Hojancha Municipality — inadmissibility of prohibition pay for urban planning coordinatorMunicipalidad de Hojancha — improcedencia del pago de prohibición a coordinador de planificación urbana

II.- As provided in Article 11 of the General Public Administration Law, “1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those public services authorized by said system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act expressly regulated by written rule shall be considered authorized, at least as to its motive or content, even if imprecisely.” This means that if there is no law that expressly authorizes it, the Administration is prohibited from doing anything that is not regulated or authorized. Therefore, only those obligations that are expressly authorized by one of the written sources of the legal system can be considered legitimate and effectively enforceable against the public administration (in this regard, see among others, rulings of this Chamber No. 759 of 10:10 a.m. on September 10, and No. 595 of 9:00 a.m. on July 21, both from 2004, and No. 648 of 10:20 a.m. on October 31, 2001). III.- Different rules have granted various public servants the right to enjoy the benefit or compensation for prohibition pay (pago de prohibición). Historically, the payment of this bonus or extra pay originated in a reform introduced to the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Article 113 (current 118) established the following: “Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The General Directors, Deputy Directors, Department and Section Heads or Deputy Heads of the Tax Administration dependencies, as well as the permanent members of the Tax Administrative Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo) and their acting substitutes, may not hold other public or private positions, whether dependent or independent, with the exception of teaching or public functions performed on behalf of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are remunerated only with per diems. / In general, personnel of the entities cited above are especially prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities in the private sector related to tax matters or managerial positions or others that involve participation in technical assistance or in the decisions of the company. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their pleadings or submissions in any of the instances, except when it concerns their personal interests, those of their parents, their spouse, or their children. / In the cases of exception referred to in the article, to avail oneself of them, the decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code must be communicated to the head of the dependency.” (The bold and underlining are the editor’s). That provision gave rise to the enactment of Law No. 5867, of December 15, 1975, “Law on Compensation for Prohibition Pay” (Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición), through which the salary bonus or economic compensation for prohibition was created and the percentages of economic remuneration for this concept were set on the base salary of the Salary Scale of the Public Administration Salary Law, for Tax Administration personnel who, by reason of their positions, were subject to the prohibition contained in Article 113 (today 118) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. By means of Law No. 6008 of November 9, 1976, amended in turn by No. 6222 of May 9, 1978, Article 5 of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, was reformed, including the officials and employees of the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) referred to in Article 141 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) (244 of the current one) and graduates of the Faculty of Law who are performing such functions, as well as officials who, at the licentiate or graduate level, work for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), the Civil Registry (Registro del Estado Civil), and the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). Law 6808 also included in its Article 2 the geologists of the Executive Branch, for prohibitions contained in Executive Decree No. 4042 of September 24, 1974. Law No. 6542 of December 22, 1980, in Article 9, subsection 31, included the professional staff of the National Customs Service (Servicio Aduanero Nacional) and, in subsection 123, the National Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer. No. 6700 of December 23, 1981, in its Article 9, numeral 31, included the professional staff of the National Customs Service and in numeral 62, by fully reforming Article 1, included officials holding leadership positions in the basic financial organization of the State referred to in Article 2 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic and, additionally, the National Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer, National Accountant, National Provider, Head of the Budget Office, Head of the Budget Control Office of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), officials of the National Budget Office, and Customs Administrators. No. 6815 of September 27, 1982 (Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), in its Article 37, included officials covered by the prohibition contained in subsection a) of Article 28 of said law and Assistant Attorneys. No. 6831 of December 23, 1982, in Article 9, subsection 53, included the same servants referred to in numeral 62 of Law No. 6700 and those of the General Directorate of Industries of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines. No. 6975 of November 30, 1984, in its Article 40, included the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office (Oficina Técnica Mecanizada) of the Ministry of Finance who hold positions whose requirements are covered by the scope of each of the subsections of Article 1 of that law. No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, included in Articles 14, 15, and 16 the following officials within the prohibition pay: the first, the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks (Auditoría General de Bancos); the second, audit officials of the different entities of the Central Government; and the third, officials of the National Treasury and the National Paymaster. No. 6995 of July 22, 1985, in Article 31, authentically interprets Article 40 of Law 6975, in the sense that the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance shall be entitled to the benefits of this law, and in Article 154 included the personnel of the Customs Laboratory of the Ministry of Finance, in addition to equating, for the payment of that compensation, Tax Administration officials who are in the prohibition situation of Article 113 (today 118) of the Tax Code. No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, included in its Articles 100, 101, 102, and 104 the following officials within the prohibition pay: the first, audit officials of the National Training Institute (Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje), the Coffee Office (Oficina del Café), and Family Allowances (Asignaciones Familiares); the second, the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks; the third, adds to Article 1.2, including within the benefits and prohibitions of said article the technical personnel of the Internal Audit of the Joint Institute for Social Aid (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social); and finally, the officials who hold the leadership positions of the Basic Financial Organization of the State (National Treasurer, Director of the National Budget Office, National Provider, and National Accountant). No. 7018 of December 20, 1985, in its Article 14, subsections 17, 18, 34, and 36, included the following officials within the prohibition pay: the first, the Audit Offices of the National Banking System; the second, added a paragraph to Article 1, subsection 2) adding servants of the General Directorate of Information Technology (Dirección General de Informática) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) and those of the Computing Center of the Ministry of Public Security; the third, appraisal technicians of the Appraisal Section of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport at any of the series levels and professionals of the General Directorate of the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional); the fourth, officials of the National Customs Service; and in its Article 49 included officials holding professional technical positions in the tax administration in the customs branch. No. 7083 of September 9, 1987, in Article 98, authentically interpreted Articles 14, subsection 18) of Law No. 7018 and 33, subsection 2) of No. 6999 of September 3, 1985, in the sense that the provision also includes those positions for which the academic degree of licentiate is required. No. 7097 of August 18, 1988, in its Articles 39, 41, 94, and 127, included the following officials within the prohibition pay: those of the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad) who receive compensation payment according to a communication from the General Directorate of Civil Service, which states they will maintain acquired rights as long as they remain in the positions to which they were appointed, while new appointments must comply with the requirements of the law; personnel with a computing specialty who work in Computing Departments of institutions covered by the Civil Service and the Judicial Branch, under the same terms recognized for those of the Mechanized Technical Office; officials of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) who enjoy this benefit; and, finally, granted the benefit of Article 46 of Law 7015 to the officials contemplated in Article 1, subsection b), in Article 5, and to those covered by the sole transitory provision of this law. No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, comprehensively reformed the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which in its Article 244 (former 141) literally states: “Even if they are lawyers, the permanent servants of the Executive and Judicial Branches, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the municipalities may not practice the profession, except in their own affairs and those of their spouses, ascendants or descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. Excepted from the preceding prohibition are servants of the Executive Branch who provide services in official educational establishments and who have no other incompatibility; likewise, interim or substitute judicial servants, provided that the interim appointment does not exceed three months; specific prosecutors; municipal council members and municipal legal representatives; the Director of the Judicial Review; part-time public defenders and those who are remunerated by the fee system and, in general, all servants who do not earn a salary but only per diems.” Within this normative chronology on recipients of the prohibition bonus, it is worth noting that through Laws No. 6999 and 7896, of September 3, 1985, and July 30, 1999, the Law on Prohibition was reformed and included the Tax Administration personnel who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 118 (former 113) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, except for the members of the Tax Administrative Court. It also granted the benefits provided by Law No. 5867 to the following officials: 1) those who hold leadership positions in the basic financial organization of the State, according to Article 2 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, No. 1279, of May 2, 1951, and its amendments; 2) those who hold “technician” and “professional technician” positions in the National Budget Office, the National Treasury, the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance, the General Directorate of Industries of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, and the General Forestry Directorate (Dirección General Forestal) of the Ministry of Agriculture; likewise, the servants of the General Directorate of Civil Service who hold positions in the technical and professional series, the officials of the General Directorate of Information Technology of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, those of the Computing Center of the Ministry of Public Security, and the officials of the General Directorate of Taxation who enjoy this benefit; 3) the head of the Budget Control Office of the Ministry of Finance; 4) customs administrators, in accordance with the procedures of general rule No. 31 of the Law of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Government of the Republic for the year 1982, No. 6700 of December 23, 1981, and included the technical personnel of the internal audit of the Joint Institute for Social Aid. Article 5 of Law No. 7896 included the officials and employees of the Executive Branch referred to in Article 244 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the graduates of licentiate, master’s, or doctoral programs in Law who are performing such functions. As well as the officials who, at the licentiate or graduate level, work for the Judicial Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civil Registry, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. From that special legislation, it is concluded that what such provisions order to be paid, as salary compensation, is the prohibition against practicing the profession for which the servant was hired and which results from the regulations (organic or statutory) governing the public employment relationship. This type of prohibition has an undeniable ethical foundation; for, when they are established, what is sought is to prevent the public servant from devoting their time to other activities in the private sector; since this is considered inconvenient, because it may affect the necessary intensity in the exercise of the activities inherent to the function or because an undesirable confusion of the interests of one and the other field may occur, leaving the public interests subordinated or even at the service of private ones. As can be noted, the legitimacy for claiming the prohibition salary bonus must arise from the laws that determine the recipients of that salary item. IV.- Not all officials who hold positions in the units known as tax administrations are recipients of the prohibition salary bonus, since, as the law that originated this right indicated and still indicates in its Article 1, it was established “...for the Tax Administration personnel who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures…”. Article 118 (former 113) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes: “Article 118.- Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The General Directors, Deputy Directors, Department and Section Heads or Deputy Heads, of the Tax Administration dependencies, as well as the permanent members of the Tax Administrative Court and the acting substitutes, may not hold other public positions, whether dependent or independent, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with the authorization of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are remunerated only with per diems. In general, personnel of the entities cited above are prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities in the private sector related to tax matters. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their pleadings or submissions in any of the instances, except when it concerns their personal interests, those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. In the cases of exception referred to in this article, to avail oneself of them, the decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code must be communicated to the superior of the dependency.” Those rules made and make reference to “Tax Administration personnel,” which Article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law 5867 came into effect (current 99), defined and defines as the “...administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of taxes, whether it is the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with Articles 11 and 14 of this Code.” (the bold and underlining are the editor’s), defining the “active subject” as the entity that is the creditor of the tax. The potential right of municipal officials to receive the prohibition bonus, although not in their entirety, derives precisely from the fact that municipalities fall within the concept of tax administration, since they are conceived as an “active subject” under the terms of the transcribed rule, given that it is clear that said entities are creditors of taxes. Although starting from the effective date of the current Municipal Code (Codigo Municipal) (Law Number 7794, of April 30, 1998, effective as of the following May 18), municipalities were conceived as an integral part of the tax administration, as expressly indicated in subsections d) and e) of Article 4, which in the cited order establish, among other powers of the municipalities, those of “d) Approve municipal rates, prices, and contributions, and propose draft tariffs for municipal taxes; and e) Collect and administer, in their capacity as tax administration, municipal taxes and other revenues” (the bold is the editor’s), the condition of active subject creditor of taxes is held by the municipalities by constitutional provision (Articles 170 and 121 subsection 13) and was so conceived since Municipal Code Law No. 4574, effective as of January 1, 1971, since Article 4 of that regulation established the competence of the municipalities to administer local services and interests, and included within their powers those of agreeing on the necessary revenues to fulfill their tasks and providing for their distribution and use (Article 7, subsection b)). Likewise, Article 21 established, as competence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), among others, that of agreeing on budgets, setting contributions and rates, and proposing draft tariffs for municipal taxes to the Legislative Assembly. On the subject, what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment number 1631, of 3:15 p.m. on August 21, 1991, is of interest, in that it indicated: “Article 170 of the Political Constitution provides that municipal corporations are autonomous. From this autonomy derives, in principle, the taxing power enjoyed by municipal governments, in that they are true local governments, whereby the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to those entities, this being subject to the legislative authorization established in Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, which is, by its nature, rather an act of approval, but in both cases, both authorization and approval, it is a tutelary activity, as will be discussed.- / ... / V.- The authorization of municipal taxes established by subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Constitution, although emanating from the Legislative Branch, is nothing other than a typically tutelary act of authorization, consisting of the mere removal of a legal obstacle so that the authorized person or body may carry out the authorized activity, an activity of which that authorized body is the holder and not the authorizing party. The Assembly has power only to authorize municipal taxes. To authorize implies that the act subject to that authorization originates in the authorized body and is inherent to the competence of that same body. Hence, constitutionally it is not possible for the Legislative Assembly to have a creative role regarding municipal taxes, in that it is the corporations that create these local tax obligations, in exercise of the autonomy enshrined in Article 170 of the Constitution and by their nature as corporate territorial entities, that is, having an associative basis, capable of generating an autonomous interest distinct from the State, and submit them for legislative approval that conditions their effectiveness.- / VI.- Authorizing does not entail any power to reform or impose programs or criteria of opportunity, unless the rule that requires the authorization expressly provides otherwise, which does not occur in this case with the respective constitutional rule (Art. 121, sub. 13). Thus, the Assembly may reject a new municipal tax, but not establish a different one not originating from the municipal will, nor introduce provisions such as the one challenged here in the authorization of a municipal tax or its modifications. The Municipalities do not make a mere proposition to the Legislative Assembly, but rather must be able to submit true tax determinations to it. This means that the municipal tax act is terminal and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for this purpose by each municipality, not initial in a presumed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposition subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax determination frames the matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consequent result can only be the authorization or disallowance of what is proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will. It must be admitted that, given the constitutional silence on the matter, the reasons for legislative authorization or its denial may well be based on merit or opportunity and not merely legal or constitutional, but even so the legislative provision can only be one of these two, authorization or disallowance, and not the creation of the municipal tax in place of and supplanting the municipality. The contrary is a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed municipal autonomy, which includes the power to set taxes for the maintenance of the Municipality and which prohibits—even though it subjects it to legislative authorization—depriving it of such power, in order to transfer it, ultimately, to the unique and exclusive will of the Legislative Assembly.- / VII.- The challenged rule also violates subsection 1) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, in that the power to legislate is not unrestricted, but, on the contrary, the Legislative Assembly, in the same manner as the other Supreme Branches, is subject to the limits that the Constitution itself establishes and which, on this matter, prevent it from removing the creation of local taxes from the municipal will, as has been set forth in the preceding considerandos.” In corporations such as the defendant, in its capacity as tax administration, the salary compensation for the prohibition of privately practicing the profession cannot be granted to all municipal servants, but only to those who perform duties strictly related to tax matters, and in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that in his position of Urban Planning and Constructive Control Coordinator, he performed tasks or administrative functions of that nature, that is, related to the collection, oversight, and administration of taxes and other municipal revenues—municipal taxes, rates, and special contributions—, besides the fact that in his condition as a civil engineer, he could not perform activities in the private sector related to said tax matter, hence the claimed salary bonus was not recognized for him because he was not covered by said prohibition. There is no rule that authorizes the payment of prohibition for incompatibility to those who, like the plaintiff, do not perform duties related to tax matters, and it is not seen why it should be done; given that, as stated, his position is not included among those to which the prohibition applies because they perform such duties, furthermore, he continued to practice his profession privately in the canton of Hojancha in open violation of the ethical content of his service relationship and could do so in the rest of the national territory, because his position was not part of the tax administration, reasons for which he does not have the right to obtain that economic compensation, as the lower court (A-quo) correctly determined. V.- The prohibition pay made by the administration to a servant constitutes an economic compensation—which forms part of the salary—to compensate for the impossibility dictated by the Law, not by the service contract, of freely practicing their profession outside the position held, and it is not within the powers of the official to request or waive it, as it is consubstantial to the service relationship by legal provision, that is, it is not within the powers of the employee or official to request it, nor does the employer have discretion to impose and pay it. So even if the municipal corporation had prohibited the plaintiff's free practice of his profession—which did not happen—, for that fact alone the protection of the claimed right does not proceed. In the case under study, it was not proven that the plaintiff performed duties related to tax matters, nor is there a rule that expressly authorizes the payment of prohibition for the position he holds, therefore the granting of said payment is improper and would constitute a breach of the principle of legality. Regarding the exclusion of the prohibition pay or compensation for the non-exercise of the profession for certain officials, without violating the principle of equality, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that such bonus: “…does not constitute, under any circumstances, an uncaused benefit or a privilege for a particular group of servants; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who, by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, have no possibility of exercising their profession or trade beyond the administrative dependency in which they work… It is a limitation on the private exercise of the profession or trade, for the establishment of which the State arranged to provide an economic recognition on the base salary of its employees. …if the servant is free to exercise their profession or activity outside of office hours, there is no logical, legal, much less constitutional, reason to argue that the non-payment of the ‘professional prohibition’ in such cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. There are, on the one hand, public servants subject to a legal prohibition on the private exercise of a specific profession or activity, and on the other, servants not subject to it.” (ruling No. 4494-96, of 11:18 a.m. on August 30, 1996). VI.- The Chamber wishes to highlight the impossibility of the plaintiff simultaneously holding his position—as Urban Planning and Constructive Control Coordinator of the Municipal Corporation of Hojancha—with the free practice of the profession in that municipality, as they are evidently incompatible. The Diccionario Enciclopédico de todos los Conocimientos, Pequeño Larousse, latest edition, Paris 1972, p. 487, defines in one of its meanings the term “incompatibility” as “Legal impossibility of simultaneously exercising certain functions.” Thus, there must not exist in said municipality that dual role on the part of the plaintiff here—municipal public servant professional and professional in the free practice of his profession—, for an ethical reason of sound administration that helps to avoid conflicts of interest, since otherwise the servant would be judge and party. This avoids the conflict of being a municipal official and simultaneously practicing the profession within the territory of the corporation in which he provides services and prevents the servant from being the one who approves the work carried out by him in the private practice of the profession, as the performance of the other function is prohibited insofar as it may affect the strict fulfillment of the official's duties or compromise his impartiality or independence. VII.- Regarding the order to pay costs (costas), the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been reiterated, in the sense that, as provided by Article 494 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in accordance with Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), applicable to labor matters under the terms stipulated by Article 452 of the first cited Code, the general rule is that the losing party in the lawsuit must be ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding. One may be exempted from said expenses when they have litigated with evident good faith, when the complaint or counter-complaint, as the case may be, includes exaggerated claims, when the judgment upholds only part of the fundamental petitions of the complaint or counterclaim, when the judgment admits important defenses, or when there is reciprocal defeat. In this case, the plaintiff requested, both in administrative and judicial venues, the recognition of rights that legally did not correspond to him, without his claims being granted.

The respondent, for its part, has had to incur legal expenses to face the process, so the claimant cannot be considered a litigant in good faith. Consequently, the ruling regarding costs must be reversed, as it is fair that the plaintiff reimburse the respondent for the expenses it was forced to incur to oppose a claim that is clearly unfounded. Pursuant to Article 495 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it is appropriate to judiciously set the personal costs at the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones, as this lawsuit involves periodic future claims (unassessable)." "**II.-** As provided in Article 11 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), “*1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those public services authorized by said system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act shall be considered authorized if it is expressly regulated by a written rule, at least regarding its motive or content, even if imprecisely*”. This means that if there is no law that expressly authorizes it, the Administration is prohibited from doing anything not regulated or authorized. Therefore, only those obligations expressly authorized by one of the written sources of the legal system can be considered legitimate and effectively enforceable against the public administration (in this regard see, among others, rulings of this Chamber Nos. 759 of 10:10 a.m. on September 10, 595 of 9:00 a.m. on July 21, both from 2004, and 648 of 10:20 a.m. on October 31, 2001). **III.-** Different regulations have granted various public servants the right to enjoy the benefit or compensation for payment of prohibition (pago de prohibición). Historically, the payment of this bonus or additional salary originated from an amendment introduced to the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Article 113 (current 118) established the following: **“***Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The General Directors, Deputy Directors, Heads or Deputy Heads of Department and Section of the **Tax Administration offices**, as well as the full members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal and their acting substitutes, **may not hold other public or private positions, with or without an employment relationship**, with the exception of teaching or public functions performed on behalf of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diems. / **In general**, the **personnel of the aforementioned entities are especially prohibited**, with the sole exception of teaching, from **performing activities related to tax matters in private enterprise, or managerial or other positions involving participation in technical assistance or company decisions**. Said personnel are also prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or submissions in any instance, except concerning their personal interests, or those of their parents, spouse, or children. / In the exception cases referred to in the article, to avail themselves of them, their decision to make use of the exceptions provided in this Code must be communicated to the head of the office.*” (The bold and underline are by the editor). That provision gave rise to the enactment of Law No. 5867, of December 15, 1975, “**Law of Compensation for Payment of Prohibition (Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición)**”, through which the salary bonus or economic compensation for prohibition was created, and the percentages of economic remuneration for this concept were set on the base salary of the Salary Scale of the Public Administration Salary Law, for the Tax Administration personnel who, by reason of their positions, were subject to the prohibition contained in Article 113 (now 118) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. By means of **Law No. 6008 of November 9, 1976**, subsequently amended by No. 6222 of May 9, 1978, Article 5 of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, was reformed, including the officials and employees of the Executive Branch referred to in Article 141 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (current 244) and the graduates of the Faculty of Law who are performing such functions, as well as the officials who, at the bachelor’s or graduate level, work for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civil Registry, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. Law 6808 also included in its Article 2 the geologists of the Executive Branch, due to prohibitions contained in Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 4042 of September 24, 1974. **Law No. 6542 of December 22, 1980**, in Article 9, subsection 31, included the professional personnel of the National Customs Service and, in subsection 123, the National Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer. **No. 6700 of December 23, 1981**, in its Article 9, numeral 31, included the professional personnel of the National Customs Service, and in numeral 62, by fully reforming Article 1, included officials holding chief positions in the basic financial organization of the State referred to in Article 2 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, and additionally, the National Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer, National Comptroller, National Supplier, Head of the Budget Office, Head of the Budget Control Office of the Ministry of Finance, officials of the National Budget Office, and Customs Administrators. **No. 6815 of September 27, 1982** (Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic), in its Article 37, included officials covered by the prohibition contained in subsection a) of Article 28 of said law and Assistant Attorneys General. **No. 6831 of December 23, 1982**, in Article 9, subsection 53, included the same servants referred to in numeral 62 of Law No. 6700 and those of the General Directorate of Industries of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines. **No. 6975 of November 30, 1984**, in its Article 40, included the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance who hold positions whose requirements are covered by the scope of each of the subsections of Article 1 of that law. **No. 6982 of December 19, 1984**, included in Articles 14, 15, and 16 within the payment of the prohibition, the following officials: the first, the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks; the second, auditing officials of the different entities of the Central Government; and the third, officials of the National Treasury and the National Paymaster. **No. 6995 of July 22, 1985**, in Article 31, authentically interprets Article 40 of Law 6975, meaning that the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance shall be entitled to the benefits of this law, and in Article 154, included the personnel of the Customs Laboratory of the Ministry of Finance, in addition to equating, for the payment of this compensation, Tax Administration officials who are under the prohibition of Article 113 (now 118) of the Tax Code. **No. 7015 of November 22, 1985**, included in its Articles 100, 101, 102, and 104 within the payment of the prohibition, the following officials: the first, officials of the Audit Office of the National Learning Institute, the Coffee Office, and Family Allowances; the second, the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks; the third, adds Article 1.2, including in the benefits and prohibitions of said article the technical personnel of the Internal Audit Office of the Joint Institute for Social Assistance; and lastly, the officials who hold the chief positions of the Basic Financial Organization of the State (National Treasurer, Director of the National Budget Office, National Supplier, and National Comptroller). **No. 7018 of December 20, 1985**, in its Article 14, subsections 17, 18, 34, and 36, included within the payment of the prohibition, the following officials: the first, the Audit Offices of the National Banking System; the second, added a paragraph to Article 1, subsection 2, adding servants of the General Directorate of Information Technology of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and those of the Computer Center of the Ministry of Public Security; the third, appraisal technicians of the Valuations Section of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport at any of the levels of the series, and professionals of the General Directorate of the National Geographic Institute (IGN); the fourth, officials of the National Customs Service; and in its Article 49, included officials holding professional technical positions in the tax administration in the customs branch. **No. 7083 of September 9, 1987**, in Article 98, authentically interpreted Articles 14, subsection 18) of Law No. 7018 and 33, subsection 2) of No. 6999 of September 3, 1985, meaning that the provision also includes those positions for which a bachelor's degree is required. **No. 7097 of August 18, 1988**, in its Articles 39, 41, 94, and 127, included within the payment of the prohibition, the following officials: those of the National Electricity Service who receive compensation payment according to the directive of the General Directorate of Civil Service indicated, who will maintain acquired rights while they remain in the positions to which they were appointed, while new appointments must comply with the law's requirements; personnel specializing in computing who work in the Computing Departments of institutions covered by the Civil Service and the Judicial Branch, under the same terms recognized for the Mechanized Technical Office; officials of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation who enjoy this benefit; and, lastly, granted the benefit of Article 46 of Law 7015 to the officials contemplated in Article 1, subsection b), in Article 5, and to those covered by the sole transitory provision of this law. **No. 7333 of May 5, 1993**, integrally reformed the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which in its Article 244 (former 141) textually states: **“***Even if they are lawyers, the proprietary servants of the Executive and Judicial Branches, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the municipalities may not practice the profession, except in their own affairs and those of their spouses, ascendants or descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. Excluded from the foregoing prohibition are the servants of the Executive Branch who provide services in official educational establishments and have no other incompatibility; as well as interim or substitute judicial servants, provided that the interim appointment does not exceed three months; specific prosecutors; municipal council members and municipal attorneys; the Director of the Judicial Review; half-time public defenders and those compensated by the fee system; and, in general, all servants who do not earn a salary but only per diems*”. Within this regulatory chronology regarding the recipients of the prohibition bonus, it is worth noting that through **Laws Nos. 6999 and 7896, of September 3, 1985, and July 30, 1999**, the Law on Prohibition was amended, and the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 118 (former 113) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures were included, except for the members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal. Similarly, it granted the benefits provided by Law No. 5867 to the following officials: 1) those who hold the chief positions in the basic financial organization of the State, according to Article 2 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, No. 1279, of May 2, 1951, and its amendments; 2) those who hold positions of “technicians” and “professional technicians” in the National Budget Office, the National Treasury, the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance, the General Directorate of Industries of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, and the General Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture; likewise, the servants of the General Directorate of Civil Service who hold positions in the technical and professional series, the officials of the General Directorate of Information Technology of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, those of the Computer Center of the Ministry of Public Security, and the officials of the General Directorate of Taxation who enjoy this benefit; 3) the head of the Budget Control Office of the Ministry of Finance; 4) customs administrators, according to the procedures of general rule No. 31 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Government of the Republic for the year 1982, No. 6700 of December 23, 1981, and included the technical personnel of the internal audit office of the Joint Institute for Social Assistance. Article 5 of Law No. 7896 included the officials and employees of the Executive Branch referred to in Article 244 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the graduates of bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral programs in Law who are performing such functions. As well as the officials who, at the bachelor’s or graduate level, work for the Judicial Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civil Registry, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. From this special legislation, it is concluded that what such provisions mandate to pay, as a salary compensation, is the prohibition to practice the profession for which the servant was hired, and which results from the regulations (organic or statutory) governing the public employment relationship. This type of prohibition has an undeniable ethical basis; for, when they are established, the aim is to prevent the public servant from dedicating their time to other activities in the private sector; since this is considered undesirable, because it may affect the necessary intensity in exercising the activities inherent to the function, or because an undesirable confusion of interests in one field and the other may arise, subordinating public interests to, or even placing them at the service of, private ones. As can be observed, the legitimacy to claim the salary bonus for prohibition must arise from the laws that determine the recipients of this salary item. **IV.-** Not all officials who hold positions in the units known as tax administrations are recipients of the salary bonus for prohibition, since, as indicated and currently indicates in its Article 1, the law that created this right established it “*...for the Tax Administration personnel who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in Article 113 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures…*”. Article 118 (former 113) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes: **“***Article 118.- Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel*. *The General Directors, Deputy Directors, Heads or Deputy Heads of Department and Section of the Tax Administration offices, as well as the full members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal and the acting substitutes, may not hold other public positions with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with the authorization of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diems. In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities related to tax matters in private enterprise. Said personnel are also prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or submissions in any instance, except concerning their personal interests, or those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. In the exception cases referred to in this article, to avail themselves of them, their decision to make use of the exceptions provided in this Code must be communicated to the superior of the office*”. Those rules made and make reference to “*Tax Administration personnel*,” which Article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law 5867 came into effect (current 99), defined and defines as the “*...administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of taxes, whether it involves the Treasury **or other public entities that are active subjects**, pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of this Code.*” (the bold and underline are by the editor), defining the “*active subject*” as the entity creditor of the tax. The eventual right of municipal officials to receive the prohibition bonus, although not in its generality, derives precisely from the fact that municipalities fall within the concept of *tax administration*, as they are conceived as an “*active subject*” in the terms of the transcribed rule, given that it is clear that these entities are creditors of taxes. Although from the entry into force of the current *Municipal Code* (Código Municipal) (Law No. 7794, of April 30, 1998, in effect as of the following May 18), municipalities were conceived as an integral part of the *tax administration*, as expressly indicated in subsections d) and e) of Article 4, which, in the cited order, establish, among other attributions of the municipalities, those of “*d) Approving municipal rates, prices, and contributions, and proposing draft tariff bills for municipal taxes; and e) Collecting and administering, **in their capacity as tax administration**, municipal taxes and other revenues*” (the bold is by the editor), the condition of active subject creditor of taxes is held by municipalities by constitutional provision (Articles 170 and 121 subsection 13) and was so conceived since the Municipal Code, Law No. 4574, in effect as of January 1, 1971, since Article 4 of said regulation established the competence of municipalities to administer local services and interests, and included within their powers those of agreeing on the necessary income for the fulfillment of their duties and providing for its distribution and use (Article 7, subsection b)). Also, Article 21 established, as the competence of the Municipal Council, among others, that of agreeing on budgets, setting contributions and rates, and proposing draft tariff bills for municipal taxes to the Legislative Assembly. On the subject, what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 1631, of 3:15 p.m. on August 21, 1991, is of interest, as it indicated: “*Article 170 of the Political Constitution provides that municipal corporations are autonomous. From this autonomy derives, in principle, the taxing power enjoyed by municipal governments, as they are true local governments, whereby the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, this being subject to the legislative authorization established in Article 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, which is, by its nature, rather an act of approval, but in both cases, authorization and approval constitute a tutelary activity, as will be discussed.- / ... / V.- The authorization of municipal taxes established in subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Constitution, although emanating from the Legislative Branch, is merely a typically tutelary act of authorization, consisting of the mere removal of a legal obstacle so that the authorized person or body may perform the authorized activity, an activity to which that authorized body is entitled and not the authorizing party. The Assembly has the power solely to authorize municipal taxes. To authorize implies that the act that is the object of that authorization originates in the authorized body and is proper to the competence of that same body. Hence, constitutionally, it is not possible for the Legislative Assembly to have a creative role regarding municipal taxes, since it is the corporations that create these local tax obligations, in exercise of the autonomy enshrined in Article 170 of the Constitution and by their nature as corporate territorial entities, that is, of associative base, capable of generating an autonomous interest distinct from that of the State, and they submit them to the legislative approval that conditions their effectiveness.- / VI.- To authorize does not entail any power to reform or impose programs or criteria of opportunity, unless the rule that requires the authorization expressly provides otherwise, which is not the case here with the respective constitutional rule (Art. 121 subs. 13). Thus, the Assembly may reject a new municipal tax, but may not establish a different one not originating from the municipal will, nor introduce provisions such as the one challenged here in the authorization of a municipal tax or its modifications. The Municipalities do not make a mere proposal to the Legislative Assembly, but must be able to submit to it true tax assessments.* This means that the municipal tax act is final and definitive, creating the tax within a tax procedure opened for that purpose by each municipality, not an initial act in a supposed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposal subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax determination frames the subject matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is to oversee and not to constitute the municipal tax, and whose resulting outcome can only be the authorization or denial of what was proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will. It must be admitted that, given the constitutional silence on the matter, the grounds for legislative authorization or its denial may well be based on merit or opportunity and not merely on legal or constitutional grounds, but even so, the legislative provision can only be one of those two, authorization or denial, and not the creation of the municipal tax in place of and substituting the municipality. The contrary is a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed municipal autonomy, which includes the power to set taxes for the support of the Municipality and which prohibits—even though it subjects it to legislative authorization—depriving it of such power, in order to transfer it, ultimately, to the sole and exclusive will of the Legislative Assembly.- / VII.- The challenged norm also violates subsection 1) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, since the power to legislate is not unrestricted, but rather, on the contrary, the Legislative Assembly, in the same manner as the other Supreme Powers, is subject to the limits that the Constitution itself establishes and that, on this particular matter, prevent it from removing the creation of local taxes from the municipal will, as has been set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos)” . In corporations such as the defendant, in its capacity as tax administration, the salary compensation for the prohibition on privately practicing the profession cannot be granted to all municipal servants, but only to those who perform tasks strictly related to tax matters, and in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that in his position of Coordinator of Urban Planning and Construction Control, he performed administrative tasks or functions of that nature, that is, related to the collection, oversight, and administration of taxes and other municipal revenues – municipal taxes, fees, and special contributions (contribuciones especiales municipales) – besides the fact that in his condition as a civil engineer, he could not perform activities related to said tax matter in private enterprise, hence the salary supplement claimed was not recognized to him as he was not covered by said prohibition. There is no norm that authorizes the payment of the incompatibility prohibition (prohibición por incompatibilidad) to those who, like the plaintiff, do not perform tasks related to tax matters, and there is no reason why it should be done; given that, as stated, his position is not included among those to which the prohibition applies because they perform such tasks, furthermore, he continued practicing his profession privately in the canton of Hojancha in open violation of the ethical content of his service relationship, and he could do so in the rest of the national territory, because his position was not part of the tax administration, reasons for which he does not have the right to obtain that economic compensation, as the lower court (A-quo) correctly determined. V.- The payment for prohibition that the administration makes to a servant constitutes an economic compensation—which forms part of the salary—to remunerate him for the impossibility, dictated by the Law, not the service contract, of practicing his profession liberally outside the position held, and it is not within the powers of the official to request or waive it, as it is consubstantial to the service relationship by legal provision, that is, it is not within the employee's or official's powers to request it, nor does the employer have discretion to impose and pay it. Therefore, even if the municipal corporation had prohibited him from the liberal practice of his profession—which did not occur—, for that sole reason, the protection of the claimed right does not proceed. In the case under study, it was not proven that the plaintiff performed tasks related to tax matters, nor is there a norm that expressly authorizes the payment of the prohibition for the position he occupies, therefore the granting of said payment is improper and would constitute a breach of the principle of legality. Regarding the exclusion of the payment of the prohibition or compensation for the non-practice of the profession for some officials, without violating the principle of equality, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has indicated that such supplement: “ …does not constitute, under any circumstance, an uncaused benefit or a privilege for a specific group of servants; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who, by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, have no possibility of practicing their profession or trade beyond the administrative agency in which they work … It is a limitation on the private practice of the profession or trade, for the establishment of which the State decided to make an economic recognition on the base salary of its employees. …if the servant is free to practice his profession or activity outside office hours, there is no logical, legal, much less constitutional reason, to argue that the non-payment of the \"professional prohibition\" in said cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. There is, on one hand, public servants subject to a legal prohibition on the private practice of a specific profession or activity, and on the other, servants not subject to it. ” (Voto N° 4494-96, of 11:18 a.m. on August 30, 1996). VI.- The Chamber (Sala) wishes to highlight the impossibility of the plaintiff exercising his position—of Coordinator of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the Municipal Corporation of Hojancha—simultaneously with the liberal practice of the profession in that municipality, as they are evidently incompatible. The Diccionario Enciclopédico de todos los Conocimientos, Pequeño Larousse, última edición, París 1972, p. 487, defines in one of its meanings the term “incompatibility”, as “ Legal impossibility of simultaneously exercising certain functions ”. This being the case, that dual function by the plaintiff herein—professional as a municipal public servant and professional in the liberal practice of his profession—must not exist in said municipality, as a matter of ethics of sound administration that helps to avoid conflicts of interest, since otherwise the servant would be judge and party. This obviates the conflict of being a municipal official and simultaneously practicing the profession in the territory of the corporation in which he provides services, and prevents the servant from being the one who approves the work performed by him in the private practice of the profession, as the performance of the other function is prohibited insofar as it may affect the strict fulfillment of the official's duties or compromise his impartiality or independence. VII.- Regarding the award of costs (condenatoria en costas), the jurisprudence of this Chamber (Sala) has been reiterated, in the sense that, as provided for in Article 494 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in accordance with Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Procesal Civil), applicable to labor matters pursuant to the provisions of Article 452 of the first cited Code, the general rule is that the losing party in the lawsuit must pay the costs of the process. One may be exempted from said expenses, when they have litigated with evident good faith, when the claim or counterclaim, as the case may be, includes exaggerated pretensions, when the judgment grants only part of the fundamental petitions of the claim or the counterclaim, when the judgment admits important defenses, or when there is reciprocal defeat. In this case, the plaintiff requested both in the administrative and judicial venues, the recognition of rights that legally did not correspond to him, without his claims being addressed. The defendant, for its part, in order to face the process, has had to incur legal expenses, therefore the plaintiff cannot be considered a litigant in good faith . Consequently, the decision regarding costs must be revoked, as it is just that the plaintiff compensate the defendant for the expenses he forced her to incur, to oppose a clearly improper claim. In accordance with Article 495 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it is appropriate to prudentially set the personal costs (personales) at the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones, since this lawsuit involves periodic pretensions into the future (inestimable)." "II.- According to the provisions of Article 11 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública), "1. The Public Administration shall act subject to the legal system and may only perform those acts or provide those public services authorized by said system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources. 2. An act expressly regulated by written rule shall be considered authorized, at least as to its motive or content, even if in an imprecise manner." This means that if there is no law expressly authorizing it, the Administration is prohibited from undertaking anything not regulated or authorized. Therefore, only those obligations that are expressly authorized by one of the written sources of the legal system can be considered legitimate and effectively enforceable as obligations on the part of the public administration (in this regard, see, among others, Rulings of this Chamber No. 759 of 10:10 a.m. on September 10, and No. 595 of 9:00 a.m. on July 21, both from 2004, and No. 648 of 10:20 a.m. on October 31, 2001). III.- Various regulations have granted different public servants the right to enjoy the benefit or compensation for prohibition pay (pago de prohibición). Historically, the payment of this bonus or extra salary originated from an amendment introduced to the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Article 113 (current 118) established the following: "Prohibition for Tax Administration Personnel. The Directors General, Deputy Directors, Department and Section Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of the Tax Administration units, as well as the full members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal and their acting substitutes, may not hold other public or private positions, with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or public functions performed in representation of their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are remunerated only by per diems. / In general, it is especially prohibited for the personnel of the entities cited above, with the sole exception of teaching, to perform activities in the private sector related to tax matters or executive positions or others that involve participation in technical assistance or in the decisions of the company. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or submissions at any instance, except when dealing with their personal interests, those of their parents, their spouse, or their children. / In the cases of exception referred to in the article, to benefit from them, the decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code must be communicated to the head of the unit." (The bold and underline are by the editor). That provision led to the enactment of Law No. 5867, of December 15, 1975 "Law of Compensation for Prohibition Pay (Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición)" through which the salary bonus or economic compensation for prohibition was created, and the percentages of economic remuneration for that concept were set based on the base salary of the Salary Scale of the Public Administration Salaries Law, for Tax Administration personnel who, by reason of their positions, were subject to the prohibition contained in Article 113 (now 118) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. Through Law No. 6008 of November 9, 1976, amended in turn by No. 6222 of May 9, 1978, Article 5 of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, was reformed, including the officials and employees of the Executive Branch referred to in Article 141 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (current 244) and the graduates of the Faculty of Law who are performing such functions, as well as officials who work at the bachelor's degree or graduate level for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Civil Registry, and Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Law No. 6808 also included, in its Article 2, the geologists of the Executive Branch, due to prohibitions contained in Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 4042 of September 24, 1974. Law No. 6542 of December 22, 1980, in Article 9, subsection 31, included the professional personnel of the National Customs Service, and in subsection 123, the National Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer. Law No. 6700 of December 23, 1981, in its Article 9, numeral 31, included the professional personnel of the National Customs Service, and in numeral 62, by entirely reforming Article 1, included officials holding management positions in the basic financial organization of the State referred to in Article 2 of the Financial Administration of the Republic Act (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República) and, in addition, the National Treasurer and Deputy National Treasurer, National Accountant, National Supplier, Head of the Budget Office, Head of the Budget Control Office of the Ministry of Finance, officials of the National Budget Office, and Customs Administrators. Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982 (Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic), in its Article 37, included officials covered by the prohibition contained in subsection a) of Article 28 of said law and Assistant Attorneys. Law No. 6831 of December 23, 1982, in Article 9, subsection 53, included the same servants referred to in numeral 62 of Law No. 6700 and those of the General Directorate of Industries of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines. Law No. 6975 of November 30, 1984, in its Article 40, included the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance who hold positions whose requirements are covered by the scope of each of the subsections of Article 1 of that law. Law No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, included in Articles 14, 15, and 16, within the prohibition pay, the following officials: the first, the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks; the second, audit officials of the different entities of the Central Government; and the third, officials of the National Treasury and the National Paymaster. Law No. 6995 of July 22, 1985, in Article 31, authentically interprets Article 40 of Law 6975, in the sense that the technicians of the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance shall have the right to the benefits of this law, and in Article 154 included the personnel of the Customs Laboratory of the Ministry of Finance, in addition to equating, for the payment of that compensation, Tax Administration officials who are in the prohibition situation of Article 113 (now 118) of the Tax Code.

**Law No. 7015 of 22 November 1985** included in its articles 100, 101, 102, and 104, within the payment of the prohibition, the following officials: the first, officials of the Audit Office of the National Institute of Learning (Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje), the Coffee Office (Oficina del Café), and Family Allowances (Asignaciones Familiares); the second, the technical staff of the General Audit Office of Banks (Auditoría General de Bancos); the third, adds article 1.2 including in the benefits and prohibitions of said article the technical staff of the Internal Audit Office of the Joint Institute for Social Aid (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social); and lastly, the officials who hold the leadership positions of the Basic Financial Organization of the State (Treasurer General (Tesorero Nacional), Director of the National Budget Office (Oficina de Presupuesto Nacional), National Supplier (Proveedor Nacional), and National Comptroller (Contador Nacional)).

**Law No. 7018 of 20 December 1985**, in its article 14, subsections 17, 18, 34, and 36, included within the payment of the prohibition the following officials: the first, the Audit Offices of the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional); the second, added a paragraph to article 1, subsection 2) adding servers of the General Directorate of Information Technology (Dirección General de Informática) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) and those of the Computing Center (Centro de Cómputo) of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública); the third, appraisal technicians of the Appraisal Section (Sección de Avalúos) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport at any of the levels of the series and professionals of the General Directorate of the National Geographic Institute (Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico Nacional); the fourth, officials of the National Customs Service (Servicio Aduanero Nacional); and in its article 49 included the officials who hold positions of professional technicians of the tax administration in the customs branch.

**Law No. 7083 of 9 September 1987**, in article 98, authentically interpreted articles 14, subsection 18) of Law No. 7018 and 33, subsection 2) of Law No. 6999 of 3 September 1985, in the sense that the provision also includes those positions for which the academic degree of licentiate (licenciatura) is required.

**Law No. 7097 of 18 August 1988**, in its articles 39, 41, 94, and 127, included within the payment of the prohibition the following officials: those of the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad) who receive compensation payment according to the official communication of the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil) indicated, who will maintain acquired rights while they remain in the positions in which they were appointed, while new appointments must comply with the requirements of the law; personnel specializing in computing who work in Computing Departments of institutions covered by the Civil Service and the Judicial Branch, under the same terms recognized for those of the Mechanized Technical Office (Oficina Técnica Mecanizada); officials of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) who enjoy this benefit; and, lastly, granted the benefit of article 46 of Law 7015 to the officials contemplated in article 1, subsection b), in article 5, and to those covered by the single transitory provision of this law.

**Law No. 7333 of 5 May 1993**, comprehensively reformed the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which in its article 244 (formerly 141) textually states:

“*Even if they are lawyers, the permanent servers of the Executive and Judicial Branches, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the municipalities may not practice the profession, except in their own matters and those of their spouses, ascendants or descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. Excepted from the foregoing prohibition are servers of the Executive Branch who provide services in official educational establishments and who have no other incompatibility; likewise interim or substitute judicial servers, provided that the interim appointment does not exceed three months; specific prosecutors; council members and municipal legal representatives; the Director of the Judicial Review; part-time public defenders and those who are compensated by a fee system, and, in general, all servers who do not earn a salary but rather per diem payments*”.

Within this normative chronology regarding recipients of the prohibition bonus, it is pertinent to indicate that through **Laws No. 6999 and 7896, of 3 September 1985 and 30 July 1999**, the Law on Prohibition was reformed and included personnel of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in article 118 (formerly 113) of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), except for the members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo). Likewise, it granted the benefits conferred by Law No. 5867 to the following officials: 1) those who hold leadership positions in the basic financial organization of the State, according to article 2 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic, No. 1279, of 2 May 1951 and its reforms; 2) those who hold positions of “technicians” and “professional technicians” in the National Budget Office, the National Treasury, the Mechanized Technical Office of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), the General Directorate of Industries (Dirección General de Industrias) of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, and the General Forestry Directorate (Dirección General Forestal) of the Ministry of Agriculture; likewise, the servers of the General Directorate of Civil Service who hold positions in the technical and professional series, the officials of the General Directorate of Information Technology of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, those of the Computing Center of the Ministry of Public Security, and the officials of the General Directorate of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación) who enjoy this benefit; 3) the head of the Budget Control Office (Oficina de Control de Presupuesto) of the Ministry of Finance; 4) the customs administrators, in accordance with the procedures of general norm No. 31 of the Law of Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Government of the Republic for the year 1982, No. 6700 of 23 December 1981, and included the technical staff of the internal audit office of the Joint Institute for Social Aid. Article 5 of Law No. 7896 included the officials and employees of the Executive Branch referred to in article 244 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the graduates of licentiate, master's, or doctorate programs in Law who are performing such functions. As well as the officials who, at the licentiate or graduate level, work for the Judicial Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civil Registry, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. From this special legislation, it is concluded that what such provisions mandate to be paid, as salary compensation, is the prohibition to practice the profession for which the server was hired and which results from the legislation (organic or statutory) regulating the public employment relationship. This type of prohibition has an unquestionable ethical foundation; since, when established, what is sought is to prevent the public server from devoting their time to other activities in the private field; given that this is considered inconvenient, because it can affect the necessary intensity in the exercise of the activities inherent to the function, or because an undesirable confusion of interests in one and the other fields may occur, leaving public interests subordinated to or even at the service of private ones. As can be noted, the legitimacy for claiming the prohibition salary bonus must arise from the laws that determine the recipients of that salary item.

**IV.-** Not all officials who hold positions in the units known as tax administrations are recipients of the prohibition salary bonus, since, as the law that originated this right indicated and indicates in its article 1, it was established “*...for the personnel of the Tax Administration who are subject, by reason of their positions, to the prohibition contained in article 113 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures…*”. Article 118 (formerly 113) of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures establishes:

“***Article 118.- Prohibition for personnel of the Tax Administration**. The Directors General, Subdirectors, Department and Section Heads or Subheads of the dependencies of the Tax Administration, as well as the permanent members of the Tax Administrative Tribunal and the acting substitutes, may not hold other public positions with or without an employment relationship, with the exception of teaching or functions performed with authorization from their respective hierarchical superior, whose positions are only compensated with per diem payments. In general, the personnel of the aforementioned entities are prohibited, with the sole exception of teaching, from performing activities related to tax matters in the private sector. Likewise, said personnel are prohibited from filing claims on behalf of taxpayers or advising them in their arguments or presentations in any of the instances, unless it concerns their personal interests, those of their spouse, ascendants, descendants, siblings, parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and brothers-in-law. In the cases of exception referred to in this article, to avail oneself of them, one must communicate to the superior of the dependency their decision to make use of the exceptions provided for in this Code*”.

Those norms made and make reference to the “personnel of the Tax Administration”, which article 105 of the cited Code in force when Law 5867 came into effect (current 99), defined and defines as “*...the administrative body in charge of the perception and supervision of taxes, whether it concerns the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with articles 11 and 14 of this Code.*” (the bolding and underlining is by the drafter), defining the “active subject” as the entity that is the creditor of the tax. The eventual right of municipal officials to receive the prohibition bonus, although not in their generality, derives precisely from the fact that the municipalities fall within the concept of tax administration, since they are conceived as an “active subject” in the terms of the transcribed norm, given that it is clear that said entities are creditors of taxes.

Although, as of the entry into force of the current Municipal Code (Law No. 7794, of 30 April 1998, in force as of the following 18 May), municipalities were conceived as an integral part of the tax administration, according to what is expressly indicated in subsections d) and e) of article 4, which, in the cited order, establish, among other attributions of the municipalities, those of “*d) Approving municipal rates, prices, and contributions, and proposing draft tax rate projects for municipal taxes; and e) Collecting and managing,* ***in their capacity as tax administration*** *, the taxes and other municipal revenues*” (the bolding is by the drafter), the condition of active subject creditor of taxes is held by the municipalities by constitutional provision (articles 170 and 121, subsection 13) and was thus conceived since the Municipal Code, Law No. 4574, in force as of 1 January 1971, since article 4 of said legislation established the competence of the municipalities to administer local services and interests, and included within their powers those of agreeing on the necessary revenues for the fulfillment of their duties and providing for their distribution and use (article 7, subsection b)). Likewise, article 21 established, as a competence of the Municipal Council, among others, that of agreeing on budgets, setting contributions and rates, and proposing draft tax rate projects for municipal taxes to the Legislative Assembly.

On the subject, what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment number 1631, of 15:15 hours on 21 August 1991, is of interest, in which it indicated: “*Article 170 of the Political Constitution provides that municipal corporations are autonomous. From that autonomy derives, in principle, the taxing power enjoyed by municipal governments, as they are true local governments, whereby the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to those entities, this being subject to the legislative authorization established in article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, which is, by its nature, rather an act of approval, but in both cases, both the authorization and the approval, it is a tutelary activity, as will be stated.- / ... / V.- The authorization of municipal taxes established by subsection 13) of constitutional article 121, although emanating from the Legislative Branch, is none other than a typically tutelary act of authorization, consisting of the mere removal of a legal obstacle so that the authorized person or body may carry out the authorized activity, an activity which is the responsibility of that authorized body and not the authorizing party. The Assembly has the power only to authorize municipal taxes. To authorize implies that the act that is the object of that authorization originates in the authorized body and is proper to the competence of that same body. Hence, constitutionally, it is not possible for the Legislative Assembly to have a creative role with respect to municipal taxes, insofar as it is the corporations that create these local tax obligations, in exercise of the autonomy enshrined in article 170 of the Constitution and due to their nature as corporate territorial entities, that is, with an associative base, capable of generating an autonomous interest distinct from the State, and they submit them to legislative approval, which conditions their effectiveness.- / VI.- To authorize does not entail any power to reform nor to impose programs or criteria of opportunity, unless the norm that requires the authorization expressly provides to the contrary, which does not occur in this case with the respective constitutional norm (art. 121, subsect. 13). Thus, the Assembly may reject a new municipal tax, but not establish a different one not originating from the municipal will, nor introduce provisions such as the one challenged here in the authorization of a municipal tax or its modifications. The Municipalities do not make a mere proposition to the Legislative Assembly, but rather must be able to submit to it true tax determinations. This means that the municipal tax act is final and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for this purpose by each municipality, not initial in a presumed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposition subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax determination frames the matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consequential result can only be the authorization or non-authorization of what is proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will. It must be admitted that, given the constitutional silence on the matter, the reasons for the legislative authorization or its denial may well be based on merit or opportunity and not merely legal or constitutional, but even so, the legislative provision can only be one of those two, authorization or non-authorization, and not the creation of the municipal tax in place of and with the supplanting of the municipality. The contrary constitutes a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed municipal autonomy, which includes the power to set taxes for the support of the Municipality and which prohibits—although subjects it to legislative authorization—depriving it of such power, in order to transfer it, ultimately, to the sole and exclusive will of the Legislative Assembly.- / VII.- The challenged norm also violates subsection 1) of article 121 of the Political Constitution, insofar as the power to legislate is not unrestricted, but rather, on the contrary, the Legislative Assembly, in the same manner as the other Supreme Branches, is subject to the limits that the Constitution itself establishes and which, on this matter, prevent it from withdrawing the creation of local taxes from the municipal will, as has been set forth in the preceding recitals*”.

In corporations such as the defendant, in its capacity as tax administration, the salary compensation for the prohibition to privately practice the profession cannot be granted to all municipal servers, but only to those who perform tasks strictly related to tax matters, and in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that in his position as Coordinator of Urban Planning and Construction Control, he performed tasks or administrative functions of that nature, that is, related to the collection, supervision, and management of taxes and other municipal revenues—municipal taxes, rates, and special contributions—, besides the fact that in his capacity as a civil engineer, he could not perform activities related to said tax matter in the private sector, hence the claimed salary bonus was not recognized for him, as he is not covered by said prohibition.

There is no norm authorizing the payment of prohibition for incompatibility to those who, like the plaintiff, do not perform tasks related to tax matters, and there is no reason why it should be done; since, as stated, his position is not included among those to which the prohibition applies because they perform such tasks, and furthermore, he continued to practice his profession privately in the canton of Hojancha, in open violation of the ethical content of his service relationship, and he could do so in the rest of the national territory, because his position was not part of the tax administration, reasons for which he is not entitled to obtain that economic compensation, as the lower court (A-quo) correctly determined.

**V.-** The payment for prohibition made by the administration to a server constitutes an economic compensation—which forms part of the salary—to compensate for the impossibility dictated by Law, not the service contract, of practicing their profession freely outside the position held, and it is not within the powers of the official to request or waive it, as it is consubstantial to the service relationship by legal provision, meaning that it is not within the powers of the employee or official to request it, nor does the employer have discretion to impose and pay it.

Thus, even if the municipal corporation had prohibited the free practice of his profession—which did not occur—, the protection of the claimed right would not proceed for that sole fact. In the case under study, it was not proven that the plaintiff performed tasks related to tax matters, nor is there any norm that expressly authorizes the payment of the prohibition for the position he holds, therefore the granting of said payment is improper and would constitute a breach of the principle of legality.

Regarding the exclusion of the payment of prohibition or compensation for the non-practice of the profession of some officials, without violating the principle of equality, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that such bonus: “*…does not constitute, under any circumstance, an uncaused benefit or a privilege for a specific group of servers; rather, it is the fair recognition for those who,* ***by reason of the function they perform, and for the protection of the highest public interest, do not have the possibility of practicing their profession or trade beyond the administrative dependency in which they work…*** *It is a limitation on the private practice of the profession or trade, for the establishment of which the State arranged to make an economic recognition on top of the base salary of its employees. …if the server is free to practice their profession or activity outside of office hours, there is no logical, legal, much less constitutional reason to argue that the non-payment of the "professional prohibition" in such cases constitutes unreasonable discrimination. There exist, on one hand, public servers subject to a legal prohibition for the private practice of a certain profession or activity, and on the other, servers not subject to it.*” (ruling No. 4494-96, of 11:18 hours on 30 August 1996).

**VI.-** The Chamber wishes to highlight the impossibility of the plaintiff to hold his position—as Coordinator of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the Municipal Corporation of Hojancha—simultaneously with the free practice of the profession in that municipality, as they are evidently incompatible. The Enciclopedic Dictionary of All Knowledge, Pequeño Larousse, last edition, Paris 1972, p. 487, defines in one of its meanings the term “incompatibility” as “*Legal impossibility of simultaneously exercising certain functions*”. Thus, that dual function should not exist in said municipality on the part of the plaintiff—a professional municipal public server and a professional in the free practice of his profession—, for an ethical matter of sound administration that helps to avoid conflicts of interest, since otherwise, the server would be both judge and interested party. This avoids the conflict of being a municipal official and simultaneously practicing the profession in the territory of the corporation in which he provides services, and prevents the server from being the one who approves the work performed by him in the private practice of the profession, as the performance of the other function is prohibited insofar as it may affect the strict compliance of the official's duties or compromise his impartiality or independence.

**VII.-** Regarding the award of costs, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been reiterated, in the sense that, as provided by article 494 of the Labor Code, in conjunction with article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to labor matters according to the provisions of article 452 of the first-cited Code, the general rule is that the losing party in the litigation must be ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding. One may be exempted from said expenses when they have litigated with evident good faith, when the claim or counterclaim, as applicable, includes exaggerated claims, when the judgment only partially upholds the fundamental petitions of the claim or the counterclaim, when the judgment admits important defenses, or when there is reciprocal loss. In this case, the plaintiff requested both in administrative and judicial venues the recognition of rights that legally did not correspond to him, without his claims being heeded. The defendant, for its part, in order to face the proceeding, had to incur legal expenses; therefore, the plaintiff cannot be considered a good faith litigant. Consequently, the decision regarding costs must be revoked, as it is fair that the plaintiff reimburse the defendant for the expenses he forced her to incur to oppose a claim that is clearly improper.

In accordance with article 495 of the Labor Code, it is appropriate to prudentially set the personal costs at the sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones, since this claim involves periodic claims into the future (inestimable).

"II.- Según lo dispone el artículo 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, “1. La Administración Pública actuará sometida al ordenamiento jurídico y solo podrá realizar aquellos actos o prestar aquellos servicios públicos que autorice dicho ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes. 2. Se considerará autorizado el acto regulado expresamente por norma escrita, al menos en cuanto a motivo o contenido, aunque sea en forma imprecisa”. Lo que significa que si no hay ley que expresamente autorice, a la Administración le está vedado realizar todo lo que no esté regulado o autorizado. Por ello, sólo pueden considerarse legítimas y efectivamente exigibles, como obligaciones a cargo de la administración pública, las que de manera expresa se encuentren autorizadas por alguna de las fuentes escritas del ordenamiento (en este sentido véanse entre otros, los votos de esta Sala N°s 759 de las 10:10 horas del 10 de setiembre, 595 de las 9:00 horas del 21 de julio, ambos del 2004 y 648 de las 10:20 horas del 31 de octubre del 2001). III.- Diferentes normas han concedido a diversos servidores públicos el derecho a disfrutar del beneficio o compensación por pago de prohibición. Históricamente, el pago de ese plus o sobresueldo, se originó en una reforma que se introdujo al Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. El artículo 113 (actual 118) establecía lo siguiente: “Prohibición para el personal de la Administración Tributaria. Los Directores Generales, los Subdirectores, los Jefes o Subjefes de Departamento y de Sección de las dependencias de la Administración Tributaria, así como los miembros propietarios del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo y sus suplentes en funciones, no pueden ejercer otros puestos públicos o privados, con o sin relación de dependencia, excepción hecha de la docencia o de funciones públicas desempeñadas en representación de su respectivo superior jerárquico, cuyos cargos estén sólo remunerados con dietas. / En general queda especialmente prohibido al personal de los entes precedentemente citados, con la única excepción de la docencia, desempeñar en la empresa privada actividades relativas a materias tributarias o cargos directivos u otros que impliquen la participación en la asistencia técnica o en las decisiones de la empresa. Asimismo está prohibido a dicho personal hacer reclamos a favor de los contribuyentes o asesorarlos en sus alegatos o presentaciones en cualquiera de las instancias, salvo que se trate de sus intereses personales, de sus padres, los de su cónyuge o de sus hijos. / En los casos de excepción a que se refiere el artículo, para acogerse a ellos, debe comunicarse al jefe de la dependencia su decisión de hacer uso de las excepciones previstas en este Código.” (La negrita y el subrayado son del redactor). Esa disposición dio origen a la promulgación de la Ley N° 5867, del 15 de diciembre de 1975 “Ley de compensación por pago de prohibición” mediante la cual se creó el plus salarial o compensación económica por concepto de prohibición y se fijaron los porcentajes de retribución económica por ese concepto sobre el salario base de la Escala de Sueldos de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, para el personal de la Administración Tributaria que por razón de sus cargos, se encontraba sujeto a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 113 (hoy 118) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Por medio de la Ley N° 6008 del 9 de noviembre de 1976, modificada a su vez por la N° 6222 del 9 de mayo de 1978, se reformó el artículo 5 de la Ley 5867 del 15 de diciembre de 1975, incluyendo a los funcionarios y empleados del Poder Ejecutivo a que se refería el artículo 141 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (244 de la actual) y a los egresados de la Facultad de Derecho que estén cumpliendo tales funciones, así como a los funcionarios que a nivel de licenciatura o de egresados laboren para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, Registro del Estado Civil y Contraloría General de la República. La 6808 también incluyó en su artículo 2° a los geólogos del Poder Ejecutivo, por prohibiciones contenidas en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 4042 del 24 de setiembre de 1974. La Ley N° 6542 del 22 de diciembre de 1980, en el artículo 9 inciso 31 incluyó al personal profesional del Servicio Aduanero Nacional y, en el inciso 123 al Tesorero y Subtesorero Nacional. La N° 6700 de 23 de diciembre de 1981, en su artículo 9, numeral 31 incluyó al personal profesional del Servicio Aduanero Nacional y en el numeral 62, al reformar íntegramente el artículo 1º, incluyó a los funcionarios que desempeñen puestos de jefatura de la organización financiera básica del Estado a que se refiere el artículo 2º de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y, además, al Tesorero y Subtesorero Nacionales, Contador Nacional, Proveedor Nacional, Jefe de la Oficina de Presupuesto, Jefe de la Oficina de Control de Presupuesto del Ministerio de Hacienda, funcionarios de la Oficina de Presupuesto Nacional y Administradores de Aduana. La N° 6815 de 27 de septiembre de 1982 (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), en su artículo 37 incluyó a funcionarios a quienes alcance la prohibición contenida en el inciso a) del artículo 28 de dicha ley y a Asistentes de Procurador. La N° 6831 de 23 de diciembre de 1982, en el artículo 9, inciso 53, incluyó a los mismos servidores a que se refiere el numeral 62 de la Ley Nº 6700 y a los de la Dirección General de Industrias del Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Minas. La N° 6975 de 30 de noviembre de 1984, en su artículo 40 incluyó a los técnicos de la Oficina Técnica Mecanizada del Ministerio de Hacienda que ocupen puestos cuyos requisitos estén cubiertos por los alcances de cada uno de los incisos del artículo 1° de esa ley. La N° 6982 de 19 de diciembre de 1984, incluyó en los artículos 14, 15 y 16 dentro del pago de la prohibición a los siguientes funcionarios: el primero, al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos; el segundo, a funcionarios de auditoría de las diferentes entidades del Gobierno Central y el tercero, a funcionarios de la Tesorería Nacional y al Pagador Nacional. La N° 6995 de 22 de julio de 1985, en el artículo 31 interpreta auténticamente el artículo 40 de la Ley 6975, en el sentido de que los técnicos de la Oficina Técnica Mecanizada del Ministerio de Hacienda tendrán derecho a los beneficios de esta ley, y en el artículo 154 incluyó al personal del Laboratorio Aduanero del Ministerio de Hacienda, además de equiparar para el pago de esa compensación, a funcionarios de la Administración Tributaria que se encuentren en situación de prohibición del artículo 113 (hoy 118) del Código Tributario. La N° 7015 de 22 de noviembre de 1985, incluyó en sus artículos 100, 101, 102 y 104 dentro del pago de la prohibición a los siguientes funcionarios: el primero, a funcionarios de la Auditoría del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, de la Oficina del Café y de Asignaciones Familiares; el segundo, al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos; el tercero, adiciona el artículo 1.2 incluyendo en los beneficios y prohibiciones de dicho artículo al personal técnico de la Auditoría Interna del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social y por último, a los funcionarios que ocupen las jefaturas de la Organización Financiera Básica del Estado (Tesorero Nacional, Director de la Oficina de Presupuesto Nacional, Proveedor Nacional y Contador Nacional). La N° 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985, en su artículo 14 incisos 17, 18, 34 y 36, incluyó dentro del pago de la prohibición a los siguientes funcionarios: el primero, a las Auditorías del Sistema Bancario Nacional; el segundo, adicionó un párrafo al artículo 1, inciso 2) agregando a servidores de la Dirección General de Informática del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y los del centro de Cómputo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública; el tercero, a técnicos en tasación de la Sección de Avalúos del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes en cualquiera de los niveles de la serie y a profesionales de la Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico Nacional; el cuarto, a funcionarios del Servicio Aduanero Nacional; y en su artículo 49 incluyó a los funcionarios que ocupen cargos de técnicos profesionales de la administración tributaria en el ramo aduanero. La N° 7083 de 9 de setiembre de 1987, en el artículo 98 interpretó auténticamente los artículos 14, inciso 18) de la Ley Nº 7018 y 33, inciso 2) de la Nº 6999 de 3 de setiembre de 1985, en el sentido de que la disposición comprende, además, aquellos cargos para los que se exija el grado académico de licenciatura. La N° 7097 de 18 de agosto de 1988, en sus artículos 39, 41, 94 y 127, incluyó dentro del pago de la prohibición a los siguientes funcionarios: a los del Servicio Nacional de Electricidad que reciben pago de compensación según oficio de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil que indica, los que mantendrán derechos adquiridos mientras permanezcan en los puestos en que fueron nombrados, en tanto los nuevos nombramientos deberán cumplir con los requisitos de la ley; al personal con especialidad en cómputo que labora en Departamentos de Cómputo de instituciones cubiertas por el Servicio Civil y Poder Judicial, en los mismos términos reconocidos al de la Oficina Técnica Mecanizada; a funcionarios de la Dirección General de Tributación Directa que gocen de este beneficio; y, por último, otorgó el beneficio del artículo 46 de la Ley 7015 a los funcionarios contemplados en el artículo 1 inciso b), en el artículo 5, y a los cubiertos por el transitorio único de la presente ley. La N° 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, reformó integralmente la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, la cual en su artículo 244 (anterior 141) textualmente señala: “Aunque sean abogados, no podrán ejercer la profesión los servidores propietarios de los Poderes Ejecutivo y Judicial, del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, de la Contraloría General de la República y de las municipalidades, salvo en sus propios negocios y en los de sus cónyuges, ascendientes o descendientes, hermanos, suegros, yernos y cuñados. Se exceptúan de la prohibición anterior los servidores del Poder Ejecutivo que presten servicios en los establecimientos oficiales de enseñanza y que no tengan ninguna otra incompatibilidad; lo mismo que los servidores judiciales interinos o suplentes, siempre que ese interinato no exceda de tres meses; los fiscales específicos; los munícipes y apoderados municipales; el Director de la Revista Judicial; los defensores públicos de medio tiempo y los que sean retribuidos por el sistema de honorarios y, en general, todos los servidores que no devenguen sueldo sino dietas”. Dentro de esa cronología normativa sobre destinatarios del plus de prohibición, conviene indicar que mediante Leyes N°s 6999 y 7896, del 3 de setiembre de 1985 y 30 de julio de 1999, se reformó la Ley sobre prohibición y se incluyó al personal de la Administración Tributaria que se encuentre sujeto, en razón de sus cargos, a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 118 (anterior 113) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, excepto para los miembros del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo. Igualmente concedió los beneficios que otorga la ley Nº 5867, a los siguientes funcionarios: 1) a quienes desempeñen los puestos de jefatura en la organización financiera básica del Estado, según el artículo 2° de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República, N° 1279, del 2 de mayo de 1951 y sus reformas; 2) a quienes ocupen puestos de “técnicos” y “técnicos profesionales” en la Oficina de Presupuesto Nacional, la Tesorería Nacional, la Oficina Técnica Mecanizada del Ministerio de Hacienda, la Dirección General de Industrias del Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Minas y la Dirección General Forestal del Ministerio de Agricultura; asimismo, a los servidores de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil que ocupen puestos de la serie técnico y profesional, los funcionarios de la Dirección General de Informática del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, los del Centro de Cómputo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y los funcionarios de la Dirección General de Tributación que gocen de este beneficio; 3) al jefe de la Oficina de Control de Presupuesto del Ministerio de Hacienda; 4) a los administradores de aduanas, conforme a los procedimientos de la norma general No. 31 de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario del Gobierno de la República para el año 1982, N° 6700 de 23 de diciembre de 1981, e incluyó al personal técnico de la auditoría interna del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social. El artículo 5 de la Ley N° 7896, incluyó a los funcionarios y empleados del Poder Ejecutivo referidos en el artículo 244 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y a los egresados de programas de licenciatura, maestría o doctorado en Derecho, que estén cumpliendo tales funciones. Así como a los funcionarios que en el nivel de licenciatura o egresados, laboren para el Poder Judicial, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, el Registro Civil y la Contraloría General de la República. De esa normativa especial se concluye, que lo que tales disposiciones mandan pagar, como una compensación salarial, es la prohibición para ejercer la profesión, por la cual el servidor fue contratado y que resulta de la normativa (orgánica o estatutaria), reguladora de la relación de empleo público. Este tipo de prohibiciones tiene un indudable fundamento ético; pues, cuando se establecen, lo que se busca es impedirle al servidor público destinar su tiempo a otras actividades, en el campo privado; dado que ello se considera inconveniente, porque puede afectar la necesaria intensidad, en el ejercicio de las actividades propias de la función o bien porque puede producirse una indeseable confusión, en los intereses de uno y otro campos, dejando los públicos subordinados o hasta al servicio de los privados. Como puede notarse, la legitimación para el reclamo del plus salarial de prohibición, debe surgir de las leyes que determinan los destinatarios de ese rubro salarial. IV.- No todos los funcionarios que ocupen puestos en las unidades conocidas como administraciones tributarias son destinatarios del plus salarial por prohibición, pues como lo indicaba e indica en su artículo 1° la ley que originó ese derecho, el mismo se estableció “...para el personal de la Administración Tributaria que se encuentre sujeto, en razón de sus cargos, a la prohibición contenida en el artículo 113 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios…”. El artículo 118 (anterior 113) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios establece: “Artículo 118.- Prohibición para el personal de la Administración Tributaria. Los Directores Generales, los Subdirectores, los Jefes o Subjefes de Departamento y de Sección, de las dependencias de la Administración Tributaria, así como los miembros propietarios del Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo y los suplentes en funciones, no pueden ejercer otros puestos públicos con o sin relación de dependencia, excepción hecha de la docencia o de funciones desempeñadas con autorización de su respectivo superior jerárquico, cuyos cargos estén sólo remunerados con dietas. En general queda prohibido al personal de los entes precedentemente citados, con la única excepción de la docencia, desempeñar en la empresa privada actividades relativas a materias tributarias. Asimismo está prohibido a dicho personal hacer reclamos a favor de los contribuyentes o asesorarlos en sus alegatos o presentaciones en cualesquiera de las instancias, salvo que se trate de sus intereses personales, los de su cónyuge, ascendientes, descendientes, hermanos, suegros, yernos y cuñados. En los casos de excepción a que se refiere este artículo, para acogerse a ellos, debe comunicarse al superior de la dependencia su decisión de hacer uso de las excepciones previstas en este Código”. Esas normas hacían y hacen referencia al “personal de la Administración Tributaria”, la que el artículo 105 del citado Código vigente cuando la ley 5867 entró a regir (actual 99), definía y define como el “...órgano administrativo que tenga a su cargo la percepción y fiscalización de los tributos, ya se trate del Fisco o de otros entes públicos que sean sujetos activos, conforme a los artículos 11 y 14 del presente Código.” (la negrita y el subrayado es del redactor), definiendo al “sujeto activo” como el ente acreedor del tributo. El eventual derecho de los funcionarios municipales a percibir el plus por prohibición, aunque no en su generalidad, deriva precisamente del hecho de que las municipalidades se enmarcan dentro del concepto de administración tributaria, pues se conciben como un “sujeto activo” en los términos de la norma transcrita, dado que está claro que dichas entidades son acreedoras de tributos. Si bien a partir de la vigencia del actual Código Municipal (ley número 7794, de 30 de abril de 1998, vigente a partir del 18 de mayo siguiente), se concibió a las municipalidades como parte integrante de la administración tributaria, según lo indicado expresamente en los incisos d) y e) del artículo 4, que en el orden citado establecen, entre otras atribuciones de las municipalidades, las de “d) Aprobar las tasas, los precios y las contribuciones municipales, y proponer los proyectos de tarifas de impuestos municipales; y e) Percibir y administrar, en su carácter de administración tributaria, los tributos y demás ingresos municipales” (la negrita es del redactor), la condición de sujeto activo acreedor de tributos, la tienen las municipalidades por disposición constitucional (artículos 170 y 121 inciso 13) y así estaba concebida desde el Código Municipal ley N° 4574, vigente a partir del 1° de enero de 1971, ya que en el artículo 4 de dicha normativa se establecía la competencia de las municipalidades para administrar los servicios e intereses locales, y se incluían dentro de sus potestades las de acordar los ingresos necesarios para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos y disponer sobre su distribución y empleo (artículo 7, inciso b)). Asimismo, en el artículo 21 se establecía, como competencia del Concejo Municipal, entre otras, la de acordar los presupuestos, fijar las contribuciones y tasas y proponer los proyectos de tarifas de impuestos municipales a la Asamblea Legislativa. Sobre el tema, resulta de interés lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia número 1631, de las 15:15 horas del 21 de agosto de 1991, en cuanto indicó: “Dispone el artículo 170 de la Constitución Política que las corporaciones municipales son autónomas. De esa autonomía se deriva, por principio la potestad impositiva de que gozan los gobiernos municipales, en cuanto son verdaderos gobiernos locales, por la que la iniciativa para la creación, modificación o extinción de los impuestos municipales corresponden a esos entes, ello sujeto a la autorización legislativa establecida en el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, la cual es, por su naturaleza, más bien un acto de aprobación, pero ambos casos, tanto la autorización como la aprobación, se tratan de una actividad tutelar, como se dirá.- / ... / V.- La autorización de los impuestos municipales que establece el inciso 13) del artículo 121 constitucional, aunque emanada del Poder Legislativo, no es sino un acto de autorización típicamente tutelar, consistente en la mera remoción de un obstáculo legal para que la persona u órgano autorizado realice la actividad autorizada, actividad de que es titular ese órgano autorizado y no el autorizante. La Asamblea tiene potestad únicamente para autorizar los impuestos municipales. Autorizar implica que el acto objeto de esa autorización es originado en el órgano autorizado y es propio de la competencia de ese mismo órgano. De ahí que constitucionalmente no es posible que la Asamblea Legislativa tenga un papel creador de los impuestos municipales, en cuanto que son las corporaciones las que crean esas obligaciones impositivas locales, en ejercicio de la autonomía consagrada en el artículo 170 de la Constitución y por su naturaleza de entidades territoriales corporativas, es decir de base asociativa, capaz de generar un interés autónomo distinto del Estado, y las someten a la aprobación legislativa que condiciona su eficacia.- / VI.- Autorizar no conlleva potestad alguna de reformar ni imponer programas o criterios de oportunidad, salvo que la norma que exige la autorización expresamente disponga en contrario, lo que no ocurre en este caso con la respectiva norma constitucional (art. 121 inc. 13). Así las cosas, la Asamblea puede rechazar un nuevo impuesto municipal, pero no establecer uno distinto no originado en la voluntad municipal, ni introducir disposiciones como la aquí impugnada en la autorización de un impuesto municipal o sus modificaciones. Las Municipalidades no hacen a la Asamblea Legislativa una mera proposición, sino que deben poder someterle verdaderas fijaciones impositivas. Esto significa que el acto impositivo municipal es terminal y definitivo, creador del impuesto en un procedimiento tributario abierto al efecto por cada municipalidad, no inicial en un presunto procedimiento legislativo con igual función, como si fuera simple proposición sujeta a la voluntad constitutiva y libre del legislador. Por consiguiente, la fijación tributaria municipal enmarca la materia del pronunciamiento legislativo, cuya función es tutelar y no constitutiva del impuesto municipal, y cuyo resultado consecuente sólo puede ser la autorización o desautorización de lo propuesto, no la sustitución de la voluntad municipal. Debe admitirse que, dado el silencio constitucional al respecto, los motivos de la autorización legislativa o de su denegación bien pueden ser de mérito u oportunidad y no meramente legales o constitucionales, pero aún así la disposición legislativa sólo puede ser una de esas dos, autorización o desautorización, y no creación del impuesto municipal en lugar y con suplantación de la municipalidad. Lo contrario es violación de la autonomía municipal constitucionalmente garantizada, que incluye la potestad de fijar impuestos para sostenimiento de la Municipalidad y que prohíbe -aunque la sujete a autorización legislativa- privar a ésta de tal potestad, para trasladarla, en último término, a la voluntad única y excluyente de la Asamblea Legislativa.- / VII.- La norma impugnada viola, además, el inciso 1) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, por cuanto el poder de legislar no es irrestricto, sino que, por el contrario, la Asamblea Legislativa, en la misma forma que los otros Supremos Poderes, está sujeta a los límites que la misma Constitución establece y que, sobre el particular, le impiden sustraer de la voluntad municipal la creación de tributos locales, como ha sido expuesto en los anteriores considerandos”. En corporaciones como la accionada, en su condición de administración tributaria, la compensación salarial por la prohibición de ejercer privadamente la profesión no puede serle concedida a todos los servidores municipales, sino solo a los que desempeñan labores estrictamente relacionadas con la materia tributaria y en el caso concreto, el actor no demostró que en su puesto de Coordinador de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo, realizara tareas o funciones administrativas de esa naturaleza, o sea, relacionadas con la percepción, fiscalización y administración de los tributos y demás ingresos municipales –impuestos, tasas y contribuciones especiales municipales-, amén de que en su condición de ingeniero civil, no podría desempeñar en la empresa privada actividades relativas a dicha materia tributaria, de ahí que no se le reconociera el plus salarial reclamado al no estar cubierto por dicha prohibición. No existe norma que autorice el pago de prohibición por incompatibilidad a quienes como el actor, no desempeñan labores relacionadas con la materia tributaria y no se ve por qué deba hacerse; toda vez que, como se dijo, su puesto no está incluido dentro de aquellos a los que se les aplica la prohibición porque desempeñan dichas labores, además él continuó ejerciendo su profesión privadamente en el cantón de Hojancha en abierta violación al contenido ético de su relación de servicio y podía hacerlo en el resto del territorio nacional, porque su puesto no integraba la administración tributaria, razones por las cuales no le asiste el derecho a obtener esa compensación económica, como acertadamente lo determinó el A-quo. V.- El pago por prohibición que hace la administración a un servidor constituye una compensación económica –que conforma el salario- para retribuirle la imposibilidad que dicta la Ley no el contrato de servicio, de ejercer su profesión en forma liberal fuera del puesto desempeñado y no está dentro de las facultades del funcionario solicitarla o renunciarla, por ser consubstancial a la relación de servicio por disposición legal, o sea, que no está dentro de las facultades del empleado o funcionario solicitarla, ni el patrono tiene discrecionalidad para imponerla y pagarla. De modo que aun y cuando en la corporación municipal se le haya prohibido el ejercicio liberal de su profesión –lo que no se dio-, por ese solo hecho no procede la tutela del derecho reclamado. En el caso que se estudia, no se acreditó que el actor realizara labores relacionadas con la materia tributaria, ni existe norma que autorice en forma expresa el pago de la prohibición para el puesto que ocupa, por lo que el otorgamiento de dicho pago es improcedente y constituiría un quebranto del principio de legalidad. En cuanto a la exclusión del pago de prohibición o compensación por el no ejercicio de la profesión de algunos funcionarios, sin que se viole el principio de igualdad, la Sala Constitucional ha señalado que tal plus: “…no constituye, bajo ninguna circunstancia, un beneficio incausado o un privilegio para un determinado grupo de servidores; antes bien, es el justo reconocimiento para quienes, en razón de la función que desempeñan, y para la protección del más alto interés público, no tienen posibilidad de ejercer su profesión u oficio más allá de la dependencia administrativa en la que laboran… Se trata de una limitación al ejercicio privado de la profesión u oficio, por cuyo establecimiento el Estado dispuso hacer un reconocimiento económico sobre el salario base de sus empleados. …si el servidor es libre de ejercer fuera de las horas de oficina su profesión o actividad, no existe ninguna razón lógica, jurídica, y mucho menos de orden constitucional, para aducir que el no pago de la "prohibición profesional” en dichos supuestos constituye una discriminación irrazonable. Existe por un lado, servidores públicos sujetos a una prohibición legal para el ejercicio privado de una determinada profesión o actividad, y por el otro, servidores no sujetos a ella.” (voto N° 4494-96, de las 11:18 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996). VI.- Desea la Sala destacar la imposibilidad de que el actor ejerza su puesto -de Coordinador de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo de la Corporación Municipal de Hojancha- simultáneamente con el ejercicio liberal de la profesión en esa municipalidad, por ser evidentemente incompatibles. El Diccionario Enciclopédico de todos los Conocimientos, Pequeño Larousse, última edición, París 1972, p. 487, define en una de sus acepciones el término “incompatibilidad”, como “Imposibilidad legal de ejercer simultáneamente ciertas funciones”. Así las cosas, no debe existir en dicha municipalidad esa doble función por parte del aquí actor -profesional servidor público municipal y profesional en el ejercicio liberal de su profesión-, por una cuestión ética de sana administración que ayuda a evitar conflictos de intereses, pues de no ser así el servidor sería juez y parte. Con ello se obvia el conflicto de ser funcionario municipal y simultáneamente ejercer la profesión en el territorio de la corporación en que presta servicios y se impide que el servidor sea quien apruebe la labor por él ejercida en el desempeño privado de la profesión, al estar vedado el desempeño de la otra función en el tanto pueda afectar el estricto cumplimiento de los deberes del funcionario o comprometa su parcialidad o independencia. VII.- En cuanto a la condenatoria en costas, ha sido reiterada la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, en el sentido de que, conforme lo prevé el artículo 494 del Código de Trabajo, en concordancia con el 221 del Procesal Civil, aplicable a la materia laboral al tenor de lo estipulado por el 452 del primer Código citado, la regla general es que a la parte vencida en juicio se le deben imponer las costas del proceso. Puede eximirse de dichos gastos, cuando haya litigado con evidente buena fe, cuando la demanda o la contrademanda, en su caso, comprendan pretensiones exageradas, cuando el fallo acoja solamente parte de las peticiones fundamentales de la demanda o de la reconvención, cuando el fallo admita defensas de importancia o cuando haya vencimiento recíproco. En este caso, el actor solicitó tanto en sede administrativa como en la judicial, el reconocimiento de derechos que legalmente no le correspondían, sin que fuesen atendidos sus reclamos. La accionada por su parte, para poder hacer frente al proceso ha tenido que incurrir en gastos legales, por lo que no puede considerarse, al accionante, como litigante de buena fe. En consecuencia, se debe revocar lo resuelto respecto de las costas, pues es justo, que la parte actora retribuya a la accionada los gastos que la obligó a realizar, para oponerse a una pretensión a todas luces improcedente. De conformidad con el artículo 495 del Código de Trabajo, procede fijar prudencialmente las personales en la suma de doscientos cincuenta mil colones, por involucrar la presente demanda pretensiones periódicas hacia el futuro (inestimables)."