Extension of expired pretrial detention and duty of judicial diligencePrórroga de prisión preventiva vencida y deber de diligencia judicial

**I.- Object of the appeal.-** The appellant, the Public Defender of Roger González Barrantes, filed this appeal because, as he asserted, the Criminal Court of San José extended the pretrial detention one day after it had expired. He argued that an expired precautionary measure cannot be extended; consequently, the Court's decision must be annulled, and he so requested from this Chamber.

**III.- On the merits.** From the documentary evidence submitted to the case file, as well as from the reports rendered by the Judge of the Criminal Court and the Judge of the Criminal Tribunal, both of the First Judicial Circuit of San José –which are given under the solemnity of an oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional– it is clearly evident that the Criminal Court's omission to decide on whether or not to extend the precautionary measure of pretrial detention imposed on the protected party prior to its expiration –which occurred on December 5, 2010– is arbitrary and curtails his personal liberty. The Criminal Judge transfers this omission to the auxiliary clerk by stating “(...) When I, in my capacity as Judge, come to hear the matter, I perceive an error in the case file number, with the unfortunate coincidence that there is another case file in the office against the same defendant but whose precautionary measure was not about to expire at that moment, so the clerk in charge filed it in the wrong case file, and then the request for extension did not appear in the correct case (...).” In a Constitutional State, if any type of justice needs to be vested with extreme guarantees to ensure there is no judicial arbitrariness or illegality, it is criminal justice. In this sphere, as in no other, the judge, who is a judge of guarantees, must not foster violations of fundamental rights. The criminal adjudicator must be especially cautious so as not to disregard the principles on which this form of administration of justice is founded, set forth in Articles 41 of the Constitución Política and 4 of the Código Procesal Penal. For the purpose of safeguarding a fundamental right as important as liberty, this Tribunal cannot accept it being said that the auxiliary clerk misfiled the Public Ministry's request, for in reiterated case law, this Chamber has warned about the diligence criminal judges must observe in cases where there is an imprisoned defendant. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the period during which the protected party was detained without a jurisdictional resolution from a competent authority ordering such, constitutes an illegitimate deprivation of his liberty which compels this Chamber to grant the appeal. Note that the pretrial detention expired on December fifth, and it was not until a resolution at sixteen hundred hours on December seventh that the extension of the defendant's pretrial detention for a period of three months was ordered. That being said, at the time this habeas corpus appeal was filed, the situation of the ward was already defined, since the extension had already been issued. Consequently, ordering his release is not appropriate. From the same resolution that decrees it, it is evident that reasons do exist to maintain the precautionary measure. Indeed, the probability of the protected party's participation in the events is maintained and the danger of obstruction has not been refuted. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the precautionary measure subsist.

In this realm, as in no other, the judge, who is a judge of guarantees, must not foster violations of fundamental rights. The criminal judge must be especially cautious, so as not to disregard the principles upon which this form of administration of justice is founded, set forth in Article 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and Article 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). For the purpose of safeguarding a fundamental right as important as liberty, this Court cannot accept the claim that the auxiliary misplaced the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), since in reiterated jurisprudence, the Chamber (Sala) has warned about the diligence that criminal judges must observe in cases where there is an imprisoned accused. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber (Sala) considers that the period in which the petitioner was detained without a jurisdictional resolution from a competent authority ordering such, constitutes an illegitimate deprivation of his liberty that compels the Chamber (Sala) to grant the appeal. Note that the pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) expired on December fifth, and it was not until a ruling at sixteen hundred hours on December seventh that the extension of the pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) of the accused was ordered for a period of three months. However, at the time this habeas corpus appeal was filed, the situation of the protected individual was already defined, since the extension had already been ordered. Consequently, ordering his release is not appropriate. From the same resolution that decrees it, it is clear that there are indeed reasons to maintain the precautionary measure (medida cautelar). In effect, the probability of the petitioner's participation in the facts persists and the risk of obstruction has not been disproven. The circumstances that led to ordering the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) remain."

“I.- Objeto del recurso.- El recurrente, Defensor Público de Roger González Barrantes, interpuso este recurso, porque, según aseguró, el Juzgado Penal de San José prorrogó la prisión preventiva un día después de que estuviera vencida. Alegó que no cabe prorrogar una medida cautelar vencida; en consecuencia, la decisión del Juzgado debe anularse y así lo solicitó a esta Sala.

III.- Sobre el fondo. De la prueba documental allegada a los autos, como de los informes rendidos por el Juez del Juzgado Penal y el Juez del Tribunal Penal, ambos del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José –que es dado bajo la solemnidad del juramento, con oportuno apercibimiento de las consecuencias, incluso penales, previstas en el artículo 44 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional– se desprende, con toda claridad, que la omisión del Juzgado Penal de resolver acerca de la prorroga o no de la medida cautelar de prisión preventiva impuesta al amparado con anterioridad a su vencimiento –lo que se produjo el cinco de diciembre de dos mil diez– es arbitraria y cercena su libertad personal. Esta omisión la traslada el Juez Penal, al auxiliar al indicar “(…) Cuando entro en mi condición de Juez a conocer del asunto percibo un error en el número de expediente, con la penosa coincidencia de que existe otro expediente en el despacho contra el mismo imputado pero cuya medida cautelar no estaba para el momento presta a vencer, así el auxiliar encargado lo archivó en el expediente equivocado, y no apareció entonces solicitud de prórroga en la causa correcta (…)”. En un Estado Constitucional, si algún tipo de justicia necesita estar revestida de garantías extremas para asegurar que no haya arbitrariedad judicial o ilegalidad es la justicia penal. En este ámbito, como en ninguno otro, el juez, que es juez de garantías, no debe propiciar vulneraciones a los derechos fundamentales. El juzgador penal debe ser especialmente cauteloso, a fin de no desconocer los principios en que se funda esta forma de administración de justicia, dispuesta en los artículos 41 de la Constitución Política y 4 del Código Procesal Penal. Para efectos del resguardo de un derecho fundamental tan importante como lo es la libertad, este Tribunal no puede aceptar que se diga que el auxiliar traspapeló la solicitud del Ministerio Público, pues en reiterada jurisprudencia, la Sala ha advertido sobre la diligencia que deben observar los jueces penales en las causas que exista reo preso. En virtud de lo anterior, la Sala estima que el plazo en que el amparado estuvo detenido sin que hubiere resolución jurisdiccional de autoridad competente que así lo dispusiere, constituye una privación ilegítima a su libertad que obliga a la Sala a estimar el recurso. Véase que la prisión preventiva venció el cinco de diciembre y fue hasta por resolución de las dieciséis horas del siete de diciembre que se ordenó la prórroga de la prisión preventiva del imputado por el plazo de tres meses. Ahora bien, al momento de interponerse este recurso de hábeas corpus, ya la situación del tutelado estaba definida, pues ya se había dictado la prórroga. Por consiguiente, no procede ordenar su libertad. De la misma resolución que la decreta, se desprende que sí existen razones para mantener la medida cautelar. En efecto, se mantiene la probabilidad de la participación del amparado en los hechos y no ser desvirtuado el peligro de obstaculización. Las circunstancias que condujeron a dictar la medida cautelar subsisten.”