Amparo for suspension without pay lacking due processAmparo por suspensión sin goce de salario sin debido proceso

I.—Object of the Appeal. The appellant alleges a violation of due process in that he was suspended without pay by resolution 1812-2010 for unjustified absences on 20 and 21 May of 2010, without having been given an opportunity for defense.

IV.—On the Merits. Recently, in a case similar to the one analyzed here in which a security and surveillance officer of an educational center of the Ministry of Public Education was dismissed for unjustified absences without being given the opportunity to exercise his right to defense, the Chamber changed the criterion that permitted dispensing with the observance of due process in offenses of mere verification (faltas de mera constatación) in order to apply dismissal, in the following terms:

“IV.— CHANGE OF JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITERION REGARDING SO-CALLED “MERE VERIFICATION” OFFENSES (FALTAS DE "MERA CONSTATACIÓN"). Repeatedly, the majority position of the Chamber had held that in those cases in which public officials commit offenses that are classified as mere verification, the Administration is not obliged to conduct a procedure in accordance with the rules of due process (see thus, by way of example, Votes Nos. 7890-10, 4097-08). Based on that criterion, amparo proceedings alleging the non-observance of due process to sanction a public servant for the commission of an offense such as those under discussion were summarily rejected or dismissed. However, upon better consideration and in light of the specific case, this Tribunal deems it appropriate to review and change that criterion in two particular scenarios: when, for incurring a "mere verification" offense, the official is sanctioned with dismissal or a work suspension. This jurisprudential change is based on the arguments set forth below, which, until now, had served to underpin the minority position of this Tribunal on the issue.

V.— OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (procedimiento administrativo) TO SANCTION MERE VERIFICATION OFFENSES: SCENARIOS OF DISMISSAL OR WORK SUSPENSION. The exercise of disciplinary power by the heads of an administrative entity or body has very serious legal repercussions or consequences upon the sphere of the public official subjected to it. Any administrative power requires, for its regularity and validity, a prior administrative procedure, especially if the final act resulting from its exercise proves afflictive or burdensome for the administered party who is the recipient of it, whether subject to a general or special relationship of subjection. That procedural path (iter procedimiental) is designed to guarantee the administered party an administrative resolution that respects due process, the right to defense, the adversarial principle or the bilateral nature of the hearing and, consequently, has a profound constitutional rooting in articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution. The administrative procedure is a formal constitutive requirement or element of the final administrative act, the absence or non-observance of which determines, ineluctably, the most serious invalidity or nullity by contravening the block of constitutionality (rights to due process and defense); on this point, article 216 of the General Law on Public Administration stipulates, with crystalline clarity, that “The Administration must adopt its resolutions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system...”. In the matter of Disciplinary Administrative Law, the General Law on Public Administration commands administrative bodies and entities to unfailingly observe the ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario) when it leads “...to the application of suspension or dismissal sanctions, or any other of similar gravity.” Inherent in the ordinary procedure is the holding of an oral and private appearance in which the administered party who is an interested party has the opportunity to formulate allegations, offer evidence, and issue conclusions (articles 309 and 317 of the General Law on Public Administration), especially when “...the final decision may cause serious harm” to any or all of the interested parties (article 218 ibidem). Even in the cases of "mere verification" offenses, the competent administrative body or entity must observe and conduct an administrative procedure which, in such case, must be the summary proceeding (procedimiento sumario) provided for and regulated in articles 320 and following of the General Law on Public Administration, characterized by its concentrated and temporally reduced nature, as there is no oral and private appearance, an aspect that does not exempt the respective public administration from exhaustively, faithfully, and completely verifying the real truth of the offense or imputed act and from granting a hearing for conclusions (articles 321, 322 and 324 ibidem). Clearly, by virtue of what is established in article 308, paragraph 2, when the proportionate disciplinary sanction corresponding to the attributed offense consists of a suspension or a dismissal, the administration must observe the ordinary procedure, such that the summary proceeding is reserved for hypotheses of easy verification or for very slight or slight offenses warranting a verbal or written reprimand. It is not enough to mechanically and automatically verify an offense, since the official may have a justified cause for having been late or absent from work, an aspect that can only be determined through the adversarial process. Thus, in the case of imposing the most burdensome sanctions upon the legal sphere of an official, such as dismissal without employer liability or work suspension for the alleged commission of a "mere verification" offense, it is imperative for the Administration to conduct an administrative procedure in which the guarantees that make up due process are respected, so that the potentially affected party can exercise his right to defense.

VI.— SPECIFIC CASE. In the sub lite, it was duly accredited that the appellant was terminated from his position as Security and Vigilance Agent 1 at the Liceo de San Antonio de Desamparados, because, allegedly, he was unjustifiably absent from his duties on 3, 12 and 28 July of 2009. This decision was taken through resolution No. 3175-09 at 8:30 a.m. on 25 August 2009 of the Minister of Public Education (visible at folios 5-8). Subsequently, the Minister of Public Education rejected the appeal for reconsideration filed by the affected party against that termination (thus by resolution No. 5091-09 at 10:30 a.m. on 25 November 2009 visible at folios 9-10). Likewise, it remains an unproven fact that, in order to dismiss the amparo petitioner, an administrative procedure was conducted with observance of due process guarantees. The foregoing, despite the fact that through official communication No. DRH-AD-637-2009 of 12 August 2009, the Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education had ordered the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs to initiate an administrative procedure for that purpose (folio 22) and that, indeed, through resolution No. 3074-2009 at 7:30 a.m. on 12 August 2009, the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs of the MEP had appointed the investigating body for the procedure (folios 23-24). This omission, in light of the arguments set forth in the preceding recital, makes the dismissal of the appellant arbitrary and contrary to the rights recognized in articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The above is no impediment to, once the administrative procedure is concluded and if there is sufficient merit, the corresponding sanction being imposed in accordance with Law.

VII.— COROLLARY. By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is necessary to grant the appeal with the consequences that will be set forth in the operative part of this judgment.” (Judgment No. 2010011495 of four fifty-two p.m. on thirty June two thousand ten).

V.—Regarding the Particular Case. From the facts that are taken as duly demonstrated in this matter, in relation to the change in jurisprudence adopted by the Chamber regarding labor offenses of mere verification, adopted in judgment number 2010-11495 of 4:52 p.m. on 30 June 2010, as well as in consideration of the evidence brought to the case file by the respondent Ministry of Public Education (see resolution No. 2302-10 of 1:00 p.m. on 31 August 2010, folio 19) and there being no element whatsoever in the case file that permits concluding that in this case an administrative procedure was conducted by the Ministry of Public Education in which the guarantees that make up due process were respected, such that the amparo petitioner Omar Camacho Astúa could have exercised his right to defense, based on the provisions of article 45 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction; the facts referred to by the amparo petitioner are taken as true, the infringement of the right to defense and the principle of due process in a suspension without pay procedure is found to exist, and as a consequence it is proper to grant the appeal, which is done solely for compensatory purposes since by resolution No. 2302-10 of 1:00 p.m. on 31 August 2010, the Directorate of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education proceeded to revoke on its own motion what was decided in resolution 1812-10 of 3:00 p.m. on 29 June 2010 in the disciplinary cause brought against the amparo petitioner Camacho Astúa, leaving the suspension without pay sanction ordered without effect.

Regarding Administrative Disciplinary Law (Derecho Administrativo Disciplinario), the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) mandates that administrative bodies and entities must unfailingly observe the ordinary procedure when it leads <i>"...to the application of sanctions of suspension or dismissal, or any other of similar gravity."</i> Inherent to the ordinary procedure is the holding of an oral and private hearing (comparecencia oral y privada) in which the administered party (administrado) who is an interested party (parte interesada) has the opportunity to formulate allegations, offer evidence, and present conclusions (Articles 309 and 317 of the General Law of Public Administration), above all when <i>"...the final decision may cause serious harm"</i> to any or all of the interested parties (Article 218 ibidem). Even in cases of offenses of "mere verification" (mera constatación), the competent administrative body or entity must observe and substantiate an administrative procedure which, in such a case, must be the summary procedure (sumario) provided for and regulated in articles 320 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, which is characterized by its concentrated and temporally reduced nature, as there is no oral and private hearing, an aspect which does not exempt the respective public administration from exhaustively, faithfully, and completely verifying the real truth of the offense or imputed act and from granting a hearing for conclusions (Articles 321, 322, and 324 ibidem). Evidently, pursuant to the provisions of Article 308, paragraph 2, when the proportional and corresponding disciplinary sanction for the attributed offense consists of a suspension or a dismissal, the administration must observe the ordinary procedure, such that the summary procedure is reserved for hypotheses of easy verification or of very minor or minor offenses that warrant a verbal or written reprimand. It is not enough to mechanically and automatically verify an offense, since the official may have a justified cause for having arrived late or being absent from work, an aspect that can only be determined through the adversarial process (contradictorio). Thus, when it comes to the imposition of the most burdensome sanctions for the legal sphere of an official, such as dismissal without employer liability or work suspension for the alleged commission of an offense of "mere verification," it is imperative for the Administration to conduct an administrative procedure in which the guarantees that make up due process (debido proceso) are respected, so that the potential affected party may exercise his right of defense.

VI.- SPECIFIC CASE (CASO CONCRETO). In the sub lite, it was duly accredited that the appellant (recurrente) was dismissed from his position as Security and Surveillance Agent 1 at the Liceo de San Antonio de Desamparados, because, presumably, he was unjustifiably absent from his duties on July 3, 12, and 28, 2009. This decision was taken through Resolution No. 3175-09 of 08:30 hours on August 25, 2009, of the Minister of Public Education (visible at folios 5-8). Subsequently, the Minister of Public Education rejected the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) filed by the affected party against that dismissal (thus by Resolution No. 5091-09 of 10:30 hours on November 25, 2009, visible at folios 9-10). Likewise, it remains an unproven fact that, in order to dismiss the protected party (amparado), an administrative procedure was conducted with observance of the guarantees of due process. The foregoing, despite the fact that by official communication No. DRH-AD-637-2009 of August 12, 2009, the Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education had ordered the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs (Departamento de Asuntos Disciplinarios) to initiate an administrative procedure for that purpose (folio 22) and that, even, by Resolution No. 3074-2009 of 7:30 hours on August 12, 2009, the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs of the MEP had designated the investigating body of the procedure (folios 23-24). This omission, in light of the arguments sustained in the preceding recital (considerando), renders the dismissal of the appellant arbitrary and contrary to the rights recognized in Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The foregoing is no impediment (óbice) to the imposition, once the administrative procedure is concluded and if there is sufficient merit, of the sanction that corresponds in accordance with the Law.

VII.- COROLLARY (COROLARIO). By virtue of the considerations set forth, the appeal (recurso) must be granted (declarar con lugar), with the consequences that will be set forth in the operative part (parte dispositiva) of this judgment." (Judgment No. 2010011495 of sixteen hours and fifty-two minutes on June thirtieth, two thousand ten).

V.- Of the particular case (caso particular).

From the facts that are held as duly proven in this matter, in relation to the change of jurisprudence adopted by the Chamber regarding merely ascertainable labor-related misconduct (faltas laborales de mera constatación), adopted in judgment number 2010-11495 of 16:52 hours on June 30, 2010, as well as in consideration of the evidence brought to the case file (expediente) by the respondent Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) (see resolution N°2302-10 of 13:00 hours on August 31, 2010, folio 19) and there being no element whatsoever in the case file that allows concluding that in this case an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) was conducted by the Ministry of Public Education in which the guarantees that make up due process (debido proceso) were respected, such that the amparo-protected party (amparado) Omar Camacho Astúa could have exercised his right of defense, based on the provisions of article 45 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); the facts referred to by the amparo-protected party are held as certain, the infringement of the right of defense and the principle of due process is confirmed in the procedure of suspension without pay (suspensión sin goce de salario), and as a consequence the amparo action (recurso) is granted, which is done solely for indemnification purposes (efectos indemnizatorios) given that by resolution N°2302-10 of 13:00 hours on August 31, 2010, from the Human Resources Directorate (Dirección de Recursos Humanos) of the Ministry of Public Education, the decision in resolution 1812-10 of 15:00 hours on June 29, 2010 in the disciplinary cause processed against the amparo-protected party Camacho Astúa was revoked ex officio, nullifying the agreed-upon sanction of suspension without pay." The exercise of disciplinary power by the heads of an administrative entity or body has very serious legal repercussions or consequences in the sphere of the public official subjected to it. Every administrative power requires, for its regularity and validity, a prior administrative procedure, especially if the final act resulting from its exercise is afflictive or burdensome for the administered recipient thereof, whether subject to a general or special relationship of subjection. That procedural iter is conceived to guarantee the administered an administrative resolution that respects due process, the right of defense, the adversarial principle or bilaterality of the hearing and, consequently, has a deep constitutional rooting in ordinals 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution. The administrative procedure is a constitutive requirement or element of a formal nature of the final administrative act, whose absence or non-observance determines, ineluctably, the most serious invalidity or nullity by contravening the block of constitutionality (rights to due process and defense), in this regard, ordinal 216 of the General Law of the Public Administration stipulates, with meridian clarity, that *“The Administration must adopt its resolutions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal order...”*. In the case of Disciplinary Administrative Law, the General Law of the Public Administration commands the administrative bodies and entities to observe, unavoidably, the ordinary procedure when this leads *“...to the application of sanctions of suspension or dismissal, or any other of similar gravity”*. Inherent to the ordinary procedure is the holding of an oral and private hearing in which the administered who is an interested party has the opportunity to formulate allegations, offer evidence and issue conclusions (articles 309 and 317 of the General Law of the Public Administration), especially when *“...the final decision may cause serious harm”* to some or all of the interested parties (article 218 ibidem). Even in cases of infractions of “mere verification,” it is necessary that the competent administrative body or entity observe and substantiate an administrative procedure which, in such case, must be the summary one provided for and regulated in ordinals 320 and following of the General Law of the Public Administration, which is characterized by its concentrated and temporally reduced nature, as there is no oral and private hearing, an extreme that does not exempt the respective public administration from exhaustively, faithfully and completely proving the real truth of the infraction or imputed fact and from granting a hearing for conclusions (articles 321, 322 and 324 ibidem). Evidently, by virtue of what is established in numeral 308, paragraph 2, when the proportional disciplinary sanction corresponding to the attributed infraction consists of a suspension or a dismissal, the administration must observe the ordinary procedure, such that the summary one is reserved for hypotheses of easy verification or for very minor or minor infractions that warrant a verbal or written reprimand. It is not enough to mechanically and automatically verify an infraction, since the official may have a justified cause for having arrived late or being absent from work, an extreme that can only be determined through the adversarial process. Thus, in the case of the imposition of the most burdensome sanctions for the legal sphere of an official, such as dismissal without employer liability or labor suspension for the alleged commission of an infraction of “mere verification,” it is imperative for the Administration to instruct an administrative procedure in which the guarantees that comprise due process are respected, so that the possible affected party may exercise his right of defense.

**VI.- SPECIFIC CASE.** In the *sub lite*, it was duly accredited that the appellant was terminated from his position as Security and Surveillance Agent 1 at the Liceo de San Antonio de Desamparados, because, presumably, he was unjustifiably absent from his duties on July 3, 12 and 28, 2009. This decision was made through resolution No. 3175-09 of 08:30 hours of August 25, 2009 of the Minister of Public Education (visible at folios 5-8). Subsequently, the Minister of Public Education rejected the appeal for reconsideration filed by the affected party against that termination (thus by resolution No. 5091-09 of 10:30 hours of November 25, 2009 visible at folios 9-10). Likewise, it stands as an unproven fact that to dismiss the protected party, an administrative procedure was instructed with observance of the guarantees of due process. The foregoing, despite the fact that by official letter No. DRH-AD-637-2009 of August 12, 2009, the Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education had ordered the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs to initiate an administrative procedure for that purpose (folio 22) and that, even, by resolution No. 3074-2009 of 7:30 hours of August 12, 2009, the Head of the Department of Disciplinary Affairs of the MEP had designated the instructing body of the procedure (folios 23-24). This omission, in light of the arguments held in the preceding recital, makes the dismissal of the appellant arbitrary and contrary to the rights recognized in constitutional articles 39 and 41. The foregoing is no obstacle for, if once the administrative procedure is concluded and there is sufficient merit, the sanction that corresponds in accordance with Law to be imposed.

**VII.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is necessary to declare the appeal granted with the consequences that will be set forth in the operative part of this judgment.” (Judgment No. 2010011495 of sixteen hours and fifty-two minutes of June thirtieth, two thousand ten).

**V.- Of the particular case**. From the facts that are held as duly demonstrated in this matter, in relation to the change in jurisprudence adopted by the Chamber regarding labor infractions of mere verification, adopted in judgment number 2010-11495 of 16:52 hours of June 30, 2010, as well as in consideration of the evidence brought to the file by the respondent Ministry of Public Education (see resolution No. 2302-10 of 13:00 hours of August 31, 2010, folio 19) and there being no element whatsoever in the file that allows concluding that in this case an administrative procedure was instructed by the Ministry of Public Education in which the guarantees that comprise due process are respected, so that the protected party Omar Camacho Astúa could have exercised his right of defense, based on the provisions of article 45 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction; the facts referred to by the protected party are held as certain, the violation of the right of defense and the principle of due process in a suspension procedure without pay is verified and consequently the appeal must be granted, which is done only for indemnification purposes due to the fact that by resolution No. 2302-10 of 13:00 hours of August 31, 2010, of the Directorate of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education, what was resolved in resolution 1812-10 of 15:00 hours of June 29, 2010 in the disciplinary cause processed against the protected party Camacho Astúa was revoked ex officio, leaving without effect the agreed sanction of suspension without pay.”

“I.-Objeto del recurso. El recurrente acusa violación del debido proceso en el tanto fue suspendido sin goce de salario por resolución 1812-2010 por ausencias injustificadas los días 20 y 21 de mayo de 2010,sin habérsele dado oportunidad de defensa.

IV.- Sobre el fondo. Recientemente, en un caso similar al que aquí se analiza en que un funcionario de seguridad y vigilancia de un centro educativo del Ministerio de Educación Pública fue despedido por ausencias injustificadas sin darle la oportunidad de ejercer su derecho de defensa; la Sala cambió el criterio que permitía obviar el seguimiento del debido proceso en las faltas de mera constatación para aplicar el despido, en los siguientes términos:

“IV.- VARIACIÓN DEL CRITERIO JURISPRUDENCIAL RESPECTO DE LAS FALTAS DENOMINADAS DE “MERA CONSTATACIÓN”. En forma reiterada, la posición mayoritaria de la Sala había sostenido que en aquellos casos en los que los funcionarios públicos cometan faltas que sean catalogadas como de mera constatación, la Administración no se encuentra obligada a llevar a cabo un procedimiento conforme las reglas del debido proceso (ver así, a manera de ejemplo, los Votos Nos. 7890-10, 4097-08). Con base en ese criterio, se rechazaban de plano o se declaraban sin lugar los procesos de amparo en los que se alegaba la inobservancia del debido proceso para sancionar a un servidor por la comisión de una falta como las de comentario. No obstante, a partir de una mejor ponderación y a la luz del caso concreto, este Tribunal considera oportuno revisar y variar ese criterio en dos supuestos particulares: cuando por incurrir en una falta de “mera constatación”, se sanciona al funcionario con el despido o con una suspensión laboral. Este cambio jurisprudencial se sustenta en los argumentos que de seguido se exponen y que, hasta este momento, habían servido para fundamentar la posición minoritaria de este Tribunal en cuanto al tema.

V.- OBLIGACIÓN DE INSTRUIR UN PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO PARA SANCIONAR LAS FALTAS DE MERA CONSTATACIÓN: SUPUESTOS DE DESPIDO O SUSPENSIÓN LABORAL. El ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria por parte de los jerarcas de un ente u órgano administrativo, tiene repercusiones o consecuencias jurídicas muy graves en la esfera del funcionario público sometido a la misma. Toda potestad administrativa requiere, para su regularidad y validez, de un procedimiento administrativo previo, sobre todo si el acto final que resulta de su ejercicio resulta aflictivo o gravoso para el administrado destinatario de ésta, sea que se encuentre sometido a una relación de sujeción general o especial. Ese iter procedimiental está concebido para garantizarle al administrado una resolución administrativa que respete el debido proceso, el derecho de defensa, el contradictorio o la bilateralidad de la audiencia y, por consiguiente, tiene una profunda raigambre constitucional en los ordinales 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política. El procedimiento administrativo es un requisito o elemento constitutivo de carácter formal del acto administrativo final, cuya ausencia o inobservancia determina, ineluctablemente, la invalidez o nulidad más grave al contrariar el bloque de constitucionalidad (derechos al debido proceso y la defensa), sobre el particular, el ordinal 216 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública estipula, con meridiana claridad, que “La Administración deberá adoptar sus resoluciones dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento...”. En tratándose del Derecho Administrativo Disciplinario, la Ley General de la Administración Pública manda a los órganos y entes administrativos a observar, indefectiblemente, el procedimiento ordinario cuando este conduzca “...a la aplicación de sanciones de suspensión o destitución, o cualquiera otra de similar gravedad”. Es inherente al procedimiento ordinario la realización de una comparecencia oral y privada en la que el administrado que es parte interesada tenga la oportunidad de formular alegaciones, ofrecer prueba y emitir conclusiones (artículos 309 y 317 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), sobre todo cuando “...la decisión final pueda causar daños graves” a alguna o a todas las partes interesadas (artículo 218 ibidem). Incluso, en los supuestos de faltas de “mera constatación” es preciso que el órgano o ente administrativo competente observe y sustancie un procedimiento administrativo que, en tal caso, debe ser el sumario previsto y normado en los ordinales 320 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el cual se caracteriza por su naturaleza concentrada y temporalmente reducida, al no haber una comparecencia oral y privada, extremo que no exime a la respectiva administración pública de comprobar exhaustiva, fiel y completamente la verdad real de la falta o hecho imputado y de otorgar una audiencia para conclusiones (artículos 321, 322 y 324 ibidem). Evidentemente, por lo estatuido en el numeral 308, párrafo 2°, cuando la sanción disciplinaria proporcional y correspondiente a la falta atribuida consiste en una suspensión o una destitución la administración debe observar el procedimiento ordinario, de tal forma que el sumario queda reservado para las hipótesis de fácil constatación o de faltas levísimas o leves que ameritan una amonestación verbal o escrita. No basta con constatar mecánica y automáticamente una falta, pues el funcionario puede tener causa justificada para haber llegado tarde o ausentarse del trabajo, extremo que solo puede ser determinado a través del contradictorio. Así las cosas, tratándose de la imposición de las sanciones más gravosas para la esfera jurídica de un funcionario, como lo son el despido sin responsabilidad patronal o la suspensión laboral por la supuesta comisión de una falta de “mera constatación”, resulta imperativo para la Administración instruir un procedimiento administrativo en el que se respeten las garantías que integran el debido proceso, de modo que el posible afectado pueda ejercer su derecho de defensa.

VI.- CASO CONCRETO. En el sub lite, quedó debidamente acreditado que el recurrente fue cesado de su puesto como Agente de Seguridad y Vigilancia 1 en el Liceo de San Antonio de Desamparados, porque, presuntamente, se ausentó en forma injustificada de sus labores los días 03, 12 y 28 de julio de 2009. Esta decisión se tomó a través de la resolución No. 3175-09 de las 08:30 horas de 25 de agosto de 2009 del Ministro de Educación Pública (visible a folios 5-8). Posteriormente, el Ministro de Educación Pública rechazó el recurso de reconsideración interpuesto por el afectado en contra de ese cese (así por resolución No. 5091-09 de las 10:30 horas de 25 de noviembre de 2009 visible a folios 9-10). Asimismo, queda como hecho indemostrado que para despedir al amparado, se haya instruido un procedimiento administrativo con observancia de las garantías del debido proceso. Lo anterior, pese a que por oficio No. DRH-AD-637-2009 de 12 de agosto de 2009, el Director de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública le había ordenado al Jefe del Departamento de Asuntos Disciplinarios, iniciar un procedimiento administrativo para ese efecto (folio 22) y que, incluso, por resolución No. 3074-2009 de las 7:30 horas de 12 de agosto de 2009, la Jefe del Departamento de Asuntos Disciplinarios del MEP había designado el órgano instructor del procedimiento (folios 23-24). Esta omisión, a la luz de los argumentos sostenidos en el considerando que antecede, hace que el despido del recurrente sea arbitrario y contrario a los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 39 y 41 constitucionales. Lo anterior no es óbice para que si concluido el procedimiento administrativo y existe mérito suficiente, se imponga la sanción que corresponda con arreglo a Derecho.

VII.- COROLARIO. En virtud de las consideraciones expuestas, se impone declarar con lugar el recurso con las consecuencias que se expondrán en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.” (Sentencia Nº 2010011495 de las dieciséis horas y cincuenta y dos minutos del treinta de junio del dos mil diez).

V.-Del caso particular. De los hechos que se tienen por debidamente demostrados en este asunto, en relación con el cambio de jurisprudencia adoptado por la Sala en cuanto a las faltas laborales de mera constatación, adoptado en la sentencia número 2010-11495 de las 16:52 horas del 30 de junio de 2010, así como en atención a la prueba traída al expediente por el Ministerio de Educación Pública recurrido (ver resolución N°2302-10 de las 13:00 horas del 31 de agosto de 2010, folio 19) y no constar en el expediente elemento alguno que permita concluir que en este caso se haya instruido por parte del Ministerio de Educación Pública un procedimiento administrativo en el que se respeten las garantías que integran el debido proceso, de modo que el amparado Omar Camacho Astúa haya podido ejercer su derecho de defensa, con base en lo dispuesto en el artículo 45 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional; se tienen por ciertos los hechos referidos por el amparado, se constata la infracción al derecho de defensa y principio del debido proceso en procedimiento de suspensión sin goce de salario y como consecuencia procede declarar con lugar el recurso, lo que se hace únicamente para efectos indemnizatorios debido a que por resolución N°2302-10 de las 13:00 horas del 31 de agosto de 2010, de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública se procedió a revocar de oficio lo resuelto en resolución 1812-10 de las 15:00 horas del 29 de junio de 2010 en la causa disciplinaria tramitada contra el amparado Camacho Astúa, dejando sin efecto la sanción de suspensión sin goce de salario acordado.”