Amparo against municipal inaction on stormwater floodingAmparo por inacción municipal ante inundaciones de aguas pluviales

**I.- Purpose of the remedy (amparo).** The petitioner considers his fundamental rights infringed, particularly those contained in Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, by virtue of the fact that the Municipality of Liberia decided to modify the course of the stormwater (aguas pluviales) that runs through the public street located on the northern boundary of the protected party's property, for which it constructed a culvert (alcantarilla) and as a consequence, a huge ditch formed where water stagnates, creating a danger due to the proliferation of diseases, and furthermore, said waters flood her property causing constant erosion. He adds that for this reason, on the past 21st of April, he addressed a note to the Mayor but to date it has also not been answered.

**IV.- Regarding the State's objective obligation to safeguard human life.** On this point, this Constitutional Court, in judgment number 2003-011519 at 10:30 a.m. on October 10, 2003, recognized the following:

"(…)It has been usual for the right to life, frequently analyzed together with the right to physical integrity, to have been understood as a right of negative content, that is, its object was limited to the claim against the State that it (sic) refrain from carrying out actions directed at eliminating the physical existence of persons, for example torture or the death penalty, or that it punish persons, public and private, who threaten the life and integrity of others, through the penal system; however, the current trend is to impose upon the State various positive conducts, in the sense that (sic) beyond the fact that it (sic) must not disturb the physical existence of persons, it must act in protection of that existence, given the multiple dangers that beset it, whether they come from actions of the State itself or from other persons, and even from nature itself. Hence, for example, environmental issues have become, at least in our country, a matter of constitutional import, since the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment was elevated to the rank of fundamental right. Now, it is necessary to clarify that the objective existence of a State obligation regarding the protection of the right to life does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through judicial bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but it does entail a right to have suitable measures taken in protection of that right, in the face of openly negligent attitudes by public authorities. Thus, it follows that (sic) the State acquires the obligation to regulate the areas of social life from which dangers may arise for the physical existence of the inhabitants of its territory, whether through law, regulations, agreements, or other measures related to administrative organization and procedures, and individuals have the subjective right to have this done diligently. Consequently, the possibility of judicially demanding, through the remedy of amparo, a specific type of welfare activity from the State in compliance with its duty to protect the life and physical integrity of its inhabitants, is restricted to the clear verification of an imminent danger against those rights of individuals, such that if, for example, a certain community deemed it necessary to have a hospital for the care of its residents (or any other public work), it is not through the remedy of amparo that it should be demanded but through the previously established mechanisms and before the competent bodies and entities, who must attend to the petition and resolve its technical feasibility, which does not necessarily imply a positive response. From which it follows that the intervention of the constitutional jurisdiction is only viable in the face of the proven inertia of the State, through its competent bodies, in attending to the demands made by the country's inhabitants in the exercise of their rights (…)”.

**V.- On the merits.** It has been fully demonstrated that in Barrio La Cruz in the canton of Liberia, Guanacaste, there exists a problem with the overflow of stormwater (aguas pluviales) and that this causes flooding that represents a potential danger to the life and physical integrity of the persons residing there. Indeed, even though under oath it was indicated to this Court that these water stagnation problems are long-standing and not the product of the work carried out last year on that culvert (alcantarilla), it can be inferred from the case file itself that whatever the reason for this problem, it exists and persists as of the date on which the legal report is submitted by the respondent authority, since the Municipal Mayor himself concurs in determining the existence of a problem with the discharge of stormwater (aguas pluviales), which is collected in a channel whose hydraulic capacity proves insufficient, with its consequent overflow. Of special interest for the resolution of the sub lite matter is what was stated by the respondent authority itself to the effect that the Municipal Council rejected the ordinary budget 2010 (period 2006-2010), meaning that the improvement works for that culvert crossing and the consequent maintenance thereof, with the scheduled cleaning works for the ditch that are required to be carried out periodically, which include the pumping of stagnant waters in order to prevent public health problems, will not be resolved until it is included in the new budget content in the Extraordinary Budget. However, despite the fact that the sued authority knows the denounced issue, to date it has not adopted the concrete and necessary measures to resolve it. In the opinion of this Constitutional Court, regardless of the actions that have already been carried out to date, the truth is that, in the sub examine matter, the inertia and lack of efficiency in promptly attending to the situation in question is manifest, which constitutes not only a violation of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and complete procedure, but also essentially implies a transgression of the objective obligation to safeguard the life and physical integrity of the persons residing in Barrio La Cruz, who are directly affected by the flooding in question.

**VI.- Regarding the right of petition.** The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the faculty held by every citizen to address in writing any public official or official entity for the purpose of presenting a matter of their interest and where what is demanded is pre-existing information, where the Administration has nothing to resolve; these are termed pure and simple requests for information. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although the latter does not mean that the administered party must receive a response favorable to their interests. In other words, it is the right to ask and not the right to obtain what is asked - even though the public official must resolve in strict accordance with the law - since the freedom of petition is based on another principle; that is, that the Administration cannot curtail the right of the administered parties to address the public bodies.

In this way, the petition route allows raising before the Administration what cannot be obtained through an appeal before it, provided that the latter is not prohibited from doing so because it involves a regulated matter. Consequently, the right protected in the aforementioned numeral 27 is composed of a formal part and a substantial part: the first refers to the means by which information is requested and in turn provided (in response to a written petition, the Administration must also respond in writing); the second, to the concordance between what is requested and the response provided.

**VII.-** However, at this point a distinction must be made between pure and simple petitions for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional; exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the period required by the Law, the reasons why it cannot address the petition at that time—obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition. The corresponding explanation must be clear, extensive, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions they deem appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals—in which the individual requests the declaration or restitution of a subjective right—as this Chamber has indicated, the applicable article is not Article 27 of the Constitution, but Article 41: "*Occurring to the laws, everyone shall find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*." The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see ruling number 2002-03851 of 2:56 p.m. on April 30, 2000). Usually, the term for resolution is provided by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within the period of two months after its initiation (see ruling number 759-93 of 4:39 p.m. on February 15, 1993). In the hypothesis of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month—from its initiation—for the Administration to conclude the processing. Furthermore, regarding the appeal phase or challenge procedure, numeral 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets a term of one month for resolution. The foregoing is affirmed on the understanding that, by virtue of the principle of due process that governs in the administrative route, the appealed authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period conferred by law for such effect, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same time span. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal instrument used by those administered to bring facts that the complainant deems irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order to the attention of the Administration, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with and, in fact, founded on the democratic principle, so it is located—like petitions for information, administrative claims, and requests for the granting of certain rights—within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain a resolution. For that reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established period to resolve the matter, this Chamber has repeatedly held that the former has the right to be informed of the result of their action within a reasonable time (see resolution number 2002-06543 of 8:57 a.m. on July 5, 2002). Finally, in the case of requests to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the request, to resolve what is appropriate under the law (see resolutions number 171-89 of 9:30 a.m. on December 15, 1989 and number 3072-93 of 4:00 p.m. on June 30, 1993).

**VIII.-** In addition to this, the Public Administrations are obligated to notify the administered person in a timely manner, in writing, of the result of their actions or appeals. On this subject, the Chamber has stated the following:

"Regarding the right of petition and prompt resolution, as well as the right to prompt and complete access to justice, the jurisprudence of this Chamber is copious, according to which it has been determined that Article 27 of the Constitución Política enshrines the right of petition and prompt resolution, which consists of a faculty that those administered have to make petitions before public authorities. It has been indicated that the petition must be made in writing, and, therefore, a formal petition corresponds to a formal response, whence it is not permissible to consider that administrative silence is a response; furthermore, **it must be timely and must be communicated to the petitioner, because what the latter requires,** and has the right to demand, is not that a response be given but that a response be given to him or her. The response offered by the requested official or public entity cannot be limited to providing proof of receipt of the petition, but must examine the content of the request and resolve it according to the legal powers that pertain to it, which does not imply that the response must be favorable to the claims of the administered person, but rather that it must respond as soon as possible." (Ruling number 4229-98 of 4:30 p.m. on July 17, 1998. The underlining is not from the original).

**IX.-** In this case, it has not only been demonstrated that the appealed Municipal Mayor of Liberia has delayed for a truly unreasonable and disproportionate period in addressing the complaint of the appellants dated April 21, 2010, but also that, as of the date the report required in the proceedings is rendered, it still remains unresolved, since in his report he expressly stated that he will proceed to answer it immediately.

**X.-** **Corollary.** By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is imperative to declare the appeal granted in all its petitionary terms, as is indeed ordered and with the consequences that will be stated below." In the opinion of this Constitutional Court, regardless of the actions that have already been taken to date, the fact is that, in *the case at hand*, the inertia and lack of efficiency in promptly addressing the denounced situation is manifest, which constitutes not only a violation of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and fulfilled procedure but, essentially, implies a transgression of the objective obligation to protect the life and physical integrity of the people residing in Barrio La Cruz, directly affected by the floods in question.

**VI.- On the right of petition.** The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the power held by every citizen to address any public official or official entity in writing in order to present a matter of their interest and where what is requested is pre-existing information, where the Administration has nothing to resolve; these are referred to as pure and simple requests for information. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although the latter does not mean that the individual must receive a favorable response to their interests. In other words, it is the right to ask and not the right to obtain what is asked—even though the public official must resolve in strict accordance with the law—since the freedom of petition is based on another principle; that is, that the Administration cannot curtail the right of individuals to address public bodies. In this way, the petition route allows the Administration to be presented with matters that cannot be obtained via an appeal before it, provided the Administration is not prohibited from doing so because it is a regulated matter. Consequently, the right protected in the cited Article 27 is comprised of a formal part and a substantial part: the first refers to the means by which information is requested and, in turn, provided (in response to a written petition, the Administration must also respond in writing); the second, to the concordance between what is asked and the response provided.

**VII.-** However, at this point, a distinction must be made between pure and simple requests for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following the receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional); exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the timeframe required by the Law, the reasons why it cannot attend to the petition at that moment—obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition. The corresponding explanation must be clear, profuse, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions they deem appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals—in which the individual requests the declaration or restitution of a subjective right—as this Chamber has indicated, it is not Article 27 of the Constitution that is applicable, but Article 41: "*Occurring to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be administered prompt, fulfilled justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*". The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see ruling number 2002-03851 of 14:56 hours on April 30, 2000). Usually, the term for resolving is given by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within a period of two months following its initiation (see ruling number 759-93 of 16:39 hours on February 15, 1993). In the case of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month—from its initiation—for the Administration to conclude the processing. Additionally, regarding the appeals phase or challenge procedure, Article 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets a term of one month to resolve. The foregoing is stated on the understanding that, by virtue of the due process principle that governs administrative proceedings, the appealed authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period granted by law for that purpose, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same period of time. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal institute used by individuals to bring to the Administration's attention facts that the complainant deems irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with, and in fact, grounded in the democratic principle, and therefore it is located—just like petitions for information, administrative claims, and requests for the granting of certain rights—within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain a resolution. For this reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established deadline to resolve the matter, this Chamber has repeatedly held that the complainant has the right to be informed of the result of their action within a reasonable time (see resolution number 2002-06543 of 08:57 hours on July 5, 2002). Lastly, in the case of requests to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the request, to resolve what is legally appropriate (see resolutions number 171-89 of 09:30 hours on December 15, 1989 and number 3072-93 of 16:00 hours on June 30, 1993).

**VIII.-** In addition to this, the Public Administrations are obligated to notify the individual in a timely manner, in writing, of the result of their actions or appeals. On this subject, the Chamber has stated the following:

"Regarding the right of petition and prompt resolution, as well as the right of access to prompt and fulfilled justice, the jurisprudence of this Chamber is copious, according to which it has been determined that Article 27 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) enshrines the right of petition and prompt resolution, which consists of a power that individuals have to make petitions before public authorities. It has been indicated that the petition must be made in writing, and, therefore, a formal petition warrants a formal response, hence it is not possible to consider that negative silence constitutes a response; furthermore, **it must be on time and must be communicated to the petitioner, since what the petitioner requires,** and has the right to demand, is not that a response be given but that a response be given *to him*. The response offered by the requested official or public entity cannot be limited to providing proof of receipt of the petition, but must examine the content of the request and resolve it according to the legal powers that correspond to it, which does not imply that the response must be favorable to the individual's claims, but rather that they must respond as soon as possible." (Ruling number 4229-98 of 16:30 hours on July 17, 1998. The underlining is not from the original).

**IX.-** In the specific case, it has not only been proven that the appealed Municipal Mayor of Liberia has taken a truly unreasonable and disproportionate amount of time to address the complaint of the petitioners dated April 21, 2010, but also that, as of the date the report required in the case file was rendered, he still has not resolved it, since in his report he expressly stated that he would proceed immediately to answer it.

**X.- Corollary.** By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is necessary to declare the appeal granted in all its petitionary extremes, as is indeed ordered and with the consequences to be stated hereinafter.”

“I.- Objeto del recurso. El recurrente considera lesionados sus derechos fundamentales, en particular los contenidos en los artículos 21 y 50 constitucionales, en virtud de que la Municipalidad de Liberia decidió modificar el curso de las aguas pluviales que corren por la calle pública que se ubica en el lindero norte de la propiedad de la amparada, para lo cual construyó una alcantarilla y como consecuencia de ello, se formó una enorme zanja en donde se empozan las aguas, creando un peligro por la proliferación de enfermedades, y además, dichas aguas inundan su propiedad causando una erosión constante. Agrega que por esa razón el 21 de abril anterior, dirigió una nota al Alcalde pero hasta la fecha tampoco le ha sido contestada.

IV.- Sobre la obligación objetiva del Estado de tutelar la vida humana. En cuanto a este extremo, este Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia número 2003-011519 de las 10:30 horas del 10 de octubre de 2003, reconoció lo siguiente:

“(…)Ha sido usual que el derecho a la vida, frecuentemente analizado conjuntamente con el derecho a la integridad física, haya sido entendido como un derecho de contenido negativo, es decir, su objeto se limitaba a la pretensión contra el Estado de que (sic) se abstuviera de realizar acciones dirigidas a eliminar la existencia física de las personas, por ejemplo la tortura o la pena de muerte, o bien que castigara a las personas, públicas y privadas, que atentaran contra la vida e integridad de los otros, a través del sistema penal; sin embargo, la tendencia actual es imponer al Estado diversas conductas positivas, en el sentido de que (sic) más allá de que (sic) no debe perturbar la existencia física de las personas debe actuar en tutela de su protección, ante los múltiples peligros que la acechan, bien sea que ellos provengan de acciones del Estado mismo o de otras personas, e inclusive, de la misma naturaleza. De ahí que, por ejemplo, los temas ambientales han pasado a ser, al menos en nuestro país, un asunto de índole constitucional, puesto que el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado fue elevado a rango de derecho fundamental. Ahora bien, es menester aclarar que la existencia objetiva de una obligación del Estado en lo referente a la protección del derecho a la vida no apareja, ineludiblemente, un derecho subjetivo de las personas a exigir, a través de los organismos judiciales, que se tome una medida determinada, pero sí a que se tomen las medidas idóneas en tutela de ese derecho, ante actitudes abiertamente negligentes de las autoridades públicas. Se trata así de que (sic) el Estado adquiere la obligación de regular las áreas de la vida social de las cuales puedan surgir peligros para la existencia física de los habitantes de su territorio, ya sea a través de la ley, de reglamentos, de acuerdos o de otras medidas relacionadas con la organización y los procedimientos administrativos, y del derecho subjetivo de las personas a que así se proceda, en forma diligente. En consecuencia, la posibilidad de exigir judicialmente, a través del recurso de amparo, un tipo específico de actividad prestacional por parte del Estado en cumplimiento de su deber de protección a la vida e integridad física de sus habitantes, es restringida a la clara verificación de un peligro inminente contra esos derechos de las personas, de forma tal que si por ejemplo, una determinada comunidad estimara necesario contar con un hospital para la atención de sus pobladores (o de cualquier otra obra pública), no es por la vía del amparo que se debe exigir sino a través de los mecanismos previamente establecidos y ante los órganos y entes competentes, quienes deberán atender la petición y resolver su procedencia técnica, que no implica necesariamente una respuesta positiva. De lo que se desprende que la injerencia de la jurisdicción constitucional solamente es viable ante la inercia comprobada del Estado, a través de sus órganos competentes, en atender las demandas que en ejercicio de sus derechos realicen los habitantes del país (…)”.

V.- Sobre el fondo. Queda plenamente demostrado que en el Barrio La Cruz en el cantón de Liberia, Guanacaste existe un problema con el desbordamiento de las aguas pluviales y que ello provoca inundaciones que representan un peligro potencial para la vida e integridad física de las personas que allí residen. En efecto, aún y cuando bajo juramento se indica a este Tribunal que dichos problemas de estancamiento de aguas son de vieja data y que no son producto de los trabajos que se realizaron el año pasado en esa alcantarilla, de los propios autos se colige que sea cual sea la razón de dicho problema, el mismo existe y persiste a la fecha en la cual se rinde el informe de ley por parte de la autoridad recurrida, ya que el propio Alcalde Municipal es conteste en determinar la existencia de un problema de desfogue de las aguas pluviales, las cuales son recogidas en un canal cuya capacidad hidráulica resulta insuficiente, con su consecuente desbordamiento. De especial interés para la resolución del sub lite, resulta lo expuesto por la propia autoridad recurrida en el sentido de que el Concejo Municipal improbó el presupuesto ordinario 2010 (período 2006-2010), por lo que las obras de mejora de ese paso de alcantarilla y el consecuente mantenimiento de la misma, con los trabajos de programación de limpiezas de la zanja que se requieren realizar de manera periódica, los cuales incluyen el bombeo de las aguas estancadas, con el fin de prevenir problemas de salud pública, no será solventado sino hasta tanto sea incluido en el nuevo contenido presupuestario en el Presupuesto Extraordinario. No obstante, pese a que la autoridad accionada, conoce la problemática denunciada, a la fecha no ha adoptado las medidas concretas y necesarias para solucionarlas. En criterio de este Tribunal Constitucional, independientemente de las actuaciones que ya se han realizado a la fecha, lo cierto es que, en el sub examine, queda manifiesta la inercia y falta de eficiencia para atender con prontitud, la situación acusada, lo cual, configura no sólo un quebranto a los derechos al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos y a un procedimiento pronto y cumplido sino que, esencialmente, implica una transgresión a la obligación objetiva de tutelar la vida y la integridad física de las personas que residen en Barrio La Cruz, directamente afectadas por las inundaciones en cuestión.

VI.- Sobre el derecho de petición. El derecho de petición, establecido en el artículo 27 Constitucional, hace referencia a la facultad que posee todo ciudadano para dirigirse por escrito a cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial con el fin de exponer un asunto de su interés y en donde lo que se demande es una información preconstituida, donde la Administración no tiene nada que resolver, se habla de peticiones puras y simples de información. Esta garantía se complementa con el derecho a obtener pronta respuesta, aunque esto último no significa que el administrado deba recibir una contestación favorable a sus intereses. En otras palabras, es el derecho a pedir y no el derecho a obtener lo que se pide -aún cuando el funcionario público deba resolver con estricta sujeción a la ley-, pues la libertad de petición se funda en otro principio; esto es, que la Administración no puede coartar el derecho de los administrados para dirigirse a los órganos públicos. De esta manera, la vía de petición permite plantear a la Administración lo que no se puede obtener por vía de recurso ante ella, siempre y cuando a ésta no le esté vedado hacerlo por tratarse de materia reglada. Consecuentemente, el derecho tutelado en el numeral 27 citado está conformado por una parte formal y otra sustancial: la primera se refiere al medio por el cual se solicita y a su vez se proporciona la información (ante una petición por escrito, la Administración debe responder también por escrito); la segunda, a la concordancia entre lo que se pide y la respuesta que se brinda.

VII.- Sin embargo, en este punto deben diferenciarse las peticiones puras y simples de información, los reclamos administrativos, las denuncias y otras solicitudes. En el primer caso, normalmente la respuesta deberá darse dentro de los diez días siguientes a la recepción de la petición, como lo ordena el artículo 32 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional; excepcionalmente, si la contestación no puede brindarse dentro de ese término por razones justificadas, la Administración está obligada a explicar, dentro del plazo exigido por la Ley, cuáles son los motivos por los que no puede atender la petición en ese momento -obviamente, en el entendido de que más adelante, cuando pueda hacerlo, deberá responder cabalmente la petición-. La explicación correspondiente deberá ser clara, profusa y detallada, con el objeto de que el petente quede debidamente informado y pueda ejercer las acciones legales que juzgue apropiadas. En el segundo caso, cuando se trata de reclamos o recursos -en que el particular pide la declaración o restitución de un derecho subjetivo-, como lo ha señalado esta Sala, no es el artículo 27 Constitucional el aplicable, sino el 41: "Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes". Lo anterior, por cuanto los reclamos y recursos administrativos, a diferencia de las peticiones puras, requieren un procedimiento para verificar los hechos que han de servir de motivo al acto final, así como adoptar las medidas probatorias pertinentes (véase la sentencia número 2002-03851 de las 14:56 horas del 30 de abril de 2000). Usualmente, el término para resolver está dado por el artículo 261, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que establece que el procedimiento administrativo ordinario debe ser concluido, por acto final, dentro del plazo de dos meses posteriores a su iniciación (véase la sentencia número 759-93 de las 16:39 horas del 15 de febrero de 1993). En la hipótesis del procedimiento sumario, el artículo 325 de esa misma ley dispone un plazo de un mes -a partir de su inicio- para que la Administración concluya la tramitación. Además, en lo tocante a la fase recursiva o procedimiento de impugnación, el numeral 261, párrafo 2° del mismo cuerpo legal fija también el término de un mes para resolver. Lo anterior se afirma en el entendido de que, en virtud del principio del debido proceso que rige en la vía administrativa, la autoridad recurrida está obligada no sólo a resolver dentro del período conferido por la ley para tal efecto, sino también a notificar la resolución respectiva dentro de ese mismo lapso de tiempo. En el tercer caso, cuando se trata de denuncias, la Sala ha reconocido y declarado que, como instituto jurídico utilizado por los administrados para poner en conocimiento de la Administración hechos que el denunciante estima irregulares, ilegales o contrarios al orden público, ésta deviene en un modo de participación en asuntos que conciernen al interés público, perfectamente compatible y, de hecho, fundamentada en el principio democrático, por lo que se ubica -al igual que las peticiones de información, los reclamos administrativos y las solicitudes de otorgamiento de ciertos derechos-, dentro del concepto genérico de petición establecido en el artículo 27 constitucional, con su correlativo derecho de obtener resolución. Por esa razón, si bien el denunciante no es parte en el procedimiento y no existe un plazo legalmente establecido para resolver al efecto, esta Sala ha sostenido reiteradamente que aquel tiene derecho a que se le comunique el resultado de su gestión en un término razonable (véase la resolución número 2002-06543 de las 08:57 horas del 05 de julio de 2002). Por último, entratándose de solicitudes para obtener autorizaciones, permisos y/o licencias, los artículos 330 y 331 de la Ley General de Administración Pública disponen que la Administración cuenta con el plazo de un mes, contado a partir del momento en que recibe la solicitud, para resolver lo que en derecho corresponda (véanse las resoluciones número 171-89 de las 09:30 horas del 15 de diciembre de 19989 y número 3072-93 de las 16:00 horas del 30 de junio de 1993).

VIII.- Además de ello, las Administraciones Públicas están obligadas a notificarle oportunamente al administrado, por escrito, cuál ha sido el resultado de sus gestiones o recursos. Sobre este tema, ha dicho la Sala lo siguiente:

"En punto al derecho de petición y pronta resolución, así como al de acceso a la justicia pronta y cumplida es copiosa la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, de conformidad con la cual se ha determinado que el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política consagra el derecho de petición y pronta resolución, el cual consiste en una facultad que tienen los administrados para realizar peticiones ante las autoridades públicas. Se ha indicado que la petición debe hacerse por escrito, y, por lo tanto, ante una petición formal corresponde una respuesta formal, de donde no es dable estimar que el silencio negativo sea respuesta; además, la misma debe ser en tiempo y debe ser comunicada al peticionario, pues éste lo que requiere, y tiene derecho a exigir, no es que se dé una respuesta sino que se le dé, a él, una respuesta. La contestación que ofrezca el funcionario o entidad pública requerido de información, no puede limitarse a dar constancia de que se recibió la petición, sino que debe examinar el contenido de la solicitud y resolverla conforme a las atribuciones jurídicas que le competen, lo que no implica que la respuesta deba ser favorable a las pretensiones del administrado, sino que le debe responder lo antes posible." (Sentencia número 4229-98 de las 16:30 horas del 17 de julio de 1998. El subrayado no es del original).

IX.- En la especie, no sólo se ha acreditado que el Alcalde Municipal de Liberia recurrido ha tardado un plazo realmente irrazonable y desproporcionado en atender la denuncia de los recurrentes en fecha 21 de abril de 2010, sino que, además, a la fecha en que se rinde el informe requerido en autos, aún sigue sin resolverla, toda vez que en su informe manifestó expresamente que procederá de inmediato a contestarla.

X.- Corolario. En mérito de las consideraciones petitorios, como en efecto se dispone y con las consecuencias que de seguido se dirán.”