Annulment of Title for Double Registration on State LandAnulación de título por doble inscripción registral sobre bien del Estado

**II.** The Attorney-in-Fact of the party against whom the joinder (incidente) is filed appeals the judgment issued at fifteen hours on November 2, 2004, also filing a concomitant motion to nullify the same based on the arguments set forth. 1. Regarding the identity of the property (bien): He considers that the first-instance judgment cannot substitute one means of evidence (medio de prueba) for another as it did in the case of the National Registry Report (Informe del Catastro Nacional) on the identity of the property. He states that such Reports do not have the character of evidence (prueba), much less full evidentiary value (plena prueba) as assigned by the judgment, because this also violates the principles governing the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), especially when it asserts that the defendant (parte demandada) did not rebut the content of the Report, since it was the plaintiff (actor) who was responsible for proving the identity of the property, thereby creating defenselessness (indefensión) and a violation of due process (debido proceso). Hence, the National Registry Report provided to the case file does not even reach the category of an evidentiary instrument (medio probatorio), but is merely part of the allegations made by the party filing the joinder (incidentista), arguments that he did not prove in the case file and therefore his claim (pretensión) must be dismissed. Nor is the argument of the contested decision admissible, to the effect that proving the identity of the property suffices from a simple comparison of the location sketches of the survey plans (planos) of the party filing the joinder and the party against whom it is filed, because what prevails is reality over the formality of the plans, and to know the real truth, one must demonstrate who possessed the real estate, where each one is actually located, since the plans may perfectly well be mistaken regarding that real location, and only a field expert report (pericia de campo) and not a desk review could verify that fact, given that the party filing the joinder has the burden of proof and did not meet it. He considers that the judge cannot become a party, nor can he create evidence for the party, nor accommodate allegations as evidence, because this would violate the right of defense (derecho de defensa), much less begin comparing plans to deduce technical facts outside the scope of law. He adds that the cadastral plan (plano catastro) number G- 229295-1995, presented by the party filing the joinder, is dated after that of his represented party, plan number G-202353-1994 of August 8, 1994, which demonstrates that the plan presented by the Procuraduría General de la República cannot be considered to allege an overlap (traslape), given that it was drawn up using the coordinates of a plan already existing and registered in the National Registry, which implies that the defective (viciado) plan is that of the party filing the joinder and not that of the party against whom it is filed. Both the preparation of the plan referred to by the Procuraduría and the National Registry Report were carried out from a desk, without knowledge of the real situation of the farm (finca), so that said document can never invalidate the titling (titulación) carried out by his represented party, because it lacks absolute evidentiary value (valor probatorio). He requests that the contested decision be annulled or, failing that, that the appeal filed be upheld. (folio 136) **III.** The appellant mixes the arguments for nullity (nulidad) with those of the appeal, so both are analyzed in this considering clause (considerando). This involves the same defense that the appellant raised in the first instance, and which was duly analyzed in the ruling of the court a quo. The fundamental complaint concerns the identity of the property, between the one registered in the name of the State and the one that the titling applicant (titulante) possesses. In the appellant's judgment, the Report from the National Registry Directorate (dirección del Catastro) should not have been admitted as proof of that identity. It is noteworthy that the appellant rejects the evidentiary value (valor probatorio) of the Report itself, but at no point indicates that said Report is false or incorrect, for his devaluation stems from the fact that it does not have the character of an expert report (peritaje), that it is prepared by a state entity, and that it is desk work. He does not provide any technical study prepared by him that contradicts the conclusions of the National Registry Directorate, nor does he propose, with the character of evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor proveer), the realization of an expert report to clarify what he deems necessary. As for the value given to the document presented by the Procuraduría as evidence of its joinder, the first-instance decision clarifies that it is received as documentary evidence (prueba documental), not as an expert report. Regarding the operation of the National Registry, the Law of its creation No. 6545 of March 26, 1981, establishes in its article the declaration of public interest that exists with its creation in service of legal, economic, fiscal, administrative purposes and all those determined by laws and their regulations. Article 32 of the same law contemplates the obligation of the National Registry to issue, at the request of any interested party, a copy of the plans, documents, and technical information contained in its archives. It is therefore a technical entity of common benefit to public and private parties. In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the appellant is not correct in his attack on the document emanating from the National Registry on folio 69. Rather, it is considered to have the evidentiary value that the law gives to documents drafted or issued by public officials, which constitute full proof (plena prueba) of the material existence of the facts that the public official affirms therein to have performed himself or to have occurred in his presence, or in the exercise of his functions, all of this as long as they are not alleged to be false (relation of articles 369 and 370 of the Código Procesal Civil). In an argument very similar to the previous one, the appellant asserts that the plaintiff therefore did not prove the prerequisites for the joinder (incidente) to be upheld, because the report has no value, and requiring the defendant to prove that there is no such identity of the property is to illegally reverse the burden of proof. The appellant is also incorrect in this aspect. Indeed, in this matter, the provisions of article 317 of the Código Procesal Civil apply, insofar as it establishes the principles governing the burden of proof. In this regard, it is established that this burden falls upon: 1) whoever formulates a claim (pretensión) regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting his right, 2) whoever opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right. It is clear, then, that the plaintiff must prove his affirmations, but the rule also provides that the party invoking a negative fact cannot exempt itself from proving its claim or defense. The defendant, in the sixth fact of his claim, categorically denies that the farm he titled, in material reality, is part of the one registered under number CED1 to which the State refers (folio 95). However, the defendant presented no proof to the effect that the farm registered by him is not the one alleged by the State, for, as previously stated, his defense is limited to detracting from the opinion of the National Registry Directorate. On the other hand, in evidentiary matters, the principle of the community of evidence (comunidad de la prueba) exists, according to which, once presented to the process, evidence serves the realization of law and justice, regardless of who provides it. As for the merits of the matter, it was duly accredited that the State's farm number 3734-000, upon which the defendant's farm number CED2 is superimposed, was registered as of January 21, 2003, while the defendant's was registered on June 20, 2003 (proven facts two and three of the judgment). The defendant's plan is G-202353-94 and the State's is G-229295-1995. As can be observed, the plan of the party against whom the joinder is filed is earlier than the State's, however the registration of the state farm is prior.

**IV.** The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides for a titling procedure for unregistered properties (articulo 1). The only exception that the law makes to this assumption is the case of article 92 of the Ley de Tierras for precarious possessors with usucapion (usucapión), which is not the case before us, so that if a farm was registered on an already registered property, such titling was carried out contrary to law. What a plan accredits is the measurement of a piece of land, it is not proof of the ownership of the property, so the fact that the plan of the party against whom the joinder is filed is earlier than the State's could not be alleged, because as already seen, the state farm is earlier than that of the titling applicant. Furthermore, the existence of two registration entries on the same property could not be admitted, as this affects registry security (seguridad registral) and violates the property right contemplated in the Constitución Polìítica in its article 45. The meaning of article 301 of the Código Civil goes in that direction, when it states that the measurement (mensura) of a piece of land, whether or not protested, is not sufficient on its own to prove possession (posesión) of the same land. Also, the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias expressly regulates the case in which an attempt is made to unduly title lands belonging to any state institution, obligating the Judge to reject it. The fact that during the processing of the possessory registration (información posesoria) no opposition to the titling was expressed or the existence of a previously registered farm demonstrated, does not affect the right of the interested party, so that within the three-year period granted by law they may assert their right, for it is not validated until that period has elapsed (article 16 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Based on the foregoing, the appropriate course is to confirm the contested decision regarding the matters that have been the subject of the appeal.

This is the same defense raised by the appellant at first instance, which was duly analyzed in the lower court’s ruling. The core grievance concerns the identity of the property, as between the one registered in the name of the State and the one the titleholder possesses. In the appellant’s view, the Cadastre Office Report should not have been admitted as evidence of that identity. It is striking that the appellant rejects the probative value of the Report itself but at no point asserts that the Report is false or incorrect, since the devaluation stems from the fact that it does not have the character of an expert opinion, that it was prepared by a state entity, and that it is a desk study. He submits no technical study of his own that contradicts the Cadastre Office’s conclusions, nor does he propose, under the heading of evidence to better provide, the production of an expert opinion to clarify whatever he deems necessary. As to the weight afforded to the document presented by the Attorney General’s Office as evidence of its bearing, the first-instance decision clarifies that it is received as documentary evidence, not as an expert opinion. As to the workings of the National Cadastre, its enabling Law No. 6545 of 26 March 1981 establishes in its article the declaration of public interest attending its creation in the service of legal, economic, fiscal, and administrative purposes and all those purposes that laws and their regulations may determine. Article 32 of that same law provides for the obligation of the Cadastre to issue, at the request of any interested party, copies of the plans, documents, and technical information held in its archives. It is therefore a technical entity of common benefit to public and private parties. In conformity with the foregoing, in the Tribunal’s view the appellant is mistaken in his attack on the document emanating from the Cadastre at folio 69. Rather, it is deemed to possess the probative value that the law grants to documents drafted or issued by public officials, which constitute full proof of the material existence of the facts that the public official affirms therein to have performed himself or to have occurred in his presence, or in the exercise of his functions, all of this as long as they are not challenged as false (in relation to Articles 369 and 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure). In an argument very similar to the preceding one, the appellant asserts that the plaintiff therefore did not prove the prerequisites for the petition to be granted, because the report has no value, and to require proof from the defendant that there is no such identity of the property is to reverse the burden of proof illegally. The appellant is likewise mistaken on this point. Indeed, in this matter the provisions of Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply insofar as it establishes the principles governing the burden of proof. It is established in that regard that the said burden lies: 1) on whoever formulates a claim, with respect to assertions of the facts constitutive of his right; 2) on whoever opposes a claim, with respect to assertions of facts that bar, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff’s right. It is clear, then, that the plaintiff must prove his assertions, but the rule also provides that a party that invokes a negative fact may not thereby exempt itself from proving its claim or defense. The defendant, in the sixth factual allegation of his claim, flatly denies that the farm he titled, in material reality, forms part of the one registered under number CED1 to which the State refers (folio 95). Nevertheless, the defendant produced no evidence to the effect that the farm registered by him is not the one the State alleges, since, as stated before, his defense is limited to depriving the Cadastre Office opinion of value. On the other hand, in evidentiary matters there exists the principle of community of evidence, according to which, once evidence has been brought into the process, it serves for the realization of right and justice, regardless of who brings it. As to the merits of the matter, it was duly established that State farm number 3734-000, upon which the defendant’s farm number CED2 is superimposed, was registered as of 21 January 2003, whereas the defendant’s farm was registered on 20 June two thousand three (proven facts two and three of the judgment). The plan of the defendant’s farm is G-202353-94 and that of the State is G-229295-1995. As can be observed, the plan of the petitioner is earlier than that of the State, yet the registration of the state farm is prior. IV.- The Law of Possessory Informations provides for a titling procedure only for unregistered properties (Article 1). The sole exception that the law makes to this premise is the case of Article 92 of the Land Law for precarious possessors with usucapion, which is not the case before us, so that if a farm was registered over an already-registered property, such titling was conducted contrary to law. What the plan proves is the measurement of a parcel of land; it is not proof of ownership of the property, and therefore the fact that the petitioner’s plan is earlier than the State’s could not be alleged, because, as already seen, the state farm is earlier than the titleholder’s. Moreover, the existence of two registry entries for the same property could not be admitted, because that affects registry security and violates the right to property enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution. The thrust of Article 301 of the Civil Code goes in that direction when it states that the survey of a parcel of land, whether protested or not, does not by itself suffice to prove possession of that land. The Law of Possessory Informations also expressly regulates the case where one seeks improperly to title lands belonging to any state institution, obligating the Judge to reject it. The fact that during the possessory information proceeding no opposition to the titling was expressed, or that the existence of a previously registered farm was not demonstrated, does not affect the right of the interested party to enforce its right within the three-year period allotted by law, because the titling is not validated until that period has elapsed (Article 16 of the Law of Possessory Informations). Based on the foregoing, the proper course is to affirm the appealed decision in respect of that which has been the subject of appeal."

"II.- El Apoderado de la incidentada apela de la sentencia de las quince horas del dos de noviembre del dos mil cuatro, interponiendo además nulidad concomitante de la misma con fundamento en lo que expone. 1. Sobre la identidad del bien: Considera que la sentencia de primera instancia no puede suplir un medio de prueba por otro como lo hizo con el caso del Informe del Catastro Nacional sobre la identidad del bien. Manifiesta, ese tipo de Informes no tienen el carácter de prueba y menos plena como le asigna la sentencia, pues con ello además violenta los principios sobre la carga de la prueba, sobre todo cuando afirma que la parte demandada no desvirtuó el contenido del Informe, por cuanto era al actor a quien le correspondía probar la identidad del bien, creando con ello indefensión y violación del debido proceso. De ahí que el Informe del Catastro Nacional aportado a los autos, ni siquiera llega a la categoría de medio probatorio, sino tan solo parte de las alegaciones hechas por el incidentista, alegatos que no probó en autos y por ende su pretensión debe ser rechazada. Tampoco es admisible el argumento de la resolución impugnada en el sentido de que basta probar la identidad del bien de la simple comparación de los croquis de ubicación de los planos del incidentista y del incidentado, esto por cuanto lo que priva es la realidad frente a la formalidad de los planos y para conocer la verdad real se debía demostrar quien poseía los inmuebles, donde está ubicado en la realidad cada uno de ellos, pues los planos perfectamente pueden estar equivocados en cuanto a esa ubicación real y solo con una pericia de campo y no de escritorio se podía verificar ese hecho, siendo que el incidentista tiene la carga de la prueba y no probó. Considera, el juzgador no se puede convertir en parte, ni le puede crear la prueba a la parte, ni acomodar alegatos como pruebas, pues violentaría el derecho de defensa, mucho menos ponerse a comparar planos para deducir hechos técnicos ajenos al derecho. Agrega que el plano catastro número G- 229295-1995, presentado por el incidentista es de fecha posterior a la de su representado, el plano número G-202353-1994 de 8 de agosto de 1994, lo que demuestra que el plano presentado por la Procuraduría General de la República no puede ser considerado para alegar un traslape, dado que el mismo fue confeccionado en las coordenadas de un plano ya existente e inscrito en el Catastro Nacional, lo que implica que el plano viciado es el del incidentista y no el del incidentado. Tanto la confección del plano que refiere la Procuraduría y el Informe del Catastro Nacional, se llevaron a cabo desde un escritorio, sin conocimiento de la finca en su realidad, por lo que dicho documento jamás puede desvrituar la titulación hecha por su representado , por carecer de absoluto valor probatorio. solicita se anule la resolución impuganda o en su defecto se acoja el recurso de apelación planteado. ( folio 136) III. El apelante mezcla los argumentos de la nulidad con los de apelación por lo que se analizan ambos en este considerando. Se trata de la misma defensa que hizo el recurrente en la primera instancia, y que fue analiza oportunamente en el fallo de la a quo. La queja fundamental tiene que ver con la identidad del bien, entre el que se encuentra inscrito a nombre del Estado y el que el titulante posee. A juicio del apelante no debió admitirse como prueba de esa identidad el Informe de la dirección del Catastro. Llama la atención que el recurrente, rechaza el valor probatorio en sí del Informe, pero no indica en ningún momento que dicho Informe sea falso, o incorrecto, pues la desvaloración proviene de que no tiene el carácter de peritaje, que es elaborado por una entidad estatal y que se trata de un trabajo de escritorio. No acompaña ningún estudio técnico elaborado por él que contradiga las conclusiones de la Dirección de Catastro, ni propone con el carácter de prueba para mejor proveer la realización de un peritaje que aclare lo que a su juicio sea necesario. En cuanto al valor que se le da al documento presentado por la Procuraduría como prueba de su incidencia, la resolución de primera instancia aclara, se recibe en el carácter de prueba documental, no de pericia. En cuanto al funcionamiento del Catastro Nacional la Ley de su creación No. 6545 de 26 de marzo de 1981, se establece en el artículo la declaratoria de interés público que existe con su creación al servicio de los fines jurídicos, económicos, fiscales, administrativos y a todos aquellos que determinen las leyes y sus reglamentos. El artículo 32 de la misma ley contempla la obligación del Catastro de expedir, a solicitud de cualquier interesado, copia de los planos, documentos e información técnica que conste en sus archivos. Se trata por tanto de una entidad técnica de beneficio común para públicos y privados. De conformidad con lo anteriormente expuesto a juicio del Tribunal, no lleva razón el apelante en su ataque al documento emanado del Catastro de folio 69. Más bien se considera tiene el valor probatorio que le da la ley a los documentos redactados o extendidos por funcionarios públicos, los cuales hacen plena prueba de la existencia material de los hechos que el oficial público afirme en ellos haber realizado él mismo o haber pasado en su presencia, o en el ejercicio de sus funciones, todo ello mientras no sean arguidos de falsos (relacion de los artículos 369 y 370 del Código Procesal Civil). En un argumento muy similar al anterior, afirma el apelante que el actor no probó entonces los presupuestos para que se acoja el incidente, pues el informe no tiene valor, y exigirle al demandado la prueba de que no hay tal identidad del bien, es revertir la carga de la prueba en forma ilegal. Tampoco lleva razón el recurrente en este aspecto. Efectivamente en esta materia es de aplicación lo dispuesto en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil en cuanto establece los principios que rigen la carga de la prueba. A respecto se establece que dicha carga incumbe: 1) a quien formule una pretensión respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor. Es claro entonces que al actor le corresponde demostrar sus afirmaciones, pero también la norma prevé que la parte que invoca el hecho negativo no puede eximirse de probar su pretensión o defensa. El demandado en el hecho sexto de su demanda rechaza rotundamente que la finca que tituló, en la realidad material, sea parte de la registrada bajo el número CED1 a que hace referencia el Estado ( folio 95) Sin embargo el demandado no hizo ninguna prueba en el sentido de que la finca inscrita por él no sea la que alega el Estado, pues como se dijo antes, su defensa se limita a restar valor al dictamen de la Dirección del Catastro. Por otra parte en materia probatoria existe el principio de la comunidad de la prueba, según el cual, una vez aportada al proceso sirve para la realización del derecho y la justicia, independientemente de quien la aporte. En cuanto al fondo del asunto quedó debidamente acreditado que la finca del Estado número 3734-000 sobre la que sobrepone la del demandado, número CED2, quedó inscrita desde el 21 de enero del 2003, mientras que la del demandado, fue inscrita el 20 de junio del dos mil tres ( hechos probados dos y tres de la sentencia ). El plano de la demandada es el G-202353-94 y el del Estado el G-229295-1995. Como se puede observar el plano del incidentado es anterior al del Estado, no obstante la inscripción de la finca estatal es previa. IV.- La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias prevé un procedimiento de titulación para bienes no inscritos ( artículo 1). La única excepción que hace la ley a este supuesto es el caso del artículo 92 de la Ley de Tierras para poseedores en precario con usucapión, que no es el que nos ocupa, de manera que si se procedió a inscribir una finca sobre un bien ya inscrito, tal titulación se realizó contra derecho. El plano lo que acredita es la medida de un terreno, no es prueba de la titularidad del bien, por lo que no podría alegarse el hecho de que el plano del incidentado es anterior al del Estado, porque como ya se vio la finca estatal es anterior a la del titulante. Además, no se podría admitir la existencia de dos inscripciones registrales sobre un mismo bien, por cuanto ello afecta la seguridad registral y vulnera el derecho de propiedad contemplado en la Constitución Polìítica en su artículo 45. El sentido del artículo 301 del Código Civil va en esa dirección, cuando se afirma que la mensura de un terreno, sea o no protestada, no basta por sí sola para probar la posesión del mismo terreno. También la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias expresamente regula el caso de que se pretenda titular indebidamente terrenos pertenecientes a cualquier institución del estado, obligando al Juez a rechazar la misma. El hecho de que durante el trámite de la información posesoria no se hubiera expresado oposición a la titulación, o se hubiere demostrado la existencia de una finca anteriormente inscrita, no afecta el derecho de la parte interesada, para que en el plazo concedido por la ley de tres años pueda hacer valer su derecho, pues la misma no queda convalidada, si no hasta que se ha superado ese plazo ( artículo 16 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Con fundamento en lo anteriormente expuesto lo procedente será confirmar en lo que ha sido objeto de apelación la resolución recurrida."