Interim Appointment in Indigenous Territory — Protection of Vested Rights and Prior ConsultationNombramiento interino en territorio indígena — intangibilidad de actos propios y consulta previa

I.PURPOSE OF THE ACTION. The petitioner alleged that, for the 2009 academic year, the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education, regardless of having issued a personnel action extending her interim appointment in position No. 3149 at the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School in the indigenous territory of Salitre, appointed Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro to the post. Based on the foregoing, she considered the principle of inviolability of the public administration's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), enshrined in Article 34 of the Political Constitution, to be violated.

III.- THE EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OR REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS THAT ARE FAVORABLE TO OR DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS FOR THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. This possibility available to public administrations and their bodies constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the irrevocability of their own acts favorable to the administered party or the principle of inviolability of their own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank as it derives from Article 34 of the Political Constitution (See judgments No. 2186-94 at 5:03 p.m. on May 4, 1994, and No. 899-95 at 5:18 p.m. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being ex officio annulment or review. For this purpose, the public administration, as a general principle, must appear as the plaintiff, and after a prior declaration of the act’s detrimental nature (lesividad) to public, economic, or any other interests, initiate the action for declaration of detriment to public interests (proceso de lesividad) (articles 10, paragraph 5, and 34 of the Code of Administrative Procedure), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for the administered parties. On this matter, this Constitutional Court in Decision No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, stated that "(...) the Administration is precluded from suppressing by its own action those acts that it has issued conferring subjective rights upon individuals. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit with respect to the powers of revocation (or modification) of administrative acts, in order to be able to demand greater procedural guarantees. When the Administration issues an act and subsequently issues another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, it is disregarding these rights that it had granted through the first act, whether by error or for any other reason. This implies that the only avenue the State has to eliminate one of its own acts from the legal system is the judicial proceeding for declaration of detriment to public interests (proceso de lesividad), since this proceeding is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the administered party; alternatively, in our legal system there is the possibility of acting against one's own acts in the administrative venue, in the case of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, subject to a prior opinion from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (as a further guarantee in favor of the administered party) and in accordance with Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, if the Administration has disregarded the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them in whole or in part (...), the principle of one's own acts determines, as a consequence of such irregularity, the invalidity of the act (…)." Pursuant to Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public entity or body may well annul in the administrative venue an act declaratory of rights for the administered party but detrimental to the public or patrimonial interests of the former, without needing to resort to the administrative proceeding for declaration of detriment to public interests (proceso de lesividad) regulated in Articles 10, paragraph 5, and 34 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (a proceeding in which the plaintiff is a public administration challenging its own act favorable to the administered party but detrimental to it) when such act is vitiated by an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity. The absolute, evident, and manifest nullity must be previously and favorably determined by the Offices of the Attorney General or the Comptroller General of the Republic —a preparatory act for the final annulment act—. It shall correspond to the Office of the Comptroller when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative procurement (Public Treasury). This opinion is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber, in Decision No. 1563-91 at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, held that "(...) It is evident, then, that as of the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, the competence to annul in the administrative venue can only be admitted if the duty to adduce an expert criterion external to the body that will issue the final act is fulfilled (...)." This is a binding opinion —from which the consulting body or entity cannot depart—, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and Article 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration. Through this opinion, a type of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, insofar as it precedes the final act of the ordinary proceeding initiated to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any of the degrees of administrative autonomy, as it is a specific manifestation of the control power inherent to intersubjective direction or administrative oversight. It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all that it positively confirms the seriousness and substance of the defects justifying the exercise of the power of ex officio review or annulment. The respective public administration is precluded by the infra-constitutional legal system from determining when a nullity is evident and manifest, since this determination is reserved to the technical-legal and consultative body called the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the opinion must be rendered by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it is also binding in nature by virtue of the provisions of Article 4, final paragraph, of its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994.

IV.- EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PREREQUISITE ENABLING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. Not every degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires the concurrence of certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations that qualify it. The nullity that justifies ex officio review must be of such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, pursuant to the provisions of Article 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, "evident and manifest." What is evident and manifest is what is obvious, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and which offers no margin of doubt or which does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In this sense, it is sufficient to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory rule that supports it to reach such a conclusion, without the need for any hermeneutics or exegesis. It must be added that Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, with some being simple and others evident and manifest; rather, what it seeks to promote is that, in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate their review in the administrative venue.

V.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FOR THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. The respective public administration —author of the act sought to be annulled or reviewed—, prior to the declaration of nullity, must open an ordinary administrative proceeding in which the principles and guarantees of due process and the right of defense must be observed (Article 173, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration). The justification for observing this proceeding lies in the fact that the final act may eliminate a subjective right of the administered party (Article 308 ibidem). During the processing of the ordinary proceeding, it is essential to obtain the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General or the Office of the Comptroller, which constitutes a procedural step of the proceeding. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident nature of the nullity (Article 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration). If the opinion of the Offices of the Attorney General or the Comptroller General of the Republic is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration shall be legally prevented from annulling the act in the administrative venue and must inevitably resort to the ordinary administrative proceeding for declaration of detriment to public interests (proceso de lesividad). The opinion of the two aforementioned consultative bodies is binding on the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest nature of the nullity. On this point, Article 183, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration prescribes that "(...) Outside of the cases provided for in Article 173 of this Code, the Administration may not ex officio annul acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party, and to obtain their elimination, it must resort to the proceeding for declaration of detriment to public interests (proceso de lesividad), provided for in the Code of Administrative Procedure." VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. An ex officio review or annulment carried out in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding considerandos "whether due to the omission of the prescribed formalities or because the nullity is not absolute, evident, and manifest" (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative proceeding was not opened) is absolutely null and renders both the public administration and the official liable for the damages caused (Article 173, paragraph 5, ibidem).

VII.- EXPIRY OF THE POWER OF EX OFFICIO REVIEW OF ACTS DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS. The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts lapses for the interested and respective public administration within a period of one year, unless their effects endure over time (Article 173, paragraph 4, LGAP). This is a rigid and fatal expiry deadline —acceleratory and peremptory— that does not admit interruptions or suspensions in the interests of the legal security and certainty of the administered parties who derive subjective rights from the administrative act sought to be reviewed and annulled, with the only adjusted nuance being for an act presenting an absolute and manifest nullity and having continuous effectiveness. Under this interpretation, the opening of the ordinary administrative proceeding and the request for an opinion from the Offices of the Attorney General or the Comptroller General of the Republic do not interrupt or suspend the deadline.

VIII.- ON THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. Regarding the education of indigenous peoples, Article 26 of ILO Convention No. 169 "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," approved by Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, obliges signatory States to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee members of indigenous communities the possibility of receiving an education at all levels, on a basis comparable with the rest of the national community. Parallel to this, paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the aforementioned Convention prescribes that educational programs and services intended for aboriginal peoples must be developed and implemented in cooperation with them, with the clear purpose of responding to their indigenous needs and, additionally, covering all their historical and cultural spheres. In this vein, paragraph 1 of Article 28 of the referred normative body establishes that, to the extent feasible, "(…) children of the peoples concerned should be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly spoken in the group to which they belong (…)." Likewise, paragraph 3 of the same article establishes that "(…) Adequate measures shall be taken to preserve the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned and to promote their development and practice (…)." A similar obligation is established by the Political Constitution in its Article 76, which provides, in what is relevant, the following: "Spanish is the official language of the Nation. However, the State shall ensure the maintenance and cultivation of the national indigenous languages." These provisions find resonance in Executive Decree No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993, which in its Article 2 enshrines among the aims of education in the indigenous reserves, the preservation of native languages as well as the promotion of their development and practice. Furthermore, Article 3 of the aforementioned Decree establishes that the educational programs and services intended for the indigenous reserves must be planned and implemented by the communities themselves, in permanent coordination with local and national educational authorities. Specifically, regarding the appointment of educators for the indigenous reserves, Article 9 of the same Decree stipulates that they must belong to the local ethnic group and preferably be natives of the respective indigenous reserve; additionally, Article 11 imposes that "(…) Before appointing teaching staff to the Indigenous Reserves, the Ministry of Public Education must consult the respective Board of Directors, whose observations it must take into consideration (…)" (emphasis not in the original).

IX.- SPECIFIC CASE. As derived from the account of proven facts, from July 1, 2007, until January 31, 2008, Carmen Morales Morales was appointed on an interim basis in position No. 3149 at the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School in the indigenous territory of Salitre. Subsequently, through personnel action No. 4976176, the appointment was extended from February 1, 2008, to January 31, 2009. For the 2009 academic year, the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education issued personnel action No. 5894821, through which it ratified the appointment of Morales Morales in position No. 3149 at the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School from February 1, 2009, to January 31, 2010 (visible on folio 11). However, the Integral Indigenous Development Association of the Territory of Salitre, in the ordinary session of January 10, 2009, minute No. 502, article 6, endorsed the appointment of Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro due to her being of Bribrí descent through her mother and having one hundred percent knowledge of the native language, and rejected Carmen Morales Morales, as she does not live within the Salitre territory, is not Bribrí, and there have been constant complaints from the community due to her irregular attendance to classes. Given this, the appointment made through personnel action No. 5894821 was revoked without complying with the guidelines deriving from the principle of inviolability of the public administration's own acts, which is, from all points of view, arbitrary. Undoubtedly, as noted in the previous considerando, our legal system recognizes the particularities under which educational services must be provided to indigenous communities; however, despite the Ministry of Public Education being aware of all the obligations and rights established by ILO Convention No. 169 "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," approved by Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, as well as our Political Constitution, and their concretization in the infra-constitutional order through Executive Decree No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993 —especially regarding the consultation with the Integral Indigenous Development Association of the Territory of Salitre before proceeding with this type of appointment— it decided to extend the designation of Carmen Morales Morales in position No. 3149, only to subsequently render the act null and void after the Development Association expressed its opposition. The Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education, Fernando Bogantes Cruz, must be clear that in a Social and Democratic State of Law such as ours, the end does not justify the means. Although the objective of the measure is entirely legitimate and commendable, this factor does not vitiate his obligation to also respect the fundamental rights of the petitioner, who does not have to bear the consequences of the administration's incorrect conduct in failing to ensure beforehand that all the requirements for the appointment were met and, to a greater degree, in not securing the consent of the Integral Indigenous Development Association of the Territory of Salitre. Consequently, the petitioner must be restored to the full enjoyment and exercise of her fundamental rights, without prejudice to the authorities of the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education immediately carrying out the necessary actions to properly carry out the designation of the educator, in order to ensure respect for the interests of the inhabitants of the Salitre indigenous territory and their rights in this matter.

X.- COROLLARY. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the action with merit, due to the violation of the principle of inviolability of the public administration's own acts, protected by Article 34 of the Political Constitution, with the consequences indicated in the operative part of this judgment.

of August 14, 1991, considered that <i>"(...) It is evident, then, that as of the effective date of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the competence to annul in administrative proceedings may only be admitted if the duty to provide an expert criterion external to the body that will issue the final act is fulfilled (...)"</i>. This is a binding opinion (dictamen de carácter vinculante)—from which the consulting body or entity cannot depart—as stipulated by ordinal 2° of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República and paragraph 1° of Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Through this opinion, a sort of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, insofar as it precedes the final act of the ordinary proceeding initiated to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any degree of administrative autonomy, being a specific manifestation of the control power inherent in intersubjective direction or administrative oversight. It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all, that it positively verifies the gravity and significance of the defects that justify the exercise of the power of ex officio review or annulment. The respective public administration is prohibited by the infra-constitutional legal system from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since that determination is reserved for the technical-legal and consultative body called the Procuraduría General de la República, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the opinion must be rendered by the Contraloría General de la República, it is also binding in nature by virtue of the provisions of paragraph in fine of Article 4° of its Ley Orgánica No. 7428 of September 7, 1994.

**IV.- EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PREREQUISITE THAT ENABLES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PERSON.** Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaring rights for an administered person (administrado), given that the administrative legal system requires the concurrence of certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations that qualify it. The nullity that justifies ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1° of Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, "evident and manifest." What is evident and manifest is that which is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and that offers no room for doubt or that does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover it, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In this sense, it suffices to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that covers it to arrive at such a conclusion, without any need for hermeneutics or exegesis. It is necessary to add that Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, with some being simple and others evident and manifest, but rather attempts to facilitate that in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the contentious-administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate its review in administrative proceedings.

**V.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FOR THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PERSON.** The respective public administration—author of the act to be annulled or reviewed—must, prior to the declaration of nullity, open an ordinary administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo ordinario) in which the principles and guarantees of due process and the right to a defense must be observed (paragraph 3° of Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). The justification for observing that proceeding lies in the fact that the final act may suppress a subjective right of the administered person (Article 308 ibidem). During the substantiation of the ordinary proceeding, it is essential to obtain the opinion (dictamen) of the Procuraduría or the Contraloría, which is a procedural step thereof. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident nature of the nullity (paragraph 1° of Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). If the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República or the Contraloría General de la República is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally prevented from annulling the act in administrative proceedings and must necessarily resort to the ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding of lesividad (lesividad). The opinion (dictamen) of the two cited consultative bodies is binding on the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest nature of the nullity. On this point, paragraph 3° of Article 183 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública prescribes that <i>"(...) Outside of the cases provided for in Article 173 of this Code, the Administration may not ex officio annul acts declaring rights in favor of the administered person and, to obtain their elimination, must resort to the lesividad proceeding provided for in the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo. "</i>.

**VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA.** The ex officio review or annulment carried out in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding recitals (considerandos) "whether by omission of the prescribed formalities or because it is not absolute, evident, and manifest" (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative proceeding was not opened) is absolutely null and makes both the public administration and the official liable for the damages caused (paragraph 5° of Article 173, ibidem).

**VII.- EXPIRY OF THE POWER OF EX OFFICIO REVIEW OF ACTS DECLARING RIGHTS.** The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts expires for the interested and respective public administration within a period of one year, unless its effects endure over time (paragraph 4° of Article 173, LGAP). This is a rigid and fatal period of expiry (caducidad)—acceleratory and peremptory—that does not admit interruptions or suspensions, in the interest of the legal security and certainty of the administered persons who derive subjective rights from the administrative act subject to review and annulment. With the sole adjusted nuance of an act presenting an absolute and manifest nullity and having continuous effectiveness. Under this understanding, the opening of the ordinary administrative proceeding and the request for the opinion to the Procuraduría or Contraloría Generales de la República do not interrupt or suspend the period.

**VIII.- ON THE SPECIFICITIES OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES.** Regarding the education of indigenous peoples, Article 26 of Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," approved by Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, obliges the signatory States to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the members of indigenous communities the possibility of receiving an education at all levels, comparable to that of the rest of the national community. Similarly, paragraph 1° of Article 27 of the cited Convention prescribes that educational programs and services intended for aboriginal peoples must be developed and implemented in cooperation with them, with the clear purpose of responding to their autochthonous needs and, additionally, covering all their historical-cultural areas. In this vein, paragraph 1° of Article 28 of the referenced normative body establishes that, insofar as it is feasible, <i>"(...) children belonging to the peoples concerned shall be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly spoken by the group to which they belong (...)"</i>. Likewise, paragraph 3° of the same numeral establishes that <i>"(...) Provisions shall be adopted to preserve the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned and to promote their development and practice (...)". </i> A similar obligation is established by the Political Constitution in its Article 76 by providing, in relevant part, the following: <i>"Spanish is the official language of the Nation. However, the State shall ensure the maintenance and cultivation of the national indigenous languages." </i> These provisions are echoed in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993, which in its Article 2 enshrines among the aims of education in the indigenous reserves, the preservation of native languages as well as the promotion of their development and practice. Furthermore, Article 3 of the cited Decree stipulates that the educational programs and services destined for the indigenous reserves must be planned and put into practice by the communities themselves, in permanent coordination with local and national educational authorities. Specifically, regarding the appointment of educators for indigenous reserves, Article 9 of the same Decree stipulates that they must belong to the local ethnic group and be, preferably, natives of the respective indigenous reserve; additionally, Article 11 imposes that <i>"(...) The Ministry of Public Education <b><u>before</u></b> appointing the teaching staff of the Indigenous Reserves <b><u>must consult</u></b> the respective Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo), whose observations it must take into consideration (...)" </i>(the highlighting is not in the original).

**IX.- THE SPECIFIC CASE.** As derived from the statement of proven facts, from July 1, 2007, until January 31, 2008, Carmen Morales Morales was appointed, on an interim basis, to position (plaza) No. 3149, of the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School in the Salitre indigenous territory. Subsequently, through personnel action No. 4976176, the appointment was extended from February 1, 2008, to January 31, 2009. For the 2009 school year, the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education issued personnel action No. 5894821, through which it ratified the appointment of Morales Morales, in position No. 3149 of the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School, from February 1, 2009, until January 31, 2010 (visible on folio 11). However, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre, in the ordinary session of January 10, 2009, act No. 502, Article 6, endorsed the appointment of Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro, for being of Bribrí (bribrí) descent on her mother's side and having a one hundred percent knowledge of the native language, and rejected Carmen Morales Morales, as she does not live within the Salitre territory, is not Bribrí, and constant complaints have been presented by the community regarding her irregular attendance to classes. In view of this, the appointment made through personnel action No. 5894821 was revoked, without complying with the guidelines deriving from the principle of the intangibility of the public administration's own acts, which, from every point of view, is arbitrary. Undoubtedly, as noted in the previous recital (considerando), our legal system recognizes the specificities under which educational services must be provided to indigenous communities; however, despite the fact that the Ministry of Public Education was aware of all the obligations and rights established by Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," approved by Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, as well as our Political Constitution, and its concretion in the infra-constitutional order through Decreto Ejecutivo No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993—especially concerning the consultation with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre before proceeding with this type of appointments—it decided to extend the appointment of Carmen Morales Morales to position No. 3149, only to later render the act void after the Development Association expressed its refusal. The Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education, Fernando Bogantes Cruz, must be clear that in a Social and Democratic State of Law such as ours, the end does not justify the means. Even though the objective of the measure is entirely legitimate and commendable, this factor does not vitiate his obligation to also respect the fundamental rights of the appellant, who does not have to bear the consequences of the incorrect conduct of the administration, by not ensuring, beforehand, that all the requirements for the appointment were met and, to a greater degree, having the consent of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre. Consequently, the protected party must be reestablished in the full enjoyment and exercise of her fundamental rights, without prejudice to the authorities of the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education immediately carrying out the necessary actions to properly make the appointment of the educator, in order to ensure respect for the interest of the inhabitants of the Salitre indigenous territory and their rights in this matter.

**X.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the appeal (recurso) granted, due to the violation of the principle of the intangibility of the public administration's own acts, protected by Article 34 of the Political Constitution, with the consequences indicated in the operative part of this judgment." </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>This possibility available to public administrations and their bodies constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the irrepealability of their own acts favorable to the administered party or the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank because it derives from Article 34 of the Political Constitution (See judgments No. 2186-94 of 17:03 hrs. on May 4, 1994, and No. 899-95 of 17:18 hrs. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the administered party, the exceptions being annulment or ex officio review. For that purpose, the public administration, as a general principle, must appear as a plaintiff, after a prior declaration of detriment (lesividad) of the act to the public, economic, or any other interests, in the proceeding of detriment (lesividad) (articles 10, paragraph 5, and 34 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for the administered parties. Regarding this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Vote No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, stated that <i>"(...) the Administration is forbidden from suppressing, through its own action, those acts it has issued conferring subjective rights to private individuals. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit regarding the powers to revoke (or modify) administrative acts, in order to demand greater procedural guarantees. The Administration, upon issuing an act and subsequently issuing another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, is disregarding these rights that it had granted through the first act, whether by error or for any other reason. This implies that the only way the State has to eliminate one of its acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional proceeding of detriment (lesividad), since this proceeding is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the administered party, or else, in our legal system, there exists the possibility of going against one's own acts through the administrative channel, in the hypothesis of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, following a prior opinion from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (as an additional guarantee in favor of the administered party) and in accordance with article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, if the Administration has failed to observe the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them entirely or in part (...) the principle of one's own acts determines the invalidity of the act as an effect of such irregularity (…)"</i>. Pursuant to numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, a public entity or body can indeed annul, through the administrative channel, an act declaratory of rights for the administered party but detrimental to the public or patrimonial interests of the former, without needing to resort to the contentious-administrative proceeding of detriment (lesividad) regulated in articles 10, paragraph 5, and 34 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (a proceeding in which the plaintiff is a public administration that challenges its own act favorable to the administered party but detrimental to it) when the same is vitiated by an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity. The absolute, evident, and manifest nullity must be ruled upon, previously and favorably, by the Office of the Attorney General or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic —a preparatory act for the final annulment act. It shall correspond to the Office of the Comptroller General when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budgetary process or administrative contracting (Public Treasury). This opinion is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber, in Vote No. 1563-91 of 15:00 hrs. on August 14, 1991, considered that <i>"(…) It is evident, then, that since the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, the competence to annul in administrative seat can only be admitted if the duty to provide an expert and external criterion to the body that is to issue the final act is fulfilled (…)"</i>. It is a binding opinion —from which the consulting body or entity cannot depart—, so established by ordinals 2 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration. Through this opinion, a sort of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, as it precedes the final act of the ordinary procedure initiated to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any of the degrees of administrative autonomy, being a specific manifestation of the control power inherent to intersubjective direction or administrative tutelage. It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all, that it positively verifies the gravity and significance of the vices that justify the exercise of the ex officio review or annulment power. The respective public administration is inhibited by the infraconstitutional legal system from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since that extreme is reserved for the technical-legal and consultative body called the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the opinion must be rendered by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, it also has a binding nature by virtue of the provisions of article 4, final paragraph, of its Organic Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>IV.- THE EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PREREQUISITE ENABLING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF EX OFFICIO ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>Not just any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an administered party, given that the administrative legal system requires that certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations concur to qualify it. The nullity that justifies ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, according to the provisions of numeral 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, "evident and manifest." The evident and manifest is what is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and offers no margin for doubt or does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover it, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In that sense, it suffices to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that covers it to reach such a conclusion, without any need for hermeneutics or exegesis. It is necessary to add that numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration does not create a sort of bipartition of absolute nullities, with some being simple and others evident and manifest. Instead, what it seeks to facilitate is that in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the contentious-administrative judge is unnecessary or dispensable to facilitate its review through the administrative channel. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>V.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>The respective public administration —author of the act sought to be annulled or reviewed—, prior to the declaration of nullity, must open an ordinary administrative procedure in which the principles and guarantees of due process and defense must be observed (article 173, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration). The justification for observing that procedure lies in the fact that the final act may suppress a subjective right of the administered party (article 308 ibidem). During the substantiation of the ordinary procedure, it is indispensable to obtain the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General or the Office of the Comptroller General, being a procedural act of the same. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident character of the nullity (article 173, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration). If the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally prevented from annulling the act through the administrative channel and must irrevocably resort to the ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding of detriment (lesividad). The opinion of the two cited consultative bodies is binding for the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest character of the nullity. On this point, article 183, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration prescribes that <i>"(…) Outside the cases provided for in article 173 of this Code, the Administration may not ex officio annul acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party, and to obtain their elimination, it must resort to the proceeding of detriment (lesividad), provided for in the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code<span class=GramE>.<span style='font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;font-style:normal'> </span>"</span></i>. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF ORDINAL 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding considerandos "whether by omission of the formalities provided for or because it is not absolute, evident and manifest" (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and renders both the public administration and the official responsible for the damages and losses caused (article 173, paragraph 5, ibidem). </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>VII.- EXPIRY OF THE POWER OF EX OFFICIO REVIEW OF ACTS DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts expires for the interested and respective public administration within a term of one year, unless their effects endure over time (article 173, paragraph 4, LGAP). It concerns a rigid and fatal expiry term —acceleratory and peremptory— that does not admit interruptions or suspensions for the sake of the legal security and certainty of the administered parties who derive subjective rights from the administrative act sought to be reviewed and annulled. With the only adjusted nuance of the act that presents an absolute and manifest nullity and has continuous effectiveness. Under this understanding, the opening of the ordinary administrative procedure and the request for the opinion from the Office of the Attorney General or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic do not interrupt or suspend the term.</span> </p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>VIII.- ON THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>Regarding the education of indigenous peoples, article 26 of Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” approved through Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, obliges signatory States to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee members of indigenous communities the possibility of receiving education at all levels, in a manner comparable to the rest of the national community. In parallel, paragraph 1 of numeral 27 of the cited Convention prescribes that educational programs and services intended for aboriginal peoples must be developed and applied in cooperation with them, with the clear purpose of responding to autochthonous needs and, additionally, covering all their historical-cultural spheres. In this vein, paragraph 1 of article 28 of the referenced normative body establishes that, as far as feasible, <i>“(…) children of the peoples concerned must be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly spoken in the group to which they belong (…)”.</i> Likewise, paragraph 3 of the same numeral establishes that <i>“(…) Provisions must be adopted to preserve the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned and to promote the development and practice thereof (…)”. </i></span> <span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>A similar obligation is established by the Political Constitution in its article 76 upon providing, to the extent relevant, the following:<b> </b><i>“Spanish is the official language of the Nation. However, the State shall ensure the maintenance and cultivation of the national indigenous languages”. </i>These provisions find resonance in the Executive Decree No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993, which in its article 2 consecrates among the aims of education in indigenous reserves, the preservation of native languages as well as the promotion of their development and practice. Moreover, numeral 3 of the cited Decree stipulates that educational programs and services intended for indigenous reserves must be planned and implemented by the communities themselves, in permanent coordination with local and national educational authorities. Specifically, with regard to the appointment of educators in indigenous reserves, article 9 of the same Decree stipulates that they must belong to the local ethnic group and be, preferably, native to the respective indigenous reserve; additionally, numeral 11 imposes that <i>“(…) The Ministry of Public Education <b><u>before</u></b> appointing the teaching staff of the Indigenous Reserves <b><u>must consult</u></b> the respective Board of Directors whose observations it must take into consideration (…)” </i>(the highlighting is not from the original). </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>IX.- SPECIFIC CASE. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>As derived from the account of proven facts, from July 1, 2007, until January 31, 2008, Carmen Morales Morales was appointed on an interim basis to position No. 3149 at the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School in the Salitre indigenous territory. Subsequently, through personnel action No. 4976176, the appointment was extended from February 1, 2008, to January 31, 2009. For the 2009 school year, the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education issued personnel action No. 5894821, by means of which it ratified the appointment of Morales Morales to position No. 3149 at the Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. School, from February 1, 2009, until January 31, 2010 (visible on folio 11). Notwithstanding, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre, in the ordinary session of January 10, 2009,<b> </b>minutes No. 502, article 6, endorsed the appointment of Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro, for being of bribrí descent on her mother's side and having a one-hundred-percent knowledge of the native language, and rejected Carmen Morales Morales, since she does not live within the Salitre territory, is not bribrí, and there have been constant complaints from the community due to her irregular class attendance. Given this, the appointment made through personnel action No. 5894821 was revoked, without complying with the guidelines deriving from the principle of intangibility of the public administration's own acts, which, from every point of view, is arbitrary. Undoubtedly, as noted in the preceding considerando, our legal system recognizes the particularities under which educational services must be delivered to indigenous communities; however, despite the fact that the Ministry of Public Education was aware of all the duties and rights established by Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” approved through Law No. 7311 of November 30, 1992, as well as our Political Constitution, and its embodiment in the infraconstitutional order through Executive Decree No. 22072-MEP of February 25, 1993 —especially regarding the consultation with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre before proceeding with this type of appointments— it decided to extend the appointment of Carmen Morales Morales to position No. 3149, only to subsequently render the act without effect after the Development Association expressed its opposition. The Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Education, Fernando Bogantes Cruz, must be clear that in a Social and Democratic State of Law such as ours, the end does not justify the means. Despite the fact that the objective of the measure is entirely legitimate and commendable, this factor does not negate his obligation to also respect the fundamental rights of the appellant, who need not bear the consequences of the administration's incorrect conduct, by not ensuring beforehand that all the requirements for the appointment were met and, to a greater degree, having the consent of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre. Consequently, the protected party must be restored to the full enjoyment and exercise of her fundamental rights, without prejudice to the authorities of the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education immediately carrying out the necessary actions to properly make the appointment of the educator, in order to enforce respect for the interest of the inhabitants of the Salitre indigenous territory and their rights in this matter. </span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>X.- COROLLARY. </span></b><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%'>By virtue of the foregoing, it is imperative to declare the appeal granted, due to the violation of the principle of intangibility of the public administration's own acts, protected by article 34 of the Political Constitution, with the consequences indicated in the operative part of this judgment.”</span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html>

“I- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. La recurrente adujo que, para el curso lectivo de 2009, la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública, sin importar que había emitido una acción de personal prorrogando su nombramiento interino en la plaza No. 3149 de la Escuela Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. del territorio indígena de Salitre, designó en el puesto, a Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro. Por lo descrito, estimó lesionado el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios de la administración pública, consagrado en el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política.

III.- LA ANULACIÓN O REVISIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES O DECLARATORIOS DE DERECHOS PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. Esta posibilidad que tienen las administraciones públicas y sus órganos constituye una excepción calificada a la doctrina de la inderogabilidad de los actos propios y favorables para el administrado o del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, al que esta Sala especializada le ha conferido rango constitucional por derivar del ordinal 34 de la Constitución Política (Ver sentencias Nos. 2186-94 de las 17:03 hrs. del 4 de mayo de 1994 y 899-95 de las 17:18 hrs. del 15 de febrero de 1995)-. La regla general es que la administración pública respectiva no puede anular un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado, siendo las excepciones la anulación o revisión de oficio. Para ese efecto, la administración pública, como principio general, debe acudir, en calidad de parte actora y previa declaratoria de lesividad del acto a los intereses públicos, económicos o de cualquier otra naturaleza, al proceso de lesividad (artículos 10, párrafo 5°, y 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), el cual se ha entendido, tradicionalmente, como una garantía para los administrados. Sobre este particular, este Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto No. 897-98 del 11 de febrero de 1998 señaló que "(...) a la Administración le está vedado suprimir por su propia acción aquellos actos que haya emitido confiriendo derechos subjetivos a los particulares. Así, los derechos subjetivos constituyen un límite respecto de las potestades de revocación (o modificación) de los actos administrativos, con el fin de poder exigir mayores garantías procedimentales. La Administración, al emitir un acto y con posterioridad al emanar otro contrario al primero, en menoscabo de derechos subjetivos, está desconociendo estos derechos, que a través del primer acto había concedido, sea por error o por cualquier otro motivo. Ello implica que la única vía que el Estado tiene para eliminar un acto suyo del ordenamiento es el proceso de jurisdiccional de lesividad, pues este proceso está concebido como una garantía procesal a favor del administrado, o bien, en nuestro ordenamiento existe la posibilidad de ir contra los actos propios en la vía administrativa, en la hipótesis de nulidades absolutas, evidentes y manifiestas, previo dictamen de la Contraloría General de la República y de la Procuraduría General de la República (como una garantía más a favor del administrado) y de conformidad con el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En consecuencia, si la Administración ha inobservado las reglas de estos procedimientos, o bien, las ha omitido del todo o en parte (...) el principio de los actos propios determina como efecto de dicha irregularidad la invalidez del acto (…)". A tenor del numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, un ente u órgano público bien puede anular en vía administrativa un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado pero lesivo para los intereses públicos o patrimoniales de la primera, sin necesidad de recurrir al proceso contencioso administrativo de lesividad normado en los artículos 10, párrafo 5°, y 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (proceso en el cual la parte actora es una administración pública que impugna un acto propio favorable para el administrado pero lesivo para ella) cuando el mismo este viciado de una nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta. La nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta debe ser dictaminada, previa y favorablemente, por la Procuraduría o la Contraloría Generales de la República -acto preparatorio del acto anulatorio final-. Le corresponderá a la Contraloría cuando la nulidad verse sobre actos administrativos relacionados directamente con el proceso presupuestario o la contratación administrativa (Hacienda Pública). Ese dictamen es indispensable, a tal punto que esta Sala en el Voto No. 1563-91 de las 15 hrs. del 14 de agosto de 1991 estimó que "(…) Es evidente, entonces, que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la competencia de anular en sede administrativa solamente puede ser admitida si se cumple con el deber de allegar un criterio trata de un dictamen de carácter vinculante -del que no puede apartarse el órgano o ente consultante-, así lo disponen los ordinales 2° de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República y el 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. A través de ese dictamen se ejerce una suerte de control previo o preventivo de legalidad, en cuanto antecede el acto final del procedimiento ordinario incoado para decretar la anulación oficiosa, que no riñe con ninguno de los grados de autonomía administrativa, por ser manifestación específica de la potestad de control inherente a la dirección intersubjetiva o tutela administrativa. Resulta lógico que tal dictamen debe ser favorable a la pretensión anulatoria de la administración consultante, y sobre todo que constate, positivamente, la gravedad y entidad de los vicios que justifican el ejercicio de la potestad de revisión o anulación oficiosa. La Administración pública respectiva está inhibida por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional de determinar cuándo hay una nulidad evidente y manifiesta, puesto que, ese extremo le está reservado al órgano técnico- jurídico y consultivo denominado Procuraduría General de la República, como órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio de Justicia. En los supuestos en que el dictamen debe ser vertido por la Contraloría General de la República, también, tiene naturaleza vinculante en virtud de lo dispuesto en artículo 4°, párrafo in fine, de su Ley Orgánica No. 7428 del 7 de septiembre de 1994.

IV.- LA NULIDAD EVIDENTE Y MANIFIESTA COMO PRESUPUESTO QUE HABILITA A LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PUBLICAS PARA EJERCER SU POTESTAD DE ANULACIÓN OFICIOSA DE ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. No cualquier grado de invalidez o nulidad autoriza a un ente u órgano público para decretar la anulación oficiosa de un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos para un administrado, dado que, el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo exige que concurran ciertas características o connotaciones específicas y agravadas que la califiquen. La nulidad que justifica la revisión de oficio debe tener tal trascendencia y magnitud que debe ser, a tenor de lo establecido en el numeral 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, "evidente y manifiesta". Lo evidente y manifiesto es lo que resulta patente, notorio, ostensible, palpable, claro, cierto y que no ofrece ningún margen de duda o que no requiere de un proceso o esfuerzo dialéctico o lógico de verificación para descubrirlo, precisamente, por su índole grosera y grave. En tal sentido, basta confrontar el acto administrativo con la norma legal o reglamentaria que le da cobertura para arribar a tal conclusión, sin necesidad de hermenéutica o exégesis ninguna. Es menester agregar que el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública no crea una suerte de bipartición de las nulidades absolutas, siendo algunas de ellas simples y otras evidentes y manifiestas, sino lo que trata de propiciar es que en el supuesto de las segundas sea innecesario o prescindible el análisis profundo y experto del juez contencioso-administrativo para facilitar su revisión en vía administrativa.

V.- LA NECESIDAD DE INCOAR UN PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO ORDINARIO PARA LA REVISIÓN O ANULACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La administración pública respectiva —autora del acto que se pretende anular o revisar—, de previo a la declaratoria de nulidad, debe abrir un procedimiento administrativo ordinario en el que se deben observar los principios y las garantías del debido proceso y de la defensa (artículo 173, párrafo 3°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), la justificación de observar ese procedimiento está en que el acto final puede suprimir un derecho subjetivo del administrado (artículo 308 ibidem). Durante la sustanciación del procedimiento ordinario, resulta indispensable recabar el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría siendo un acto de trámite del mismo. Tal y como se indicó supra, el dictamen debe pronunciarse, expresamente, sobre el carácter absoluto, manifiesto y evidente de la nulidad (artículo 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Si el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría Generales de la República es desfavorable, en el sentido que la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo no es evidente y manifiesta, la respectiva administración pública se verá impedida, legalmente, para anular el acto en vía administrativa y tendrá que acudir, irremisiblemente, al proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo de lesividad. El dictamen de los dos órganos consultivos citados es vinculante para la administración respectiva en cuanto al carácter evidente y manifiesto de la nulidad. Sobre este punto, el artículo 183, párrafo 3°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública preceptúa que "(…) Fuera de los casos previstos en el artículo 173 de este Código, la Administración no podrá anular de oficio los actos declaratorios de derechos en favor del administrado y para obtener su eliminación deberá acudir al proceso de lesividad, previsto en el Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo. ".

VI.- CONSECUENCIAS JURÍDICAS DE LA INOBSERVANCIA DE LOS RECAUDOS FORMALES Y SUSTANCIALES DEL ORDINAL 173 DE LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA. La revisión oficiosa o anulación con quebranto de los requisitos legales referidos en los considerandos precedentes "sea por omisión de las formalidades previstas o por no ser absoluta, evidente y manifiesta" (v. gr. que el dictamen sea desfavorable, que no se recabó el dictamen o que no se abrió un procedimiento administrativo ordinario) es absolutamente nula y hace responsable por los daños y perjuicios provocados tanto a la administración pública como al funcionario (artículo 173, párrafo 5°, ibidem).

VII.- CADUCIDAD DE LA POTESTAD DE REVISIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS DECLARATORIOS DE DERECHOS. La potestad de revisión o anulación de oficio de los actos favorables, le caduca a la administración pública interesada y respectiva en el plazo de un año, salvo que sus efectos perduren en el tiempo (artículo 173, párrafo 4°, LGAP). Se trata, de un plazo rígido y fatal de caducidad -aceleratorio y perentorio- que no admite interrupciones o suspensiones en aras de la seguridad y certeza jurídicas de los administrados que derivan derechos subjetivos del acto administrativo que se pretende revisar y anular. Con la única matización ajustada del acto que presente una nulidad absoluta y manifiesta y tenga una eficacia continúa. Bajo esta inteligencia, la apertura del procedimiento administrativo ordinario y la solicitud del dictamen a la Procuraduría o Contraloría Generales de la República no interrumpen o suspenden el plazo.

VIII.- SOBRE LAS PARTICULARIDADES DEL DERECHO A LA EDUCACIÓN DE LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS. En lo atinente a la educación de los pueblos indígenas, el artículo 26 del Convenio No. 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo “Sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes”, aprobado mediante la Ley No. 7311 de 30 de noviembre de 1992, obliga a los Estados firmantes a adoptar las medidas necesarias con el fin de garantizar a los miembros de las comunidades indígenas, la posibilidad de recibir una educación en todos los niveles, de manera equiparable con el resto de la comunidad nacional. Paralelamente, el párrafo 1° del numeral 27 del citado Convenio, preceptúa que los programas y los servicios educativos destinados a los pueblos aborígenes, deben desarrollarse y aplicarse en cooperación con estos, con el claro propósito que respondan a las necesidades autóctonas y, adicionalmente, abarquen todos sus ámbitos histórico-culturales. En este orden de ideas, el párrafo 1° del artículo 28 del referido cuerpo normativo establece que, en el tanto sea viable, “(…) deberá enseñarse a los niños de los pueblos interesados a leer y escribir en su propia lengua indígena o en la lengua que más comúnmente se hable en el grupo a que pertenezcan (…)”. Igualmente el párrafo 3° del mismo numeral establece que “(…) Deberán adoptarse disposiciones para preservar las lenguas indígenas de los pueblos interesados y promover el desarrollo y la práctica de las mismas (…)”. Similar obligación establece la Constitución Política en su artículo 76 al disponer en lo que interesa lo siguiente: “ El español es el idioma oficial de la Nación. No obstante, el Estado velará por el mantenimiento y cultivo de las lenguas indígenas nacionales”. Dichas disposiciones encuentran eco en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 22072-MEP de 25 de febrero de 1993, que en su artículo 2 consagra entre los fines de la educación en las reservas indígenas, la preservación de las lenguas nativas así como la promoción de su desarrollo y práctica. De otra parte, el numeral 3 del citado Decreto estatuye que los programas y servicios educativos destinados a las reservas indígenas deben ser planificados y puestos en práctica por las propias comunidades, en coordinación permanente con las autoridades educativas locales y nacionales. Específicamente, en lo que al nombramiento de los educadores de las reservas indígenas se refiere, el artículo 9 del mismo Decreto estipula que aquellos deben pertenecer a la etnia local y ser, preferiblemente, nativos de la respectiva reserva indígena; adicionalmente, el numeral 11 impone que “(…) El Ministerio de Educación Pública antes de nombrar el personal docente de las Reservas Indígenas deberá consultar al respectivo Consejo Directivo cuyas observaciones deberá tomar en consideración (…)” (el destacado, no es del original).

IX.- CASO CONCRETO. Tal y como se deriva de la relación de hechos probados, desde el 1° de julio de 2007 y hasta el 31 de enero de 2008, Carmen Morales Morales, estuvo nombrada, de manera interina, en la plaza No. 3149, de la Escuela Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G. del territorio indígena Salitre. Posteriormente, mediante la acción de personal No. 4976176, la designación fue prorrogada del 1° de febrero de 2008 al 31 de enero de 2009. Para el curso lectivo de 2009, la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública, emitió la acción de personal No. 5894821, por medio de la cual ratificó el nombramiento de Morales Morales, en la plaza No. 3149 de la Escuela Bikakra Jaime Ortiz G., del 1° de febrero de 2009 hasta el 31 de enero de 2010 (visible a folio 11). No obstante, la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre, en la sesión ordinaria del 10 de enero de 2009, acta No. 502, artículo 6, avaló el nombramiento de Ingrid Figueroa Lázaro, por ser de ascendencia bribrí, por parte de su madre y tener un conocimiento de la lengua nativa del cien por ciento, y rechazó, a Carmen Morales Morales, pues no vive dentro del territorio Salitre, no es bribrí y se han presentado quejas constantes de la comunidad por su asistencia irregular a clases. Ante esto, se revocó el nombramiento realizado a través de la acción de personal No. 5894821, sin cumplir los lineamientos que derivan del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios de la administración pública, lo que, desde todo punto de vista, es arbitrario. Indubitablemente, como se hizo notar en el anterior considerando, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico reconoce las particularidades en las cuales se deben impartir los servicios educativos a las comunidades indígenas, sin embargo, pese a que el Ministerio de Educación Pública tenía presente todas las obligaciones y derechos que estatuye el Convenio No. 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo “Sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes”, aprobado mediante la Ley No. 7311 del 30 de noviembre de 1992, así como nuestra Constitución Política, igual que su concreción en el orden infraconstitucional a través del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 22072-MEP de 25 de febrero de 1993 -sobre todo en lo atinente a la consulta a la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre antes de proceder con este tipo nombramientos- decidió prorrogar la designación de Carmen Morales Morales en la plaza No. 3149, para dejar, ulteriormente, sin efecto el acto, luego que la Asociación de Desarrollo expresara su negativa. El Director de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública, Fernando Bogantes Cruz, debe tener claro que en un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho como el nuestro, el fin no justifica los medios. Pese a que el objetivo de la medida es del todo legítimo y encomiable, este factor no enerva su obligación de respetar, también, los derechos fundamentales de la recurrente, que no tiene porque soportar las consecuencias del proceder incorrecto de la administración, al no asegurarse, de previo, que se cumplieran todos los requisitos para el nombramiento y, en mayor grado, contar con la anuencia de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígena del Territorio de Salitre. Por consiguiente, la amparada debe ser reestablecida en el pleno goce y ejercicio de sus derechos fundamentales, sin perjuicio que, las autoridades de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública lleven a cabo, de inmediato, las actuaciones necesarias para que se haga, de manera debida, la designación del educador, en aras de hacer respetar el interés de los habitantes del territorio indígena Salitre y sus derechos en la materia.

X.- COROLARIO. En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone declarar con lugar el recurso, por la lesión del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios de la administración pública, tutelado por el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política, con las consecuencias que se indican en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.”