-term position, due to an express regulatory provision; for, precisely, Article 183 of the Political Constitution established a specific and determined appointment term for said position, albeit renewable. Her relationship was a single one, except that from a specific moment it ceased to be for an indefinite term and became, upon changing positions, a fixed-term one, optionally renewable for the employer. Consequently, the indemnities natural or inherent to an indefinite-term contract cannot be legally granted to the plaintiff, given that her position as Deputy Comptroller General of the Republic was a fixed-term position she assumed by express regulatory mandate. For the reasons stated, the plaintiff cannot validly claim payment of the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), since, from the moment she was appointed to the indicated position, she was aware of the end date of her duties, as well as the legal consequences entailed by her resignation from the position she held as a permanent employee (en propiedad), as Director of the General Directorate of Legal Affairs (Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos), also at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República).” - V. [...] In no way could the thesis be admitted that two separate and distinct relationships existed between the parties, with a break in continuity—one until April 10, 1997, and another beginning on that date—as invoked in the appeal; therefore, it is also untrue that she should have claimed her rights "...when the nature of the contract conditions changed." The foregoing is because, as already explained with reference to Voto 791 of 2003, although it is true that initially the engagement was for an indefinite term, later, upon [Name1] being appointed permanently (en propiedad) as Municipal Executive (Ejecutivo Municipal), the nature of the relationship changed to become a fixed-term relationship [...] VII.- For the defendant, Article 31 of the Labor Code was violated "...since, given any fixed-term contract, like the appointment of Mayors (Alcaldes), what corresponds in cases such as this one is to apply the indemnity for early termination regulated by this article." The first-instance judgment considered that the plaintiff was a career civil servant, whose relationship with the Municipality was suspended upon being appointed as Mayor (Alcalde), and, finding no evidence to conclude that there was a reinstatement to his previous position or payment of the entitlements proper to a dismissal with employer liability, taking into account the plaintiff's average salary before his appointment as Mayor (Alcalde), it recognized, among other entitlements, advance notice (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). The contested judgment noted that since no dismissal took place when [Name1] was appointed as Municipal Executive (Ejecutivo Municipal), one might think those entitlements were not owed to him; but it did not proceed to analyze the point because its granting was not a cause of grievance, limiting itself in the appeal to asserting that the right to collect was time-barred. It adds that "...the defendant acquiesced to the ruling, except regarding the mathematical calculations verified by the lower court (a quo) for advance notice (preaviso), severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), and vacation pay for the first part of the relationship, which, contrary to what was argued, turn out to be correct." In accordance with the analysis in Considerando II of this judgment, [Name3], by accepting a permanent position for a fixed term by legal provision, by his own will caused his previously indefinite-term relationship to become a fixed-term one; hence, he could in no way claim the right to the indemnities for advance notice (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía) inherent to that other nature; he could only opt for the entitlements provided for in Article 31 of the Labor Code. However, it is observed that this point was not subject to analysis by the Court, which alleged limitations in the appeal. That reasoning is not challenged in this instance, and for that reason the Chamber cannot consider it (Article 560 of the Labor Code) [...]. XVII.- Regarding the average salary taken into account to calculate the entitlements for advance notice (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), the appellant argues that if the plaintiff worked continuously for the Municipality from March 8, 1964, to January 24, 2002, it is not logical, reasonable, or legal for the order to pay advance notice (preaviso) and severance (cesantía) to violate subsection b) of Article 30 of the Labor Code by not valuing the average of the last six months' salaries earned, using a fiction not contemplated in said rule to calculate them. Consequently, it requests that the amounts granted for those concepts be revoked or modified and that they be ordered to be calculated based on the average salary earned during the six months prior to January 24, 2002. Also, on a subsidiary basis, it requests that the calculations be made based on a monthly average of two hundred fifty-one thousand five hundred twenty-one colones and forty-nine céntimos. This petition cannot be endorsed by this body. In a case such as this, the recognition of said entitlements would not be appropriate, and if the Chamber does not revoke their recognition by the lower courts, it is simply due to a matter of procedural preclusion (see Considerando VII). In any event, as observed, those line items were granted for the period worked at the Municipality before being appointed as Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal); therefore, a salary corresponding to positions held subsequently cannot effectively be taken into account; for, it bears repeating, a period of service is being indemnified on the understanding that during that period the relationship was for an indefinite term, later changing to a fixed-term relationship.

"IV.- En primer término precisa determinar si entre las partes existió una única relación de servicio, si pueden identificarse dos distintas relaciones o si se trata de una sola modificada en el tiempo en razón de haberse aceptado un cargo por tiempo determinado. El artículo 169 de la Constitución Política reza: “ La administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón, estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal, formado de un cuerpo deliberante, integrado por regidores municipales de elección popular, y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designará la ley ” (énfasis suplido). Según el anterior Código Municipal (Ley N° 4574 del 4 de mayo de 1970), ese funcionario ejecutivo es precisamente el Ejecutivo Municipal (hoy Alcalde). En lo que interesa, respecto del mismo, los artículos 55, 58 y 156, de ese cuerpo normativo, por su orden expresaban: “ Artículo 55.- El nombramiento del Ejecutivo lo hará el Concejo en la segunda quincena del mes de junio siguiente a su instalación. No podrá ser nombrado Ejecutivo quien sea regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente./ El Ejecutivo será nombrado por cuatro años, contados a partir del primero de julio inmediato a la instalación de la respectiva municipalidad y podrá ser reelecto …” (énfasis suplido). “ Artículo 58.- El Ejecutivo sólo podrá ser removido o suspendido de su cargo por votación no menor de las dos terceras partes de los regidores que integran el Concejo. ”. “ Artículo 156.- Las disposiciones contenidas en este Título sobre procedimientos de nombramiento y remoción, no serán aplicables a los funcionarios que dependan directamente del Concejo, ni a los empleados ocasionales contratados con cargo a las partidas presupuestarias de Servicios Especiales o Jornales./ Las acciones laborales que afecten a los funcionarios que dependen directamente del Concejo serán acordadas por éste. ”. Aunque por Ley N° 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998, se dictó un nuevo Código Municipal derogatorio del anterior; en su Transitorio II se dispuso: “ TRANSITORIO II.- Para el período municipal de 1998-2002, el ejecutivo municipal nombrado por el Concejo Municipal respectivo se convertirá automáticamente, en el momento de entrar en vigencia esta ley, en el alcalde municipal con todos sus deberes y atribuciones. Para que dicho funcionario pueda ser removido o suspendido de su cargo, se requerirá una votación mínima de las dos terceras partes de los regidores que integren el Concejo./ El alcalde municipal se mantendrá en su cargo hasta que los alcaldes electos en el 2002 tomen posesión de sus cargos …”. Según se dispuso, ese cuerpo normativo entró en vigencia dos meses después de su publicación, la cual se verificó el 18 de mayo de 1998, por lo que rige a partir del 18 de julio siguiente. La situación del demandante se enmarca dentro del supuesto contemplado en esa norma transitoria; por cuanto, en el hecho primero de la demanda don [Nombre1] indicó que comenzó a laborar en la Municipalidad de Puntarenas desde el 8 de marzo de 1964 en diversos puestos administrativos, nombrándosele interinamente como Ejecutivo Municipal a partir del 10 de abril de 1997, luego en propiedad desde el 19 de setiembre siguiente y en aplicación de lo dispuesto en el nuevo Código Municipal el 16 de junio de 1998 fue nombrado en propiedad, esta vez como Alcalde para el periodo comprendido entre el 18 de julio de 1998 y el 3 de febrero del 2003. Desde esa perspectiva, resulta importante hacer un recuento de los pronunciamientos relevantes dictados por la Sala Constitucional relacionados con la especial vinculación entre el ente municipal y el Ejecutivo Municipal –hoy Alcalde-, porque aunque algunos de ellos fueron dictados mucho tiempo antes del nombramiento del actor como Ejecutivo Municipal y, por ende, mucho antes de la aludida reforma legal, resultan aplicables al caso concreto, a la luz de la mencionada norma transitoria. Mediante el Voto de ese órgano N° 1119-90 de las 14:00 horas, del 18 de setiembre de 1990 se resolvió una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 55 y 58 del antiguo Código Municipal (Ley N° 4574). En ese antecedente se consideró: “ III.- … Es verdad que el Código de Trabajo dispone que los contratos a plazo fijo se tendrán como de plazo indeterminado cuando al vencer el plazo subsistan las causas que le dieron origen y la materia del trabajo. Pero esta disposición no puede prevalecer cuando la fijación del plazo es de origen legal, y no convencional, pues en estos casos se tratará (cuando sea verdaderamente justificado, como se expresó antes) de excepciones al régimen especial que la Constitución autoriza por vía de ley. IV.- … el Ejecutivo Municipal es un servidor público cuya relación de servicio se encuentra regulada de modo especial en el Código Municipal, el cual lo excluye de la garantía de estabilidad laboral (que sí protege al resto de los empleados municipales) en dos sentidos: por una parte, autoriza un nombramiento a plazo fijo, por cuatro años; de otra, exonera su nombramiento y remoción de los procedimientos que al efecto señala el Título V del Código tratándose de los funcionarios municipales que no dependan directamente del Concejo. En este caso, la garantía de estabilidad otorgada a los servidores públicos en la Constitución, viene a resultar limitada por la ley, pues la restringe al requisito de una votación calificada (dos terceras partes de los miembros del Concejo) para su remoción antes del vencimiento del plazo, sin requerir justa causa. Con mayor razón, el vencimiento del plazo opera como causal de extinción legal de la relación, sin que se violenten por todo esto, los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución, pues ella autoriza dichas limitaciones, según lo expuesto hasta aquí. ”. Con base en ello, arribó a la conclusión de que las normas impugnadas no resultaban contrarias a la Carta Fundamental, precisamente, porque el cargo del Ejecutivo Municipal tenía una naturaleza especial “… se trata de un forma de servicio caracterizada por una relación dual con el órgano superior, el Concejo Municipal, que lo nombra y remueve, pero que no es un superior jerárquico propiamente dicho. Entre el ejecutivo y el Concejo existe, por efecto de sus atribuciones propias, más bien una relación de confianza, compatible con su discrecionalidad en el cumplimiento de las instrucciones que de él recibe. Más que a órdenes del Concejo el ejecutivo está sometido a sus directrices. (Véase la Municipalidad en Costa Rica, Eduardo Ortiz, Instituto de Estudios de Administración Laboral, Madrid, 1987, pág. 130). Se trata, en suma, de una relación especialísima, que justifica ampliamente la exclusión del régimen común de los servidores públicos. El caso es aún más calificado puesto que la Constitución misma dio un rango y carácter diferente a todo el Régimen Municipal, otorgándole autonomía, y limitándose a señalar, apenas, que la administración de los intereses y servicios locales estará a cargo del gobierno municipal (regidores municipales de elección popular) y de un funcionario o ejecutivo que designará la ley. (Art.169 constitucional). Los constituyentes no quisieron siquiera darle una denominación (y con ello un régimen concreto) al funcionario ejecutivo, y dispusieron que ello lo haría la ley. (Actas Asamblea Constituyente No. 80 art.3). Es claro que se trata de un funcionario de rango especial, de carácter sui géneris, que aunque pueda estimarse un servidor público, es uno de los casos de excepción autorizados por la Constitución, y que están fuera del Estatuto o Régimen de Servicio Civil; como un caso especial lo trata, incluso, la misma Constitución en el título dedicado al Régimen Municipal. ”. Luego, se cuestionó la constitucionalidad del artículo 156 de ese mismo cuerpo legal, lo que dio origen al Voto N° 2859 de las 14:45 horas del 8 de setiembre de 1992, en el cual se reiteraron las consideraciones vertidas en aquella sentencia 1119-90, agregándose: “ II- El artículo 169 de la Constitución Política señala que la administración de los intereses y servicios municipales, están a cargo del Gobierno Municipal, formado por un cuerpo deliberante de elección popular y un funcionario ejecutivo que designa la ley, que en este caso particular, es el Código Municipal. De lo anterior se infiere que el Ejecutivo no es sólo un funcionario municipal más, sino, además, un verdadero agente político, responsable de la rama ejecutiva de esa unidad de gobierno autónoma que se denomina Municipalidad. Amplias son sus atribuciones y grandes, por ello, sus responsabilidades, tanto desde el punto de vista legal, como por ser el principal depositario de la confianza popular para la correcta administración y solución de las necesidades comunales, confianza que le es transmitida por la delegación que recibe de la propia Constitución en la norma aquí comentada y de la misma corporación, en virtud del mandato que recibe en el acto de su nombramiento que hace el Concejo. Como administrador general y jefe de las dependencias municipales, encargado de la organización, funcionamiento y coordinación, así como de la correcta ejecución de los acuerdos del Concejo (Art. 57 Código Municipal), tiene funciones políticas, ejecutivas y administrativas y no está subordinado más que a la ley en el ejercicio de sus funciones y al mismo Concejo, en lo que atañe al cumplimiento de los planes, metas y objetivos, la aplicación de los reglamentos y normas internas y la ejecución del presupuesto, facultades que emanan todas del Concejo como manifestación de su propia autonomía. Por ello, bajo ningún concepto se puede entender, que es un simple subordinado de los regidores municipales, quienes sólo pueden indicarle los límites de sus actuaciones, por medio de acuerdos adoptados en deliberación previa, pero nunca en forma individual o fuera de la solemnidad de la sesión. Es decir, los regidores municipales ejercen las funciones de Gobierno Local que se les encomienda por el voto directo de los ciudadanos, únicamente, cuando concurren con sus votos en la adopción de decisiones que atañen a todo el municipio, en el decurso de una sesión legalmente convocada para esos efectos. Consecuentemente, la relación del Ejecutivo Municipal con el Concejo, no es jerárquica propiamente dicha, porque lo esencial de las funciones administrativas que le competen, las ejerce en forma exclusiva y con exclusión del mismo Concejo; en síntesis, conforma la parte "ejecutiva" del Gobierno Municipal y por ello no se le aplican, en sus vinculaciones con la Municipalidad, las regulaciones ordinarias de los demás empleados y funcionarios a que aluden los artículos 149 y 154 del Código de esa materia. ”. En el Voto N° 1613-93 de las 9:39 horas del 2 de abril de 1993 se reiteraron las consideraciones externadas en los antecedentes aludidos 1119-90 y 2859-92, con relación a la inexistencia de la obligación de seguir el debido proceso a funcionarios de confianza, en cuyo grupo se ubicó al Ejecutivo Municipal. Por su parte, en el fallo número 425-95 de las 9:39 horas del 20 de enero de 1995 se rechazó un recurso de amparo por estimar que la destitución de un ejecutivo municipal solamente requiere el voto conforme de las dos terceras partes de los integrantes del Concejo, sin que sea necesario seguir un debido proceso (Sobre la no necesidad de seguir un proceso previo para la destitución del Ejecutivo Municipal –hoy Alcalde- también se pueden consultar los Votos de la Sala Constitucional números 177-93 de las 10:06 horas del 15 de enero de 1993; 177-94 de las 17:42 horas del 11 de enero de 1994; 7483-99 de las 18:21 horas del 28 de setiembre de 1999; 9309-2000 de las 9:28 horas del 20 de octubre del 2000 y; 10628-2001 de las 9:47 horas del 19 de octubre del 2001). Por otro lado, interesa traer a cuenta los razonamientos expuestos en el Voto N° 788-2000 de las 17:03 horas del 25 de enero del 2000 para rechazar por el fondo un recurso de amparo, el cual dio respuesta a una situación que se asemeja a la que nos ocupa: “ I.- Los recurrentes alegan que para la destitución del amparado del cargo de Alcalde Municipal de [Nombre2] y Parrita, se debió seguir el debido proceso contenido en el nuevo Código Municipal, Ley 7794, artículos 149 y siguientes, toda vez que al no haberlo hecho, se violan sus derechos fundamentales. Al respecto es menester indicarles a los recurrentes, en primer lugar, que los artículo 149 y siguientes del Código Municipal vigente, se instauraron como una garantía procesal en favor de los funcionarios de la corporación o subalternos de los distintos departamentos del municipio, no así respecto del Alcalde Municipal quien, por la especialidad de su puesto, debe ser removido por un procedimiento distinto al establecido en dichos numerales. Es así como, en los artículos 18 y 19 del Código Municipal, se establece un procedimiento de remoción o de pérdida de credencial del Alcalde Municipal, el cual debe ser observado por el Concejo Municipal a fin de destituir de su cargo a dicho funcionario quien -para todos los efectos- posee un puesto y una función distinta a la de los demás funcionarios municipales de rango inferior. No obstante ello y, en segundo lugar, es necesario aclararle a los petentes que, el caso que ahora se resuelve, no se encuentra enmarcado dentro de los presupuestos de derecho que exige el nuevo Código Municipal en cuanto a su remoción, por lo siguiente. Según se observa de la documentación allegada a los autos, (folio 16), su nombramiento se dio bajo las antiguas fórmulas de elección del Ejecutivo Municipal, contenidas en la Ley 4574 de cuatro de mayo de mil novecientos setenta, artículos 55 a 59, motivo por el cual su nombramiento y remoción son competencia exclusiva del Concejo Municipal. Así lo reafirma la Ley 7794 en su Transitorio II, párrafo primero. Por otra parte, y al no haber sido nombrado por elección popular, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 14 párrafo tercero, el requisito procesal del artículo 19, y en cuanto al plebiscito se refiere, sólo sería indispensable bajo ese supuesto, situación que en el presente caso no se dio y, por ende, dicho procedimiento es innecesario, bastando únicamente para este caso concreto, el acuerdo del Concejo Municipal tomado por no menos de las dos terceras partes de los regidores que lo integran, todo según lo dispone el artículo 58 del Código Municipal anterior y el Transitorio II del nuevo Código Municipal. II.- Por lo expuesto en el considerando anterior, y en virtud de que conforme se desprende de la certificación que corre agregada a los autos a folio 16, el amparado fue nombrado en el cargo de Alcalde Municipal de [Nombre2] y Parrita, a partir del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, lo que implica que previo a su destitución, no debió haberse garantizado el debido proceso, conforme a las nuevas disposiciones que rigen la materia, sino por el contrario, conforme al acuerdo adoptado por el Concejo Municipal, -como ocurrió en este caso-, en consecuencia, advierte la Sala que si los amparados estiman que los motivos y fundamentos esgrimidos en el acuerdo para su destitución resultan improcedente, esa disconformidad por su naturaleza, deberá ser dirimido -si a bien lo tienen los petentes- en la vía ordinaria correspondiente, toda vez que en cuanto a ello, este Tribunal no posee competencia alguna. Por lo expuesto, el recurso resulta improcedente y así debe declararse. ”. Por último, cabe reseñar que en el Voto de esta otra Sala número 78 de las 10:10 horas del 11 de febrero del 2004, a la luz de los antecedentes emanados por el órgano contralor de constitucionalidad, no sólo no se avaló la tesis acerca de la necesidad de seguir el debido proceso para el cese del cargo del Ejecutivo Municipal, sino, además, se agregó: “… si bien el actor fue nombrado Ejecutivo Municipal por el período del 1 de julio de 1998 al 30 de junio del 2002, esto es, durante el período de transición a que alude el Transitorio II del actual Código Municipal (Ley No. 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998) que entró en vigencia el 18 de julio de 1998 (dos meses después de su publicación en La Gaceta No. 94 del 18 de mayo de 1998), por lo que la denominación de su puesto cambió a la de Alcalde, eso no significa que quedara amparado a las específicas causas y procedimiento de destitución, en particular mediante previo plebiscito, establecidas en los artículos 14 in fine, 18 y 19 del vigente Código Municipal, ya que su nombramiento no se produjo por elección popular sino que fue designado, como hasta entonces se nombraba a los Ejecutivos Municipales, esto es, por el Concejo Municipal y de una manera discrecional, libre y directa. Sin ningún procedimiento previo de concurso. Siendo vinculante y aplicable en su caso la citada jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional según la cual, por ser un funcionario de confianza y libre remoción, no se requería de ningún procedimiento previo al despido. Consiguientemente no es de recibo su alegato de violación al debido proceso …”. Tomando en cuenta esos antecedentes que para esta otra Sala resultan vinculantes (artículo 13 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional), para resolver el caso debe estarse a la especial relación entre las partes a partir del nombramiento en propiedad del señor [Nombre3] como Ejecutivo Municipal. En ese orden de ideas, en aplicación de la norma transitoria a la cual se ha hecho alusión debe partirse de la potestad del Concejo Municipal de elegir y remover libremente al Alcalde (quien venía ocupando el cargo de Ejecutivo Municipal), sin estar sujeto a seguir un debido proceso para tal propósito, dada la naturaleza de funcionario de confianza, bastando el voto conforme de las dos terceras partes de los integrantes del Concejo. Y, además, atendiendo el contenido del citado Voto 1119-90 debe arribarse a la conclusión de que entre quien ocupa el órgano ejecutivo (llámese Ejecutivo Municipal o Alcalde) de la Municipalidad y ésta existe una relación por tiempo determinado por disposición de ley y no por tiempo indefinido. Así lo ha reiterado la Sala con base en aquel pronunciamiento: “… , en vista de que la Sala Constitucional determinó que el contrato que une a un Ejecutivo Municipal, con su municipalidad, es de plazo fijo y no por tiempo indefinido; en esa forma ha de entenderse el punto jurídico, pues, como se indicó, no sólo la jurisprudencia sino hasta los simples precedentes emanados de ese alto Tribunal, son vinculantes, pues producen efectos erga omnes. ” (voto número 285 de las 10:40 horas del 25 de noviembre de 1998) (sobre el punto también se pueden consultar, entre otras, las sentencias números 27 de las 8:30 horas del 26 de enero de 1996 y 260 de las 10:20 horas del 16 de mayo del 2001). De lo expuesto se colige que, en el supuesto en que un servidor público ligado a la Administración –en este caso al ente municipal- mediante una relación por tiempo indefinido, opta o acepta un cargo de confianza, sujeto a tiempo determinado por disposición de la ley, la relación se convierte en una por tiempo determinado, con características distintas y especiales. En el Voto N° 791 de las 14:30 horas del 18 de diciembre del 2003 se tuvo la oportunidad de analizar una situación parecida, esta vez, de una funcionaria de la Contraloría General de la República, quien estuvo ligada por una cantidad considerable de años mediante una relación por tiempo indefinido para luego aceptar un cargo de Subcontralora General de la República, previsto por ley que fuera por tiempo determinado. Para la resolución de ese asunto se acudió de nuevo al contenido del aludido Voto 1119-90, para considerar: “… la actora decidió renunciar a su puesto en propiedad, como Directora de la Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos, que ocupaba en la propia Contraloría General de la República, para poder seguir desempeñando su cargo como Subcontralora. Por consiguiente, se procedió a nombrar, en propiedad, a otra persona en su lugar. La actora pretende el pago del auxilio de cesantía; no obstante, tal y como lo argumenta el representante legal del Estado, no se está en presencia de los supuestos de hecho que permitan la concesión de ese derecho; por cuanto, el nombramiento de la demandante en el puesto de Subcontralora General de la República fue por tiempo determinado, por disponerlo así expresamente la Constitución Política. En efecto, por disposición constitucional (ver artículo 183), está claro que el nombramiento en los cargos de Contralor y Subcontralor Generales de la República, se hace por un plazo de ocho años , sin perjuicio de una eventual reelección, lo que en el caso concreto no se dio. De esa manera, tal y como se expuso en las consideraciones anteriores, con independencia de la naturaleza permanente de las funciones ejecutadas por la actora, el cargo por ella ocupado debe considerarse como uno por tiempo determinado, por expresa disposición normativa; pues, precisamente, en el artículo 183 de la Constitución Política, se estableció un plazo concreto y determinado de nombramiento para dicho cargo; aunque prorrogable. Su relación fue una sola, sólo que a partir de un momento determinado dejó de ser por tiempo indefinido y se convirtió, al cambiar de puesto, a una de plazo fijo, renovable potestativamente para el empleador. Por ende, las indemnizaciones naturales o propias de un contrato por tiempo indefinido no le pueden ser legalmente concedidas a la accionante; dado que su puesto como Subcontralora General de la República, fue un cargo que asumió por tiempo determinado, por disposición normativa expresa. Por las razones expuestas, la demandante no puede válidamente pretender el pago del auxilio de cesantía; por cuanto, desde que fue nombrada en el puesto indicado, tenía conocimiento de la fecha de finalización de sus funciones; así como de las consecuencias legales que conllevaba la renuncia que hizo al puesto que ocupaba en propiedad, como Directora de la Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos, también en la Contraloría General de la República ”.- V. [...] En modo alguno podría admitirse la tesis, según la cual, entre las partes existieron dos relaciones distintas y separadas con solución de continuidad, una hasta el 10 de abril de 1997 y otra, a partir de ese momento, como se invoca en el recurso, por lo que no es cierto tampoco que los derechos debió reclamarlos “… cuando cambió la naturaleza de las condiciones del contrato ”. Lo anterior, por cuanto, según ya se explicó con cita del Voto número 791 del año 2003, si bien es cierto inicialmente la vinculación fue por tiempo indefinido, luego, al nombrarse a don [Nombre1] en propiedad como Ejecutivo Municipal la relación cambió de naturaleza para convertirse en una relación por tiempo determinado [...] VII.- Para la demandada se violentó el artículo 31 del Código de Trabajo “… pues ante todo contrato a plazo fijo, como es el nombramiento de los Alcaldes lo que corresponde en casos como el presente, es aplicar la indemnización ante la cesación anticipada, que este artículo regula ”. La sentencia de primera instancia consideró que el actor era un funcionario de carrera, cuya relación con la Municipalidad quedó suspendida al ser nombrado como Alcalde y al echar de menos prueba que permitiera concluir la existencia de una reincorporación a su puesto anterior o el pago de los extremos propios del despido con responsabilidad patronal, tomando en cuenta el promedio salarial del demandante con anterioridad a su nombramiento como Alcalde, reconoció entre otros extremos el preaviso y el auxilio de cesantía. La sentencia impugnada señaló que al no mediar un despido en el momento que don [Nombre1] fue nombrado Ejecutivo Municipal, podría pensarse que no le correspondían aquellos extremos; pero, no entró a analizar el punto por cuanto su otorgamiento no fue motivo de agravio, limitándose en el recurso de apelación a afirmar que el derecho para su cobro se encontraba prescrito. Agrega que “… la demandada se conformó con el pronunciamiento, salvo en lo relativo a los cálculos matemáticos verificados por el a quo por preaviso, auxilio de cesantía, aguinaldo y vacaciones de la primera parte de la relación, que contrario a lo expuesto resultan ser los correctos ”. Conforme con lo analizado en el Considerando II de este fallo, el señor [Nombre3] al aceptar un cargo en propiedad por tiempo determinado por disposición de ley, por su propia voluntad provocó que su relación hasta entonces por tiempo indefinido se convirtiera a tiempo determinado y de ahí que, en modo alguno podría pretender derecho a las indemnizaciones de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía propias de aquella otra naturaleza; y sólo podía optar los extremos previstos en el artículo 31 del Código de Trabajo. No obstante, se observa que el punto no fue objeto de análisis por el Tribunal alegando limitaciones en el recurso. Ese razonamiento no se combate en esta instancia y por ese motivo la Sala no puede entrar a conocerlo (artículo 560 del Código de Trabajo) [...]. XVII.- En cuanto al promedio salarial tomado en cuenta para calcular los extremos de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, el recurrente aduce que si el actor laboró ininterrumpidamente para la Municipalidad desde el 8 de marzo de 1964 al 24 de enero del 2002, no es lógico, razonable ni legal que la condenatoria al pago de preaviso y cesantía se haga con quebranto del inciso b) del artículo 30 del Código de Trabajo al no valorar el promedio de los últimos seis meses de salario devengados, usando para calcularlos una ficción no contemplada en dicha norma. En consecuencia, solicita revocar o modificar las cantidades concedidas por esos conceptos y disponer que se calculen con base en el promedio salarial devengado durante los seis meses anteriores al 24 de enero del 2002. También de modo subsidiario, pide hacer los cálculos con fundamento en un promedio mensual de doscientos cincuenta y un mil quinientos veintiún colones con cuarenta y nueve céntimos. Ese pedimento no lo puede avalar este órgano. En un caso como el presente no procedería el reconocimiento de dichos extremos y si la Sala no revoca su reconocimiento por parte de los juzgadores de instancia, es simplemente por una cuestión de preclusión procesal (ver Considerando VII). En todo caso, según se observa dichos renglones se concedieron por el periodo laborado en la Municipalidad antes de ser nombrado como Alcalde Municipal y de ahí que efectivamente no se pueda tomar en cuenta un salario correspondiente a puestos ocupados con posterioridad; pues, se repite, se está indemnizando un periodo de labores entendiendo que en ese la relación fue por tiempo indefinido para luego relacionarse por tiempo determinado.”