Formal requirements of the judge and violation of due processRequisitos formales del juzgador y lesión al debido proceso

**I. Preliminary Matter.** The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Chamber in the case of mandatory judicial consultations is determined by the existence of a proceeding for sentence review in which—pursuant to articles 102, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and 408, subsection g), of the Código Procesal Penal—it is alleged that the conviction was not imposed through due process (debido proceso) or an opportunity for defense. The Chamber is empowered in these cases to determine the scope of the constitutional principle of due process and its derivative, the right of defense, but without qualifying or assessing the circumstances of the specific case, an aspect that falls to the consulting authority to elucidate.

II.- On the Merits. It has been repeatedly noted that the so-called principle of the "natural judge," "ordinary judge," or "regular judge" (juez regular) is an integral part of the right to due process and that its foundation is found, among other constitutionality parameters, in Article 35 of the Political Constitution, which literally provides:

"Article 35.- No one may be tried by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the Tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution." For its part, Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), states in what is relevant that:

"Every person has the right to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against them, or for the determination of their rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature." In the same vein, numeral 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." Finally, and now in the purely legal sphere, its necessary observance in criminal proceedings finds support in the first article of the current Código de Procedimientos Penales, which provides that "No one may be punished except by virtue of a proceeding conducted in accordance with this Code; nor tried by tribunals other than those instituted by law in accordance with the Political Constitution..." III.– More specifically, the scope of the principle of the regular judge were outlined by the Chamber in Judgment number 1739-92 of eleven o'clock on the first of July of last year, to the effect that «This principle, which we have called that of the "regular judge," is complemented, in turn, by articles 9, 152, 153 and, as applicable, 10, 48 and 49 (of the Constitution), from which clearly results, as stated supra, the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the tribunals dependent on the Judicial Branch, as well as with that of article 39, in which it must be understood that the "competent authority" is necessarily the judicial and ordinary one, the latter because the transcribed article 35 excludes all possibility of trial by special tribunals for the case or for specific cases, and because articles 152 and 153 exhaust, within the scope of the Judicial Branch, all possibility of creating tribunals "established in accordance with this Constitution," with the sole exception of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for electoral disputes...

Although jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence in the distribution that the law makes of the different spheres of knowledge of the tribunals based on criteria of subject matter, seriousness or amount, territory, and degree, both jurisdiction—general or by subject matter—and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by the regulated tribunals, in the manner stated.» In summary, the principle of the regular judge can be expressed as the right of citizens to be tried only by tribunals previously instituted in accordance with our Constitution; that is, by those of the Judicial Branch created by law, pursuant to the provisions of Article 152 and following of our Magna Carta; and, a contrario sensu, as the prohibition for the State to try them by means of "... a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case..." (Article 35 transcribed above).- IV.- In the case raised, the existence and actions of the Tribunal as a jurisdictional body are not disputed, much less its competence, but rather the appellant is limited to claiming that one of its members did not meet the legal and regulatory requirements to act as such, because "she does not appear on the eligible list for Judge 4," which is, according to her criteria, a conditio sine qua non for forming a tribunal such as the one that tried her. In this regard, it must first be noted that the question of the validity of the judge's appointment in the particular case under discussion is not as simple as the mere inclusion or not on an eligible list, as is sought to be presented, since a multiplicity of factors must be taken into account, principally the date on which the substitution occurred (the year two thousand) and what the legal rules for substitution that governed at that time were, besides which, it is public and notorious that at that time there existed constitutionality challenges to the Judicial Career Law (which is the one that establishes the system of eligible lists) that prevented its full application and that had led to the establishment of substitution norms in accordance with the particular situation regarding the need to provide continuity to the administration of justice.

V.- But furthermore, and now from a strictly constitutional perspective, it should be noted that this Chamber has already issued a pronouncement regarding the constitutional scope of a hypothesis such as the alleged lack of formal requirements as claimed. In Judgment 6701-93, an issue with similar characteristics was raised regarding the constitutional validity of actions taken by a tribunal that was not formally created by law, and in that case it was stated:

III.- It was established in the preceding consideranda that there exists a formal error in the creation of the Tribunal, since the Full Court assumed its creation by a budgetary norm as valid, and it turns out that, as a jurisdictional body, it has been acting as a de facto official (funcionario de hecho). It is important to highlight that the Chamber has already established that the theory of the de facto official is applicable to the jurisdictional sphere:

"While it is true that the Political Constitution contains the guarantee of the natural judge in Article 39 and that it affects due process, the allegation raised by the defense, as the basis for the reproach formulated in the first instance, namely the fact that Cruz Ramírez was tried by a person without jurisdiction or competence, does not produce the procedural breach that is alleged, since the lack does not affect the stated guarantee, if it is taken into consideration—as this Chamber has repeatedly accepted—that in relation to judges, the theory of the de facto official also operates, normatively accepted in the General Law of Public Administration (art. 115 ff.), by means of which it is considered that an official validly acts who lacks one or several of the requirements demanded by law to consider them fully vested for the exercise of the office, but who performs it in a public, peaceful, continuous, and normally lawful manner. From this, it has been concluded that the lack of oath-taking, by itself, does not entail the nullity of the proceedings in which the judge participated, if they were previously duly appointed or designated by someone with the legal authority to do so. In summary, the guarantee of the natural judge is indeed constitutionally established and, for that reason, its breach affects due process, but the reproach formulated does not injure it." (Judgment number 2765-92 of fifteen hours and thirty minutes on the first of September of nineteen ninety-two).

Doctrinally, it is established that for a person to be recognized as a de facto official, several requirements must concur simultaneously, among them: a) Preexistence of "de jure" functions, i.e., normatively established. Only the State, through its legal instruments (formal or material laws), can create positions, employments, or public functions. Thus, the position, employment, or function must be found established in a norm. In the case at hand, it is the Political Constitution itself that determines that the administration of justice corresponds to the Judicial Branch, through its various instances, and there is no doubt that the functions are normatively established; b) To consider a person as a de facto official, they must be effectively in possession of the position. They must be vested with the outward appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the position. Throughout all these years, the distinct persons who have been appointed as superior judges in Heredia effectively exercised their respective positions and were appointed following the procedure established for that purpose; c) The position must be held under the appearance of legitimacy, and the exercise of the function must be public, peaceful, and carried out in a normal manner (in official premises, using official registries and seals, etc.). It must be determined whether the inhabitants have considered the holder of the position as a regular official and whether the other public authorities have treated them as such. The Tribunal as such, and the persons who throughout all these years, have functioned with all the appearance of legitimacy, which was recognized even by the Legislative Assembly, by endowing it with budgetary content, and by the Full Court, by delimiting its jurisdiction and making the respective appointments.

IV.- Since de facto officials act without an appointment or designation made by the State, or without said appointment or designation being in force, it is plausible to think that the acts they issue or perform lack validity. But the majority doctrine recognizes the validity of those acts, as long as certain requirements or conditions are met. Such a position is due to the logical necessity of preserving the general interest, the principal objective that the legal order must serve. The essential requirements that acts emanating from de facto officials must have in order for their validity to be recognized are: a) That they externally present themselves as if they emanated from de jure officials, that is, they must produce, regarding third parties, the public, the legal effects proper to acts that emanate from truly regular agents; b) It is necessary that the third parties affected by such acts could have reasonably and in good faith believed that the author thereof was in accordance with the law regarding their function. This must be elucidated in the specific case, and in the one at hand, no one doubted or questioned the investiture of the superior judges of Heredia; c) The recognition of the validity of those acts in favor of third parties must be of "public interest," in pursuit of legal security and the certainty of law. (...) d) It is also necessary that what was done by the de facto official was carried out within the limits of the competence of the official authority that said official claims to possess. (...)

V.- (...) In essence, what is claimed to have been violated is the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge, which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, alleging that by being tried by a tribunal not legally constituted, this principle is violated. The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the "natural judge" principle is as a legal judge, that is, as an "organ" created by law in accordance with the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for that purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, as a principle, in the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc or ex post facto bodies, or special ones, to judge specific acts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial tribunals. Ultimately, what is sought is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, preventing it from being created or chosen by some authority once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not occur in the case under examination.

VI.- Nor has the guarantee of jurisdiction itself been violated, for the principles of unity and monopoly of Jurisdiction, as well as that of judicial independence, were not threatened. It was not the Executive Branch that de facto created a tribunal, nor did it simply dispense with the ordinary ones by way of attributing judicial functions to certain administrative bodies. (...)" (Judgment number 6701-1993) VI.– The considerations expressed in the transcribed ruling are fully applicable in this case, since it is clear that in the hypothesis raised here, the guarantee has not been affected, given that, even if the absence of formal requirements for the exercise of the office were true, the fact is that from the perspective of its protective purpose, the right to the natural judge fulfilled its objective at the time, insofar as the appellant was tried by the regularly created Tribunal with all the appearance of competence and jurisdiction of which no one had any reason whatsoever to suspect, besides which its decision and actions could be the subject of challenge (even through this avenue of review) to verify in general or specific terms the legal adequacy and professional competence of its members. Therefore, the Chamber does not consider that the simple lack or non-fulfillment of formal requirements by the judges who form a criminal tribunal constitutes, by that fact alone, an injury to the accused's right to due process.

**Preliminary Issue.** The competence of the Constitutional Chamber in the case of mandatory judicial consultations is determined by the existence of a process for the review of a judgment in which—pursuant to Article 102, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and Article 408(g) of the Código Procesal Penal—it is alleged that the conviction was not imposed through due process or an opportunity for defense. In these consultations, the Chamber is empowered to determine the scope of the constitutional principle of due process and its derivative, the right of defense, but without qualifying or assessing the circumstances of the specific case, an aspect that falls to the consulting authority to clarify.

**II.- On the merits.** On repeated occasions, it has been noted that the so-called principle of "natural judge" (juez natural), "regular judge" (juez regular), or "ordinary judge" (juez ordinario) is an integral part of the right to due process, and its foundation is found, among other constitutional parameters, in Article 35 of the Constitución Política, which literally states:

"Article 35.- No one may be judged by a commission, tribunal, or judge specially appointed for the case, but exclusively by the Tribunals established in accordance with this Constitution." For its part, Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), states, in relevant part:

"Every person has the right to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation brought against them, or for the determination of their rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature." In a similar vein, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." Finally, and already within the purely legal sphere, its necessary observance in criminal proceedings is grounded in Article 1 of the current Código de Procedimientos Penales, which states:

"No one may be punished except by virtue of a process conducted in accordance with this Code; nor judged by any tribunals other than those instituted by law in accordance with the Constitución Política..." **III.-** More specifically, the scope of the principle of the regular judge (juez regular) was outlined by the Chamber in Judgment No. 1739-92 at eleven o'clock on July first of last year, in the sense that:

«This principle, which we have called "regular judge" (juez regular), is complemented, in turn, by Articles 9, 152, 153, and, as applicable, 10, 48, and 49 (of the Constitution), from which it clearly results, as stated supra, the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the hands of the courts dependent upon the Poder Judicial, as well as with that of Article 39, in which it must be understood that the "competent authority" is necessarily the judicial and ordinary one, the latter because Article 35 transcribed excludes any possibility of trial by special courts created for a particular case or for specific cases, and because Articles 152 and 153 exhaust within the scope of the Poder Judicial any possibility of creating tribunals "established in accordance with this Constitution," with the sole exception of the Supremo de Elecciones for electoral litigation...

While jurisdiction consists, in general, of the power to administer justice, and competence consists of the distribution made by law among the different spheres of cognizance of the tribunals based on criteria of subject matter, gravity, or amount, territory, and functional level, both jurisdiction—general or by subject matter—and competence are part of due process, as they guarantee that conflicts are resolved by the regulated tribunals, in the manner described.» **V.-** But moreover, and now from a strictly constitutional perspective, it must be noted that this Chamber has already ruled on the constitutional implications of a hypothesis like the one of an alleged lack of formal requirements as claimed. In Judgment 6701-93, an issue with similar characteristics was raised concerning the constitutional validity of actions taken by a tribunal that was not formally created by law, and in that case, the following was stated:

III.- It was established in the preceding recitals that a formal error exists in the creation of the Tribunal, as the Corte Plena assumed its creation by a budgetary rule to be valid, and it turns out that, as a jurisdictional body, it has been acting as a de facto official (funcionario de hecho). It is important to highlight that the Chamber has already established that the theory of the de facto official (funcionario de hecho) is applicable to the jurisdictional sphere:

"If it is true that the Constitución Política contains the guarantee of the natural judge (juez natural) in Article 39, and that this affects due process, the allegation raised by the defense, as the basis for the reproach made primarily, i.e., the fact that Cruz Ramírez was tried by a person without jurisdiction or competence, does not produce the procedural defect alleged, since the defect does not affect the aforementioned guarantee, if one takes into consideration—as this Chamber has repeatedly accepted—that with respect to judges, the theory of the de facto official (funcionario de hecho) also applies, normatively accepted in the Ley General de la Administración Pública (Art. 115 et seq.), by which an official is deemed to act validly when they lack one or more of the requirements required by law to be considered fully invested for the exercise of the office, but who performs it in a public, peaceful, continuous manner normally in accordance with the law. From this, it has been concluded that the lack of swearing an oath, by itself, does not entail the nullity of the proceedings in which the judge has participated, if they were previously duly appointed or designated by one with the legal authority to do so. In summary, the guarantee of the natural judge (juez natural) is indeed established constitutionally, and for that reason, its violation affects due process, but the reproach made does not harm it." (Judgment No. 2765-92 of three thirty in the afternoon of September first, nineteen ninety-two).

Doctrinally, it is established that for a de facto official (funcionario de hecho) to be recognized, several requirements must concur simultaneously, among them: **a)** Pre-existence of "de jure" functions, i.e., normatively established. Only the State, through its legal instruments (formal or material laws), can create public offices, jobs, or functions. Thus, the office, job, or function must be established in a norm. In the case at hand, it is the Constitución Política itself that determines that the administration of justice corresponds to the Poder Judicial, through its various instances, and there is no doubt that the functions are normatively established. **b)** To consider a person as a de facto official (funcionario de hecho), they must be effectively in possession of the office. They must be vested with the outward appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the office. Throughout all these years, the various persons who have been appointed as superior judges in Heredia effectively exercised their respective offices and were appointed following the procedure established for this purpose. **c)** The office must be held under the appearance of legitimacy, and the exercise of the function must be public, peaceful, carried out in a normal manner (in official premises, using official records and seals, etc.). It must be determined whether the inhabitants have considered the office holder as a regular official and whether the other public authorities have treated them as such. The Tribunal as such, and the persons who worked there over all these years, have functioned with all the appearance of legitimacy, which was recognized even by the Asamblea Legislativa, by providing it with budgetary content, and by the Corte Plena, by delimiting its jurisdiction and making the respective appointments.

IV.- Since de facto officials (funcionarios de hecho) act without an appointment or designation made by the State, or without those appointments or designations being in force, it is feasible to think that the acts they issue or perform lack validity. But the majority doctrine recognizes validity in those acts, provided that certain requirements or conditions are met. Such a position obeys the logical necessity of preserving the general interest, the principal objective the legal order must serve. The essential requirements that acts emanating from de facto officials (funcionarios de hecho) must have to be recognized as valid are: **a)** That they externally present themselves as if they emanated from de jure officials, i.e., they must produce, with respect to third parties, to the public, the legal effects typical of acts emanating from truly regular agents. **b)** It is necessary that the third parties affected by such acts could have reasonably and in good faith believed that the author thereof was acting legally with respect to their function. This must be elucidated in the specific case, and in the one before us, no one doubted or questioned the investiture of the superior judges of Heredia. **c)** The recognition of the validity of those acts in favor of third parties must be of "public interest," in pursuit of legal certainty and the certitude of law. (...) **d)** It is also necessary that the actions taken by the de facto official (funcionario de hecho) were carried out within the limits of the competence of the official authority which that official purports to have. (...)

V.- (...) In essence, what is claimed as violated is the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge (juez natural), which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, alleging that being judged by a tribunal not legally constituted violates that principle. The guarantee of the natural judge (juez natural) signifies the existence of judicial bodies pre-established in a permanent manner by law. One of the contents of the "natural judge" (juez natural) principle is as a legal judge, that is, as a "body" created by law in accordance with the competence that the Constitution assigns to the Congress for that purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, in principle, in having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges (jueces naturales) is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge (juez natural) is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc bodies, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge specific facts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence characteristic of judicial courts. Ultimately, what is sought is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal by preventing it from being created or chosen by some authority once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not occur in the case under examination.

VI.- Nor was the guarantee of jurisdiction itself violated, as the principles of unity and monopoly of Jurisdiction, as well as that of judicial independence, were not threatened. It was not the Poder Ejecutivo that de facto created a tribunal, nor did it simply dispense with the ordinary ones by way of attributing judicial functions to certain administrative bodies. (...)" (Judgment No. 6701-1993) **VI.-** The considerations expressed in the transcribed ruling are fully applicable in this case, since it is clear that in the hypothesis raised here, the guarantee has not been affected, given that, even if the absence of formal requirements for the exercise of the office were true, the fact is that from the perspective of its protective purpose, the right to the natural judge (juez natural) fulfilled its objective at the time, insofar as the appellant was judged by the regularly created Tribunal and with all the appearance of competence and jurisdiction of which no one had any reason to be suspicious, besides the fact that its decision and actions were capable of being challenged (even through this avenue of review) to verify in general or specific terms the legal suitability and professional competence of its members. Therefore, the Chamber does not consider that the simple lack or non-compliance with formal requirements by the judges who make up a criminal court constitutes, by that fact alone, an injury to the accused's right to due process." In summary, the principle of the lawful judge can be expressed as the right of citizens to be judged only by courts previously established in accordance with our Constitution; that is, by those of the Judicial Branch created by law, pursuant to the provisions of Article 152 and following of our Magna Carta; and, conversely, as the prohibition for the State to judge them by means of "...a commission, court, or judge specially appointed for the case..." (Article 35 transcribed above).

**IV.-** In the case presented, the existence and action of the Court as a jurisdictional body is not disputed, nor even less its competence; rather, the appellant merely claims that one of its members did not meet the legal and regulatory requirements to act as such, because she "does not appear on the list of eligible candidates for Judge 4," which is, in her view, a sine qua non condition for forming part of a court such as the one that judged her. In this regard, it must first be noted that the question of the validity of the judge's appointment in the particular case under discussion is not as simple as the mere inclusion or not on a list of eligible candidates, as it is sought to be presented, because a multiplicity of factors must be taken into account, mainly the date on which the substitution occurred (the year two thousand) and what the legal rules for substitution were that governed at that time, in addition to the fact that it is public and notorious that at that time there were challenges to the constitutionality of the Judicial Career Law (which is the one that establishes the system of eligible candidate lists) that prevented its full application and that had led to the establishment of rules for substitution and replacement in accordance with the particular situation regarding the need to provide continuity to the administration of justice.

**V.-** But in addition, and now from a strictly constitutional perspective, it should be noted that this Chamber has already ruled on the constitutional scope of a hypothesis such as the alleged lack of formal requirements claimed here. In decision 6701-93, an issue with similar characteristics was raised regarding the constitutional validity of the actions of a court that was not formally created by law, and in that case it was stated:

III.- It was established in the preceding recitals that there is a formal error in the creation of the Court, because the Full Court assumed its creation by budgetary norm to be valid, and it turns out that, as a jurisdictional body, it has been acting as a de facto official (funcionario de hecho). It is important to highlight that the Chamber has already established that the theory of the de facto official is applicable to the jurisdictional sphere:

*"Although it is true that the Political Constitution contains the guarantee of a natural judge in Article 39 and that this affects due process, the claim made by the defense, as the basis for the objection raised in the first instance, namely the fact that Cruz Ramírez was judged by a person without jurisdiction or competence, does not produce the procedural violation alleged, since the defect does not affect the indicated guarantee, if it is taken into consideration—as this Chamber has repeatedly accepted—that the theory of the de facto official, normatively accepted in the General Law of Public Administration (Art. 115 et seq.), also functions in relation to judges, whereby it is considered that an official who acts validly is one for whom one or more of the requirements demanded by law to consider them fully vested for the exercise of the position are lacking, but who performs the role publicly, peacefully, continuously, and normally in accordance with the law. From this it has been concluded that the lack of being sworn in, by itself, does not entail the nullity of the proceedings in which the judge has participated, if he was previously duly appointed or designated by someone with the legal authority to do so. In summary, the guarantee of a natural judge is constitutionally established and for that reason its violation affects due process, but the objection raised does not injure it."* (decision number 2765-92 of fifteen hours and thirty minutes on the first of September, nineteen ninety-two).

Doctrinally, it is established that for a de facto official to be recognized, several requirements must be present simultaneously, among them: **a)** Pre-existence of "de jure" functions, that is, normatively established functions. Only the State, through its legal instruments (formal or material laws), can create public offices, jobs, or functions. Thus, the office, job, or function must be established in a norm. In the case before us, it is the Political Constitution itself that determines that the administration of justice corresponds to the Judicial Branch, through its various instances, and there is no doubt that the functions are normatively established; **b)** To consider a person as a de facto official, they must effectively be in possession of the office. They must be vested with the outward appearance of being the legitimate occupant of the office. Throughout all these years, the different persons who have been appointed as superior judges in Heredia effectively exercised their respective offices and were appointed following the procedure established for that purpose; **c)** The office must be held under the appearance of legitimacy and the exercise of the function must be public, peaceful, and carried out in a normal manner (in official premises, using official records and seals, etc.). It must be determined whether the inhabitants have considered the holder of the office as a regular official and whether the other public authorities have treated them as such. The Court as such, and the persons who have served during all these years, have functioned with all the appearance of legitimacy, which was recognized even by the Legislative Assembly, by providing it with budgetary content, and by the Full Court, by delimiting its jurisdiction and making the respective appointments.

IV.- Since de facto officials act without an appointment or designation made by the State, or without said appointment or designation being in force, it is conceivable that the acts they issue or perform lack validity. But the majority doctrine recognizes validity in these acts, as long as certain requirements or conditions are met. This position is due to the logical need to preserve the general interest, the main objective that the legal order must serve. The essential requirements that the acts emanating from de facto officials must have, for their validity to be recognized, are: **a)** That they outwardly present themselves as if they emanate from de jure officials, that is, they must produce, with respect to third parties, the public, the legal effects proper to acts emanating from truly regular agents; **b)** It is necessary that the third parties affected by such acts could have reasonably and in good faith believed that the author of the act was legally established regarding their function. This must be elucidated in the specific case, and in the one before us, no one doubted or questioned the investiture of the superior judges of Heredia; **c)** The recognition of the validity of these acts in favor of third parties must be in the "public interest," in pursuit of legal certainty and the certainty of the law. (...) **d)** It is also necessary that what was carried out by the de facto official was performed within the limits of the competence of the official authority that said official claims to hold. (...)

V.- (...) In essence, what is claimed as violated is the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge, which forms part of the generic guarantee of due process, arguing that being judged by a court not legally constituted violates this principle. The guarantee of the natural judge means the existence of judicial bodies permanently pre-established by law. One of the contents of the "natural judge" principle is as a legal judge, that is, as a "body" created by law in accordance with the competence that the Constitution assigns to Congress for that purpose. The right to jurisdiction consists, precisely, as a principle, in having the possibility of access to one of those judges. As established in Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, Costa Rica, the right to jurisdiction and the guarantee of natural judges is the right that every person has to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or court, previously established by law. What is protected through the principle of the natural judge is the prohibition of creating ad-hoc, or ex post facto (after the fact), or special bodies, to judge specific acts or specific persons, without the generality and permanence proper to judicial courts. Ultimately, what is sought is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the court, preventing it from being created or chosen by some authority once the case occurs in reality, which evidently did not happen in the case under review.

VI.- Nor has the guarantee of the jurisdiction itself been violated, since the principles of unity and monopoly of Jurisdiction, as well as that of judicial independence, were not threatened. It was not the Executive Branch who de facto created a court, nor did it simply dispense with the ordinary ones by attributing judicial functions to certain administrative bodies. (...)" (Decision number 6701-1993) **VI.-** The considerations expressed in the transcribed decision are fully applicable in this case, since it is clear that in the hypothesis raised here, the guarantee has not been affected, given that, even if the absence of formal requirements for the exercise of the office were true, the fact is that from the perspective of its protective purpose, the right to a natural judge fulfilled its objective at the time, insofar as the appellant was judged by the Court that was regularly created and with all the appearance of competence and jurisdiction, of which no one had any reason to be suspicious, in addition to the fact that its decision and actions could be the subject of challenge (including through this review process) to verify, in general or specific terms, the legal suitability and professional competence of its members. For this reason, the Chamber does not consider that the simple lack or non-compliance with formal requirements by the judges that form part of a criminal court constitutes, by that fact alone, an injury to the accused's right to due process."

“Cuestión previa. La competencia de la Sala Constitucional en el caso de las consultas judiciales preceptivas, está determinada por la existencia de un proceso para la revisión de sentencia en el cual –conforme a los artículos 102 párrafo segundo de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 408 inciso g) del Código Procesal Penal– se alegue que la sentencia condenatoria no se impuso mediante el debido proceso u oportunidad de defensa. La Sala está facultada en ellas para determinar cuáles son los alcances del principio constitucional del debido proceso y su derivado, el derecho de defensa, pero sin calificar, ni valorar las circunstancias del caso concreto, aspecto que corresponde dilucidarlo a la autoridad consultante.

II.- Sobre el fondo. En reiteradas ocasiones se ha señalado que el denominado principio de "juez natural", "juez regular" o "juez ordinario", es parte integrante del derecho al debido proceso y que su fundamento se encuentra, entre otros parámetros de constitucionalidad, en el artículo 35 de la Constitución Política, que a la letra dispone:

"Artículo 35.- Nadie puede ser juzgado por comisión, tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso, sino exclusivamente por los Tribunales establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución.".

Por su parte, el artículo 8.1 de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José), dice en lo que interesa que:

"Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter." En el mismo orden de ideas, el numeral 10 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, expone:

"Toda persona tiene derecho, en condiciones de plena igualdad, a ser oída públicamente y con justicia por un tribunal independiente e imparcial, para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones o para el examen de cualquier acusación contra ella en materia penal.".

Finalmente, y ya en el ámbito meramente legal, su necesaria observancia en los procesos penales, encuentra sustento en el artículo primero del Código de Procedimientos Penales vigente, que dispone que "Nadie podrá ser penado sino en virtud de un proceso tramitado con arreglo a este Código; ni juzgado por otros tribunales que los instituidos por la ley de acuerdo con la Constitución Política..." III.- Más concretamente, los alcances del principio del juez regular fueron esbozados por la Sala en la Sentencia número 1739-92 de las once horas del primero de julio del año pasado, en el sentido de que «Este principio, al que hemos llamado de "juez regular" se complementa, a su vez, con los artículos 9, 152, 153 y, en su caso, 10, 48 y 49 (de la Constitución), de los cuales resulta claramente, como se dijo supra, la exclusividad y la universalidad de la función jurisdiccional en manos de los tribunales dependientes del Poder Judicial, así como con el del artículo 39, en el cual debe entenderse que la "autoridad competente" es necesariamente la judicial y ordinaria, esto último porque el 35 transcrito excluye toda posibilidad de juzgamiento por tribunales especiales para el caso o para casos concretos, y porque el 152 y el 153 agotan en el ámbito del Poder Judicial toda posibilidad de creación de tribunales "establecidos de acuerdo con esta Constitución", con la única salvedad del Supremo de Elecciones para el contencioso electoral...

Si bien, la jurisdicción consiste, en general, en la potestad de administrar justicia, y la competencia en la distribución que hace la ley de las diferentes esferas de conocimiento de los tribunales con base en criterios de materia, gravedad o cuantía, territorio y grado, tanto la jurisdicción -general o por materia- como la competencia son parte del debido proceso, pues garantizan que los conflictos sean resueltos por los tribunales regulados, en la forma dicha.».

En resumen el principio del juez regular puede expresarse como el derecho de los ciudadanos de ser juzgados únicamente por los tribunales previamente instituidos de acuerdo con nuestra Constitución; esto es, por los del Poder Judicial creados por la ley, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 152 y siguientes de nuestra Carta Magna; y, a contrario censu, como la prohibición para el Estado de juzgarlos por medio de "...comisión, tribunal o juez especialmente nombrado para el caso..." (artículo 35 antes transcrito).- IV.- En el caso planteado, no se discute la existencia y actuación del Tribunal como órgano jurisdiccional ni menos aún su competencia, sino que la recurrente se limita a reclamar que uno de sus integrantes no cumplía con los requisitos legales y reglamentarios para actuar como tal, pues "no aparece en la lista de elegibles de Juez 4" que es según su criterio condición sine qua non para integrar un tribunal como el que la juzgó. Al respecto, debe señalarse primero que la cuestión de la validez del nombramiento de la juez en el caso particular que se discute no resulta tan sencilla como la mera inclusión o no en una lista elegibles, tal y como se quiere plantear, pues debe tomarse en cuenta una multiplicidad de factores, principalmente la fecha en que ocurre la sustitución (año dos mil) y cuáles eran las reglas legales para suplencia que regían en ese momento, amén de que, es público y notorio la existencia en ese momento cuestionamientos de constitucionalidad de la ley de Carrera Judicial (que es la que establece el sistema de listas de elegibles) que impedían aplicarla en toda su extensión y que habían producido el establecimiento de normas de suplencia y sustitución acorde con la situación particular en cuanto a la necesidad de brindar continuidad a la administración de justicia..

V.- Pero además, y ya desde la perspectiva estrictamente constitucional debe anotarse que ya esta Sala ha hecho pronunciamiento respecto de los alcances constitucionales de una hipótesis como la de supuesta falta de requisitos formales como la que reclama. En la sentencia 6701-93 se planteó un tema con características similares en cuanto a la validez constitucional de lo actuado por un tribunal que no estaba creado formalmente por ley, y en ese caso se señaló:

III.- Se estableció en los considerandos anteriores que existe un error formal en la creación del Tribunal, pues la Corte Plena asumió como válida su creación por norma presupuestaria y resulta que como órgano jurisdiccional, ha venido actuando como funcionario de hecho. Es importante destacar que ya la Sala estableció que la teoría del funcionario de hecho es aplicable al ámbito jurisdiccional:

"Si bien es cierto que la Constitución Política contiene la garantía de juez natural en el artículo 39 y ella incide en el debido proceso, la alegación planteada por la defensa, como base del reproche formulado en primer término, sea el hecho de que Cruz Ramírez fue juzgado por persona sin jurisdicción, ni competencia, no produce el quebranto procesal que se alega, pues la falta no incide en la señalada garantía, si se toma en consideración -como en forma reiterada esta Sala lo ha aceptado- que en relación con los jueces también funciona la teoría del funcionario de hecho, aceptada normativamente en la Ley General de la Administración Pública (art. 115 ss), mediante la cual se estima que actúa validamente, el funcionario al que falta uno o varios de los requisitos exigidos por la ley para tenerlo como plenamente investido para el ejercicio del cargo, pero que lo desempeña en forma pública, pacífica, continua y normalmente ajustada a derecho. De ello se ha concluido que la falta de juramentación, por sí sola, no conlleva la nulidad de las actuaciones en que ha participado el juez, si con anterioridad fue debidamente nombrado o designado por quien tiene facultad legal para hacerlo. En síntesis, la garantía de juez natural si está establecida constitucionalmente y en tal razón su quebranto repercute en el debido proceso, pero el reproche formulado no la lesiona." (sentencia número 2765-92 de las quince horas y treinta minutos del primero de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos).

Doctrinariamente se establece que para que se pueda reconocer a un funcionario de hecho, deben concurrir, en forma simultánea, varios requisitos, entre ellos: a) Preexistencia de funciones "de jure", es decir establecidas normativamente. Sólo el Estado, a través de sus instrumentos jurídicos (leyes formales o materiales), pueden crear cargos, empleos o funciones públicas. De manera que el cargo, empleo o función deben hallarse establecidos en una norma. En el caso que nos ocupa, es la misma Constitución Política la que determina que la administración de justicia corresponde al Poder Judicial, a través de sus diversas instancias y no cabe duda de que las funciones están establecidas normativamente;. b) Para tener a una persona como funcionario de hecho, éste debe estar efectivamente en posesión de cargo. Debe estar revestido con la apariencia exterior de ser el ocupante legítimo del cargo. A través de todos estos años, las distintas personas que han sido nombradas como jueces superiores en Heredia, ejercieron efectivamente sus respectivos cargos y fueron nombrados siguiendo el procedimiento establecido al efecto;.c) Se debe detentar el cargo bajo la apariencia de legitimidad y el ejercicio de la función debe ser público, pacífico, efectuado de manera normal (en los locales oficiales, utilizando registros y sellos oficiales, etc.). Se debe determinar si los habitantes han considerado al titular del cargo como funcionario regular y si las demás autoridades públicas lo ha tratado como tal. El Tribunal como tal y las personas que durante todos estos años, ha funcionado con toda la apariencia de legitimidad, la que fue reconocida incluso por la Asamblea Legislativa, al dotarlo de contenido presupuestario y por la Corte Plena, al delimitar su jurisdicción y hacer los respectivos nombramientos.

IV.- Desde que los funcionarios de hecho actúan sin nombramiento o designación efectuados por el Estado, o sin estar vigentes dichos nombramientos o designación, es dable pensar que los actos que emitan o realicen carecen de validez. Pero la doctrina mayoritaria reconoce validez a esos actos, en tanto se cumplan determinados requisitos o condiciones. Tal posición obedece a la lógica necesidad de preservar el interés general, principal objetivo que debe atender el orden jurídico. Los requisitos esenciales que deben tener los actos emanados por los funcionarios de hecho, para que se les pueda reconocer su validez son: a) Que exteriormente se presenten como si emanaran de funcionarios de jure, es decir, deben producir, respecto a terceros, al público, los efectos jurídicos propios de los actos que emanan de agentes verdaderamente regulares;.b) Es necesario que los terceros afectados por tales actos hayan podido creer razonablemente y de buena fe que el autor del mismo estaba a derecho en cuanto a su función. Esto se debe dilucidar en el caso concreto y en el que nos ocupa, nadie dudó ni cuestionó la investidura de los jueces superiores de Heredia; .c) El reconocimiento de la validez de esos actos en favor de los terceros, debe ser de "interés público", en busca de la seguridad jurídica y a la certidumbre del derecho. (...) d) También es necesario que lo actuado por el funcionario de hecho se haya realizado dentro de los límites de la competencia de la autoridad oficial que dicho funcionario pretende tener.(...)

V.- (...) En esencia, lo que se reclama como violado es la garantía constitucional al juez natural, que forma parte de la garantía genérica al debido proceso, alegando que al ser juzgado por un tribunal no constituido legalmente, se viola ese principio. La garantía del juez natural significa la existencia de órganos judiciales preestablecidos en forma permanente por la ley. Uno de los contenidos del principio "juez natural" es como juez legal, es decir, como "órgano" creado por ley conforme a la competencia que para ello la Constitución asigna al Congreso. El derecho a la jurisdicción consiste, precisamente, como principio, en tener posibilidad de acceso a uno de esos jueces. Según lo establece el artículo 8,1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José de Costa Rica, el derecho a la jurisdicción y la garantía de los jueces naturales, es el derecho que toda persona tiene a ser oída con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley. Lo que se tutela a través del principio del juez natural es la prohibición de crear organismos ad-hoc, o ex post facto (después del hecho), o especiales, para juzgar determinados hechos o a determinadas personas, sin la generalidad y permanencia propias de los tribunales judiciales. En definitiva lo que se pretende es asegurar la independencia e imparcialidad del tribunal evitando que sea creado o elegido, por alguna autoridad, una vez que el caso sucede en la realidad, lo que evidentemente no ocurrió en el caso en examen.

VI.- Tampoco se ha vulnerado la garantía de la propia jurisdicción, pues los principios de unidad y monopolio de la Jurisdicción así como el de la independencia judicial, no fueron amenazados. No fue el Poder Ejecutivo quien creó de facto un tribunal, ni prescindió simplemente de los ordinarios por la vía de atribuir funciones judiciales a determinados órganos administrativos. (...)"(Sentencia número 6701-1993) VI.- Las consideraciones que queda claro que en la hipótesis aquí planteada la garantía no se ha visto afectada dado que, aún cuando si fuese cierta la ausencia de requisitos formales para el ejercicio del cargo, lo cierto es que desde la perspectiva de su finalidad protectora el derecho al juez natural cumplió en su momento con su objetivo, en tanto la recurrente fue juzgada por el Tribunal regularmente creado y con toda la apariencia de competencia y jurisdicción de la que nadie tuvo motivo alguno para sospechar, amén de que su decisión y actuaciones pudieron ser objeto de cuestionamiento (incluso por esta vía de revisión) para verificar en términos generales o concretos la adecuación jurídica y competencia profesional de sus integrantes. Por ello, no estima la Sala que la simple falta o incumplimiento de reqauisitos formales por parte de los jueces que integran un tribunal penal, constituya por ese sólo hecho una lesión al derecho del acusado al debido proceso.”