Municipality must resolve stormwater drainage before demolishing wallMunicipalidad debe resolver canalización de aguas pluviales antes de demoler muro

**I.- Subject of the appeal.** The appellant considers her fundamental rights injured, as she indicates that the respondent Municipality did not resolve a problem of ponded water coming from a municipal park that was affecting her property, for which reason she built a wall that they now intend to demolish, to which she does not object but requests that the same materials be returned to her so she can resolve the situation.

**III.- The right of petition, timely resolution, and prompt and complete justice.** The right established in Article 27 of the Constitución Política refers to the power that every citizen has to address, in writing, any public official or official entity in order to present a matter of their interest. As an integral part of its content, and as an important factor for its justiciability, this guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response within a specific timeframe. Thus, if every person has the power to address public bodies in writing so that they may inform or resolve matters of their interest, the Administración Pública is necessarily obligated to respond within a specific timeframe, which in no way implies that the response will be favorable – see, in this regard, judgments numbers 1995-653 and 2000-10447. In this respect, Article 32 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional states:

"When the amparo refers to the right of petition and to obtain a timely resolution, established in Article 27 of the Constitución Política, and there is no established deadline to respond, it shall be understood that the violation occurs once ten business days have elapsed from the date on which the request was filed in the administrative office, without prejudice to the fact that, in the decision of the appeal, reasons given may be considered to deem that timeframe insufficient, given the circumstances and the nature of the matter." In any case, and despite this general rule of ten business days, there are also situations where it must necessarily be assessed whether the time taken by the administration is excessive or not for the purposes of the right to obtain a response – see, in this regard, judgments numbers 2000-37 and 2002-6858-. Indeed, the Chamber has already ruled on the reasonableness of timeframes in the administrative sphere, defining through judgment number 2007-15580, among others, that:

"In this sense, the 'reasonable' nature of the duration of administrative activity is determined on a case-by-case basis based on various elements, such as the technical complexity of the administrative matter, the breadth of the evidence to be gathered, or the degree of impact on the person or the environment of the challenged act, from which it is inferred that there is no strict right to the constitutionalization of timeframes, but rather a right to have constitutional review applied to those actions of the Administración for which there are no sufficient reasons to justify the time taken in resolving some type of administrative proceeding." However, when dealing with administrative claims or appeals – where it is appropriate to apply Article 41 of the Constitución Política – that require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures, it has been defined that the legal timeframe granted to the Administración to resolve these proceedings is that set forth in Article 261 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública – two months –, unless an express rule states otherwise.

**IV.- Regarding the fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services.** This Chamber in its jurisprudence has established that the Constitución Política enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of administered persons to the proper functioning of public services, inferred from the relationship of articles, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8°, 139, subsection 4°, and 191 of the fundamental Law as they encompass, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as "proper functioning of administrative services and units," "proper conduct of the Government," and "efficiency of the administration." There are already numerous rulings in which it has stated that this fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes upon public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. Along this line of thought, in judgment number 2004-07532 of 17:03 hours on July 13, 2004, the following is textually stated:

"(…) our fundamental text enshrines as a fundamental right of individuals the proper functioning of public services; consequently, the principles that inform public services, inasmuch as they make such right effective, have constitutional rank. Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration clearly provides that 'The activity of public entities shall be subject, as a whole, to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need it satisfies, and equality in the treatment of users or beneficiaries.' Continuity implies that the provision of services must not be interrupted; various legal mechanisms of the administrative legal system aim to ensure this principle, such as the prohibition of strikes and work stoppages in essential public services, the theory of unforeseen circumstances to address economic disruptions that may suspend or paralyze public services, the non-attachable nature of public domain property destined for the provision of a public service, etc. Any action—by action or omission—by officials or their lack of foresight in the rational organization of resources that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. Regularity implies that the public service must be provided or performed subject to certain pre-established rules, norms, or conditions. Continuity should not be confused with regularity; the first concept assumes it must function without interruptions, and the second, in adherence to the norms that make up the legal system. Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socioeconomic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to meet the new demands and challenges imposed, whether due to an increase in the volume of demand for the public service or due to technological changes. No entity, body, or public official may allege reasons of budgetary or financial lack, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to cease providing it continuously and regularly. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those who find themselves in the same situation may demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service that is not enunciated in Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration is that of its compulsory nature, since it would be useless to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the providing entity does not have the obligation to provide it. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide the service to anyone who requires it." Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the administration of the local interests and services of each canton corresponds to the municipalities, which is why it is these local entities that are responsible for ensuring proper urban development. From an infra-constitutional standpoint, Article 15 of the Urban Planning Law recognizes the competence and authority of local governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their territory; consequently, and in use of such powers, each municipality may implement a master plan (plan regulador) and the related urban development regulations that are necessary to achieve such ends.

**V.- The specific case**. From the study of the case file and the report rendered under oath, the Chamber has as accredited that on January 16, February 16, March 19, and March 30, all of the year 2007, the petitioner and other neighbors requested help from the respondent authority to build a retaining wall beside her house, since pooled water coming from a municipal park was affecting their properties. However, it was not until the year 2008 that the Social Affairs Committee of the respondent municipality analyzed the denounced issue and determined that it was not possible to respond favorably to the neighbors, since this type of help is granted only in cases of misfortune, and in the present case that was not the reason, but rather it was due to deficiencies in the design and construction process of the development (Urbanización), and therefore, it was the responsibility of the construction company that developed the project. By virtue of this, the protected party proceeded to build the retaining wall, which, based on the technical study of the respondent authority through official communication MSA-DOT-USV-04-193-10, encroaches upon the municipal land with real property folio number 1-52195-000 by approximately 3 meters, for which they were granted a period of five business days to demolish the wall and also the possibility of appealing in accordance with Article 162 of the Municipal Code. Subsequently, on November 16, 2010, the petitioner filed a brief before the respondent Municipality indicating she did not oppose the demolition of the wall; however, she begged that the materials used to build it be returned to her so she could build it again in the proper place, in order to prevent flooding from rainwater from causing part of her house to collapse by undermining the foundations of her property. Based on the foregoing, the respondent Municipality considers it has protected the rights of the protected party; however, this Court does not consider it so, since although it is true that the Committee reached an agreement in 2008, which it notified the petitioner at that time, it ignored the underlying problem that, as part of its obligations, it has the duty to protect—the channeling of rainwater. It is not reasonable for the Chamber that the respondent authority delegates the responsibility for this problem to the project developer, having received the development in apparent compliance with all existing regulations at the proper time. Regarding this inescapable responsibility of the municipalities, the Chamber has specified:

"IV.- On structural aspects of the project's construction. The argument of the respondent Municipality is not disputed, to the effect that the design of a foundation and of a work in its entirety is the responsibility of one or more professionals in the construction field, who must carry out the preliminary studies and others they deem technically pertinent to decide on the foundation design without violating the current regulations governing the matter; **however, this does not relieve the municipal entity of the functions and responsibilities inherent in the exercise of its powers with regard to the control of safety and health aspects of all constructions erected in its jurisdiction**…" (judgment No. 2004-4415) Thus, the relevant discussion in this amparo is not really whether the wall was built within a few meters of the municipal property, but rather the fact that, given a situation that was imperative for the Municipality to resolve, which was the channeling of rainwater and which affected several properties, it did not proceed accordingly, having the duty to do so according to the considerations given, which motivated the protected party's solution by herself. Proof of this is what is indicated in technical study MSA-DOT-APU-USV-04-208-2010 of December 16, 2010, where authorities of the same respondent Municipality recommend building a half-moon ditch between vertices 15 and 4 of the municipal lot, to collect the water and channel it towards the culvert of alameda number 1 of the development Las Promesas (Urbanización Las Promesas), and it is in response to the filing of this appeal that the respondent Mayor reports that they will coordinate with the Directorate of Investments and Works to address this situation in the first quarter of 2011. This municipal inertia in promptly addressing the identified situation is a delay that put the right to property and full environmental protection at risk due to the flooding problem that was common in that sector, and which the petitioner tried to eradicate with the construction in question. Consequently, it is proper to grant the appeal and order the respondent Mayor to stay the demolition order for the retaining wall in question, until the problem of channeling the rainwater that runs through the petitioner's property is effectively resolved. The Chamber has been emphatic in pointing out the fundamental right of citizens to the proper and efficient functioning of public services, that is, that they be provided with high-quality standards, which has as a necessary corollary the obligation of public administrations to provide them continuously, regularly, swiftly, effectively, and efficiently. This latter obligation derives from the systematic relationship of several constitutional precepts, such as Article 140, subsection 8, which imposes upon the Executive Branch the duty to "Monitor the proper functioning of administrative services and agencies," Article 139, subsection 4, insofar as it incorporates the concept of "good operation of the Government," and Article 191 insofar as it incorporates the principle of "efficiency of the administration" (judgment number 2007-4610).

In light of the foregoing and having determined that the respondent authority has not timely and expeditiously fulfilled its duty to safeguard the rights of the amparo petitioner, it is appropriate to grant the amparo (recurso) as set forth in the terms described." From the study of the case file and the report rendered under oath, this Chamber finds it established that on January 16, February 16, March 19, and March 30, all in 2007, the petitioner and other neighbors requested help from the respondent authority to build a retaining wall (muro de retención) alongside her house, since ponded waters originating from a municipal park were affecting their properties. However, it was not until 2008 that the Social Affairs Commission of the respondent municipality analyzed the reported issue and determined that it was not possible to respond favorably to the neighbors, inasmuch as this type of aid is granted only in cases of misfortune, and in the present case that was not the reason; rather, it stemmed from deficiencies in the design and construction process of the Development, and therefore, it was the responsibility of the construction company that developed the project. By virtue of that, the protected party proceeded with the construction of the containment wall, which, based on the technical study of the respondent authority through official communication MSA-DOT-USV-04-193-10, encroaches approximately 3 meters onto the municipal property with real folio number 1-52195-000, for which they were granted a period of five business days to demolish the wall and also the possibility of appealing pursuant to Article 162 of the Municipal Code. Subsequently, on November 16, 2010, the petitioner filed a brief before the respondent Municipality in which she states she does not oppose the demolition of the wall; however, she begs that they please return the materials used so she can rebuild it in the proper location, in order to prevent flooding from stormwater (aguas pluviales) from causing part of her house to collapse by undermining the foundations of her property. Based on the foregoing, the respondent Municipality considers it has protected the rights of the aggrieved party; however, this Court does not consider it so, because although it is true that the Commission adopted a resolution in 2008, which it notified the petitioner at that time, it ignored the underlying problem that, as part of its obligations, it has the duty to protect — the channeling of stormwater. It is not reasonable for this Chamber that the respondent authority delegates responsibility for said problem to the project's development company, having received the development in apparent compliance with all existing regulations at the appropriate time. Regarding this inescapable responsibility of municipalities, this Chamber has specified:

"IV.- On structural aspects of the project's construction. The argument of the respondent Municipality is not disputed, in that the design of a foundation and of a work in its entirety is under the responsibility of one or more professionals in the construction field, who must carry out the preliminary studies and others they deem technically pertinent in order to decide the foundation design without violating the regulations in force governing the matter; **however, this does not relieve the municipal entity of the functions and responsibilities inherent to the exercise of its competencies regarding the control of safety and health aspects of all constructions erected in its jurisdiction**..." (Judgment No. 2004-4415) Thus, the relevant discussion in this amparo action is not really whether the wall was built within a few meters of the municipal property, but rather the fact that, a situation existing that was imperative for the Municipality to resolve — namely, the channeling of stormwater and that was affecting several properties — it did not proceed accordingly, having the duty to do so according to the considerations given, which motivated the aggrieved party's self-help solution. Proof of this is what is indicated in technical study MSA-DOT-APU-USV-04-208-2010 of December 16, 2010, where authorities of the same respondent Municipality recommend building a half-moon ditch (cuneta media luna) between vertices 15 and 4 of the municipal lot, to collect the waters and channel them toward the culvert of alameda number 1 of the Las Promesas Development, and it is in response to the filing of this appeal that the respondent Mayor reports they will coordinate with the Directorate of Investments and Works to address this situation in the first quarter of 2011. This municipal inertia in promptly addressing the identified situation is a delay that put at risk the right to property and the full protection of the environment in the face of the flooding problem that was common in that sector, and which the petitioner attempted to eradicate with the construction in question. Consequently, it is appropriate to grant the appeal and order the respondent Mayor to halt the demolition order of the retaining wall in question, until such time as he effectively resolves the problem of channeling the stormwater that flows across the petitioner's property. This Chamber has been emphatic in pointing out the fundamental right of the administered to the good and efficient functioning of public services, that is, that they be rendered with high quality standards, which has as its necessary corollary the obligation of public administrations to provide them in a continuous, regular, swift, effective, and efficient manner. This last obligation follows from the systematic relationship of several constitutional precepts, such as Article 140, subsection 8, which imposes upon the Executive Branch the duty to "Oversee the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies," Article 139, subsection 4), insofar as it incorporates the concept of "proper conduct of the Government," and Article 191 to the extent that it incorporates the principle of "efficiency of the administration" (Judgment number 2007-4610). By reason of the foregoing, and having determined that the respondent authority has not timely and with celerity fulfilled its duty to safeguard the rights of the aggrieved party, it is appropriate to declare the appeal with merit in the terms set forth."

“I.- Objeto del recurso. La recurrente considera lesionados sus derechos fundamentales, por cuanto señala que la Municipalidad recurrida no resolvió un problema de aguas empozadas provenientes de un parque municipal que afectaba su propiedad, por lo que construyó un muro que ahora pretenden demoler, a lo cual no se opone pero pide que se le devuelvan los mismos materiales para poder resolver la situación.

III.- El derecho de petición, pronta resolución y justicia pronta y cumplida. El derecho establecido en el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política hace referencia a la facultad que posee todo ciudadano para dirigirse, por escrito, a cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial con el fin de exponer un asunto de su interés. Como parte integrante de su contenido, y como factor importante para su justiciabilidad, esta garantía se complementa con el derecho a obtener pronta respuesta dentro de un plazo determinado. De manera que si toda persona tiene la facultad de dirigirse por escrito a los órganos públicos a fin de que éstos le informen o resuelvan asuntos de su interés, la Administración Pública necesariamente estará en la obligación de contestarle dentro de un plazo concreto, lo cual no supone en modo alguno que la contestación será favorable –ver, en este sentido, sentencias números 1995-653 y 2000-10447. Al respecto, el artículo 32 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional señala:

“Cuando el amparo se refiera al derecho de petición y de obtener pronta resolución, establecido en el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política, y no hubiere plazo señalado para contestar, se entenderá que la violación se produce una vez transcurridos diez días hábiles desde la fecha en que fue presentada la solicitud en la oficina administrativa, sin perjuicio de que, en la decisión del recurso, se aprecien razones que se aduzcan para considerar insuficiente ese plazo, entendidas las circunstancias y la índole del asunto”.

En todo caso, y a pesar de esta regla general de los diez días hábiles, también existen supuestos donde se debe valorar, necesariamente, si el plazo tomado por la administración resulta excesivo o no a los efectos del derecho de obtener una respuesta –ver, en este sentido, sentencias números 2000-37 y 2002-6858-. En efecto, la Sala se ha pronunciado ya sobre la razonabilidad de los plazos en sede administrativa, definiendo mediante sentencia número 2007-15580, entre otras, que:

“En este sentido, el carácter “razonable” de la duración de la actividad administrativa se determina casuísticamente con base en diversos elementos, tales como la complejidad técnica del asunto administrativo, la amplitud de la prueba por evacuar o el grado de afectación a la persona o al ambiente del acto impugnado, de lo cual se infiere que no existe un derecho estricto a la constitucionalización de los plazos, sino más bien un derecho a que se aplique el control de constitucionalidad sobre aquellas actuaciones de la Administración, en las cuales no existan motivos suficientes para justificar el tiempo demorado en la solución de algún tipo de gestión administrativa.” Sin embargo, cuando se trata de reclamos o recursos administrativos -donde lo procedente es aplicar el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política- que requieren un procedimiento para verificar los hechos que han de servir de motivo al acto final, así como adoptar las medidas probatorias pertinentes, se ha definido que el plazo legal otorgado a la Administración para resolver éstas gestiones es el dispuesto en el artículo 261 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública –dos meses-, salvo norma expresa en contrario.

IV.- Sobre el derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos. Esta Sala en su jurisprudencia ha establecido que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico, que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, que se infiere de la relación de los numerales, interpretados a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el "buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas", "buena marcha del Gobierno" y "eficiencia de la administración". Son ya numerosos los fallos en los que ha dicho que este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. En esta línea de pensamiento, en la sentencia número 2004-07532 de las 17:03 horas del 13 de julio de 2004 se lee, textualmente lo siguiente:

"(…) nuestro texto fundamental recoge como derecho fundamental de las personas el del buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, consecuentemente los principios que informan los servicios públicos en cuanto hacen efectivo tal derecho tienen un rango constitucional. El ordinal 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone claramente que "La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad en el trato de los destinatarios o beneficiarios". La continuidad supone que la prestación de los servicios no se debe interrumpir, diversos mecanismos jurídicos del ordenamiento administrativo pretenden asegurar este principio, tales como la prohibición de la huelga y de paro en los servicios públicos esenciales, la teoría de la imprevisión para hacerle frente a los trastornos económicos que pueden suspender o paralizar los servicios públicos, el carácter inembargable de los bienes dominicales destinados a la prestación de un servicio público, etc.. Cualquier actuación -por acción u omisión- de los funcionarios o imprevisión de éstos en la organización racional de los recursos que propenda a interrumpir un servicio público es abiertamente antijurídica. La regularidad implica que el servicio público debe prestarse o realizarse con sujeción a ciertas reglas, normas o condiciones preestablecidas. No debe confundirse la continuidad con la regularidad, el primer concepto supone que debe funcionar sin interrupciones y el segundo con apego a las normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico. La adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o a las necesidades impuestas por el contexto socioeconómico significa que los entes y órganos administrativos deben tener capacidad de previsión y, sobre todo, de programación o planificación para hacerle frente a las nuevas exigencias y retos impuestos, ya sea por el aumento en el volumen de la demanda del servicio público o bien por los cambios tecnológicos. Ningún ente, órgano o funcionario público pueden aducir razones de carencia presupuestaria o financiera, ausencia de equipos, falta de renovación tecnológica de éstos, exceso o saturación de la demanda en el servicio público para dejar de prestarlo de forma continua y regular. La igualdad o universalidad en el acceso demanda que todos los habitantes tienen derecho a exigir, recibir y usar el servicio público en igualdad de condiciones y de conformidad con las normas que los rigen, consecuentemente, todos los que se encuentran en una misma situación pueden exigir idénticas ventajas. Uno de los principios rectores del servicio público que no se encuentra enunciado en el artículo 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública lo constituye el de su obligatoriedad, puesto que, de nada serviría afirmar que deben ser continuos, regulares, uniformes y generales si el sujeto prestador no tiene la obligación de prestarlo. La administración pública prestadora del servicio público no puede escoger su clientela o usuarios, debe brindárselo a cualquiera que se lo requiera." Asimismo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, la administración de los intereses y servicios locales de cada cantón, corresponde a las municipalidades, razón por la cual es a tales entes locales a los que le corresponde velar por el adecuado desarrollo urbano. Desde el punto de vista infraconstitucional, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana reconoce la competencia y autoridad de los gobiernos locales para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su territorio, consecuentemente y en uso de tales facultades, cada una de las municipalidades, puede implementar un plan regulador y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano conexos que sean necesarios para la consecución de tales fines.

V.- El caso concreto. Del estudio de los autos y del informe rendido bajo fe de juramento, la Sala tiene por acreditado que el 16 de enero, 16 de febrero, 19 de marzo y el 30 de marzo todos del año 2007, la recurrente y otros vecinos solicitaron a ayuda a la autoridad recurrida para construir un muro de retención a un lado de su casa, ya que las aguas empozadas provenientes de un parque municipal afectaban sus propiedades. Sin embargo es hasta en el año 2008 que la Comisión de Asuntos Sociales de la municipalidad recurrida analizó el tema denunciado y determinó que no era posible responder favorablemente a los vecinos, toda vez que este tipo de ayudas se otorgan únicamente en caso de infortunio, y en el presente caso ese no era el motivo, sino que obedecía a deficiencias en el diseño y proceso constructivo de la Urbanización, y que por lo tanto, era responsabilidad de la empresa constructora que desarrolló el proyecto. En virtud de ello es que la amparada procede a la construcción del muro de contención, que con fundamento en el estudio técnico de la autoridad recurrida mediante oficio MSA-DOT-USV-04-193-10, invade en aproximadamente 3 metros el terreno municipal con folio real número 1-52195-000, por lo cual se les otorgó un plazo de cinco días hábiles para demoler la tapia y también, la posibilidad de recurrir conforme lo establece el artículo 162 del Código Municipal. Posteriormente, el 16 de noviembre de 2010 la recurrente presentó un escrito ante la Municipalidad recurrida en la que indica no oponerse a la demolición de la pared, no obstante le ruega que por favor le devuelvan los materiales utilizados para hacerlo de nuevo en el lugar correspondiente, con el objeto de evitar que las inundaciones por aguas pluviales derrumbaran parte de su casa, al falsear los cimientos de su propiedad. Con fundamento en lo expuesto la Municipalidad recurrida considera haber tutelado los derechos de la amparada, sin embargo este Tribunal no lo considera así, por cuanto si bien es cierto la Comisión tomó un acuerdo en el año 2008, que notificó a la recurrente en aquella oportunidad, hizo caso omiso al problema de fondo que como parte de sus obligaciones tiene el deber de tutelar - la canalización de las aguas pluviales-. No resulta razonable para la Sala, que la autoridad recurrida delegue la responsabilidad de dicha problemática en la empresa desarrolladora del proyecto, habiendo recibido la urbanización en aparente cumplimiento de toda la normativa existente en su debida oportunidad. Respecto a esta responsabilidad ineludible de las municipalidades, la Sala ha precisado:

“IV.- Sobre aspectos estructurales de la construcción del proyecto. No se discute el argumento de la Municipalidad recurrida, en punto a que el diseño de una fundación y de una obra en su totalidad está bajo responsabilidad de uno o más profesionales en el campo de la construcción, quienes deben realizar los estudios preliminares y otros que estimen técnicamente pertinentes para poder decidir el diseño de las cimentaciones sin violentar la normativa vigente que regula la materia; sin embargo, ello no releva al ente municipal de las funciones y responsabilidades inherentes al ejercicio de sus competencias en lo que se refiere al control de aspectos seguridad y salubridad de todas las construcciones que se levantan en su jurisdicción…” (sentencia No. 2004-4415) De manera que la discusión relevante de este amparo, no es en realidad si el muro se construyó dentro de algunos metros de la propiedad municipal, sino en el hecho de que, existiendo una situación que resultaba imperativa para el Municipio resolver, que era la canalización de las aguas pluviales y que afectaba varias propiedades, no procedió de conformidad, teniendo el deber de hacerlo según las consideraciones dadas, lo que motivó la solución de la amparada por sí misma. Prueba de ello es lo señalado en el estudio técnico MSA-DOT-APU-USV-04-208-2010 del 16 de diciembre de 2010, donde autoridades de la misma Municipalidad recurrida recomiendan construir una cuneta media luna entre los vértices 15 al 4 del lote municipal, para recoger las aguas y encausarlas hacia el caño de la alameda número 1 de la Urbanización Las Promesas, y es en atención a la presentación de este recurso, que el Alcalde recurrido informa que van a coordinar con la Dirección de Inversiones y Obras para atender esta situación en el primer trimestre del año 2011. Esta inercia municipal para la pronta atención de la situación identificada, es una dilación que puso en riesgo el derecho de propiedad y la plena protección al ambiente ante el problema de inundaciones que resultaba común en ese sector, y que trató de erradicar la recurrente con la construcción en cuestión. En consecuencia procede estimar el recurso y ordenar al Alcalde recurrido detener la orden de demolición del muro de contención en cuestión, hasta tanto resuelva en forma efectiva el problema de canalización de las aguas pluviales que discurren por la propiedad de la recurrente. La Sala ha sido enfática en señalar el derecho fundamental de los administrados al buen y eficiente funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, esto es, que sean prestados con elevados estándares de calidad, el cual tiene como correlato necesario la obligación de las administraciones públicas de prestarlos de forma continua, regular, célere, eficaz y eficiente. Esta última obligación se desprende de la relación sistemática de varios preceptos constitucionales, tales como el 140, inciso 8, el cual le impone al Poder Ejecutivo el deber de “Vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, el 139, inciso 4), en cuanto incorpora el concepto de “buena marcha del Gobierno” y el 191 en la medida que incorpora el principio de “eficiencia de la administración” (sentencia número 2007-4610). En razón de lo expuesto y habiéndose determinado que la autoridad recurrida no ha cumplido oportunamente y con celeridad su deber de velar por los derechos de la amparada, procede declarar con lugar el recurso según los términos señalados.”