Denial of building permit and right to housingDenegatoria de permiso de construcción y derecho a la vivienda

I.Purpose of the appeal. The appellant alleges that, despite owning a plot of land in the canton of Orotina, which he acquired from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and having obtained a housing voucher (bono de la vivienda) to build his dwelling house, the Municipality of the canton of Orotina denied him the construction permit, even though he met all the necessary requirements for such a procedure. He considers that the conduct of the respondent entity is arbitrary and unjustified, in addition to being a violation of his fundamental rights. He considers that Constitutional Law has been impaired.

III.On the fundamental right to decent housing. Article 65 of the Constitution, already mentioned, charges the State with promoting the construction of affordable housing, while by signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Costa Rica recognized the right of every person to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their family, which includes housing. This right, in addition to having its individual basis, must be framed as derived from the conception of the State as a social State of Law (Estado social de Derecho), attributing to this expression the meaning that was specified in judgment number 2000-05500 of 14:33 hours on July 5, 2000, according to which public authorities are obliged to make possible "[…] the realization of material justice, among other means through positive actions, restoring to a certain sector of the population the enjoyment of social and economic conditions appropriate for a dignified life, which in reality do not exist or which are not available, a situation that may have derived, even indirectly, from the action or economic policy developed by the State itself. That is, this type of benefit cannot be simple gratifications without true basis in a socioeconomic assistance function directed at population sectors or depressed communities or those in a disadvantaged situation, but rather the rule must constitute an authentic mechanism of redistribution of wealth (in the terms of Article 50 of the Constitution) among those who suffer significant social disadvantages, for whom wealth is a reality from which they are excluded; a mechanism that may arise from very particular or specific circumstances facing a given social situation that the legislator is legitimately empowered to assess. This is precisely the foundation of all legislation creating social institutions, as well as the legal institutes tending to assist those who find themselves in a specific condition that is significantly inferior to the rest of the economically active population, and to whom the State grants economic or other type of aid without receiving a consideration in return, precisely because this is one of the functions of the State, as the superior entity charged with procuring conditions of free and dignified life, and with maintaining social peace as a value of the legal system that demands the creation of these living conditions for all, especially for the most disadvantaged in the distribution of the community's goods."

Furthermore, through decision number 1992-01441 of 15:45 hours on June 2, 1992, the Chamber identified the positive law bases of such a postulate: "The basic general principle of the Political Constitution is enshrined in Article 50, by providing that 'the State shall procure the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth', which, combined with the declaration of adherence of the Costa Rican State to the Christian principle of social justice, included in Article 74 ibid, determines the very essence of the political and social system we have chosen for our country, and which defines it as a social State of Law (Estado social de Derecho).-" (see in the same sense resolution number 2002-05651 of 15:00 hours on June 12, 2002).

Finally, through its jurisprudence, the Chamber has undertaken to give specific content to a notion that could initially be qualified as merely ideological guidance, linking the social State of Law (Estado social de Derecho), among others, to the right to enjoy a healthy environment (judgment number 1999-00644 of 11:24 hours on January 29, 1999), to the distribution of agrarian property (judgment number 2000-09119 of 15:14 hours on October 17, 2000), to the right of access to justice for those without resources to pay for legal aid (judgment number 2001-05420 of 15:16 hours on June 20, 2001), and to social security (judgment number 7605-20001, of 14:32 hours on August 8, 2001).

V.That said, the fundamental right to housing does not imply the right to claim, through the guarantee mechanisms for these rights, that an individual and immediate housing solution be supplied, since the responsibility and decision to allocate a specific amount of public resources for that purpose and to distribute them in the most equitable and efficient manner possible is, first of all, political. However, within the context of the politically established programs for providing housing to persons of scarce resources, they may claim, as in this case, that their implementation be governed by parameters of equality and that there be consistency between the established objective of satisfying this fundamental right and the means arranged to achieve it. In the Costa Rican case, the legislator has selected various ways to comply with the constitutional mandate and International Human Rights Law to provide people with a decent home, when they cannot achieve it by themselves, among which is the attribution to a Ministry of the specific subject of housing and the creation of specialized public entities on the issue, such as the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda or the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, the respondents here. Especially with regard to the latter–which is accused of the direct management of the challenged actions, in its capacity as an authorized financial entity of the National System for Housing Finance (Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda)–Articles 1 and 4 of its Law of Creation stipulate that this autonomous institution was founded, among other purposes, to guide its activities with a view to obtaining greater economic and social well-being, procuring for the Costa Rican family better housing and the corresponding related elements. It is also attributed to it to attend, preferentially, to the problem of the lowest-income classes of the community, both in the cities and in the countryside. On the other hand, Article 5 confers on it competence in the construction of hygienic dwellings, of an individual or collective type, within reach of families of scarce economic resources, based on comprehensive and even individual programs, that tend toward the planning of the housing zones; the gradual elimination from urban areas of unsanitary or dangerous constructions and dwellings, through adequate plans for their reconstruction or rehabilitation, which it will elaborate within the best safety standards for its investments, taking into account the social aspect that the problem presents.

VI.On the right to property and its social function: It is clear that current Political Constitutions –and ours does not escape this reality– deal with the protection or guarantee of Human Rights and within these rights it has been considered that the right to property is found. Our current Constitution does not define the right to property; this definition is transferred to a legal concept that we can find in the Civil Code, but property does remain as an idea of constitutional rank. That said, within Civil Law, "property" is known by the term ownership (dominio) and consists, in the strict sense, of the most complete form of right of dominion over a thing, and its purpose is for its owner to be able to make use, to the greatest extent possible, of the thing that is the object of that legal relationship. Thus, a direct, immediate, and exclusive power is granted. Property, as a right in rem (derecho real), has the virtue of granting full dominion over a thing and consists of the power to subject it to our will in all its aspects, thereby granting the owner of this right the power to obtain from a thing all the utility it can provide. Nevertheless, from the content of numeral 45 in harmony with 50, both of the Political Constitution, we obtain what the Constitutional Jurisprudence, in a solid and reiterated jurisprudence, has understood as the social function of property; this seeks to harmonize the interests of the individual against the interests of the community, imposing on the owner the obligation to fulfill the social function. The aim, then, is to incentivize production in accordance with the technical levels existing at a given moment and, at the same time, to ensure that the laws are not infringed by the owner. This is achieved through the imposition of limits, limitations, and duties on the owner, for example, by requiring that the exercise of the right to property be carried out within certain canons of safety, health, and environmental protection. That is, property is conceived as a power-duty; one can exercise the right, but at the same time, one must fulfill certain obligations. Then, the right to property, like any other subjective right, attributes powers, but these are given within certain limits. It is more than recognized in doctrine that any system contains, implicitly–or even explicitly–the prohibition of misuse or abuse of a subjective right. Now, the social function of property not only imposes burdens on the owner but also on the State, which must promote access to productive assets for all those persons who lack productive means or have them insufficiently, such that even having them, they cannot perform productive work. This would then be a matter of a just, equitable, adequate, and reasonable distribution of property, but of productive property, which yields fruits. Having said this, we must pause for a moment at this point and reiterate, as stated in Considerando IV of this judgment, that the effective realization of such a function depends on the structuring and execution of socioeconomic policies of the Government at a given historic moment.

Continuing with the above, to achieve that ultimate purpose, the State is in a position to establish restrictions on property which, basically, are structured through limits and limitations imposed in accordance with the legal system. Thus, limits we will understand, in the strict sense, as the behavior that, by law, the owner must follow. They are those conducts that the owner can display within the normal content of the right they have, and they will always depend on the nature of the asset in question. Now, when speaking of "Law" here, we do so understanding it in a formal and material sense (Article 45 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 266 in fine Civil Code), which, according to the vast jurisprudence of this Tribunal, must necessarily be approved by a qualified majority. Regarding this, in judgment 1990-00546 of 14:30 hours on May 22, 1990, it was considered: "[...] V. The thesis outlined by the Procuraduría General de la República, that it must be presumed that the legislative approval of norms imposing limitations on property was given (sic) with the majority required by the Political Constitution, is not acceptable, because in this case it is expressly recorded, in the legislative file, that the law was not approved with the number of votes required by the Constitution, for which reason the infringement of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution is evident. In this case, it is a matter not only of a formal requirement, but also of the requirement of an express will of a qualified majority for the imposition of limitations on the said right. In the Chamber's opinion, the qualified majority that the Constitution requires to impose limitations on the right to property cannot be presumed; on the contrary, it must be expressly recorded in the minutes of the law's approval. [...]" In accordance with this, it is evident that the limit is not created for a specific asset, because, by existing through a law, it is of general application.

We have, on the other hand, a different form of restriction to the right to property, such as limitations, which must be created for a specific asset through legal transactions, must be registered in the Public Registry (Article 268 in relation to 266 and 292, all of the Civil Code), and have an eminently temporary character.

Continuing with the logical order in which this judgment has been developing, it is evident that what is sought through the limits and limitations on property is to fulfill its social function, imposing some restrictions on the owner in their enjoyment and exercise. In other words, both –limits and limitations– impose a few minor inconveniences on the owner for the sake of satisfying the community, the common good, and the social function of property. Nevertheless, it can never be interpreted that what they seek is to empty or strip a person of their fundamental right to property and its consequent attributes; understanding what has been set forth so far in this way would not only be erroneous but contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution; it would be, in a word, a contradiction. The Chamber itself has understood that neither limits nor limitations can have the virtue of emptying the essential content, the basic core of property. In this sense, in vote 1993-06706 of 15:21 hours on December 21, 1993, the Chamber held: "B) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 22 OF LAW #4240 V).- Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law is also challenged, which literally provides: 'Article 22.- None of the limitations on property that this law establishes, being burdens or easements (servidumbres) of the urban regime, require registration in the Public Registry, nor shall they give rise to any compensation, except in those cases where this law expressly so provides.'.- This norm is openly unconstitutional, for being contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The exemption from liability that it establishes inverts the terms in which the right to property and its limitations are conceived.- The Chamber considers that the limitations established by the Urban Planning Law are indeed compensable, of course, to the extent of the gravity or extent of the injury; and this applies both when dealing with "impossible limitations," which always are so because they amount to an expropriation, and when in the presence of limitations where this circumstance does not concur.- In other terms, those that are possible are compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the Administration are compensable; that is, to the extent that these permitted acts cause–as it was stated–a special injury in the manner defined in Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, be it due to the small number of affected persons or due to the exceptional intensity of the injury (as this Chamber ruled in judgment #6419-93 of 10:21 hours on the 3rd of this month).- To maintain that the limitations on property permitted by Article 45 of the Constitution are not compensable is equivalent to totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right to property: what the Constitution does is make them possible exceptionally, because the rule is that they are not so by virtue of the inviolability of property; but from there to affirm that because they are possible none is compensable is equivalent to violating all the principles not only of the right to property, but of equity and justice, among them the principle of equality before public burdens (igualdad ante las cargas públicas), by virtue of which what is of interest to the community in general must be borne by the community, with all the members of the latter compensating, through the taxes they pay, anyone who suffers a prejudice both due to what positively interests the entire community and due to the misfortunes that must passively be borne by all.- By virtue of this same principle –equality before public burdens– collective advantages or misfortunes that prejudice everyone in general are not compensable, not because they are not, but because individualizing them is practically equivalent to leaving things as they are (for example, the case of taxes), since in those cases it involves a general harm, and there is then a true compensation of debits and credits.- It must be clear that, as has already been established on previous occasions, not all urban burdens are compensable, but only those that empty (sic) the content of the fundamental right in question, be it in its entirety or in one or some of its essential attributes, according to its nature: emptying the content of the right is not a reasonable limitation, but an absolute deprivation of it (see in this sense judgment #5097-93 of 10:24 hours on October 15 last)." Subsequently, along that same line of thought, in judgment 1993-06419 of 10:21 on December 3, 1993, the Chamber considered: "I).- Article 169 of the Political Constitution granted municipalities powers to administer local interests and services; and in development of that precept, Articles 15 of the Urban Planning Law and 4.4 of the Municipal Code, recognize the competence of local governments to direct urban planning within the limits of their territory, through the enactment and coercive imposition of a regulatory plan (plan regulador) and the respective urban development regulations, tending toward the full execution of the former.- By virtue of that local planning power, it is possible to impose restrictions on the exercise of one of the attributes of ownership, as long as–of course–these are reasonable and do not empty (sic) the content of the right to property or absolutely limit its essential attributes (See in this sense judgments N° 5305-93 of 10:06 hrs on October 22, 1993 and N° 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs on October 15, 1993).- For the case at hand, the Chamber considers that indeed, the decision of the officials of the Council and the Municipal Engineer of Montes de Oca, by which they ordered the petitioner, for the purposes of carrying out an expansion of her dwelling house, to set back two meters from the sidewalk line –a strip that will constitute a front garden (antejardín) in accordance with Article VI.3.8.1. of the Construction Regulations– without proceeding to the payment of the corresponding compensation, is contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution, as it is the imposition of an absolute limitation on the ius aedificandi over that portion of her property; and that this will remain in the hands of its owner, with her being responsible for maintaining that strip of land at her own expense, for the benefit of the orderliness and cleanliness of her community, but without being able to exercise that attribute, which besides being essential is inherent to ownership.- In the Chamber's opinion, such a situation is what removes from the owner the full ownership (sic) over that part of her property and which, therefore, is compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the administration are compensable, insofar as they cause a special injury in the manner defined, for example, by Article 194.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (due to the small number of affected persons or the exceptional intensity of the injury); to argue the contrary would imply totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right to property and, in addition, that of equality before public burdens, as an integral part of the principles of equality and equity, according to which it is the entire community that must compensate, through the taxes paid by all its members, anyone who suffers a prejudice, due to what is of interest to everyone, which in the present case happens to be the regulation of the urban development of the Canton of Montes de Oca." Finally, in vote 1993-05097, this Tribunal considered that if there is a burden that makes the right to property null and void, that burden is compensable: "IV) For the Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State can impose on private property, in accordance with its nature, are constitutionally possible as long as they do not empty its content. When that occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation and becomes a deprivation of the right itself. This is precisely what occurs in the case at hand, in which the petitioner can obtain no economic benefit from her property. Even, according to the evidence added to the file, the agricultural activity that the Regulatory Plan allows represents a serious risk to the health of the individuals who dedicate themselves to cultivating the land, since, as was reported, the noise (sic) coming from the airport is dangerous, due to the petitioner's land being located 125 meters from the center line of the runway. V) The Chamber makes no objection to the safety and health reasons that led to the establishment of a protection zone for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. Nevertheless, the limitations introduced for these reasons, insofar as they totally empty the attributes that the petitioner derives from her property and render it unusable, oblige the Chamber to grant the appeal based on strict liability of the Administration. Consequently, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport–to which the General Directorate of Civil Aviation belongs–must proceed to initiate, within a period of six months, from the adoption of the corresponding agreement, the expropriation proceedings." It is clear then, from what has been said up to now, that limits and limitations can be imposed to restrict the enjoyment of the right to property, in order to achieve and fulfill the social function that the profile of our model based on the social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) has conferred upon it. Nevertheless, it is a fact that these restrictions must be imposed within the parameters of necessity, suitability, reasonableness, and proportionality and, this is an evident consequence of what has been said so far, the interpretation of these must always be done tending toward the satisfaction of the social function and an enjoyment in accordance with the legal system of the right to property, which clearly imposes an interpretation in light of Constitutional Law and the "pro homine" and "pro libertate" principles, in order to inconvenience the owner as little as possible in the exercise of their right, because as we know, in matters of fundamental rights, when it is intended or will in fact cause a limitation on these, it is absolutely prohibited for the Administration to carry out an extensive interpretation of those rules that will in some way disturb the fundamental right that is sought to be exercised.

VII.Regarding the specific case. In this case, the first thing that must be clarified is that, regarding the permit requested by the appellant, the respondent Municipality cannot generically allege that the projects developed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the canton of Orotina aim to create minifundios, because this authority does not provide an empirical basis to corroborate that fact, and it is also used as almost the sole argument to deny the construction permit to the appellant, interpreting in an extensive manner and against Constitutional Law norms that restrict fundamental rights. We see that the respondent Municipality alleges that what is being attempted are disguised urban developments. Nevertheless, again this authority does not provide any element that would allow the Chamber to take that affirmation as true, which evidently makes it seem that it is nothing more than a mere supposition, furthermore unfounded, and that transforms or acquires the character of a restriction on private property and even more so on the appellant's right to housing, inasmuch as, despite having all the elements to achieve his housing solution, he is not given the authorization to proceed to build his dwelling house. From this point of view, the limitations that the Municipality of the canton of Orotina intends to impose for urban planning reasons, in this case attempt to stand as a total curtailment and an emptying of the petitioner's right to property and to decent housing. Thus, the respondent Municipality, for generic reasons and without a specific empirical reference, has impeded the appellant from proceeding to build his dwelling, with these arguments of the respondent entity being empty of specific content and without expressly indicating in what way he has violated urban planning or construction norms and that, for that reason, regarding his specific case, the construction permit must be denied. For these reasons, what the Municipality of the canton of Orotina argues lacks any support whatsoever, with the argument of that entity constituting a decision that does nothing more than empty of all content the right to property and to decent housing of the protected party, especially if we examine that he already possesses the elements to solve such deficiencies.

VIII.On the other hand, regarding what the respondent entity alleges, to the effect that the zone where the petitioner's parcel is located does not have the necessary infrastructure and likewise lacks basic services, it is clear that, based on the evidence gathered during the processing of the file, the place where he intends to build has the infrastructure and basic services (potable water and electricity) indispensable for leading a dignified life, which is recorded in the reports rendered under oath, with even the criminal consequences that this entails, Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which appear on folios 1027 and 107 of the file, making what was reported by the respondent authorities mere suppositions once again.

IX.It is clear, then, that the actions of the authorities have come to cause an impairment to the property right of the petitioner that equally violates the social function that the latter possesses, by imposing illegitimate limitations contrary to Constitutional Law; under this understanding, the amparo must be granted with respect to the Municipality of the canton of Orotina.

X.Now, concerning the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the Chamber must warn that it has the obligation to plan the execution of projects to provide agrarian property to the population, in order to avoid causing eventual harm to the beneficiaries, by delivering to them parcels that do not have the minimum conditions to develop land-use activities there, whether for productive or subsistence purposes. Nevertheless, in this case, it is not observed that this institution has any responsibility for the denial of the construction permits to the appellant.

XI.

Conclusion: As a conclusion of the foregoing, the granting of the amparo is warranted, ordering the respondent Municipality to proceed with issuing the construction permit in favor of the plaintiff.”

I.Purpose of the appeal. The appellant alleges that, despite owning a plot of land in the canton of Orotina, which he acquired from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and having obtained a housing voucher (bono de la vivienda) to be able to build his family home, the Municipality of the canton of Orotina denied him the construction permit, even though he met all the necessary requirements for such procedure. He considers that the conduct of the respondent entity is arbitrary and unjustified, as well as a violation of his fundamental rights. He considers that the Right of the Constitution has been undermined.

III.Regarding the fundamental right to decent housing. Article 65 of the Constitution, already mentioned, entrusts the State with promoting the construction of low-income housing (viviendas populares), while upon signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Costa Rica recognized the right of every person to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, which includes housing. This right, in addition to having its individual substratum, must be framed as derived from the conception of the State as a social State under the rule of law (Estado social de Derecho), attributing to this expression the meaning that was specified in judgment number 2000-05500 of 14:33 hours on July 5, 2000, according to which public authorities are obliged to make possible

"[…] the realization of material justice, among other means through positive actions (prestaciones positivas), restoring to a certain sector of the population the enjoyment of social and economic conditions appropriate for a dignified life, which in reality do not exist or are not available, a situation that may have derived, even indirectly, from the actions or economic policies developed by the State itself. That is, this type of actions cannot be simple gratifications without true support in a function of socioeconomic aid directed at population sectors or depressed communities or those in a disadvantaged situation, but rather the norm must constitute an authentic mechanism for the redistribution of wealth (in the terms of Article 50 of the Constitution) among those who suffer significant social disadvantages, for whom wealth is a reality from which they are excluded; a mechanism that may arise from very particular or specific circumstances in the face of a given social situation that the legislator is legitimated to assess. This is precisely the foundation underlying all legislation that creates social institutions, as well as legal institutions aimed at assisting those who find themselves in a particular condition that is significantly inferior to the rest of the economically active population, and to whom the State grants economic or other types of aid without receiving compensation in return, precisely because this is one of the functions of the State, as the superior entity responsible for ensuring conditions of free and dignified life, and for maintaining social peace as a value of the legal system that demands the creation of these living conditions for all, especially for the most disadvantaged in the distribution of the community's goods." Furthermore, through decision number 1992-01441 of 15:45 hours on June 2, 1992, the Chamber identified the bases of positive law for this postulate:

"The basic general principle of the Political Constitution is embodied in Article 50, by providing that 'the State shall seek the greatest well-being of all the country's inhabitants, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth,' which, together with the declaration of adherence of the Costa Rican State to the Christian principle of social justice, included in Article 74 ibid, determines the very essence of the political and social system we have chosen for our country, and which defines it as a social State under the rule of law.-" (see, in the same sense, resolution number 2002-05651 of 15:00 hours on June 12, 2002).

In short, through its jurisprudence, the Chamber has been responsible for giving specific content to a notion that could initially be qualified as merely ideological guidance, linking the social State under the rule of law, among others, to the right to enjoy a healthy environment (judgment number 1999-00644 of 11:24 hours on January 29, 1999), to the distribution of agrarian property (judgment number 2000-09119 of 15:14 hours on October 17, 2000), to the right of access to justice for those without resources to pay for legal assistance (judgment number 2001-05420 of 15:16 hours on June 20, 2001), and to social security (judgment number 7605-20001, of 14:32 hours on August 8, 2001).

V.Now then, the fundamental right to housing does not imply the right to claim, through the mechanisms for guaranteeing these rights, that an individual and immediate housing solution be provided, since the responsibility and decision to allocate a certain amount of public resources for that purpose and to distribute them in the most equitable and efficient manner possible is, first and foremost, political. However, within the context of the politically established programs for providing housing to people of limited resources, they can claim, as in this case, that their implementation be governed by parameters of equality and that there be consistency between the fixed objective of satisfying this fundamental right and the means arranged to achieve it. In the Costa Rican case, the legislator has selected various ways to comply with the constitutional mandate and that of International Human Rights Law to provide people with a dignified home when they cannot achieve it by themselves, among which is the attribution to a Ministry of the specific subject of housing and the creation of specialized public entities on the topic, such as the Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda or the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, the respondents here. Especially regarding the latter –which is blamed for the direct management of the challenged actions, in its capacity as an authorized financial entity of the Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda–, Articles 1 and 4 of its Creation Law stipulate that this autonomous institution was founded, among other purposes, to direct its activities with a view to obtaining greater economic and social well-being, securing for the Costa Rican family better housing and the corresponding related elements. It is also attributed with preferentially attending to the problem of the lowest-income classes of the community, both in cities and in the countryside. On the other hand, Article 5 confers upon it competence in the construction of hygienic housing, of an individual or collective type, accessible to families of limited economic resources, through collective and even individual programs, aimed at the planning of residential zones; the gradual elimination from urban areas of unhealthy or dangerous constructions and dwellings, through adequate reconstruction or readaptation plans, which it shall elaborate within the best safety standards for its investments, taking into account the social aspect that the problem presents.

VI.Regarding the right to property and its social function: It is clear that current Political Constitutions –and ours does not escape this reality– deal with the protection or guarantee of Human Rights, and within these rights, the right to property has been considered to be included. Our current Constitution does not define the right to property; this definition is transferred to a legal concept that we can find in the Civil Code, but property remains as an idea of constitutional rank. Now then, within Civil Law, “property” is known by the term ownership (dominio) and consists, in the strict sense, of the most complete form of right of dominion over a thing, and its purpose is for its holder to be able to make use of the object of that legal relationship to the greatest possible extent. Thus, a direct, immediate, and exclusive power is granted. Property, as a real right (derecho real), has the virtue of granting full dominion over a thing and consists of the power to submit it to our will in all its aspects, thereby granting the holder of this right the power to obtain from a thing all the utility it can provide. However, from the content of numeral 45 in harmony with 50, both of the Political Constitution, we obtain what Constitutional Jurisprudence, in solid and reiterated jurisprudence, has understood as the social function of property; this seeks to harmonize the interests of the individual against the interests of the community, imposing on the owner the obligation to fulfill the social function. The aim, then, is to incentivize production in accordance with the technical levels existing at a given moment and simultaneously to ensure that the owner does not infringe the laws. This is achieved through the imposition of boundaries (límites), limitations (limitaciones), and duties on the owner, for example, by demanding that the exercise of the property right be carried out within certain canons of safety, health, and environmental protection. That is, property is conceived as a power-duty; the right can be exercised, but at the same time, certain obligations must be fulfilled. Therefore, the right to property, like any other subjective right, grants powers, but these are given within certain boundaries. It is widely recognized in doctrine that any system contains the implicit –or even explicit– prohibition of making bad use of, or abusing, a subjective right. Now, the social function of property not only imposes burdens on the owner, but also on the State, which must promote access to productive goods for all those persons who lack productive means or have them insufficiently, such that even having them, they cannot perform productive work. This would then involve a just, equitable, adequate, and reasonable distribution of property, but of productive property that yields fruits. Now then, we must pause for a moment at this point and reiterate, as stated in Considerando IV.- of this judgment, that the effective realization of such a function depends on the socioeconomic political structuring and execution of the Government at a given historical moment.

Continuing with the foregoing, to achieve that ultimate purpose, the State is in the position to establish restrictions on property, which are basically structured through boundaries and limitations imposed in accordance with the legal system. Thus, boundaries shall be understood, in the strict sense, as the behavior that the owner must follow by law. They are those actions that the owner can deploy within the normal content of the right he holds, and they will always depend on the nature of the property in question. Now then, when speaking of “Law” here, we do so understanding it in the formal and material sense (Article 45 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 266 in fine of the Civil Code), which, according to the vast jurisprudence of this Court, must necessarily be approved by a qualified majority. In this regard, in judgment 1990-00546 of 14:30 hours on May 22, 1990, it was considered:

"[...]

V.The thesis outlined by the Procuraduría General de la República, that it must be presumed that the legislative approval of rules imposing limitations on property occurred (sic) with the majority required by the Political Constitution, is not acceptable, because in this case it is expressly recorded in the legislative record that the law was not approved with the number of votes required by the Constitution, so the infraction of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution is evident. This involves, in the case at hand, not only a formal requirement, but the requirement of an express will of a qualified majority for the imposition of limitations on the cited right. In the Chamber's opinion, the qualified majority that the Constitution requires to impose limitations on the right to property cannot be presumed; on the contrary, it must be expressly stated in the approval acts of the law. [...]"

In accordance with this, it is evident that the boundary is not created for a specific property, since, because a law exists, it is of general application.

We have, on the other hand, a distinct form of restriction on the right to property, which are limitations, which must be created for a specific property through legal transactions, must be registered in the Public Registry (Article 268 in relation to 266 and 292, all of the Civil Code), and are eminently temporary in character.

Continuing with the line of reasoning in which this judgment has been developed, it is evident that what is intended through boundaries and limitations on property is to fulfill its social function, imposing some restrictions on the owner in his enjoyment and exercise. In other words, both –boundaries and limitations– impose some few inconveniences on the owner for the sake of satisfying the community, the common good, and the social function of property. However, it can never be interpreted that what they seek is to empty or strip a person of his fundamental right to property and its consequent attributes; to understand what has been set forth thus far in this way would not only be erroneous, but contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution; it would be, in a word, a contradiction.

The same Chamber has understood that neither limits nor limitations can have the virtue of emptying the essential content, the basic core of property; in this sense, in vote 1993-06706 of 3:21 p.m. on December 21, 1993, the Chamber held:

"B) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 22 OF LAW #4240 V).- Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law is also challenged, which literally provides:

«Article 22.- None of the limitations on property that this law establishes, as charges or easements (servidumbres) of the urban regime that they are, require registration in the Public Registry, nor shall they give rise to any compensation (indemnización), except in those cases expressly provided for by this law.» .- This norm is openly unconstitutional, for being contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The exemption from liability that it establishes inverts the terms in which the right of property and its limitations are conceived.- The Chamber considers that the limitations established by the Urban Planning Law are indeed compensable (indemnizables), of course to the extent of the seriousness or the extent of the injury; and this applies both when dealing with "impossible limitations" which always are so because they amount to an expropriation, as when in the presence of limitations where this circumstance does not concur.- In other terms, those that are possible are compensable (indemnizables), to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the Administration are; that is, to the extent that those permitted acts cause—as has been said—a special injury in the manner defined by Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, whether by the small number of those affected or by the exceptional intensity of the injury (thus this Chamber pronounced in judgment #6419-93 of 10:21 a.m. on the 3rd of this month).- To maintain that the limitations on property permitted by Article 45 of the Constitution are not compensable (indemnizables) is equivalent to totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right of property: what the Constitution does is make them exceptionally possible, because the rule is that they are not by virtue of the inviolability of property; but from there to affirm that because they are possible none is compensable (indemnizable) is equivalent to violating all the principles not only of the right of property, but of equity and justice, among them the principle of equality before public burdens, by virtue of which what interests the community in general is what the community must bear, compensating all its members, through the taxes they pay, to whoever suffers a prejudice both by reason of what positively interests the entire community and of the misfortunes that must be passively borne by all.- By virtue of this same principle—equality before public burdens—collective advantages or misfortunes that harm everyone in general are not compensable (indemnizables), but not because they are not so, but because individualizing them is practically equivalent to leaving things as they are (for example, the case of taxes), since in those cases it is a matter of general harm, and what exists then is a true compensation of debits and credits.- It must be clear that, as has already been established on previous occasions, not all urban charges are compensable (indemnizables), but only those that empty (vacien) (sic) the content of the fundamental right in question, whether in its entirety or in one or some of its essential attributes, according to its nature: emptying the content of the right is not a reasonable limitation, but an absolute deprivation of it (see in this sense judgment #5097-93 of 10:24 a.m. on October 15 last)." Subsequently, along the same line of thought, in judgment 1993-06419 of 10:21 on December 3, 1993, the Chamber considered:

"I).- Article 169 of the Political Constitution granted municipalities powers to administer local interests and services; and in development of that precept, Article 15 of the Urban Planning Law and Article 4.4 of the Municipal Code recognize the competence of local governments to direct urban planning within the limits of their territory, through the enactment and coercive imposition of a regulatory plan (plan regulador) and the respective urban development regulations, aimed at the full execution of the former.- By virtue of that power of local planning, it is possible to impose restrictions on the exercise of one of the attributes of ownership (dominio), insofar as—of course—these are reasonable and do not empty (vacien) (sic) the content of the right of property or absolutely limit its essential attributes (See in this sense judgments No. 5305-93 of 10:06 hrs on October 22, 1993 and No. 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs on October 15, 1993).- For the case at hand, the Chamber considers that indeed, the decision of the officials of the Council and the Municipal Engineer of Montes de Oca, by which they ordered the petitioner, for the purposes of carrying out an expansion of her dwelling house, to set back two meters from the sidewalk line—a strip that will constitute a front garden (antejardín) in accordance with Article VI.3.8.1. of the Construction Regulations—without proceeding to the payment of the corresponding compensation, is contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution, since it is a matter of imposing an absolute limitation on the ius aedificandi over that portion of her property; and that this will continue in the hands of its owner, who must maintain that strip of land at her own expense, for the benefit of the ornament and cleanliness of her community, but without being able to exercise that attribute, which besides being essential is inherent to ownership (dominio).- In the Chamber's opinion, such a situation is what removes from the owner full ownership (dominiio) (sic) over that part of her property and therefore, is compensable (indemnizable), to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the administration are, insofar as they cause a special injury in the manner defined, for example, by Article 194.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (by the small number of those affected or by the exceptional intensity of the injury); the contrary would imply totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right of property and, furthermore, that of equality before public burdens, as part of the principles of equality and equity, according to which it is the entire community that must compensate, through the taxes paid by all its members, whoever suffers a prejudice, by reason of what interests everyone, which in the present case is the ordering of the urban development of the Canton of Montes de Oca." Finally, in vote 1993-05097, this Court considered that if there is a charge that makes the right of property nugatory, that charge is compensable (indemnizable):

"IV) For the Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State may impose on private property, in accordance with its nature, are constitutionally possible insofar as they do not empty its content. When that occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation and becomes a deprivation of the right itself. This is precisely what occurs in the case at hand, in which the petitioner can obtain no economic benefit from her property. Even, according to the elements of conviction added to the file, the agricultural activity permitted by the Regulatory Plan represents a serious risk to the health of persons engaged in cultivating the land, since, as was reported, the noise (ruído) (sic) from the airport is dangerous, due to the petitioner's land being located 125 meters from the runway centerline.

• V)The Chamber makes no objection to the safety and health reasons that led to the establishment of a protection zone for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. However, the limitations introduced for these reasons, insofar as they totally empty the attributes that the petitioner derives from her property and render it unusable, oblige the Chamber to grant the remedy based on the objective liability of the Administration. Consequently, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport—to which the General Directorate of Civil Aviation belongs—shall proceed to initiate, within a period of six months from the adoption of the corresponding agreement, the expropriation proceedings." It is clear then, from what has been said so far, that limits and limitations can be imposed to restrict the enjoyment of the right of property, in order to achieve and fulfill the social function that the profile of our model based on the Social State of Law has granted to it. However, it is certain that these restrictions must be imposed within the parameters of necessity, suitability, reasonableness (razonabilidad), and proportionality and, this is an evident consequence of what has been said so far, their interpretation must always be done tending to the satisfaction of the social function and of an enjoyment in accordance with the ordering of the right of property, which clearly imposes an interpretation in light of the Law of the Constitution and of the principles "pro homine" and "pro libertate", in order to inconvenience the owner as little as possible in the exercise of his right, since as we know, in matters of fundamental rights, when it is intended to or will in fact cause a limitation to them, it is absolutely prohibited for the Administration to carry out an extensive interpretation of those norms that will in some way disturb the fundamental right that is sought to be exercised.

VII.Regarding the specific case. In this case, the first thing that must be clarified is that, in response to the permit requested by the petitioner, the respondent Municipality cannot generically allege that the projects developed by the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, INDER) in the canton of Orotina seek to create minifundios, since that authority does not provide an empirical substrate that allows corroborating that fact, and it is also used as almost the sole argument to deny the construction permit to the petitioner, interpreting norms that restrict fundamental rights extensively and against the Law of the Constitution. We see that the respondent Municipality alleges that what is being attempted are concealed Urban Developments. However, once again that authority does not provide any element that would allow the Chamber to take that assertion as true, which evidently makes it appear that it is nothing more than a mere supposition, otherwise unfounded, and that transforms or acquires the character of a restriction on private property and, even more so, on the petitioner's right to housing, insofar as, despite having all the elements to achieve his housing solution, he is not given the authorization to proceed to build his dwelling house. From that point of view, the limitations that for urban planning reasons the Municipality of the canton of Orotina seeks to impose, in this case attempt to erect themselves as a total curtailment and an emptying of the right to property and to dignified housing of the plaintiff. Thus, the respondent Municipality, for generic reasons and without a concrete empirical reference, has prevented the petitioner from proceeding to build his dwelling, those arguments of the respondent entity being empty of determined content and without expressly indicating in what way he has violated the urban planning or construction norms and for what reason, in light of his specific case, the construction permit must be denied. For these reasons, what has been argued by the Municipality of the canton of Orotina lacks any support whatsoever, the allegations made by that entity constituting a decision that does nothing more than empty of all content the right to property and to access to dignified housing of the protected party, especially if we examine that she already possesses the elements to resolve such deficiencies.

VIII.On the other hand, regarding what has been alleged by the respondent entity, to the effect that the zone where the petitioner's parcel is located does not have the necessary infrastructure and likewise that it does not have basic services, it is clear that, from the evidence gathered during the instruction of the file, the place where he intends to build has the infrastructure and basic services (drinking water and electricity) indispensable for leading a dignified life, which is stated in the reports rendered under oath, with the even criminal consequences that this entails, Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which appear at folios 1027 and 107 of the file, what was reported by the respondent authorities once again becoming mere suppositions.

IX.It is clear, then, that the action of the authorities has resulted in an impairment of the right to property of the plaintiff that likewise violates the social function that it possesses, by imposing illegitimate limitations contrary to the Law of the Constitution; under that understanding, the amparo must be granted with regard to the Municipality of the canton of Orotina.

X.Now, with regard to the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, INDER), the Chamber must note that it has the obligation to plan the execution of projects to provide agrarian property to the population, in order not to cause potential harm to the beneficiaries, by delivering parcels that do not have the minimum conditions to develop land exploitation activities there, whether productively or for subsistence.

However, in this case it is not apparent that this institution bears any responsibility for the denial of the construction permits to the appellant.

XI.Conclusion: As a conclusion of the foregoing, the granting of the amparo is required, ordering the respondent Municipality to proceed with issuing the construction permit in favor of the plaintiff.”

On the other hand, Article 5 grants it competence in the construction of hygienic housing, of an individual or collective type, within reach of families with scarce economic resources, based on collective and even individual programs, aimed at the planning of housing zones; the gradual elimination from urban areas of unhealthy or dangerous constructions and housing, through adequate plans for their reconstruction or rehabilitation, which it shall elaborate within the best safety standards for its investments, taking into account the social aspect that the problem presents.

**VI. On the right to property and its social function:** It is clear that current Political Constitutions—and ours does not escape this reality—deal with the protection or guarantee of Human Rights, and within these rights, the right to property has been considered to be included. Our current Constitution does not define the right to property; this definition is transferred to a legal concept that we can find in the Civil Code, but property remains as an idea of constitutional rank. Now, within Civil Law, “property” is known by the term ownership (*dominio*) and consists, in a strict sense, of the most complete form of right of lordship over a thing, and its purpose consists of its holder being able to make use of the thing that is the object of that legal relationship to the greatest extent possible. Thus, a direct, immediate, and exclusive power is granted. Property, as a right *in rem*, has the virtue of granting full lordship over a thing and consists of the power to subject it to our will in all its aspects, thus granting the holder of this right the power to obtain from a thing all the utility it can provide. However, from the content of numeral 45 in harmony with 50, both of the Political Constitution, we obtain what the Constitutional Jurisprudence, in a solid and reiterated jurisprudence, has understood as the social function of property; this seeks to harmonize the interests of the individual against the interests of the community, imposing on the owner the obligation to fulfill the social function. It is sought then to incentivize production in accordance with the technical levels existing at a given moment and, at the same time, seeking that the laws are not infringed by the owner. This is achieved through the imposition of limits, limitations, and duties on the owner, for example, by requiring that the exercise of the right to property be carried out within certain canons of safety, health, and environmental protection. That is to say, property is conceived as a power-duty; the right can be exercised, but at the same time, certain obligations must be fulfilled. Therefore, the right to property, like any other subjective right, attributes faculties, but these occur within certain limits. It is more than recognized in doctrine that any system contains, implicitly—or even explicitly—the prohibition of making bad use of or abusing a subjective right. Now, the social function of property not only imposes burdens on the owner, but also on the State, which must promote access to productive assets for all those persons who lack productive means or have them insufficiently, such that even having them, they cannot carry out productive work. This would then involve a just, equitable, adequate, and reasonable distribution of property, but of a productive property, which yields fruits. Now, we must pause for a moment at this point and reiterate, as stated in Considerando IV of this judgment, that the effective realization of such a function depends on the structuring and execution of the Government's socioeconomic policies at a given historical moment.

Continuing with the above, to achieve that ultimate purpose, the State is in the position to establish restrictions on property which are, basically, structured through limits and limitations imposed in accordance with the legal system. Thus, we shall understand limits, in a strict sense, as the behavior that by law the owner must follow. They are those conducts that the owner may deploy within the normal content of the right they possess, and they will always depend on the nature of the asset in question. Now, when speaking of “Law” here, we do so understanding it in a formal and material sense (article 45 *in fine* of the Political Constitution and article 266 *in fine* Civil Code), which, according to the vast jurisprudence of this Court, must necessarily be approved by a qualified majority. In this regard, in judgment 1990-00546 of 14:30 hours on May 22, 1990, it was considered:

“[...]

*V. The thesis outlined by the Attorney General's Office, that it must be presumed that the legislative approval of norms imposing limitations on property was given (sic) with the majority required by the Political Constitution, is not acceptable, since in this case it is expressly recorded in the legislative file that the law was not approved with the number of votes required by the Constitution, so the infringement of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution is evident. In this case, it is not only a formal requirement, but the requirement of an express will of a qualified majority for the imposition of limitations on the cited right. In the opinion of the Chamber, the qualified majority that the Constitution requires to impose limitations on the right to property cannot be presumed; on the contrary, it must be expressly recorded in the minutes of the law's approval.* [...]” According to this, it is evident that the limit is not created for a specific asset, since, by virtue of a law existing, it is of general application.

We have, on the other hand, a different form of restriction on the right to property, such as limitations, which must be created for a specific asset through legal transactions, must be registered in the Public Registry (article 268 in relation to 266 and 292, all of the Civil Code), and have an eminently temporary character.

Continuing with the logical order in which this judgment has been developed, it is evident that what is intended through the limits and limitations on property is to fulfill its social function, imposing some restrictions on the owner in their enjoyment and exercise. In other words, both—limits and limitations—impose some few discomforts on the owner for the sake of satisfying the community, the common good, and the social function of property. However, it can never be interpreted that what they seek is to empty or deprive a person of their fundamental right to property and its consequent attributes; understanding what has been set forth so far in this way would not only be erroneous, but contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution; it would be, in a word, a contradiction. The Chamber itself has understood that neither limits nor limitations can have the virtue of emptying the essential content, the basic core of property; in this sense, in vote 1993-06706 of 15:21 hours on December 21, 1993, the Chamber estimated:

“***B) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 22 OF LAW #4240*** ***V).-*** *Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law is also challenged, which literally provides:* *«Article 22.- None of the limitations on property that this law establishes, as charges or easements of the urban regime that they are, require registration in the Public Registry, nor shall they give rise to any compensation, except in those cases where this law expressly provides for it.».-* *This norm is openly unconstitutional, being contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The exemption from liability it establishes inverts the terms in which the right to property and its limitations are conceived.- The Chamber estimates that the limitations established by the Urban Planning Law are indeed compensable, of course, to the extent of the gravity or extension of the injury; and this is so both when dealing with "impossible limitations," which always are so because they equate to an expropriation, and when in the presence of limitations where this circumstance does not concur.- In other terms, those that are possible are compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the Administration are compensable; that is, to the extent that these permitted acts cause—as stated—a special injury in the manner defined by Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, whether due to the small number of affected persons or the exceptional intensity of the injury (as this Chamber pronounced in judgment #6419-93 of 10:21 hours on the 3rd of this month).- To maintain that the limitations on property permitted by Article 45 of the Constitution are not compensable equates to totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right to property: what the Constitution does is to make them exceptionally possible, because the rule is that they are not so by virtue of the inviolability of property; but from there to state that because they are possible, none are compensable equates to violating all the principles, not only of the right to property, but of equity and justice, among them the principle of equality before public burdens, by virtue of which what interests the community in general must be borne by the community, indemnifying all the members of the community, through the taxes they pay, the one who suffers a prejudice, whether due to what interests the whole community positively, or due to misfortunes, which passively must be borne by all. By virtue of this same principle—equality before public burdens—the collective advantages or misfortunes that prejudice everyone in general are not compensable, but not because they are not so, but because individualizing them practically equates to leaving things as they are (for example, the case of taxes), since in those cases it involves a general damage, and there is then a true compensation of debits and credits.- It should be clear that, as already established on previous occasions, not all urbanistic charges are compensable, but only those that empty (sic) the content of the fundamental right in question, whether in its totality or in one or some of its essential attributes, according to its nature: emptying the content of the right is not a reasonable limitation, but an absolute deprivation of it (see in this sense judgment #5097-93 of 10:24 hours on October 15 last).*” Subsequently, along the same line of thought, in judgment 1993-06419 of 10:21 on December 3, 1993, the Chamber considered:

“***I).-*** *Article 169 of the Political Constitution granted municipalities powers to administer local interests and services; and in development of that precept, Articles 15 of the Urban Planning Law and 4.4 of the Municipal Code recognize the competence of local governments to direct urban planning within the limits of their territory, through the enactment and coercive imposition of a regulatory plan and the respective urban development regulations, aimed at the full execution of the former.- By virtue of that local planning power, it becomes possible to impose restrictions on the exercise of one of the attributes of ownership, as long as—it is clear—these are reasonable and do not empty (sic) the content of the right to property or absolutely limit its essential attributes (See in this sense judgments N° 5305-93 of 10:06 hrs on October 22, 1993 and N° 5097-93 of 10:24 hrs on October 15, 1993).- For the case at hand, the Chamber estimates that, indeed, the decision of the officials of the Council and the Municipal Engineer of Montes de Oca, by which they ordered the plaintiff, for the purposes of carrying out an extension of her dwelling house, to set back two meters from the sidewalk line—a strip that will constitute a front garden in accordance with article VI.3.8.1. of the Construction Regulations—without proceeding with the payment of the corresponding compensation, is contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution, because it involves the imposition of an absolute limitation on the ius aedificandi over that portion of her property; and that this will continue in the hands of its owner, who will be responsible for maintaining that strip of land at her own expense, for the benefit of the ornament and cleanliness of her community, but without being able to exercise that attribute, which besides being essential, is inherent to ownership.- In the Chamber's criterion, such a situation is what removes from the owner the full ownership over that part of her property and that therefore, it is compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the administration are, insofar as they cause a special injury in the manner in which they are defined, for example, by Article 194.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (due to the small number of affected persons or the exceptional intensity of the injury); the contrary would imply totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right to property and, moreover, that of equality before public burdens, as an integral part of the principles of equality and equity, according to which it is the entire community that must indemnify, through the taxes paid by all its members, the one who suffers a prejudice, due to something that interests everyone, which in the present case turns out to be the regulation of the urban development of the Canton of Montes de Oca.*” Finally, in vote 1993-05097, this Tribunal estimated that if a charge exists that nullifies the right to property, that charge is compensable:

“***IV*** ***)*** *For the Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State can impose on private property, according to its nature, are constitutionally possible as long as they do not empty its content. When that occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation and becomes a deprivation of the right itself. This is precisely what occurs in the case at hand, in which the plaintiff can obtain no economic benefit from her property. Even, according to the elements of conviction included in the file, the agricultural activity that the Regulatory Plan allows represents a serious risk to the health of the persons dedicated to cultivating the land, since, as it was reported, the noise coming from the airport is dangerous, because the plaintiff's land is located 125 meters from the runway centerline.* ***V)** *The Chamber makes no objection to the safety and health reasons that led to the establishment of a protection zone for the Juan Santamaría International Airport. However, the limitations introduced for these reasons, insofar as they totally empty the attributes that the plaintiff derives from her property and render it unusable, oblige the Chamber to grant the appeal for objective liability of the Administration. Consequently, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport—to which the General Directorate of Civil Aviation belongs—shall proceed to initiate, within the term of six months, starting from the adoption of the corresponding agreement, the expropriation procedures.*” It is clear then, from what has been said so far, that limits and limitations can be imposed to restrict the enjoyment of the right to property, for the sake of achieving and fulfilling the social function that our model based on the Social Rule of Law has conferred upon it. However, it is certain that these restrictions must be imposed within the parameters of necessity, suitability, reasonableness, and proportionality, and this is an evident consequence of what has been said so far: the interpretation of these must always be done tending towards the satisfaction of the social function and enjoyment in accordance with the legal system of the right to property, which clearly imposes an interpretation in light of the Law of the Constitution and the principles “*pro homine*” and “*pro libertate*”, for the sake of inconveniencing the owner as little as possible in the exercise of their right, because as we know, in matters of fundamental rights, when it is intended or will in fact cause a limitation to these, the Administration is absolutely prohibited from performing an extensive interpretation of those norms that will in some way disturb the fundamental right intended to be exercised.

**VII. On the specific case.** In this case, the first thing that must be clarified is that, regarding the permit requested by the appellant, the respondent Municipality cannot generically allege that the projects developed by the Agrarian Development Institute in the canton of Orotina aim to create minifundios, since that authority does not provide an empirical substrate to corroborate that information, and it is also used as almost the sole argument to deny the construction permit to the appellant, interpreting norms that restrict fundamental rights in an extensive manner and contrary to the Law of the Constitution. We see that the respondent Municipality alleges that what is being attempted are disguised Urbanistic developments. However, once again, that authority does not provide any element allowing the Chamber to consider that affirmation as true, which evidently makes it appear to be nothing more than a mere, moreover unfounded, supposition, and which becomes or acquires the character of a restriction on private property and, even more so, on the appellant's right to housing, insofar as, despite having all the elements to achieve his housing solution, he is not given the authorization to proceed to build his dwelling house. From that point of view, the limitations that the Municipality of the canton of Orotina seeks to impose for urbanistic reasons, in this case, attempt to be erected as a total curtailment and an emptying of the plaintiff's right to property and to decent housing. Thus, the respondent Municipality, for generic reasons and without a concrete empirical reference, has prevented the appellant from proceeding to build his housing, with those arguments from the respondent entity being empty of determined content and without expressly indicating in what manner he has violated the urban planning or construction norms and for which reason, in his specific case, the construction permit must be denied. For these reasons, what is argued by the Municipality of the canton of Orotina lacks any support whatsoever, constituting what is alleged by that entity into a decision that does nothing but empty of all content the protected person's right to property and access to decent housing, especially if we examine that she already possesses the elements to solve such deficiencies.

**VIII.** On the other hand, regarding what is alleged by the respondent entity, in the sense that the zone where the petitioner's parcel is located lacks the necessary infrastructure and equally lacks basic services, it is clear, from the evidence gathered during the processing of the case file, that the place where he intends to build has the infrastructure and basic services (potable water and electricity) indispensable to lead a decent life, which is recorded in the reports rendered under oath, with the even criminal consequences that entails, Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which appear on folios 1027 and 107 of the file, rendering what was reported by the respondent authorities once again mere suppositions.

**IX.** It is clear, then, that the actions of the authorities have brought about an impairment of the plaintiff's right to property that equally violates the social function it possesses, by imposing illegitimate limitations contrary to the Law of the Constitution. Under that understanding, the amparo must be granted with respect to the Municipality of the canton of Orotina.

**X.** Now, with respect to the Agrarian Development Institute, the Chamber must warn that it has the obligation to plan the execution of the projects to provide agrarian property to the population, for the sake of not causing eventual harm to the beneficiaries, delivering to them parcels that lack the minimum conditions to develop land exploitation activities there, whether in a productive or subsistence form. However, in this case, it is not observed that this institution bears any responsibility for the denial of the construction permits to the appellant.

**XI. Conclusion:** As a conclusion to the foregoing, the granting of the amparo is imposed, ordering the respondent Municipality to proceed to issue the construction permit in favor of the plaintiff.”

“ l.Objeto del recurso. El recurrente alega que, a pesar de contar con un terreno en el cantón de Orotina, el cual adquirió del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, y de haber obtenido un bono de la vivienda para poder construir su casa de habitación, la Municipalidad del cantón de Orotina le denegó el permiso de construcción, aun cuando cumplía todos los requisitos necesarios para tal trámite. Estima que la conducta del ente recurrido resulta arbitraria e injustificada, además de violatoria de sus derechos fundamentales. Considera que se ha menoscabado el Derecho de la Constitución.

III.Sobre el derecho fundamental a una vivienda digna. El artículo 65 de la Constitución, ya mencionado, encarga al Estado promover la construcción de viviendas populares, mientras que al suscribir el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Costa Rica reconoció el derecho de toda persona a un nivel de vida adecuado para sí y su familia, lo que incluye la vivienda. Este derecho, además de tener su sustrato individual, debe enmarcarse como derivado de la concepción del Estado como Estado social de Derecho, atribuyendo a esta expresión el significado que se especificó en la sentencia número 2000-05500 de las 14:33 horas del 5 de julio del 2000, según el cual las autoridades públicas están obligadas a hacer posible

“[…] la realización de la justicia material, entre otras vías mediante prestaciones positivas, restituyendo a determinado sector de la población el goce de condiciones sociales y económicas apropiadas para una vida digna, que en la realidad no existen o con las que no se cuenta, situación esta última que ha podido derivar, incluso de modo indirecto, de la actuación o política económica desarrollada por el propio Estado. Es decir, esta clase de prestaciones no pueden ser simples gratificaciones sin verdadero sustento en una función de auxilio socioeconómico dirigida a sectores de población o a comunidades deprimidas o que se hallan en una situación de desventaja, sino que la norma debe constituir un mecanismo auténtico de redistribución de la riqueza (en los términos del artículo 50 constitucional) entre aquellos que sufren desventajas sociales significativas, para quienes la riqueza es una realidad de la que están excluidos; mecanismo que puede surgir de circunstancias muy particulares o específicas frente a determinada situación social que el legislador está legitimado para valorar. Precisamente este es el fundamento que posee toda la legislación que crea instituciones de carácter social, así como los institutos jurídicos tendientes a socorrer a quienes se encuentran en una determinada condición sensiblemente inferior al resto de la población económicamente activa, y a los que el Estado concede una ayuda económica o de otro tipo sin recibir una contraprestación por ello, justamente porque es ésta una de las funciones del Estado, como ente superior encargado de procurar condiciones de vida libre y digna, y de mantener la paz social como valor del ordenamiento que exige la creación de esas condiciones de vida para todos, especialmente para los más desfavorecidos en el reparto de los bienes de la colectividad.” Además, mediante decisión número 1992-01441 de las 15:45 horas del 2 de junio de 1992, la Sala identificó las bases de derecho positivo de tal postulado:

“El principio general básico de la Constitución Política está plasmado en el artículo 50, al disponer que «el Estado procurará el mayor bienestar de todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza», lo que unido a la declaración de adhesión del Estado costarricense al principio cristiano de justicia social, incluido en el artículo 74 ibídem, determina la esencia misma del sistema político y social que hemos escogido para nuestro país, y que lo definen como un Estado social de Derecho.-” (ver en el mismo sentido la resolución número 2002-05651 de las 15:00 horas del 12 de junio del 2002).

En fin, a través de su jurisprudencia, la Sala se ha encargado de dar contenidos específicos a una noción que podría inicialmente calificarse como de tan solo orientación ideológica, vinculando el Estado social de Derecho, entre otros, al derecho de disfrutar de un medio ambiente sano (sentencia número 1999-00644 de las 11:24 horas del 29 de enero de 1999), a la distribución de la propiedad agraria (sentencia número 2000-09119 de las 15:14 horas del 17 de octubre del 2000), al derecho al acceso a la justicia para quienes no tienen recursos para pagar asistencia letrada (sentencia número 2001-05420 de las 15:16 horas del 20 de junio del 2001) y a la seguridad social (sentencia número 7605-20001, de las 14:32 horas del 8 de agosto de 2001).

V.Ahora bien, el derecho fundamental a la vivienda no implica el de reclamar, por los mecanismos de garantía de estos derechos, que se suministre una solución habitacional individual e inmediata, ya que la responsabilidad y decisión de destinar una determinada cantidad de recursos públicos a ese fin y de distribuirlos de la manera más equitativa y eficiente posible es, primero que nada, política. Eso sí, dentro del contexto de los programas políticamente establecidos de provisión de vivienda a las personas de escasos recursos, ellas pueden reclamar, como en este caso, que su implementación se rija por parámetros de igualdad y que exista consecuencia entre el objetivo fijado de satisfacer este derecho fundamental y los medios dispuestos para alcanzarlo. En el caso costarricense, el legislador ha seleccionado diversas formas para dar cumplimiento al mandato constitucional y del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos de proveer a las personas de hogar digno, cuando por ellas mismas no puedan lograrlo, entre los que se encuentra la atribución a un Ministerio de la materia concreta de vivienda y la creación de entes públicos especializados en el tema, como son el Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda o el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, aquí recurridos. Sobre todo en cuanto a este último –a quien se achaca la gestión directa de las actuaciones impugnadas, en su condición de ente financiero autorizado del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda-, los artículos 1º y 4º de su Ley de Creación estipulan que esa institución autónoma se fundó, entre otros fines, para orientar sus actividades con miras a obtener un mayor bienestar económico y social, procurando a la familia costarricense una mejor habitación y los elementos conexos correspondientes. Se le atribuye también atender, de manera preferente, el problema de las clases de más bajos recursos de la colectividad, tanto en las ciudades como en el campo. Por otra parte, el artículo 5º le confiere competencia en la construcción de viviendas higiénicas, de tipo individual o colectivo, al alcance de familias de escasos recursos económicos, a partir de programas de conjunto y aun individuales, que tiendan al ordenamiento de las zonas de vivienda; la eliminación gradual de las áreas urbanas de las construcciones y viviendas insalubres o peligrosas, mediante planes adecuados de reconstrucción o de readaptación de la mismas, que elaborará dentro de las mejores normas de seguridad para sus inversiones, tomando en cuenta el aspecto social que el problema presente.

VI.Sobre el derecho de propiedad y la función social de ésta: Es claro que las Constituciones Políticas actuales -y la nuestra no escapa a esta realidad- se ocupan de la protección o garantía de los Derechos Humanos y dentro de estos derechos se ha considerado que se encuentra el derecho de propiedad. Nuestra actual Constitución no define el derecho de propiedad, se traslada esta definición a un concepto legal que podemos encontrar en el Código Civil, pero sí permanece la propiedad como una idea de rango constitucional. Ahora bien, dentro del Derecho Civil a la “propiedad” se le conoce con el término de dominio y consiste en sentido estricto en la forma más completa de derecho de señorío sobre una cosa y su finalidad consiste en que su titular pueda aprovechar en la mayor medida posible la cosa objeto de esa relación jurídica. Así se otorga un poder directo, inmediato y exclusivo. La propiedad, como derecho real tiene la virtud de otorgar el señorío pleno sobre una cosa y consiste en el poder de someterla a nuestra voluntad en todos sus aspectos otorgándosele así al titular de este derecho el poder obtener de una cosa toda la utilidad que pueda prestar. Sin embargo, por el contenido del numeral 45 en armonía junto con el 50, ambos de la Constitución Política, obtenemos lo que la Jurisprudencia Constitucional, en una sólida y reiterada jurisprudencia ha entendido como la función social de la propiedad, ésta pretende armonizar los intereses del individuo frente a los intereses de la colectividad, imponiéndole al propietario la obligación de cumplir con la función social. Se pretende entonces incentivar la producción de acuerdo con los niveles técnicos existentes en un momento determinado y buscando al mismo tiempo que no se infrinjan las leyes por parte del propietario. Esto se logra a través de la imposición de límites, limitaciones y deberes a cargo del propietario, por ejemplo exigiendo que el ejercicio del derecho de propiedad se lleve a cabo dentro de determinados cánones de seguridad, salubridad y protección del entorno. Es decir, la propiedad se concibe como un poder-deber, se puede ejercer el derecho, pero al mismo tiempo se debe cumplir ciertas obligaciones. Entonces, el derecho de propiedad, como cualquier otro derecho subjetivo, atribuye facultades, pero éstas se dan dentro de ciertos límites. Es más que reconocido en doctrina que cualquier sistema contiene de manera implícita -o incluso subjetivo. Ahora, la función social de la propiedad no sólo impone cargas al propietario, sino también al Estado que debe promover el acceso a los bienes productivos, a todas aquellas personas que carecen de medios productivos o los tienen de forma insuficiente, de tal forma que aún teniéndolos no puedan cumplir una labor productiva. Se trataría entonces de una distribución justa, equitativa, adecuada y razonable de la propiedad, pero de una propiedad productiva, que rinda frutos. Ahora bien, debemos reparar un momento en este punto y reiterar, como se dijo en el considerando IV.- de esta sentencia, que la realización efectiva de tal función depende de la estructuración y ejecución políticas socioeconómicas del Gobierno en un momento histórico dado.

Siguiendo con lo expuesto, para alcanzar esa ulterior finalidad, el Estado se encuentra en la posibilidad de establecer restricciones a la propiedad las cuales, básicamente, se estructuran a través de límites y limitaciones impuestos de conformidad con el ordenamiento. Así los límites los entenderemos, en estricto sentido como el comportamiento que por ley el propietario debe seguir. Son aquellas conductas que éste puede desplegar dentro del contenido normal del derecho que tiene, y siempre van a depender de la naturaleza del bien que se trate. Ahora bien, al hablar de “Ley” acá, lo hacemos entendiéndola en sentido formal y material (artículo 45 in fine de la Constitución Política y artículo 266 in fine Código Civil), la cual, de acuerdo con la basta jurisprudencia de este Tribunal debe necesariamente ser aprobada por mayoría calificada. Al respecto en la sentencia 1990-00546 de las 14:30 horas del 22 de mayo de 1990, se consideró:

“[...]

V.La tesis esbozada por la Procuraduría General de la República, de que debe presumirse que la aprobación legislativa de normas que impongan limitaciones a la propiedad se dió (sic) con la mayoría exigida por la Constitución Política, no es de recibo, pues en este caso consta expresamente, en el expediente legislativo, que la ley no fue aprobada con el número de votos exigido por la Constitución, por lo que la infracción al segundo párrafo del artículo 45 constitucional es evidente. Se trata en la especie, no solamente de un requisito formal, sino de la exigencia de una expresa voluntad de una mayoría calificada para la imposición de limitaciones al citado derecho. A criterio de la Sala la mayoría calificada que exige la Constitución para imponer limitaciones al derecho de propiedad no puede presumirse, por el contrario debe constar expresamente en las actas de aprobación de la ley. [...]”

De acuerdo con esto, resulta evidente que el límite no se crea para un bien en específico, pues, por existir una ley, éste resulta de aplicación general.

Tenemos por otro lado una forma distinta de restricción al derecho de propiedad, como lo son las limitaciones, las cuales deben ser creadas para un bien específico a través de negocios jurídicos, deben estar inscritas en el Registro Público (artículo 268 en relación con el 266 y 292 todos del Código Civil) y tienen un carácter eminentemente temporal.

Continuando con el orden ilativo en el que se ha venido desarrollando esta sentencia, es evidente que lo que se pretende a través de los límites y limitaciones a la propiedad es cumplir con la función social de ésta, imponiendo algunas restricciones al propietario en su disfrute y ejercicio. En otras palabras, ambos -límites y limitaciones- imponen algunas pocas incomodidades al propietario en aras de satisfacer a la colectividad, al bien común y a la función social de la propiedad. Sin embargo, nunca puede interpretarse que éstos lo que busquen sea vaciar o despojar a una persona de su derecho fundamental a la propiedad y sus consecuentes atributos, entender de esta forma lo expuesto hasta ahora no sólo sería erróneo, sino contrario al artículo 45 Constitucional, sería, en una palabra, un contrasentido. La misma Sala ha entendido que ni los límites ni las limitaciones pueden tener la virtud de vaciar el contenido esencial, el núcleo básico de la propiedad, en este sentido en el voto 1993-06706 de las 15:21 horas del 21 de diciembre de 1993, la Sala estimó:

“B) INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTICULO 22 DE LA LEY #4240 V).- Se impugna también el artículo 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, que a la letra dispone:

«Artículo 22.- Ninguna de las limitaciones a la propiedad que esta ley establece, como cargas o servidumbres del régimen urbano que son, precisan de inscripción en el Registro Público, ni darán lugar a indemnización alguna, excepto en aquellos casos en que expresamente lo disponga esta ley.».- Esta norma es abiertamente inconstitucional, por ser contrario a los artículos 9, 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política.- La eximente de responsabilidad que establece invierte los términos en que está concebido el derecho de propiedad y sus limitaciones.- La Sala estima que las limitaciones que establece la Ley de Planificación Urbana sí son indemnizables, claro está en la medida de la gravedad o la extensión de la lesión; y esto tanto cuando se trate de "limitaciones imposibles" que siempre lo son porque equivalen a una expropiación, como cuando se esté en presencia de limitaciones en que no concurre esta circunstancia.- En otros términos, las que son posibles son indemnizables, en la medida en que lo son los actos lícitos o el funcionamiento normal de la Administración; es decir, en la medida en que esos actos permitidos causen -como se dijo- una lesión especial en la forma en que los tiene definidos el artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sea por el pequeño número de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión (así se pronunció esta Sala en la sentencia #6419-93 de las 10:21 horas del 3 de este mes).- Sostener que las limitaciones a la propiedad permitidas por el artículo 45 de la Constitución no son indemnizables, equivale a invertir totalmente los conceptos constitucionales sobre el derecho de propiedad: lo que la Constitución hace es hacerlas posibles excepcionalmente, porque la regla es que no lo son en virtud de la inviolabilidad de la propiedad; pero de ahí a afirmar que por ser posibles ninguna es indemnizable equivale a violar todos los principios ya no sólo del derecho de propiedad, sino de la equidad y la justicia, entre ellos el principio de igualdad ante las cargas públicas, en virtud del cual lo que interesa a la comunidad en general es la comunidad quien debe soportarlo, indemnizando todos los miembros de ésta, a través de los impuestos que pagan, a quien sufra un perjuicio tanto por causa de lo que interesa a toda la comunidad positivamente como de los infortunios, que pasivamente deben ser soportados por todos.- En virtud de este mismo principio -igualdad ante las cargas públicas- las ventajas colectivas o los infortunios que perjudican a todos en general no son indemnizables, pero no porque no lo sean sino porque individualizarlas equivale prácticamente a dejar las cosas como están (verbigracia, el caso de los impuestos), ya que en esos casos se trata de un daño general, y lo que hay es entonces una verdadera compensación de débitos y créditos.- Debe quedar claro que, como ya se ha establecido en anteriores oportunidades, no todas las cargas urbanísticas son indemnizables, sino solamente aquellas que vacien (sic) el contenido del derecho fundamental de que se trate, sea en su totalidad o en alguno o algunos de sus atributos esenciales, de acuerdo a su naturaleza: vaciar el contenido del derecho no es una limitación razonable, sino una privación absoluta de éste (ver en este sentido la sentencia #5097-93 de las 10:24 horas del 15 de octubre pasado).” Posteriormente, en esa misma línea de pensamiento, en la sentencia 1993-06419 de las 10:21 del 3 de diciembre de 1993, la Sala consideró:

“I).- El artículo 169 de la Constitución Política otorgó a las municipalidades atribuciones para administrar los intereses y servicios locales; y en desarrollo de ese precepto, los artículos 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana y 4.4 del Código Municipal, reconocen la competencia de los gobiernos locales para dirigir la planificación urbana dentro de los límites de su territorio, a través de la promulgación e imposición coactiva de un plan regulador y de los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano respectivos, tendientes a la plena ejecución del primero.- En virtud de esa potestad de planificación local, resulta posible imponer restricciones al ejercicio de uno de los atributos del dominio, en tanto -claro está- estos resulten razonables y no vacien (sic) el contenido del derecho de propiedad o limiten en forma absoluta sus atributos esenciales (Ver en este sentido las sentencias N° 5305-93 de las 10:06 hrs del 22 de Octubre de 1993 y N° 5097-93 de las 10:24 hrs del 15 de octubre de 1993).- Para el caso que nos ocupa, la Sala estima que efectivamente, resulta contrario al artículo 45 de la Constitución la decisión de los funcionarios del Concejo y el Ingeniero Municipal de Montes de Oca, por la que ordenaron a la accionante, a los efectos de realizar una ampliación de su casa de habitación, a retirarse dos metros de la línea de la acera -franja que se constituirá en antejardín de conformidad con el artículo VI.3.8.1. del Reglamento de Construcciones-, sin proceder al pago de la indemnización correspondiente, pues se trata de la imposición de una limitación absoluta al ius aedificandi sobre esa porción de su propiedad; y que ésta continuará en manos de su propietaria, correspondiéndole dar mantenimiento a esa franja de terreno por cuanta propia, en beneficio del ornato y aseo de su comunidad, pero sin poder ejercer ese atributo, que además de esencial es inherente al dominio.- En criterio de la Sala, tal situación es que sustrae del propietario el dominiio (sic) pleno sobre esa parte de su propiedad y que por lo tanto, es indemnizable, en la medida en que lo son los actos lícitos o el funcionamiento normal de la administración, en tanto causen una lesión especial en la forma en que los tiene definidos por ejemplo el artículo 194.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (por el pequeño número de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión); lo contrario implicaría invertir totalmente los conceptos constitucionales sobre el derecho de propiedad y además, el de igualdad ante las cargas públicas, como integrante de los principios de igualdad y equidad, según el cual es la comunidad entera la que debe indemnizar, a través de los impuestos que pagan todos sus miembros, a quien sufra un perjuicio, por causa de lo que a todos interesa, que en el presente caso resulta ser la ordenación del desarrollo urbano del Cantón de Montes de Oca.” Finalmente, en el voto 1993-05097, este Tribunal estimo que si existe una carga que haga nugatorio el derecho de propiedad, esa carga es indemnizable:

“IV) Para la Sala los límites razonables que el Estado puede imponer a la propiedad privada, de acuerdo con su naturaleza, son constitucionalmente posibles en tanto no vacíen su contenido. Cuando ello ocurre deja de ser ya una limitación razonable para convertirse en una privación del derecho mismo. Esto es precisamente lo que ocurre el caso que nos ocupa, en el que ningún provecho económico, puede la accionante, obtener de su inmueble. Inclusive, según los elementos de convicción que corren agregados al expediente, la actividad agrícola que permite el Plan Regulador, representa un serio riesgo para la salud de las personas, que se dediquen al cultivo de la tierra, ya que, según se informó, el ruído (sic) proveniente del aeropuerto resulta peligroso, en razón de localizarse el terreno de la accionante a 125 metros de la línea de centro de pista.

• V)Ningún reparo hace la Sala a los motivos de seguridad y de salud que llevaron al establecimiento de una zona de protección para el Aeropuerto Internacional Juan Santamaría. Sin embargo, las limitaciones introducidas por estos motivos en tanto vacían totalmente los atributos que deriva la accionante de su propiedad y la hacen inutilizable, obligan a la Sala a acoger el recurso por responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración. En consecuencia, proceda el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes- al que pertenece la Dirección General de Aviación Civil- a iniciar, dentro del plazo de seis meses, a partir de la adopción del acuerdo correspondiente, los trámites de expropiación.” Resulta claro entonces, de lo dicho hasta ahora, que los límites y limitaciones se pueden imponer para restringir el disfrute del derecho de propiedad, en aras de alcanzar y cumplir con la función social que a ésta le ha otorgado el perfil de muestro modelo basado en el Estado Social de Derecho. Sin embargo, es lo cierto que esas restricciones deben imponerse dentro de los parámetros de necesidad, idoneidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y, esto es consecuencia evidente de lo que hasta ahora se ha dicho, la interpretación de éstas debe hacerse tendiendo siempre a la satisfacción de la función social y de un disfrute acorde con el ordenamiento del derecho de propiedad, lo cual claramente impone una interpretación a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución y de los principios “pro homine” y “pro libertate”, en aras de incomodar lo menos posible al propietario en el ejercicio de su derecho, pues como sabemos, en materia de derechos fundamentales, cuando se pretende o de hecho se va a causar una limitación a éstos, está absolutamente prohibido para la Administración realizar una interpretación extensiva de esas normas que de alguna van a perturbar el derecho fundamental que se pretende ejercer.

VII.Sobre el caso concreto. En este caso lo primero que hay que aclarar es que frente al permiso solicitado por el recurrente, la Municipalidad recurrida no puede en forma genérica alegar que los proyectos desarrollados por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en el cantón de Orotina lo que pretende es crear minifundios, lo anterior por cuanto no aporta esa autoridad un sustrato empírico que permita corroborar ese dato y se utiliza además como casi el único alegato para denegar el permiso de construcción al recurrente, interpretando en forma extensiva y en contra del Derecho de la Constitución normas que restringen derechos fundamentales. Vemos que la Municipalidad accionada alega que lo que se intenta hacer son desarrollos Urbanísticos encubiertos. Sin embargo, de nuevo esa autoridad no aporta ningún elemento que permita a la Sala tener como cierta esa afirmación, lo cual evidentemente hace parecer que no se trata más que de una mera suposición, por demás infundada, y que se transforma o adquiere el carácter de restricción a la propiedad privada y más aún al derecho a la vivienda del recurrente, en el tanto, a pesar de contar con todos los elementos para alcanzar su solución habitacional, no se le da la autorización para proceder a edificar su casa de habitación. Desde ese punto de vista, las limitaciones que por razones de urbanística pretende imponer la Municipalidad del cantón de Orotina, tratan en este caso erigirse como un cercenamiento total y un vaciamiento al derecho a la propiedad y a la vivienda digna del actor. Así, la Municipalidad accionada, por razones genéricas y sin un referente empírico concreto, ha impedido que el recurrente proceda a edificar su vivienda, resultando esos argumentos del ente recurrido vacíos de un contenido determinado y sin indicar expresamente en que forma él ha vulnerado las normas de urbanismo o de construcción y que por esa razón frente a su caso concreto se debe denegar el permiso de construcción. Por estas razones, lo argumentado por la Municipalidad del cantón de Orotina carece de sustento alguno, constituyéndose lo alegado por ese ente en una decisión que no hace más que vaciar de todo contenido el derecho a la propiedad y de acceso a la vivienda digna del amparado, máxime si examinamos que ella ya posee los elementos para solucionar tales carencias.

VIII.Por otro lado en cuanto a lo alegado por el ente recurrido, en el sentido que la zona donde se encuentra la parcela del promovente no cuenta con la infraestructura necesaria e igualmente que no cuenta con servicios básicos, es claro que, por la prueba acopiada durante la instrucción del expediente, el lugar donde él pretende construir cuenta con la infraestructura y los servicios básicos (agua potable y electricidad) indispensables para llevar una vida digna, lo cual consta en los informes rendidos bajo fe de juramento, con las consecuencias incluso penales que ello acarrea, artículo 44 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que rolan a folios 1027 y 107 del expediente, tornándose de nuevo en meras suposiciones lo informado por las autoridades recurridas.

IX.Es claro, entonces, que la actuación de las autoridades lo que han venido a provocar es un menoscabo al derecho a la propiedad del actor que igualmente vulnera la función social que ésta posee, por imponerse limitaciones ilegítimas y contrarias al Derecho de la Constitución, bajo ese entendido el amparo debe estimarse en lo que se refiere a la Municipalidad del cantón de Orotina.

X.Ahora bien, en lo que atañe al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, debe advertir la Sala que éste tiene la obligación de planificar la realización de los proyectos para dotar de propiedad agraria a la población, en aras de no causarle un eventual daño a los beneficiarios, entregándoles parcelas que no cuentan con las condiciones mínimas para desarrollar ahí actividades de explotación de la tierra sea en forma productiva o de subsistencia. Sin embargo, en este caso no se aprecia que esta institución tenga responsabilidad alguna en la denegatoria de los permisos de construcción al recurrente.

XI.Conclusión: Como conclusión de lo expuesto se impone la estimatoria del amparo, ordenándole a la Municipalidad recurrida que proceda a emitir el permiso de construcción a favor del actor.”