Irregular management of water and wildlife at Termo Manía tourist centerManejo irregular de aguas y vida silvestre en centro turístico Termo Manía

**I.- Purpose of the appeal.** The plaintiff states that in the operation of the Termo Manía Tourist Center, located in La Fortuna de Bagaces, surface waters are illegally used, while a liquor license is operated and wild animals are kept in irregular conditions.

**III.- On the merits. Regarding the tourist center's liquor license.** As for the appellants' claim that the Termo Manía tourist center was granted a liquor license in disregard of the minimum distance from an educational center, besides the fact being refuted by the authorizing Municipality, in the sense that the activity is secondary and not primary, thus making the distance irrelevant, the Chamber has already established that this is a matter to be discussed in the administrative venue and, eventually, in the ordinary jurisdictional venue, but not in the constitutional one (see, for example, judgments #2008-91 of 9:03 a.m. on January 11, 2008, and #2009-11496 of 9:41 a.m. on July 24, 2009). This aspect of the amparo, therefore, must be dismissed.

**IV.- On the management of wild animals in the tourist center.** The fact that wild animals are kept in inadequate conditions and without the basic authorizations for that purpose is linked to the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (resolutions #2000-3896 of 11:21 a.m. on May 9, 2000, #2000-5348 of 11:39 a.m. on June 30, 2000, #2002-02486 of 10:54 a.m. on March 8, 2002, and #2003-243 of 10:11 a.m. on January 17, 2003). The tourist center referred to in this proceeding has a certificate issued by a veterinary professional, but it was not authorized to handle wild species that officials from the Arenal Tempisque Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Arenal Tempisque) confiscated, although leaving them in the custody of the establishment's owners for lack of a better place to transfer them. There is no indication that the situation of the specimens has been regularized, nor that their transfer to another site could have been arranged, meaning that the material result of the action would have implied only changing their location within the tourist center. This precarious oversight injures the indicated right to a healthy environment (Article 50 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, the appeal is granted, in what corresponds to this aspect, ordering the Minister of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications, in his capacity as head of the institution, to take the necessary steps to immediately verify the conditions in which the wildlife species are found at the Termo Manía tourist center and to adopt the necessary measures for their protection.

**V.- On the use of water and the construction of works in the public domain channel at the tourist center.** Finally, the problem of greatest scope and complexity raised in the amparo is that of water resource management, also in close connection with the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (see rulings #5893-95, #5445-99, #2003-6322, #2004-13414, #2004-01923, #2006-7994, and #2010-6922). Private individuals cannot dispose of water at their discretion, due to its condition as a public domain asset (articles 4 of the Mining Code, 50 of the Organic Environmental Law, and 17 of the Water Law), but, furthermore, the public authorization and regulatory powers over water use must fulfill the purpose of conserving that resource and administering it equitably. Regarding the special conditions of public domain assets, the Chamber stated in judgment #5976-93 of 3:42 p.m. on November 16, 1993, the following:

"... the legal nature and regime are different when dealing with private property or public or State property, because the former is regulated in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution and the relevant Civil Code regulations, such that its inviolability is protected, introducing the concept of social function, so that no one can be deprived of their own except when motivated by a social interest and through a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of demanial property is based on subsection 14) of Article 121 of the Constitution, as this Chamber already indicated in resolution number 2306-91, at two forty-five p.m. on November six, so its legal nature is virtually different, which indicated that: 'The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. They are called dominical assets, demanial assets, public assets or things, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected by the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance under Civil Law terms, and administrative action replaces interdicts to recover ownership. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use can be acquired, though not a right to ownership, the use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the beneficial ownership of the asset, with the State always reserving direct ownership over the thing. The precariousness of any right or use permit is consubstantial to the figure and alludes to the possibility that the administration, at any time, revokes it, whether for the State's need to fully occupy the asset, for the construction of a public work, as well as for reasons of safety, hygiene, aesthetics, all to the extent that if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the asset and the granted permit, the natural use of the public thing must prevail. Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets ... places them outside the commerce of men and therefore the permits granted shall always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so indicate.'" It has also been noted that, over such assets "... the State has full power, and especially regarding the protection of our country's natural resources, an asset over which the plaintiff nor any private individual has any right, whether of possession, exploitation, and much less of ownership. (...) it is not possible to consider Article 45 of the Constitution violated ... since limitations are not imposed on private property, but rather, when regulating the public domain, the law merely establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment ... is possible by private parties. Thus, whoever attempts by unauthorized means to exercise exclusive use of that zone will be barred from consummating it, for it is also acceptable, since time immemorial, that these are assets imprescriptible in favor of private parties and are outside commerce." (judgment #5399-93 of 4:39 p.m. on October 26, 1993. See in the same sense resolution #2005-16513 of 8:04 p.m. on November 29, 2005).

**VI.-** In this proceeding, it was proven that the use of surface waters reported by the appellants is carried out with partial authorization and supervision from the Water Directorate, but it was reported since 2002 and could be corroborated, for the first time, since 2003 that part of this use is carried out through illegal intakes. In the study and conclusions formulated in 2003, it was also established that works had been built in the channel, which to date still lack formal authorization. An order had been given to suspend the use of the illegal intakes and release the waters. In 2005, the order was reiterated to the person identified as the owner of the works and intakes. Even at the end of 2010, this state of affairs persisted. The fact that eight years later the rights of those involved remain undefined, without resolving the pending authorizations, and that the ordered measures for the release of waters have not been executed, allows the Chamber to conclude that inefficient public protection violated the fundamental right to a healthy environment of the local inhabitants. Thus, although it is beyond the Chamber's competence to establish the technical details of the solution to conflicts among the area's neighbors over water use, such as the location of intake points, authorized flows, works in the channel that may be permitted, etc., it is indeed proper to its function of protecting fundamental rights to compel the appealed authorities of the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications to promptly regulate, in the exercise of their powers, the use of the area's waters and, principally, to employ their regulatory and enforcement powers to oblige the involved private individuals to comply with what the legal system establishes on the matter. For the foregoing reasons, this aspect of the amparo is granted, ordering the Minister of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications and the Director of the Water Directorate to take prompt regulatory and oversight measures regarding the water resource in the area.

**I.- Purpose of the appeal.** The appellant states that in the operation of the Termo Manía Tourist Center, located in La Fortuna de Bagaces, surface waters are illegally used, while a liquor license is operated and wild animals are kept in irregular conditions.

**III.- On the merits. Regarding the tourist center's liquor license.** As for the appellants' claim that the Termo Manía tourist center was granted a liquor license in violation of the minimum distance from an educational center, besides the fact being refuted by the authorizing Municipality, in the sense that the activity is secondary and not primary, such that the distance is not relevant, this Chamber has already established that this is a matter to be discussed in the administrative venue and, eventually, in the ordinary jurisdictional venue, but not in the constitutional one (e.g., rulings #2008-91 of 9:03 a.m. on January 11, 2008, and #2009-11496 of 9:41 a.m. on July 24, 2009). This part of the amparo appeal, therefore, must be dismissed.

**IV.- On the management of wild animals at the tourist center.** The fact that wild animals are kept in inadequate conditions and without the basic authorizations for that purpose is linked to the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (rulings #2000-3896 of 11:21 a.m. on May 9, 2000, #2000-5348 of 11:39 a.m. on June 30, 2000, #2002-02486 of 10:54 a.m. on March 8, 2002, and #2003-243 of 10:11 a.m. on January 17, 2003). The tourist center referred to in this proceeding has a certificate issued by a veterinary professional, but was not authorized to manage wild species that officials from the Arenal Tempisque Conservation Area seized, although leaving them in the custody of the establishment's owners, for lack of a better place to transfer them. It is not indicated that the situation of the specimens has been regularized, nor that their transfer to another site could have been arranged, such that the material result of the action would have implied merely changing their location within the tourist center. This precarious oversight harms the indicated right to a healthy environment (Article 50 of the Political Constitution). Consequently, the appeal is granted, with regard to this aspect, ordering the Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, in his capacity as head of the institution, to arrange what is necessary to immediately verify the conditions in which the wildlife species are kept at the Termo Manía tourist center and to adopt the necessary measures for their protection.

**V.- On the use of waters and the construction of works in the public domain watercourse at the tourist center.** Finally, the problem of greatest scope and complexity raised in the amparo appeal is that of water resource management, also in close connection with the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (see pronouncements #5893-95, #5445-99, #2003-6322, #2004-13414, #2004-01923, #2006-7994, and #2010-6922). Private parties cannot dispose of water discretionally, due to its status as a public domain good (Articles 4 of the Mining Code, 50 of the Organic Environmental Law, and 17 of the Water Law), but, furthermore, the public powers of authorization and regulation of water use must fulfill the purpose of conserving this resource and administering it equitably. Regarding the special conditions of public domain goods, this Chamber noted in ruling #5976-93 of 3:42 p.m. on November 16, 1993, the following:

*“... the legal nature and regime are different when dealing with private property or public or State property, since the former is regulated in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution and the pertinent Civil Code regulations, so that its inviolability is protected, introducing the concept of social function, such that no one can be deprived of their own except when motivated by a social interest and by means of a law approved by the Legislative Assembly with the vote of two-thirds of its members. For its part, the regulation of demanial property is based on subsection 14) of Article 121 of the Constitution, as this Chamber already indicated in ruling number 2306-91, of fourteen forty-five hours on November sixth, so that its legal nature is virtually different, which indicated that: 'Public domain is made up of goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. They are called dominical goods, demanial goods, public goods or things, which do not individually belong to private parties and are intended for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover ownership. As they are outside of commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use can be acquired, though not a right to property; the use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the use of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private party is the beneficial ownership of the good, with the State always reserving the direct ownership over the thing. The precariousness of every right or use permit is consubstantial to the figure and alludes to the possibility that the administration, at any time, revokes it, whether due to the State's need to fully occupy the good, for the construction of a public work, as well as for reasons of security, hygiene, aesthetics, all insofar as if a conflict of interests arises between the purpose of the good and the granted permit, the natural use of the public thing must prevail. Consequently, the national regime of public domain goods... places them outside the commerce of men and therefore the permits granted will always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so indicate.”* It has also been noted that, over such goods *“...the State has full power, and more so when dealing with the protection of the natural resources of our country, a good over which the appellant nor any private party has any right, whether of possession, exploitation, and much less of property. (...) it is not possible to consider Article 45 of the Constitution violated... since no limitations are imposed on private property, but rather, in regulating the public domain, the law merely establishes conditions by which use and enjoyment... are possible by private parties. Thus, anyone who seeks by unauthorized means to exercise a private use of that zone will be prevented from consummating it, for it is also acceptable, since time immemorial, that these are goods imprescriptible in favor of private parties and which are outside of commerce.”* (ruling #5399-93 of 4:39 p.m. on October 26, 1993. See in the same sense ruling #2005-16513 of 8:04 p.m. on November 29, 2005).

**VI.-** In this proceeding, it was proven that the use of surface waters reported by the appellants is being developed with partial authorization and supervision from the Water Directorate, but it was reported since 2002 and could be corroborated, for the first time, since 2003 that part of this use is carried out through illegal intakes. In the study and conclusions formulated in 2003, moreover, it was established that works had been built in the watercourse, which to this date still lack formal authorization. The suspension of the use of illegal intakes and the release of the waters had been ordered. In 2005, the order was reiterated to whom was identified as the owner of the works and intakes. Even at the end of 2010, this state of affairs persisted. The fact that eight years later the rights of those involved remain undefined, the pending authorizations unresolved, and that the ordered water release measures have not been executed, allows this Chamber to conclude that the inefficient public guardianship violated the fundamental right to a healthy environment of the local inhabitants. Thus, although it is beyond the competence of this Chamber to establish the technical details of the solution to the conflicts among the neighbors of the area over water use, such as the location of intake points, authorized flow rates (caudales), works in the watercourse that may be permitted, etc., it is indeed proper to its function of protecting fundamental rights to compel the respondent authorities of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications to promptly order, in the exercise of their powers, the use of the waters in the area and, principally, to employ their regulatory and enforcement powers to oblige the involved private parties to adhere to what the legal system establishes on the matter. Based on what has been stated here, this part of the amparo appeal is granted, ordering the Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications and the Director of the Water Directorate to take prompt measures for the regulation and oversight of the water resource in that place.

“I.- Objeto del recurso. Señala el actor que en el funcionamiento del Centro Turístico Termo Manía, ubicado en La Fortuna de Bagaces se emplea ilegalmente aguas superficiales, a la vez que se opera una patente de licores y se mantiene animales silvestres en condiciones irregulares.

III.- Sobre el fondo. Acerca de la patente de licores del centro turístico. En lo que se refiere al alegato de los recurrentes de haberse conferido al centro turístico Termo Manía una patente de licores en inobservancia de la distancia mínima con un centro educativo, además de ser refutado el hecho por la Municipalidad autorizante, en el sentido que la actividad es secundaria y no principal, con lo que la distancia no es relevante, ya ha establecido la Sala que se trata de un tema que debe discutirse en la sede administrativa y, eventualmente, en la jurisdiccional ordinaria, pero no en la constitucional (v. gr. las sentencias #2008-91 de las 9:03 horas del 11 de enero del 2008 y #2009-11496 de las 9:41 horas del 24 de julio del 2009). Este extremo del amparo, por ende, debe desestimarse.

IV.- Sobre el manejo de animales silvestres en el centro turístico. El hecho que se mantengan animales silvestres en condiciones inadecuadas y sin las autorizaciones básicas para ese fin está vinculado con el derecho fundamental a un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (resoluciones #2000-3896 de las 11:21 horas del 9 de mayo del 2000, #2000-5348 de las 11:39 horas del 30 de junio de 2000, #2002-02486 de las 10:54 horas del 8 de marzo de 2002 y #2003-243 de las 10:11 horas del 17 de enero de 2003). El centro turístico al que se refiere este proceso cuenta con certificado emitido por un profesional en veterinaria, pero no estaba autorizado para manejar especies silvestres que funcionarios del Área de Conservación Arenal Tempisque decomisaron, aunque dejándolas en depósito de los propietarios del establecimiento, a falta de un mejor lugar donde trasladarlas. No se indica que se haya regularizado la situación de los ejemplares, ni que haya podido disponerse su traslado a algún otro sitio, con lo que el resultado material de la gestión habría implicado solamente cambiar su ubicación dentro del centro turístico. Esta fiscalización precaria lesiona el indicado derecho a un medio ambiente sano (artículo 50 de la Constitución Política). Consecuentemente se estima el recurso, en lo que corresponde a este aspecto, ordenando al Ministro del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, en su condición de jerarca de la institución, disponer lo necesario para que se verifique, de inmediato, las condiciones en que se encuentran las especies de vida silvestre en el centro turístico Termo Manía y se adopten las medidas necesarias para su protección.

V.- Sobre el aprovechamiento de aguas y la construcción de obras en el cauce de dominio público en el centro turístico. Finalmente, el problema de mayor amplitud y complejidad que se plantea en el amparo es el del manejo del recurso hídrico, también en estrecha conexión con el derecho fundamental a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (v. los pronunciamientos #5893-95, #5445-99, #2003-6322, #2004-13414, #2004-01923, #2006-7994 y #2010-6922). Los particulares no pueden disponer del agua discrecionalmente, debido a su condición de bien de demonio público (artículos 4 del Código de Minería, 50 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y 17 de la Ley de Aguas), pero, además, las facultades de autorización y regulación públicas del uso del agua deben cumplir el fin de conservar ese recurso y administrarlo equitativamente. Sobre las condiciones especiales de los bienes de dominio público señaló la Sala en la sentencia #5976-93 de las 15:42 horas del 16 de noviembre de 1993 lo siguiente:

“... la naturaleza y régimen jurídicos son diferentes tratándose de propiedad privada o de propiedad pública o del Estado, ello por cuanto la primera es regulada de conformidad con el artículo 45 Constitucional y la normativa del Código Civil pertinente, de manera que se protege la inviolabilidad de la misma, introduciéndose el concepto de función social, de manera que no se puede privar a nadie de la suya si no es motivado en un interés social y mediante ley aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa con el voto de las dos terceras partes de sus miembros. Por su parte, la regulación de la propiedad demanial se fundamenta en el inciso 14) del artículo 121 Constitucional, como ya lo indicó esta Sala por resolución número 2306-91, de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de noviembre, de modo que su naturaleza jurídica es virtualmente diferente, la cual indicó que: "El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público. Son llamados bienes dominicales, bienes demaniales, bienes o cosas públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres. Es decir, afectados por su naturaleza y vocación. En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos de Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio. Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad, el permiso de uso es un acto jurídico unilateral que lo dicta la Administración, en el uso de sus funciones y lo que se pone en manos del particular, es el dominio útil del bien, reservándose siempre el Estado, el dominio directo sobre la cosa. La precariedad de todo derecho o permiso de uso, es consustancial a la figura y alude a la posibilidad que la administración, en cualquier momento lo revoque, ya sea por la necesidad del Estado de ocupar plenamente el bien, por la construcción de una obra pública al igual que por razones de seguridad, higiene, estética, todo ello en la medida que si llega a existir una contraposición de intereses entre el fin del bien y el permiso otorgado, debe prevalecer el uso natural de la cosa pública. En consecuencia, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, ... los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres y por ello los permisos que se otorguen serán siempre a título precario y revocables por la Administración, unilateralmente, cuando razones de necesidad o de interés general así lo señalan.” También se ha señalado que, sobre tales bienes “...el Estado tiene plena potestad, y más tratándose de la protección de los recursos naturales de nuestro país, bien sobre el que la accionante ni particular alguno tiene derecho, sea de posesión, de explotación, y mucho menos de propiedad. (...) no es posible tener por violado el artículo 45 Constitucional, ... ya que no se imponen limitaciones a la propiedad privada, sino que al regularse el dominio público, la ley lo que hace es establecer condiciones mediante las que es posible el uso y disfrute ..., por parte de los particulares. Así quien pretenda por medios no autorizados ejercer un uso privativo de esa zona tendrá vedada la posibilidad de consumarlo, pues es aceptable también, desde tiempo inmemorial, que se trata de bienes imprescriptibles en favor de particulares y que están fuera de comercio." (sentencia #5399-93 de las 16:39 horas del 26 de octubre de 1993. V. en igual sentido la resolución #2005-16513 de las 20:04 horas del 29 de noviembre del 2005).

VI.- En este proceso se tuvo por demostrado que el aprovechamiento de aguas superficiales denunciado por los recurrentes se desarrolla con autorización y supervisión parcial de la Dirección de Aguas, pero se denunció desde el año 2002 y pudo corroborarse, por primera vez, desde el 2003 que parte de ese aprovechamiento se efectúa por medio de tomas ilegales. En el estudio y conclusiones formuladas en el 2003, además, se estableció que se había construido obras en el cauce, que a la fecha siguen sin contar con una autorización formal. Se había ordenado suspender el uso de las tomas ilegales y liberar las aguas. En el año 2005 se reiteró la orden a quien se identificó como dueño de las obras y de las tomas. Aún a finales del 2010 se mantenía tal estado de cosas. El hecho que ocho años después continúen sin definirse los derechos de los involucrados, sin resolverse las autorizaciones pendientes y que no se haya ejecutado las medidas ordenadas de liberación de aguas, permite a la Sala concluir que la ineficiente tutela pública quebrantó el derecho fundamental a un medio ambiente sano de los habitantes del lugar. De este modo, aunque resulta ajeno a la competencia de la Sala establecer los detalles técnicos de la solución a los conflictos entre los vecinos de la zona por el aprovechamiento de las aguas, como serían la ubicación de los puntos de toma, caudales autorizados, obras en el cauce que pueden permitirse, etc., sí resulta propio de su función de tutela de los derechos fundamentales compeler a las autoridades recurridas del Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones a ordenar prontamente, en ejercicio de sus competencias, el uso de las aguas de la zona y, principalmente, emplear sus potestades de regulación y ejecución para obligar a los particulares involucrados a apegarse a lo que el ordenamiento jurídico establece en la materia. Por lo dicho hasta aquí es que se estima este extremo del amparo, ordenando al Ministro del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones y al Director de la Dirección de Aguas tomar medidas prontas de regulación y fiscalización del recurso hídrico en el lugar. “