Omission of Prior Consultation with Indigenous Communities in AYA-CONAI AgreementOmisión de consulta previa a comunidades indígenas en convenio AYA-CONAI

**I.-** The petitioner complains of the violation of his fundamental rights, in particular of the provisions of ILO Convention 169, due to the omission of the authorities of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (regarding the approval of the "Framework agreement for cooperation, investment, and joint operation between the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas") to grant a prior hearing to the indigenous communities. Specifically, he accuses that the Comunidad de Guatuso was not heard beforehand. In his view, the foregoing is illegitimate and violates the Law of the Constitution.” **…III.-** The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on other occasions, has referred to the scope of ILO Convention 169 in relation to indigenous communities and, specifically, the obligation to ensure their participation, whenever legislative or administrative measures likely to affect them directly are envisaged, as is the specific case. In this regard, Article 6 of the aforementioned Convention establishes:

**“Article 6** 1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:

• a)consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly; b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them; c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose.

2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.” In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 2003-03485 of 2:07 p.m. on 2 May 2003, ordered:

*“IV.- As the Chamber has already noted, the Law of the Constitution establishes the State's responsibility to provide indigenous peoples with adequate instruments that guarantee their right to participate in decision-making on matters that concern them, and to organize themselves in elective institutions, administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes that concern them (Articles 6 and 33 of ILO Convention No. 169). It follows, then, that the legislator must design legal mechanisms that allow them to fully exercise that right. The norms in this matter must be oriented towards allowing broad and organized participation of the indigenous people.”* **IV.-** On the other hand, it must be mentioned that with the reform of Article 9 of the Constitution, through Law No. 8364 of 1 July 2003, the principle of participation in the Government of the Republic has been incorporated, thereby effecting a substantial modification in the form of power. The incorporation of this principle in Article 9 implies much more than a formal, purely adjectival matter of adding a new qualifier to the Government, understood as the assembly of public powers (see judgment No. 919-99); it represents a substantial change in the design of democracy and radically expands the content of the democratic principle recognized in Article 1 and deployed throughout the Political Constitution, by adding to the principle and mechanisms of representation on which our democracy has traditionally rested, the element of citizen participation. The Constitution, previously reformed, has created specific mechanisms for citizen participation, such as the referendum and the popular initiative; on the other hand, various laws predating the new constitutional text also contemplate other mechanisms through which individuals or collectivities intervene in public decision-making, thus, for example, Article 361 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública incorporates the hearing of representative entities of general or corporate interests in the procedures for drafting general rules; in Article 13 of the Código Municipal, plebiscites, referendums, and open town councils (cabildos) are contemplated. Thus, the existence of these instruments at the infra-constitutional level are signs of the existence of participatory democracy.

**V.-** Now, in the present case, it is established that the authorities of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (on the occasion of the approval of the "Framework agreement for cooperation, investment, and joint operation between the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas"), have omitted to grant a prior hearing to the indigenous communities, despite it being required by force of Article 9 of the Constitution and Article 6 of ILO Convention 169, all of which is undoubtedly improper and violates the fundamental rights of these collectivities, for which reason it is appropriate to grant the amparo action. Indeed, although the respondents allege in their report that the administration of water resources corresponds to the indigenous development associations, the failure to grant a prior hearing before the signing of the aforementioned agreement is conspicuous, which is illegitimate and violates the Law of the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, the amparo must be granted, not without first admonishing the respondents, based on the provisions of Article 50 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, not to incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave merit to the acceptance of this matter.

**I.-** The petitioner claims the violation of his fundamental rights, in particular of the provisions of Convention 169 of the I.L.O., by the omission of the authorities of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (regarding the approval of the "*Convenio marco de cooperación, inversión y operación conjunta entre el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas*") to grant a prior hearing to the indigenous communities. Specifically, he alleges that the Community of Guatuso was not previously heard. In his opinion, the foregoing is illegitimate and violates the Law of the Constitution.

**…III.-** The Constitutional Chamber, on other occasions, has referred to the scope of Convention 169 of the I.L.O. in relation to indigenous communities and, specifically, the obligation to ensure their participation, whenever legislative or administrative measures are foreseen that may directly affect them, as is the specific case. In this regard, Article 6 of the aforementioned Convention establishes:

**“Article 6** **1 .** *In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:* *a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly;* *b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them;* *c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose.* **2.** *The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”* On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber in judgment N°2003-03485 of 14:07 hrs. of May 2, 2003, held:

*“**IV.-** As the Chamber has already indicated, the Law of the Constitution establishes the State's responsibility to provide indigenous peoples with adequate instruments that guarantee their right to participate in the making of decisions that concern them, and to organize themselves in elective institutions, administrative bodies, and others responsible for policies and programmes that concern them (Articles 6 and 33 of Convention No. 169 of the ILO). It follows then that the legislator must design legal mechanisms that allow them to fully exercise that right. The norms in this area must be oriented in the sense of allowing broad and organized participation by indigenous people.”* **IV.-** On the other hand, it should be mentioned that with the reform of Article 9 of the Constitution, by operation of Law Nº8364 of July 1, 2003, the principle of participation has been incorporated into the Government of the Republic, thereby bringing about a substantial modification in the form of power. The incorporation of this principle into Article 9 implies much more than a formal, purely adjectival matter of adding a new qualifier to the Government, understood as the set of public powers (see judgment Nº919-99); it constitutes a substantial change in the design of democracy and radically expands the content of the democratic principle recognized in Article 1 and displayed throughout the Political Constitution, by adding the element of citizen participation to the principle and mechanisms of representation on which our democracy has traditionally rested. The Constitution, previously reformed, has created specific mechanisms of citizen participation, such as the referendum and popular initiative; on the other hand, various laws prior to the new constitutional text also contemplate other mechanisms through which persons or communities intervene in public decision-making, for example, Article 361 of the General Law of Public Administration incorporates the hearing to representative entities of general or corporate interests in the procedures for drafting norms of a general nature; in Article 13 of the Código Municipal, plebiscites, referendums, and town hall meetings are contemplated. Thus, the existence of these instruments at the infra-constitutional level are signs of the existence of participatory democracy.

**V.-** Now then, in the present case it has been proven that the authorities of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (on the occasion of the approval of the "*Convenio marco de cooperación, inversión y operación conjunta entre el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas*"), have omitted to grant a prior hearing to the indigenous communities, despite it being required by force of Article 9 of the Constitution and Article 6 of Convention 169 of the I.L.O., all of which is undoubtedly improper and violates the fundamental rights of these communities, for which reason it is appropriate to declare the appeal granted. Indeed, although the respondents allege in their report that the administration of water resources corresponds to the indigenous development associations, the granting of a prior hearing before the signing of the aforementioned agreement is lacking, which is illegitimate and violates the Law of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the amparo must be granted, not without first warning the respondents, based on the provisions of Article 50 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, that they must not incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave merit to the acceptance of this matter.”

“I.- El recurrente reclama la violación de sus derechos fundamentales, en particular de las disposiciones del Convenio 169 de la O.I.T., por la omisión de las autoridades de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (a propósito de la aprobación del "Convenio marco de cooperación, inversión y operación conjunta entre el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas") de conceder una audiencia previa a las comunidades indígenas. En concreto, acusa que no se escuchó previamente a la Comunidad de Guatuso. En su criterio, lo anterior es ilegítimo y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución.” “…III.- La Sala Constitucional, en otras oportunidades, se ha referido sobre los alcances del Convenio 169 de la O.I.T. en relación con las comunidades indígenas y, en concreto, la obligación de contar con su participación, cada vez que se prevean medidas legislativas o administrativas susceptibles de afectarlas directamente, como es el caso concreto. En este sentido, el artículo 6° del Convenio aludido establece:

“Artículo 6 1 . Al aplicar las disposiciones del presente Convenio, los gobiernos deberán:

• a)consultar a los pueblos interesados, mediante procedimientos apropiados y en particular a través de sus instituciones representativas, cada vez que se prevean medidas legislativas o administrativas susceptibles de afectarles directamente; b) establecer los medios a través de los cuales los pueblos interesados puedan participar libremente, por lo menos en la misma medida que otros sectores de la población, y a todos los niveles en la adopción de decisiones en instituciones electivas y organismos administrativos y de otra índole responsables de políticas y programas que les conciernan; c) establecer los medios para el pleno desarrollo de las instituciones e iniciativas de esos pueblos, y en los casos apropiados proporcionar los recursos necesarios para este fin.

2. Las consultas llevadas a cabo en aplicación de este Convenio deberán efectuarse de buena fe y de una manera apropiada a las circunstancias, con la finalidad de llegar a un acuerdo o lograr el consentimiento acerca de las medidas propuestas.” Sobre el particular, la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia N°2003-03485 de las 14:07 hrs. de 2 de mayo de 2003, dispuso:

“IV.- Como ya la Sala señaló, el Derecho de la Constitución, instaura la responsabilidad del Estado de dotar a los pueblos indígenas de instrumentos adecuados que les garanticen su derecho a participar en la toma de decisiones que les atañen, y a organizarse en instituciones electivas, organismos administrativos y de otra índole responsables de políticas y programas que les conciernan (artículos 6 y 33 del Convenio Nº 169 de OIT). Resulta entonces que el legislador debe diseñar mecanismos jurídicos que les permitan ejercer plenamente ese derecho. Las normas en esta materia han de orientarse en el sentido de permitir una amplia y organizada participación de los indígenas.” IV.- De otra parte, se debe mencionar que con la reforma del artículo 9º constitucional, por obra de la Ley Nº8364 de 1º de julio de 2003, se ha incorporado el principio de participación en el Gobierno de la República, con lo cual, se ha operado una modificación sustancial en la forma del poder. La incorporación de ese principio en el artículo 9º implica mucho más que un asunto formal, puramente adjetivo, de añadir un nuevo calificativo al Gobierno, entendido como conjunto de los poderes públicos (v. sentencia Nº919-99); se trata de un cambio sustancial en el diseño de la democracia y amplía radicalmente el contenido del principio democrático reconocido en el artículo 1º y desplegado en toda la Constitución Política, al sumar al principio y mecanismos de representación en los que ha descansado tradicionalmente nuestra democracia, el elemento de la participación ciudadana. La Constitución, previamente reformada, ha creado mecanismos específicos de participación ciudadana, como el referendum y la iniciativa popular; por otra parte, diversas leyes anteriores al nuevo texto constitucional contemplan también otros mecanismos mediante los cuales las personas o colectividades intervienen en la toma de decisiones públicas, así, por ejemplo, el artículo 361 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública incorpora la audiencia a entidades representativas de intereses de carácter general o corporativo en los procedimientos de elaboración de normas de carácter general; en el artículo 13 del Código Municipal, se contemplan los plebiscitos, referendums y cabildos. Así, la existencia de esos instrumentos a nivel infraconstitucional son signos de la existencia de la democracia participativa.

V.- Ahora bien, en el caso presente se tiene por demostrado que las autoridades de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (con motivo de la aprobación del "Convenio marco de cooperación, inversión y operación conjunta entre el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas"), han omitido conceder una audiencia previa a las comunidades indígenas, pese a que es requerido por fuerza del artículo 9° constitucional y 6° del Convenio 169 de la O.I.T, todo lo cual sin duda es indebido y lesiona los derechos fundamentales de estas colectividades, razón por la cual lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso. En efecto, aunque los recurridos alegan en su informe que la administración de los recursos hídricos le corresponde a las asociaciones de desarrollo indígena, se echa de menos la concesión de una audiencia previa a la suscripción del convenio aludido, lo cual es ilegítimo y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución. Por lo expuesto, se debe estimar el amparo, no sin antes advertir a los recurridos, con sustento en lo dispuesto por el artículo 50 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que no deben incurrir a futuro en los actos u omisiones que dieron mérito a la acogida de este asunto.”