Dismissal of Amparo Against ARESEP Tariff Resolution as Matter of LegalityInadmisibilidad del amparo contra tarifas de ARESEP por ser cuestión de legalidad

“II.- Purpose of the appeal. The appellant alleges that through resolution RRG-9318-2008 of eleven thirty hours on December 8, 2008—published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 23, 2008—the Public Services Regulatory Authority established an increase in the public service rates for the bus mode of routes 400, 420, and 402-421, described as Heredia-San José and vice versa, without holding a prior hearing so that the general public could participate and challenge the aforementioned provision. Furthermore, he considers said increase to be disproportionate because the local residents do not have the necessary resources to pay such a high price for the transportation fare. He also indicates that in 2008, the drivers of the aforementioned company applied increases of five colones to the bus fare, arguing a lack of low-value coins.

“…IV.- On the merits. The special administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo especial) established in Ley 7593 for setting public service rates is intended to guarantee transparency in the decisions of the regulatory entity and the possibility of allowing consumer and user participation in the process. The rate petition (petición tarifaria) is submitted to a public hearing in which those citizens who present an opposition based on technical criteria may participate; an opposition that must be presented in accordance with the requirements stipulated by the Regulation, giving the interested party the opportunity to defend their interest in the matter. The procedure aims, through its various stages, to issue an administrative act dictated in light of the principles inherent to the regulatory philosophy and contained in Ley 7593, among which may be cited service at cost, respect for the balance between the interests of the user and the provider, the avoidance of settings contrary to the financial equilibrium of the providers, as well as the exclusion of unacceptable costs, in accordance with the principles of the regulation of public services. In the present case, as reported by the Regulador General and confirmed by reading the contested resolution, the petitioner (amparado) did not participate in due course as an opponent in the rate-setting procedure (procedimiento de fijación tarifaria), the final act of which, after the appeals filed were resolved, is now being challenged; he did not come forward to defend his interests according to the procedure specifically established for that purpose in Ley 7593, and therefore his claim that the questioned resolution be annulled through the amparo appeal is inadmissible.

V.- Furthermore, the reiterated jurisprudence of this Chamber has pronounced to the effect that disagreement with the resolutions of the Public Services Regulatory Authority must be settled before the Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda), since this Court is not responsible for hearing and deciding on the merits of the questioned resolution, determining whether it was issued in accordance with the law or not, or whether, in addressing the rate adjustment (ajuste tarifario) request, ARESEP exceeded its prerogatives, misapplied the laws, or incurred in omissions, as this involves aspects of legality—not of constitutionality—outside the competence of this Chamber. The same applies to the provision of the transportation service itself, such as the condition of the units providing the service, compliance with schedules, or the rate charged to users. It must be kept in mind that this is a Court of Law, the purpose of which is to guarantee the supremacy of constitutional norms and principles and of applicable International or Community Law in the Republic, their uniform interpretation and application, as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution or in the international human rights instruments in force in Costa Rica (article 10 of the Constitución Política). It is the Constitución Política itself, in its article 48, that created the mechanisms for those superior rights and principles to be asserted before this Court, through the habeas corpus appeal, in the case of personal liberty and integrity, and the amparo appeal, to maintain and restore the enjoyment of the other rights enshrined in the Constitución Política, as well as those of a fundamental nature established in international human rights instruments applicable in the Republic. It has been insisted in the jurisprudence of this Chamber that a constitutional amparo (amparo constitucional) is appropriate when there is a direct violation of those rights, whether by actions or omissions or simple material acts not based on an effective administrative act by public officials or bodies. The foregoing, given that, certainly, if the norms contemplated in the Constitución Política are at the apex of the normative order, any violation of a legal nature indirectly violates the Constitución Política; however, to resolve these conflicts, the constitutional legislator created the ordinary jurisdictions, namely the Administrative-Adjudicative (contencioso-administrativa), Labor, Commercial, Civil, Criminal, Family, and others, in articles 49 and 153 of the Constitución Política, just as it established the constitutional jurisdiction in articles 10 and 48, but—as indicated supra—limiting its competence to guaranteeing the protection of those fundamental rights directly violated by public law bodies or servants and, exceptionally, by private law subjects, in the cases indicated in article 57 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. In this order of ideas, it follows from what has been said that there are direct and indirect violations of fundamental rights, such that our Legal System guarantees effective judicial protection against any violation of those rights, but for this purpose has created different specialized jurisdictions. By way of example: killing another person is, without a doubt, a violation of the right to life enshrined in ordinal 21 of the Constitución Política, but it is not in the constitutional jurisdiction where the case should be tried, but rather in the criminal one, which was also created by the constitutional legislator as the specialized jurisdiction to provide effective protection against the injury to certain legal interests which, due to their transcendental importance for life in society, also require a particularly severe sanction when they are attacked. The specialization of each jurisdiction has very important implications regarding effective judicial protection, since, to continue with the example, it would be impossible to provide such protection in a constitutional venue, where there are highly summary proceedings such as the amparo or habeas corpus, limited in terms of the possibility of producing evidence and guaranteeing an adversarial process, which can only be carried out in a full proceeding as is indeed ensured in the ordinary route, namely the criminal one, for the example, or the labor, family, or administrative-adjudicative, depending on the nature of the conflict (see rulings number 2000-08628 of ten o'clock on September twenty-ninth, two thousand, 2000-439 of 9:50 hours on November 24, two thousand, 2000-10457 of 10:08 hours on that same day). This Court has consistently held that objections made to the resolution of the Public Services Regulatory Authority, due to their eminently technical nature, require for their definition the production of expert evidence, which distorts the highly summary nature of the amparo appeal (ruling number 1998-1318, 1999-9589). For all the foregoing considerations, this Court deems the appeal inadmissible, and it is hereby so ordered.

VI.- Conclusion. By virtue of the considerations put forth, as no violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights has been verified, the appropriate course is to dismiss this appeal, and it is hereby so ordered.” **II.- Object of the appeal.** The appellant alleges that by means of resolution RRG-9318-2008 of eleven thirty hours on December 8, 2008 —published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 23, 2008— the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos established an increase in the tariffs for the public bus service on routes 400, 420, and 402-421, described as Heredia-San José and vice versa, without a prior hearing being held so that the general public could participate and challenge the aforementioned provision. Furthermore, he considers said increase to be disproportionate because the residents of the locality do not have the necessary resources to pay such a high price for the transportation fare. He also indicates that in 2008, the drivers of the cited company applied increases of five colones to the bus fare, arguing a lack of low-value coins.

**“…IV.- On the merits.** The special administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo especial) established in Law 7593 for setting public service tariffs is intended to guarantee transparency in the decisions of the regulatory entity and the possibility of allowing consumers and users to participate in the process. The tariff petition is submitted to a public hearing in which those citizens who present an opposition based on technical criteria may participate, an opposition that must be presented in accordance with the requirements stipulated by the Regulation, giving the interested party the opportunity to defend their interest in the matter. The procedure intends that, through its various stages, an administrative act (acto administrativo) is issued in light of the principles inherent to the philosophy of regulation and contained in Law 7593, among which may be cited service at cost, respect for the balance between the interests of the user and the provider, the avoidance of setting tariffs contrary to the financial equilibrium of the providers, as well as the exclusion of unacceptable costs, in accordance with the principles of public service regulation. In the present case, as reported by the Regulador General and verified by reading the challenged resolution, the appellant did not participate in due time as an opponent in the tariff-setting procedure whose final act, after the appeal filed was resolved, is now being challenged; he did not appear to defend his interests in accordance with the procedure specifically established for that purpose in Law 7593, and therefore his claim that the questioned resolution be annulled via the amparo (recurso de amparo) route is inadmissible.

**V.-** Furthermore, the reiterated jurisprudence (jurisprudencia) of this Chamber has pronounced to the effect that disagreement with the resolutions of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos must be settled before the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, since it is not for this Court to hear and resolve on the merits of the challenged resolution, determine whether it was issued in accordance with the law or not, or whether, upon hearing the tariff adjustment request, the ARESEP exceeded its prerogatives, improperly applied the laws, or incurred omissions, as this involves aspects of legality —not constitutionality— outside the competence of this Chamber. The same applies regarding the provision of the transportation service itself, such as the condition of the units providing the service, compliance with schedules, or the fare charged to users. It must be borne in mind that this is a Court of Law, whose purpose is to guarantee the supremacy of the constitutional norms and principles and of the International or Community Law in force in the Republic, their uniform interpretation and application, as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution or in the international human rights instruments in force in Costa Rica (Article 10 of the Constitución Política). It is the Carta Magna itself, in its Article 48, that created the mechanisms so that these higher rights and principles can be asserted before this Court, through the remedy of habeas corpus, in the case of personal liberty and integrity, and through the remedy of amparo, to maintain and restore the enjoyment of the other rights enshrined in the Constitución Política, as well as those of a fundamental nature established in the international human rights instruments applicable in the Republic. The jurisprudence of this Chamber has insisted that constitutional amparo is appropriate in the face of a direct violation of those rights, whether by actions or omissions or mere material actions not founded on an effective administrative act by public servants or bodies. The foregoing, in view of the fact that, certainly, if at the apex of the normative order are the norms contemplated by the Constitución Política, any violation of a legal nature indirectly violates the Constitución Política; however, to elucidate such conflicts, the constituent legislator created the ordinary jurisdictions, namely the contentious-administrative, labor, commercial, civil, criminal, family, and others, in Articles 49 and 153 of the Carta Magna, just as it established the constitutional jurisdiction in Articles 10 and 48, but —as indicated supra— delimiting its competence to guaranteeing the protection of those fundamental rights violated directly by public law bodies or servants and, exceptionally, by private law subjects, in the hypotheses set forth in Article 57 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. In this train of thought, it follows from what has been said that there are direct and indirect violations of fundamental rights, such that our Legal System guarantees effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) against any violation of these rights, only that for this purpose it has created different specialized jurisdictions. By way of example: taking the life of another person is, without a doubt, a violation of the right to life enshrined in ordinal 21 of the Constitución Política, but it is not in the constitutional jurisdiction where the case should be aired, but rather in the criminal jurisdiction, which was also created by the constituent legislator as the specialized jurisdiction to provide effective protection against injury to certain legal interests (bienes jurídicos) which, due to their transcendent importance for life in society, also require a particularly serious sanction when they are attacked. The specialization of each jurisdiction has very important implications for effective judicial protection, since, to continue with the example, it would be impossible to provide that protection in the constitutional forum, where summary proceedings (procesos sumarísimos) such as amparo or habeas corpus are available, limited in terms of the possibility of producing evidence and guaranteeing the adversarial principle (contradictorio), which can only be carried out in a plenary proceeding (proceso plenario) such as that which is indeed ensured in the ordinary route, be it criminal, for the example, or labor, family, contentious-administrative, depending on the conflict at issue (see judgments number 2000-08628 of ten hours on September twenty-ninth, two thousand, 2000-439 of 9:50 hours on November 24, two thousand, 2000-10457 of 10:08 hours on that same day). This Court has consistently held that the objections formulated against the resolution of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, due to their eminently technical nature, require for their definition the production of expert evidence (prueba pericial), which detracts from the summary nature of the amparo remedy (judgment number 1998-1318, 1999-9589). For all the foregoing considerations, this Court considers that the appeal is inadmissible, as is hereby ordered.

**VI.- Conclusion.** By virtue of the considerations put forth, as no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant has been verified, it is pertinent to dismiss the present appeal as is hereby ordered.”

“II.- Objeto del recurso. El recurrente alega que mediante resolución RRG-9318-2008 de las once y treinta horas del 8 de diciembre del 2008 -publicada en la Gaceta No. 248 del 23 de diciembre del 2008-, la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos estableció un aumento en las tarifas del servicio público modalidad autobús de las rutas 400, 420 y 402-421, descrita Heredia-San José y viceversa, sin llevarse a cabo una audiencia previa para que el público en general participara e impugnara la disposición aludida. Además, estima que dicho aumento es desproporcionado por cuanto los vecinos de la localidad no cuentan con los recursos necesarios para cancelar por la tarifa de transporte un precio tan elevado. También indica que en el 2008, los conductores de la citada empresa aplicaban aumentos de cinco colones en el pasaje de autobús, argumentándose la falta de monedas de bajo valor. “ “…IV.- Sobre el fondo. El procedimiento administrativo especial establecido en la Ley 7593 para la fijación de tarifas de los servicios públicos tiene como fin garantizar la transparencia en las decisiones de la entidad reguladora y la posibilidad de dar participación a los consumidores y usuarios en el trámite. La petición tarifaria se somete a la audiencia pública en la cual pueden participar aquellos ciudadanos que presenten una oposición fundamentada en criterios técnicos, oposición que debe presentarse de conformidad con los requisitos que estipula el Reglamento, dándole al interesado la oportunidad de defender su interés en el asunto. El procedimiento pretende que, a través de sus varias etapas, se emita un acto administrativo dictado a la luz de los principios propios de la filosofía de la regulación y contenidos en la Ley 7593, entre los que pueden citarse el servicio al costo, el respeto al equilibrio entre los intereses del usuario y del prestatario, el evitar fijaciones contrarias al equilibrio financiero de los prestatarios, así como la exclusión de los costos no aceptables, conforme a los principios de la regulación de los servicios públicos. En el presente caso, según informa el Regulador General y se constata por la lectura de la resolución impugnada, el amparado no participó en su oportunidad como opositor en el procedimiento de fijación tarifaria cuyo acto final, luego de resuelta la apelación interpuesta, ahora se impugna; no acudió a defender sus intereses de acuerdo al procedimiento especialmente establecido para ello en la Ley 7593, por lo que resulta improcedente su pretensión de que se anule en la vía de amparo la resolución cuestionada.

V.- Además, la reiterada jurisprudencia de esta Sala se ha pronunciado en el sentido de que la inconformidad con las resoluciones de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos debe ser dirimida ante la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda, pues no le corresponde a este Tribunal conocer y resolver sobre el fondo de la resolución cuestionada, determinar si fue dictada conforme a derecho o no, o si al conocer de la solicitud de ajuste tarifario, la ARESEP se excedió en sus prerrogativas, aplicó indebidamente las leyes o incurrió en omisiones, pues ello involucra aspectos de legalidad -no de constitucionalidad-, ajenos a la competencia de esta Sala. En igual sentido lo referente a la prestación del servicio de transporte en sí, como el estado de las unidades que prestan el servicio, el cumplimiento de horarios o la tarifa que se cobra a los usuarios. Debe tenerse presente que este es un Tribunal de Derecho, cuyo objeto es garantizar la supremacía de las normas y principios constitucionales y del Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigente en la República, su uniforme interpretación y aplicación, así como los derechos y libertades fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos vigentes en Costa Rica (artículo 10 de la Constitución Política). Es la misma Carta Magna, en su artículo 48, la que creó los mecanismos para que ante este Tribunal se hagan valer esos derechos y principios superiores, a través del recurso de habeas corpus, en caso de la libertad e integridad personales y, del recurso de amparo, para mantener y restablecer el goce de los otros derechos consagrados en la Constitución Política, así como de los de carácter fundamental establecidos en los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, aplicables en la República. Se ha insistido en la jurisprudencia de esta Sala que procede el amparo constitucional ante la vulneración directa de esos derechos, ya sea con acciones u omisiones o simples actuaciones materiales no fundadas en un acto administrativo eficaz de los servidores u órganos públicos. Lo anterior, en vista de que, ciertamente, si en la cúspide del orden normativo se encuentran las normas que contempla la Constitución Política, cualquier vulneración de orden legal violenta de manera indirecta la Constitución Política; sin embargo, para dilucidar esos conflictos el legislador constituyente creó las jurisdicciones comunes, sea la contencioso-administrativa, la laboral, la comercial, la civil, la penal, la de familia y otras, en los artículos 49 y 153 de la Carta Magna, al igual que instauró la jurisdicción constitucional en el 10 y el 48 ocho, pero -como se indicó supra- delimitando su competencia a garantizar la tutela de aquellos derechos fundamentales violentados en forma directa por órganos o servidores de derecho público y, excepcionalmente, por sujetos de derecho privado, en las hipótesis que señala el artículo 57 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En este orden de ideas, se desprende de lo dicho que hay violaciones directas e indirectas a los derechos fundamentales, de suerte que nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico garantiza la tutela judicial efectiva contra cualquier vulneración a esos derechos, sólo que al efecto ha creado distintas jurisdicciones especializadas. A manera de ejemplo: dar muerte a otra persona es, sin duda alguna, una violación al derecho a la vida consagrado en el ordinal 21 de la Constitución Política, pero no es en la jurisdicción constitucional donde debe ventilarse el caso, sino en la penal, que fue creada también por el legislador constituyente como la jurisdicción especializada para dar protección efectiva contra la lesión a ciertos bienes jurídicos que, por su trascendental importancia para la vida en sociedad requieren de una sanción también, particularmente grave, cuando son atacados. La especialización de cada jurisdicción tiene implicaciones muy importantes de cara a la tutela judicial efectiva, puesto que, para seguir con el ejemplo, sería imposible brindar esa tutela en sede constitucional, donde se cuenta con procesos sumarísimos como el amparo o el habeas corpus, limitados en cuanto a la posibilidad de evacuar prueba y garantizar el contradictorio, que sólo puede realizarse en un proceso plenario como el que sí se asegura en la vía ordinaria, sea la penal, para el ejemplo, o bien la laboral, la de familia, la contencioso-administrativa, según se trate el conflicto (ver sentencias número 2000-08628 de las diez horas del veintinueve de setiembre del dos mil, 2000-439 de las 9:50 horas del 24 de noviembre del dos mil, 2000-10457 de las 10:08 horas de ese mismo día). Este Tribunal ha sostenido consistentemente que las objeciones formuladas a la resolución de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, por su índole eminentemente técnica, requieren para su definición de la evacuación de prueba pericial, lo que desvirtúa la naturaleza sumarísima del recurso de amparo (sentencia número 1998-1318, 1999-9589). Por todas las anteriores consideraciones, este Tribunal estima que el recurso es inadmisible, como en efecto se dispone.

VI.- Conclusión. En mérito de las consideraciones esgrimidas, al no haberse constatado la violación de los derechos fundamentales del amparado, lo pertinente es desestimar el presente recurso como en efecto se dispone. “