Unenforceability of Coffee Stabilization Fund Parafiscal Title Due to Lack of Prior Administrative Collection NoticeInejecutividad de título parafiscal cafetalero por falta de notificación del cobro administrativo previo

I.- It is important to make some preliminary considerations regarding the agrarian jurisdiction over this matter. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have established jurisdiction in this specialized court without any challenge whatsoever, so by the principle of perpetuity of jurisdiction, it remains vested in this jurisdiction. Regarding the agrarian nature for hearing this type of executive process, this specialized jurisdiction has already been hearing matters of execution of titles arising from the contribution that feeds the National Coffee Stabilization Fund (Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera). Since this contribution, imposed by the special Law creating FONECAFE, is a parafiscal levy, one might initially think it falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Treasury Courts and not the Agrarian Courts. It is agrarian jurisdiction for the following reasons: It is a matter of agrarian para-taxation, which has a direct impact on the sustainability of a contribution fund to stabilize the national coffee activity in times of crisis, when international coffee prices have declined and producers' profits are deficient. This fund is important so that the subsistence of this national agricultural activity is not put at risk. This agrarian parafiscal levy is not destined for the State's single treasury, but is administered by an eminently agrarian entity, created to protect and support an agricultural activity of public interest. The jurisdiction of the agrarian courts includes those cases involving the application of its special regulations; and based on Article 2, subsection h) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), all those cases relating to acts and contracts in which an agricultural entrepreneur is a party, originating from the exercise of activities of production, transformation, industrialization, and sale of agricultural products. The coffee contribution to the aforementioned fund originates precisely from this agrarian production, where the intervening parties are agrarian subjects closely linked to this productive activity of the country. The legal relationships arising under the Law Creating the National Coffee Stabilization Fund are relationships concerning coffee production, and since this is an activity of great importance for the national economy and food security, it requires attention by the specialized Agrarian Courts as a guarantee of access to quality justice based on procedural principles that differentiate it from other matters.- In this same vein, this Court has already ruled defining agrarian jurisdiction precisely for collection matters based on agrarian parafiscal tax executive titles, and in one of those cases it was stated: " I.- This process has been processed by the Civil Court of Higher Quantification of Cartago, which issued a ruling without time or date, nor was any number assigned. Said ruling was appealed, and the appeal was admitted before the Superior Civil Court of Cartago. The latter, in Vote No. 214 of 11:15 a.m. on August 12, 2005, declared itself incompetent and ordered the case be referred to this Court, considering it is in the presence of a process of an agrarian nature. The agrarian jurisdiction by reason of the matter is generally defined by Article 1 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, according to which, it corresponds to the agrarian courts to hear those processes involving a principal activity of production or those related to it, such as transformation, industrialization, and sale of agrarian products. In this case, the base document of the process consists of a certification from the Executive Director of the National Coffee Stabilization Fund, which states that the defendant owes the plaintiff: “... for the concept of coffee contribution, the liquid and demandable sum of three thousand four hundred fifty-six dollars, currency of the United States of America, in principal, plus late-payment interest at a rate of six point twelve percent annually, from December 3, 1999 …” (folio 3). From the foregoing, it follows that the credit investment plan was linked to the coffee activity, which is purely agrarian in nature, and its purpose was to subsidize it so that the producer could cope with the deficient prices that said product suffers at certain times. Added to this, it is recorded in the case file at folios 4 and 7 that the defendant is dedicated to coffee cultivation, and in the complaint, it was stated that the defendant's representative is a farmer. Certainly, this last piece of information is not relevant insofar as the company's line of business does not necessarily have to coincide with the occupation of its representative; however, it is one more element to take into account to ensure that the defendant is dedicated to coffee cultivation. Based on the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that this is a process of an agrarian nature, and therefore, it must continue to be processed in this venue" (See Vote 1002-F-05 of 9:58 a.m. on December 6, 2005, of this Agrarian Court).- II.- This Court does not adopt the statement of facts deemed proven in the appealed judgment, given the manner in which this matter is resolved. Instead, the following are deemed proven facts: 5.- The National Coffee Stabilization Fund issues official communication D.E. 082-2003, dated February 19, 2003, indicating the amount owed by Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima to that fund. (See document at folios 72-76).- III.- The following is deemed an unproven fact in this Instance: The plaintiff did not prove that it personally notified the defendant's legal representative at its registered address of the payment demand in official communication D.E. 82-2003, dated February 19, 2003, or that the fax sending of such communication was sent to a number belonging to Hacienda Agua Caliente. (There is no record of suitable notification, as the fax number of the defendant is not indicated on the fax confirmation slips at folios 71 and 77 to determine with certainty that sending, and furthermore, there is no record of the content of what is indicated was sent.).- IV.- Mr. Fraser Pirie Robson, in his capacity as unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the defendant company, Hacienda Agua Caliente SA, dissatisfied with the first-instance judgment, number 08-2005 at eleven o'clock on April 12, 2005, issued by the Agrarian Judge of Cartago, appeals said resolution for the following reasons: The parafiscal levy that Fonecafé charges taxes the export of coffee, an activity of a commercial nature. According to him, Article 6 of said law states: "The coffee stabilization contribution is created, which shall tax the export of coffee..." He adds that, on its part, Article 7 describes that: "The contribution of coffee producers to FONECAFE shall be calculated on the exportable production, and the amount payable per exported sack of 46 kg..." Coffee processing (beneficiado del café) is the process of preparing the bean from the fruit to the final consumable product. He points out that Fonecafé does not tax coffee sold for national consumption but is limited, through said law, to taxing the export activity. In his opinion, it is the activity of exporting coffee that is taxed with this parafiscal levy from Fonecafé. This means, in his view, that if a person buys thousands of kilograms of coffee and does not export them but sells those kilograms here in Costa Rica, those sales would not be subject to the payment of the parafiscal levy in favor of Fonecafé. He argues that, conversely, if all those kilograms of coffee are exported abroad, the exporting processing plant would immediately owe a sum of money X in favor of Fonecafé. He describes that the Dictionary of the Spanish Language (Diccionario de la Lengua Española) defines the word "Export" as: "1. Action and effect of exporting. 2. Set of goods that are exported." In turn, it defines the word "export" as: "To sell goods to another country." He therefore considers exportation to be a sale of goods made to another country. It is a commercial act through which the exporter sells to an importer outside the country a series of goods from the country of origin; therefore, every export is a sale, a commercial act that has been developing at great speed lately in view of the phenomenon of globalization.

Regarding the Defense of Statute of Limitations (Prescripción), the appellant states the following: His primary disagreement with the first-instance judgment concerns the interpretation of the applicable regulations when resolving the defense of statute of limitations raised by his represented party, and regarding the merits of the matter. He states that his represented party was registered with Icafé as a coffee exporter, which is very different from processing the bean. The processing of the coffee product is precisely the elaboration of the coffee fruit until its completion through manufacturing processes, to transform said fruit into an export product. He argues that the purchase and sale of coffee fruit is, in essence, AN AGRARIAN CONTRACT entered into between processing firms and coffee producers. He considers the export of already processed coffee to be a different thing, an export that by its nature is specifically of a commercial nature. He argues that the Fonecafé law imposes a parafiscal tax on processing firms and only taxes THE EXPORT OF COFFEE when said processing firms (if they are exporters) decide to export or sell the coffee to a buyer outside the national territory, and that this tax is imposed on the coffee export activity, which is a purely COMMERCIAL activity.

Furthermore, he points out that because this levy is a charge made by Fonecafé on a COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY (the export of coffee) carried out by processing firms, he considers that the applicable statute of limitations is four years and not the ordinary one. He argues that he understands this according to the provisions of Article 968 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), which establishes that: "Actions arising from commercial acts and contracts shall prescribe in accordance with the provisions of this chapter...." He also points out that Article 984 of the Commercial Code imposes a prescriptive period of FOUR years, and in turn, its subsection e) stipulates that ACTIONS DERIVED FROM WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SALES TO OTHER MERCHANTS OR DIRECTLY TO THE CONSUMER prescribe in one year. He states that the executive action promoted through the complaint filed by the plaintiff seeks the collection of a "mandatory contribution" on the export of coffee, an action that, according to him, derives precisely from the commercial activity that is the export of coffee. He also points out that in accordance with the foregoing, Article 984 of the Commercial Code expressly states the applicable prescriptive period, which is 4 years; therefore, the exception of statute of limitations should have been granted in the judgment on the merits. He also submits for consideration the prescriptive period of 1 year, according to subsection e) of Article 984 of the Commercial Code, since the sale of coffee in bulk is a wholesale sale to another merchant outside the national territory. He considers that the first-instance judgment is incorrect in stating that the applicable statute of limitations is the ordinary one, i.e., ten years, because, in his opinion, we are faced with an action that properly derives from a commercial activity, so the statute of limitations must necessarily be approached in light of the Commercial Code, and not the Civil Code (Código Civil). Based on the foregoing facts, the appellant considers that the prescriptive period is 1 year under subsection e) of the Commercial Code, and if not, the applicable statute of limitations must be 4 years; therefore, he requests the first-instance judgment be reversed, upholding the exception of statute of limitations for the principal and its interest as accessory, dismissing the complaint since the prescriptive period has more than elapsed without being interrupted in any way, and ordering the plaintiff to pay both costs.

On another point of appeal, the appellant considers that his represented party was an exporter and has never been a processing firm: For the foregoing reason, he considers the plaintiff lacks standing (legitimación activa) to seek collection against his represented party, since Article 9 of said law establishes that the responsibility for payment shall lie exclusively with the processing firm. He points out that his represented party was not a processing firm but an EXPORTER, so the exception of lack of standing should have been granted. He reiterates that a processing firm (which is responsible for processing coffee from the fruit to the final product) is one thing, and a completely different thing is an EXPORTING firm, as is his represented party. He affirms that Article 9 of said law imposes the payment of the parafiscal levy EXCLUSIVELY ON PROCESSING FIRMS; therefore, only a processing firm that is also an exporter can be sued by the plaintiff. According to him, his represented party is not a processor but an exporter, which is why neither active nor passive standing exists. For the foregoing reasons, he considers that the exception of Lack of Standing in its two modalities should be upheld, reversing the first-instance judgment, dismissing the complaint filed by the active procedural subject, and ordering the plaintiff to pay both costs.

He points out as another point of appeal that the administrative channel was never exhausted: He states that the first-instance judgment, through official communication D.E. 082-2003, maintains that a payment demand was supposedly made to his represented party, a situation that, according to him, never occurred; therefore, he challenges said document, since his represented party was never demanded by the plaintiff and, as is clearly seen, was NEVER notified of that supposed demand. According to him, it is not recorded anywhere in said document that it was made and notified to his represented party, neither at its registered address nor through its representative. His represented party was not notified of the present matter, meaning the plaintiff has failed to comply with said prerequisite for the complaint; therefore, it lacks the right for what is sought in the executive complaint to be declared in its favor. He also points out that his represented party has acted in good faith: Therefore, he requests that if the first-instance judgment is upheld, his represented party be exempted from paying costs, reversing that ruling granted in favor of the plaintiff in the first-instance judgment. (folios 148-154).

V.- The plaintiff appeals said judgment based on the following: The plaintiff appeals only regarding the exception of STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR INTEREST, as it considers that the lower court is granting said exception based on an interest obligation, applying the rules of Article 894 of the Commercial Code, whereas these interest items derive from a parafiscal obligation, so the Tax Code (Código Tributario) should be applied, as it explains: It points out that through Law No. 7301 of July 2, 1992, comprehensively reformed by Law No. 7309 of September 17, 1992, the National Coffee Stabilization Fund FONECAFE was created. Currently, said coffee contribution is regulated by Law 7770, published on May 6, 1998. The plaintiff continues saying that, attached to the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica (ICAFE), it was endowed with legal personality for the administration of coffee stabilization resources, "whose main objective is to balance the settlement price to the producer when the final settlement of the coffee price is deficient for the producer, in relation to the production costs of that bean determined by the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica." (Article 1 of the cited law.) Therefore, it considers the Fund exists to financially assist the coffee producer in those years when low international bean prices threaten to ruin them, and that the corresponding sum of money is calculated in proportion to the production registered by the interested party in previous periods and is disbursed "as an advance against a future harvest account."- It indicates that one of the sources feeding said fund is the coffee stabilization contribution, which appears regulated in the aforementioned Law, and that the prevailing doctrine on the matter qualifies this type of contribution or levy as a case of parafiscal contribution (parafiscalidad) but maintains its special tax nature that distinguishes it from purely fiscal taxes. For the plaintiff, the category of special contributions, being mandatory payments owed due to individual or group benefits derived from special State activities, are taxes created by a state law, which is responsible for defining the taxable event (hecho generador) and the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) of the tax relationship, as well as its rate and calculation basis. However, it points out that they are not administered by State bodies nor do they figure as budgetary income. It further states that, having defined the coffee contribution as a special contribution of a parafiscal nature, its tax character is indisputable. For this reason, it is regulated by the Law that creates it and supplementarily by the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (Article 1.) In that order of ideas and applying numeral 57 of this Code, it points out that payment made outside the corresponding term obligates the taxpayer to also pay interest, under the terms of that legal provision, without any action by the corresponding Tax Administration being necessary. Therefore, it considers that FONECAFE has the powers and the right to collect sums for the interest corresponding to the sums owed for the coffee contribution, and that the statute of limitations for them, being parafiscal contributions, is 3 years in application of Article 51 of the Tax Code, and not as provided in the Commercial Code; therefore, it considers the exception of statute of limitations for interest should have been rejected, since the sums collected by its represented party for interest ARE NOT TIME-BARRED. (folios 155-161).- VI.- It is not feasible to address the grievances of the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the issue of the statute of limitations without first resolving the enforceability of the collection title. It is necessary to determine if the document is enforceable, and from there, the statute of limitations for principal and interest would be determined. The defendant appeals the judgment, arguing that it was never notified of the payment demand indicated in official communication D.E. 082-2003, thus having the possibility to challenge that document, this being a prima facie requirement of the complaint, thus constituting a lack of right. The appellant is correct regarding this grievance. Article 438 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) in its subsection 6) establishes that a document to which the law gives such character shall be an executive title. On the other hand, Article 149, subsection a) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) contemplates the power of the Public Administration to create executive titles, in that regard it provides: "The means of administrative enforcement shall be the following: a) Forced Execution by means of constraint on the assets of the administered party when it involves a liquid credit of the Administration, all with application of the pertinent rules of the Civil Procedure Code regarding seizure and auction, with the caveat that the executive title may be the certification of the act constituting the credit issued by the competent body to order the execution." In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that the constitutionality of that ordinal has been questioned, with the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Vote No. 2180-96 of 9:21 a.m. on May 10, 1996, and Vote No. 2360-96 of 10:09 a.m. on May 17, 1996, establishing that this power granted to the Administration is not unconstitutional. This being the case, both ordinals can be considered to constitute the primary foundation of the executive title in tax matters. Now, depending on the administrative entity that holds the status of active subject of the tax obligation (State, Municipalities, or other institutions), there are special rules that regulate each executive title. In this case, the National Coffee Stabilization Fund was created by Law 7301 of July 2, 1992, and No. 7770 of April 24, 1998, for the purpose of being the administrator of the resources collected from the mandatory contribution for profits from coffee exports, the same fund that would serve as support for coffee production in times of crisis. Article 9 of said Law establishes: "Concurrently, FONECAFE may initiate the executive process against the debtor firm; to do so, it shall base its case on the accounting records and export documents available to it, which constitute an executive title."- The payment of the aforementioned coffee contribution constitutes a parafiscal levy, which is administered by Fonecafé as the collector and administrator of the fund; hence, the tax rules and procedures apply supplementarily. Regarding the parafiscal nature of this type of contributions, consult Legal Opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) number C-203-89, signed on November 27, 1989, which analyzed the nature of the contribution of agricultural producers to the National Agricultural Contingency Fund (Fondo Nacional de Contingencias Agrícolas), which is applied in Legal Opinion C-080-96 of May 23, 1996, to analyze the parafiscal nature of the contribution to the National Coffee Stabilization Fund.- Having clarified the applicable regulations, we have that the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes in Article 169: "The offices that control, in favor of the Central Government, income or credits of the nature indicated in Article 166 of this Code, within the nine months following the expiration of the legal payment term, must prepare the certifications of what is pending collection and order, as the case may be, the withdrawal of the respective receipts from banks and other collection offices. Tax credits originating from taxes regulated by this Code, their interest, and surcharges that have been subject to challenge by the interested party in administrative proceedings shall not be certified until the Administrative Tax Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo) has issued a resolution, and in the case of fines, until a final judgment exists. Before sending the certifications to the Collection Office, the offices controlling income or credits alluded to in the first paragraph of this article must notify the debtor by any of the means authorized by Article 137 of this Code, at the address recorded in their registries, that a period of fifteen days is granted, counted from their notification, to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit. If, upon expiration of the indicated period, the debtor does not regularize their situation, said certifications must be sent immediately to the Collection Office for the purposes of exercising the respective judicial or extrajudicial collection action. The certifications of debt issued by the offices indicated in this article must be signed by the managers of the tax administrations and large taxpayers. They shall have the character of a sufficient executive title to initiate judicial collection." For the specific case, and in the same sense of giving notice to the defendant in the administrative venue about the sum collected for its respective cancellation, we have Article 8 of the cited Law Creating the National Coffee Stabilization Fund, which establishes: "The coffee contribution shall be assessed upon registration of the export contract with the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica and shall be paid by the processor, within eight calendar days following the date stated on the invoice corresponding to the respective export contract, directly to FONECAFE." This administrative procedure referring to the payment demand to the debtor was attempted to be carried out via Official Communication D.E.- 082-2003 dated February 19, 2003, by FONECAFÉ, demanding payment from Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima; however, it was not duly notified to the defendant. Note that the fax confirmation slips at folios 77 and 71 indicate it was sent to "Agua Caliente," without stating the fax number to which it was sent, because stating the sending name is not a procedural guarantee that the name actually corresponds to the fax number of the required company. Nor is there certainty about the content of what is indicated was sent by fax. The fax confirmation slips at folios 71 and 77 are not proof of suitable notification, as has been set forth. As indicated, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, Article 169, provides that as an act prior to sending the certification to the Collection Office, the Tax Administration must notify the debtor by any of the means authorized by Article 137 of that same Code, at the address recorded in the case file in its registries, granting a period of fifteen days counted from their notification to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, and if, upon expiration of the period, they do not pay, the certifications must be sent immediately to the Collection Office to initiate the judicial or extrajudicial action. Likewise, Article 171 of that legal body (for the case of collections in favor of the Central Government) provides for A SECOND DEMAND, establishing that once the Collection Office receives the certifications referred to in Article 169, its Chief must distribute them among the lawyers of the specific permanent body and/or the Specific Prosecutors to exercise the collection action, with said professionals being required to manage the payment of the credits entrusted to them. However, before initiating execution, they must send the debtor a collection notice by mail or deliver it personally, granting a period of eight days to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, under warning that if they do not do so, sufficient assets will be seized to make said credit and its legal accessories effective. Under this understanding, non-compliance with the first demand renders the title unenforceable. Regarding the second demand, it also renders the title unenforceable, by virtue of the principle of legality, even though it is a reiteration of administrative collection. Thus, it can be affirmed that a particularity of the enforceability of the title for agrarian-tax matters is the fact that DUE PROCESS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH. The observance of due process refers both to the stage of determining the obligation and to the stage of administrative collection of that already determined obligation. The foregoing, because the applicable procedural regulations must be complied with, that is, in special laws and their regulations, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and, failing that, the procedural rules contained in Articles 308 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration. In this sense, the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José dismissed an executive lawsuit, arguing that the Tax Administration did not proceed to apply the procedure stipulated by law for ex officio determination. In what is relevant, it established: "...

if the officials of the Dirección General de la Tributación considered that the declared tax did not correspond to the accounting reality of Mr. ..., what was necessary in Law was to open an administrative proceeding against his person and grant him the opportunity to exercise his legitimate right of defense, such as hearing his arguments and attending to the offering of exculpatory evidence, and once the conduct of the proceeding was completed, issue a resolution with the formalities of law in that venue, where, adhering to the evidence produced, establish or determine that the reported tribute was not that which Mr. *... should effectively pay, an occasion in which he had the right to challenge such considerations and have the orders known by his hierarchical Superior, where the actions and decisions of his inferiors would eventually be confirmed, or on the contrary, conclude that the amount declared as income tax was that which corresponded to the accounting reality of that period. The omission of the due process that was required in this case, allows the undersigned, ... to accept the defenses raised by the defendant of lack of effectiveness of the instrument, lack of right, lack of current standing (legitimación actual), and lack of passive standing to be sued (legitimación ad causam pasiva), because we are in the presence of an instrument that lacks enforceability (fuerza ejecutiva), its content being ineffective to be collected in the summary proceeding (vía sumaria), as there is no resolution where, with broad criteria of fact and law and, above all, supported by suitable, reliable evidence, declare that Mr. *... did not fully comply when he reported the tribute that he paid at the time ... \". (Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios del II Circuito Judicial de San José. No. 1378 of eight hours thirty minutes on October seventeen, two thousand two. Emphasis is not from the original). The foregoing because the power of imperium does not imply curtailing the right of defense and, since a power of considerable magnitude has been granted to the Public Administration to create enforceable instruments (títulos ejecutivos), as an unavoidable counterbalance to said power, due process must necessarily be guaranteed in the procedure for determining the obligation and in the administrative collection procedure thereof, both circumstances being corollaries of the enforceability of the instrument. That is, the enforceable instrument in a substantive sense, in tax-agrarian matters, is comprised not only of a certification of a liquid and exigible obligation issued by the competent authority, but also an integral part of that certification is the correct observance of due process in the phase of determining that obligation and in the administrative collection phase once it is determined, both elements being necessary for the completeness of the instrument. Regarding the non-observance of due process as a reason for the unenforceability of the instrument, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: \"The reasonableness of the norm whose constitutionality is questioned derives from the fact that the Public Administration, in order to issue an enforceable instrument with enforceability (fuerza ejecutiva), bases it on an ordinary administrative proceeding where possible liability is determined. Thus, through an ordinary procedure, of obligatory compliance for the Administration, guaranteed and structured in the Ley General de la Administración Pública itself, the administered party is allowed to exercise their right of defense, without prejudice to resorting to the Courts of Justice to defend their rights; an administrative procedure that meets all the guarantees of due process as this Constitutional Jurisdiction has required.\" (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto 2360 of 9 hours on January 31, 1996, and 6477 of 14 hours 39 minutes on November 28, 1996. Emphasis is not from the original). And in a similar vein: “The manner in which the appealed Council would have estimated the amount of the tax obligation that concerns it —within the scope of its competence— constitutes a matter of mere legality that must be elucidated not in this venue but in the corresponding legal venue. However, the fact that the Municipal Council of Esparza agreed to the determination of said obligation, without the corresponding communication having been made, nor any hearing having been granted to the appellant, so that she could challenge it, through the remedies that the legal system grants her for that purpose, injures the fundamental guarantee of due process enshrined in her favor by Constitutional numeral 39, since acting in this way violates the right of defense. Likewise, the circumstance that the Municipal Accounting Office would have issued, in compliance with what was ordered by the defendant Council, the certification of said determination, to then send it for judicial collection for its non-payment, without it having acquired finality (firmeza) for that purpose, violates the fundamental principle of private property, which Article 45 of the Constitución Política establishes in favor of the appellant\". (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto 3930 of fifteen hours twenty-seven minutes on July 18, 1995. Emphasis is not from the original). Likewise, the Administrative Litigation Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) has shared the same criterion: \"(...) 11. That undoubtedly if the determination of the tribute had not been definitively established in the administrative venue (vía administrativa), because the notification thereof had not been made to the legal representative acting at that time, as well excepted by the defendant, leaving them the opportunity to challenge it in time and form in that venue, since the period to do so had not begun to run, the plaintiff was forbidden from resorting to the judicial venue (vía judicial) to collect the taxes, fines, and interest originating from those determinations definitively established in the administrative venue, as correctly reasoned by the Judge and clearly derived from the provisions of Article 160, paragraph 2, of the Código Tributario, in relation to the other provisions of that same Code that the Judge also cites and analyzes. III That in the judgment of this Tribunal, that defense is not strictly a lack of right (falta de derecho) but rather what happens is that the right is uncertain because it is not yet definitively established in the administrative venue as to be judicially exigible, therefore, in that sense, it is appropriate to clarify the appealed judgment. (...)\" (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo. No. 3136 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes on December twenty-one, nineteen seventy-eight). In this same sense, the Procuraduría General de la República* in a recent opinion, generalizes and reaffirms the principle: \"Prior to filing the corresponding executory proceeding (juicio ejecutivo), the Administration must carry out due process, properly notifying the final decision, and make the intimations provided for in numeral 150 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; because compliance with such requirements forms an integral part of due process, which must be reviewed by the Courts to give enforceability to the instrument presented\". (Dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República No. 241 of September eighteen, two thousand two.).- A basic principle of Procedural Law in general, namely, as well cited by [Name1], \"il processo segue il diritto come l' ombra segue il corpo\" (the procedure follows the Law as the shadow follows the body). It is thus that Article 3 of the Código Procesal Civil itself establishes that when interpreting the procedural norm, the judge must take into account that the purpose of said norm is to give application to the substantive norms, in such a way that one must not lose sight that what is being attempted to enforce is a coffee contribution obligation (obligación de contribución cafetalera) and therefore a paratariff obligation (paratributaria), which has particularities distinct from civil obligations. One of those singularities is that it is an obligation created by law in favor of the State or its Institutions —such as FONECAFE—, which through the power of imperium enjoys coercive power to enforce it, given that IT IS THE SAME CREDITOR OF THE OBLIGATION WHO UNILATERALLY PREPARES THE ENFORCEABLE INSTRUMENT (TÍTULO EJECUTIVO). As a counterbalance to the foregoing and as a manifestation of the balance that must exist between authority and liberty, the administered party has a series of legal and constitutional guarantees (due process among others) related to the process of fulfilling that obligation. As a result of the foregoing analysis, it is reasonable and legal to accept that in an executory proceeding of this nature those aspects can be discussed, since due process is part of the determination process of the paratariff obligation and, therefore, is a substantial element of the enforceable instrument. The notification should have been carried out correctly, leaving undeniable proof that the recipient or debtor required certainly received the administrative collection. That notification is not a simple requirement, but rather implicitly carries the opportunity for the person required for payment to oppose the determination of the obligation. That opposition is not referred only to the amount charged, but also regarding the determination of the passive subject. It is noted in the appeal (recurso de apelación), the appellant shows his disagreement insofar as the defendant corporation is not obligated, not being a processing-exporting company (beneficiadora productora), but rather a simple commercial marketing-exporting company. Such argument, related to the imputation as the passive subject, must be discussed before FONECAFE, since part of the determination of the obligation is not only defining the amount, but also the intervening subjects. This collection proceeding, having its basis in a special enforceable instrument issued unilaterally by an administrative entity FONECAFE, has special particularities regarding the issue of the enforceability of the instrument, which distinguish it from the simple common executory proceeding. Although article 433 of the Código Procesal Civil establishes that only the exceptions cited therein (lack of competence, lack of capacity or defective representation, improper joinder of claims, prescription (prescripción), expiration (caducidad), payment, lack of right (falta de derecho) and lack of standing (falta de legitimación)) may be raised, an exception inherent to every executory proceeding has also been recognized, which is the exception of lack of enforceability of the instrument. Said exception derives from the doctrine of numeral 440 of the same legal body as it establishes that the order for response (auto de traslado) is appealable only when it is alleged that the instrument is not enforceable. That being the case, unenforceability can be alleged by way of exception or by appealing the order for response, and it is even reviewable ex officio by the judge. In this specific case, the defendant timely raised the exception of lack of enforceability of the instrument, showing disagreement with the monetary obligation imputed to it, indicating it did not have an opportunity to oppose before being judicially sued. Since due process was not granted in the determination of the paratariff debt in question here, it could not be affirmed that one is in the presence of a liquid and exigible debt, because it has not been previously defined as a certain and determined obligation, as has been set forth supra. VII.- Based on the foregoing, it is proper to revoke the lower court's judgment in that it rejects the exceptions of prescription of capital, lack of enforceability of the instrument, lack of active and passive standing to be sued (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of right, and lack of current interest, partially grants the exception of prescription of interest, and partially grants this simple agrarian executory claim, condemning the defendant to pay the sum of seven hundred seventy-five dollars and forty-eight cents as principal for the mandatory contribution from a part of the coffee producer established by article six of Law seven thousand seven hundred seventy of April twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-eight as a contribution to said Fund for the two thousand one-two thousand two harvest; confirms the order of execution, and declares the interest prior to April tenth, two thousand three, prescribed, and rejects the claim for interest liquidated with this claim, condemns the defendant corporation to the payment of future interest until the total payment of the debt and condemns it to pay both sets of costs; to instead resolve the following: The exception of lack of enforceability of the instrument is granted, a ruling on the rest of the exceptions raised by the defendant is omitted as unnecessary, and the executory claim filed by Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera against Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. The lifting of the attachments decreed in the orders is ordered, upon the finality of this resolution. Both sets of costs are charged to the plaintiff in accordance with article 221 of the Código Procesal Civil and 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria.\"" "I.- It is important to make some preliminary considerations regarding the agrarian competence of this matter. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have established competence in this jurisdictional venue without any questioning thereof, so by the principle of perpetuation of competence, it remained established in this jurisdiction. Regarding the agrarian nature for hearing this type of executory proceeding, this specialized jurisdiction has already been hearing matters of enforcement of instruments deriving from the contribution that feeds the Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera. As this contribution, imposed by the special Law creating FONECAFE, is a parafiscal tribute, one might initially think it is the competence of the Juzgados Civiles de Hacienda and not the competence of the Juzgados Agrarios. It is agrarian competence for the following reasons: It deals with agrarian paratariff matters, which have a direct impact on the sustainability of a contribution fund to stabilize the national coffee activity in times of crisis, when international coffee prices have fallen, and producers' profits are in deficit. That fund is important so that the subsistence of that national agricultural activity is not put at risk. That agrarian parafiscal tribute is not destined for the single fund of the State but is administered by an eminently agrarian entity, created to protect and support an agricultural activity of public interest. Those cases of application of its special regulations are the competence of the agrarian jurisdiction; and based on article 2 subsection h of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, all those cases relating to acts and contracts in which an agricultural entrepreneur is a party, originating in the exercise of activities of production, transformation, industrialization, and alienation of agricultural products. The coffee contribution to the cited fund originates precisely in that agrarian production, where the intervening parties are agrarian subjects closely linked to that productive activity of the country. The legal relationships that arise under the Law Creating the Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera are relationships concerning coffee production, and as this is an activity of great importance for the national economy and food security, it requires being attended by the specialized agrarian Courts as a guarantee of access to quality justice based on procedural principles that differentiate it from other matters.- In this same sense, this Tribunal has already pronounced itself defining agrarian competence precisely for collection matters based on agrarian parafiscal tax enforceable instruments, and in one of those cases it was stated: \" I.- This process has been processed by the Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Cartago, which issued a resolution without time or date, nor was any number assigned to it. Said resolution was appealed and the appeal admitted before the Tribunal Superior Civil de Cartago. The latter, in Voto Nº 214 of 11 hours 15 minutes on August 12, 2005, declared itself incompetent and ordered the process be sent to this Tribunal considering that it is in the presence of a process of an agrarian nature. Agrarian competence by reason of the matter is defined in a general manner by Article 1 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, according to which, it corresponds to the agrarian courts to hear those processes in which a principal activity of production or those related to it of transformation, industrialization, and alienation of agrarian products mediates. In this case, the base document of the process is constituted by a certification from the Executive Director of the Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, in which it is recorded that the defendant owes the plaintiff: “... for the concept of coffee contribution, the liquid and exigible sum of three thousand four hundred fifty-six dollars, currency of the United States of America, in principal, plus default interest at the rate of six point twelve percent annually, from the third day of December, nineteen ninety-nine …” (folio 3). From the foregoing it follows, the credit investment plan was linked to the coffee activity which is purely agrarian in nature and its purpose was to serve as a subsidy for it so that the producer could face the deficit prices that said product suffers in certain periods. In addition to this, it is recorded in the file on folios 4 and 7 that the defendant is dedicated to the cultivation of coffee and in the complaint it was recorded that the representative of the defendant is an agriculturist. Certainly, this last detail is not relevant to the extent that the company's line of business does not necessarily have to coincide with the occupation of its representative; however, it is one more element to consider to ascertain that the defendant is dedicated to the cultivation of coffee. Based on the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that we are in the presence of a process of an agrarian nature, for which reason it must continue to be processed in this venue\" (See Voto 1002-F-05 of 9:58 hours on December 6, 2005 of this Agrarian Tribunal).- II.- This Tribunal does not adopt the list of facts held as proven in the appealed judgment given the manner in which this matter is resolved. Instead, the following are held as proven facts: 5.- The Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera issues official notice D.E. 082-2003, dated February 19, 2003, in which it indicates the amount owed by Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima to that fund. (See document on folios 72-76).- III.- As a fact not proven in this Instance, the following is held: The plaintiff did not prove that it personally notified the legal representative of the defendant or at its corporate domicile of the payment requirement in official notice D.E. 82-2003, dated February 19, 2003, or that the fax sending of said official notice was to a number of Hacienda Agua Caliente. (There is no record of suitable notification, as the defendant's fax number is not indicated on the fax stubs on folios 71 and 77 so as to certainly determine that sending, nor is there a record of the content of what is indicated was sent.).- IV.- Mr. Fraser Pirie Robson, in his capacity as unlimited general power of attorney agent of the defendant corporation, Hacienda Agua Caliente SA, dissatisfied with the first instance judgment, number 08-2005 of eleven hours on April twelve, two thousand five, issued by the Agrarian Judge of Cartago, appeals said resolution for the following reasons: The parafiscal exaction that Fonecafé charges taxes the export of coffee, an activity of a commercial nature. According to him, article 6 of said law provides: “The coffee stabilization contribution (contribución de la estabilización cafetalera) is created, which shall tax the export of coffee...” He adds that, for its part, article 7 describes that: “The contribution from coffee producers to FONECAFE shall be calculated on the exportable production and the amount payable per exported 46 kg sack. The processing (beneficiado) of coffee is the process of elaborating the bean from the fruit to the consumable final product. He points out that Fonecafé does not tax the coffee sold for national consumption, but rather limits itself by means of said law to taxing the activity of exportation. According to his criterion, it is the activity of coffee exportation that is taxed with this parafiscal exaction from Fonecafé. Which means, according to his view, that if a person buys thousands of kilograms of coffee and does not export them, but rather sells said kilograms here in Costa Rica, said sales would not be subject to the payment of the parafiscal exaction in favor of Fonecafé. He alleges that contrario sensu, if all those kilograms of coffee are exported abroad, the exporting processing firm (beneficio exportador) would immediately owe an amount of money X in favor of Fonecafé. He describes that the Diccionario de la Lengua Española defines the word “Exportación” as follows: “1. Action and effect of exporting. 2. Set of goods that are exported.” For its part, it defines the word “exportar” as follows: “To sell goods to another country.” He considers that exportation, therefore, is a sale made of goods to another country. It is an act of commerce by means of which the exporter sells to an importer outside the country, a series of goods from the country of origin, for which reason all exportation is a sale, an act of commerce that has lately been developing at great speed in view of the phenomenon of globalization. Regarding the Defense of Prescription, the appellant refers to the following: His first disagreement with the first instance judgment arises regarding the interpretation of the applicable regulations when resolving the defense of prescription raised by his represented party, and regarding the merits of the matter. He refers that his represented party was registered with Icafé as an exporter of coffee, which is very different from the processing (beneficiado) of the bean. The processing of the coffee product is precisely the elaboration of coffee in fruit until its finalization through elaboration processes, to transform said fruit into an export product. He alleges the purchase and sale of coffee in fruit is in essence, AN AGRARIAN CONTRACT entered into between the processing firms (firmas beneficiadoras) and the coffee producers. He considers that the export of already elaborated coffee is a different thing, an exportation that by its nature is specifically commercial. He alleges that the Fonecafé law imposes a parafiscal exaction charged to the processing firms and taxes ONLY THE EXPORT OF COFFEE at the time that said processing firms (if they are exporters) decide to export or sell the coffee to a buyer outside the national territory, and that said tribute is imposed on the activity of coffee export, which is a purely COMMERCIAL activity. On the other hand, he points out that because said tribute is a charge made by Fonecafé to a COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY (the export of coffee) undertaken by the processing firms, he considers that the applicable prescription is quadrennial and not ordinary. He alleges that he understands it this way according to what is stipulated by article 968 of the Código de Comercio, which establishes that: “Actions derived from commercial acts and contracts prescribe in accordance with the provisions of this chapter....” He further points out that article 984 of the Código de Comercio imposes the prescriptive period of FOUR years, and for its part, its subsection e) stipulates that ACTIONS DERIVED FROM WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SALES TO OTHER MERCHANTS OR DIRECTLY TO THE CONSUMER prescribe in one year. He refers that the executory action promoted through the claim filed by the plaintiff, seeks the collection of a “mandatory contribution” regarding the export of coffee, an action that according to him derives precisely from the commercial activity which is precisely the export of coffee. He further points out that in accordance with the foregoing, article 984 of the Código de Comercio expressly states what the applicable prescriptive period is, that is, 04 years, therefore the exception of prescription should have been granted in the judgment on the merits. Furthermore, he submits for consideration the also prescriptive period of 1 year, according to subsection e) of article 984 of the Código de Comercio, given that the sale of coffee in bulk is a wholesale sale to another merchant outside the national territory. He considers that the first instance judgment is not correct in stating that the applicable prescription is ordinary, that is, ten years, since according to his view we are facing an action that properly derives from a commercial activity, therefore the prescription must necessarily be focused under the Código de Comercio, and not the Código Civil. For the foregoing facts, the appellant considers that the prescriptive period is 1 year according to subsection e) of the Código de Comercio and that if not, the applicable prescription must be 4 years, therefore requesting to revoke the first instance judgment, granting the exception of prescription of the capital and its interest for being accessories, declaring the claim without merit since the prescription period has amply elapsed, without it having been interrupted in any way, and condemning the plaintiff to pay both sets of costs. In another point of appeal, the appellant considers that his represented party was an exporter and never has been a processing firm: For the foregoing, he considers the plaintiff lacks active standing to claim payment against his represented party, since article 9 of said law establishes that the responsibility for payment shall be exclusively that of the processing firm. He points out that his represented party was not a processing firm, but an EXPORTER, therefore the exception of lack of standing should have been granted. He reiterates that a processing firm (which is responsible for elaborating coffee from the fruit to the final product) is one thing and a very different thing is an EXPORTING firm, as his represented party is. He affirms that article 9 of said law imposes the payment of the parafiscal exaction EXCLUSIVELY ON PROCESSING FIRMS, which is why only a processing firm that is simultaneously an exporter can be sued by the plaintiff. According to him, his represented party is not a processing firm, but an exporter, which is why there is no active, much less passive, standing. For the above reasons, he considers the exception of Lack of Standing must be granted in its two modalities, revoking the first instance judgment and declaring the claim filed by the active procedural subject without merit, condemning the plaintiff to pay both sets of costs. He points out as another point of appeal that the administrative venue (vía administrativa) was never exhausted: He refers that the first instance judgment, through official notice D.E. 082-2003, maintains that a payment requirement was supposedly made to his represented party, a situation that according to him never occurred, for which reason he challenges said document, given that his represented party was never required by the plaintiff, and as can be clearly seen, it was NEVER notified of that supposed requirement. According to him, it is nowhere recorded in said document that it was carried out and notified to his represented party, neither at its corporate domicile, nor through the representative. Thus, his represented party was not notified of the present matter, which is why he points out the plaintiff has failed to comply with said prerequisite prima facie to the claim, therefore lacking the right for what was sought in the executory claim to be declared in its favor. He further points out that his represented party has acted in good faith: Therefore requesting that in the event the first instance judgment is confirmed, his represented party be exempted from the payment of costs, revoking said extreme granted in favor of the plaintiff in the first instance judgment. (folios 148-154). V.- The plaintiff appeals the referred judgment based on the following: The plaintiff appeals only regarding the exception of PRESCRIPTION OF INTEREST, as it considers that the a quo is granting said exception based on an interest obligation, applying the rules of article 894 of the Código de Comercio, given that said items for interest derive from a parafiscal obligation, therefore the Código Tributario should be applied, as it explains: it points out that through Law No. 7301 of July 02, 1992, integrally reformed by Law No.

7309 of September 17, 1992, created the National Coffee Stabilization Fund, FONECAFE. Currently, said coffee contribution is regulated by Law 7770, published on May 6, 1998. The plaintiff continues stating that, attached to the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica (ICAFE), it was granted legal personality for the administration of the coffee stabilization resources, "whose main objective is to balance the liquidation price to the producer when the final liquidation of the coffee price is deficient for them, in relation to the production costs of that grain determined by the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica." (Article 1 of the cited law.) Therefore, it considers that the Fund exists to financially assist the coffee producer in those years when low international grain prices threaten to ruin them, and that the corresponding sum of money is calculated in proportion to the production registered by the interested party in prior periods and is disbursed "as an advance against the account of a future harvest."- It points out that one of the sources that feeds said fund is the coffee stabilization contribution, which is regulated in the aforementioned Law, and that in the prevailing doctrine on the matter, this type of aport or contribution is classified as a case of parafiscality but maintains its special tax nature that distinguishes it from properly fiscal taxes. For the plaintiff, the category of special contributions, being mandatory payments owed due to individual or group benefits derived from special State activities, are taxes created by a state law, which is responsible for defining the taxable event and the taxpayer of the tax relationship, as well as its rate and calculation base. However, it points out that they are neither administered by State bodies nor appear as their budgetary income. It also states that, once the coffee contribution is defined as a special contribution of a parafiscal nature, its tax character is indisputable. For this reason, it is regulated by the Law that creates it and supplementarily by the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Article 1.) In that order of ideas and with application of numeral 57 of this Code, it points out that payment made outside the corresponding deadline obliges the taxpayer to also pay interest, under the terms of that legal provision, without the need for any action by the corresponding Tax Administration. Therefore, it considers that FONECAFE has the powers and the right to collect sums for the interest corresponding to the sums owed for the coffee contribution, and that the statute of limitations for these, being parafiscal contributions, is 3 years in application of article 51 of the Tax Code, and not the provisions of the Commerce Code, for which reason it considers that the exception of statute of limitations on interest should have been rejected, since the sums collected by its represented party regarding the interest ARE NOT TIME-BARRED. (folios 155-161).- **VI.-** It is not feasible to hear the grievances of the plaintiff and the defendant related to the issue of statute of limitations, without first having resolved the enforceability of the title for collection. It is necessary to determine if the document is enforceable and from there determine the statute of limitations on principal and interest. The defendant appeals the judgment, alleging that the payment requirement indicated in official letter D.E. 082-2003 was never notified to them, and thus having the possibility to challenge that document, this being a *prima facie* requirement of the claim, meaning it constitutes a lack of right. The appellant is correct regarding this grievance. Article 438 of the Civil Procedure Code, in its subsection 6), establishes that a document to which the law gives that character shall be an enforceable title. Furthermore, article 149, subsection a) of the General Public Administration Law, **contemplates the power of the Public Administration to create enforceable titles**, in this regard it provides: "*The means of administrative execution shall be the following: a) Forced Execution by means of constraint on the administered party's assets when dealing with a liquid credit of the Administration, all with application of the pertinent rules of the Code of Civil Procedure on seizure and auction, with the proviso that the enforceable title may be the certification of the act constituting the credit issued by the competent body to order the execution*". In this regard, it is necessary to indicate the constitutionality of this ordinal has been questioned, given that the Constitutional Chamber, in vote No. 2180-96 of 9:21 a.m. on May 10, 1996, and vote No. 2360-96 of 10:09 a.m. on May 17, 1996, established that this power granted to the Administration is not unconstitutional. Thus, both ordinals can be considered to constitute the primary basis of the enforceable title in tax matters. Now, depending on the administrative entity to which the status of active subject of the tax obligation corresponds (State, Municipalities, or other institutions), there are special rules that regulate each enforceable title. In this case, the National Coffee Stabilization Fund was created by Law 7301 of July 2, 1992, and No. 7770 of April 24, 1998, in order to be the administrator entity of the resources collected through the mandatory contribution for profits on coffee exports, the same fund that would serve as support for coffee production in times of crisis. Article 9 of said Law establishes: "*Simultaneously, FONECAFE may initiate the executive proceeding against the debtor firm; to do so, it will base itself on the accounting records and export documents it has available, which constitute an enforceable title*".- The payment of the referred coffee contribution constitutes a parafiscal tax, which is administered by FONECAFE as the collecting entity and administrator of the fund, hence the supplementary application of tax rules and procedures. Regarding the parafiscal nature of this type of contribution, one may consult Opinion C-203-89 of the Attorney General's Office, signed on November 27, 1989, in which the nature of the agricultural producers' aport to the National Agricultural Contingencies Fund was analyzed, which is applied in Opinion C-080-96 of May 23, 1996, to analyze the parafiscal nature of the aport to the National Coffee Stabilization Fund.- Having clarified the applicable regulations, we have that the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures establishes in article 169: "*The offices that control, on behalf of the Central Government, income or credits of the nature indicated in article 166 of this Code, within the nine months following the expiration of the legal payment term, must prepare the certifications of what is pending collection and order, where appropriate, the withdrawal of the respective receipts from the banks and other collecting offices. Tax credits originating from taxes regulated by this Code, their interest and surcharges that have been subject to challenge by the interested party in an administrative proceeding, must not be certified until the Administrative Tax Tribunal has issued a resolution, and in the case of fines, there is no final judgment. Before sending the certifications to the Collection Office, the offices that control income or credits alluded to in the first paragraph of this article must notify the debtor by any of the means authorized in article 137 of this Code, at the address on file in their records, that a period of fifteen days is granted, counted from their notification, for them to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit. If upon expiry of the indicated period the debtor does not regularize their situation, said certifications must be sent immediately to the Collection Office for the purposes of exercising the respective judicial or extrajudicial collection action. The debt certifications issued by the offices indicated in this article must be signed by the managers of the tax administrations and large taxpayers. They shall have the character of an enforceable title sufficient to initiate judicial collection*". For the specific case here, and in the same sense of notifying the defendant at the administrative venue about the sum collected, for its respective cancellation, there is article 8 of the cited Law Creating the National Coffee Stabilization Fund, which establishes: "*The coffee contribution shall be assessed upon registering the export contract with the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica and shall be paid by the processor (beneficiador), within the eight calendar days following the date recorded on the invoice corresponding to the respective export contract, directly to FONECAFE*". This administrative procedure relating to the payment requirement to the debtor, is recorded as having been attempted via Official Letter D.E.- 082-2003 of February 19, 2003, by FONECAFE, requiring payment from Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima; however, it was not duly notified to the defendant. Note that folios 77 and 71 contain fax transmission confirmations, indicating it was sent to "Agua Caliente", without recording the fax number to which it was sent, because the recording of the sending name is not a procedural guarantee that the name corresponds truly to the fax number of the required corporation. There is also no certainty of the content of what is indicated was sent by fax. The fax confirmations on folios 71 and 77 are not proof of a proper notification, as has been stated. As indicated, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, article 169, provides that as an act prior to sending the certification to the Collection Office, the Tax Administration must notify the debtor by any of the means authorized by article 137 of that same Code, at the address on file in the proceedings in its records, granting them a period of fifteen days counted from their notification to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, and if upon expiry of the period they do not pay, the certifications must be sent immediately to the Collection Office to initiate the judicial or extrajudicial action. Likewise, article 171 of that legal body (for the case of collections on behalf of the Central Government) provides for A SECOND REQUIREMENT, by establishing that once the Collection Office receives the certifications referred to in article 169, its Head must distribute them among the lawyers of the specific permanent body and/or the Specific Prosecutors so that they exercise the collection action, and said professionals must manage the payment of the credits entrusted to them, but before initiating execution, they must send the debtor a collection notice by mail or deliver it personally, granting them a period of eight days to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, under warning that if they do not do so, sufficient assets will be seized to make said credit and its legal accessories effective. Under this understanding, non-compliance with the first requirement generates unenforceability. Regarding the second requirement, it also generates unenforceability of the title, by virtue of the principle of legality, even if it is a reiteration of administrative collection. Thus, it can be affirmed that a particularity of the enforceability of the title for tax-agrarian matters is the fact that DUE PROCESS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH. **The observance of due process refers both to the stage of determining the obligation and to the stage of administrative collection of that already determined obligation**. The foregoing, because the applicable procedural regulations must be complied with, that is, in special laws and their regulations, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and failing that, the procedural rules contained in articles 308 and following of the General Public Administration Law. In this sense, the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José declared an executive lawsuit without merit, arguing that the Tax Administration did not proceed to apply the procedure stipulated by law for the ex officio determination. Regarding what is relevant, it was established: "*... if the officials of the Directorate General of Taxation deemed that the declared tax did not correspond to the accounting reality of Mr. ..., what was necessary to do in Law was to open an administrative proceeding against his person and grant him the opportunity to exercise his legitimate right of defense, such as hearing his arguments and attending to the offer of exculpatory evidence, and once the proceeding was substantiated, issue a resolution with the legal formalities in that venue, where based on the evidence produced, establish or determine that the tax reported was not the one that Don *... effectively had to pay, at which time he had the right to challenge such considerations and have the proceedings reviewed by his hierarchical Superior, where the actions and decisions of his inferiors would eventually be confirmed or, on the contrary, conclude that the amount declared as income tax was what corresponded to the accounting reality of that period. The omission of the due process that was required in this case allows the undersigned, ... to accept the defenses opposed by the defendant of lack of effectiveness of the title, lack of right, lack of current standing, and lack of passive standing to sue, because we are in the presence of a title that lacks executive force, its content being ineffective to be collected through the summary proceeding, as there is no resolution where, with broad fact-based and legal criteria, and above all, supported by suitable, reliable evidence, it is declared that Don *... did not fully comply when he reported the tax he paid at the time ...*". (Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. No. 1378 at eight thirty in the morning on October seventeen, two thousand two. Emphasis is not from the original). The foregoing because the power of imperium does not imply curtailing the right of defense, and given that a power of considerable magnitude has been granted to the Public Administration to create enforceable titles, as an unavoidable counterweight to said power, due process must necessarily be guaranteed in the procedure for determining the obligation and its administrative collection, both circumstances being corollaries of the enforceability of the title. That is, the enforceable title in a substantive sense, in tax-agrarian matters, is comprised not only of a certification of a liquid and enforceable obligation issued by the competent authority, but also that the correct observance of due process in the phase of determining that obligation and in the phase of administrative collection when it is already determined forms an integral part of that certification, both elements being necessary for the completeness of the title. Regarding non-observance of due process as a cause for unenforceability of the title, the **Constitutional Chamber** has stated: "*The reasonableness of the norm whose constitutionality is questioned derives from the fact that the Public Administration, in order to issue an enforceable title with executive force, has as its basis an ordinary administrative proceeding where possible liability is determined. Thus, through an ordinary proceeding, of mandatory observance for the Administration, guaranteed and structured in the General Public Administration Law itself, the administered party is allowed to exercise their right of defense, without prejudice to going before the Courts of Justice to defend their rights; an administrative proceeding that meets all the guarantees of due process as this Constitutional Jurisdiction has required*." (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote 2360 at 9:00 a.m. on January 31, 1996, and 6477 at 2:39 p.m. on November 28, 1996. Emphasis is not from the original). **And in a similar sense:** "*The manner in which the appealed Council would have estimated the amount of the tax obligation that interests it - within the scope of its competence - constitutes a matter of mere legality that must be elucidated not in this venue but in the corresponding legal one. However, the fact that the Municipal Council of Esparza agreed to the determination of said obligation, without the corresponding communication having been made regarding it, nor any hearing having been granted to the appellant, so that she could challenge it, through the remedies that the legal system grants her for that purpose, injures the fundamental guarantee of due process consecrated in her favor by Constitutional numeral 39, since acting in this way violates the right of defense. Likewise, the circumstance that the Municipal Comptroller's Office had issued, in compliance with what was ordered by the defendant Council, the certification of said determination, to later send it for judicial collection for its non-payment, without it having acquired firmness for this, violates the fundamental principle of private property, which article 45 of the Political Constitution establishes in favor of the appellant*." (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote 3930 at three twenty-seven in the afternoon on July 18, 1995. Emphasis is not from the original). Likewise, the Administrative Litigation Tribunal has shared the same criterion: "*... 11. **That undoubtedly, if the tax determination had not been definitively established in the administrative venue, because its notification had not been made to the legal representative acting at that time, as the defendant well pleaded, leaving them the opportunity to challenge it in due time and form in that venue, because the period for doing so had not begun to run, the plaintiff was barred from resorting to the judicial venue to collect the taxes, fines, and interest originating from those determinations definitively established in the administrative venue, as the Judge correctly reasons and clearly follows from the provisions of article 160, paragraph 2, of the Tax Code, in relation to the other provisions of that same Code that the Judge also cites and analyzes. III That in the opinion of this Tribunal, that defense is not strictly a lack of right, but what occurs is that the right itself is uncertain because it is not yet definitively established in the administrative venue such that it can be judicially enforceable, for which reason the appealed judgment should be clarified in that sense.* (...)" (Superior Administrative Litigation Tribunal. No. 3136 at three fifteen in the afternoon on December twenty-one, nineteen hundred seventy-eight). In this same sense, the Attorney General's Office* in a recent opinion, generalizes and reaffirms the principle: "*Prior to the filing of the corresponding executive lawsuit, the Administration must carry out due process, adequately notifying the final decision, and make the intimations provided for in numeral 150 of the General Public Administration Law; because compliance with such requirements forms an integral part of due process, which must be reviewed by the Courts to grant enforceability to the title presented*". (Opinion of the Attorney General's Office No. 241 of September eighteen, two thousand two.).- A basic principle of Procedural Law in general, namely, as [Nombre1] well cites it, ***il processo segue il diritto come l' ombra segue il corpo*** (the process follows the Law as the shadow follows the body). It is thus that article 3 of the Civil Procedure Code itself establishes **that when interpreting the procedural rule, the judge must take into account that the purpose of the former is to give application to the substantive rules**, so that one must not lose sight of the fact that what is being attempted to execute is a coffee contribution obligation and therefore a para-tax obligation, which has particularities distinct from civil obligations. One of those singularities is that it is an obligation created by law in favor of the State or its Institutions -like FONECAFE-, which by means of the power of imperium enjoys coercive power to execute it, given that **IT IS THE SAME CREDITOR OF THE OBLIGATION THAT UNILATERALLY CREATES THE ENFORCEABLE TITLE**. As a counterweight to the above and as a manifestation of the balance that must exist between authority and freedom, the administered party has a series of legal and constitutional guarantees (due process among others) related to the process of compliance with that obligation. As a result of the foregoing analysis, it is reasonable and legal to accept that in an executive proceeding of this nature, those aspects can be discussed, since due process is part of the process of determining the para-tax obligation and therefore is a substantial element of the enforceable title. The notification should have been carried out correctly, leaving indubitable proof that the recipient or required debtor certainly received the administrative collection. That notification is not a simple requirement, but implicitly carries the opportunity for the payment respondent to oppose the determination of the obligation. That opposition does not refer only to the amount collected, but also regarding the determination of the taxpayer. Note in the appeal, the appellant shows their disagreement insofar as the defendant corporation is not obligated, not being a producing processor (beneficiador), but rather a mere exporting marketer company. That argument, related to the imputation as taxpayer, must be discussed before FONECAFE, since part of the determination of the obligation is not only defining the amount, but the intervening subjects. This collection proceeding, having its basis in a special enforceable title issued unilaterally by an administrative entity, FONECAFE, has special particularities regarding the issue of enforceability of the title, which distinguish it from the simple common executive proceeding. Although article 433 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes that only the defenses cited there may be opposed (lack of competence, lack of capacity or defective representation, improper joinder of claims, statute of limitations, expiration, payment, lack of right, and lack of standing), an exception inherent to every executive proceeding has also been recognized, which is the exception of lack of enforceability of the title. This exception stems from the doctrine of numeral 440 of the same legal body insofar as it establishes the order for transfer is appealable only when it is alleged that the title is not enforceable. Thus, unenforceability can be alleged by way of exception or by appealing the order for transfer; it is even reviewable *ex officio* by the judge. In this specific case, the defendant timely opposed the exception of lack of enforceability of the title, showing disagreement with the monetary obligation imputed to them, indicating they had no opportunity to oppose it before being judicially sued. Not having granted due process in the determination of the para-tax debt in question here, one could not assert that this involves a liquid and enforceable debt, because the same has not been defined as a certain and specified obligation beforehand, as has been stated above. **VII.-** Based on the foregoing, the proper course of action is to revoke the lower court's judgment insofar as it rejects the exceptions of statute of limitations on principal, lack of enforceability of the title, lack of active and passive standing to sue, lack of right, and lack of current interest; partially accepts the exception of statute of limitations on interest and partially grants the present simple agrarian executive claim, ordering the defendant to pay the sum of seven hundred seventy-five dollars and forty-eight cents in concept of principal due to the mandatory contribution from the coffee producer established by article six of Law seven thousand seven hundred seventy of April twenty-four, nineteen ninety-eight as an aport to said Fund for the two thousand one-two thousand two harvest; confirms the writ of execution, and declares interest prior to April tenth, two thousand three time-barred, and rejects the claim for interest liquidated with the present claim, orders the defendant corporation to pay future interest until the total payment of the debt, and orders it to pay both costs; in order to instead resolve the following: The exception of lack of enforceability of the title is accepted, a pronouncement on the remaining exceptions opposed by the defendant is omitted as unnecessary, and the executive claim brought by the National Coffee Stabilization Fund against Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. The lifting of the seizures decreed in the proceedings is ordered, effective upon the firmness of this resolution.

Both sets of costs are borne by the plaintiff in accordance with Article 221 of the Código Procesal Civil and 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria."</span></p></div></body></html> On the other hand, Article 149, subsection a) of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de Administración Pública) <span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">contemplates the power of the Public Administration to create enforceable instruments</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, providing in this regard: “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The means of administrative enforcement shall be the following: a) Forced Execution by means of constraint upon the administered party’s assets when a liquid credit of the Administration is involved, all with application of the pertinent rules of the Code of Civil Procedure on attachment and auction, with the proviso that the enforceable instrument may be the certification of the act constituting the credit issued by the body competent to order the execution</span><span style="font-family:Arial">”. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that the constitutionality of that provision has been questioned, with the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Vote No. 2180–96 of 9 hrs 21 minutes of May 10, 1996 and Vote No. 2360-96 of 10 hrs 09 minutes of May 17, 1996, having established that this power granted to the Administration is not unconstitutional. Thus, both provisions can be considered to constitute the primary foundation of the enforceable instrument in tax matters. Now then, depending on the administrative entity that holds the status of active subject of the tax obligation (the State, Municipalities or other institutions), there are special rules governing each enforceable instrument. In this case, the National Coffee Stabilization Fund (Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera) was created by Law 7301 of July 2, 1992 and No. 7770 of April 24, 1998, for the purpose of being the entity administering the resources collected through the mandatory contribution on coffee export earnings, the same fund that would serve as support for coffee production in times of crisis. Article 9 of said Law provides: \" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Concurrently, FONECAFE may initiate the enforcement proceeding against the debtor firm; to do so, it shall base its action on the accounting records and export documents in its possession, which constitute an enforceable instrument</span><span style="font-family:Arial">\".- The payment of the aforementioned coffee contribution constitutes a parafiscal levy, which is administered by Fonecafé as the collecting entity and fund administrator, hence the tax rules and procedures are applicable to it on a supplementary basis. Regarding the parafiscal nature of this type of contributions, consult the Legal Opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República) number C-203-89, signed on November 27, 1989, in which the nature of the agricultural producers’ contribution to the National Agricultural Contingency Fund was analyzed, which is applied in Legal Opinion C-080-96 of May 23, 1996, to analyze the parafiscal nature of the contribution to the National Coffee Stabilization Fund.- Having clarified the applicable rules, we find that the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) establishes in Article 169: “ </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The offices that control, in favor of the Central Government, revenues or credits of the nature indicated in Article 166 of this Code, must, within nine months following the expiration of the legal payment term, prepare the certifications of amounts pending collection and order, where applicable, the withdrawal of the respective receipts from banks and other collecting offices. Tax credits arising from taxes regulated by this Code, along with their interest and surcharges, that have been challenged by the interested party in administrative proceedings must not be certified until the Tax Administrative Court has issued a decision, and in the case of fines, until a final judgment exists. Before remitting the certifications to the Collections Office, the offices that control the revenues or credits referred to in the first paragraph of this article must notify the debtor, by any of the means authorized by Article 137 of this Code, at the address appearing in their records, that a period of fifteen days is granted, counted from notification, for it to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit. If upon expiration of the indicated period the debtor does not regularize its situation, said certifications must be sent immediately to the Collections Office for the purposes of exercising the respective judicial or extrajudicial collection action. The certifications of debt issued by the offices indicated in this article must be signed by the managers of the tax administrations and large taxpayers. They shall have the character of a sufficient enforceable instrument to initiate judicial collection</span><span style="font-family:Arial">”. For the specific case, and in the same sense of giving notice to the defendant in the administrative venue regarding the sum being collected, for its respective cancellation, there is Article 8 of the cited Law Creating the National Coffee Stabilization Fund, which establishes: \" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The coffee contribution shall be assessed upon registering the export contract before the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica (Instituto del Café de Costa Rica) and shall be paid by the processor (beneficiador), within eight calendar days following the date stated on the invoice corresponding to the respective export contract, directly before FONECAFE</span><span style="font-family:Arial">\". It is on record that this administrative procedure, referring to the demand for payment to the debtor, was attempted by means of Official Letter D.E.- 082-2003 of February 19, 2003 by FONECAFÉ, demanding payment from Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima; however, it was not duly notified to the defendant. Note that at folios 77 and 71, fax transmission reports appear, indicating it was sent to \"Agua Caliente\", without the fax number to which it was sent being recorded, because stating the transmission name does not constitute procedural guarantee that the name actually corresponds to the fax number of the required company. Nor is there any certainty regarding the content of what is indicated was sent by fax. The fax reports at folios 71 and 77 are not proof of adequate notification, as has been set forth. As indicated, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, Article 169, provides that as a prior act to sending the certification to the Collections Office, the Tax Administration must notify the debtor by any of the means authorized by Article 137 of that same Code, at the address appearing in the record of its files, granting it a period of fifteen days counted from its notification to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, and if upon expiration of the period it does not pay, the certifications must be sent immediately to the Collections Office to initiate the judicial or extrajudicial action. Likewise, Article 171 of that legal body (for the case of collections in favor of the Central Government) provides for A SECOND REQUIREMENT, by establishing that once the Collections Office receives the certifications referred to in Article 169, its Chief must distribute them among the lawyers of the specific permanent corps and/or the Specific Prosecutors so that they may exercise the collection action, and said professionals must manage the payment of the credits entrusted to them, but before initiating execution, they must send the debtor a collection notice by mail or deliver it personally, granting it a period of eight days to proceed with the cancellation of the unpaid tax credit, under warning that if it fails to do so, sufficient assets will be attached to make said credit and its legal accessories effective. Under this understanding, failure to comply with the first requirement renders the instrument unenforceable. As for the second requirement, it also renders the instrument unenforceable, by virtue of the principle of legality, even if it is a reiteration of administrative collection. Thus, it can be affirmed that a peculiarity of the enforceability of the instrument for tax-agrarian matters is the fact that DUE PROCESS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Observance of due process refers both to the stage of determining the obligation and to the stage of administrative collection of that already-determined obligation</span><span style="font-family:Arial">. The foregoing, because the applicable procedural rules must be complied with, that is, in special laws and their regulations, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and in default thereof, the procedural rules contained in Articles 308 and following of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de Administración Pública). In this sense, the Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José dismissed an enforcement proceeding, arguing that the Tax Administration did not apply the procedure stipulated by law for an ex officio determination. In what is relevant, it was established: \" ...</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> if the officials of the General Directorate of Taxation considered that the declared tax did not correspond to the accounting reality of Mr. ..., </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">what was necessary to do in Law was to open an administrative proceeding against his person and grant him the opportunity to exercise his legitimate right of defense, such as hearing his arguments and attending to the offer of exculpatory evidence, and once the substantiation of the proceeding was carried out, issue a decision with the formalities of law in said venue, where, in adherence to the evidence presented, establish or determine that the reported tax was not what Mr. *... effectively had to pay, at which time he had the right to challenge such considerations and for the proceedings to be reviewed by his hierarchical Superior, where the actions and decisions of his subordinates would eventually be confirmed or, on the contrary, conclude that the amount declared as income tax was that which corresponded to the accounting reality of that period. Omitting the due process that was required in this case allows the undersigned, ... to uphold the defenses asserted by the defendant of lack of effectiveness of the instrument, lack of right, lack of current standing, and lack of passive standing to be sued, because we are in the presence of an instrument that lacks executory force, as its content is ineffective to be collected in the summary proceeding</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, in the absence of a decision where, with broad criteria of fact and law and above all supported by suitable, reliable proof, declare that Mr. *... did not fully comply when he reported the tax that he paid at the time ... </span><span style="font-family:Arial">\". (Civil Treasury Court for Summary Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. No. 1378 of eight hours thirty minutes of October seventeen, two thousand two. Emphasis not in original). The foregoing, because the power of imperium does not imply curtailing the right of defense, and given that a power of considerable magnitude has been granted to the Public Administration to create enforceable instruments, as an unavoidable counterweight to said power, due process must necessarily be guaranteed in the proceeding to determine the obligation and in the administrative collection proceeding thereof, both circumstances being corollaries of the enforceability of the instrument. That is to say, the enforceable instrument in a substantive sense, in tax-agrarian matters, is comprised not only of a certification of a liquid and exigible obligation issued by the competent authority, but also that correct observance of due process in the phase of determining that obligation and in the administrative collection phase once it has been determined forms an integral part of that certification, both elements being necessary for the completeness of the instrument. Regarding the non-observance of due process as a ground for unenforceability of the instrument, the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> has stated: \"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The reasonableness of the norm whose constitutionality is questioned derives from the fact that the Public Administration, in order to issue an enforceable instrument with executory force, bases itself on an ordinary administrative process where possible liability is determined. Thus, through an ordinary proceeding, of mandatory compliance for the Administration, guaranteed and structured in the General Public Administration Law itself, the administered party is allowed to exercise its right of defense, without prejudice to resorting to the Courts of Justice to defend its rights; an administrative proceeding that gathers all the guarantees of due process as this Constitutional Jurisdiction has required</span><span style="font-family:Arial">.\" (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote 2360 of 9 hours of January 31, 1996 and 6477 of 14 hours 39 minutes of November 28, 1996. Emphasis not in original). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">And in a similar sense: </span><span style="font-family:Arial">“</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The manner in which the respondent Council may have estimated the amount of the tax obligation that concerns it -within the scope of its jurisdiction- constitutes a matter of mere legality that must be elucidated not in this venue but in the corresponding legal one. However, the fact that the Municipal Council of Esparza agreed to the determination of said obligation, without the corresponding communication having been made regarding it, and without any hearing having been granted to the appellant, so that it could challenge it by means of the remedies that the legal system grants it for that purpose, injures the fundamental guarantee of due process enshrined in its favor by Constitutional numeral 39, since the right of defense is violated by what was thus done. Likewise, the circumstance that the Municipal Accounting Office issued, in compliance with what was ordered by the respondent Council, the certification of said determination, to then send it for judicial collection for non-payment, without it having acquired finality for that purpose, violates the fundamental principle of private property, which Article 45 of the Political Constitution establishes in favor of the appellant</span><span style="font-family:Arial">\". (Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote 3930 of fifteen hours twenty-seven minutes of July 18, 1995. Emphasis not in original). Likewise, the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal has shared the same criterion: \"(...) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">11. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">That undoubtedly if the determination of the tax had not been definitively established in the administrative venue, because notification thereof had not been made to the legal representative acting at that time, as the defendant properly raised as a defense, leaving it the opportunity to challenge it in time and form in that venue, because the period to do so had not begun to run, it was forbidden for the plaintiff to resort to the judicial venue to collect the taxes, fines and interest originating from those determinations definitively established in the administrative venue, as the Judge correctly reasons</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> and clearly derives from the provisions of Article 160, paragraph 2, of the Tax Code, in relation to the other provisions of that same Code which the Judge also cites and analyzes. III That in the judgment of this Tribunal, that defense is not strictly a lack of right but rather that the right is uncertain because it is not yet definitively established in the administrative venue so as to be judicially exigible, so in that sense it is appropriate to clarify the appealed judgment.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (...)\" (Superior Contentious-Administrative Tribunal. No. 3136 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of December twenty-one, nineteen seventy-eight). In this same sense, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">* </span><span style="font-family:Arial">in a recent legal opinion, generalizes and reaffirms the principle: \"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Prior to filing the corresponding enforcement proceeding, the Administration must observe due process, duly notifying the final decision, and carry out the intimations provided for in numeral 150 of the General Public Administration Law; because compliance with such requirements forms an integral part of due process, which must be reviewed by the Courts in order to grant enforceability to the instrument presented</span><span style="font-family:Arial">\". (Legal Opinion of the Office of the Attorney General No. 241 of September eighteen, two thousand two.).- A basic principle of Procedural Law in general, namely, as well cited by [Nombre1], </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">\"il processo segue il diritto come l' ombra segue il corpo\"</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (the process follows law as the shadow follows the body). It is thus that Article 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself establishes </span><span style="font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline">when interpreting the procedural rule, the judge must take into account that the purpose thereof is to give application to the substantive rules</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">,</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> so that one must not lose sight of the fact that what is being attempted to enforce is a coffee contribution obligation, and therefore a parafiscal one, which has particularities distinct from civil obligations. One of those singularities is that it is an obligation created by law in favor of the State or its Institutions – such as FONECAFE – which, by means of the power of imperium, enjoys coercive power to enforce it, and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">IT IS THE SAME CREDITOR OF THE OBLIGATION THAT UNILATERALLY CREATES THE ENFORCEABLE INSTRUMENT</span><span style="font-family:Arial">. As a counterweight to the foregoing and as a manifestation of the balance that must exist between authority and liberty, the administered party has a series of legal and constitutional guarantees (due process among others) related to the process of fulfilling that obligation. As a result of the foregoing analysis, it is reasonable and legal to accept that in an enforcement proceeding of this nature, those aspects can be discussed, since due process is part of the proceeding to determine the parafiscal obligation and therefore is a substantive element of the enforceable instrument. Notification must have been carried out correctly, leaving indisputable proof that the recipient or required debtor certainly received the administrative collection notice. That notification is not a mere requirement, but implicitly carries the opportunity for the party required to pay to oppose the determination of the obligation. That opposition is not referred only to the amount being collected, but also as to the determination of the passive subject. Note that in the appeal, the appellant shows its disagreement insofar as the defendant company is not obligated, not being a processing-producer, but rather a mere export-marketing company. Such argument, related to the imputation as a passive subject, must be discussed before FONECAFE, because part of determining the obligation is not only defining the amount, but also the intervening subjects. This collection proceeding, having its foundation in a special enforceable instrument issued unilaterally by an administrative entity FONECAFE, has special particularities regarding the issue of enforceability of the instrument, which distinguish it from the simple common enforcement proceeding. While Article 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes that only the defenses cited therein may be asserted (lack of jurisdiction, lack of capacity or defective representation, improper joinder of claims, prescription, expiry, payment, lack of right, and lack of standing), a defense inherent to every enforcement proceeding has also been recognized, which is the defense of lack of enforceability of the instrument. Said defense arises from the doctrine of numeral 440 of the same legal body insofar as it establishes that the order granting leave to proceed is appealable only when it is alleged that the instrument is not enforceable. Thus, unenforceability may be alleged by way of defense or by appealing the order granting leave, and it is even reviewable ex officio by the judge. In this specific case, the defendant timely asserted the defense of lack of enforceability of the instrument, expressing disagreement with the monetary obligation imputed to it, indicating it did not have an opportunity to oppose before being sued judicially. As due process was not granted in the determination of the parafiscal debt at issue here, it could not be affirmed that one is in the presence of a liquid and exigible debt, because the same has not been defined as a certain and determined obligation previously, as has been set forth supra. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VII.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Based on the foregoing, it is proper to reverse the first-instance judgment insofar as it dismisses the defenses of prescription of principal, lack of enforceability of the instrument, lack of active and passive standing to be sued, lack of right, and lack of present interest, partially upholds the defense of prescription of interest, and partially grants the present simple agrarian enforcement claim, condemning the defendant to pay the sum of seven hundred seventy-five dollars and forty-eight cents as principal by reason of the mandatory contribution on the part of the coffee producer established by Article six of Law seven thousand seven hundred seventy of April twenty-four, nineteen ninety-eight as a contribution to said Fund for the two thousand one-two thousand two harvest; confirms the order of execution, and declares interest prior to April ten, two thousand three prescribed, and dismisses the claim for interest liquidated with the present claim, condemns the defendant company to payment of future interest until total payment of the debt and condemns it to pay both costs; to instead resolve the following: The defense of lack of enforceability of the instrument is upheld, a ruling on the remaining defenses asserted by the defendant is omitted as unnecessary, and the enforcement claim brought by the National Coffee Stabilization Fund (Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera) against Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima is DISMISSED. The lifting of the attachments ordered in the proceedings is ordered, effective from the finality of this decision. Both costs are chargeable to the plaintiff in accordance with Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 55 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction.\"</span></p></div></body></html>"

"I.- Es importante hacer unas consideraciones preliminares sobre la competencia agraria de este asunto. Tanto la parte actora como la demandada han radicado la competencia en esta sede jurisdiccional sin que exista cuestionamiento alguno al respecto, por lo que por el principio de perpetuidad de la competencia la misma quedó radicada en esta jurisdicción. Sobre la naturaleza agraria para conocer este tipo de proceso ejecutivo, ya esta jurisdicción especializada ha venido conociendo los asuntos de ejecución de títulos provenientes de la contribución que alimenta el Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera. Al tratarse esta contribución impuesta por Ley especial de creación del FONECAFE, de un tributo parafiscal, podría pensarse en un primer momento es de competencia de los Juzgados Civiles de Hacienda y no competencia de los Juzgados Agrarios. Es competencia agraria por las siguientes razones: Se trata de materia paratributaria agraria, que tiene incidencia directa en la sostenibilidad de un fondo de contribución para estabilizar la actividad cafetalera nacional en tiempos de crisis, cuando los precios internacionales del café hayan decaído, y las ganancias de los productores sean deficitarias. Ese fondo es importante para que no se ponga en riesgo la subsistencia de esa actividad agrícola nacional. Ese tributo parafiscal agrario, no se destina a la caja única del Estado, sino que es administrado por un ente eminentemente agrario, creado para tutelar y dar soporte a una actividad agrícola de interés público. Es competencia de la jurisdicción agraria aquellos casos de aplicación de su normativa especial; y con base en el artículo 2 inciso h de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, de todos aquellos casos relativos a los actos y contratos en que sea parte un empresario agrícola, originados en el ejercicio de las actividades de producción, transformación, industrialización y enajenación de productos agrícolas. La contribución cafetalera al citado fondo, se origina precisamente en esa producción agraria, donde las partes intervinientes son sujetos agrarios vinculados estrechamente con esa actividad productiva del país. Las relaciones jurídicas que surjan a la luz de la Ley de Creación del Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, son relaciones en torno a la producción del café, y siendo esta una actividad de gran importancia para la economía nacional y seguridad alimentaria, requiere sea atendida por los Tribunales especializados agrarios como garantía al acceso de una justicia de calidad basada en principios procesales que la diferencia de otras materias.- En este mismo sentido, ya este Tribunal se ha pronunciado definiendo la competencia agraria precisamente para asuntos cobratorios basados en títulos ejecutivos tributarios parafiscales agrarios, y en uno de esos casos se dijo: " I.- Este proceso ha sido tramitado por el Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía de Cartago, quien dictó resolución sin hora ni fecha, tampoco se le consignó número alguno. Dicha resolución fue apelada y el recurso de apelación admitido para ante el Tribunal Superior Civil de Cartago. Este último en Voto Nº 214 de las 11 horas 15 minutos del 12 de agosto del 2005 se declaró incompetente y dispuso remitir el proceso a este Tribunal al considerar se está en presencia de un proceso de naturaleza agraria. La competencia agraria en razón de la materia está definida de manera genérica por el artículo 1º de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, según la cual, corresponde a los tribunales agrarios conocer de aquellos procesos en lo que medie una actividad principal de producción o conexas a ésta de transformación, industrialización y enajenación de productos agrarios. En este caso, el documento base del proceso está constituido por una certificación de la Directora Ejecutiva del Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, en la cual se consigna que la demandada es en deberle a la actora: “... por concepto de contribución cafetalera, la suma líquida y exigible de tres mil cuatrocientos cincuenta y seis dólares, moneda de los Estados Unidos de América, de principal, más intereses moratorios al tipo del seis punto doce por ciento anual, desde el día tres de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve …” (folio 3). De lo expuesto se desprende, el plan de inversión del crédito estuvo vinculado con la actividad cafetalera que es netamente de carácter agrario y su fin fue servir de subsidio a la misma para que el productor pudiera hacer frente a los precios deficitarios que en determinadas épocas sufre dicho producto. Aunado a ello, consta en autos a folios 4 y 7 que la demandada se dedica al cultivo del café y en el escrito de demanda se consignó que el representante de la demandada es un agricultor. Ciertamente este último dato no es relevante en la medida de que el giro de la empresa no necesariamente debe coincidir con la ocupación de su representante; sin embargo, es un elemento más a tomar en cuenta para cerciorarse de que la demandada se dedica al cultivo del café. Por lo expuesto, es posible concluir se está en presencia de un proceso de carácter agrario en razón de lo cual el mismo debe seguir siendo tramitado en esta sede" (Ver Voto 1002-F-05 de las 9:58 horas del 6 de diciembre del 2005 de este Tribunal Agrario).- II.- Este Tribunal no prohija la relación de hechos tenidos por demostrados en el fallo recurrido dada la forma en que se resuelve este asunto. En su lugar se tienen como hechos probados los siguientes: 5.- El Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, emite oficio D.E. 082-2003, fechado 19 de febrero del 2003, en el que indica el monto adeudado por Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima a ese fondo. (Ver documento de folios 72-76).- III.- Como hecho no probado en esta Instancia se tiene el siguiente: No probó la parte actora haya notificado personalmente al apoderado de la demandada o en su domicilio social el requerimiento de pago oficio D.E. 82-2003, fechado 19 de febrero del 2003, o bien, que el envío de fax de tal oficio lo fuera a un número de Hacienda Agua Caliente. (No hay constancia de notificación idónea, pues no se indica número de fax de la demandada en las colillas de fax a folios 71 y 77 como para determinar en forma cierta ese envío, además no hay constancia del contenido de lo que se indica se envió.).- IV.- El señor Fraser Pirie Robson en su condición de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad demandada, Hacienda Agua Caliente SA, inconforme con la sentencia de primera instancia, número 08-2005 de las once horas del doce de abril de dos mil cinco, dictada por el juez Agrario de Cartago, apela dicha resolución por las siguientes razones: La exacción parafiscal que cobra el Fonecafé grava la exportación del café, actividad de carácter comercial. Según él el artículo 6 de dicha ley dispone: “Créase la contribución de la estabilización cafetalera que gravará la exportación de café...”Agrega que por su parte el artículo 7 describe que: “La contribución de los productores de café a FONECAFE, se calculará sobre la producción exportable y, el monto por pagar por saco exportado de 46 kgr. El beneficiado del café, es el proceso de elaboración del grano desde la fruta, hasta el producto final consumible. Señala que el Fonecafé no grava el café que se venda para el consumo nacional, sino que se limita por medio de dicha ley a gravar la actividad de la exportación. Según su criterio es la actividad de la exportación del café la que se encuentra gravada con esta exacción parafiscal del Fonecafé. Lo que quiere decir según su parecer, que si una persona compra miles de kilogramos de café y no los exporta, sino que vende dichos kilogramos aquí en Costa Rica, dichas ventas no estarían sujetas al pago de la exacción parafiscal a favor de Fonecafé. Alega que contrario sensu, si todos esos kilogramos de café son exportados hacia el exterior, inmediatamente el beneficio exportador estaría adeudando una cantidad de dinero X a favor del Fonecafé. Describe que el Diccionario de la Lengua Española define la palabra “Exportación” de la siguiente manera: “1. Acción y efecto de exportar. 2. Conjunto de mercancías que se exportan.” Por su parte define la palabra “exportar” de la siguiente manera: “Vender géneros a otro país.” Considera la exportación por ende, es una venta que se hace de mercancías a otro país. Es un acto de comercio por medio del cual el exportador vende a un importador fuera del país, una serie de mercancías desde el país de origen, por lo que toda exportación es una venta, un acto de comercio que se ha venido desarrollando últimamente a gran velocidad en vista del fenómeno de la globalización. En cuanto a la Defensa de Prescripción refiere el apelante lo siguiente: Su primera inconformidad con la sentencia de primera instancia se da en cuanto a la interpretación de la normativa aplicable a la hora de resolver la defensa de prescripción opuesta por su representada, y en cuanto al fondo del asunto. Refiere que su representada estuvo inscrita en el Icafé como exportadora de café, cosa que es muy distinta al beneficiado del grano. El beneficiado del producto del café, es precisamente la elaboración del café en fruta hasta su finalización por medio de procesos de elaboración, para transformar dicha fruta en producto de exportación. Alega la compra venta del café en fruta es en esencia, UN CONTRATO AGRARIO suscrito entre las firmas beneficiadoras y los productores de café. Considera que es cosa distinta la exportación del café ya elaborado, exportación que por su naturaleza es de índole comercial específicamente. Alega que la ley del Fonecafé impone una exacción parafiscal a cargo de las firmas beneficadoras y grava únicamente LA EXPORTACIÓN DEL CAFÉ a la hora de que dichas firmas beneficiadoras (si son exportadoras) decidan exportar o vender el café a un comprador fuera del territorio nacional, y que se impone dicho tributo a la actividad de la exportación del café, la cual es una actividad netamente COMERCIAL. Por otra parte señala que por tratarse dicho tributo de un cobro que hace el Fonecafé a una ACTIVIDAD COMERCIAL (la exportación del café) emprendida por las firmas beneficiadoras, considera que la prescripción aplicable es cuatrienal y no la ordinaria. Alega que así lo entiende según lo estipulado por el artículo 968 del Código de Comercio, que establece que: “Las acciones que se deriven de actos y contratos comerciales, prescriben con arreglo a las disposiciones de éste capítulo....” Señala además que el artículo 984 del Código de Comercio impone el plazo prescriptivo de CUATRO años, y por su parte su inciso e) estipula que prescriben al año LAS ACCIONES DERIVADAS DE VENTAS A POR MAYOR Y AL DETALLE A OTROS COMERCIANTES O AL CONSUMIDOR DIRECTAMENTE. Refiere que la acción ejecutiva promovida por medio de la demanda interpuesta por la parte actora, pretende el cobro de una “contribución obligatoria” en cuanto a la exportación del café, acción que viene según él derivada precisamente de la actividad comercial que es precisamente la exportación del café. Señala además que en concordancia con lo anterior, el artículo 984 del Código de Comercio manifiesta expresamente cual es el plazo prescriptivo aplicable, sea el de 04 años, por lo que la excepción de prescripción debió de ser declarada con lugar en la sentencia de fondo. Además somete a consideración el plazo también prescriptivo de 1 año, según el inciso e) del artículo 984 del Código de Comercio, toda vez que la venta del café en masa es una venta al por mayor a otro comerciante fuera del territorio nacional. Considera que no lleva razón la sentencia de primera instancia al manifestar que la prescripción aplicable es la ordinaria, sea la de diez años, pues según su parecer estamos frente a una acción que deriva propiamente de una actividad comercial, por lo que la prescripción necesariamente debe de enfocarse a la luz del Código de Comercio, y no del Código Civil. Por los anteriores hechos considera el apelante que el plazo prescriptivo es de 1 año al tenor del inciso e) del Código de Comercio y que de no serlo la prescripción aplicable debe de ser la de 4 años, por lo que solicita revocar la sentencia de primera instancia, acogiendo la excepción de prescripción del capital y sus intereses por ser accesorios, declarando sin lugar la demanda toda vez que de sobra ha transcurrido el plazo de la prescripción, sin que el mismo se viese interrumpido de ninguna manera, y condenando al actor al pago de ambas costas. En otro punto de apelación considera el recurrente que su representada era una exportadora y nunca ha sido una firma beneficiadora: Por lo anterior considera carece el actor de legitimación activa para pretender el cobro en contra de su representada, ya que el artículo 9 de dicha ley establece que la responsabilidad de pago será exclusivamente de la firma beneficiadora. Señala que su representada no era una firma beneficiadora, sino una EXPORTADORA, por lo que se debió de declarar con lugar la excepción de falta de legitimación. Reitera que una cosa es una firma beneficiadora (que se encarga de elaborar el café desde la fruta hasta el producto final) y otra cosa muy diferente es una firma EXPORTADORA, como lo es su representada. Afirma que el artículo 9 de dicha ley impone el pago de la exacción parafiscal EXCLUSIVAMENTE A LAS FIRMAS BENEFICIADORAS, razón por la cual solo una firma beneficiadora que a la vez sea exportadora, puede ser demandada por la parte actora. Según él su representada no es beneficiadora, sino exportadora, razón por la cual no existe legitimación activa ni mucho menos pasiva. Por las anteriores razones, considera debe acogerse la excepción de Falta de Legitimación en sus dos modalidades, revocando la sentencia de primera instancia y declarándose sin lugar la demanda interpuesta por el sujeto procesal activo, condenando al actor al pago de ambas costas. Señala como otro punto de apelación que nunca se agoto la vía administrativa: Refiere que la sentencia de primera instancia mediante el oficio D.E. 082-2003, mantiene que supuestamente se hizo un requerimiento de pago a su representada, situación que según él nunca se dio, por lo cual impugna dicho documento, toda vez que su representada nunca fue requerida por parte de la actora, y como a todas luces se ve, NUNCA fue notificada de ese supuesto requerimiento. Según él no consta en dicho documento por ninguna parte que se le hubiera efectuado y notificado a su representada, ni en su domicilio social, ni por medio del representante. Sino fue notificada su representada con el presente asunto, por lo cual señala el actor ha incumplido con dicho requisito prima fascie demanda, por lo que carece de derecho para que se declare a su favor lo pretendido en la demanda ejecutiva. Señala además que su representada ha actuado de buena fe: Por lo que solicita que en caso de que se confirme la sentencia de primera instancia, sea su representada eximida del pago de las costas, revocándose dicho extremo concedido a favor de la parte actora en la sentencia de primera instancia. (folios 148-154). V.- La parte actora apela referida sentencia con fundamento en lo siguiente: La parte actora apela solamente en cuanto a la excepción de PRESCRIPCION DE INTERESES, pues considera que el a quo esta acogiendo dicha excepción basado en una obligación de intereses, aplicando las reglas del artículo 894 del Código de Comercio, siendo que dichos rubros por intereses devienen de una obligación parafiscal, por lo que debiese de aplicar el Código Tributario, según explica: pues señala que mediante Ley No. 7301 del 02 de julio de 1992, reformada integralmente por la ley No. 7309 del 17 de septiembre del 1992, se creo el Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera FONECAFE. Actualmente dicha contribución cafetalera está regulada por la Ley 7770, publicada el 6 de mayo de 1998. continúa diciendo la actora que adscrito al Instituto del Café de Costa Rica (ICAFE), se le doto de personalidad jurídica para la administración de los recursos de estabilización cafetalera, “los que tienen por objetivo principal equilibrar el precio de liquidación al productor cuando la liquidación final del precio del café sea deficitaria para este, en relación con los costos de producción de ese grano determinados por el Instituto del Café de Costa Rica.” (Artículo 1 de la ley citada.) Por ende considera, el Fondo existe para auxiliar financieramente al productor de café en aquellos años donde los bajos precios internacionales del grano amenacen arruinarlo y que la suma de dinero correspondiente se calcula en proporción a la producción que haya registrado el interesado en períodos anteriores y se gira “a título de anticipo a la cuenta de una cosecha futura”.- Señala que una de las fuentes que alimenta dicho fondo es la contribución de estabilización cafetalera, que aparece regulada en la Ley supra citada, y que en la doctrina imperante en la materia se califica a este tipo de aportes o contribuciones como un caso de parafiscalidad pero mantiene su naturaleza tributaria especial que los distingue de los tributos propiamente fiscales. Para la actora la categoría de contribución especiales, por tratarse de prestaciones obligatorias y debidas a causa de beneficios individuales o grupales derivados de especiales actividades del Estado, son tributos creados por una ley estatal, la que se encarga de definir el hecho generador y el sujeto pasivo de la relación tributaria, así como su tarifa y base de cálculo. Sin embargo señala que no son administrados por órganos del Estado ni figura como ingreso presupuestario suyo. Refiere además que definida la contribución cafetalera como una contribución especial de naturaleza parafiscal, resulta indisputable su carácter tributario. Por tal razón, la misma resulta regulada por la Ley que la crea y supletoriamente por el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios ( Artículo 1.) En ese orden de ideas y con aplicación del numeral 57 de este Código, señala que el pago efectuado fuera del plazo correspondiente obliga al sujeto pasivo a cancelar también intereses, en los términos de esa disposición legal, sin necesidad de actuación alguna de la Administración Tributaria correspondiente. Por lo anterior considera que FONECAFE tiene las facultades y el derecho de cobrar sumas por los intereses correspondientes a las sumas adeudadas por contribución cafetalera, y que el plazo de prescripción de las mismas por ser contribuciones parafiscales es de 3 años en aplicación al artículo 51 del Código Tributario, y no así lo dispuesto en el Código de Comercio, por lo que considera la excepción de prescripción de intereses debió de rechazarse, ya que las sumas cobradas por su representada en cuanto a los intereses NO ESTÁN PRESCRITOS. (folios 155-161).- VI.- No es factible entrar a conocer los agravios de la parte actora y de la demandada referidos al tema de prescripción, sin haberse resuelto antes sobre la ejecutividad del título al cobro. Se hace necesario determinar si el documento es ejecutable y apartir de allí se determinaría sobre su prescripción de capital e intereses. El demandado apela la sentencia aduciendo nunca le fue notificado el requerimiento de pago que se indica en el oficio D.E. 082-2003, y así tener la posibilidad de impugnar ese documento, siendo ello un requisito prima facie de la demanda, por lo que se constituye en una falta de derecho. Lleva razón el recurrente en cuanto a este agravio. El artículo 438 del Código Procesal Civil en su inciso 6) establece que será título ejecutivo al que la ley le dé ese carácter. Por otro lado, el articulo 149 inciso a) de la Ley General de Administración Pública, contempla la potestad de la Administración Pública para crear títulos ejecutivos, al respecto dispone: “Los medios de la ejecución administrativa serán los siguientes: a) Ejecución Forzada mediante apremio sobre el patrimonio del administrado cuando se trate de un crédito líquido de la Administración, todo con aplicación de las normas pertinentes del Código de Procedimiento Civiles sobre embargo y remate, con la salvedad de que el título ejecutivo podrá ser la certificación del acto constitutivo del crédito expedida por el órgano competente para ordenar la ejecución”. Al respecto es menester indicar la constitucionalidad de ese ordinal ha sido cuestionada, siendo que la Sala Constitucional en voto No. 2180 –96 de las 9 hrs 21 minutos del 10 de mayo de 1996 y voto No. 2360-96 de las 10 hrs 09 minutos del 17 de mayo de 1996, estableció que esa potestad concedida a la Administración no es inconstitucional. Así las cosas, ambos ordinales se puede considerar constituyen el fundamento primario del título ejecutivo en materia tributaria. Ahora bien, dependiendo de la entidad administrativa a la que le corresponda la calidad de sujeto activo de la obligación tributaria (Estado, Municipalidades u otras instituciones), así se encuentran normas especiales que regulan cada título ejecutivo. En este caso, el Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, fue creado por Ley 7301 del 2 de julio de 1992 y No 7770 del 24 de abril de 1998, con el fin de ser ente administrador de los recursos recaudados por la contribución obligatoria por concepto de ganancias en las exportaciones de café, mismo fondo que serviría de soporte en la producción cafetalera en tiempos de crisis. El artículo 9 de dicha Ley, establece: " Paralelamente, FONECAFE podrá incoar el proceso ejecutivo contra la firma deudora; para ello, se fundamentará en los registros contables y los documentos de exportación de que disponga, los cuales constituyen título ejecutivo".- El pago de la referida contribución cafetalera, se constituye en un tributo parafiscal, el cual es administrado por Fonecafé como ente recaudador y administrador del fondo, de allí le sea de aplicación en forma supletoria las normas y procedimientos tributarios. Sobre la naturaleza parafiscal de este tipo de contribuciones, puede consultarse el Dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República número C-203-89, suscrito el 27 de noviembre de 1989, en el que se analizó la naturaleza del aporte de los productores agrícolas al Fondo Nacional de Contingencias Agrícolas, el cuál es aplicado en Dictamen C-080-96 del 23 de mayo de 1996, para analizar la naturaleza parafiscal del aporte al Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera.- Teniendo clara la normativa a aplicar, tenemos que el Código de Normas y Procedimientos tributarios, establece en el artículo 169: “ Las oficinas que controlen, a favor del Poder Central, ingresos o créditos de la naturaleza indicada en el artículo 166 de este Código, dentro de los nueve meses siguientes a la expiración del término legal de pago, deben preparar las certificaciones de lo pendiente de cobro y ordenar, en su caso, el retiro de los respectivos recibos de los bancos y las demás oficinas recaudadoras. No deben certificarse los créditos fiscales originados en tributos regulados por el presente Código, sus intereses y recargos que hayan sido objeto de impugnación por el interesado en trámite administrativo, hasta tanto el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo no haya dictado resolución y tratándose de multas, no exista sentencia ejecutoria. Antes de remitir las certificaciones a la Oficina de Cobros, las oficinas que controlen ingresos o créditos a que se alude en el párrafo primero de este artículo, deben notificar al deudor por cualesquiera de los medios que autoriza el artículo 137 de este Código, al domicilio que en conste en sus registros, que se le concede un plazo de quince días contados a partir de su notificación, para que proceda a la cancelación del crédito fiscal impago. Si vencido el plazo señalado el deudor no regulariza su situación, dichas certificaciones deben ser enviadas de inmediato a la Oficina de Cobros para los efectos de ejercer la respectiva acción judicial o extrajudicial de cobro. Las certificaciones de adeudo expedidas por las oficinas señaladas en este artículo, deberán ser firmadas por los gerentes de las administraciones tributarias y de grandes contribuyentes. Tendrán el carácter de título ejecutivo suficiente para iniciar el cobro judicial” Para el caso, concreto, y en el mismo sentido de dar traslado al demandado en sede administrativa sobre la suma cobrada, para su respectiva cancelación, se tiene el artículo 8 de la citada Ley de Creación del Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera, el cual establece: " La contribución cafetalera se tasará al inscribir el contrato de exportación ante el Instituto del Café de Costa Rica y será cancelada por el beneficiador, dentro de los ocho días naturales siguientes a la fecha consignada en la factura correspondiente al respectivo contrato de exportación, directamente ante FONECAFE". Este procedimiento administrativo referido al requerimiento de pago al deudor, consta se intentó hacer mediante Oficio D.E.- 082-2003 del 19 de febrero del 2003 por parte de FONECAFÉ, requiriéndole el pago a Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima, sin embargo, el mismo no fue debidamente notificado a la demandada. Nótese, consta a folios 77 y 71, colillas de envíos de fax, indicándose se remitió a "Agua Caliente", sin que conste el número de fax al que fue enviado, porque la consignación del nombre de envío ello no es garantía procesal de que el nombre corresponde realmente al número de fax de la sociedad requerida. Tampoco hay certeza del contenido de lo que se indica se envió por fax. Las colillas de fax de folios 71 y 77 no son prueba de una notificación idónea, tal y como se ha expuesto. Como se indicó, el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, artículo 169, dispone que como acto previo al envío de la certificación de la Oficina de Cobros la Administración Tributaria deberá notificar al deudor por cualquiera de los medios que autoriza el articulo 137 de ese mismo Código, al domicilio que conste en autos en sus registros, concediéndole el plazo de quince días contados a partir de su notificación para que proceda a la cancelación del crédito fiscal impago y si vencido el plazo no pagare, las certificaciones deben ser enviadas de inmediato a la Oficina de Cobros para iniciar la acción judicial o extrajudicial. Asimismo el artículo 171 de ese cuerpo legal (para el caso de cobros a favor del Poder Central) dispone UN SEGUNDO REQUERIMIENTO, al establecer que una vez que la Oficina de Cobros reciba las certificaciones a que se refiere el articulo 169, su Jefe las debe distribuir entre los abogados del cuerpo permanente específico y/ los Fiscales Específicos para que ejerzan la acción de cobro, debiendo dichos profesionales gestionar el pago de los créditos que se les encomienden, pero antes de iniciar la ejecución, deben dirigir al deudor una nota de cobro por medio del correo o bien entregársela personalmente, concediéndole un plazo de ocho días para que proceda a la cancelación del crédito fiscal impago, bajo apercibimiento que de no hacerlo, se le van a embargar bienes suficientes para hacer efectivo dicho crédito y sus accesorios legales. Bajo esta inteligencia, el incumplimiento del primer requerimiento genera la inejecutividad. En cuanto al segundo requerimiento, también genera la inejecutividad del título, en virtud del principio de legalidad, aún cuando sea una reiteración de cobro administrativo. Así las cosas, se puede afirmar que una particularidad de la ejecutividad del título para la materia tributaria-agraria, es el hecho de que DEBE DE CUMPLIRSE CON EL DEBIDO PROCESO. La observancia del debido proceso se refiere tanto a la etapa de determinación de la obligación como a la etapa del cobro administrativo de esa obligación ya determinada. Lo anterior, porque debe de cumplirse con la normativa procesal aplicable, es decir, en leyes especiales y sus reglamentos, el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios y en su defecto las normas procedimentales contenidas en los artículos 308 y siguientes de la Ley General de Administración Pública. En este sentido, el Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios del II Circuito Judicial de San José, declaró sin lugar un juicio ejecutivo argumentando que la Administración Tributaria no procedió a aplicar el procedimiento estipulado por ley para la determinación de oficio. En lo que interesa se estableció: " ... si los funcionarios de la Dirección General de la Tributación estimaron que el impuesto declarado no correspondía con la realidad contable del señor ..., lo que en Derecho era menester hacer era abrir un procedimiento administrativo contra su persona y concederle la oportunidad de que ejerciera su legítimo derecho de defensa, como era escuchar sus argumentos y atender el ofrecimiento de la prueba de descargo y una vez efectuada la sustanciación del proceso, emitir una resolución con las formalidades de ley en dicha sede, donde con apego en las probanzas evacuadas establecer o determinar que el tributo reportado no era el que efectivamente debía pagar don *..., ocasión en la que éste tenía el derecho de impugnar tales consideraciones y ser conocidos los autos por su Superior jerárquico, donde eventualmente se confirmarían las actuaciones y decisiones de sus inferiores o por el contrario, concluir que el monto declarado como impuesto sobre la renta era el que correspondía a la realidad contable de ese periodo. Al omitirse el debido proceso que en la especie se requería, permite a quien suscribe, ... acoger las defensas opuestas por el demandado de falta de efectividad del título, falta de derecho, falta de legitimación actual y falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, por cuanto estamos en presencia de un título que carece de fuerza ejecutiva, al ser ineficaz su contenido para ser cobrado en la vía sumaria, al no contar con una resolución donde con amplitud de criterios de hecho y de derecho y sobre todo apoyados en prueba idónea, fehaciente, declarar que don *... no cumplió a cabalidad cuando reportó el tributo que en su momento canceló ... ". (Juzgado Civil de Hacienda de Asuntos Sumarios del II Circuito Judicial de San José. No. 1378 de las ocho horas treinta minutos del diecisiete de octubre del dos mil dos. El énfasis no es del original). Lo anterior porque la potestad de imperio no implica cercernar el derecho de defensa y siendo que se ha otorgado una potestad de considerable magnitud a la Administración Pública para crear títulos ejecutivos, como contrapeso ineludible a dicho poder debe necesariamente garantizarse el debido proceso en el procedimiento de determinación de la obligación y el de cobro administrativo de ésta, siendo ambas circunstancias corolarios de la ejecutividad del titulo. Es decir, el título ejecutivo en sentido sustancial, en materia tributaria-agraria, está comprendido no solamente por una certificación de una obligación líquida y exigible emitida por la autoridad competente, sino también que forma parte integral de esa certificación la correcta observancia del debido proceso en la fase de determinación de esa obligación y en la fase de cobro administrativo cuando ya está determinada, siendo ambos elementos necesarios para la completez del título. En cuanto a la inobservancia del debido proceso como motivo de inejecutividad del título la Sala Constitucional ha manifestado: "La razonabilidad de la norma cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona, deriva del hecho de que la Administración Pública, para poder emitir título ejecutivo con fuerza ejecutiva, tiene como base un proceso ordinario administrativo en donde se determina la posible responsabilidad. Así, a través de un procedimiento ordinario, de obligado acatamiento para la Administración, garantizado y estructurado en la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública, se le permite al administrado ejercer su derecho de defensa, sin perjuicio de acudir ante los Tribunales de Justicia a defender sus derechos; procedimiento administrativo que reúne todas las garantías del debido proceso lo ha exigido esta Jurisdicción Constitucional." (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto 2360 de las 9 horas del 31 de enero de 1996 y 6477 de las 14 horas 39 minutos del 28 de noviembre de 1996. El énfasis no es del original). Y en sentido similar: “La forma en que el Concejo recurrido, hubiese estimado el monto de la obligación tributaria que le interesa -dentro del ámbito de su competencia- constituye un asunto de mera legalidad que debe dilucidarse no en esta vía sino en la legal correspondiente. No obstante, el hecho de que el Concejo Municipal de Esparza acordase la determinación de dicha obligación, sin que sobre ello se hubiese hecho la comunicación correspondiente, ni se le hubiese dado audiencia alguna a la recurrente, a fin de que ésta pudiera impugnarla, por medio de los recursos que al efecto le otorga el ordenamiento jurídico, lesiona la garantía fundamental de debido proceso que consagra a su favor el numeral 39 Constitucional, toda vez que con lo así actuado se vulnera el derecho de defensa. Asimismo, la circunstancia de que la Contaduría Municipal hubiese expedido, en acatamiento a lo dispuesto por el Consejo demandado, la certificación de dicha determinación, para enviarla luego al cobro judicial por su no pago, sin que ésta hubiese adquirido la firmeza para ello, viola el principio fundamental de la propiedad privada, que a favor del recurrente establece el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política". (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto 3930 de las quince horas veintisiete minutos del 18 de julio de 1995. El énfasis no es del original). Asimismo el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo ha compartido el mismo criterio: "(...) 11. Que indudablemente si la determinación del tributo no había sido establecida definitivamente en la vía administrativa, por cuanto la notificación de la misma no había sido hecha en cabeza del personero que fingía en ese momento, como bien se excepcionó la demandada, quedando a ésta la oportunidad de impugnarla en tiempo y forma en esa vía, por no haber comenzado a transcurrir el plazo par hacerlo, le estaba vedado al actor recurrir a la vía judicial para cobrar los impuestos, multas e intereses originados de esas determinaciones establecidas definitivamente en la vía administrativa, como correctamente lo razona el señor Juez y claramente se desprende de lo dispuesto en el artículo 160, párrafo 2, del Código Tributario, en relación con las otras disposiciones de ese mismo Código que el señor Juez también cita y analiza. III Que a juicio de este Tribunal, esa defensa no es en puridad una falta de derecho sino lo que sucede es el que el mismo es incierto por no estar todavía establecido definitivamente en vía administrativa como para poder ser exigible judicialmente, por lo que en ese sentido procede aclarar el fallo recurrido. (...)" (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo. No. 3136 de las quince horas quince minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y ocho). En este mismo sentido, la Procuraduría General de la República* en un dictamen reciente, generaliza y reafirma el principio: "De previo a la interposición del juicio ejecutivo correspondiente, debe la Administración realizar el debido proceso, notificando adecuadamente la decisión final, y realizar las intimaciones previstas en el numeral 150 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; en razón de que el cumplimiento de tales requisitos forman parte integrante del debido proceso, que debe ser revisado por los Tribunales para darle ejecutividad al título que se presenta". (Dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República No. 241 del dieciocho de setiembre del dos mil dos.).- Un principio básico del Derecho Procesal en general, a saber, como bien lo cita [Nombre1], "il processo segue il diritto come l' ombra segue il corpo" (el proceso sigue al Derecho como la sombra sigue al cuerpo) . Es así como el artículo 3 del propio Código Procesal Civil establece al interpretar la norma procesal el juez deberá tomar en cuenta que la finalidad de aquella es dar aplicación a las normas de fondo, de manera tal que no debe perderse de vista que lo que se está pretendiendo ejecutar es una obligación de contribución cafetalera y por ende paratributaria, la cual tiene particularidades distintas a las obligaciones civiles. Una de esas singularidades es que es una obligación creada por ley a favor del Estado o sus Instituciones -como FONECAFE-., el cual por medio de la potestad de imperio goza de poder coercitivo para ejecutarla, siendo que ES EL MISMO ACREEDOR DE LA OBLIGACION EL QUE CONFECCIONA UNILATERALMENTE EL TITULO EJECUTIVO. Como contrapeso de lo anterior y como una manifestación del equilibrio que debe de existir entre autoridad y libertad, el administrado cuenta con una serie de garantías legales y constitucionales (el debido proceso entre otros) relacionadas con el proceso de cumplimiento de esa obligación. Como resultado del análisis anterior, es razonable y legal aceptar que en un proceso ejecutivo de esta naturaleza se puedan discutir esos aspectos, toda vez el debido proceso es parte del proceso de determinación de la obligación paratributaria y por ende es un elemento sustancial del título ejecutivo. Debió practicarse la notificación en forma correcta, dejándose constancia indubitable de que el destinatario o deudor requerido, recibió ciertamente el cobro administrativo. Esa notificación no es un simple requisito, sino que lleva implicita la oportunidad para el requerido del pago a oponerse en la determinación de la obligación. Esa oposición no es referida sólo al monto cobrado, sino también en cuanto a la determinación del sujeto pasivo. Nótese en el recurso de apelación, el recurrente muestra su inconformidad en cuanto la sociedad demandada no está obligada al no ser beneficiadora productora, sino que es una simple sociedad comercializadora exportadora. Tal argumento, relacionado a la imputación como sujeto pasivo, debe ser discutida ante FONECAFE, pues parte de la determinación de la obligación lo es no sólo definir el monto, sino los sujetos intervinientes. Este proceso cobratorio al tener su fundamento en un título ejecutivo especial emitido unilateralmente por un ente administrativo FONECAFE, reviste particularidades especiales en cuanto al tema de la ejecutividad del título, que lo distinguen del proceso ejecutivo simple común. Si bien el articulo 433 del Código Procesal Civil establece que solamente podrán ser oponibles las excepciones allí citadas (falta de competencia, falta de capacidad o defectuosa representación, indebida acumulación de pretensiones, prescripción, caducidad, pago, falta de derecho y falta de legitimación), también se ha conocido de una excepción inherente a todo proceso ejecutivo que es la excepción de falta de ejecutividad del título. Dicha excepción se desprende de la doctrina del numeral 440 del mismo cuerpo legal en cuanto establece el auto de traslado es apelable únicamente cuando se alegue que el título no es ejecutivo. Así las cosas, la inejecutividad puede alegarse vía excepción o bien apelando el auto de traslado, incluso es revisable de oficio por el juzgador. En este caso concreto, la parte demandada opuso en tiempo la excepción de falta de ejecutividad del título, mostrándose inconforme con la obligación dineraria que se le imputa, indicando no tuvo oportunidad para oponerse antes de que fuera demandado judicialmente. Al no haberse otorgado el debido proceso en la determinación de la deuda paratributaria aquí en cuestión, no se podría afirmar, se está en presencia de una deuda líquida y exigible, pues la misma no ha sido definida como una obligación cierta y determinada en forma previa, tal y como se ha expuesto supra. VII.- Con base en lo expuesto, lo procedente es revocar la sentencia de instancia en cuanto rechaza las excepciones de prescripción de capital, falta de ejecutividad del título, falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva, falta de derecho, y falta de interés actual, acoge parcialmente la excepción de prescripción de intereses, y declara parcialmente con lugar la presente demanda ejecutiva simple agraria condenando a la parte demandada a pagar la suma de setecientos setenta y cinco dólares con cuarenta y ocho centavos en concepto de principal en razón de la contribución obligatoria de parte del productor de café establecida por el artículo sexto de la Ley siete mil setecientos setenta del veinticuatro de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho como aporte a dicho Fondo por la cosecha del período dos mil uno-dos mil dos; confirma el despacho de ejecución, y declara prescritos los intereses anteriores al diez de abril del dos mil tres, y rechaza la pretensión de intereses liquidados con la presente demanda, condena a la sociedad demandada al pago de los intereses futuros hasta el pago total de la deuda y la condena en ambas costas; para en su lugar resolver lo siguiente: Se acoge la excepción de falta de ejecutividad del título, se omite pronunciamiento por innecesario sobre el resto de excepciones opuestas por la demandada, y se DECLARA SIN LUGAR la demanda ejecutiva incoada por Fondo Nacional de Estabilización Cafetalera contra Hacienda Agua Caliente Sociedad Anónima. Se ordena el levantamiento de los embargos decretados en autos, a partir de la firmeza de la presente resolución. Son ambas costas a cargo de la parte actora de conformidad con el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil y 55 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria."