Limits on employment incompatibility due to marriage in internal circularsLímites a incompatibilidades laborales por matrimonio en circulares internas

I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The petitioner seeks protection of her rights to special employment stability and to due process. She challenges that, without any reasoning, her appointments at the Clínica Solón Núñez Frutos were terminated and, subsequently, she learned that her exclusion from the roster was due to her marriage to Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca. She additionally considers that the decision is unreasonable and disproportionate, being based on a circular that limits her fundamental freedoms.” IV.- THE REASONABLENESS OF IMPOSING INCOMPATIBILITIES DUE TO KINSHIP THROUGH INTERNAL CIRCULARS. This Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to address the reasonableness of this type of circulars that, in essence, limit the fundamental rights of citizens, specifically, the fundamental rights to marry, to found a family, and to employment stability. On these topics, in judgment No. 4287-1995 of 3:15 p.m. on August 3, 1995, this Constitutional Court held the following:

"(...) III.- First of all, it should be noted that the provision of Article 14 of the former Organic Law of the Comptroller General's Office did not expressly determine that the incompatibility applied to cases of supervening kinship (parentesco sobreviniente), but rather referred specifically to a hypothesis: the appointment (nombramiento) of officials. The new regulation, contained in Article 49 of Law 7428, the current Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, also refers exclusively to the case of the appointment of officials. It is logical and reasonable, protected by the general interest of a proper exercise of public function, that norms such as these seek the necessary independence among officials, so as to avoid nepotism; that is, that an official seeks to place, in the same institution where he works, his relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the degrees determined by law. However, it seems illogical and irrational to apply the same regulation to another factual hypothesis, which would be the marital union between officials of the institution, that is, to a supervening kinship (parentesco sobreviniente). This is because it does not seek to benefit a relative with their entry into the same workplace, but rather the relationship occurs in the opposite sense: two people who work in the same office decide to marry, in exercise of their most fundamental freedoms, such as the right to choose one's civil status and to found a family. In this case, the common employment has been nothing more than the cause of the mutual acquaintance that led to the decision to marry.

It should also be observed that the attributed consequences are diverse: in the case of appointments (nombramientos)—a hypothesis contemplated in Article 14 of the former Organic Law, and in Article 49 of the current Organic Law—the consequence of the incompatibility is the impediment, derived from the prohibition, of being appointed to a position in the institution. The new article is even clearer, by determining the nullity of the appointment. In contrast, in the case of marriage between officials—a case contemplated in the challenged circular—the consequence of the incompatibility stated therein is the cessation of the public employment labor relationship in that unit. As can be seen, this is a consequence of greater significance and severity than that contemplated in the Law, since it is more severe to lose one's job than not to be admitted into an institution, or to have a submitted application denied.

This last point is also implicitly set forth in the final paragraph of Article 14 of the former organic law, which lifted that incompatibility in the case of the appointment of the Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General, when relatives of theirs are already employees of the Comptroller General's Office, logically, because the positions of Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General are appointed by the Legislative Assembly, pursuant to Article 183 of the Constitution. If the incompatibility were to operate, it would prevent the appointment of the Comptroller General—which is absurd—or his relatives already working in the Comptroller General's Office would necessarily have to cease their positions, something that is also not appropriate, given the gravity that consequence would have. Thus, it can be concluded that the spirit of Article 14 of the former organic law protected already-appointed officials if, due to a supervening cause—in this case, the appointment of the Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General—a relative of theirs came to be an official of the Comptroller General's Office.

Thus, the incompatibility between the marriage of officials and the retention of employment by either of them in the institution clearly constitutes a limitation on fundamental rights not enshrined or determined by law, but rather contemplated in a provision of lower rank, which extends said incompatibility to a scenario different from the mere appointment of officials. This contradicts the principle of legal reserve that governs matters of individual freedoms.

IV.- Secondly, the proper stability (estabilidad propia) of public officials requires that, for the cessation of their position to proceed, it must be due to a cause for dismissal specified by current legislation, for which personal responsibility is attributed to the official, after the prior exercise of their right of defense and in observance of the other norms that determine due process.

(...)

Considering that the supposed incompatibility between marriage of officials—regular servants—of the Comptroller General's Office and their permanence in their position is sufficient for one of the two to be obliged to leave the position they hold constitutes, in a certain way, a disguised cause for dismissal, since the servant is left with no other option: if they wish to keep their position, they must not marry; if they freely agree to marry another servant, they or their spouse lose their employment. This violates, as can be seen, the regime governing public servants regarding the stability they enjoy in their positions, in accordance with current regulations and constitutional principles.

V.- Thirdly, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular certainly places the officials in an excessively burdensome dilemma regarding the exercise of their fundamental rights, such as the choice of civil status and the right to found a family, the basis of society, especially protected by the Constitution and the norms of international human rights law, and other rights such as their work and their freedom. All of this undermines the reasonableness of the norms as a requirement for their constitutional validity, especially when they regulate matters concerning fundamental freedoms and rights.

(...)

VII.- Based on all the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular is indeed contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 28 (right to freedom), 51 and 52 (marriage as the essential basis of the family), 56 (the right to work, to its free choice, and that conditions shall not be established that in any way undermine human freedom or dignity); 74 (the inalienability of fundamental rights); and 192 (the right to labor stability of public servants, unless a justified cause for dismissal expressed in legislation is present) of the Political Constitution, and therefore the action must be granted. (…)” Criteria that are reiterated by the majority of this Court in judgment No. 12845-2007 of 8:38 a.m. on September 5, 2007.

In the specific case, it is duly accredited that, based on an internal circular of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the fundamental rights of the petitioner, Laura Muñoz Semidei, were limited. The foregoing, inasmuch as, through a general directive, it is intended to impose limitations on the most basic freedoms of the petitioning official, even though the regime of fundamental rights and freedoms is a matter reserved to law (materia de reserva de la ley). Said principle finds constitutional basis in Article 28 of the Political Constitution and also has legal rank in Article 19 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública when it states that “The legal regime of constitutional rights shall be reserved to law, without prejudice to the corresponding executive regulations”. Consequently, as this Constitutional Court has repeatedly held, only through a formal law emanating from the Legislative Power through the pronouncement provided for in the Constitution for the issuance of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, limit fundamental rights and freedoms, all, of course, to the extent that the nature and essential core thereof permit it. In the specific case, we are faced with the restriction of the petitioner's right to work. The foregoing, inasmuch as the questioned circular exceeds the reasonableness required for this type of administrative resolutions. It should be noted that according to the information provided, it is not the case that the petitioner and her husband, Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca, maintain a hierarchical relationship that could compromise, in any way, the adequate and suitable functioning of the public administration, or that compromises the independence of labor relations, inasmuch as it has been recognized by the respondent authorities that there is no relationship of hierarchy, supervision, or subordination whatsoever between the two officials. The only labor relationship shared by the spouses is that they are subordinates of the same immediate superior (the Director) at the Clínica Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos. The foregoing, in the opinion of this Constitutional Court, does not compromise the continuity and objectivity in the provision of public service. In light of the considerations made, it is concluded that the challenged conduct is contrary to the fundamental rights of the petitioner, because the enjoyment of a constitutionally enshrined freedom is limited through a means other than a law, especially since it is an openly unreasonable and disproportionate provision regarding the purposes of providing public services.

V.- ON THE REASONING (MOTIVACIÓN) OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTIONS. The reasoning (motivación) of administrative resolutions, when affecting the rights of the administered parties, is necessary insofar as it constitutes a parameter of legality of the administrative action and its absence restricts or limits the possibilities of their judicial protection. In the constitutional context, the requirement for reasoning (motivación) of administrative acts and resolutions implies imposing a limitation on public power, since it is obliged to adhere to the principle of legality, recognized in Article 11 of the Political Constitution, and to the need to invoke a reasonable criterion in its decision-making. On this matter, this Constitutional Court has held the following:

"(...) Regarding the reasoning (motivación) of administrative acts, it should be understood as the substantiation that public authorities must give of the content of the act they issue, taking into account the factual and legal grounds, and the purpose intended with the decision. In reiterated case law, this court has stated that the reasoning (motivación) of administrative acts is a requirement of the constitutional principle of due process as well as of the right of defense and implies a reference to facts and legal grounds, so that the administered party knows the reasons for which they are to be sanctioned or for which a request affecting their interests or even their subjective rights is denied (…)” Judgment No. 7924-1999 of 5:48 p.m. on October 13, 1999.

VI.- PRINCIPLE OF PROHIBITION OF ARBITRARINESS, REASONABLENESS, AND PROPORTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS. In ruling 2004-14421 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004, this Court, authored by the Reporting Judge, held the following:

"(...) The regulation of the substantive objective constitutive elements (grounds (motivo), content, and purpose) or subjective elements (jurisdiction, standing, and investiture) and formal elements (procedure and reasoning (motivación)) of the administrative act, is intended to rationalize the administrative function or conduct and, above all, to endow it with logicality or reasonableness, preventing public administrations from surprising the administered parties with contradictory, absurd, disproportionate, or irrational acts. An aspect of prime importance in every administrative act is the proportionality in the strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the purposes intended to be achieved with it, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or burdensome, the weighing of its intervention or minimum impact. Precisely for the foregoing reason, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably grounded in the body of legality, so that it is self-sufficient and explained by itself. In our constitutional legal system, this principle arises from what is established in the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution, when it prescribes that "Public officials are mere trustees of authority. They are obliged to fulfill the duties that the law imposes upon them and cannot arrogate faculties not granted to them therein (…)". It is not superfluous, furthermore, to warn that arbitrariness should not be confused with administrative discretion, that is, with the possibility every public entity or body has to choose among several options or solutions (content), all equally just, when faced with a specific need (grounds (motivo)) and the use of indeterminate legal concepts to address a problem (grounds (motivo)), which presuppose a margin of positive and negative appreciation and a halo of uncertainty, but which, ultimately, admit a single just solution.(…)"

VII.- ON THE VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND THE REASONING (MOTIVACIÓN) OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. From the considerations made, it follows that the general principle is the obligation to provide reasoning (motivación) for burdensome administrative acts, given that it arises from the observance and application by public entities and bodies of the principles of legality and prohibition of arbitrariness. In this way, the reasoning (motivación) of the administrative act must be an exposition of the factual and legal reasons that led to its issuance, and not a mere formalistic scruple that can be fulfilled with the ad hoc fabrication of the grounds. Under this understanding, this Constitutional Court observes that in the specific case, the authorities of the Clínica Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos violated these guarantees established in favor of the administered party. The foregoing, inasmuch as she was not expressly informed of the reasons why she was no longer considered for temporary substitutions and interim appointments (nombramientos interinos) at the referred clinic. This omission was reflected in the impossibility of exercising her right of defense against the true reasoning (motivación) that served as the basis for the exclusion from the roster of interim appointments (nombramientos interinos). Indeed, from the evidence provided in the case file, a reasoned and written resolution that justified the decision in question to the petitioner is lacking. Additionally, when the respondent authorities resolved the claim filed by the petitioner, she was never informed that the measure adopted by the Administration was based on the kinship reasons already stated, but rather, on the contrary, she was surreptitiously informed that, at no time, had her interim appointments (nombramientos interinos) been suspended (see folios 32-35). It was not until the investigation carried out by the Unión Médica Nacional that the Coordinator of Outpatient Consultation of the Área de Salud de Hatillo truly provided the reasoning (motivación) for the challenged decision. Indeed, it was not until the communication of official letter No. S.D.M.C.S.N.F.-209-07 of July 5, 2007, that the respondent indicated to the President of the Unión Médica Nacional that, in his opinion, there was a "legal" impediment to continuing to appoint Dr. Laura Muñoz. That impediment is, precisely, the marital relationship of the petitioner with Dr. Láscarez Abarca (see copies at folios 12-14). Such contradictions have undoubtedly placed the petitioner in a defenseless situation against the indicated administrative irregularities. Consequently, the violation of due process invoked by the petitioner is deemed accredited.

VIII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the considerations made, it is necessary to grant the amparo appeal and, therefore, to restore the petitioner to the enjoyment of her freedoms.” of August 3, 1995, this Constitutional Court ruled as follows:

"(...) III.- In the first place, it should be noted that the provision of Article 14 of the former Organic Law of the Comptroller's Office did not expressly determine that the incompatibility applied to cases of supervening kinship (parentesco sobreviniente), but rather referred specifically to one hypothesis: the appointment of officials. The new regulation, contained in Article 49 of Law #7428, the current Organic Law of the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic, also refers exclusively to the case of appointment of officials. It is logical and reasonable, protected by the general interest of a correct exercise of public function, that norms such as these seek the necessary independence among officials, so as to avoid nepotism; that is, that an official seeks to place, in the same institution where he works, his relatives by consanguinity or affinity to the degrees determined by law. However, it seems illogical and irrational to apply the same regulation to another factual hypothesis, which would be the marital union between officials of the institution, that is, to a supervening kinship (parentesco sobreviniente). This is because it does not seek to benefit a relative with their entry into the same workplace, but rather the relationship occurs in the opposite sense: two people who work in the same office decide to bind themselves in marriage, in exercise of their most fundamental freedoms, such as the right to choose one's state and found a family. The common employment has not been, in this case, more than the cause of the mutual knowledge that has led to the decision to marry.

Note, moreover, that the attributed consequences are diverse: in the case of appointments—a hypothesis contemplated in Article 14 of the former Organic Law, and in Article 49 of the current Organic Law—the consequence of the incompatibility is the impediment, derived from the prohibition, of being appointed to a position in the institution. The new article is even clearer, by determining nullity of the appointment. On the other hand, in the case of marriage between officials—a case contemplated in the challenged circular—the consequence of the incompatibility stated therein is the termination of the public employment labor relationship in that unit. As can be seen, this is a consequence of greater transcendence and gravity than that contemplated in the Law, since losing one's job is more severe than not being admitted to an institution, or having a submitted application denied.

This latter point is also implicitly set forth in the final paragraph of Article 14 of the former organic law, which lifted that incompatibility in the case of the appointment of the Comptroller or Sub-Comptroller, when relatives of theirs are already employees of the Comptroller's Office, logically, because the positions of Comptroller and Sub-Comptroller being appointed by the Legislative Assembly, pursuant to constitutional Article 183, if the incompatibility were to operate, it would prevent the appointment of the Comptroller—which is absurd—or necessarily their relatives who already worked in the Comptroller's Office would have to cease from their positions, which is also not proper, given the gravity that consequence would have. Thus, it can be concluded that in the spirit of Article 14 of the former organic law, already appointed officials were protected if, by supervening cause (causa sobreviniente)—in this case, the appointment of the Comptroller or Sub-Comptroller—a relative of theirs came to be an official of the Comptroller's Office.

Thus, the incompatibility between the marriage of officials and the conservation of employment by either of them in the institution clearly constitutes a limitation on fundamental rights not enshrined or determined by law, but rather contemplated in a provision of lower rank, which extends said incompatibility to a case different from the mere appointment of officials. This contradicts the principle of legal reserve that governs matters of individual liberties.

IV.- In the second place, the stability inherent to public officials requires that, for the cessation of their position to proceed, it must be due to a cause for dismissal indicated by the legislation in force, whose personal responsibility is attributed to the official, following the exercise of their right of defense and in observance of the other norms that determine due process.

(...)

Considering that the supposed incompatibility between the marriage of officials—regular servants—of the Comptroller's Office and permanence in their position is sufficient for one of the two to be obliged to leave the position they hold constitutes, in a certain way, a covert cause for dismissal, since the servant is left no other option: if they wish to keep the position, they must not marry; if they freely accept to bind themselves in marriage with another servant, they or their spouse lose their employment. This violates, as can be seen, the regime governing public servants regarding the stability they enjoy in their positions, pursuant to the regulations in force and constitutional principles.

V.- In the third place, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular certainly places the officials in an excessively burdensome dilemma, regarding the exercise of their fundamental rights, such as the choice of state and the right to found a family, the basis of society, specially protected by the Constitution and the norms of international human rights law, and other rights such as their work and their freedom. All this is to the detriment of the reasonableness (razonabilidad) of norms as a requirement for their constitutional validity, especially when they regulate matters concerning fundamental liberties and rights.

(...)

VII.- Based on all the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular is indeed contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 28 (right to freedom), 51 and 52 (marriage as the essential basis of the family), 56 (the right to work, to its free choice, and to not have conditions established that in any way impair the freedom or dignity of man); 74 (the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad) of fundamental rights); and 192 (the right to labor stability of public servants, unless a cause for justified dismissal expressed in legislation is present) of the Political Constitution, for which reason it is proper to declare the action with merit. (...)" Criteria that are reiterated by the majority of this Court in judgment No. 12845-2007 of 08:38 hrs. on September 5, 2007.

In the specific case, it is duly accredited that, based on an internal circular of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), the fundamental rights of the petitioner, Laura Muñoz Semidei, were limited. The foregoing, because, through a general directive, limitations are sought to be imposed on the most basic freedoms of the petitioning official, even though the regime of fundamental rights and liberties is a matter reserved to law. Said principle finds constitutional basis in Article 28 of the Political Constitution and also has legal rank in Article 19 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) when it states that "The legal regime of constitutional rights shall be reserved to law, without prejudice to the corresponding executive regulations". Consequently, as this Constitutional Court has repeatedly held, only by means of a formal law emanating from the Legislative Branch through the pronouncement provided for in the Constitution for the issuance of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, limit fundamental rights and liberties, all, of course, to the extent that the nature and essential core thereof permit it. In the specific case, we are faced with the restriction of the right to work of the petitioner. The foregoing, because the questioned circular exceeds the reasonableness (razonabilidad) required for this type of administrative resolutions. Note that according to what was reported, it is not the case that the petitioner and her husband, Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca, maintain a hierarchical relationship that could compromise, in any way, the adequate and suitable functioning of the public administration, or that compromises the independence of labor relations, because it has been recognized by the respondent authorities that there is no relationship of hierarchy, supervision, or any subordination between both officials. The only labor relationship the spouses share is that they are subordinates of the same immediate boss (the Director) at the Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos Clinic. The foregoing, in the opinion of this Constitutional Court, does not compromise the continuity and objectivity in the provision of public service. In light of the considerations made, it is concluded that the challenged action is contrary to the fundamental rights of the petitioner, for the reason that the enjoyment of a constitutionally enshrined freedom is limited through a means other than law, especially since it is an openly unreasonable and disproportionate provision for the purposes of providing public services.

**V.- ON THE MOTIVATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTIONS**. The motivation of administrative resolutions, by affecting the rights of those administered, is necessary insofar as it constitutes a parameter of legality of administrative action and its absence restricts or limits the possibilities of its judicial protection. In the constitutional context, the requirement for motivation of administrative acts and resolutions implies imposing a limitation on public power, since it is obliged to adhere to the principle of legality, recognized in Article 11 of the Political Constitution, and to the need to invoke a reasonable criterion in making its decisions. On this matter, this Constitutional Court has held the following:

"(...) Regarding the motivation of administrative acts, it should be understood as the reasoning (fundamentación) that public authorities must give for the content of the act they issue, taking into account the motives of fact and of law, and the end sought with the decision. In reiterated jurisprudence, this court has stated that the motivation of administrative acts is a requirement of the constitutional principle of due process as well as of the right of defense and implies a reference to facts and grounds of law, so that the administered person knows the motives for which they are to be sanctioned or for which a petition affecting their interests or even their subjective rights is denied (...)" Judgment No. 7924-1999 of 17:48 hrs. on October 13, 1999.

**VI.- PRINCIPLE OF INTERDICTION OF ARBITRARINESS, REASONABLENESS (RAZONABILIDAD) AND PROPORTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS**. In vote 2004-14421 of 11:00 hrs. on December 17, 2004, this Court, with the writing of the Reporting Magistrate, considered the following:

"(...) The regulation of the constituent elements of a substantive nature, objective (motive, content, and end) or subjective (competence, standing, and investiture), and formal (procedure and motivation) of the administrative act, have the purpose of rationalizing the administrative function or conduct and, above all, endowing it with logicality (logicidad) or reasonableness (razonabilidad), avoiding that public administrations surprise those administered with contradictory, absurd, disproportionate, or irrational acts. An aspect of first order in every administrative act is proportionality in the strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends sought to be achieved with it, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or burdensome, the weighing of its intervention or minimum impact. Precisely for the above reason, there has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law, as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, that of the interdiction of arbitrariness, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported in the block of legality, so that it is self-sufficient and explains itself. In our constitutional legal order, such principle emanates from what is established in the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution when it prescribes that 'Public officials are simple depositaries of authority. They are obliged to fulfill the duties that the law imposes on them and cannot arrogate powers not granted to them therein (...).' It is not superfluous, moreover, to warn that arbitrariness should not be confused with administrative discretion, that is, with the possibility that every public entity or organ has to choose among several options or solutions (content), all equally just, when faced with the posing of a determined necessity (motive) and the use of indeterminate legal concepts to address a problem (motive) which entail a margin of positive and negative appreciation and a halo of uncertainty, but which, ultimately, admit only one just solution.(...)"

**VII.- ON THE VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND THE MOTIVATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** From the considerations made, it follows that the general principle is the obligation to motivate burdensome administrative acts, given that it emanates from the observance and application by public entities and organs of the principles of legality and interdiction of arbitrariness. In this way, the motivation of the administrative act must be an exposition of the reasons of fact and of law that led to its issuance, and not a mere formalistic scruple that can be fulfilled with the *ad hoc* fabrication of motives. Under this understanding, this Constitutional Court observes that in the specific case, the authorities of the Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos Clinic violated these guarantees established in favor of the administered party. The foregoing, because the reasons for which she was no longer considered for the performance of temporary substitutions and interim appointments (suplencias y nombramientos interinos) in the referred clinic were not expressly indicated to her. Said omission was reflected in the impossibility of exercising her right of defense against the true motivation that served as the basis for the exclusion from the roll of interim appointments. Indeed, from the evidence provided to the record, a reasoned and written resolution that justified the decision in question to the petitioner is missing. Additionally, when the respondent authorities resolved the claim presented by the petitioner, she was never informed that the measure adopted by the Administration was based on the reasons of kinship already set forth, but rather, on the contrary, she was surreptitiously told that, at no time, had her interim appointments been suspended (see folios 32-35). It was not until the investigation conducted by the National Medical Union (Unión Médica Nacional) that the Coordinator of External Consultation of the Hatillo Health Area really motivated the challenged decision. Effectively, it was not until the communication of official letter No. S.D.M.C.S.N.F.-209-07 of **July 5, 2007**, that the respondent indicated to the President of the National Medical Union that, in his opinion, there existed a *"legal"* impediment to continue appointing Dr. Laura Muñoz. Said impediment is, precisely, the marital relationship of the petitioner with Dr. Láscarez Abarca (see copies at folios 12-14). Such contradictions, without any doubt, have placed the petitioner in a defenseless position in the face of the administrative irregularities noted. Consequently, the infraction of due process invoked by the petitioner is taken as accredited.

**VIII.- CONCLUSION**. As a corollary of the considerations made, it is imperative to grant the *amparo* appeal and, therefore, to restore the petitioner to the enjoyment of her freedoms." “I.- OBJECT OF THE APPEAL. The petitioner seeks protection (amparo) of her rights to improper stability (estabilidad impropia) and to due process. She challenges that, without any statement of reasons (motivación), her appointments at the Clínica Solón Núñez Frutos were terminated and, subsequently, she learned that the exclusion from the roster was due to her marriage to Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca. She considers, additionally, that the decision is unreasonable and disproportionate, being based on a circular that limits her fundamental freedoms.” “IV.- THE REASONABLENESS (RAZONABILIDAD) OF IMPOSING INCOMPATIBILITIES DUE TO KINSHIP IN INTERNAL CIRCULARS. This Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to address the reasonableness of this type of circulars that, in essence, limit the fundamental rights of citizens, specifically, the fundamental rights to marry, to found a family, and to stability in employment. On such matters, in judgment No. 4287-1995 of 3:15 p.m. on August 3, 1995, this Constitutional Court held the following:

“(…) III.- First, it should be noted that the provision of Article 14 of the former Organic Law of the Comptroller General’s Office did not expressly determine that the incompatibility applied to cases of supervening kinship (parentesco sobreviniente), but referred specifically to one hypothesis: the appointment of officials. The new regulations, contained in Article 49 of Law #7428, the current Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, also refers exclusively to the case of appointment of officials. It is logical and reasonable, protected by the general interest of the correct exercise of public office, that norms such as these seek the necessary independence among officials, so as to avoid nepotism; that is, that an official seeks to place, in the same institution where he or she works, his or her relatives by consanguinity or affinity to the degrees determined by law. However, it seems illogical and irrational to apply the same regulations to another factual hypothesis, which would be the marital union between officials of the institution, i.e., a supervening kinship. This, because it is not sought to benefit a relative with their entry into the same workplace, but rather the relationship occurs in the opposite direction: two people who work in the same office decide to bind themselves in marriage, in exercise of their most fundamental liberties, such as the right to choose one's status and to found a family. The common employment has not, in this case, been more than the cause of the mutual acquaintance that has led to the decision to marry.

Note, moreover, that the attributed consequences are different: in the case of appointments—the hypothesis contemplated in Article 14 of the former Organic Law, and in Article 49 of the current Organic Law—the consequence of the incompatibility is the impediment, derived from the prohibition, of being appointed to a position in the institution. The new article is even clearer, establishing the nullity of the appointment. In contrast, in the case of marriage between officials—the case contemplated in the challenged circular—the consequence of the incompatibility stated therein is the termination of the public employment relationship in that unit. As can be seen, this is a consequence of greater transcendence and gravity than that contemplated in the Law, since it is more severe to lose one's job than not to be admitted to an institution, or to have a submitted application denied.

This latter point is also implicitly set out in the final paragraph of Article 14 of the former organic law, which lifted that incompatibility in the case of the appointment of the Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General, when their relatives are already employees of the Comptroller General’s Office, logically, because since the positions of Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General are appointed by the Legislative Assembly, pursuant to constitutional Article 183, if the incompatibility were to operate it would prevent the appointment of the Comptroller General—which is absurd—or necessarily their relatives who already worked at the Comptroller General’s Office would have to cease their positions, something that is also not applicable, given the gravity that consequence would entail. Thus, it can be concluded that in the spirit of Article 14 of the former organic law, officials already appointed were protected if, by supervening cause—in this case, the appointment of the Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General—a relative of theirs becomes an official of the Comptroller General’s Office.

Thus, the incompatibility between the marriage of officials and the retention of employment by either of them in the institution clearly constitutes a limitation on fundamental rights not enshrined or determined by law, but contemplated in a provision of lower rank, which extends said incompatibility to a scenario distinct from the mere appointment of officials. This contradicts the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) that governs matters of individual liberties.

IV.- Secondly, the proper stability (estabilidad propia) of public officials requires that, for their dismissal to proceed, it must be due to a cause for dismissal indicated by current legislation, the personal responsibility for which is attributed to the official, after the prior exercise of their right of defense and in observance of the other norms that define due process.

(…)

Considering that the supposed incompatibility between the marriage of officials—regular employees—of the Comptroller General’s Office and the permanence in their position is sufficient for one of the two to be obliged to leave the position they hold constitutes, to a certain extent, a concealed cause for dismissal, since it leaves the employee no other option: if they wish to keep the position, they must not marry; if they freely accept to bind themselves in marriage with another employee, they or their spouse lose their employment. This, as can be seen, violates the regime governing public employees regarding the stability (estabilidad) they enjoy in their positions, in accordance with current regulations and constitutional principles.

V.- Thirdly, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular indeed places officials in an excessively burdensome dilemma regarding the exercise of their fundamental rights, such as the choice of status and the right to found a family, the basis of society, specially protected by the Constitution and international human rights norms, and other rights such as their work and their freedom. All of this is to the detriment of the reasonableness of norms as a requirement of their constitutional validity, especially when they regulate matters concerning fundamental liberties and rights.

(…)

VII.- Based on all of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the challenged circular is contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 28 (right to liberty), 51 and 52 (marriage as the essential basis of the family), 56 (the right to work, to its free choice, and that conditions be not established which in any way impair the liberty or dignity of man); 74 (the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad) of fundamental rights); and 192 (the right to employment stability (estabilidad laboral) of public employees, unless a justified cause for dismissal expressed in the legislation occurs) of the Political Constitution, therefore, the action should be granted. (…)” Criteria that are reiterated by the majority of this Court in judgment No. 12845-2007 of 8:38 a.m. on September 5, 2007.

In the specific case, it is duly proven that, based on an internal circular of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the fundamental rights of the petitioner, Laura Muñoz Semidei, were limited. The foregoing, because, through a general directive, an attempt is made to impose limitations on the most basic liberties of the petitioning official, despite the fact that the regime of fundamental rights and liberties is a matter of legal reserve (reserva de la ley). This principle finds constitutional foundation in Article 28 of the Political Constitution and also has legal rank in Article 19 of the General Law of Public Administration when it states that "The legal regime of constitutional rights shall be reserved to law, without prejudice to the corresponding executive regulations." Consequently, as this Constitutional Court has repeatedly held, only by means of a formal law emanating from the Legislative Power through the procedure provided in the Constitution for the issuance of laws, is it possible to regulate and, where appropriate, limit fundamental rights and liberties, all, of course, to the extent that the nature and essential core of these permits it. In the specific case, we are faced with the restriction of the petitioner's right to work. The foregoing, because the challenged circular exceeds the reasonableness required for this type of administrative resolutions. Note that, in accordance with what was reported, it is not the case that the petitioner and her husband, Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca, maintain a hierarchical relationship that could in any way compromise the adequate and suitable functioning of the public administration, or that compromises the independence of employment relationships, since it has been recognized by the respondent authorities that no relationship of hierarchy, supervision, or subordination whatsoever exists between both officials. The only employment relationship shared by the spouses is that they are subordinates of the same immediate superior (the Director) at the Clínica Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos. The foregoing, in the opinion of this Constitutional Court, does not compromise the continuity and objectivity in the provision of public service. In light of the considerations made, it is concluded that the challenged action is contrary to the fundamental rights of the petitioner, on the grounds that it limits the enjoyment of a constitutionally enshrined liberty through a means other than law, especially since it is an openly unreasonable and disproportionate provision for the purposes of providing public services.

V.- ON THE STATEMENT OF REASONS (MOTIVACIÓN) FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTIONS. The statement of reasons (motivación) for administrative resolutions, as it affects the rights of the administered, is necessary insofar as it constitutes a parameter of legality of the administrative action and its absence restricts or limits the possibilities of its judicial protection. In the constitutional context, the requirement of a statement of reasons (motivación) for administrative acts and resolutions implies imposing a limitation on public power, since it is obliged to adhere to the principle of legality, recognized in Article 11 of the Political Constitution, and to the need to invoke a reasonable criterion in its decision-making. On this matter, this Constitutional Court has held the following:

“(…) Regarding the statement of reasons (motivación) for administrative acts, it should be understood as the justification (fundamentación) that public authorities must provide for the content of the act they issue, taking into account the reasons of fact and law, and the purpose sought with the decision. In reiterated jurisprudence, this court has stated that the statement of reasons (motivación) for administrative acts is a requirement of the constitutional principle of due process as well as the right of defense and implies a reference to facts and foundations of law, so that the administered knows the reasons for which they are to be sanctioned or for which a petition that affects their interests or even their subjective rights is denied (…)” Judgment No. 7924-1999 of 5:48 p.m. on October 13, 1999.

VI.- PRINCIPLE OF INTERDICTION OF ARBITRARINESS, REASONABLENESS (RAZONABILIDAD), AND PROPORTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS. In vote 2004-14421 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004, this Court, authored by the reporting Magistrate, held the following:

“(…) The regulation of the constitutive elements of a substantive, objective nature (motive, content, and purpose) or subjective nature (competence, legitimacy, and investiture) and formal elements (procedure and statement of reasons (motivación)) of the administrative act, have the purpose of rationalizing the administrative function or conduct and, above all, endowing it with logicality (logicidad) or reasonableness (razonabilidad), preventing public administrations from surprising the administered with contradictory, absurd, disproportionate, or irrational acts. A matter of the highest importance in every administrative act is proportionality in the strict sense between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends sought to be achieved therewith, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content and, of course, when it is afflictive or imposes a burden, the weighting of its intervention or minimal impact. Precisely because of the foregoing, there has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law, as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, that of the interdiction of arbitrariness, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the body of legality, so that it is self-sufficient and explains itself. In our constitutional legal order, such principle emanates from the provisions of the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution when it prescribes that ‘Public officials are mere depositaries of authority. They are obliged to fulfill the duties the law imposes on them and may not arrogate powers not granted to them therein (…)’. It is not superfluous, furthermore, to warn that arbitrariness should not be confused with administrative discretion, that is, with the possibility that every public entity or body has to choose among several options or solutions (content), all equally just, when a specific need is raised (motive) and the use of indeterminate legal concepts to address a problem (motive) which imply a margin of positive and negative appreciation and a haze of uncertainty, but which, ultimately, admit a single just solution.(…)” VII.- ON THE VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND THE STATEMENT OF REASONS (MOTIVACIÓN) FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. From the considerations made, it follows that the general principle is the obligation to state reasons (motivar) for administrative acts that impose a burden, given that it emanates from the observance and application by public entities and bodies of the principles of legality and interdiction of arbitrariness. In this way, the statement of reasons (motivación) for an administrative act must be an exposition of the reasons of fact and law that led to its issuance, and not a mere formalistic scruple that can be fulfilled with the fabrication ad hoc of the motives. Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court observes that in the specific case, the authorities of the Clínica Dr.

Solón Núñez Frutos, violated these guarantees established in favor of the petitioner. The foregoing, because she was not expressly given the reasons why she was no longer considered for substitutions and interim appointments (nombramientos interinos) at the referred clinic. Said omission was reflected in the impossibility of exercising her right of defense against the true motivation that served as the basis for the exclusion from the roster of interim appointments (nombramientos interinos). Indeed, from the evidence provided in the case file, a reasoned and written resolution justifying the decision in question to the petitioner is missing. Additionally, when the respondent authorities resolved the claim presented by the petitioner, she was never informed that the measure adopted by the Administration was founded on the grounds of kinship already set forth, but rather, on the contrary, she was surreptitiously told that, at no time, had her interim appointments (nombramientos interinos) been suspended (see folios 32-35). It was not until the investigation carried out by the Unión Médica Nacional that the Coordinator of External Consultation of the Hatillo Health Area truly gave reasons for the contested decision. Indeed, it was not until the communication of official letter No. S.D.M.C.S.N.F.-209-07 of July 5, 2007, that the respondent indicated to the President of the Unión Médica Nacional that, in his opinion, a “legal” impediment existed to continuing to appoint Dra. Laura Muñoz. That impediment is, precisely, the marital relationship of the petitioner with Dr. Láscarez Abarca (see copies at folios 12-14). Such contradictions, without any doubt, have placed the petitioner in defenselessness in the face of the administrative irregularities noted. Consequently, the violation of due process, invoked by the petitioner, is deemed proven.

VIII.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the considerations made, the amparo action must be granted and, therefore, the petitioner must be restored to the full enjoyment of her freedoms."

“I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. La amparada solicita el amparo de sus derechos a la estabilidad impropia y al debido proceso. Cuestiona que sin motivación alguna, le cesaron sus nombramientos en la Clínica Solón Núñez Frutos y, posteriormente, tuvo noticia que la exclusión del rol obedece a su matrimonio con el Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca. Considera, adicionalmente, que es irrazonable y desproporcionada la decisión, fundándose en una circular que limita sus libertades fundamentales.” “IV.- LA RAZONABILIDAD DE IMPONER INCOMPATIBILIDADES POR PARENTESCO EN CIRCULARES INTERNAS. Este Tribunal Constitucional ha tenido oportunidad de referirse a la razonabilidad de este tipo de circulares que, en el fondo, limitan los derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos, específicamente, los derechos fundamentales a contraer matrimonio, a fundar una familia y a la estabilidad en el empleo. Sobre tales temas en sentencia No. 4287- 1995 de las 15:15 hrs. del 03 de agosto de 1995, este Tribunal Constitucional dispuso lo siguiente:

“(…) III.- En primer lugar, cabe señalar que la disposición del artículo 14 de la antigua Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría no determinaba expresamente que la incompatibilidad se aplicaba a los casos de parentesco sobreviniente, sino que se refería en concreto a una hipótesis: el nombramiento de los funcionarios. La nueva normativa, contenida en el artículo 49 de la Ley #7428, Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República vigente, se refiere también exclusivamente al caso de nombramiento de funcionarios. Es lógico y razonable, amparadas en el interés general de un correcto ejercicio de la función pública, que normas como éstas procuren la independencia necesaria entre los funcionarios, de modo que se evite el nepotismo; es decir, que un funcionario busque colocar, en la misma institución que trabaja, a sus familiares por consanguinidad o afinidad en los grados en que la ley determina. No obstante, parece ilógico e irracional aplicar la misma normativa a otra hipótesis fáctica, cual sería la unión matrimonial entre funcionarios de la institución, es decir, a un parentesco sobreviniente. Esto, por cuanto no se busca beneficiar a algún pariente con su ingreso en el mismo lugar de trabajo, sino que la relación se da en el sentido contrario: dos personas que trabajan en la misma oficina deciden vincularse en matrimonio, en ejercicio de sus libertades más fundamentales, como el derecho a elegir estado y fundar una familia. El empleo común no ha sido, en este caso, más que la causa del conocimiento mutuo que ha llevado a la decisión de contraer matrimonio.

Obsérvese, además, que las consecuencias atribuidas son diversas: en el caso de nombramientos -hipótesis contemplada en el artículo 14 de la Ley Orgánica antigua, y en el artículo 49 de la Ley Orgánica vigente-, la consecuencia de la incompatibilidad es el impedimento, derivado de la prohibición, de ser nombrado en un puesto en la institución. El nuevo artículo es aún más claro, al determinar nulidad del nombramiento. En cambio, en el caso de matrimonio entre funcionarios -caso contemplado en la circular impugnada-, la consecuencia de la incompatibilidad que allí se consigna es el cese de la relación laboral de empleo público en esa dependencia. Como se ve, se trata de una consecuencia de mayor trascendencia y gravedad que la contemplada en la Ley, pues es más severo perder el trabajo que no ser admitido en una institución, o que se deniegue una solicitud presentada.

Esto último también se encuentra implícitamente levantaba esa incompatibilidad en el caso del nombramiento del Contralor o Subcontralor, cuando parientes suyos ya sean empleados de la Contraloría, en forma lógica, por cuanto siendo el puesto de Contralor y Subcontralor de nombramiento de la Asamblea Legislativa, conforme el artículo 183 constitucional, si la incompatibilidad operara se impediría el nombramiento del Contralor -lo cual es absurdo- o necesariamente sus parientes que ya trabajasen en la Contraloría tendrían que cesar de sus cargos, cosa que tampoco procede, dada la gravedad que tendría esa consecuencia. Así, se puede concluir que en el espíritu del artículo 14 de la ley orgánica anterior se protegía a los funcionarios ya nombrados si por causa sobreviniente -en este caso, el nombramiento del Contralor o Subcontralor- algún pariente suyo llega a ser funcionario de la Contraloría.

Así, la incompatibilidad entre el matrimonio de funcionarios y la conservación del empleo de alguno de ellos en la institución a todas luces constituye una limitación a derechos fundamentales no consagrada o determinada por la ley, sino contemplada en una disposición de rango inferior, que hace extensiva dicha incompatibilidad a un supuesto distinto al mero nombramiento de funcionarios. Esto contradice el principio de reserva de ley que rige en materia de libertades individuales.

IV.- En segundo lugar, la estabilidad propia de los funcionarios públicos exige que, para que proceda el cese de su cargo, este se deba a una causal de despido señalada por la legislación vigente, cuya responsabilidad personal sea atribuida al funcionario, previo ejercicio de su derecho de defensa y en observancia de las demás normas que determinan el debido proceso.

(…)

Considerar que la supuesta incompatibilidad entre matrimonio de funcionarios -servidores regulares- de la Contraloría y la permanencia en su cargo es suficiente para que uno de los dos esté obligado a dejar el cargo que ocupa constituye en cierto modo una causal de despido encubierta, pues no se deja otra opción al servidor: si desea conservar el cargo, no debe casarse; si libremente acepta vincularse en matrimonio con otro servidor, él o su cónyuge pierden el empleo. Esto violenta, como se ve, el régimen que rige a los servidores públicos en cuanto a la estabilidad que gozan en sus cargos, conforme la normativa vigente y los principios constitucionales.

V.- En tercer lugar, considera la Sala que ciertamente la circular impugnada pone a los funcionarios en una disyuntiva excesivamente gravosa, en cuanto al ejercicio de sus derechos fundamentales, como son la elección de estado y el derecho a fundar una familia, base de la sociedad, especialmente protegida por la Constitución y las normas de derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, y otros derechos como su trabajo y su libertad. Todo ello va en detrimento de la razonabilidad de las normas como requisito de su validez constitucional, especialmente cuando regulan lo relativo a las libertades y derechos fundamentales.

(…)

VII.- Con base en todo lo anterior, considera la Sala que la circular impugnada sí es contraria a los derechos fundamentales consagrados en los artículos 28 (derecho a la libertad), 51 y 52 (el matrimonio como base esencial de la familia), 56 (el derecho al trabajo, a su libre elección, y a que no se establezcan condiciones que de alguna forma menoscaben la libertad o la dignidad del hombre); 74 (la irrenunciabilidad de los derechos fundamentales); y 192 (el derecho a la estabilidad laboral de los servidores públicos, salvo que concurran en causal de despido justificado expresada en la legislación) de la Constitución Política, por lo que procede declarar con lugar la acción. (…)” Criterios que son reiterados por la mayoría de este Tribunal en la sentencia No. 12845-2007 de las 08:38 hrs. del 5 de setiembre de 2007.

En el caso concreto, se encuentra debidamente acreditado que con fundamento en una circular interna de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se limitaron los derechos fundamentales de la amparada, Laura Muñoz Semidei. Lo anterior, por cuanto, a través de una directriz general se pretende imponer limitaciones a las libertades más básicas de la funcionaria amparada, pese que el régimen de los derechos y las libertades fundamentales es materia de reserva de la ley. Dicho principio encuentra fundamento constitucional en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política y tiene, además, rango legal en el artículo 19 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública cuando refiere que “El régimen jurídico de los derechos constitucionales estará reservado a la ley, sin perjuicio de los reglamentos ejecutivos correspondientes”. En consecuencia, tal y como reiteradamente lo ha sostenido este Tribunal Constitucional, solamente mediante una ley formal emanada del Poder Legislativo por el pronunciamiento previsto en la Constitución para la emisión de las leyes, es posible regular y, en su caso, limitar los derechos y libertades fundamentales, todo, por supuesto, en la medida en que la naturaleza y el núcleo esencial de éstos lo permita. En el caso concreto, nos encontramos frente a la restricción del derecho al trabajo de la amparada. Lo anterior, por cuanto, la circular cuestionada sobrepasa la razonabilidad requerida para este tipo de resoluciones administrativas. Nótese que de conformidad con lo informado, no se trata que la amparada y su esposo, el Dr. Fabián Láscarez Abarca, mantengan una relación jerárquica que pueda comprometer, de forma alguna, el adecuado e idóneo funcionamiento de la administración pública, o que comprometa la independencia de las relaciones laborales, por cuanto, ha sido reconocido por las autoridades recurridas que no existe relación de jerarquía, supervisión o de subordinación alguna entre ambos funcionarios. La única relación laboral que comparten los cónyuges es que son subalternos de un mismo jefe inmediato (el Director) en la Clínica Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos. Lo anterior, en criterio de este Tribunal Constitucional, no compromete la continuidad y la objetividad en la prestación del servicio público. A la luz de las consideraciones realizadas, se concluye que la actuación impugnada, es contraria a los derechos fundamentales de la amparada, en razón que se limita el goce de una libertad consagrada constitucionalmente a través de un medio distinto a la ley, máxime, que se trata de una disposición abiertamente irrazonable y desproporcionada a los fines de la prestación de los servicios públicos.

V.- SOBRE LA MOTIVACIÓN DE LAS RESOLUCIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS. La motivación de las resoluciones administrativas, al incidir en los derechos de los administrados, es necesaria en el tanto constituye un parámetro de legalidad de la actuación administrativa y su ausencia restringe o limita las posibilidades de su tutela judicial. En el contexto constitucional, el requerimiento de motivación de los actos y resoluciones administrativos, implica imponer una limitación al poder público, ya que se le obliga a apegarse al principio de legalidad, reconocido en el artículo 11 de la Constitución Política y a la necesidad de invocar un criterio razonable en la toma de sus decisiones. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional ha sostenido lo siguiente:

“(…) En cuanto a la motivación de los actos administrativos se debe entender como la fundamentación que deben dar las autoridades públicas del contenido del acto que emiten, tomando en cuenta los motivos de hecho y de derecho, y el fin que se pretende con la decisión. En reiterada jurisprudencia, este tribunal ha manifestado que la motivación de los actos administrativos es una exigencia del principio constitucional del debido proceso así como del derecho de defensa e implica una referencia a hechos y fundamentos de derecho, de manera que el administrado conozca los motivos por los cuales ha de ser sancionado o por los cuales se le deniega una gestión que afecta sus intereses o incluso sus derechos subjetivos (…)” Sentencia No. 7924- 1999 de las 17:48 hrs. del 13 de octubre de 1999.

VI.- PRINCIPIO DE INTERDICCION DE LA ARBITRARIEDAD, RAZONABILIDAD Y PROPORCIONALIDAD DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS. En el voto 2004-14421 de las 11:00 hrs. del 17 de diciembre de 2004, este Tribunal, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, estimó lo siguiente:

“(…) La regulación de los elementos constitutivos de carácter sustancial objetivos (motivo, contenido y fin) o subjetivos (competencia, legitimación e investidura) y formales (procedimiento y motivación) del acto administrativo, tienen por objeto racionalizar la función o conducta administrativa y, sobre todo, dotarla de logicidad o razonabilidad, evitando que las administraciones públicas sorprendan a los administrados con actos contradictorios, absurdos, desproporcionados o irracionales. Un aspecto de primer orden en todo acto administrativo es la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto entre los medios empleados por la administración pública respectiva y los fines que se pretenden lograr con éste, así como la idoneidad o necesidad de su contenido y, desde luego, cuando resulta aflictivo o de gravamen, la ponderación de su intervención o impacto mínimo. Precisamente por lo anterior, ha surgido en el Derecho Constitucional contemporáneo, como uno de los principios rectores de la función administrativa el de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, de acuerdo con el cual la conducta administrativa debe ser suficientemente coherente y razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad, de modo que se baste y principio dimana de lo establecido en la primera parte del artículo 11 de la Constitución Política al preceptuar que “Los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad. Están obligados a cumplir los deberes que la ley les impone y no pueden arrogarse facultades no concedidas en ella (…)”. No sobra, por lo demás, advertir, que la arbitrariedad no debe ser confundida con la discrecionalidad administrativa, esto es, con la posibilidad que tiene todo ente u órgano público de escoger entre varias opciones o soluciones (contenido), todas igualmente justas, ante el planteamiento de una necesidad determinada (motivo) y el uso de conceptos jurídicos indeterminados para atender un problema (motivo) los cuales suponen un margen de apreciación positiva y negativa y un halo de incertidumbre, pero que, en último término, admiten una única solución justa.(…)” VII.- SOBRE LAS VIOLACIONES AL DEBIDO PROCESO Y A LA MOTIVACIÓN DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS EN EL CASO CONCRETO. De las consideraciones realizadas, se deriva que el principio general es la obligación de motivar los actos administrativos de gravamen, dado que, dimana de la observancia y aplicación por parte de los entes y órganos públicos, de los principios de legalidad e interdicción de la arbitrariedad. De esta forma, la motivación del acto administrativo debe ser una exposición de las razones de hecho y de derecho que llevaron a su emisión, y no un mero escrúpulo formalista que pueda ser cumplido con la fabricación ad hoc de los motivos. Bajo esa inteligencia, observa este Tribunal Constitucional que en el caso concreto las autoridades de la Clínica Dr. Solón Núñez Frutos, violentaron estas garantías dispuestas a favor de la administrada. Lo anterior, por cuanto, no se le indicaron, expresamente, las razones por las cuales no volvió a ser tomada en cuenta para la realización de suplencias y nombramientos interinos en la referida clínica. Dicha omisión se reflejó en la imposibilidad de ejercer su derecho de defensa contra la verdadera motivación que sirvió de fundamento para la exclusión del rol de nombramientos interinos. En efecto, de las pruebas aportadas a los autos, se echa de menos una resolución motivada y por escrito que le justificara a la amparada la decisión en cuestión. Adicionalmente, cuando las autoridades recurridas resolvieron el reclamo presentado por la amparada, nunca se le informó que la medida adoptada por la Administración estuviera fundada en las razones de parentesco ya expuestas, sino que, por el contrario, de forma subrepticia se le indicó que, en ningún momento, se le habían suspendido los nombramientos interinos (ver folios 32-35). No fue, sino, hasta la investigación realizada por la Unión Médica Nacional, que el Coordinador de Consulta Externa del Área de Salud de Hatillo motivó, realmente, la decisión impugnada. Efectivamente, fue hasta la comunicación del oficio No. S.D.M.C.S.N.F.-209-07 del 5 de julio de 2007, que el recurrido le indicó al Presidente de la Unión Médica Nacional que, en su criterio, existía un impedimento “legal” para continuar nombrando a la Dra. Laura Muñoz. Dicho impedimento es, precisamente, la relación matrimonial de la amparada con el Dr. Láscarez Abarca (ver copias a folios 12-14). Tales contradicciones, sin duda alguna, han colocado en indefensión a la amparada frente a las irregularidades administrativas apuntadas. En consecuencia, se tiene por acreditada la infracción al debido proceso, invocada por la amparada.

VIII.- CONCLUSIÓN. Corolario de las consideraciones realizadas, se impone estimar el recurso de amparo y, por ende, restituir a la amparada en el goce de sus libertades.”