Lottery prize expiration deadline must be established by statute, not by regulationPlazo de caducidad para cobrar premios de lotería debe estar en la ley, no en el reglamento

I.- Purpose of the appeal. The appellant alleges that the decision of the Social Protection Board (Junta de Protección Social) not to deliver a national lottery prize to the protected party on the grounds that it is expired, violates his fundamental rights, insofar as it is based on a statute of limitations (plazo de caducidad) that is not established in the Lottery Law (Ley de Loterías) but in the Regulations (Reglamento) and, therefore, violates the principle of legal reserve. In his view, the foregoing is illegitimate and injures the Law of the Constitution.

III.- Preliminary clarifications. On the admissibility of the amparo. Both Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 48 of the Political Constitution, recognize the right of every individual to file an amparo action, as a procedural and substantive guarantee of their fundamental rights. In this vein, this jurisdictional process, in accordance with Article 29 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, is not only applicable against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms, that have violated, violate, or threaten to violate any of those rights. Thus, in the present case, it is taken as demonstrated that the refusal of the Social Protection Board of San José to grant the protected party the aforementioned prize responds, as will be developed later, to an erroneous application and improper interpretation of Articles 4, 23, and 42 of the Lottery Law, as well as Articles 4 and 80 of its Regulations, reasons for which this amparo action is admissible in terms of its purpose, precisely upon verifying (as will be seen below) the violation of the fundamental rights of the protected party. In this vein, the Constitutional Chamber, in ruling N°1160-94 of 10:30 hrs. on March 2, 1994, stated:

"According to what was noted supra, the plaintiff bases her argument on 'the harm' caused to her by the 'interpretation and application' of the challenged regulations, which is why this does not meet the prerequisites of an unconstitutionality action, but rather of an amparo action, based on what is stipulated in Article 73 subsection b.) that governs this Jurisdiction—which provides that an unconstitutionality action shall be applicable against subjective acts if they are not subject to habeas corpus or amparo actions—by virtue of which, it is concluded that the content of this challenge should have been the subject of an amparo action because it involves not constitutional clashes, but allegations against administrative acts that can be heard through that other channel, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction." IV.- On the merits. Well, in the specific case, it is discussed whether a regulatory provision can restrict, by the passage of time, the possibility of an individual to obtain a prize for being favored in the national draw. In this regard, Article 80 of the Regulations to the Lottery Law, Executive Decree N°28529-MTSS-MP, establishes:

"Article 80.- Prize-winning tickets shall be paid to the bearer upon presentation, from the first business day following the holding of the draw and within a period of sixty calendar days, at the Institution's Treasury, or any other place that may be established, provided they do not present tears or alterations that cast doubt on their authenticity or validity. In case of doubt on this matter, the Management shall decide, and it may resort to the opinions of experts it deems appropriate. The Board shall make prize payments starting from the business day after the draw is held at authorized Agencies and Branches. Should the technological circumstances at its disposal allow it, the Board may make prize payments from the same day the draw is held and at previously authorized agencies or branches." On this matter, it is blatantly evident that the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in its Article 34, confers protection on acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations, so that their enjoyment may only be restricted or limited by a norm with legal rank. This is in application of the principle of legal reserve, which has been enshrined in Articles 11 and 28 of the Political Constitution, as well as in Articles 11, 18, and 19 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, in ruling N°3550-92 of 16:00 hrs. on November 24, 1992, the Constitutional Chamber developed the constituent elements of this principle, which can be summarized in four essential criteria, those contained in the aforementioned ruling:

"... a) First, the very principle of 'legal reserve,' from which it follows that only through formal law, emanating from the Legislative Power through the procedure provided in the Constitution for the issuance of laws, is it possible to regulate and, if applicable, restrict fundamental rights and freedoms—all, of course, to the extent that the nature and regime of these allow it, and within the applicable constitutional limitations—; b) Second, that only the executive regulations of those laws can develop their precepts, it being understood that they cannot increase the restrictions established nor create those not established by them, and that they must rigorously respect their 'essential content'; and, c) Third, that neither in executive regulations, much less in autonomous ones or other norms or acts of lower rank, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose, from which a new essential consequence results:

• d)Finally, that all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated, without being able to grant discretionary powers to the Administration, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the legal reserve itself." (The bold is not from the original).

From the text of the transcribed ruling, it is clear that although the State has the power to dictate provisions that restrict—in a reasonable manner—the exercise of fundamental rights, such norms must necessarily emanate from the Legislative Power, therefore the Executive Power is disqualified from dictating autonomous or executive regulations that curtail the enjoyment of such rights.

V.- In this way, and in application of the principle of legal reserve, it is blatantly evident that the Executive Power cannot introduce, through a regulatory provision, unfounded restrictions or limitations concerning acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations, as is the case here with the situation of the protected party, who is an elderly person, and who was favored in a national lottery draw. Hence, the term of prescription (prescripción) or statute of limitations (caducidad) must be provided for in the law and not in a regulation, in which case the restriction of the right is illegitimate and injures the Law of the Constitution. It is clear then that the situation challenged in this amparo proceeding is based on an erroneous application of Article 80 of the Regulations to the Lottery Law, Executive Decree N°28529-MTSS-MP, bearing in mind that said term must be provided for in a norm of legal rank. Moreover, the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in paragraph 3 of its Article 49, establishes that "the law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered," hence a regulatory provision cannot limit the period available to an individual (who has been favored by the national lottery) to demand from the sued authorities the payment of the sums corresponding to their prize. It is evident, then, that the violation of the fundamental rights of the protected party stems from the erroneous interpretation and improper application of Articles 4 and 80 of the Regulations to the Lottery Law, Executive Decree N°28529-MTSS-MP, for which reason the appropriate course is to grant the amparo in all its aspects.

VI.- But the appealed authorities have also, in the present case, overlooked the scope of the right protected in Article 51 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the obligation of state authorities to provide special protection to certain sectors of the population, including the elderly, as well as the State's obligation to implement affirmative action measures regarding certain population groups. In this vein, by virtue of the constitutional principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Political Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, equal treatment must be given to equals and differentiated treatment to those who are unequal, precisely because of the existing differences or particular situations of each person or group, which has been previously termed by constitutional jurisprudence (in ruling number 0337-91, of fourteen hours fifty-six minutes on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one), as "objective elements of differentiation" that justify and warrant different treatment. This type of situation has been called in doctrine "affirmative action" (discriminación positiva), which consists of giving special treatment to those differentiated persons or groups that are in a disadvantaged situation compared to others.

"This differentiated treatment seeks to compensate for that original situation of inequality; and is oriented towards achieving 'real equality' among subjects. It must be emphasized that this difference in treatment does not violate the principle of equality; rather, it results from its application, and from an adequate interpretation of the Law of the Constitution. Various legal instruments exist aimed at promoting that real equality among subjects; [...]" (Ruling number 0337-91, cited supra).

This situation has been previously recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, regarding indigenous people (ruling number 0337-91, cited supra, and dissenting vote of Magistrate Piza in ruling number 1530-00, of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on December twenty-first, two thousand); and regarding women, in defining female participation in political positions (Ruling number 0718-98), and in the definition of conditions for granting pensions (rulings number 6472-99, of fourteen hours forty-two minutes on August eighteenth, nineteen ninety-nine; and number 8240-2001, of sixteen hours eight minutes on August fourteenth, two thousand one).

VII.- Now, regarding the special protection for the elderly, it is in no way possible to forget the scope of the right protected in the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution, in that:

"They shall likewise be entitled to this protection: the mother, the child, the elderly, and the destitute sick person." By virtue of what is provided in the transcribed norm, it is clear that special protection by the State for these groups of people constitutes a true fundamental right, enforceable in the corresponding administrative offices and courts of justice. It is thus, from the concept of the Social State of Law, that obligations for public authorities can be derived, precisely in pursuit of the greater well-being of "all the inhabitants of the country," within which the Law of the Constitution specially points to children, mothers, the elderly, and destitute persons. It is from the establishment of a Social State, derivable from the provisions contained in Articles 50 and following of the Fundamental Charter, that the mandatory state intervention is immediately generated in social matters, in which it must act in a certain sense and orientation: in favor of those special sectors of the population that, by their condition, so require; and such is the case—without a doubt—of the elderly, referred to as senior citizens or older adults. Until recently, there were no regulations aimed at guaranteeing in a more adequate way the special state protection and guardianship that the older adult in our country requires; however, recently, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, number 7935, of October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, which aims to:

"a) Guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas.

• b)Guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of the policies that affect them.
• c)Promote the permanence of older adults in their family-community nucleus.
• d)Foster forms of organization and participation of older adults, allowing the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.
• e)Promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of the programs and services intended for this population.
• f)Guarantee the protection and social security of older adults." In any case, it cannot and should not be intended that this regulation exhausts the work and guarantees the special protection that this sector of the population requires from the State; it is only the legal framework from which it is incumbent upon it to begin to act. In the present case, the scope of this fundamental right undoubtedly translates into the obligation of the authorities of the appealed Board to attend to the protected party with the greatest possible speed and to provide a timely response (even a positive one, having been favored in the national lottery draw), precisely due to his condition as an elderly person. The impairment of the fundamental rights of the petitioner is evident then, for which reason the amparo must be granted.

VIII.- Based on the reasons set forth, the appropriate course is to grant the amparo in all its aspects, as is hereby ordered.

IX.- Magistrates Vargas, Abdelnour, and Salazar dissent and grant the appellant a period to file the corresponding unconstitutionality action. " a) In the first place, the very principle of "legal reserve (reserva de ley)", from which it follows that <b>only through a formal law, issued by the Legislative Power through the procedure established in the Constitution for the enactment of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, restrict fundamental rights and freedoms</b>—all, of course, to the extent that the nature and regime of these permit, and within the applicable constitutional limitations—; b) Secondly, that only the <b>executive regulations of those laws can develop their precepts, it being understood that they cannot increase the restrictions</b> <b>established by them nor create those not established by them,</b> and that they must rigorously respect their "essential content"; and, c) Thirdly, that not even in <b>executive Regulations, much less in autonomous ones or other norms or acts of lower rank, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose</b>, from which a new <b>essential</b> consequence follows:

• d)Finally, that <b>all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated</b>, without discretionary powers being able to be granted to the Administration, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the legal reserve (reserva de ley) itself." (<b>The bolding is not from the original</b>).

From the text of the transcribed judgment, it is clear that although the State has the power to issue provisions that reasonably restrict the exercise of fundamental rights, such norms must necessarily emanate from the Legislative Power, so the Executive Power is disabled from issuing autonomous or executive regulations that curtail the enjoyment of such rights.

V.- In this way, and in application of the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), the impossibility of the Executive Power to introduce, through a provision of a regulatory nature, unfounded restrictions or limitations regarding <i>acquired property rights or consolidated legal situations, </i>as constituted in the present case by the situation of the protected person, who is an older adult and who was favored in a national lottery drawing, is clearly evident. Hence, the term of prescription or expiration must be established in the law and not in a regulation, in which case the restriction of the right is illegitimate and injures the Right of the Constitution. It is clear then that the situation challenged in this amparo proceeding is based on an erroneous application of article 80 of the Regulation to the Lottery Law, Decreto Ejecutivo N°28529-MTSS-MP, taking into account that said term must be established in a norm of legal rank. Furthermore, the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in the 3rd paragraph of its article 49, establishes that “<b><i>the law</i></b><i> shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered</i>”, hence, through a provision of regulatory rank, it is not possible to limit the period available to an individual (who has been favored by the national lottery) to demand payment from the respondent authorities of the sums corresponding to his prize. The violation of the fundamental rights of the protected person is therefore evident, arising from the erroneous interpretation and improper application of articles 4 and 80 of the Regulation to the Lottery Law, Decreto Ejecutivo N°28529-MTSS-MP, for which reason the proper course is to declare the amparo upheld in its entirety.

VI.- But the respondent authorities have also overlooked, in the present case, the scope of the right protected in article 51 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the obligation of state authorities to provide special protection to certain sectors of the population, among them, elderly persons, as well as the obligation of the State to implement affirmative action measures with respect to certain groups of the population. In this vein, by virtue of the constitutional principle of equality, enshrined in article 33 of the Political Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, it is necessary to give equal treatment to equals and differentiated treatment to unequals, precisely because of the existing differences or particular situations of each person or group, which has been previously termed by constitutional jurisprudence (in judgment number 0337-91, at fourteen hours fifty-six minutes on the eighth of February, nineteen ninety-one), as "objective elements of differentiation" that justify and warrant different treatment. This type of situation has been termed in the doctrine as "affirmative action (discriminación positiva)", and it consists of giving special treatment to those differentiated persons or groups that find themselves in a disadvantaged situation with respect to others.

"<b>This differentiated treatment seeks to compensate for that original situation of inequality; and is oriented toward achieving a 'real equality' among subjects.</b> <b>It should be highlighted that this difference in treatment does not breach the principle of equality; rather, it results from the application of the same, and from an adequate interpretation of the Right of the Constitution. Various legal instruments exist aimed at fostering that real equality among subjects; [...]" (Judgment number 0337-91, cited above).</b> This situation has been previously recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, regarding indigenous people (judgment number 0337-91, cited above, and dissenting vote of Magistrate Piza in judgment number 1530-00, at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twenty-first of December, two thousand); and regarding women, in defining female participation in political positions (Judgment number 0718-98), and in defining the conditions for granting a pension (judgments number 6472-99, at fourteen hours forty-two minutes on the eighteenth of August, nineteen ninety-nine; and number 8240-2001, at sixteen hours eight minutes on the fourteenth of August, two thousand one).

VII.- Now, regarding the special protection for elderly persons, it is in no way possible to forget the scope of the right protected in the final paragraph of article 51 of the Political Constitution, insofar as:

"Likewise, the mother, the child, <b>the elderly</b>, and the helpless sick shall have the right to that protection." By virtue of the provisions of the transcribed norm, it is clear that special protection by the State for these groups of persons constitutes a true fundamental right, enforceable before the corresponding administrative offices and courts of justice. Thus, based on the concept of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), it is possible to derive obligations for public authorities, precisely for the sake of seeking the greatest well-being of "<i>all the inhabitants of the country</i>", among whom the Right of the Constitution especially points to children, mothers, the elderly, and helpless persons. It is from the establishment of a Social State, derivable from the provisions contained in articles 50 and following of the Fundamental Charter, that the mandatory state intervention in social matters is immediately generated, in which it must act in a certain direction and orientation: in favor of those special sectors of the population that, due to their condition, so require; and such is the case – without a doubt – of the elderly, referred to as older adults or senior citizens. Until recently, there was no regulatory framework aimed at guaranteeing in a more adequate manner the special protection and state guardianship required by the older adult in our country; however, the Legislative Assembly recently enacted the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, number 7935, of the nineteenth of October, nineteen ninety-nine, with which it is intended "a) To guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas.

• b)To guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of policies that affect them.
• c)To promote the permanence of older adults in their family and community nucleus.
• d)To foster forms of organization and participation for older adults, that allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.
• e)To promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and to ensure the proper functioning of the programs and services intended for this population.
• f)To guarantee the protection and social security of older adults." In any case, it cannot nor should it be intended that with this regulation, the work is exhausted and the special protection that this sector of the population requires from the State is guaranteed; it is merely the legal framework from which it must begin to act. In the present case, the scope of this fundamental right undoubtedly translates into the obligation of the authorities of the respondent Board to attend to the protected person with the greatest possible speed and to provide a timely response (even a positive one, for having been favored in the national lottery drawing), precisely because of his condition as an older adult. The harm to the fundamental rights of the petitioner is therefore evident, which is why the amparo must be granted.

VIII.- Based on the reasons set forth, the proper course is to declare the amparo upheld in its entirety, as is hereby ordered.

IX.- Magistrates Vargas, Abdelnour, and Salazar dissent and grant the petitioner a period to file the corresponding action of unconstitutionality.

**“ I.- Purpose of the appeal (recurso).** The appellant claims that the decision of the Junta de Protección Social not to deliver a national lottery prize to the amparo claimant on the grounds that it has expired violates his fundamental rights, insofar as it is based on a lapse (caducidad) period not established in the Ley de Loterías but in the Regulation, thereby violating the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley). In his opinion, the foregoing is illegitimate and injures the Right of the Constitution.

**III.- Preliminary clarifications. On the admissibility of the amparo.** Both Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 48 of the Political Constitution recognize the right of any individual to file an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo), as a procedural and substantive guarantee of their fundamental rights. In this vein, said jurisdictional process, in accordance with Article 29 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, is not only admissible against arbitrary acts, but also against actions or omissions based on erroneously interpreted or improperly applied norms that have violated, violate, or threaten to violate any of those rights. Thus, in the present case it has been demonstrated that the refusal of the Junta de Protección Social of San José to grant the protected person the aforementioned prize responds, as will be developed further on, to an erroneous application and improper interpretation of Articles 4, 23, and 42 of the Ley de Loterías, as well as Articles 4 and 80 of its Regulation, reasons for which this amparo appeal is admissible regarding its purpose, precisely upon verifying (as will be seen below) the violation of the protected person's fundamental rights. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling No. 1160-94 of 10:30 a.m. on March 2, 1994, stated:

*“According to the above, the plaintiff bases her claim on ‘the harm’ caused to her by the ‘interpretation and application’ of the challenged regulations, which is why this is not a case meeting the prerequisites of an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), but rather an amparo appeal, based on the provisions of Article 73, subsection b.) governing this Jurisdiction—which provides that the unconstitutionality action shall be applicable against subjective acts if they are not subject to habeas corpus or amparo appeals—by virtue of which, it is concluded that the content of this challenge should have been the subject of an amparo appeal, as it involves not constitutional clashes, but allegations against administrative actions that can be heard through that other avenue, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 29 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.”* **IV.- On the merits.** Well then, in the specific case, the question is whether a regulatory provision can restrict, through the passage of time, an individual's possibility of collecting a prize for having been favored in the national draw. In this sense, Article 80 of the Regulation to the Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28529-MTSS-MP, establishes:

*“Article 80.- Winning tickets shall be paid to the bearer upon presentation, from the business day following the draw and within a period of sixty calendar days, at the Institution's Treasury, or any other established location, provided they do not present tears or alterations that cast doubt on their authenticity or validity. In case of doubt regarding this aspect, the Management shall resolve, and it may resort to expert opinions it deems appropriate. The Junta will make prize payments starting from the business day after the draw is held at authorized Agencies and Branches. Should the technological circumstances at its disposal allow, the Junta may make prize payments from the same day the draw is held at previously authorized agencies or branches.”* On this matter, it is patently evident that the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in its Article 34, confers protection *to acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations*, meaning their enjoyment can only be restricted or limited by means of a norm with legal rank. The foregoing is in application of the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley), which has been enshrined in Articles 11 and 28 of the Political Constitution, as well as in Articles 11, 18, and 19 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. In this respect, in ruling No. 3550-92 of 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, the Constitutional Chamber developed the constituent elements of this principle, which can be summarized into four essential criteria, which are contained in the mentioned ruling:

*"... a) Firstly, the principle of 'legal reservation' itself, from which it follows that **only through a formal law, emanating from the Legislative Branch by the procedure provided in the Constitution for the enactment of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, restrict fundamental rights and freedoms**—all, of course, to the extent that the nature and regime of these allow it, and within the applicable constitutional limitations—; b) Secondly, that only the **executive regulations (reglamentos ejecutivos) of those laws can develop their precepts, it being understood that they cannot increase the restrictions established nor create those not established by them,** and that they must strictly respect their 'essential content'; and, c) Thirdly, that not even in **executive regulations, much less in autonomous regulations or other lower-ranking norms or acts, could the law validly delegate the determination of regulations or restrictions that only it is empowered to impose**, from which a new **essential** consequence follows:

• d)Finally, that **all administrative activity in this matter is necessarily regulated (reglada)**, and discretionary powers cannot be granted to the Administration, because these would obviously imply an abandonment of the legal reservation itself."* (**The bold is not from the original**).

From the text of the transcribed ruling, it follows that although the State has the power to issue provisions that—reasonably—restrict the exercise of fundamental rights, such norms must necessarily emanate from the Legislative Branch; therefore, the Executive Branch is precluded from issuing autonomous or executive regulations that curtail the enjoyment of such rights.

**V.-** In this manner, and in application of the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley), the impossibility of the Executive Branch to introduce, by means of a regulatory provision, unfounded restrictions or limitations regarding *acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations* is patently evident, as is constituted in this case by the situation of the protected person, who is an elderly individual and who was favored in a national lottery draw. Hence, the statute of limitations (prescripción) or lapse (caducidad) term must be provided for in the law and not in a regulation, in which case the restriction of the right is illegitimate and injures the Right of the Constitution. It is clear, then, that the situation challenged in this amparo proceeding is based on an erroneous application of Article 80 of the Regulation to the Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28529-MTSS-MP, considering that said term must be provided for in a norm with legal rank. Moreover, the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in the 3rd paragraph of its Article 49, establishes that “***the law*** *shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered parties,”* hence, a regulatory provision cannot limit the period an individual (who has been favored with the national lottery) has to demand payment from the respondent authorities for the sums corresponding to their prize. The violation of the fundamental rights of the protected person is thus evident, stemming from the erroneous interpretation and improper application of Articles 4 and 80 of the Regulation to the Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28529-MTSS-MP, for which reason the appropriate course is to declare the amparo fully granted in all its parts.

**VI.-** But the respondent authorities have also, in this case, overlooked the scope of the right protected in Article 51 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the obligation of state authorities to provide special protection to certain sectors of the population, among them, the elderly, as well as the State's obligation to implement positive discrimination measures regarding certain population groups. In this vein, by virtue of the constitutional principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Political Constitution and Article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, equal treatment must be given to equals and differentiated treatment to unequals, precisely because of the existing differences or particular situations of each person or group, which has been previously termed by constitutional jurisprudence (in this ruling number 0337-91, of two hours and fifty-six minutes on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one) as "objective elements of differentiation" that justify and warrant different treatment.

This type of situation has been termed in legal doctrine "positive discrimination" (discriminación positiva), and it consists of giving special treatment to those differentiated persons or groups that are in a disadvantaged situation with respect to others.

"**This differentiated treatment seeks to compensate for that original situation of inequality; and it is oriented toward the achievement of a 'real equality' among subjects.** It should be highlighted that this difference in treatment does not violate the principle of equality; rather, it results from its application, and from an adequate interpretation of the Law of the Constitution. Various legal instruments exist tending to foster that real equality among subjects; [...]" (Judgment number 0337-91, cited above).

This situation has been previously recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, regarding indigenous people (judgment number 0337-91, cited above, and the dissenting vote (voto salvado) of Magistrate Piza in judgment number 1530-00, of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes of December twenty-first, two thousand); and regarding women, when defining female participation in political positions (Judgment number 0718-98), and in the definition of the conditions for granting a pension (judgments number 6472-99, of fourteen hours forty-two minutes of August eighteenth, nineteen ninety-nine; and number 8240-2001, of sixteen hours eight minutes of August fourteenth, two thousand one).

VII.- Now then, regarding the special protection for the elderly, it is in no way possible to forget the scope of the right protected in the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution, in that:

"Equally, the mother, the child, **the elderly**, and the helpless sick shall have the right to that protection." By virtue of what is established in the transcribed norm, it is clear that the special protection by the State for those groups of people constitutes a true fundamental right, enforceable before the corresponding administrative offices and courts of justice. It is thus, that from the concept of the Social State of Law, it is possible to derive obligations for the public authorities, precisely for the sake of seeking the greater well-being of "*all the inhabitants of the country*", among whom, the Law of the Constitution especially points out children, mothers, the elderly, and helpless persons. It is from the establishment of a Social State, derivable from the provisions contained in Articles 50 and following of the Fundamental Charter, that the obligatory state intervention in social matters is immediately generated, in which it must act in a certain sense and orientation: in favor of those special sectors of the population that, by their condition, so require; and such is the case –without a doubt– of the elderly, termed as senior citizens (personas de la tercera edad), or older adults (personas adultas mayores). Until recently, there was no regulation aimed at guaranteeing in a more adequate form the special state protection and guardianship that the older adult of our country requires; however, recently, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor), number 7935, of October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, with which it is intended to:

"a) Guarantee older adults, equality of opportunity and a dignified life in all areas.

• b)Guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of the policies that affect them.
• c)Promote the permanence of older adults in their family and community nucleus.
• d)Foster forms of organization and participation of older adults, that allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.
• e)Promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of programs and services, destined for this population.
• f)Guarantee the protection and social security of older adults." In any case, it cannot and should not be pretended that with this regulation the task is exhausted and the special protection that this sector of the population requires from the State is guaranteed; it is merely the legal framework from which it is incumbent to begin to act. In the present case, the scope of this fundamental right undoubtedly translates into the obligation of the authorities of the appealed Board (Junta) to attend with the greatest possible speed and to provide a timely response to the protected party (tutelado) (even a positive one, for having been favored in the national lottery drawing), precisely because of his condition as an elderly person. The infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioner (promovente) is thus evident, which is why the amparo must be granted.

VIII.- Based on the reasons set forth, it is appropriate to declare the amparo granted in all its aspects, as is in effect ordered.

IX.- Magistrates Vargas, Abdelnour, and Salazar issue a dissenting vote (salvan el voto) and grant the petitioner a period to file the corresponding action of unconstitutionality."

“ I.- Objeto del recurso. Alega el recurrente que la decisión de la Junta de Protección Social de no entregar un premio de la lotería nacional al amparado bajo el argumento que está caduco, es violatoria de sus derechos fundamentales, en tanto se sustenta en un plazo de caducidad que no está establecido en la Ley de Loterías sino en el Reglamento y, por ende, vulnera el principio de reserva de ley. En su criterio, lo anterior es ilegítimo y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución.

III.- Aclaraciones preliminares. Sobre la procedencia del amparo. Tanto el artículo 25 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, cuanto el artículo 48 de la Constitución Política, reconocen el derecho todo particular de interponer un recurso de amparo, como garantía procesal y sustantiva de sus derechos fundamentales. En este orden de ideas, dicho proceso jurisdiccional, de acuerdo con el artículo 29 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, no sólo procede contra los actos arbitrarios, sino también contra las actuaciones u omisiones fundadas en normas erróneamente interpretadas o indebidamente aplicadas, que hayan violado, viole o amenace vulnerar cualquiera de aquellos derechos. Así, en el caso presente se tiene por demostrado que la negativa de la Junta de Protección Social de San José de conferir al tutelado el premio aludido responde, como se desarrollará más adelante, a una errónea aplicación e indebida interpretación de los artículos 4°, 23 y 42 de la Ley de Loterías, así como los artículos 4° y 80 de su Reglamento, motivos por los cuales es admisible este recurso de amparo en cuanto a su objeto, justamente al constatarse (según se verá infra) la violación de los derechos fundamentales del tutelado. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia N°1160-94 de las 10:30 hrs. de 2 de marzo de 1994, señaló:

“Según lo apuntado supra la accionante fundamenta su alegato en "el perjuicio" que le ha causado la "interpretación y aplicación" de la normativa impugnada, razón por la cual no se está ante los presupuestos de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, sino de un recurso de amparo, con fundamento en lo dictado en el artículo 73 inciso b.) que rige esta Jurisdicción -el cual dispone que cabrá la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los actos subjetivos si no fueren susceptibles de los recursos de habeas corpus o de amparo-, en virtud del cual, se concluye que el contenido de esta impugnación debió haber sido objeto de un recurso de amparo por tratarse no de roces constitucionales, sino de alegatos contra actuaciones administrativas susceptibles de ser conocidas en esa otra vía, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 29 párrafo último de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.” IV.- Sobre el fondo. Pues bien, en el caso concreto se discute si mediante una disposición con carácter reglamentario es posible restringir, por el transcurso del tiempo, la posibilidad a un particular de obtener un premio por resultar favorecido en el sorteo nacional. En este sentido, el artículo 80 del Reglamento a la Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo N°28529-MTSS-MP, establece:

“Artículo 80.- Los billetes que resultaren premiados se le pagan al portador cuando se presente, desde el día hábil siguiente a la realización del sorteo y dentro del plazo de sesenta días naturales, en la Tesorería de la Institución, o cualquier otro lugar que se establezca, siempre que no presenten roturas o alteraciones que hagan dudar de su autenticidad o validez. En caso de duda en cuanto a este extremo, resuelve la Gerencia, la que pueda recurrir a los dictámenes de peritos que considere procedentes. La Junta hará el pago de premios a partir del día hábil siguiente de efectuarse el sorteo en las Agencias y Sucursales autorizadas. De permitirlo las circunstancias tecnológicas a su disposición, la Junta puede efectuar el pago de premios desde el mismo día en que se realice el sorteo y en las agencias o sucursales previamente autorizadas.” Sobre el particular, a todas luces es evidente que la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, en su artículo 34, confiere protección a los derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o a las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, de modo que su disfrute únicamente puede ser restringido o limitado mediante una norma con rango legal. Lo anterior, en aplicación del principio de reserva de ley, que ha sido consagrado en los artículos 11 y 28 de la Constitución Política, así como en los artículos 11, 18 y 19 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al respecto, en la sentencia N°3550-92 de las 16:00 hrs. de 24 de noviembre de 1992, la Sala Constitucional desarrolló los elementos integrantes de este principio, que pueden ser resumidos en cuatro criterios esenciales, los que se encuentran contenidos en la sentencia mencionada:

"... a) En primer lugar, el principio mismo de "reserva de ley", del cual resulta que solamente mediante ley formal, emanada del Poder Legislativo por el procedimiento previsto en la Constitución para la emisión de las leyes, es posible regular y, en su caso restringir los derechos y libertades fundamentales -todo, por supuesto, en la medida en que la naturaleza y régimen de éstos lo permita, y dentro de las limitaciones constitucionales aplicables-; b) En segundo, que sólo los reglamentos ejecutivos de esas leyes pueden desarrollar los preceptos de éstas, entendiéndose que no pueden incrementar las restricciones establecidas ni crear las no establecidas por ellas, y que deben respetar rigurosamente, su "contenido esencial"; y, c) En tercero, que ni aún en los Reglamentos ejecutivos, mucho menos en los autónomos u otras normas o actos de rango inferior, podría válidamente la ley delegar la determinación de regulaciones o restricciones que sólo ella está habilitada a imponer, de donde resulta una nueva consecuencia esencial:

• d)Finalmente, que toda actividad administratIva en esta materia es necesariamente reglada, sin poder otorgarse a la Administración potestades discrecionales, porque éstas implicarían obviamente un abandono de la propia reserva de ley." (La negrita no es del original).

Del texto de la sentencia transcrita se desprende que si bien el Estado tiene la potestad para dictar disposiciones que vengan a restringir -de manera razonable- el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales, tales normas deben emanar en forma necesaria del Poder Legislativo, por lo que el Poder Ejecutivo se encuentra inhabilitado de dictar reglamentos autónomos o ejecutivos que vengan a liminar el goce de tales derechos.

V.- De esta manera, y en aplicación del principio de reserva de ley, a todas luces es evidente la imposibilidad del Poder Ejecutivo de introducir, mediante una disposición con carácter reglamentario, restricciones o limitaciones infundadas con respecto a los derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o a las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, como lo constituye en el caso presente la situación del tutelado, quien es una persona mayor de edad, y que resultó favorecida en un sorteo de la lotería nacional. De ahí que el término de prescripción o caducidad debe encontrarse previsto en la ley y no en un reglamento, caso en que la restricción del derecho es ilegítima y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución. Es claro entonces que la situación impugnada en este proceso de amparo se sustenta en una errónea aplicación del artículo 80 del Reglamento a la Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo N°28529-MTSS-MP, teniendo en cuenta que dicho término debe encontrarse previsto en una norma de rango legal. A mayor abundamiento, la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, en el párrafo 3° de su artículo 49 establece que “la ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, de ahí que mediante una disposición de rango de reglamento no es posible limitar el plazo con que cuenta un particular (que ha resultado favorecido con la lotería nacional) de exigir a las autoridades accionadas el pago de las sumas que corresponden a su premio. Es evidente, entonces, la violación de los derechos fundamentales del tutelado a partir de la errónea interpretación e indebida aplicación de los artículos 4° y 80 del Reglamento a la Ley de Loterías, Decreto Ejecutivo N°28529-MTSS-MP, motivo por el cual lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo en todos sus extremos.

VI.- Pero también han soslayado las autoridades recurridas, en el caso presente, los alcances del derecho protegido en el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política, en la cual se establece la obligación de las autoridades estatales de brindar protección especial a determinados sectores de la población, entre ellos, las personas de la tercera edad, así como la obligación del Estado de implementar medidas de discriminación positiva con respecto de ciertos grupos de la población. En este orden de ideas, en virtud del principio constitucional de igualdad, consagrado en el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, es que debe darse un mismo trato a los iguales y un trato diferenciado a los desiguales, precisamente por las diferencias existentes o situaciones particulares de cada persona o grupo, lo que ha sido denominado con anterioridad por la jurisprudencia constitucional (en este sentencia número 0337-91, de las catorce horas cincuenta y seis minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno), como "elementos objetivos de diferenciación" que justifican y ameritan un trato diferente. Este tipo de situaciones ha sido denominado en la doctrina como "discriminación positiva", y que consiste en dar un tratamiento especial a aquellas personas o grupos diferenciados que se encuentren en una situación de desventaja con respecto de los demás.

"Este tratamiento diferenciado busca compensar esa situación de desigualdad original; y se orienta al logro de una «igualdad real» entre los sujetos. Debe resaltarse que, esa diferencia de trato no quebranta el principio de igualdad; más bien, resulta de la aplicación del mismo, y de una adecuada interpretación del Derecho de la Constitución. Existen diversos instrumentos jurídicos tendientes a fomentar esa igualdad real entre los sujetos; [...]" (Sentencia número 0337-91, supra citada).

Esta situación ha sido reconocida con anterioridad por la jurisprudencia constitucional, respecto de los indígenas (sentencia número 0337-91, supra citada, y voto salvado del Magistrado Piza en sentencia número 1530-00, de las catorce horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del veintiuno de diciembre del dos mil); y respecto de la mujer, al definirse la participación femenina en los puestos políticos (Sentencia número 0718-98), y en la definición de las condiciones del otorgamiento de la pensión (sentencias número 6472- 99, de las catorce horas cuarenta y dos minutos del dieciocho de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve; y número 8240-2001, de las dieciséis horas ocho minutos del catorce de agosto del dos mil uno).

VII.- Ahora bien, en cuanto a la protección especial para las personas de la tercera edad, de ninguna manera es posible olvidar los alcances del derecho protegido en el párrafo final del artículo 51 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto a que:

"Igualmente tendrán derecho a esa protección la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido." En virtud de lo dispuesto en la norma transcrita, queda claro que la protección especial por parte del Estado para esos grupos de personas se constituye en un verdadero derecho fundamental, exigible en las correspondientes dependencias administrativas y tribunales de justicia. Es así, como a partir del concepto del Estado Social de Derecho, es posible derivar obligaciones para las autoridades públicas, precisamente en aras a la búsqueda del mayor bienestar de "todos los habitantes del país", dentro de los cuales, el Derecho de la Constitución señala de manera especial a los niños, a las madres, al anciano y personas desvalidas. Es a partir del establecimiento de un de Estado Social, derivable de las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 50 y siguientes de la Carta Fundamental, que de manera inmediata se genera la obligada intervención estatal en materia social, en la que ha de obrar en determinado sentido y orientación: a favor de aquellos sectores especiales de la población que, por su condición, así lo requieren; y tal es el caso –sin duda alguna- de los ancianos, denominados como personas de la tercera edad, o personas adultas mayores. Hasta hace poco, no se contaba con una normativa tendente a garantizar en una forma más adecuada, la especial protección y tutela estatal que requiere el adulto mayor de nuestro país; sin embargo, recientemente, la Asamblea Legislativa promulgó la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, número 7935, de diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, con la que se pretende "a) Garantizar a las personas adultas mayores, igualdad de oportunidades y vida digna en todos los ámbitos.

• b)Garantizar la participación activa de las personas adultas mayores en la formulación y aplicación de las políticas que las afecten.
• c)Promover la permanencia de las personas adultas mayores en su núcleo familiar comunitario.
• d)Propiciar formas de organización y participación de las personas adultas mayores, que le permitan al país aprovechar la experiencia y el conocimiento de esta población.
• e)Impulsar la atención integral e interinstitucional de las personas adultas mayores por parte de las entidades públicas y privadas, y velar por el funcionamiento adecuado de los programas y servicios, destinados a esta población.
• f)Garantizar la protección y la seguridad social de las personas adultas mayores." En todo caso, no puede ni debe pretenderse que con esta normativa se de por agotada la labor y garantizada la especial protección que este sector de la población requiere de parte del Estado, es apenas el marco jurídico a partir del cual le corresponde comenzar a actuar. En el caso presente, los alcances de este derecho fundamental sin duda se traducen en la obligación de las autoridades de la Junta recurrida de atender con la mayor celeridad posible y brindar una respuesta oportuna al tutelado (incluso positiva, por haber resultado favorecido en el sorteo de la lotería nacional), justamente por su condición de persona mayor de edad. Es evidente entonces la afectación de los derechos fundamentales del promovente, razón por la cual se debe estimar el amparo.

VIII.- Con sustento en las razones expuestas, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo en todos sus extremos, como en efecto se dispone.

IX.- Los Magistrados Vargas, Abdelnour y Salazar salvan el voto y otorgan plazo al recurrente para formular la acción de inconstitucionalidad correspondiente. “