Constitutionality of Age Difference Requirement in AdoptionConstitucionalidad del requisito de diferencia de edad en la adopción

I.- Admissibility. First, pursuant to Article 73, subsection a), of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), an acción de inconstitucionalidad is available against laws or provisions of a general nature that infringe, by action or omission, constitutional norms or principles. In this case, the petitioner (accionante) challenges the requirement established in numeral 106, subsection c), of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which states that to be an adoptive parent, one must be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. As for the standing (legitimación) of the petitioner, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad there must be a matter pending resolution before the courts, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured. In this case, Mr. Wong Fernández filed a joint adoption proceeding on February 4, 2010, before the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José on behalf of Cristina González Collado, assigned case number 10-00285-0165-FA, which confirms that Mr. Wong has standing to file this action, given that the norm the Family Court must apply in resolving the case presented by Mr. Wong is precisely the one challenged here, and therefore we proceed with the substantive analysis.

II.- Purpose of the Action. The petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of Article 106, subsection c), of the Family Code be declared, believing it infringes the principle of equality, contained in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In this regard, said norm establishes the following:

“To be an adoptive parent, it is required:

• c)To be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. In a joint adoption, this difference shall be established with respect to the younger adoptive parent. In an adoption by a single spouse, this difference must also exist with the adoptive parent's consort”.

In the opinion of the appellants, the contested norm is unreasonable in the case of an adoption between adults. They believe it injures the right to equality and non-discrimination, in addition to human dignity. They also consider that this norm does not protect the family as the foundation of society and is not reasonable, all because despite complying with all other requirements demanded for adoption, their application will be denied solely for failure to comply with a single one of these, without taking into consideration the family bond created.

III.- On the Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination. This Chamber (Sala) has recognized, on previous occasions, that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition which, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differentiating element to be permissible, it must not only be real but must also have a legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (see in this regard Votos numbers 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 and 5061-94). In that sense, if situations occur where several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this receive diverse treatment without any justifiable reason being present, it is considered that there is an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation for not being supported by objective elements. On this point, in Judgment number 337-91 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of February 8, 1991, the Chamber indicated the pertinent part:

“The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution aims, in part, for the same measure or the same treatment to be given to those who are in identical or reasonably similar situations, and not just any difference is valid for establishing distinct treatment, since, in respect of the reasonableness (razonabilidad) that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be a legitimate cause for establishing different treatment”.

According to the above, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Moreover, for differentiation to be constitutionally proper, it must be reasonable, meaning by this that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. As the Chamber has stated, the necessity of a measure refers directly to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community — or of a specific group — by adopting a differentiation measure. Suitability (idoneidad), for its part, entails a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. And proportionality (proporcionalidad) refers to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see Judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes of December 15, 1998). On this point, this Chamber, when analyzing in a Judicial Consultation (Consulta Judicial) the requirement of a minimum age of twenty-five for the adoptive parent, in Judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December 19, 2001, stated:

“Article 106, subsection b), of the Family Code, certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years old who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that required minimum age. This unequal treatment does not occur in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights; because there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State's obligation to protect the family and especially “the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick” (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain with and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided by the legislator is not unreasonable”.

In that sense, said position can be applied in the analysis of the contested norm, since it also establishes an age-related requirement, that is, a difference of fifteen years of age between the adoptee and the adoptive parent, a situation which does not injure the right to equality. In the first instance, because, as indicated previously, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international norms, which instead protect the right to a family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary that persons in the same situation be granted different treatment, which does not happen in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to comply with this requirement, with no exceptions applied since the law does not provide for any. It is evident that persons with more than fifteen years of age difference from the adoptive parent are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference, hence the legislator decided to impose this requirement, whose reasonableness will be analyzed later. In addition, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through the acción de inconstitucionalidad, to assess aspects of a specific case, so the petitioners' argument that the norm injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr. Wong's surname, unlike her siblings who will, is an aspect specific to the case being heard before the Family Court of the II Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the contested norm does not injure the principle of equality, as it is not apparent that unequal treatment exists for the same situation, what is appropriate is to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.

IV.- On the Principle of Reasonableness as a Constitutional Parameter. The constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, first of all, that the "reasonableness of the law" (razonabilidad de la ley) was born as part of "substantive due process of law," a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In its initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural examination of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. By the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was overcome and it was elevated to an axiological recourse that limits the actions of the legislative organ. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of "due process" as a procedural guarantee basically responds to the fact that even a law that has followed the established procedure and is valid and effective can injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine invites an examination, first of all, of the so-called "technical reasonableness" (razonabilidad técnica), within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a certain matter, it is necessary to examine whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the end sought. Having overcome the criterion of "technical reasonableness," one must analyze "legal reasonableness" (razonabilidad jurídica). For this purpose, this doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness (razonabilidad ponderativa), which is a type of legal assessment resorted to when, given a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain obligation is demanded (e.g., tax), and in this case, it must be established whether the obligation is equivalent or proportional; b) reasonableness of equality (razonabilidad de igualdad), which is the type of legal assessment based on the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end (razonabilidad en el fin), at this point, one assesses whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the purposes intended by the legislator with its approval. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and the extent of the limitation that a personal right must bear by that means. In this way, if the same end can be achieved by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. In this case, this Chamber concludes that the norm is indeed reasonable. The foregoing, given that, as the Office of the Procuraduría General de la República correctly points out in its report, the age difference is necessary, given the integrative nature of the institution of adoption, as a guarantee of the plausibility of the parental relationship (relación parental) between adoptee and adoptive parent, its objective being that a bond of authority (typical of the parental relationship) be established between the adoptee and the adoptive parent, which would be very difficult to sustain between persons of similar ages. In principle, every minor has the right to live with their parents, who are responsible for ensuring the satisfaction of their needs, both material and moral and spiritual. The family, as a natural element, constitutes, in the Costa Rican legal system, the foundation of society, a fact recognized not only by the Political Constitution but also by instruments of International Law in force in Costa Rica. It is the social organization that ideally permits and fosters the best possible development of minors' potentialities and attributes. Article 100 of the Family Code, as amended by Law number 7538 of August 22, 1995, defines adoption as a legal institution of family integration and protection, public order, and social interest; it also indicates that it constitutes a legal and psychosocial process by which the adoptee becomes part of the adoptive parents' family, for all purposes as a son or daughter. It can be affirmed, then, that the primary purpose of the institution of adoption is to provide a minor in a state of abandonment with a family nucleus that allows them to have the necessary conditions for their integral development within society. From the foregoing, it follows that although both International Law and domestic Law permit adoption, this is exceptional and subsidiary in nature compared to the right of children to be cared for and to remain with their biological parents. For that reason, the legislator chose to establish an adoption regime demanding specific requirements and forms that must be met in consideration of the interests of minors and adoptable persons in general. Among these requirements, some require the assessment of the judge or another professional, such as the personal conditions of each adoptive parent; however, there are also other requirements—like the one at hand—that are merely confirmatory in nature, which, as this Chamber pointed out in Judgment 1997-02052 of sixteen hours of April 15, 1997: “(...) this is not a single requirement that has the property of exempting the judge from all assessment, but rather a regime in which that assessment of the individual case has a place, evidently within the restrictive system the legislator has preferred as a way of protecting the best interest of the child.” In this way, it is evident that the requirement of fifteen years of age difference seeks to equate the relationship between the adoptee and the adoptive parent to the parental relationship, so the legislator decided that the minimum difference must be fifteen years, in consideration of the minimum difference that generally exists between a biological parent and their child. In addition, this Chamber considers not only that the requirement established in Article 106, subsection c), fulfills its objective, that is, equating the adoption relationship with the parental relationship, but also that it is necessary, since no other less burdensome measure that achieves this purpose is envisioned, as leaving this point unregulated would imply that situations could occur in practice where the age difference between the adoptive parent and the adoptee is minimal, which evidently cannot happen in parental relationships. In that sense, this Chamber, when analyzing the minimum age of twenty-five required to adopt in Judgment number 12994-01 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December 19, 2001, stated:

“In the case under analysis, specifically regarding legal reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is not disproportionate or illegitimate to set a minimum age to be able to adopt that is higher than the age of majority established for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, in addition to the other requirements established by Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator intends to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability demanded by such a momentous decision as adopting a person, which, in any case, constitutes a subsidiary and exceptional measure in relation to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Bearing in mind, above all, the degree of vulnerability of adoptable subjects, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator chooses to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements.” From the foregoing, it also follows that the petitioners are not correct in stating that the analyzed norm injures the right to liberty, contained in numeral 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised under legally established parameters; that is, the fact that a person wants to adopt, the desire alone does not imply that they will be able to do so, but rather they must comply with a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt. Law in a society exists to regulate relationships between persons and their acts, so they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the acción de inconstitucionalidad to analyze the specific case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to possess Mr. Wong's surname, since this is a particular case that is not appropriately analyzed in this action.

V.- Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the contested norm, that is, Article 106, subsection c), of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.” As this Chamber has stated, the need for a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure. Suitability, for its part, entails a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. And proportionality refers to a necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight). On this point, when analyzing the minimum age requirement of twenty-five years for the adopter in a Judicial Consultation, this Chamber, in judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand one, indicated:

“*Article 106, subsection b) of the Family Code certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years of age who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that required minimum age. This unequal treatment does not arise in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights, since there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State's obligation to protect the family and especially the 'mother, child, the elderly, and the helpless sick' (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain with and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided for by the legislator is not unreasonable*.” In that sense, this position can be applied in the analysis of the challenged norm, since it also establishes an age-related requirement, that is, a fifteen-year age difference between the adoptee and the adopter, a situation that does not injure the right to equality. In the first instance, because, as indicated above, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international norms, which protect the right to family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary that persons in the same situation be granted different treatment, which does not occur in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to meet this requirement, without applying any exception since the law does not provide for one. It is evident that persons with more than fifteen years of age difference with the adopter are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference, hence the legislator decided to impose this requirement, the reasonableness of which will be analyzed later. Added to this, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through the acción de inconstitucionalidad, to assess aspects of a specific case; therefore, the argument of the plaintiffs that the norm injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr. Wong's surname, unlike her brothers who will be able to, is an aspect specific to the case being heard before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the challenged norm does not injure the principle of equality, since it is not apparent that there is unequal treatment for the same situation, it is appropriate to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.

**IV.- Regarding the principle of reasonableness as a constitutional parameter.** Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth remembering, first, that the "reasonableness of the law" was born as part of the "substantive due process of law" guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, in line with the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural review of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was overcome, and it was elevated to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of "due process" as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has conformed to the established procedure, and is valid and effective, can also injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the reasonableness test, U.S. doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called "technical reasonableness" within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is appropriate for regulating a given matter, one must examine whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the sought end. Having overcome the criterion of "technical reasonableness," one must analyze "juridical reasonableness." For this, this doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness, which is a type of juridical valuation resorted to when, given the existence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain contribution is demanded (e.g., tax), and in this case it must be established whether it is equivalent or proportionate; b) reasonableness of equality, which is the type of juridical valuation that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end, at which point it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the ends sought by the legislator through its approval. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably suited to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and extent of the limitation that a personal right must bear through that means. In this way, if the same end can be reached by another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. In this case, this Chamber concludes that the norm is indeed reasonable. The foregoing, given that, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic correctly points out in its report, the age difference is necessary, given the integrative nature of the institution of adoption, as a guarantee of the verisimilitude of the parental relationship between adoptee and adopter, its objective being that a bond of authority (typical of the parental relationship) be established between the adoptee and the adopter, which would be very difficult to sustain between persons of similar ages. In principle, every minor has the right to live with their parents, who are responsible for ensuring the satisfaction of their needs, both material, moral, and spiritual. The family, as a natural element, constitutes in the Costa Rican legal system the foundation of society, a fact recognized not only by the Political Constitution, but also by international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica. It is the social organization that ideally allows and enables minors to develop their potential and attributes in the best possible way. Article 100 of the Family Code, according to the reform enacted by Law number 7538 of August twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five, defines adoption as a juridical institution of family integration and protection, public order, and social interest; it further states that it constitutes a juridical and psychosocial process by which the adoptee becomes part of the adopters' family, for all purposes, in the capacity of a son or daughter. It can be affirmed, then, that the primary purpose of the institution of adoption is to provide the minor in a state of abandonment with a family nucleus that allows them to have the necessary conditions for their integral development within society. From the foregoing, it is inferred that although both International Law and domestic law allow adoption, it has an exceptional and subsidiary character regarding the right of children to be cared for and to remain with their biological parents. For this reason, the legislator chose to establish an adoption regime that demands specific requirements and forms that must be met in consideration of the interests of minors and adoptable persons in general. Among these requirements, there are some that require the assessment of a judge or other professional, such as the personal conditions of each adopter; however, there are also other requirements—like the one before us—that are of mere verification, which, as this Chamber noted in judgment 1997-02052 of sixteen hours of April fifteenth, nineteen ninety-seven: “*(…) it is not a case of a single requirement that has the property of removing all assessment from the judge, but rather of a regime in which that assessment of the singular case has a place, evidently within the restrictive system preferred by the legislator as a means of protecting the best interest of the child*.” Thus, it is evident that the requirement of a fifteen-year age difference seeks to equate the relationship between the adoptee and the adopter to a parental one, for which reason the legislator decided that the minimum difference should be fifteen years, in consideration of the minimum difference that generally exists between a biological parent and their child. In addition to this, this Chamber considers not only that the requirement established in Article 106, subsection c) fulfills its objective, that is, to equate the adoption relationship with a parental one, but also that it is necessary, since no other less burdensome measure that achieves this purpose is visualized, as leaving this point unregulated would imply that situations could arise in practice where the age difference between the adopter and the adoptee is minimal, which is evidently not possible in parental relationships. In that sense, when analyzing the minimum age of twenty-five years required to adopt in judgment number 12994-01 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand one, this Chamber indicated:

“*In the case under analysis, specifically regarding juridical reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is neither disproportionate nor illegitimate to set a minimum age for adoption that is higher than the age of majority contemplated for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, in addition to the other requirements established in Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator seeks to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability that such a momentous decision as adopting a person demands, which, in any event, represents a subsidiary and exceptional measure compared to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Given above all the degree of vulnerability of adoptable subjects, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator opts to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements*.” From what has been indicated above, it can also be inferred that the plaintiffs are not correct in stating that the analyzed norm injures the right to freedom, contained in Article 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised within legally established parameters; that is, the mere fact that a person wants to adopt does not imply that they will be able to do so by their wish alone, but rather that they must meet a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt. Law in a society exists to regulate relations between persons and their acts, so they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the acción de inconstitucionalidad to analyze the specific case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to bear that of Mr. Wong, since this is a particular case that cannot be analyzed in this action.

**V.- Corollary.** Based on the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the challenged norm, namely Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.” In this case, Mr. Wong Fernández filed on February fourth, two thousand ten, before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, a joint adoption proceeding in favor of Cristina González Collado, which was assigned number 10-00285-0165-FA, a reason that proves Mr. Wong has standing to bring this action, given that the provision the Family Court must apply in resolving the case presented by Mr. Wong is the one challenged here, a reason for which the substantive analysis proceeds.

**II.- Object of the action.** The claimants request that the unconstitutionality of Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) be declared, on the grounds that it violates the principle of equality, contained in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, said provision establishes the following:

*“To be an adopter, the following is required:* *c) To be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. In a joint adoption, this difference shall be established with respect to the youngest adopter. In an adoption by a single spouse, this difference must also exist with respect to the spouse of the adopter.”* In the opinion of the appellants, the challenged provision is unreasonable when it comes to an adoption between adults. They consider it injures the right to equality and non-discrimination, as well as human dignity. They also believe that this provision does not protect the family as the foundation of society and is not reasonable, all because, despite meeting all other requirements demanded for adoption, their application will be denied solely due to failure to comply with just one of these requirements, without taking into consideration the family bond created.

**III.- On the principle of equality and non-discrimination**. This Chamber has recognized, on previous occasions, that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition that, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differentiating factor to be possible, it must not only be real but must also have legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (see, in this regard, Opinions numbers 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 and 5061-94). In this sense, if situations arise where several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this they receive diverse treatment without any acceptable justification, it is considered that an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation exists because it is not supported by objective elements. On this point, in Judgment number 337-91 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one, the Chamber indicated in relevant part:

*“The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution aims, in part, for the same measure or treatment to be given to those who are in identical or reasonably similar situations; not just any difference is valid to establish distinct treatment, because in respect of the reasonableness (razonabilidad) that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be legitimate cause to establish a different treatment.”* According to the above, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Moreover, for differentiation to proceed constitutionally, it must be reasonable, meaning that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. As the Chamber has stated, the necessity of a measure refers directly to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity. And proportionality refers to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight). On this point, this Chamber, when analyzing in a Judicial Consultation the requirement of a minimum age of twenty-five years for the adopter, in judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand one, stated:

*“Article 106, subsection b) of the Family Code certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years of age who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that minimum required age. This unequal treatment does not occur in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights; inasmuch as there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State’s obligation to protect the family and especially the ‘mother, child, elderly, and the infirm’ (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided by the legislator is not unreasonable.”* In that sense, said position can be applied in the analysis of the challenged provision, since it also establishes an age-related (etario) requirement, namely a difference of fifteen years of age between the adoptee and the adopter, a situation that does not injure the right to equality. In the first instance, because, as previously indicated, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international laws, which protect the right to family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary for persons in the same situation to be granted different treatment, which does not happen in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to meet this requirement, without applying any exception since the law does not provide for one. It is evident that persons with a difference of more than fifteen years in age with the adopter are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference; hence, the legislator decided to impose this requirement, whose reasonableness will be analyzed later. Added to this, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through an unconstitutionality action, to assess aspects of a concrete case; therefore, the claimants' argument that the provision injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr. Wong's surname, unlike her siblings who will be able to, is an aspect specific to the case being ventilated before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the challenged provision does not injure the principle of equality, as no unequal treatment for the same situation is observed, it is appropriate to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.

**IV.- On the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) as a constitutional parameter.** The constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, in the first place, that the "reasonableness of the law" was born as part of the "substantive due process of law," a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the context of the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural review of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was surpassed, and it was elevated to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The surpassing of "due process" as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has complied with the established procedure and is valid and effective can also injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine suggests examining, in the first place, the so-called "technical reasonableness (razonabilidad técnica)," within which the specific provision (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen provision is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the intended end. Once the criterion of "technical reasonableness" is surpassed, "juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad jurídica)" must be analyzed. For this, this doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness (razonabilidad ponderativa), which is a type of legal assessment invoked when, given the existence of a specific antecedent (e.g., income), a specific benefit is demanded (e.g., tax), making it necessary in this case to determine whether it is equivalent or proportional; b) reasonableness of equality (razonabilidad de igualdad), which is the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end (razonabilidad en el fin), at this point it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the goals intended by the legislator with its approval. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to state that a means is reasonably suitable for an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and the size of the limitation that a personal right must bear by that means. Thus, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. In this case, this Chamber concludes that the provision is indeed reasonable. The foregoing is because, as the Procuraduría General de la República rightly points out in its report, the age difference is necessary, given the integrative nature of the institution of adoption, as a guarantee of the verisimilitude of the parental (parental) relationship between adoptee and adopter, its objective being that a bond of authority (typical of the parental relationship) is established between the adoptee and the adopter, which would be very difficult to sustain between persons of similar ages. In principle, every minor has the right to live with their parents, who are responsible for ensuring the satisfaction of their needs, both material and moral and spiritual. The family, as a natural element, constitutes, in the Costa Rican legal system, the foundation of society, a fact recognized not only by the Political Constitution but also by instruments of International Law in force in Costa Rica. It is the social organization that ideally allows and fosters that minors manage to develop their potential and attributes in the best possible way. Article 100 of the Family Code, according to the reform operated by Law number 7538 of August twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five, defines adoption as a legal institution of family integration and protection, public order, and social interest; it also indicates that it constitutes a legal and psychosocial (psicosocial) process through which the adoptee becomes part of the adopters' family, for all purposes, as a son or daughter. It can be affirmed, then, that the primary purpose of the institution of adoption is to provide a minor in a state of abandonment with a family nucleus that allows them to have the necessary conditions for their integral development within society. From the foregoing, it follows that although both International Law and domestic law permit adoption, this has an exceptional and subsidiary character in relation to the right of children to be cared for and remain with their biological parents. For that reason, the legislator chose to establish an adoption regime where specific requirements and forms are demanded that must be met in consideration of the interests of minors and adoptable persons in general. Among these requirements, some require assessment by a judge or other professional, such as the personal conditions of each adopter; however, there are also other requirements—like the one at hand—that are purely verifiable, which, as this Chamber noted in judgment 1997-02052 of sixteen hours on April fifteenth, nineteen ninety-seven: *“(...) we are not facing a single requirement that has the property of removing the judge from all assessment, but rather a regime in which that assessment of the singular case has a place, evidently within the restrictive system that the legislator has preferred as a mode of protecting the best interest of the child.”* In this way, it is evident that the requirement of fifteen years of age difference seeks to equate the relationship between the adoptee and the adopter to the parental one, for which the legislator decided that the minimum difference must be fifteen years, taking into account the minimum difference that generally exists between a biological parent and their child. Added to this, this Chamber considers not only that the requirement established in Article 106, subsection c) fulfills its objective, namely equating the adoption relationship with the parental one, but that, additionally, it is necessary, since no other less burdensome measure that achieves this purpose is visualized, given that leaving this point unregulated would imply that situations could practically arise in which the age between the adopter and the adoptee is minimal, something that evidently cannot happen in parental relationships. In this sense, this Chamber, when analyzing the minimum age of twenty-five years required to adopt in judgment number 12994-01 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand one, stated:

*“In the case being analyzed, specifically regarding juridical reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is not disproportionate or illegitimate for a minimum age to be set to be able to adopt, higher than the age of majority provided for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, together with the other requirements established by Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator seeks to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability needed for a decision as momentous as adopting a person, which in any case is a subsidiary and exceptional measure compared to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Attending, above all, to the degree of vulnerability that adoptable subjects have, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator chooses to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements.”* From the above, it also follows that the claimants are not correct in stating that the analyzed provision injures the right to freedom, contained in numeral 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised under the legally established parameters; that is, the mere fact that a person wants to adopt does not imply that they will be able to do so; rather, they must comply with a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt. Law in a society exists to regulate the relationships between persons and their acts; therefore, they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to the legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the unconstitutionality action to analyze the concrete case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to possess that of Mr. Wong, as this is a particular case that cannot be analyzed in this action.

**V.- Corollary.** In merit of the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the challenged provision, namely Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.

“I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. En primer término, de conformidad con el artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional inciso a), cabe la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra leyes o disposiciones de carácter general que infrinjan, por acción u omisión, normas o principios constitucionales. En este caso, el accionante cuestiona el requisito establecido en el numeral 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, que indica que para ser adoptante se debe ser al menos quince años mayor que el adoptado. En cuanto a la legitimación del accionante, de conformidad con el artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad es necesario que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, como medio razonable de amparada el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En este caso, el señor Wong Fernández presentó el día cuatro de febrero de dos mil diez ante el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José un proceso de adopción conjunta a favor de Cristina González Collado, al cual se le asignó el número 10-00285-0165-FA, razón por la cual se comprueba que el señor Wong se encuentra legitimado para interponer la presente acción, habida cuenta que la norma que el Juzgado de Familia deberá aplicar en la resolución del caso presentado por el señor Wong es la que aquí se cuestiona, razón por la cual se procede a realizar el análisis de fondo.

II.- Objeto de la acción. Los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, por considerar que infringe el principio de igualdad, contenido en el numeral 33 de la Constitución Política. Al respecto, dicha norma establece lo siguiente:

“Para ser adoptante, se requiere:

• c)Ser por lo menos quince años mayor que el adoptado. En la adopción conjunta, esa diferencia se establecerá con respecto al adoptante de menor edad. En la adopción por un solo cónyuge, esa diferencia también deberá existir con el consorte del adoptante”.

En criterio de los recurrentes, la norma impugnada es irrazonable tratándose de una adopción entre adultos. Consideran que lesiona el derecho a la igualdad y no discriminación, además de la dignidad humana. Estiman también que esta norma no protege a la familia como fundamento de la sociedad y no es razonable, todo ello por cuanto a pesar de cumplir con todos los demás requisitos exigidos para la adopción, su solicitud será denegada solamente por falta de cumplimiento de uno solo de éstos, sin tomar en consideración el vínculo familiar creado.

III.- Sobre el principio de igualdad y no discriminación. Esta Sala ha reconocido, en anteriores oportunidades, que es perfectamente posible que dos sujetos o categorías de sujetos difieran en alguna característica o condición esencial que, por su naturaleza, haga comprensible y justificable una diferencia de tratamiento. Para que el elemento diferenciador sea posible, no sólo debe ser real, sino que también debe tener una trascendencia jurídica de tal naturaleza o magnitud que haga razonable y justificable el trato diverso (véanse en este sentido los votos números 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 y 5061-94). En ese sentido, sí se dan situaciones en que varios sujetos se encuentran en las mismas condiciones, y a pesar de ello reciben un tratamiento diverso sin que medie ninguna justificación atendible, se considera que existe una diferenciación irrazonable y discriminatoria por no estar apoyada en elementos objetivos. Sobre este punto, en la sentencia número 337-91 de las catorce horas y cincuenta y seis minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, la Sala indicó en lo conducente:

“El principio de igualdad contenido en el artículo 33 constitucional, pretende en parte, que una misma medida o un mismo trato se dé a quienes se encontraren en situaciones idénticas o razonablemente similares, no siendo válida cualquier diferencia para establecer un trato distinto, pues en respeto de la razonabilidad que debe regir todo acto, sólo aquellas diferencias relevantes serían causa legítima para establecer un trato diferente” .

Según lo anterior, para aspirar al trato igual, las situaciones deben ser idénticas o razonablemente parecidas o simplemente similares. Además, la diferenciación para que proceda constitucionalmente debe ser razonable, entendiendo por esto que debe ser necesaria, idónea y proporcional. Como ha dicho la Sala la necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad -o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. Y la proporcionalidad remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer (al respecto véase la sentencia número 08858-98 de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). Sobre este punto, esta Sala al analizar en una Consulta Judicial el requisito de la edad mínima del adoptante de veinticinco años, en la sentencia número 2001-12994 catorce horas treinta y siete minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil uno, indicó:

“El artículo 106 inciso b) del Código de Familia, ciertamente establece una diferencia de trato a favor de las personas mayores de veinticinco años que desean adoptar, en perjuicio de los que, pese a ser mayores de edad, aún no cumplen con esa edad mínima exigida. Ese trato desigual no se da en relación con el ejercicio de derechos fundamentales; por cuanto, no existe un derecho constitucional a la adopción; lo que existe es la obligación del Estado de proteger a la familia y especialmente a la “madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido” (artículo 51 de la Constitución Política). Los instrumentos de derecho internacional vigentes en Costa Rica tampoco establecen un derecho de las personas a poder adoptar, lo que establecen es el derecho de los niños a permanecer y ser cuidados por sus padres biológicos, y en forma excepcional y subsidiaria, a tener un hogar sustituto. Por otra parte, considera esta Sala que la desigualdad de trato prevista por el legislador no es irrazonable”.

En ese sentido, dicha posición puede aplicarse en el análisis de la norma cuestionada, toda vez que ésta establece un requisito también etario, sea una diferencia de quince años de edad entre el adoptado y el adoptante, situación con la que no se lesiona el derecho a la igualdad. En primera instancia porque tal y como se indicó anteriormente no existe, en este caso, un derecho fundamental en cuestión, ya que no hay un derecho a la adopción contenido en las normas nacional o internacionales, que lo que protegen es el derecho a la familia. En segunda instancia, porque para que exista una discriminación es necesario que a personas que se encuentren en la misma situación se les otorgue un trato distinto, lo que no sucede en este caso, ya que a todas las personas que pretendan adoptar ya sea una persona menor o mayor de edad, se les exigirá cumplir con este requisito, sin aplicar ninguna excepción ya que la ley no la prevé. Es evidente que las personas con más de quince años de diferencia en la edad con el adoptante no se encuentran en la misma posición que una persona que no tiene esa diferencia, de ahí que el legislador decidió imponer este requisito, cuya razonabilidad se analizará posteriormente. Aunado a ello, debe aclararse, en este caso, que no procede, mediante la acción de inconstitucionalidad valorar aspectos de un caso concreto, por lo que el argumento de los accionantes que la norma lesiona el principio de igualdad porque la señorita González Collado no podrá tener el apellido del señor Wong, a diferencia de sus hermanos que sí lo podrán, es un aspecto propio del caso que está siendo ventilado ante el Juzgado de Familia del II Circuito Judicial de San José. Habiendo establecido que la norma cuestionada no lesiona el principio de igualdad, pues no se aprecia que exista un trato desigual para la misma situación, lo procede es analizar la razonabilidad de este requisito.

IV.- Sobre el principio de razonabilidad como parámetro constitucional. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la "razonabilidad de la ley" nació como parte del "debido proceso sustantivo" (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial "debido proceso" se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, se superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva. La superación del "debido proceso" como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Una vez establecido que la norma elegida es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica" hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin, en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos por el legislador con su aprobación. Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable. En este caso, esta Sala concluye que la norma sí es razonable. Lo anterior toda vez que, como bien lo apunta en su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, la diferencia de edad es necesaria, dada la naturaleza integradora del instituto de la adopción, como una garantía de verosimilitud de la relación parental entre adoptado y adoptante, siendo su objetivo que entre el adoptado y el adoptante se establezca un vínculo de autoridad (propio de la relación parental) que sería muy difícil que subsistiera entre personas con edades similares. En principio, todo menor tiene el derecho de convivir con sus padres, quienes son los responsables de velar por la satisfacción de sus necesidades, tanto materiales como morales y espirituales. La familia, como elemento natural, constituye en el sistema jurídico costarricense, el fundamento de la sociedad, hecho reconocido no sólo por la Constitución Política, sino también por instrumentos de Derecho Internacional vigentes en Costa Rica. Es la organización social que idealmente permite y propicia que los menores de edad logren desarrollar sus potencialidades y atributos de la mejor manera. El artículo 100 del Código de Familia, según reforma operada por Ley número 7538 de veintidós de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, define la adopción como una institución jurídica de integración y protección familiar, orden público e interés social; además señala, que constituye un proceso jurídico y psicosocial mediante el cual el adoptado entra a formar parte de la familia de los adoptantes, para todos los efectos en calidad de hijo o hija. Puede afirmarse, entonces, que la finalidad primordial del instituto de la adopción es la de dotar al menor en estado de abandono de un núcleo familiar que le permita contar con las condiciones necesarias para su desarrollo integral dentro de la sociedad. De lo expuesto, se colige que si bien tanto en el Derecho Internacional como en el Derecho interno, se permite la adopción, ésta tiene un carácter excepcional y subsidiario frente al derecho de los niños de ser cuidados y permanecer junto a sus padres biológicos. Por esa razón, el legislador optó por establecer un régimen de adopción donde se exijan requisitos y formas determinadas que deben cumplirse en atención a los intereses de los menores de edad y personas adoptables en general. Dentro de estos requisitos los hay algunos que requieren de la valoración del juez u otro profesional tales como las condiciones personales de cada adoptante; sin embargo, también hay otros requisitos –como el que nos ocupa- que son de mera constatación, que tal y como lo apuntó esta Sala en la sentencia 1997-02052 de las dieciséis horas del quince de abril de mil novecientos noventa y siete: “(…) no se está ante un único requisito que tiene la propiedad de sustraer al juez de toda valoración, sino ante un régimen en el que esa valoración del caso singular tiene cabida, evidentemente en el sistema restrictivo que ha preferido el legislador como modo de protección del interés superior del niño”. De esta manera es evidente que el requisito de quince años de diferencia de edad, lo que busca es equipar la relación entre el adoptado y el adoptante a la parental, por lo que el legislador decidió que la diferencia mínima debe ser de quince años, ello en atención de la diferencia mínima que por lo general existe entre un padre biológico y su hijo. Aunado a ello, estima esta Sala no sólo que el requisito establecido en el ordinal 106 inciso c) cumple con su objetivo, sea equiparar la relación de adopción con la parental, sino que, además, es necesaria, pues no se visualiza otra medida menos gravosa que consiga esta finalidad, ya que dejar este punto sin regulación implicaría que se podrían dar en la práctica situaciones en las que la edad entre el adoptante y el adoptado sea mínima, lo que evidentemente no es posible que suceda en las relaciones parentales. En ese sentido, esta Sala al analizar la edad mínima de veinticinco años requerida para adoptar en la sentencia número 12994-01 de las catorce horas treinta y siete minutos del diecinueve minutos de dos mil uno, indicó:

“En el caso que se analiza, propiamente respecto de la razonabilidad jurídica, considera esta Sala que no resulta desproporcionado ni ilegítimo que se fije una edad mínima para poder adoptar, superior a la mayoridad contemplada para ejercer los derechos civiles. Es comprensible que aunado a los demás requisitos que establece el artículo 106 del Código de Familia (buena conducta, condiciones familiares, morales, psicológicas, sociales, económicas, de salud, etc.) el legislador pretenda reforzar aún más la exigencia de la madurez y estabilidad que requiere una decisión tan trascendental como la de adoptar a una persona, que de todas maneras, supone una medida subsidiaria y excepcional frente al derecho del menor de permanecer al lado de sus padres biológicos. Atendiendo sobre todo al grado de vulnerabilidad que tienen los sujetos adoptables, por las circunstancias particulares que han tenido que enfrentar en la vida, es entendible que el legislador opte por ser especialmente riguroso y cauto a la hora de establecer los requisitos”.

De lo indicado anteriormente también se colige que no llevan razón los accionantes al indicar que la norma analizada lesiona el derecho a la libertad, contenido en el numeral 28 de la Constitución Política, toda vez que éste derecho no es absoluto y debe ejercerse bajo los parámetros legalmente establecidos, es decir, el hecho que una persona quiera adoptar, por sí solo el deseo no implica que podrá hacerlo, sino que deberá cumplir con una serie de requisitos que el legislador estableció para tal efecto y, posteriormente, podrá optar por adoptar. El derecho en una sociedad existe para normar las relaciones entre las personas y los actos de éstas, por lo que ellas son libres de hacer lo que deseen siempre y cuando se ajuste a los parámetros legalmente establecidos. Por último, es menester aclarar que no procede en la acción de inconstitucionalidad analizar el caso concreto de la señorita González Collado en cuanto a su apellido se refiere y su deseo de poseer el del señor Wong, ya que ésta es un caso particular que no procede ser analizada en la acción.

V.- Corolario. En mérito de lo expuesto, esta Sala concluye que la norma cuestionada, sea el artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, no es inconstitucional.”