Due Process in Judicial Branch Disciplinary ProceedingDebido proceso en procedimiento disciplinario del Poder Judicial

“I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The appellant considered that his represented parties’ right to due process (debido proceso) had been violated, since, in his opinion, the ruling of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, which upheld the complaint against the protected parties, not only lacks proper reasoning (debida fundamentación) but is also incongruent, disproportionate, and unreasonable. In addition, there is no coherence in the Superior Council’s resolution, No. 102-10, held on November 18, 2010, Article XXII, which confirmed the appealed administrative act insofar as it upheld the complaint and classified the misconduct as serious.

III.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONGRUENCE. This Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 2006-05754 of 11:56 a.m. on April 28, 2006, drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo, ruled on the dispositive principle (principio dispositivo) and the congruence of administrative resolutions, holding, in relevant part, the following:

“(…) V.- ON THE DISPOSITIVE PRINCIPLE. Regarding the alleged violation of this principle, it should be noted that the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) regulates, in its ‘Second Book’, the general principles of the administrative procedure, whose purpose is the ascertainment of the real truth (verdad real). Although, in principle, the administrative proceeding is conducted based on the grounds proposed by the promoter, nothing prevents new facts from being known, in exercise of the broad powers of the investigating body to ascertain the material truth (verdad material). This is evident from the interplay of Articles 214, 221, and 297 of that Law, which, to that effect, provide the following:

“.Article 214.- 1.- (…)

2.- Its most important purpose is the verification of the real truth of the facts that serve as the grounds for the final act” “Article 221.- 1.- In the administrative procedure, the facts serving as the grounds for the final act must be verified in the most faithful and complete manner possible, for which the directing body must adopt all pertinent or necessary evidentiary measures, even if they have not been proposed by the parties and even against the will of the latter.” Furthermore, Article 297, paragraph 1), prescribes the following:

“Article 2197.- 1.- The Administration shall order and execute all necessary evidentiary proceedings to determine the real truth of the facts subject to the process, on its own motion (de oficio) or at the request of a party.

2.- (…)” Under this reasoning, in administrative proceedings where clear public interests are at stake, the dispositive principle and the principle of congruence do not apply. That principle is applicable, solely and exclusively, in disciplinary proceedings, which are even often preceded by a preliminary investigation that helps to clearly define, from the outset, the charges or misconducts imputed to an official (…)”.

It was proven that by virtue of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal's ruling of 10:55 a.m. on June 5, 2009, the opening of a disciplinary administrative proceeding against the protected parties and the notification of charges (traslado de cargos) were ordered, to determine the real truth of the facts imputed, namely, the following: “improper conduct and violation of Article 156 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica)” (folios 21-24 of the copies of the administrative file). It is also recorded that by resolution of that Tribunal, No. 265-2010 of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, the misconduct committed by the protected parties – having participated in illegal financial intermediation in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica – was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed (copy at folios 25-28). As can be seen, from the order notifying charges, the protected parties were informed that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is consistent with the sanction finally imposed. In addition to the foregoing, the reproached conducts were delimited in both resolutions.

IV.- ON PROPER REASONING (DEBIDA FUNDAMENTACIÓN). By resolution of that Tribunal, No. 265-2010 of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, the misconduct committed by the protected parties – having participated in illegal financial intermediation in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica – was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed, holding, in relevant part, the following:

“(…) the activity deployed by all the defendants, borrower and creditors, savers (ahorrantes) or investors, has incurred in very serious misconduct, since all should know that this activity can only be carried out with authorization and under the supervision of the General Superintendency (sic) of Financial Entities, according to the Organic Law of the Central Bank and its regulations, besides which the fatal result of the activity has caused anxiety among themselves and, in general, within the sphere of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), since it was of public knowledge and no one can understand that, given the quality and profession of the ‘savers' (ahorrantes), these would fall into such a trap, which has caused, certainly, a deserved ridicule, because they better than anyone should know that greater profitability entails greater risk and that the inordinate eagerness for profit is highly dangerous (…)” (copy at folios 25-28).

As can be seen, the resolution is duly reasoned.

V.- ON THE PROPORTIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED. This Chamber, in repeated pronouncements, has indicated that this principle constitutes even a parameter of constitutionality for acts subject to public law (laws, regulations (reglamentos), and administrative acts in general), which is why it has concerned itself with its analysis and development. Following German doctrine, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 9:50 a.m. on June 12, 1998, it stated the following:

“(…) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person.

Strict proportionality provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be suitable and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be “unreasonable to demand” of the individual (…).” In Voto No. 8858-98 of 16:33 hrs. of December 15, 1998, this Court again mentioned the referred components, stating the following:

“(…) An act that limits rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The **necessity** of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if such action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. **Suitability**, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, **proportionality** refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. (…).” In Voto No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hrs. of July 1, 1992, this Chamber considered that a distinction must be made between the following:

“(…) technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. (…).” It is worth noting that the principle of reasonableness and proportionality plays a leading role in Administrative Law, as it is projected in various areas. Thus, it is of vital importance as a limit on the exercise of administrative discretion, as the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that discretionary administrative acts may not be issued contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience (articles 16, paragraph 1, 158, paragraph 4, and 160). Regarding the constitutive elements of an objective material nature (motive, content, and purpose), a proportional relationship must exist among them, thus for a specific disciplinary fault of an official—motive—there must be a proportionate sanction—verbal or written reprimand, suspension, or dismissal—, in that sense article 132, paragraph 2, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that the content “Must be (…) proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the motive, when both are regulated.” In the field of administrative sanctioning law and tax law, the principle of proportionality and reasonableness is decisive to avoid exorbitant or disproportionate sanctions or taxes. As can be appreciated, from the order of notice of charges (auto de traslado de cargos), the petitioners were made aware that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is consistent with the sanction ultimately imposed. In this sense, the imposed sanction is not only within the parameters provided for the committed fault, but also conforms to the interest it sought to protect.- **VI.- ON THE ALLEGED INCOHERENCE AND THE OMISSION TO ASSESS THE EVIDENCE GATHERED.** These disagreements are matters of ordinary legality that must be discussed in the corresponding venues.

**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.-” of **March 17, 2010**, the offense committed by the petitioners—having participated in illegal financial intermediation (intermediación financiera) in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica—was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed, considering the following, in relevant part:

“(…) the activity carried out by all the defendants, borrower and creditors, savers (ahorrantes) or investors, have incurred a very serious offense, since everyone must know that this activity can only be carried out with authorization and under the supervision of the General Superintendency (sic) of Financial Entities, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank and its regulations, in addition to the fact that the fatal result of the activity has caused unease among themselves and, in general, within the sphere of the Judiciary, since it was of public knowledge and no one can explain how, given the standing and profession of the “savers (ahorrantes)”, they fell into such a trap, which has certainly caused deserved mockery, because they better than anyone should know that higher returns entail higher risk and that the excessive desire for profit is highly dangerous (…)” (copy at folios 25-28).

As can be seen, the resolution is duly reasoned.

**V.- ON THE PROPORTIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS (RAZONABILIDAD) OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED.** This Chamber, in repeated pronouncements, has indicated that this principle even constitutes a parameter of constitutionality for acts subject to public law (laws, regulations, and administrative acts in general), for which reason it has concerned itself with its analysis and development. Following German doctrine, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability (idoneidad), necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Voto No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it stated the following:

“(…) Legitimacy refers to the objective sought by the challenged act or provision not being, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability (idoneidad) indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person. Proportionality in the strict sense stipulates that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be ‘inexigible’ to the individual (…).” In Voto No. 8858-98 of 16:33 hrs. on December 15, 1998, this Tribunal again mentioned the referred components, stating the following:

“(…) An act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable (idóneo), and proportional. The **necessity** of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community - or of a specific group - through the adoption of a measure of differentiation. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable either, and therefore constitutionally valid. **Suitability (idoneidad)**, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability (inidoneidad) of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, with some of them possibly fulfilling the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, **proportionality** refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained thereby for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second proceeds from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. (…).” In Voto No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hrs. on July 1, 1992, this Chamber considered that a distinction must be made between the following:

“(…) technical reasonableness (razonabilidad), which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad), or the conformity to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or implied by it; and finally, reasonableness (razonabilidad) of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights limitations or burdens other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. (…).” It should be noted that the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality plays a leading role in Administrative Law, projecting itself in various areas. Thus, it is of vital importance as a limit to the exercise of administrative discretion, as the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that discretionary administrative acts may not be issued contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience (articles 16, paragraph 1, 158, paragraph 4, and 160). Regarding the constituent elements of an objective material nature (grounds, content, and purpose), a relationship of proportionality must exist between them, so for a specific disciplinary offense of an official —grounds— there must be a proportionate sanction —verbal or written warning, suspension, or dismissal—, in this sense article 132, paragraph 2, of the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that the content “Must be (…) proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the grounds, when both are regulated.” In the field of administrative sanctioning law and tax law, the principle of proportionality and reasonableness (razonabilidad) is decisive to avoid exorbitant or disproportionate sanctions or taxes. As can be seen, from the notice of charges, the petitioners were informed that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is in accordance with the sanction finally imposed. In this sense, the sanction imposed is not only within the parameters provided for the offense committed, but also conforms to the interest it sought to protect.- **VI.- ON THE CLAIMED INCOHERENCE AND THE OMISSION TO ASSESS THE COLLECTED EVIDENCE.** These disagreements are matters of ordinary legality that must be discussed in the corresponding avenues.

**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** As a corollary to the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.-“

“I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El recurrente estimó transgredido el derecho al debido proceso de sus representados, pues, en su criterio, la resolución del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, que declaró con lugar la queja seguida contra los amparados, no solo carece de la debida fundamentación, sino que es incongruente, desproporcionada e irrazonable. Aunado a lo anterior, no existe coherencia en la resolución del Consejo Superior, Nº 102-10, celebrada el 18 de noviembre de 2010, artículo XXII, que confirmó el acto administrativo recurrido en cuanto declaró con lugar la queja y calificó la falta de grave.

III.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE CONGRUENCIA. Este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto Nº 2006-05754 de las 11:56 hrs. de 28 de abril de 2006, con redacción del Magistrado Jinesta Lobo, se pronunció sobre el principio dispositivo y la congruencia de las resoluciones administrativas, estimando, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente:

“(…) V.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DISPOSITIVO. Respecto de la presunta violación a este principio, conviene señalar que la Ley General de la Administración Pública regula, en su "Libro Segundo" los principios generales del procedimiento administrativo, cuyo objeto es la averiguación de la verdad real. Aunque en principio, el desalojo administrativo se tramita sobre la base de la causal propuesta por el promoverte, nada impide que se conozcan hechos nuevos, en ejercicio de las amplias facultades del órgano instructor para averiguar la verdad material. Así se desprende, de la relación de los artículos 214, 221 y 297 de esa Ley, que al efecto disponen lo siguiente:

“.Artículo 214.- 1.- (…)

2.- Su objeto más importante es la verificación de la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al acto final” “Artículo 221.- 1.- En el procedimiento administrativo deberá verificar los hechos que sirven de motivo al acto final en la forma más fiel y completa posible, para lo cual el órgano que o dirige deberá adoptar todas las medidas probatorias pertinentes o necesarias, aún si no han sido propuestas por las partes y aún contra la voluntad de éstas últimas”.

A mayor abundamiento, el artículo 297, párrafo 1), prescribe lo siguiente:

“Artículo 2197.- 1.- La Administración ordenará y practicará todas las diligencias de prueba necesarias para determinar la verdad real de los hechos objeto del trámite, de oficio o a petición de parte.

2.- (…)” Bajo esta inteligencia, en los procedimientos administrativos al estar empeñados claros intereses públicos, no rige el principio dispositivo y la congruencia. Ese principio resulta predicable, única y exclusivamente, en los procedimientos disciplinarios, los cuales, incluso suelen estar precedidos de una investigación preliminar que coadyuva a definir claramente, desde un principio, los cargos o faltas que se le imputan a un funcionario (…)”.

Se acreditó que mediante la resolución del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial de las 10:55 hrs. de 5 de junio de 2009, se dispuso la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario en contra de los amparados y el traslado de cargos, para determinar la verdad real de los hechos imputados, a saber, lo siguiente: “conducta impropia y violación del artículo 156 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica” (folios 21- 24 de las copias del expediente administrativo). También, consta que por resolución de ese Tribunal, Nº 265-2010 de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, se calificó de grave la falta cometida por los amparados –haber participado en una ilegal intermediación financiera con violación a las reglas atinentes de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica- e impuso la sanción de ocho días de suspensión sin goce de salario (copia a folios 25- 28). Como se puede apreciar, desde el auto de traslado de cargos, se les hizo saber a los amparados que los hechos reprochados podrían calificarse como graves, lo que resulta conforme con la sanción finalmente impuesta. Aunado a lo anterior, en ambas resoluciones se delimitaron las conductas reprochadas.

IV.- SOBRE LA DEBIDA FUNDAMENTACIÓN. Por resolución de ese Tribunal, Nº 265-2010 de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, se calificó de grave la falta comedida por los amparados –haber participado en una ilegal intermediación financiera con violación a las reglas atinentes de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica- e impuso la sanción de ocho días de suspensión sin goce de salario, estimando en lo que interesa, lo siguiente:

“(…) la actividad desplegada por todos los encausados, prestatario y acreedores, ahorrantes o inversionistas, han incurrido en falta muy grave, puesto que todos han de saber que esa actividad solo se puede realizar con autorización y bajo la supervisión de la Superintendencia general (sic) de Entidades Financieras, conforma la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central y sus reglamentos, además de que el fatal resultado de la actividad ha causado zozobra en ellos mismo y, en general, en el ámbito del Poder Judicial, puesto que fue de conocimiento público y nadie se explica que, dada la calidad y la profesión de los “ahorrantes”, estos fueran a caer en semejante trampa, lo que ha ocasionado, ciertamente, un merecido ludibrio, pues ellos mejor que nadie han de saber que a mayor rentabilidad hay mayor riego y que el desmesurado afán de lucro es altamente peligroso (…)” (copia a folios 25- 28).

Como se puede apreciar, la resolución se encuentra debidamente motivada.

V.- SOBRE LA PROPORCIONALIDAD Y RAZONABILIDAD DE LA SANCIÓN IMPUESTA. Esta Sala, en reiterados pronunciamientos, ha indicado que este principio constituye, incluso, un parámetro de constitucionalidad de los actos sujetos al derecho público (leyes, reglamentos y actos administrativos en general), razón por la cual, se ha preocupado de su análisis y desarrollo. Siguiendo la doctrina alemana, esta Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los componentes básicos de la proporcionalidad lo son la legitimidad, la idoneidad, la necesidad y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Así, en el Voto No. 3933-98 de las 09:50 hrs. del 12 de junio de 1998, indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado, no debe estar al menos legalmente prohibido. La idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido. La necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona. La proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, es decir, no le sea "inexigible" al individuo (…).” En el Voto No. 8858-98 de las 16:33 hrs. del 15 de diciembre de 1998, este Tribunal volvió a mencionar los componentes referidos, al indicar lo siguiente:

“(…) Un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad - o de un determinado grupo - mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los dos últimos elementos, podría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que el segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados. (…).” En el Voto No. 1739-92 de las 11:45 hrs. del 1° de julio de 1992, esta Sala estimó que debe distinguirse entre lo siguiente:

“(…) razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad. (…).” Conviene indicar que el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad cumple un rol de primer orden en el Derecho Administrativo, al proyectarse en diversos ámbitos. Así, es de vital importancia como límite al ejercicio de la discrecionalidad administrativa, al establecer la Ley General de la Administración Pública que no podrán dictarse actos administrativos discrecionales contrarios a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica, o a los principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia (artículos 16, párrafo 1°, 158, párrafo 4° y 160). En materia de los elementos constitutivos de índole material objetivo (motivo, contenido y fin), debe existir una relación de proporcionalidad entre los mismos, así para una falta disciplinaria específica de un funcionario –motivo- debe existir una sanción proporcionada –amonestación verbal o escrita, suspensión o destitución-, en tal sentido el artículo 132, párrafo 2°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que el contenido “Deberá ser (…) proporcionado al fin legal y correspondiente al motivo, cuando ambos se hallen regulados”. En el terreno del derecho administrativo sancionador y del derecho tributario, el principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad es determinante para evitar sanciones o tributos desorbitados o desproporcionados. Como se puede apreciar, desde el auto de traslado de cargos, se les hizo saber a los amparados que los hechos reprochados podrían calificarse como graves, lo que resulta conforme con la sanción finalmente impuesta. En este sentido, la sanción impuesta no solo se encuentra dentro de los parámetros dispuestos para la falta cometida, sino que se adecua al interés que pretendía proteger.- VI.- SOBRE LA INCOHERENCIA RECLAMADA Y LA OMISIÓN DE VALORAR LA PRUEBA RECABADA. Esas disconformidades, son extremos de legalidad ordinaria que deben ser discutidos en las vías correspondientes.

VII.- CONCLUSIÓN.- Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso.-“