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Res. 01354-2011 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 02/02/2011
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber denies the unconstitutionality action against Article 106(c) of the Family Code, upholding the requirement that the adoptive parent be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee.La Sala declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, manteniendo el requisito de que el adoptante sea al menos quince años mayor que el adoptado.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber reviews a claim of unconstitutionality against Article 106(c) of the Family Code, which requires the adoptive parent to be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. The plaintiffs argued that this age difference violates the principle of equality, human dignity, and family protection, particularly in adult adoptions. The Chamber dismisses the action, holding that there is no fundamental right to adoption; rather, adoption is an exceptional and subsidiary institution designed to protect the best interests of the child. It finds the requirement reasonable and proportionate, as it aims to render the adoptive relationship comparable to a biological one, ensuring an age difference that makes a credible parental authority bond. The Chamber reiterates that the unconstitutionality action is not the proper channel for analyzing individual case circumstances.La Sala Constitucional analiza una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, que exige que el adoptante sea al menos quince años mayor que el adoptado. Los accionantes alegaban que esta diferencia etaria vulnera el principio de igualdad, la dignidad humana y la protección a la familia, especialmente en adopciones entre adultos. La Sala desestima la acción, estableciendo que no existe un derecho fundamental a la adopción, sino que esta es una institución excepcional y subsidiaria orientada a proteger el interés superior del niño. Concluye que el requisito es razonable y proporcionado, ya que busca equiparar la relación adoptiva a la parental, garantizando una diferencia de edad que haga verosímil el vínculo de autoridad propio de la filiación. Reitera que la acción de inconstitucionalidad no es la vía para analizar situaciones particulares de cada caso.
Key excerptExtracto clave
It is therefore evident that the fifteen-year age difference requirement seeks to equate the relationship between the adoptee and the adoptive parent to a parental one, which is why the legislator set the minimum difference at fifteen years, in consideration of the typical age gap between a biological parent and child. Additionally, this Chamber finds that not only does the requirement in Article 106(c) fulfill its purpose of equating the adoptive relationship with a parental one, but it is also necessary, as no equally effective but less burdensome measure is apparent; leaving this point unregulated could lead to situations where the age difference between the adoptive parent and adoptee is minimal, something that clearly would not occur in a parental relationship.De esta manera es evidente que el requisito de quince años de diferencia de edad, lo que busca es equipar la relación entre el adoptado y el adoptante a la parental, por lo que el legislador decidió que la diferencia mínima debe ser de quince años, ello en atención de la diferencia mínima que por lo general existe entre un padre biológico y su hijo. Aunado a ello, estima esta Sala no sólo que el requisito establecido en el ordinal 106 inciso c) cumple con su objetivo, sea equiparar la relación de adopción con la parental, sino que, además, es necesaria, pues no se visualiza otra medida menos gravosa que consiga esta finalidad, ya que dejar este punto sin regulación implicaría que se podrían dar en la práctica situaciones en las que la edad entre el adoptante y el adoptado sea mínima, lo que evidentemente no es posible que suceda en las relaciones parentales.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En primera instancia porque tal y como se indicó anteriormente no existe, en este caso, un derecho fundamental en cuestión, ya que no hay un derecho a la adopción contenido en las normas nacional o internacionales, que lo que protegen es el derecho a la familia."
"In the first place, as previously stated, no fundamental right is at issue here, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international norms, which protect the right to family."
Considerando III
"En primera instancia porque tal y como se indicó anteriormente no existe, en este caso, un derecho fundamental en cuestión, ya que no hay un derecho a la adopción contenido en las normas nacional o internacionales, que lo que protegen es el derecho a la familia."
Considerando III
"la diferencia de edad es necesaria, dada la naturaleza integradora del instituto de la adopción, como una garantía de verosimilitud de la relación parental entre adoptado y adoptante, siendo su objetivo que entre el adoptado y el adoptante se establezca un vínculo de autoridad (propio de la relación parental) que sería muy difícil que subsistiera entre personas con edades similares."
"the age difference is necessary, given the integrative nature of the adoption institution, as a guarantee of the credibility of the parental relationship between adoptee and adoptive parent, with the objective of establishing an authority bond (inherent to the parental relationship) that would be very difficult to maintain between people of similar ages."
Considerando IV
"la diferencia de edad es necesaria, dada la naturaleza integradora del instituto de la adopción, como una garantía de verosimilitud de la relación parental entre adoptado y adoptante, siendo su objetivo que entre el adoptado y el adoptante se establezca un vínculo de autoridad (propio de la relación parental) que sería muy difícil que subsistiera entre personas con edades similares."
Considerando IV
"no se visualiza otra medida menos gravosa que consiga esta finalidad, ya que dejar este punto sin regulación implicaría que se podrían dar en la práctica situaciones en las que la edad entre el adoptante y el adoptado sea mínima, lo que evidentemente no es posible que suceda en las relaciones parentales."
"no other less burdensome measure that achieves this purpose is apparent, since leaving this point unregulated could lead to situations where the age difference between the adoptive parent and the adoptee is minimal, something that clearly would not occur in a parental relationship."
Considerando IV
"no se visualiza otra medida menos gravosa que consiga esta finalidad, ya que dejar este punto sin regulación implicaría que se podrían dar en la práctica situaciones en las que la edad entre el adoptante y el adoptado sea mínima, lo que evidentemente no es posible que suceda en las relaciones parentales."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
I.Admissibility. First, pursuant to Article 73, subsection a), of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), an acción de inconstitucionalidad is available against laws or provisions of a general nature that infringe, by action or omission, constitutional norms or principles. In this case, the petitioner (accionante) challenges the requirement established in numeral 106, subsection c), of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which states that to be an adoptive parent, one must be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. As for the standing (legitimación) of the petitioner, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad there must be a matter pending resolution before the courts, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured. In this case, Mr. Wong Fernández filed a joint adoption proceeding on February 4, 2010, before the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José on behalf of Cristina González Collado, assigned case number 10-00285-0165-FA, which confirms that Mr. Wong has standing to file this action, given that the norm the Family Court must apply in resolving the case presented by Mr. Wong is precisely the one challenged here, and therefore we proceed with the substantive analysis.
II.Purpose of the Action. The petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of Article 106, subsection c), of the Family Code be declared, believing it infringes the principle of equality, contained in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In this regard, said norm establishes the following:
“To be an adoptive parent, it is required:
In the opinion of the appellants, the contested norm is unreasonable in the case of an adoption between adults. They believe it injures the right to equality and non-discrimination, in addition to human dignity. They also consider that this norm does not protect the family as the foundation of society and is not reasonable, all because despite complying with all other requirements demanded for adoption, their application will be denied solely for failure to comply with a single one of these, without taking into consideration the family bond created.
III.On the Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination. This Chamber (Sala) has recognized, on previous occasions, that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition which, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differentiating element to be permissible, it must not only be real but must also have a legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (see in this regard Votos numbers 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 and 5061-94). In that sense, if situations occur where several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this receive diverse treatment without any justifiable reason being present, it is considered that there is an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation for not being supported by objective elements. On this point, in Judgment number 337-91 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes of February 8, 1991, the Chamber indicated the pertinent part:
“The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution aims, in part, for the same measure or the same treatment to be given to those who are in identical or reasonably similar situations, and not just any difference is valid for establishing distinct treatment, since, in respect of the reasonableness (razonabilidad) that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be a legitimate cause for establishing different treatment”.
According to the above, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Moreover, for differentiation to be constitutionally proper, it must be reasonable, meaning by this that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. As the Chamber has stated, the necessity of a measure refers directly to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community — or of a specific group — by adopting a differentiation measure. Suitability (idoneidad), for its part, entails a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. And proportionality (proporcionalidad) refers to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see Judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes of December 15, 1998). On this point, this Chamber, when analyzing in a Judicial Consultation (Consulta Judicial) the requirement of a minimum age of twenty-five for the adoptive parent, in Judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December 19, 2001, stated:
“Article 106, subsection b), of the Family Code, certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years old who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that required minimum age. This unequal treatment does not occur in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights; because there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State's obligation to protect the family and especially “the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick” (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain with and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided by the legislator is not unreasonable”.
In that sense, said position can be applied in the analysis of the contested norm, since it also establishes an age-related requirement, that is, a difference of fifteen years of age between the adoptee and the adoptive parent, a situation which does not injure the right to equality. In the first instance, because, as indicated previously, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international norms, which instead protect the right to a family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary that persons in the same situation be granted different treatment, which does not happen in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to comply with this requirement, with no exceptions applied since the law does not provide for any. It is evident that persons with more than fifteen years of age difference from the adoptive parent are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference, hence the legislator decided to impose this requirement, whose reasonableness will be analyzed later.
In addition, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through the acción de inconstitucionalidad, to assess aspects of a specific case, so the petitioners' argument that the norm injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr. Wong's surname, unlike her siblings who will, is an aspect specific to the case being heard before the Family Court of the II Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the contested norm does not injure the principle of equality, as it is not apparent that unequal treatment exists for the same situation, what is appropriate is to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.
On the Principle of Reasonableness as a Constitutional Parameter. The constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, first of all, that the "reasonableness of the law" (razonabilidad de la ley) was born as part of "substantive due process of law," a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In its initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural examination of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. By the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was overcome and it was elevated to an axiological recourse that limits the actions of the legislative organ.
From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of "due process" as a procedural guarantee basically responds to the fact that even a law that has followed the established procedure and is valid and effective can injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine invites an examination, first of all, of the so-called "technical reasonableness" (razonabilidad técnica), within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a certain matter, it is necessary to examine whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the end sought. Having overcome the criterion of "technical reasonableness," one must analyze "legal reasonableness" (razonabilidad jurídica). For this purpose, this doctrine proposes examining:
“In the case under analysis, specifically regarding legal reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is not disproportionate or illegitimate to set a minimum age to be able to adopt that is higher than the age of majority established for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, in addition to the other requirements established by Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator intends to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability demanded by such a momentous decision as adopting a person, which, in any case, constitutes a subsidiary and exceptional measure in relation to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Bearing in mind, above all, the degree of vulnerability of adoptable subjects, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator chooses to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements.” From the foregoing, it also follows that the petitioners are not correct in stating that the analyzed norm injures the right to liberty, contained in numeral 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised under legally established parameters; that is, the fact that a person wants to adopt, the desire alone does not imply that they will be able to do so, but rather they must comply with a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt.
Law in a society exists to regulate relationships between persons and their acts, so they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the acción de inconstitucionalidad to analyze the specific case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to possess Mr. Wong's surname, since this is a particular case that is not appropriately analyzed in this action.
V.Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the contested norm, that is, Article 106, subsection c), of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.”
As this Chamber has stated, the need for a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure. Suitability, for its part, entails a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. And proportionality refers to a necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight). On this point, when analyzing the minimum age requirement of twenty-five years for the adopter in a Judicial Consultation, this Chamber, in judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand one, indicated:
“*Article 106, subsection b) of the Family Code certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years of age who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that required minimum age. This unequal treatment does not arise in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights, since there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State's obligation to protect the family and especially the 'mother, child, the elderly, and the helpless sick' (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain with and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided for by the legislator is not unreasonable*.” In that sense, this position can be applied in the analysis of the challenged norm, since it also establishes an age-related requirement, that is, a fifteen-year age difference between the adoptee and the adopter, a situation that does not injure the right to equality.
In the first instance, because, as indicated above, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international norms, which protect the right to family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary that persons in the same situation be granted different treatment, which does not occur in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to meet this requirement, without applying any exception since the law does not provide for one. It is evident that persons with more than fifteen years of age difference with the adopter are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference, hence the legislator decided to impose this requirement, the reasonableness of which will be analyzed later. Added to this, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through the acción de inconstitucionalidad, to assess aspects of a specific case; therefore, the argument of the plaintiffs that the norm injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr.
Wong's surname, unlike her brothers who will be able to, is an aspect specific to the case being heard before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the challenged norm does not injure the principle of equality, since it is not apparent that there is unequal treatment for the same situation, it is appropriate to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.
Regarding the principle of reasonableness as a constitutional parameter. Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth remembering, first, that the "reasonableness of the law" was born as part of the "substantive due process of law" guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, in line with the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural review of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was overcome, and it was elevated to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee.
The overcoming of "due process" as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has conformed to the established procedure, and is valid and effective, can also injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the reasonableness test, U.S. doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called "technical reasonableness" within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is appropriate for regulating a given matter, one must examine whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the sought end. Having overcome the criterion of "technical reasonableness," one must analyze "juridical reasonableness." For this, this doctrine proposes examining:
“*In the case under analysis, specifically regarding juridical reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is neither disproportionate nor illegitimate to set a minimum age for adoption that is higher than the age of majority contemplated for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, in addition to the other requirements established in Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator seeks to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability that such a momentous decision as adopting a person demands, which, in any event, represents a subsidiary and exceptional measure compared to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Given above all the degree of vulnerability of adoptable subjects, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator opts to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements*.” From what has been indicated above, it can also be inferred that the plaintiffs are not correct in stating that the analyzed norm injures the right to freedom, contained in Article 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised within legally established parameters; that is, the mere fact that a person wants to adopt does not imply that they will be able to do so by their wish alone, but rather that they must meet a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt.
Law in a society exists to regulate relations between persons and their acts, so they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the acción de inconstitucionalidad to analyze the specific case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to bear that of Mr. Wong, since this is a particular case that cannot be analyzed in this action.
V.Corollary. Based on the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the challenged norm, namely Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.”
In this case, Mr. Wong Fernández filed on February fourth, two thousand ten, before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, a joint adoption proceeding in favor of Cristina González Collado, which was assigned number 10-00285-0165-FA, a reason that proves Mr. Wong has standing to bring this action, given that the provision the Family Court must apply in resolving the case presented by Mr. Wong is the one challenged here, a reason for which the substantive analysis proceeds.
II.Object of the action. The claimants request that the unconstitutionality of Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) be declared, on the grounds that it violates the principle of equality, contained in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, said provision establishes the following:
*“To be an adopter, the following is required:* *c) To be at least fifteen years older than the adoptee. In a joint adoption, this difference shall be established with respect to the youngest adopter. In an adoption by a single spouse, this difference must also exist with respect to the spouse of the adopter.”* In the opinion of the appellants, the challenged provision is unreasonable when it comes to an adoption between adults. They consider it injures the right to equality and non-discrimination, as well as human dignity. They also believe that this provision does not protect the family as the foundation of society and is not reasonable, all because, despite meeting all other requirements demanded for adoption, their application will be denied solely due to failure to comply with just one of these requirements, without taking into consideration the family bond created.
III.On the principle of equality and non-discrimination. This Chamber has recognized, on previous occasions, that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition that, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differentiating factor to be possible, it must not only be real but must also have legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (see, in this regard, Opinions numbers 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 and 5061-94). In this sense, if situations arise where several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this they receive diverse treatment without any acceptable justification, it is considered that an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation exists because it is not supported by objective elements. On this point, in Judgment number 337-91 of fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one, the Chamber indicated in relevant part:
*“The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution aims, in part, for the same measure or treatment to be given to those who are in identical or reasonably similar situations; not just any difference is valid to establish distinct treatment, because in respect of the reasonableness (razonabilidad) that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be legitimate cause to establish a different treatment.”* According to the above, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Moreover, for differentiation to proceed constitutionally, it must be reasonable, meaning that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. As the Chamber has stated, the necessity of a measure refers directly to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure.
Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity. And proportionality refers to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed (in this regard, see judgment number 08858-98 of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight). On this point, this Chamber, when analyzing in a Judicial Consultation the requirement of a minimum age of twenty-five years for the adopter, in judgment number 2001-12994 of fourteen hours and thirty-seven minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand one, stated:
*“Article 106, subsection b) of the Family Code certainly establishes a difference in treatment in favor of persons over twenty-five years of age who wish to adopt, to the detriment of those who, despite being of legal age, have not yet reached that minimum required age. This unequal treatment does not occur in relation to the exercise of fundamental rights; inasmuch as there is no constitutional right to adoption; what exists is the State’s obligation to protect the family and especially the ‘mother, child, elderly, and the infirm’ (Article 51 of the Political Constitution). The international legal instruments in force in Costa Rica also do not establish a right of persons to be able to adopt; what they establish is the right of children to remain and be cared for by their biological parents, and exceptionally and subsidiarily, to have a substitute home. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that the inequality of treatment provided by the legislator is not unreasonable.”* In that sense, said position can be applied in the analysis of the challenged provision, since it also establishes an age-related (etario) requirement, namely a difference of fifteen years of age between the adoptee and the adopter, a situation that does not injure the right to equality.
In the first instance, because, as previously indicated, there is no fundamental right at issue in this case, since there is no right to adoption contained in national or international laws, which protect the right to family. In the second instance, because for discrimination to exist, it is necessary for persons in the same situation to be granted different treatment, which does not happen in this case, since all persons who seek to adopt, whether a minor or an adult, will be required to meet this requirement, without applying any exception since the law does not provide for one. It is evident that persons with a difference of more than fifteen years in age with the adopter are not in the same position as a person who does not have that difference; hence, the legislator decided to impose this requirement, whose reasonableness will be analyzed later. Added to this, it must be clarified, in this case, that it is not appropriate, through an unconstitutionality action, to assess aspects of a concrete case; therefore, the claimants' argument that the provision injures the principle of equality because Miss González Collado will not be able to have Mr.
Wong's surname, unlike her siblings who will be able to, is an aspect specific to the case being ventilated before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Having established that the challenged provision does not injure the principle of equality, as no unequal treatment for the same situation is observed, it is appropriate to analyze the reasonableness of this requirement.
On the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) as a constitutional parameter. The constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, in the first place, that the "reasonableness of the law" was born as part of the "substantive due process of law," a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the context of the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, "due process" was directed at the procedural review of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was surpassed, and it was elevated to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee.
The surpassing of "due process" as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has complied with the established procedure and is valid and effective can also injure the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine suggests examining, in the first place, the so-called "technical reasonableness (razonabilidad técnica)," within which the specific provision (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen provision is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the intended end. Once the criterion of "technical reasonableness" is surpassed, "juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad jurídica)" must be analyzed. For this, this doctrine proposes examining:
*“In the case being analyzed, specifically regarding juridical reasonableness, this Chamber considers that it is not disproportionate or illegitimate for a minimum age to be set to be able to adopt, higher than the age of majority provided for exercising civil rights. It is understandable that, together with the other requirements established by Article 106 of the Family Code (good conduct, family, moral, psychological, social, economic, health conditions, etc.), the legislator seeks to further reinforce the requirement of maturity and stability needed for a decision as momentous as adopting a person, which in any case is a subsidiary and exceptional measure compared to the minor's right to remain with their biological parents. Attending, above all, to the degree of vulnerability that adoptable subjects have, due to the particular circumstances they have had to face in life, it is understandable that the legislator chooses to be especially rigorous and cautious when establishing the requirements.”* From the above, it also follows that the claimants are not correct in stating that the analyzed provision injures the right to freedom, contained in numeral 28 of the Political Constitution, since this right is not absolute and must be exercised under the legally established parameters; that is, the mere fact that a person wants to adopt does not imply that they will be able to do so; rather, they must comply with a series of requirements that the legislator established for that purpose and, subsequently, may choose to adopt.
Law in a society exists to regulate the relationships between persons and their acts; therefore, they are free to do what they wish as long as it conforms to the legally established parameters. Finally, it is necessary to clarify that it is not appropriate in the unconstitutionality action to analyze the concrete case of Miss González Collado regarding her surname and her desire to possess that of Mr. Wong, as this is a particular case that cannot be analyzed in this action.
V.Corollary. In merit of the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that the challenged provision, namely Article 106, subsection c) of the Family Code, is not unconstitutional.
“I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. En primer término, de conformidad con el artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional inciso a), cabe la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra leyes o disposiciones de carácter general que infrinjan, por acción u omisión, normas o principios constitucionales. En este caso, el accionante cuestiona el requisito establecido en el numeral 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, que indica que para ser adoptante se debe ser al menos quince años mayor que el adoptado. En cuanto a la legitimación del accionante, de conformidad con el artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad es necesario que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, como medio razonable de amparada el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En este caso, el señor Wong Fernández presentó el día cuatro de febrero de dos mil diez ante el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José un proceso de adopción conjunta a favor de Cristina González Collado, al cual se le asignó el número 10-00285-0165-FA, razón por la cual se comprueba que el señor Wong se encuentra legitimado para interponer la presente acción, habida cuenta que la norma que el Juzgado de Familia deberá aplicar en la resolución del caso presentado por el señor Wong es la que aquí se cuestiona, razón por la cual se procede a realizar el análisis de fondo.
II.Objeto de la acción. Los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, por considerar que infringe el principio de igualdad, contenido en el numeral 33 de la Constitución Política. Al respecto, dicha norma establece lo siguiente:
“Para ser adoptante, se requiere:
En criterio de los recurrentes, la norma impugnada es irrazonable tratándose de una adopción entre adultos. Consideran que lesiona el derecho a la igualdad y no discriminación, además de la dignidad humana. Estiman también que esta norma no protege a la familia como fundamento de la sociedad y no es razonable, todo ello por cuanto a pesar de cumplir con todos los demás requisitos exigidos para la adopción, su solicitud será denegada solamente por falta de cumplimiento de uno solo de éstos, sin tomar en consideración el vínculo familiar creado.
III.Sobre el principio de igualdad y no discriminación. Esta Sala ha reconocido, en anteriores oportunidades, que es perfectamente posible que dos sujetos o categorías de sujetos difieran en alguna característica o condición esencial que, por su naturaleza, haga comprensible y justificable una diferencia de tratamiento. Para que el elemento diferenciador sea posible, no sólo debe ser real, sino que también debe tener una trascendencia jurídica de tal naturaleza o magnitud que haga razonable y justificable el trato diverso (véanse en este sentido los votos números 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 y 5061-94). En ese sentido, sí se dan situaciones en que varios sujetos se encuentran en las mismas condiciones, y a pesar de ello reciben un tratamiento diverso sin que medie ninguna justificación atendible, se considera que existe una diferenciación irrazonable y discriminatoria por no estar apoyada en elementos objetivos. Sobre este punto, en la sentencia número 337-91 de las catorce horas y cincuenta y seis minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, la Sala indicó en lo conducente:
“El principio de igualdad contenido en el artículo 33 constitucional, pretende en parte, que una misma medida o un mismo trato se dé a quienes se encontraren en situaciones idénticas o razonablemente similares, no siendo válida cualquier diferencia para establecer un trato distinto, pues en respeto de la razonabilidad que debe regir todo acto, sólo aquellas diferencias relevantes serían causa legítima para establecer un trato diferente” .
Según lo anterior, para aspirar al trato igual, las situaciones deben ser idénticas o razonablemente parecidas o simplemente similares. Además, la diferenciación para que proceda constitucionalmente debe ser razonable, entendiendo por esto que debe ser necesaria, idónea y proporcional. Como ha dicho la Sala la necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad -o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. Y la proporcionalidad remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer (al respecto véase la sentencia número 08858-98 de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). Sobre este punto, esta Sala al analizar en una Consulta Judicial el requisito de la edad mínima del adoptante de veinticinco años, en la sentencia número 2001-12994 catorce horas treinta y siete minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil uno, indicó:
“El artículo 106 inciso b) del Código de Familia, ciertamente establece una diferencia de trato a favor de las personas mayores de veinticinco años que desean adoptar, en perjuicio de los que, pese a ser mayores de edad, aún no cumplen con esa edad mínima exigida. Ese trato desigual no se da en relación con el ejercicio de derechos fundamentales; por cuanto, no existe un derecho constitucional a la adopción; lo que existe es la obligación del Estado de proteger a la familia y especialmente a la “madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido” (artículo 51 de la Constitución Política). Los instrumentos de derecho internacional vigentes en Costa Rica tampoco establecen un derecho de las personas a poder adoptar, lo que establecen es el derecho de los niños a permanecer y ser cuidados por sus padres biológicos, y en forma excepcional y subsidiaria, a tener un hogar sustituto. Por otra parte, considera esta Sala que la desigualdad de trato prevista por el legislador no es irrazonable”.
En ese sentido, dicha posición puede aplicarse en el análisis de la norma cuestionada, toda vez que ésta establece un requisito también etario, sea una diferencia de quince años de edad entre el adoptado y el adoptante, situación con la que no se lesiona el derecho a la igualdad. En primera instancia porque tal y como se indicó anteriormente no existe, en este caso, un derecho fundamental en cuestión, ya que no hay un derecho a la adopción contenido en las normas nacional o internacionales, que lo que protegen es el derecho a la familia. En segunda instancia, porque para que exista una discriminación es necesario que a personas que se encuentren en la misma situación se les otorgue un trato distinto, lo que no sucede en este caso, ya que a todas las personas que pretendan adoptar ya sea una persona menor o mayor de edad, se les exigirá cumplir con este requisito, sin aplicar ninguna excepción ya que la ley no la prevé.
Es evidente que las personas con más de quince años de diferencia en la edad con el adoptante no se encuentran en la misma posición que una persona que no tiene esa diferencia, de ahí que el legislador decidió imponer este requisito, cuya razonabilidad se analizará posteriormente. Aunado a ello, debe aclararse, en este caso, que no procede, mediante la acción de inconstitucionalidad valorar aspectos de un caso concreto, por lo que el argumento de los accionantes que la norma lesiona el principio de igualdad porque la señorita González Collado no podrá tener el apellido del señor Wong, a diferencia de sus hermanos que sí lo podrán, es un aspecto propio del caso que está siendo ventilado ante el Juzgado de Familia del II Circuito Judicial de San José. Habiendo establecido que la norma cuestionada no lesiona el principio de igualdad, pues no se aprecia que exista un trato desigual para la misma situación, lo procede es analizar la razonabilidad de este requisito.
Sobre el principio de razonabilidad como parámetro constitucional. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la "razonabilidad de la ley" nació como parte del "debido proceso sustantivo" (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial "debido proceso" se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, se superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva.
La superación del "debido proceso" como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Una vez establecido que la norma elegida es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica" hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar:
“En el caso que se analiza, propiamente respecto de la razonabilidad jurídica, considera esta Sala que no resulta desproporcionado ni ilegítimo que se fije una edad mínima para poder adoptar, superior a la mayoridad contemplada para ejercer los derechos civiles. Es comprensible que aunado a los demás requisitos que establece el artículo 106 del Código de Familia (buena conducta, condiciones familiares, morales, psicológicas, sociales, económicas, de salud, etc.) el legislador pretenda reforzar aún más la exigencia de la madurez y estabilidad que requiere una decisión tan trascendental como la de adoptar a una persona, que de todas maneras, supone una medida subsidiaria y excepcional frente al derecho del menor de permanecer al lado de sus padres biológicos. Atendiendo sobre todo al grado de vulnerabilidad que tienen los sujetos adoptables, por las circunstancias particulares que han tenido que enfrentar en la vida, es entendible que el legislador opte por ser especialmente riguroso y cauto a la hora de establecer los requisitos”.
De lo indicado anteriormente también se colige que no llevan razón los accionantes al indicar que la norma analizada lesiona el derecho a la libertad, contenido en el numeral 28 de la Constitución Política, toda vez que éste derecho no es absoluto y debe ejercerse bajo los parámetros legalmente establecidos, es decir, el hecho que una persona quiera adoptar, por sí solo el deseo no implica que podrá hacerlo, sino que deberá cumplir con una serie de requisitos que el legislador estableció para tal efecto y, posteriormente, podrá optar por adoptar. El derecho en una sociedad existe para normar las relaciones entre las personas y los actos de éstas, por lo que ellas son libres de hacer lo que deseen siempre y cuando se ajuste a los parámetros legalmente establecidos. Por último, es menester aclarar que no procede en la acción de inconstitucionalidad analizar el caso concreto de la señorita González Collado en cuanto a su apellido se refiere y su deseo de poseer el del señor Wong, ya que ésta es un caso particular que no procede ser analizada en la acción.
V.Corolario. En mérito de lo expuesto, esta Sala concluye que la norma cuestionada, sea el artículo 106 inciso c) del Código de Familia, no es inconstitucional.”
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