Delay in resolving municipal appeal and denial of access to the administrative fileRetraso en resolver recurso de apelación municipal y denegatoria de acceso al expediente administrativo

**I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL.** The appellant claims that on August 16, 2004, he filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) which has not been resolved as of the date of filing this amparo. Likewise, he alleges that the authorities of said Municipality did not allow him access to the respective administrative file (expediente administrativo).

**II.- PROVEN FACTS.** The following facts are deemed proven as relevant for settling this amparo appeal: 1) By resolution No. 300-L-2004 of 10:00 a.m. on July 14, 2004, the Municipal Mayor of San José heard the application to operate the national liquor license No. 147 for the Merced District, requested by the appellant and Ms. Mora Vargas, and ordered the suspension of the requested procedure until the Constitutional Chamber resolves the unconstitutionality action filed against Article 9, subsection a), of the Regulation to the Liquor Law (visible on pages 86-88 of the administrative file). 2) On July 22, 2004, through notification No. 56371, the closure of his establishment was carried out pursuant to the resolution of the Liquor Department No. 300-L-2004, which ordered the suspension of the processing of the requested procedure until the Constitutional Chamber resolves a pending unconstitutionality action against the Regulation to the Liquor Law. On that occasion, the seals were affixed (visible on page 107 of the administrative file). 3) On July 26, 2004, the appellant and Ms. Hazel Yutsing Mora Vargas filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with an appeal (apelación) in the alternative against notifications Nos. 56371 and 56372 from the Licensing Department of the Municipality of San José – regarding the closure of the premises and the affixing of seals – (visible on pages 160-161 of the administrative file). 4) By resolution No. 6609 of 9:00 a.m. on August 4, 2004, the Municipal Mayor of San José rejected the revocation motion and confirmed resolution No. 300-L-2004 in all its parts. Likewise, since an appeal had been filed, he referred the administrative file to the Municipal Council (visible on pages 174-176 of the administrative file). 5) On August 16, 2004, the appellant filed an appeal in the alternative against the resolutions issued by the Municipal Mayor of San José, No. 300-L-2004 of July 14, 2004, and No. 6609 of August 4, 2004 – which rejected the revocation motion and confirmed resolution No. 300-L-2004 in all its parts (visible on pages 2-16 and pages 184-191 of the administrative file). 6) On October 13, 2004, the appellant verbally requested a copy of administrative file No. 4290 from the Secretary of the Legal Affairs Commission. On that occasion, said official informed him that he was not authorized to deliver a copy of the file, given that it was, at that moment, being analyzed by the Commission and, furthermore, he should request said copy in writing from the Secretary of the Council. Given that circumstance, the appellant submitted the aforementioned request in writing (visible on page 53 of the copies attached to the administrative file). 7) On October 20, 2004, the appellant appeared again before the Municipal Council of San José and requested a copy of the file from the Secretary of the Council, at which time he had access to administrative file No. 4290 and, furthermore, obtained photocopies thereof (visible on page 48 of the copies attached to the administrative file). 8) The Municipal Corporation has not resolved the appeal filed by the appellant on August 16, 2004, against resolutions No. 300-L-2004 and No. 6609 (report visible on pages 19-24).

**III.- RIGHT TO A PROMPT AND FULFILLED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.** Public administrations, in the exercise of their powers, competencies, or attributions, must hear and resolve, in the prior administrative or governmental venue, through a procedure, multiple requests from the administered parties or users of public services, in order to obtain a final administrative act, whose psychological content may be volitive, of judgment, or of knowledge. This administrative act concluding an administrative procedure may grant or recognize subjective rights or legitimate interests – substantial legal situations – (favorable acts) or suppress them, deny them, or impose obligations (burdensome or ablatory acts). It is logical and sensible that there cannot be immediate administrative justice, since the public administration and its organs require a prudent timeframe to adequately process the respective petition and issue the most accurate administrative resolution, closely adhering to the real truth of the facts that constitute the grounds for the final act. The foregoing means that a physiologically necessary period (vacatio or distantia temporis) must elapse between the initial request filed by the administered party and its final resolution, imposed by the observance of that party's fundamental rights (due process, defense, bilateral hearing, or adversary principle) and the best possible satisfaction of public interests. It must not be lost from perspective that an administrative procedure is defined as a set of acts – of the directing and deciding administrative body and of the petitioner himself – concatenated and teleologically linked or united, which require time to be carried out. Consequently, the processing of requests filed by administered parties requires a necessary period of time that guarantees respect for their fundamental rights, an adequate weighing of factual and legal elements, and the particular interest, third-party interests, and the public interests involved. However, the foregoing does not legally legitimize public administrations to indefinitely prolong the hearing and resolution of the matters that administered parties have entrusted to them, since, in such a case, procedures become pathologically prolonged for reasons exclusively attributable to the administrations, with administered parties having no duty or obligation to tolerate such delays and undue postponements. The Right to prompt and fulfilled justice in article 41 of the Political Constitution is not limited, in Administrative Law, to the jurisdictional sphere, that is, to the processes heard by the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction created in Article 49 of the same supreme normative body, but also projects and expands with force to the administrative or governmental venue prior to the judicial one, that is, to administrative procedures. Thus, it is a constitutional imperative that administrative procedures are, likewise, prompt, timely, and fulfilled for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal certainty and security, to which all administered parties are deserving creditors. Precisely for this reason, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional root, such as those of promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as speed or celerity (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration), effectiveness and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8), of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem). These guiding principles of administrative procedures impose upon public entities the imperative obligation to process them within a reasonable timeframe and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified postponements, to avoid the frustration, possible extinction, or serious harm to the substantial legal situations invoked by the administered parties due to the passage of an excessive and unreasonable period of time. The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, termed declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) and which, in the end, constitutes a heavy burden for the administered parties, must not be inverted and taken advantage of by the administrations to cause an unlawful harm to the administered party through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.

**IV.- NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND REASONABLE TIME LIMITS.** Regarding administrative procedures, it is necessary to distinguish between those of a constitutive nature and those of an adversarial (impugnación) nature. The former has as its main purpose the issuance of a final administrative act resolving the petition filed by the petitioner or interested party – whether favorably or unfavorably –, and the latter is designed to hear the challenge presented against the final act that was issued in the constitutive procedure – the appeal stage (fase recursiva). The constitutive procedure can be, by way of example, the ordinary and summary procedures regulated in the General Law of Public Administration, or any other special procedure due to the subject matter regulated in a specific law that can be placed within the exceptions contained in article 367, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration and in Executive Decrees numbers 8979-P of August 28 and 9469-P of December 18, both from 1978. The adversarial procedure comprises ordinary remedies (revocation, appeal (apelación), and reconsideration (reposición)) and extraordinary remedies (review). For both situations, and regarding common administrative procedures – ordinary, summary, and remedies –, the General Law of Public Administration establishes time limits within which the respective public entity must resolve either the initial petition or request, or the remedy timely filed. In effect, Article 261, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within the period of two months following its initiation; for the case of the summary procedure, Article 325 ibidem provides a period of one month – from its initiation – for its conclusion. Regarding the appeal stage or adversarial procedure, Article 261, paragraph 2, sets a period of one month. When a public body or entity exceeds these time limits, a violation of the right to prompt and fulfilled administrative justice established in Article 41 of the Political Constitution occurs.

**V.-** The appellant claims a violation of the right to a prompt and fulfilled administrative procedure, given that on August 16, 2004, he filed an appeal (apelación) in the alternative, which to date has not been resolved. In the present matter, it is fully accredited that on July 26, 2004, the appellant filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with an appeal in the alternative against resolution No. 300-L-2004 issued by the Municipal Mayor of San José. The mentioned Mayor, through resolution No. 6609 of August 4, 2004, rejected the indicated revocation motion, confirmed the appealed resolution, and elevated the respective matter to the Municipal Council for the purpose of resolving the appeal. The effective transfer of the respective administrative file was not carried out until August 17, 2004. On the other hand, despite the resolution of the appeal (apelación) filed in the alternative by the appellant being in progress, on August 16, 2004, the latter filed a new appeal, this time against resolution No. 6609, in which the Municipal Mayor rejected the revocation motion initially filed. As things stand, the respondent Municipal Council, prior to hearing the appeal filed on August 16, 2004 – which is the subject of this amparo – proceeded to resolve the first appeal filed, which had been raised against resolution No. 300-L-2004. On that occasion, the Municipal Council agreed to declare without merit the appeal subsidiarily filed on July 26, 2004, a result that was notified to the appellant on October 22, 2004. Once the first appeal filed by the appellant was resolved, the second appeal – filed against resolution No. 6609 – was referred to the Legal Directorate for its resolution, as is proper. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, this Constitutional Tribunal considers that the action carried out by the respondent Municipal Council was not arbitrary, insofar as it merely respected the chronological order of the procedure, according to the filing date of the respective appeal petition. Due to the presentation of the motion for revocation and appeal in the alternative filed on July 26, 2004, the Municipal Council proceeded to hear them, rejecting the revocation motion and elevating the appeal. During the course of that process, the appellant filed a new appeal, this time against the resolution that rejected the revocation motion. Under this understanding, the Municipal entity, by first hearing the appeal filed on July 26 of the current year, before resolving the appeal filed on August 16, 2004, did not violate the right to a prompt and fulfilled administrative procedure. However, this Tribunal considers it proven that the Municipal Corporation has not resolved this latter appeal – filed on August 16, 2004 –, so having this omission proven, the appeal must be granted due to the violation of a prompt and fulfilled administrative procedure.

**VI.- ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.** Within the framework of the Social and Democratic State of Law, each and every one of the public entities and bodies that make up the respective administration must be subject to the implicit constitutional principles of transparency and public disclosure, which must be the rule for all administrative action or function. The collective organizations of Public Law – public entities – are called to be true glass houses, inside of which all administered parties can scrutinize and oversee in broad daylight. Public administrations must create and foster permanent and fluid channels of communication or information exchange with administered parties and the mass media in order to encourage greater direct and active participation in public management and to put into effect the principles of results evaluation and accountability currently incorporated into our constitutional text (Article 11 of the Political Constitution). Under this understanding, administrative secrecy or confidentiality (reserva) are exceptions that are justified only under qualified circumstances, when constitutionally relevant values and assets are thereby protected. Various mechanisms exist to achieve higher levels of administrative transparency in a given legal system, such as the reasoning (motivación) of administrative acts, the forms of their communication – publication and notification –, the public information process for drafting regulations and regulatory plans (planes reguladores), participation in the administrative procedure, public procurement procedures, etc. However, one of the most valuable tools for achieving that objective is the right of access to administrative information.

**VII.- THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to "administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest," a fundamental right that, in doctrine, has been called the right of access to administrative archives and records; however, the most accurate denomination is the right of access to administrative information, since access to the material or virtual supports of the public administrations is the instrument or mechanism to achieve the intended purpose, which consists of the administered parties becoming aware of the information held by those administrations. It is necessary to point out that the administrative information of public interest sought by an administered party is not always found in an administrative file, archive, or registry. The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of the administered parties, since it allows them to exercise optimal control over the legality, opportunity, convenience, or merit and, in general, the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative function deployed by the various public entities. Efficient and effective public administrations are those that submit to public control and scrutiny, but citizen control cannot exist without adequate information. In this way, a logical chain can be established between access to administrative information, knowledge and handling of it, effective or timely citizen control, and efficient public administrations. The right of access to administrative information has a deep foundation in a series of principles and values inherent to the Social and Democratic State of Law, which it, in turn, puts into effect. Thus, effective and direct citizen participation in the management and handling of public affairs is inconceivable without a significant body of information about administrative competencies and services; likewise, the democratic principle is strengthened when the diverse social, economic, and political forces and groups participate actively and informedly in the formation and execution of public will. Finally, the right of access to administrative information is an indispensable tool, like many others, for the full validity of the principles of administrative transparency and public disclosure. The content of the right of access to administrative information is truly broad and consists of a bundle of powers held by the person exercising it, such as the following: a) access to public departments, units, offices, and buildings; b) access to archives, registries, files, and physical or automated documents – databases, files –; c) the power of the administered party to know the stored personal or nominative data that affect him or her in any way; d) the power of the administered party to rectify or eliminate such data if they are erroneous, incorrect, or false; e) the right to know the content of physical or virtual documents and files; and f) the right to obtain, at his or her own cost, certifications or copies thereof.

**VIII.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra – outside – and (b) ad intra – within – an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information – *uti universi* – and the latter, only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure – *uti singuli* –. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Chapter Six entitled "On access to the file and its parts," Title Three of Book Two, in Articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for over fifty years since the constitutional text came into force. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, the National Archives System Law No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it regarding documents with scientific and cultural value from public entities and bodies – passive subjects – that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers, and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).

**IX.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The active subject of the right enshrined in Article 30 of the Magna Carta is every person or every administered party, so the constituent's purpose was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and expand administrative transparency and public disclosure. Independently of the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for privileged institutional access to administrative information, such as, for example, that enjoyed by the investigative commissions of the Legislative Assembly (Article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of their political oversight. It should be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the infra-constitutional legal framework for other situations, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic (Articles 13 of the Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, and its reforms), the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) (Article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, and its reforms), the commissions to Promote Competition and the National Consumer Commission (Article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (Articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be considered that Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to "administrative departments," meaning that passive subjects will be all public entities and their bodies, both from the Central Administration – the State or the largest public entity – and from the institutional or service-based Decentralized Administration – most autonomous institutions –, territorial – municipalities –, and corporate – professional associations (colegios profesionales), productive or industrial corporations such as the Sugarcane Agro-Industrial League (Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar), the Coffee Institute (Instituto del Café), the Tobacco Board (Junta del Tabaco), the Rice Corporation (Corporación Arrocera), the National Livestock and Horticultural Corporations (Corporaciones Ganadera y Hortícola Nacional), etc. –. The right of access must be extended, passively, to public enterprises that assume collective organizational forms under private law through which a public administration carries out a business, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and market, such as the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery, Public Limited Company (Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima, RECOPE), the National Power and Light Company, Public Limited Company (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima, CNFL), Radiográfica Costarricense, Public Limited Company (Radiográfica de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica, Public Limited Company (Correos de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima), the Public Services Company of Heredia, Public Limited Company (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima, EPSH), etc., especially when they possess information of public interest. Finally, private persons who permanently or transiently exercise a public power or competence by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as concessionaires of public services or works, interested parties (gestores interesados), notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., may eventually become passive subjects when they handle or possess information – documents – of clear public interest.

**X.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The constitutional text, in its Article 30, refers to free access to "administrative departments," meaning that unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative units or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the goal of having informed administered parties knowledgeable about administrative management. Consequently, a purposive or axiological interpretation of the constitutional norm must lead to the conclusion that administered parties or persons can access any information held by the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, whether documentary – files, registries, archives, records –, electronic or computer-based – databases, electronic files, automated records, diskettes, compact discs –, audiovisual, tape-recorded, etc.

**XI.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right is "information on matters of public interest," such that when the administrative information sought does not concern a matter of such nature, the right is nullified and access cannot be granted. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Constitution by stipulating: "State secrets are excepted." The State secret as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a matter of legal reserve (Article 19, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration); however, over fifty years have passed since the Constitution came into force, and the legislative omission in issuing a law on state secrets and classified matters still persists. This legislative gap has obviously caused serious uncertainty and has fostered the custom contra legem of the Executive Power to classify, via executive decree, in a punctual and circumstantial manner, certain matters as reserved or classified because they constitute, in its understanding, a State secret. Regarding the sphere, extent, and scope of State secrecy, the doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it covers aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and foreign relations concluded between the State and other subjects of Public International Law (see Article 284 of the Penal Code, which defines the crime of "disclosure of secrets"). It is not idle to distinguish between secrecy established for objective and material reasons (ratione materiae), referring to the three aspects previously indicated (national security, national defense, and foreign relations), and secrecy imposed on public officials or servants (ratione personae), who by reason of exercising their functions are aware of certain types of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see Article 337 of the Penal Code, which defines and sanctions the crime of "disclosure of secrets"). The State secret is regulated in the body of legality in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (e.g., the General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, which qualifies reports and documents from the Directorate of State Security as confidential and, potentially, declarable as a State secret by the President of the Republic – Article 16; the General Civil Aviation Law regarding some agreements of the Technical Civil Aviation Council – Article 303, etc.). The State secret, insofar as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and public disclosure of the public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied restrictively at all times. Regarding the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes public morals and public order as extrinsic limits to any right. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees every person a sphere of intangible privacy against other legal subjects, such that those intimate, sensitive, or nominative data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, as they are recorded in its physical or automated archives, registries, and files, cannot be accessed by any person, as that would constitute unconstitutional external intrusion or interference. Obviously, the foregoing is more applicable when the administered party himself has brought confidential information to the knowledge of a public administration, being required for it, for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is intimately linked to the first intrinsic limit indicated, since, very probably, in such a case, the information sought does not concern matters of public interest but private ones.

Closely linked to this limitation are bank secrecy, understood as the duty imposed on every financial intermediation entity not to reveal the information and data it holds on its clients from any banking operation or banking contract entered into with them, especially in the case of checking accounts, given that Article 615 of the Commercial Code expressly enshrines it for that hypothesis, and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain industrial ideas, products, or procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which the information of a private individual held by a public entity or body may have, especially when combined with that of other individuals, a clear public dimension and vocation, circumstances that this Constitutional Court must progressively and casuistically identify. 3) The investigation of crimes, when it involves criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police bodies, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.

XII.- On the other hand, the petitioner alleges a violation of his right enshrined in Article 30 of the Political Constitution, since, according to his statement, the authorities of the Municipal Council of San José have not allowed him access to the administrative file of the proceeding (expediente administrativo) submitted before the respondent Municipality. As can be deduced from the case file, on October 13, 2004, the petitioner requested administrative file No. 4290 from the Secretary of the Legal Affairs Commission. On that occasion, the petitioner could not access that file because, at that precise moment, it was being examined and studied by the Commission; hence, the aforementioned official verbally explained the situation to him and indicated that he had to make a formal written request to the Council Secretariat. By virtue of the foregoing, on October 20 of the current year, the petitioner accessed file No. 4290 and, additionally, obtained photocopies of it (visible at folio 48). This Constitutional Court finds that the reasons that prevented the petitioner from accessing the file on the first occasion are not admissible. If an interested party in an administrative procedure requests access to the file, it must be provided immediately, without the need for a written request; it is also inappropriate to delay its access on the pretext that it is under study by an administrative body. Since in the case under study the petitioner requested access from October 13 and it was not until seven days later that he obtained it – namely, on the following October 20 – this constitutes a clear denial of access to the administrative file, which makes it necessary to grant this aspect of the appeal, due to a violation of Article 30 of the Constitution, solely for indemnity purposes (Article 52 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

XIII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal filed with merit.

7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates the matter regarding documents with scientific and cultural value belonging to the public entities and bodies –passive subjects– that make up the National Archives System (Sistema Nacional de Archivos) (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).

**IX.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The active subject of the right enshrined in Article 30 of the Magna Carta is any person or any administered party, for which reason the constituent’s purpose was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and expand administrative transparency and publicity. Independently of the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for a privileged institutional access to administrative information, such as, for example, that enjoyed by the investigative committees of the Legislative Assembly (Article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of their political control. It should be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the infra-constitutional legal system for other scenarios, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) (Articles 13 of the Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983 and its reforms), the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) (Article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992 and its reforms), the commissions for Promoting Competition and National Consumer Affairs (Article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (Articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be taken into consideration that Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to “administrative departments,” meaning that all public entities and their bodies shall be passive subjects, both from the Centralized Administration –the State or major public entity– and from the Decentralized Administration, whether institutional or by services –the majority of the autonomous institutions–, territorial –municipalities– and corporate –professional associations (colegios profesionales), productive or industrial corporations such as the Sugar Cane Agroindustrial League (Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar), the Coffee Institute (Instituto del Café), the Tobacco Board (Junta del Tabaco), the Rice Corporation (Corporación Arrocera), the National Livestock and Horticultural Corporations, etc.–. The right of access must be passively extended to public enterprises that assume forms of collective organization under private law, through which some public administration exercises a business, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and the market, such as the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery, Stock Corporation (Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima, RECOPE), the National Power and Light Company, Stock Corporation (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima, CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica, Stock Corporation (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica, Stock Corporation, the Public Services Company of Heredia, Stock Corporation (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima, EPSH), etc., especially when they possess information of public interest. Finally, private individuals who permanently or temporarily exercise a public power or competence by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as concessionaires of public services or works, interested managers, notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., may eventually become passive subjects when they handle or possess information –documents– of a clear public interest.

**X.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The constitutional text in its Article 30 refers to free access to “administrative departments,” given that unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative dependencies or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the goal of having informed administrators who are knowledgeable about administrative management. Consequently, a finalist or axiological hermeneutics of the constitutional rule must lead to the conclusion that the administered parties or persons may access any information held by the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, be it documentary –case files (expedientes), records, archives, files–, electronic or computer-based –databases, electronic case files, automated files, floppy disks, compact discs–, audiovisual, magnetic tape, etc.

**XI.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right is “information on matters of public interest,” so that when the administrative information sought does not concern an aspect of such nature, the right is nullified and cannot be accessed. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is established in paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Constitution, stipulating “State secrets shall remain safeguarded.” The State secret as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a legal reserve (Article 19, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), however, more than fifty years have elapsed since the Constitution came into force and the legislative omission in issuing a law on state secrets and classified matters persists. This legislative gap has obviously caused serious uncertainty and has fostered the custom contra legem of the Executive Branch of classifying, by means of an executive decree (decreto ejecutivo), in a specific and circumstantial manner, certain matters as reserved or classified for constituting, in its understanding, a State secret. Regarding the sphere, extent, and scope of the State secret, the doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it includes aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and foreign relations concluded between the State and the rest of the subjects of Public International Law (vid. Article 284 of the Penal Code, when criminalizing the offense of “revelation of secrets”). It is not idle to distinguish between the secret for objective and material reasons (ratione materia), referring to the three aspects previously indicated (national security, defense, and foreign relations), and the secret imposed on public officials or servants (ratione personae) who, by reason of the exercise of their functions, know a certain type of information regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (vid. Article 337 of the Penal Code when criminalizing and punishing the offense of “disclosure of secrets”). The State secret is regulated within the block of legality in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (v. gr. General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, when classifying reports and documents of the State Security Directorate as confidential and, eventually, declarable as a State secret by the President of the Republic –Article 16–; the General Civil Aviation Law regarding certain agreements of the Technical Civil Aviation Council –Article 303–, etc.). The State secret, as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and publicity of the public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied restrictively at all times. Regarding the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes morality and public order as an extrinsic limit of any right. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees all persons a sphere of intangible privacy from the rest of the legal subjects, in such a way that intimate, sensitive, or nominative data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, as recorded in its physical or automated archives, records, and case files, cannot be accessed by any person as this would imply an external and unconstitutional intrusion or interference. Obviously, the foregoing is more applicable when the administered party himself has made confidential information known to a public administration, as required, for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is intimately linked to the first intrinsic limit indicated, since, very probably, in such a case the sought-after information does not concern matters of public interest but rather private interest. Intimately linked to this limitation are bank secrecy (secreto bancario), understood as the duty imposed on every financial intermediation entity not to reveal the information and data it possesses about its clients from any banking operation or contract entered into with them, especially regarding checking accounts, since Article 615 of the Commercial Code expressly enshrines it for this scenario, and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which the information of a private individual held by a public entity or body may have, especially when articulated with that of other private individuals, a clear public dimension and vocation, circumstances that must be progressively and casuistically identified by this Constitutional Court. 3) The investigation of crimes, when it involves criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police bodies, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.

**XII.-** On the other hand, the petitioner claims a violation of his right enshrined in Article 30 of the Political Constitution, since, according to his statement, the authorities of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) of San José have not allowed him access to the administrative case file (expediente administrativo) of the proceeding filed before the respondent Municipality. As evidenced in the case file, on October 13, 2004, the petitioner requested administrative case file No. 4290 from the Secretary of the Legal Affairs Commission. On that occasion, the petitioner could not access said case file because, at that precise moment, it was being analyzed and studied by the Commission, hence, the aforementioned official verbally referred him to the situation, and indicated that he had to make the formal request in writing before the Secretariat of the Council. By virtue of the foregoing, on October 20 of the current year, the petitioner accessed case file No. 4290 and, additionally, obtained photocopies thereof (visible on page 48). This Constitutional Court finds that the reasons that prevented the petitioner from accessing the case file on the first occasion are not acceptable. If an interested party in an administrative procedure requests access to the case file, this must be provided immediately, without the need to request it in writing, and it is also improper to delay access under the pretext of it being under study by an administrative body. As in the case under study, the petitioner requested access since October 13 and it was not until seven days later that he obtained it –namely, on October 20 following–, we are faced with a clear denial of access to the administrative case file, hence it is necessary to grant this part of the action, for violation of Article 30 of the Constitution, solely for compensatory effects (Article 52 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

**XIII.- CONCLUSION.** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the filed action with merit.

**3)** On **July 26, 2004**, the appellant and Mrs. Hazel Yutsing Mora Vargas filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against notifications Nos. 56371 and 56372 from the Patents Department of the Municipality of San José – relating to the closure of the premises and the placement of seals – (visible on pages 160-161 of the administrative file). **4)** By resolution No. 6609 at 9:00 a.m. on **August 4, 2004**, the Municipal Mayor of San José rejected the motion for reconsideration and confirmed resolution No. 300-L-2004 in all its aspects. Likewise, since an appeal had been filed, he forwarded the administrative file to the Municipal Council (visible on pages 174-176 of the administrative file). **5)** On **August 16, 2004**, the appellant filed a subsidiary appeal against the resolution issued by the Municipal Mayor of San José, **No. 300-L-2004** of July 14, 2004, and **No. 6609** of August 4, 2004 – which rejected the motion for reconsideration and confirmed resolution No. 300-L-2004 in all its aspects (visible on pages 2-16, and on pages 184-191 of the administrative file). **6)** On **October 13, 2004**, the appellant verbally requested a copy of administrative file No. 4290 from the Secretary of the Commission on Legal Affairs. On that occasion, said official indicated to him that he was not authorized to give him a copy of the file, given that it was, at that moment, being analyzed by the Commission and, furthermore, he had to request said copy in writing from the Secretary of the Council. Given this circumstance, the appellant delivered the referred request to her in writing (visible on page 53 of the copies attached to the administrative file). **7)** On **October 20, 2004**, the appellant appeared, again, at the Municipal Council of San José, and requested the copy of the file from the Secretary of the Council, at which time he gained access to administrative file No. 4290 and, additionally, obtained photocopies thereof (visible on page 48 of the copies attached to the administrative file). **8)** The Municipal Corporation has not resolved the appeal filed by the appellant on August 16, 2004, against resolutions No. 300-L-2004 and No. 6609 (report visible on pages 19-24).

**III.- RIGHT TO A PROMPT AND DULY COMPLETED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE**. Public administrations, in the exercise of their powers, competencies, or attributions, must hear and resolve, in the prior administrative or governmental venue, through a procedure, multiple requests from the administered parties or users of public services in order to obtain a final administrative act, whose psychic content may be volitional, judgmental, or cognitive. This conclusive administrative act of an administrative procedure may grant or recognize subjective rights or legitimate interests – substantial legal situations – (favorable acts) or suppress them, deny them, or impose obligations (acts of burden or abrogation). It is logical and sensible that there cannot be immediate administrative justice, since the public administration and its bodies require a prudential period to adequately process the respective petition and issue the most accurate administrative resolution, adhering to the real truth of the facts that constitute the grounds for the final act. The foregoing means that between the initial request formulated by the administered party and its final resolution, a physiologically necessary time must elapse (vacatio or distantia temporis), imposed by the observance of the fundamental rights of the former (due process, defense, bilateral hearing or adversarial principle) and the best possible satisfaction of public interests. It should not be lost from perspective that the administrative procedure is defined as a set of acts – of the directing, deciding administrative body and of the applicant themselves – concatenated and teleologically linked or united that require time to be carried out. Consequently, the substantiation of the requests formulated by the administered parties requires a necessary time that guarantees respect for their fundamental rights, an adequate weighing of the factual and legal elements, of the particular interest, of third parties, and of the involved public interests. However, the foregoing does not legally legitimize public administrations to indefinitely prolong the hearing and resolution of the matters that the administered parties have entrusted to them, since, in such a case, the procedures are pathologically prolonged for causes exclusively attributable to them, given that the administered parties do not have the duty or obligation to tolerate such undue delays and dilations. The Right to a prompt and duly completed justice under article 41 of the Political Constitution is not limited, in Administrative Law, to the jurisdictional sphere, that is, to the proceedings heard by the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction created in Article 49 of the same supreme normative body, but rather is projected and expands with force, also, to the administrative or governmental venue prior to the judicial one, that is, to administrative procedures. Thus, it is a constitutional imperative that administrative procedures be, equally, prompt, timely, and duly completed for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal certainty and security, of which all administered parties are deserving creditors. Precisely because of the foregoing, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as celerity or speed (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration), efficacy and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem). These guiding principles of administrative procedures impose on public entities the imperative obligation to substantiate them within a reasonable period and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified delays to avoid the frustration, the eventual extinction, or the serious injury of the substantial legal situations invoked by the administered parties due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-tutelage (autotutela declarativa), which ultimately constitutes a heavy burden for the administered parties, should not be inverted and exploited by them to cause unlawful harm to the administered party through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.

**IV.- NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND REASONABLE PERIODS**. In matters of administrative procedures, it is necessary to distinguish between the constitutive nature and the challenge (impugnación). The former's main purpose is the issuance of a final administrative act that resolves the request formulated by the applicant or interested party – in a favorable or unfavorable sense – and the latter is designed to hear the challenge filed against the final act that was issued in the constitutive procedure – the recourse phase (fase recursiva). The constitutive procedure may be, by way of example, the ordinary and summary procedures regulated in the General Law of Public Administration or any other special one by reason of the subject matter regulated in a specific law and that may be classified within the exceptions contained in article 367, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration and in Executive Decrees numbers 8979-P of August 28 and 9469-P of December 18, both of 1978. The challenge procedure comprises ordinary recourses (reconsideration, appeal, and reversal) and extraordinary ones (review). For both cases, and regarding common administrative procedures – ordinary, summary, and recourses – the General Law of Public Administration establishes periods within which the respective public entity must resolve either the initial petition or request or the recourse timely filed. Indeed, Article 261, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within the period of two months after its initiation; for the case of the summary procedure, Article 325 ibidem, provides for a period of one month – from its start – for its conclusion. Regarding the recourse phase or challenge procedure, article 261, paragraph 2, sets a period of one month. When a public body or entity exceeds these periods, a violation of the right to prompt and duly completed administrative justice established in Article 41 of the Political Constitution occurs.

**V.-** The appellant alleges the violation of the right to a prompt and duly completed administrative procedure, given that on August 16, 2004, he filed a subsidiary appeal that has not been resolved to date. In the present matter, it is fully proven that on July 26, 2004, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against resolution No. 300-L-2004 issued by the Municipal Mayor of San José. The referred Mayor, through resolution No. 6609 of August 4, 2004, rejected the indicated motion for reconsideration, confirmed the challenged resolution, and elevated the respective matter to the Municipal Council, for the purposes of resolving the appeal. The effective transfer of the respective administrative file was not carried out until August 17, 2004. On the other hand, despite the resolution of the subsidiary appeal filed by the appellant being in process, on August 16, 2004, he filed a new appeal, this time against resolution No. 6609, in which the Municipal Mayor rejected the motion for reconsideration initially filed. Thus, the respondent Municipal Council, prior to hearing the appeal filed on August 16, 2004 – which is the object of this amparo – proceeded to resolve the first appeal filed, which was raised against resolution No. 300-L-2004. On that occasion, the Municipal Council agreed to declare the subsidiarily filed appeal of July 26, 2004, without merit, a result that was notified to the appellant on October 22, 2004. Once the first appeal filed by the appellant was resolved, the second appeal – filed against resolution No. 6609 – was forwarded to the Legal Directorate for its resolution, as is proper. Contrary to what is asserted by the appellant, this Constitutional Chamber considers that the action carried out by the respondent Municipal Council was not arbitrary, as it limited itself to respecting the chronological order of the procedure, according to the filing date of the respective recourse petition. Due to the filing of the motions for reconsideration and subsidiary appeal filed on July 26, 2004, the Municipal Council proceeded to hear these, rejecting the motion for reconsideration and elevating the appeal. During the course of that procedure, the appellant filed a new appeal, this time against the resolution that rejected the motion for reconsideration. Under this understanding, the Municipal entity, by first hearing the appeal filed on July 26 of the current year, before resolving the appeal filed on August 16, 2004, did not violate the right to a prompt and duly completed administrative procedure. However, this Chamber finds it proven that the Municipal Corporation has not resolved this last appeal – filed on August 16, 2004 –, and therefore, having proven said omission, the recourse must be declared with merit for violation of a prompt and duly completed administrative procedure.

**VI.- ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLICITY.** In the framework of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, each and every one of the public entities and bodies that make up the respective administration must be subject to the implicit constitutional principles of transparency and publicity, which must be the rule for all administrative action or function. The collective organizations of Public Law – public entities – are called to be true glass houses whose interior all administered parties can scrutinize and monitor, in broad daylight. Public administrations must create and foster permanent and fluid channels of communication or exchange of information with the administered parties and the collective media for the sake of encouraging greater direct and active participation in public management and of implementing the principles of evaluation of results and accountability currently incorporated into our constitutional text (Article 11 of the Political Constitution). Under this understanding, administrative secrecy or confidentiality are an exception that is justified, solely, under qualified circumstances when through them constitutionally relevant values and assets are protected. Various mechanisms exist to achieve higher levels of administrative transparency in a given legal system, such as the statement of reasons for administrative acts, the forms of their communication – publication and notification –, the public information procedure for the drafting of regulations and master plans, participation in the administrative procedure, administrative contracting procedures, etc. However, one of the most precious tools for achieving this objective is the right of access to administrative information.

**VII.- THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to "administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest," a fundamental right that in doctrine has been called the right of access to administrative archives and records; however, the most accurate denomination is the right of access to administrative information, since access to the material or virtual supports of public administrations is the instrument or mechanism to achieve the proposed end, which consists of the administered parties learning of the information held by those administrations. It is necessary to indicate that the administrative information of public interest sought by an administered party is not always found in an administrative file, archive, or record. The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of the administered parties, since it allows them to exercise optimal control of the legality and of the timeliness, convenience or merit, and, in general, of the efficacy and efficiency of the administrative function deployed by the various public entities. Efficient and effective public administrations are those that submit to public control and scrutiny, but citizen control cannot exist without adequate information. In this way, a logical chain can be established between access to administrative information, knowledge and handling of it, effective or timely citizen control, and efficient public administrations. The right of access to administrative information has a profound foundation in a series of principles and values inherent to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, which it, at the same time, implements. Thus, effective and direct citizen participation in the management and handling of public affairs is inconceivable without a significant body of information about administrative competencies and services. Likewise, the democratic principle is strengthened when the diverse social, economic, and political forces and groups participate actively and in an informed manner in the formation and execution of public will. Finally, the right of access to administrative information is an indispensable tool, like many others, for the full validity of the principles of administrative transparency and publicity. The content of the right of access to administrative information is truly broad and comprises a bundle of faculties vested in the person who exercises it, such as the following: a) access to public departments, dependencies, offices, and buildings; b) access to archives, records, files, and physical or automated documents – databases, files –; c) the faculty of the administered party to know the stored personal or nominative data that affect them in any way; d) the faculty of the administered party to rectify or eliminate such data if they are erroneous, incorrect, or false; e) the right to know the content of physical or virtual documents and files; and f) the right to obtain, at their cost, certifications or copies thereof.

**VIII.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** A clear distinction can be drawn between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra – outside – and (b) ad intra – within – an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information – uti universi – and the latter, solely, to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure – uti singuli –. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Chapter Six entitled “On access to the file and its parts”, Title Three of Book Two, in Articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution clearly refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and significant gap in our legal system that has persisted over time for more than fifty years since the constitutional text came into force. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectorial; thus, by way of example, the Law of the National Archives System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value from the public entities and bodies – passive subjects – that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).

**IX.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The active subject of the right enshrined in Article 30 of the Magna Carta is any person or any administered party; thus, the constituent's purpose was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and expand administrative transparency and publicity. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for a privileged institutional access to administrative information, such as that enjoyed by the investigative committees of the Legislative Assembly (Article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of their political control. It must be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the infra-constitutional legal system for other cases such as the Comptroller General of the Republic (Article 13 of the Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, and its reforms), the Ombudsman's Office (Article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, and its reforms), the Commissions for Promoting Competition and the National Consumer (Article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (Articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be taken into consideration that Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to “administrative departments,” whereby the passive subjects shall be all public entities and their bodies, both of the Central Administration – State or major public entity – and of the Decentralized Administration, whether institutional or by services – the majority of autonomous institutions –, territorial – municipalities – and corporate – professional associations, productive or industrial corporations such as the Sugarcane Agroindustrial League, the Coffee Institute, the Tobacco Board, the Rice Corporation, the National Livestock and Horticultural Corporations, etc. –. The right of access must be passively extended to public enterprises that assume collective forms of organization under private law, through which some public administration carries out a business, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and the market, such as the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery, S.A. (RECOPE), the National Power and Light Company, S.A. (CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica, S.A. (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica, S.A., the Public Services Company of Heredia, S.A. (EPSH), etc., above all, when they possess information of public interest. Lastly, private persons who permanently or temporarily exercise a public power or competence by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as concessionaires of public services or works, interested managers, notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., can eventually become passive subjects when they handle or possess information – documents – of a clear public interest.

**X.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The constitutional text in its Article 30 refers to free access to “administrative departments,” given that unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative dependencies or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the end of having administered parties informed and knowledgeable about administrative management.

Consequently, a purposive or axiological hermeneutic of the constitutional norm must lead to the conclusion that administered persons or individuals may access any information held by the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, whether documentary—files (expedientes), registries, archives, card indexes—electronic or computer-based—databases, electronic files (expedientes electrónicos), automated indexes, diskettes, compact discs—audiovisual, magnetic tape, etc.

**XI.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right is “information on matters of public interest,” such that when the administrative information sought does not concern a matter of that nature, the right is vitiated and access cannot be granted. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is established in the 2nd paragraph of constitutional article 30, stipulating “State secrets are safeguarded.” State secrecy as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a matter reserved to law (article 19, 1st paragraph, of the General Law of Public Administration), however, more than fifty years have passed since the Constitution came into force and the legislative omission in enacting a law on state secrets and classified matters still persists. This legislative gap, obviously, has caused grave uncertainty and has fostered the *contra legem* custom of the Executive Branch of classifying, by way of executive decree (decreto ejecutivo), in a specific and conjunctural manner, certain matters as reserved or classified because they constitute, in its understanding, a State secret. Concerning the scope, extension, and reach of State secrecy, the doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it includes aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and the foreign relations concluded between the State and the rest of the subjects of Public International Law (see article 284 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes the offense of “revelation of secrets”). It is not otiose to distinguish between secrecy for objective and material reasons (*ratione materiae*), referring to the three previously indicated aspects (national security, defense, and foreign relations), and secrecy imposed on public officials or servants (*ratione personae*) who, by reason of the exercise of their functions, know certain types of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of secrecy and confidentiality (see article 337 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes and sanctions the offense of “divulging secrets”). State secrecy is regulated in the body of laws in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (e.g., General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, by classifying as confidential and, eventually, declarable as State secret by the President of the Republic the reports and documents of the Directorate of State Security –article 16–; the General Law of Civil Aviation regarding certain agreements of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation –article 303–, etc.). State secrecy, insofar as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and publicity of public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied, at all times, in a restrictive manner. Regarding the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes morality and public order as an extrinsic limit to any right. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees all persons a sphere of intangible privacy against the rest of the subjects of law, such that those intimate, sensitive, or personal data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, because they appear in its files (archivos), registries, and files (expedientes), whether physical or automated, cannot be accessed by any person, as that would constitute an unconstitutional external intrusion or interference. Obviously, the above is of greater application when the administered person themselves has brought confidential information to the knowledge of a public administration—because it is required—for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is intimately linked to the first indicated intrinsic limit, since, very probably, in such a case the intended information does not pertain to matters of public but rather private interest. Intimately linked to this limitation are bank secrecy, understood as the duty imposed on every financial intermediary entity not to reveal the information and data it possesses on its clients from any banking operation or banking contract entered into with them, above all, in the case of checking accounts, since article 615 of the Commercial Code expressly enshrines it for that hypothesis, and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain industrial ideas, products, or procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which a private individual's information held by a public entity or body may have, especially when combined with that of other private individuals, a clear public dimension and vocation, circumstances that must be progressively and casuistically identified by this Constitutional Court. 3) The investigation of crimes, when dealing with criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police forces, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.

**XII.-** On the other hand, the petitioner claims a violation of his right enshrined in Article 30 of the Political Constitution, since, according to his account, the authorities of the Municipal Council of San José have not permitted him access to the administrative file (expediente administrativo) for the proceeding presented before the respondent Municipality. As can be deduced from the case file, on October 13, 2004, the petitioner requested administrative file (expediente administrativo) No. 4290 from the Secretary of the Legal Affairs Commission. On that occasion, the petitioner could not access that file (expediente) because, at that precise moment, it was being subject to analysis and study by the Commission; hence, the aforementioned official verbally explained the situation and indicated that he needed to make a formal written request to the Council Secretariat. By virtue of the above, on October 20 of the current year, the petitioner gained access to file (expediente) No. 4290 and also obtained photocopies thereof (visible at folio 48). This Constitutional Court finds that the reasons that prevented the petitioner from accessing the file (expediente) on the first occasion are not acceptable. If an interested party in an administrative procedure requests access to the file (expediente), it must be provided immediately, without the need to request it in writing, it also being improper to delay access under the pretext of it being under study by an administrative body; since in the case under study, the petitioner requested access as of October 13, and it was only seven days later that he obtained it—namely, on the following October 20—, this constitutes a clear denial of access to the administrative file (expediente administrativo), hence it is necessary to grant this part of the appeal, for violation of constitutional Article 30, solely for purposes of compensation (article 52 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

**XIII.- CONCLUSION.** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal filed with merit.

I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El recurrente acusa que el 16 de agosto del 2004, presentó un recurso de apelación sin que a la fecha de interposición del amparo se haya resuelto dicha gestión. Asimismo, alega que las autoridades de dicha Municipalidad no le permitieron tener acceso al respectivo expediente administrativo.

II.- HECHOS PROBADOS. De relevancia para dirimir el presente recurso de amparo se tienen por demostrados los siguientes hechos: 1) Mediante resolución No. 300-L-2004 de las 10:00 hrs. del 14 de julio del 2004, el Alcalde Municipal de San José conoció de la gestión de explotación de la patente de licores nacionales No. 147 del Distrito Merced, solicitada por el recurrente y la señora Mora Vargas, y ordenó suspender el trámite solicitado, hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional resuelva la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el artículo 9, inciso a), del Reglamento a la Ley de Licores (visible a folios 86-88 del expediente administrativo). 2) El 22 de julio del 2004, mediante notificación No. 56371, se procedió a la clausura de su establecimiento conforme a la resolución del Departamento de licores No. 300-L-2004, en la que se ordenó suspender el conocimiento del trámite solicitado, hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional no resuelva una acción de inconstitucionalidad pendiente contra el Reglamento a la Ley de Licores. En esa oportunidad, se colocaron los sellos (visible a folios 107 del expediente administrativo). 3) El 26 de julio del 2004, el recurrente y la señora Hazel Yutsing Mora Vargas, presentaron un recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra las notificaciones Nos. 56371 y 5637 2 del Departamento de Patentes de la Municipalidad de San José –relativas al cierre del local y a la colocación de sellos- (visible a folios 160-161 del expediente administrativo). 4) Mediante resolución No. 6609 de las 9:00 hrs. del 4 de agosto del 2004, el Alcalde Municipal de San José, rechazó el recurso de revocatoria y confirmó en todos los extremos la resolución No. 300-L-2004. Asimismo, por haberse interpuesto un recurso de apelación, remitió el expediente administrativo al Concejo Municipal (visible a folios 174-176 del expediente administrativo). 5) El 16 de agosto del 2004, el recurrente interpuso un recurso de apelación en subsidio contra la resolución dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de San José, No. 300-L-2004 del 14 de julio del 2004 y No. 6609 del 4 de agosto del 2004 –que rechazó el recurso de revocatoria y confirmó en todos los extremos la resolución No. 300-L-2004 (visible a folios 2-16, y a folios 184-191 del expediente administrativo). 6) El 13 de octubre del 2004, el recurrente solicitó, verbalmente, al Secretario de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos una copia del expediente administrativo No. 4290. En esa oportunidad, dicho funcionario le indicó que él no estaba autorizado para entregarle una copia del expediente, dado que éste, en ese momento, estaba siendo analizado en la Comisión y, además, debía solicitar dicha copia, por escrito, a la Secretaria del Concejo. Ante dicha circunstancia, el recurrente le entregó la referida solicitud por escrito (visible a folio 53 de las copias adjuntas al expediente administrativo). 7) El 20 de octubre del 2004, el recurrente se presentó, nuevamente, en el Concejo Municipal de San José, y solicitó la copia del expediente a la Secretaria del Concejo, oportunidad en la que tuvo acceso al expediente administrativo No. 4290 y, además, obtuvo fotocopias del mismo (visible a folio 48 de las copias adjuntas al expediente administrativo). 8) La Corporación Municipal no ha resuelto el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el recurrente el 16 de agosto del 2004 contra las resoluciones No. 300-L-2004 y No. 6609 (informe visible a folios 19-24).

III.- DERECHO A UN PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO PRONTO Y CUMPLIDO. Las administraciones públicas en el ejercicio de sus potestades, competencias o atribuciones deben conocer y resolver en la sede administrativa o gubernativa previa, a través de un procedimiento, múltiples solicitudes de los administrados o usuarios de los servicios públicos a efecto de obtener un acto administrativo final, cuyo contenido psíquico puede ser volitivo, de juicio o de conocimiento. Ese acto administrativo conclusivo de un procedimiento administrativo puede otorgar o reconocer derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos –situaciones jurídicas sustanciales- (actos favorables) o bien suprimirlos, denegarlos o imponer obligaciones (actos de gravamen o ablatorios). Es lógico y sensato que no puede haber una justicia administrativa inmediata, puesto que, la administración pública y sus órganos requieren de un plazo prudencial para tramitar de forma adecuada la respectiva petición y dictar la resolución administrativa más acertada y apegada a la verdad real de los hechos que constituyen el motivo del acto final. Lo anterior significa que entre el pedimento inicial formulado por el administrado y su resolución final debe mediar un tiempo fisiológicamente necesario (vacatio o distantia temporis), impuesto por la observancia de los derechos fundamentales de aquel (debido proceso, defensa, bilateralidad de la audiencia o contradictorio) y la mejor satisfacción posible de los intereses públicos. No debe perderse de perspectiva que el procedimiento administrativo se define como un conjunto de actos –del órgano administrativo director, decisor y del propio gestionante- concatenados y teleológicamente vinculados o unidos que precisan de tiempo para verificarse. Consecuentemente, la substanciación de las solicitudes formuladas por los administrados requiere de un tiempo necesario que garantice el respeto de los derechos fundamentales de éstos, una ponderación adecuada de los elementos fácticos, jurídicos, del interés particular, de terceros y de los intereses públicos involucrados. Sin embargo, lo anterior no legitima jurídicamente a las administraciones públicas para que prolonguen indefinidamente el conocimiento y resolución de los asuntos que los administrados les han empeñado, puesto que, en tal supuesto los procedimientos se alargan patológicamente por causas exclusivamente imputables a éstas, siendo que los administrados no tienen el deber o la obligación de tolerar tales atrasos y dilaciones indebidas. El Derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida del ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política no se limita, en el Derecho Administrativo, al ámbito jurisdiccional, esto es, a los procesos que conoce la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa creada en el artículo 49 del mismo cuerpo normativo supremo, sino que se proyecta y expande con fuerza, también, a la vía administrativa o gubernativa previa a la judicial, esto es, a los procedimientos administrativos. De modo y manera que es un imperativo constitucional que los procedimientos administrativos sean, igualmente, prontos, oportunos y cumplidos en aras de valores constitucionales trascendentales como la seguridad y la certeza jurídicas de los que son merecidos acreedores todos los administrados. Precisamente por lo anterior, los procedimientos administrativos se encuentran informados por una serie de principios de profunda raigambre constitucional, tales como los de prontitud y oportunidad (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), más conocido como de celeridad o rapidez (artículos 225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), eficacia y eficiencia (artículos 140, inciso 8), de la Constitución Política, 4°, 225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), simplicidad y economía procedimentales (artículo 269, párrafo 1°, ibidem). Estos principios rectores de los procedimientos administrativos, le imponen a los entes públicos la obligación imperativa de substanciarlos dentro de un plazo razonable y sin dilaciones indebidas, es decir, sin retardos graves e injustificados para evitar la frustración, la eventual extinción o la lesión grave de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales invocadas por los administrados por el transcurso de un tiempo excesivo e irrazonable. El privilegio sustancial y posicional de las administraciones públicas, denominado autotutela declarativa y que, a la postre, constituye una pesada carga para los administrados, no debe invertirse y ser aprovechado por éstas para causarle una lesión antijurídica al administrado con la prolongación innecesaria de los procedimientos administrativos.

IV.- NATURALEZA DE LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS Y PLAZOS RAZONABLES. En materia de procedimientos administrativos, es menester distinguir entre el de naturaleza constitutiva y el de impugnación. El primero tiene como principal propósito el dictado de un acto administrativo final que resuelva el pedimento formulado por el gestionante o parte interesada –en un sentido favorable o desfavorable-, y el segundo está diseñado para conocer de la impugnación presentada contra el acto final que fue dictado en el procedimiento constitutivo –fase recursiva-. El procedimiento constitutivo puede ser, a modo de ejemplo, los procedimientos ordinario y sumario normados en la Ley General de la Administración Pública o cualquier otro especial por razón de la materia regulado en una ley específica y que sea posible encuadrarlo dentro de las excepciones contenidas en el numeral 367, párrafo 2°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y en los Decretos Ejecutivos números 8979-P del 28 de agosto y 9469-P del 18 de diciembre, ambos de 1978. El procedimiento de impugnación comprende los recursos ordinarios (revocatoria, apelación y reposición) y los extraordinarios (revisión). Para sendos supuestos, y en lo que se refiere a los procedimientos administrativos comunes –ordinario, sumario y recursos-, la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece plazos dentro de los cuales la respectiva entidad pública debe resolver ya sea la petición o solicitud inicial o el recurso oportunamente interpuesto. En efecto, el artículo 261, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que el procedimiento administrativo ordinario debe ser concluido, por acto final, dentro del plazo de dos meses posteriores a su iniciación; para la hipótesis del procedimiento sumario, el artículo 325 ibidem, dispone un plazo de un mes –a partir de su inicio- para su conclusión. En lo tocante a la fase recursiva o procedimiento de impugnación, el numeral 261, párrafo 2°, fija un plazo de un mes. Cuando un órgano o ente público se excede en estos plazos, se produce un quebranto del derecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida establecido en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política.

V.- El recurrente acusa la violación del derecho a un procedimiento administrativo pronto y cumplido, dado que el 16 de agosto del 2004, presentó un recurso de apelación en subsidio que a la fecha no ha sido resuelto. En el presente asunto se encuentra, plenamente, acreditado que el 26 de julio del 2004, el recurrente interpuso un recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución No. 300-L-2004 dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de San José. El Alcalde referido, mediante resolución No. 6609 del 4 de agosto del 2004 rechazó el recurso de revocatoria señalado, confirmó la resolución impugnada, y elevó el respectivo asunto al Concejo Municipal, a efectos de resolver la apelación. El traslado efectivo del respectivo expediente administrativo no se realizó sino hasta el 17 de agosto del 2004. De otra parte, pese a encontrarse en trámite la resolución del recurso de apelación en subsidio presentado por el recurrente, el 16 de agosto del 2004, éste interpuso un nuevo recurso de apelación, esta vez contra la resolución No. 6609, en la que el Alcalde Municipal rechazó el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto en un primer momento. Así las cosas, el Concejo Municipal recurrido, previo a conocer el recurso de apelación presentado el 16 de agosto del 2004 –que es objeto del presente amparo- procedió a resolver el primer recurso de apelación interpuesto, que fuera planteado contra la resolución No. 300-L-2004. En esa oportunidad, el Concejo Municipal acordó declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación subsidiariamente presentado el 26 de julio del 2004, resultado que fue notificado al recurrente el 22 de octubre del 2004. Una vez resuelto el primer recurso de apelación presentado por el recurrente, se remitió el segundo recurso –interpuesto contra la resolución No. 6609- a la Dirección Legal, para su resolución, tal y como corresponde. Contrario a lo sostenido por el recurrente, este Tribunal Constitucional considera que la actuación llevada a cabo por el Concejo Municipal recurrido, no fue arbitraria, por cuanto se limitó a respetar el orden cronológico del procedimiento, según la fecha de presentación de la gestión recursiva respectiva. Debido a la presentación de los recursos de revocatoria y apelación en subsidio presentados el 26 de julio del 2004, el Concejo Municipal procedió a conocer de éstos, rechazando el recurso de revocatoria y elevando la apelación. Durante el transcurso de ese trámite, el recurrente presentó un nuevo recurso de apelación, esta vez contra la resolución que rechazó el recurso de revocatoria. Bajo esta inteligencia, el ente Municipal, al conocer primero el recurso de apelación interpuesto el 26 de julio del año en curso, antes de resolver el recurso de apelación presentado el 16 de agosto del 2004, no violentó el derecho a un procedimiento administrativo pronto y cumplido. Sin embargo, este Tribunal tiene por acreditado que la Corporación Municipal no ha resuelto este último recurso de apelación –presentado el 16 de agosto del 2004-, por lo que al tenerse por acreditado dicha omisión se debe declarar con lugar el recurso por violación a un procedimiento administrativo pronto y cumplido.

VI.- TRANSPARENCIA Y PUBLICIDAD ADMINISTRATIVAS. En el marco del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, todos y cada uno de los entes y órganos públicos que conforman la administración respectiva, deben estar sujetos a los principios constitucionales implícitos de la transparencia y la publicidad que deben ser la regla de toda la actuación o función administrativa. Las organizaciones colectivas del Derecho Público –entes públicos- están llamadas a ser verdaderas casas de cristal en cuyo interior puedan escrutar y fiscalizar, a plena luz del día, todos los administrados. Las administraciones públicas deben crear y propiciar canales permanentes y fluidos de comunicación o de intercambio de información con los administrados y los medios de comunicación colectiva en aras de incentivar una mayor participación directa y activa en la gestión pública y de actuar los principios de evaluación de resultados y rendición de cuentas actualmente incorporados a nuestro texto constitucional (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política). Bajo esta inteligencia, el secreto o la reserva administrativa son una excepción que se justifica, únicamente, bajo circunstancias calificadas cuando por su medio se tutelan valores y bienes constitucionalmente relevantes. Existen diversos mecanismos para alcanzar mayores niveles de transparencia administrativa en un ordenamiento jurídico determinado, tales como la motivación de los actos administrativos, las formas de su comunicación –publicación y notificación-, el trámite de información pública para la elaboración de los reglamentos y los planes reguladores, la participación en el procedimiento administrativo, los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, etc., sin embargo, una de las herramientas más preciosas para el logro de ese objetivo lo constituye el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa.

VII.- EL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El ordinal 30 de la Constitución Política garantiza el libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos con propósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés público”, derecho fundamental que en la doctrina se ha denominado derecho de acceso a los archivos y registros administrativos, sin embargo, la denominación más acertada es la de derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, puesto que, el acceso a los soportes materiales o virtuales de las administraciones públicas es el instrumento o mecanismo para alcanzar el fin propuesto que consiste en que los administrados se impongan de la información que detentan aquéllas. Es menester indicar que no siempre la información administrativa de interés público que busca un administrado se encuentra en un expediente, archivo o registro administrativo. El derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es un mecanismo de control en manos de los administrados, puesto que, le permite a éstos, ejercer un control óptimo de la legalidad y de la oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito y, en general, de la eficacia y eficiencia de la función administrativa desplegada por los diversos entes públicos. Las administraciones públicas eficientes y eficaces son aquellas que se someten al control y escrutinio público, pero no puede existir un control ciudadano sin una adecuada información. De este modo, se puede establecer un encadenamiento lógico entre acceso a la información administrativa, conocimiento y manejo de ésta, control ciudadano efectivo u oportuno y administraciones públicas eficientes. El derecho de acceso a la información administrativa tiene un profundo asidero en una serie de principios y valores inherentes al Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, los cuales, al propio tiempo, actúa. Así, la participación ciudadana efectiva y directa en la gestión y manejo de los asuntos públicos resulta inconcebible si no se cuenta con un bagaje importante de información acerca de las competencias y servicios administrativos, de la misma forma, el principio democrático se ve fortalecido cuando las diversas fuerzas y grupos sociales, económicos y políticos participan activa e informadamente en la formación y ejecución de la voluntad pública. Finalmente, el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es una herramienta indispensable, como otras tantas, para la vigencia plena de los principios de transparencia y publicidad administrativas. El contenido del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es verdaderamente amplio y se compone de un haz de facultades en cabeza de la persona que lo ejerce tales como las siguientes: a) acceso a los departamentos, dependencias, oficinas y edificios públicos; b) acceso a los archivos, registros, expedientes y documentos físicos o automatizados –bases de datos ficheros-; c) facultad del administrado de conocer los datos personales o nominativos almacenados que le afecten de alguna forma, d) facultad del administrado de rectificar o eliminar esos datos si son erróneos, incorrectos o falsos; e) derecho de conocer el contenido de los documentos y expedientes físicos o virtuales y f) derecho de obtener, a su costo, certificaciones o copias de los mismos.

VIII.- TIPOLOGIA DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra –dentro- de un procedimiento administrativo. El primero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una información administrativa determinada –uti universi- y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes interesadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico –uti singuli-. Este derecho se encuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo Sexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del Libro Segundo en los artículos 272 a 274. El numeral 30 de la Constitución Política, evidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, puesto que, es absolutamente independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo. Este derecho no ha sido desarrollado legislativamente de forma sistemática y coherente, lo cual constituye una seria y grave laguna de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico que se ha prolongado en el tiempo por más de cincuenta años desde la vigencia del texto constitucional. La regulación de este derecho ha sido fragmentada y sectorial, así, a título de ejemplo, la Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos No. 7202 del 24 de octubre de 1990, lo norma respecto de los documentos con valor científico y cultural de los entes y órganos públicos –sujetos pasivos- que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Archivos (Poderes Legislativo, Judicial, Ejecutivo y demás entes públicos con personalidad jurídica, así como los depositados en los archivos privados y particulares sometidos a las previsiones de ese cuerpo legal).

IX.- SUJETOS ACTIVO Y PASIVO DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El sujeto activo del derecho consagrado en el artículo 30 de la Carta Magna lo es toda persona o todo administrado, por lo que el propósito del constituyente fue reducir a su mínima expresión el secreto administrativo y ampliar la transparencia y publicidad administrativas. Independientemente de lo anterior, el texto constitucional prevé, también, un acceso institucional privilegiado a la información administrativa como, por ejemplo, del que gozan las comisiones de investigación de la Asamblea Legislativa (artículo 121, inciso 23, de la Constitución Política) para el ejercicio de su control político. Debe advertirse que el acceso institucional privilegiado es regulado por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional para otras hipótesis tales como la Contraloría General de la República (artículos 13 de la Ley Orgánica No. 7428 del 26 de agosto de 1994; 20, párrafo 2º, de la Ley sobre el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de los Servidores Públicos, No. 6872 del 17 de junio de 1983 y sus reformas), la Defensoría de los Habitantes (artículo 12, párrafo 2º, de la Ley No. 7319 del 17 de noviembre de 1992 y sus reformas), las comisiones para Promover la Competencia y Nacional del Consumidor (artículo 64 de la Ley No. 7274 del 20 de diciembre de 1994), la administración tributaria (artículos 105, 106, y 107 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), etc. En lo tocante a los sujetos pasivos del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, debe tomarse en consideración que el numeral 30 de la Constitución Política garantiza el libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos”, con lo que serán sujetos pasivos todos los entes públicos y sus órganos, tanto de la Administración Central –Estado o ente público mayor- como de la Administración Descentralizada institucional o por servicios –la mayoría de las instituciones autónomas-, territorial –municipalidades- y corporativa –colegios profesionales, corporaciones productivas o industriales como la Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar, el Instituto del Café, la Junta del Tabaco, la Corporación Arrocera, las Corporaciones Ganadera y Hortícola Nacional, etc.-. El derecho de acceso debe hacerse extensivo, pasivamente, a las empresas públicas que asuman formas de organización colectivas del derecho privado a través de las cuales alguna administración pública ejerce una actividad empresarial, industrial o comercial e interviene en la economía y el mercado, tales como la Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima (RECOPE), la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima (CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima (EPSH), etc., sobre todo, cuando poseen información de interés público. Por último, las personas privadas que ejercen de forma permanente o transitoria una potestad o competencia pública en virtud de habilitación legal o contractual (munera pubblica), tales como los concesionarios de servicios u obras públicas, los gestores interesados, los notarios, contadores públicos, ingenieros, arquitectos, topógrafos, etc. pueden, eventualmente, convertirse en sujetos pasivos cuando manejan o poseen información –documentos- de un claro interés público.

X.- OBJETO DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El texto constitucional en su numeral 30 se refiere al libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos”, siendo que el acceso irrestricto a las instalaciones físicas de las dependencias u oficinas administrativas sería inútil e insuficiente para lograr el fin de tener administrados informados y conocedores de la gestión administrativa. Consecuentemente, una hermenéutica finalista o axiológica de la norma constitucional, debe conducir a concluir que los administrados o las personas pueden acceder cualquier información en poder de los respectivos entes y órganos públicos, independientemente, de su soporte, sea documental –expedientes, registros, archivos, ficheros-, electrónico o informático –bases de datos, expedientes electrónicos, ficheros automatizados, disquetes, discos compactos-, audiovisual, magnetofónico, etc..

XI.- LÍMITES INTRÍNSECOS Y EXTRÍNSECOS DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. En lo relativo a los límites intrínsecos al contenido esencial del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, tenemos, los siguientes: 1) El fin del derecho es la “información sobre asuntos de interés público”, de modo que cuando la información administrativa que se busca no versa sobre un extremo de tal naturaleza el derecho se ve enervado y no se puede acceder. 2) El segundo límite está constituido por lo establecido en el párrafo 2º del ordinal 30 constitucional al estipularse “Quedan a salvo los secretos de Estado”. El secreto de Estado como un límite al derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es reserva de ley (artículo 19, párrafo 1º, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), empero, han transcurrido más de cincuenta años desde la vigencia de la Constitución y todavía persiste la omisión legislativa en el dictado de una ley de secretos de estado y materias clasificadas. Esta laguna legislativa, obviamente, ha provocado una grave incertidumbre y ha propiciado la costumbre contra legem del Poder Ejecutivo de calificar, por vía de decreto ejecutivo, de forma puntual y coyuntural, algunas materias como reservadas o clasificadas por constituir, a su entender, secreto de Estado. Tocante el ámbito, extensión y alcances del secreto de Estado, la doctrina es pacífica en aceptar que comprende aspecto tales como la seguridad nacional (interna o externa), la defensa nacional frente a las agresiones que atenten contra la soberanía e independencia del Estado y las relaciones exteriores concertadas entre éste y el resto de los sujetos del Derecho Internacional Público (vid. artículo 284 del Código Penal, al tipificar el delito de “revelación de secretos”). No resulta ocioso distinguir entre el secreto por razones objetivas y materiales (ratione materia), referido a los tres aspectos anteriormente indicados (seguridad, defensa nacionales y relaciones exteriores) y el secreto impuesto a los funcionarios o servidores públicos (ratione personae) quienes por motivo del ejercicio de sus funciones conocen cierto tipo de información, respecto de la cual deben guardar un deber de sigilo y reserva (vid. artículo 337 del Código Penal al tipificar y sancionar el delito de “divulgación de secretos). El secreto de Estado se encuentra regulado en el bloque de legalidad de forma desarticulada, dispersa e imprecisa (v. gr. Ley General de Policía No. 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, al calificar de confidenciales y, eventualmente, declarables secreto de Estado por el Presidente de la República los informes y documentos de la Dirección de Seguridad del Estado –artículo 16-; la Ley General de Aviación Civil respecto de algunos acuerdos del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil –artículo 303-, etc.). El secreto de Estado en cuanto constituye una excepción a los principios o valores constitucionales de la transparencia y la publicidad de los poderes públicos y su gestión debe ser interpretado y aplicado, en todo momento, de forma restrictiva. En lo concerniente a las limitaciones o límites extrínsecos del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa tenemos los siguientes: 1) El artículo 28 de la Constitución Política establece como límite extrínseco del cualquier derecho la moral y el orden público. 2) El artículo 24 de la Constitución Política le garantiza a todas las personas una esfera de intimidad intangible para el resto de los sujetos de derecho, de tal forma que aquellos datos íntimos, sensibles o nominativos que un ente u órgano público ha recolectado, procesado y almacenado, por constar en sus archivos, registros y expedientes físicos o automatizados, no pueden ser accedidos por ninguna persona por suponer ello una intromisión o injerencia externa e inconstitucional. Obviamente, lo anterior resulta de mayor aplicación cuando el propio administrado ha puesto en conocimiento de una administración pública información confidencial, por ser requerida, con el propósito de obtener un resultado determinado o beneficio. En realidad esta limitación está íntimamente ligada al primer límite intrínseco indicado, puesto que, muy, probablemente, en tal supuesto la información pretendida no recae sobre asuntos de interés público sino privado. Íntimamente ligados a esta limitación se encuentran el secreto bancario, entendido como el deber impuesto a toda entidad de intermediación financiera de no revelar la información y los datos que posea de sus clientes por cualquier operación bancaria o contrato bancario que haya celebrado con éstos, sobre todo, en tratándose de las cuentas corrientes, ya que, el numeral 615 del Código de Comercio lo consagra expresamente para esa hipótesis, y el secreto industrial, comercial o económico de las empresas acerca de determinadas ideas, productos o procedimientos industriales y de sus estados financieros, crediticios y tributarios. Habrá situaciones en que la información de un particular que posea un ente u órgano público puede tener, sobre todo articulada con la de otros particulares, una clara dimensión y vocación pública, circunstancias que deben ser progresiva y casuísticamente identificadas por este Tribunal Constitucional. 3) La averiguación de los delitos, cuando se trata de investigaciones criminales efectuadas por cuerpos policiales administrativos o judiciales, con el propósito de garantizar el acierto y éxito de la investigación y, ante todo, para respetar la presunción de inocencia, el honor y la intimidad de las personas involucradas.

XII.- De otra parte, el amparado acusa vulnerado su derecho consagrado en el artículo 30 de la Constitución Política, pues según su dicho, las autoridades del Concejo Municipal de San José no le han permitido tener acceso al expediente administrativo del trámite presentado ante la Municipalidad recurrida. Según se desprende de los autos, el 13 de octubre del 2004, el recurrente solicitó el expediente administrativo No. 4290 al Secretario de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos. En esa ocasión, el recurrente no pudo tener acceso a dicho expediente debido a que, en ese preciso momento, estaba siendo objeto de análisis y estudio por parte de la Comisión, de allí que, de forma verbal el funcionario anterior le refirió la situación, y le indicó que debía hacer la solicitud formal por escrito ante la Secretaría del Concejo. En virtud de lo anterior, el 20 de octubre del año en curso el recurrente tuvo acceso al expediente No. 4290 y, además, obtuvo fotocopias del mismo (visible a folio 48). Encuentra este Tribunal Constitucional que las razones que le imposibilitaron al recurrente el acceso al expediente en la primera oportunidad, no son atendibles. Si una parte interesada en un procedimiento administrativo solicita el acceso al expediente, éste debe de brindársele inmediatamente, sin necesidad de gestionarlo por escrito siendo, también, improcedente retrasar su acceso so pretexto de encontrarse en estudio por un órgano administrativo, como en el caso bajo estudio el recurrente solicitó el acceso desde el 13 de octubre y fue hasta siete días después que lo obtuvo –a saber, el 20 de octubre siguiente-, se está ante una clara de denegatoria de acceso al expediente administrativo, de allí que sea preciso estimar este extremo del recurso, por violación al artículo 30 constitucional, únicamente para efectos indemnizatorios (artículo 52 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

XIII.- CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar con lugar el recurso planteado.