Constitutionality of the Worker Protection BillConstitucionalidad del proyecto de Ley de Protección al Trabajador

Having completed the delimitation referred to in the preceding recitals, and based on the legal theses established by the Chamber, the possible unconstitutionalities that the petitioners formulate with specific indications are analyzed below, in the same order in which they are presented to the Chamber, with the warning that the numbering of the articles that this judgment will include corresponds to the wording and numbering of the copy of the bill dated December 13, 1999, provided to the case file and which is attached starting from page 21.

ARTICLE 3 OF THE BILL FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 63, 72, 73, AND 74 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The petitioners are not correct in considering that the bill converts the severance pay (indemnización por cesantía) into a worker's right, since, as indicated, there is no modification to the current system, with the indemnity (indemnización) remaining in its essence. Consequently, there is no violation of the provisions of numeral 63 of the Political Constitution. Nor is it possible to understand that the bill makes the transitory severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) regime permanent. What is maintained is that the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía) would yield in the eventual case that the unemployment insurance (seguro de desempleo) established by the fundamental charter is applied in the country, since, as has been indicated, if the latter exists, the indemnity would be substituted. It is also true, as already stated, that the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) is a "new" social contribution (carga social) established to be borne by employers (patronos). Being a power of the Legislative Assembly, exercised in accordance with the Political Constitution, and, furthermore, since the interested parties do not indicate in what sense it is unconstitutional, except that they accuse it based on their criterion—already stated to be without basis—that it is a regulation of the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) contrary to what is provided by Article 63, the Chamber must reject that there is any unconstitutionality. Additionally, the deputies who are consulting indicate that the bill violates the content of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which reaffirms the principle of solidarity. However, this does not prevent the legislator, in certain circumstances and by its very nature, from being able to establish social contributions (cargas sociales) on only one or some of the factors that concur in the production process. In labor law, the protective principle has been conceived as the need to protect the weaker party in the relationship, for which reason, historically and based on this principle, workers have been protected with certain contributions (cargas) supported mainly by employers (patronos) and the State itself.

ARTICLES 9, 10, 11, 12, AND 13 OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 28, 63, 73, AND 74 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. Regarding the supplementary pension regime (régimen de pensiones complementarias) established in the bill, the petitioners consider that it would be sustained with funds originating from the severance pay (indemnización por cesantía), but on this matter, the petitioners should be referred to what has been said throughout this judgment, on which it is not appropriate to continue expanding. Furthermore, it is indicated that the principle of private autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad) is violated, considering that the monies of the Capitalization Fund (Fondo de capitalización) are the property of the workers and therefore could not be invested in aspects on which they had not given their opinion. The Chamber does not share this criterion, since it involves, as indicated, monies intended to benefit the workers, administered by authorized institutions that can be freely chosen by the worker. Certainly, the withdrawal of the monies has been conditioned on two future events clearly determined in the law, since it aims to provide financial support to a supplementary pension regime (régimen de pensiones complementarias) and savings that can be used by the worker when they meet the legal requirements. Although the resources are to be managed in individual accounts, they do not enter the beneficiaries' assets (patrimonio) until the parameters established by law are verified. The fact that it is mandatory could in no way be considered harmful to the interests of the workers, since it aims to provide them with additional income via a pension for when they do not have ordinary income from wages and have taken ordinary retirement. It is a future benefit, which would not materialize if it were left to the worker's choice whether to join or not. And as the petitioners indicate, if a pension regime—ordinary—already exists, it must be understood that the establishment of another complementary one such as the one we are dealing with does not come to substitute the former, which we would call general, but rather to reinforce it, almost at no cost to the workers, and which would be given to them alongside the ordinary one, which would mean an improvement in their current situation. The Chamber does not accept the petitioners' thesis that the monies of the pension fund could only be administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as the institution constitutionally established to administer social insurance (seguros sociales). The problem lies in considering the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) as a social insurance (seguro social) in the sense used by the Political Constitution, which, as has been sufficiently explained, does not occur with the analyzed Fund and its special nature. Thus, given the different nature of the pension contained in the consulted bill and the social insurances administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), in this case there is no constitutional friction. It is also consulted whether there is a violation of the principle of private autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad) when the bill establishes that the supplementary pension regime (régimen de pensiones complementarias) would also receive the 1% mandatory savings established for workers in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. It is true that the Chamber has deemed the monies from the mandatory savings established in Article 5 of Law No. 4351 of July 11, 1969, to be the worker's property, given that from the workers' wages, the aforementioned law established the obligation to collect one percent that must be withheld by the employer (patrono) and delivered to the Banco Popular, for it to administer the money for the term established in Article 8. This is established with the dual purpose of providing funds to the banking institution and that the worker benefits from them both by being able to obtain loans and by enjoying their savings periodically, as these are partially returned after the period mentioned in Article 8 of the law. However, with the questioned reform, such monies do not cease to be the worker's property, even though they become part of the Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización), since this Fund, through its own mechanisms, also has the ultimate goal of benefiting the worker. Here we again find the principle of solidarity and contribution of all factors participating in the production process, as proclaimed by the Political Constitution. Hence, in the Chamber's opinion, the claimed unconstitutionality does not occur.

Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents in relation to what is provided in the Bill insofar as it removes the administration of the Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización) from the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), which violates Article 73 of the Constitution.

ARTICLE 8 OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The petitioners consider that said article of the bill confuses the employer contribution for severance (cesantía) with that of the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral), but as already explained in previous recitals, in the Chamber's opinion, this conclusion cannot be reached. Indeed, neither the provisions of Article 8, nor those of Article 30 of the bill, can lead to the understanding that there is an affectation of acquired rights. The Solidarity Associations (asociaciones solidaristas) and the savings cooperatives retain their rights, although from the effective date of the law they will be governed by different rules, with the regulations being applied to them prospectively. Even, as the bill clearly indicates, they are fully entitled to establish the so-called pension operators (operadoras de pensiones), participating under equal conditions as any other organizations of this type.

ARTICLE 40 BIS OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 41 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. In its Article 40 Bis, the bill establishes in its third paragraph: "…In any case, the operators (operadoras) must be liable for the integrity of the contributions of the workers and contributors with their assets (patrimonio) and if the same is not sufficient to cover the damage, once all instances established by law have been exhausted, the State shall make the missing compensation for such contributions and shall proceed to liquidate the Operator (Operadora), without prejudice to subsequent criminal and administrative actions." Regarding its content, the inclusion of this paragraph was made through motion No. 809 by Deputy Luis Fishmann, and it reproduces an effect of the State's protective principle, i.e., despite the respective operator (operadora) being directly responsible for the monies it administers, in the case of funds that would benefit workers and given the possibility that, even with all legal precautions taken, some operator might not meet its obligations, the State, as a last resort, would assume a subsidiary obligation destined to compensate shortfalls, all in order not to harm the beneficiaries. The Chamber feels that, due to the nature of the interests at stake, this type of liability can very well be established by ordinary law. It is a matter of granting confidence to the system, and only a deviated exercise could be attacked in the respective pathway, without the regulation as such being able to be attacked as illegitimate.

ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 23, 24, 46, AND 56 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The aspects contemplated in the mentioned article, regarding the reform of several articles of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), concerning the obtaining of data from the Dirección General de Tributación Directa and the possibility of ordering the closure of businesses, are measures adopted to give the institution a greater possibility of obtaining the contributions that by law must be deposited in its coffers to maintain the different social insurance regimes (regímenes de seguros sociales) it administers by constitutional mandate. Thus, from this perspective, since the provision of Article 73 of the Political Constitution is broad, there can be no unconstitutionality in the coordinated work of supplying vital information and the possibility of closing businesses, which seem to be included in the constitutional power granted to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) so that it can carry out its mission. This has been recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, and in that sense, see ruling of this Chamber number 6497, of 11:42 hours on December two, nineteen ninety-six, in which it was held that "the invocation of Article 24 of the Constitution has a limit in the subjective rights of the workers, recognized in the cited Article 73, and it is a value—solidarity—also constitutionally recognized; value and rights whose undeniable importance makes them a priority in this case. It is not compatible with the spirit of the Constitution that the company takes refuge in Article 24 to refuse to supply pertinent information to the Fund (Caja), without this infringing the corresponding right of the workers..." See also, in the same sense, rulings number 200-96 and 4720-96.

It is noted, however, that it will be the exercise of those powers that can be reviewed through specific constitutional processes, but not the norm itself which, as indicated, does not imply any constitutional injury. Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents and declares that the questioned norm would produce an injury to Article 24 of the Constitution.

ARTICLE 3, SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 183 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. What is provided in the consulted paragraph is no more than a development of what is already provided in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, in the sense that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is in charge of supervising the public treasury (hacienda pública) and, according to the following Article 184, of approving or disapproving the budgets of the entities indicated by the Constitution. Thus, it does not violate any principle or superior norm that the Law provides that the Comptroller's Office (Contraloría) can disapprove what in the budget draft (proyecto de presupuesto) submitted to it does not include the mentioned provision. It should be noted that during the legislative discussion, an unconstitutionality that the bill contained has been eliminated, in the sense of regulating the Legislative Assembly in a similar way, transferring the duty to include the corresponding items to the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda).

ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The petitioners consider that regarding the voluntary supplementary pension regime (régimen voluntario de pensiones complementarias), the law cannot establish 57 years as the minimum age to qualify for the pension, since it is a voluntary regime, and therefore these aspects should be regulated by the parties. Indeed, it must be distinguished that two types of supplementary pensions are established in the bill, the first being the mandatory one, which will be sustained with contributions established in Article 13 of the bill. The other regime is the voluntary one, to which only the worker contributes, if they so decide. We are, therefore, facing a voluntary regime in the strict sense of the term, so the worker will enter it, freely contracting if they consider the established criteria favorable, or they will simply not contract. But, on the other hand, the Chamber cannot dispute the Legislative Assembly regarding the technical criteria that have been used to estimate that even in the case of a voluntary regime, the age of fifty-seven years is what actuarially makes the existence of the regime viable. That question must be debated in another area, including the legislative one, so that it may be refuted or confirmed, but in the abstract, it is impossible for the Chamber to find that it is an unreasonable or disproportionate age. At least it does not appear as such, in light of what the mandatory pension regimes provide.

ARTICLE 73, FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The paragraph mentioned by the petitioners indicates: "ARTICLE 73. Special authorization rules to create operators (operadoras)… The Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Asociación Nacional de Educadores, the Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio, and the Sociedad de Seguros de Vida del Magisterio Nacional are authorized to jointly constitute a public limited company (sociedad anónima) with the sole purpose of establishing a pension operator (operadora de pensiones), which shall be considered, for the purposes of this law, as the only authorized operator (operadora) of the national teaching profession (magisterio nacional)…" The consulted article does not establish what the petitioning deputies argue, given that it authorizes different institutions, such as the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, Infocoop, JAPDEVA, and the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) to create an operator (operadora) so that they can collect the monies of the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de capitalización Laboral). Only with respect to the National Teaching Profession (Magisterio Nacional), because several organizations are involved, does the bill authorize them a single operator (operadora), but without indicating the obligation of all teachers to affiliate with this one only. The foregoing would contrast with what is provided in Article 11, also of the consulted bill, which empowers workers to choose their operator (operadora), and only in cases where the worker does not decide, the contributions will automatically be transferred to the operator of the National Teaching Profession (Magisterio Nacional) in the cases of workers affiliated with that union's pension system, and for the rest of the workers, it would be deposited in the operator of the Banco Popular.

TRANSITORY PROVISION V, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 182 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. By means of this transitory provision, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) is exempted from the application of the procedures of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) for the acquisition of the goods and services that the institution deems necessary to put into operation the Centralized Collection System (Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación) established in Article 31 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). In this sense, the transitory provision is related to the term that the bill itself establishes for putting the collection system into effect, that is, six months. It must be cited that this Chamber, in ruling number 998-98, examined the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) in general terms, to point out that there are two main institutes upon which the Constituent Power built the system: public bidding (licitación) as the suitable means for the execution of State contracts, lato sensu, and control in the hands of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). On that occasion, the different modalities of public bidding (licitación) were examined, which was found congruent with the text of Article one hundred and eighty-two of the Constitution. In light of that doctrine, and in reference to the specific case, whose special circumstances have been analyzed, the Chamber deems that the exemption regime contemplated in Transitory Provision V is not contrary to it, given that the guiding principles of the administrative procurement regime must be observed as much as possible, and the comptroller intervention—a posteriori—is not eliminated as a guarantee of the correctness of the authorized administration's actions. The Chamber understands that the legislator has granted a precise term for this, which does not appear unreasonable, taking into account that an efficient and suitable collection system must be implemented for the purposes pursued by the system, hence it is deemed that there is no claimed unconstitutionality.

Magistrates Nombre12677 and Nombre3835 dissent in relation to what is provided in this Transitory Provision of the Bill, insofar as they consider that the temporary authorization granted to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) for the acquisition of materials, goods, and services, without applying the procedures established in the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), violates Article 182 of the Constitution.

ARTICLES 77 AND 78, NEW, OF THE CONSULTED BILL, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW SYSTEM. In the first of the consulted articles, it is established that 15% of the profits (utilidades) of the State's public enterprises will be allocated to strengthen the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). And in the second, that from the profits (utilidades) of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, a 10% contribution must be made to strengthen the Occupational Risks Regime (Régimen de Riesgos del Trabajo). The consultation concerns the term "profit (utilidad)," with the petitioners considering that this cannot be used for the State. However, the bill establishes contributions to be paid by public entities, which are not part of the central administration, to strengthen already established special protection regimes. Hence, we are not dealing with monies budgeted by law for the service that the State must provide; rather, these are indeed institutions that generate surpluses in their operation, so the legislator has considered that these can be used to improve social security regimes, which cannot be considered unconstitutional. Since it is only consulted on the merits, the indicated provision is not unconstitutional in nature.

ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED BILL, FOR ALLEGED LEGISLATIVE EXCESS. The petitioners indicate that Article 82 of the bill reforms Article 44 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), indicating that despite the spirit of the bill being inclined to regulate the situation of salaried workers, and not that of independent workers, references to this latter group of workers are still maintained in the discussed text. In this sense, the Chamber does not find the inclination that the legislators indicate, neither in the statement of motives, nor in the content of the bill, but in any case, this is an aspect that in itself is not unconstitutional, and which, by its nature, is susceptible to being handled discretionally by the legislator. On the other hand, the deputies consult that Article 82 of the bill determines the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of employers (patronos) for the failure to make deductions they are obligated to, without indicating that fault is required for said liability to arise. This aspect cannot be defined in the abstract, and rather one must resort to criminal doctrine and even constitutional jurisprudence in examining the cases that arise in particular.

ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED BILL. In this article, Article 74 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) is reformed, which obligates all employers (patronos) and persons who totally or partially carry out independent or salaried activities, their duty to be up to date with the payment of their obligations, since this constitutes a requirement, among others, for the admissibility processing of any administrative authorization request, and for the registration of any document in the Public Mercantile Registry (Registro Público Mercantil). The content of the consulted article cannot be unconstitutional, since the legislator is fully empowered to regulate the circumstances of convenience and opportunity, such as the establishment of requirements for administrative and registry processing.

ARTICLE 85 OF THE CONSULTED BILL. This article adds to Article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), involving specific destinations for the funds of Law No. 5662 (Ley de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares), to cover the employer contribution (cuota patronal) for independent workers. The content of the consulted article indicates: "… For the case of independent workers whose net income is less than the legal minimum wage and who request their affiliation to the IVM of the CCSS, the State contribution shall be increased, in order to partially cover the absence of the employer contribution (cuota patronal). For such purposes, a special permanent program shall be created charged to the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares…". As the petitioners indicate, what is established in the studied article is a destination for the family allowances (asignaciones familiares) funds, a situation that is not contrary to the legislator's power, since, as is evident from the content of Law No. 5662 of December 23, 1974, in its Article three, the legislator provided the destinations for those funds, without it being determined that they are numerus clausus. Hence, if the legislator, through a modification of the mentioned law, now determines another similar destination that will have to be covered by the monies entering the family allowances fund, it cannot be considered as an excessive or illegitimate action.

Thus, the consultation formulated must be resolved in the sense that, in what has been consulted, the bill processed under file number No. 13.691 called "LEY DE PROTECCION AL TRABAJADOR," is not unconstitutional.

And as the consulting parties indicate, if an ordinary pension system already exists, it must be understood that the establishment of another complementary one, such as the one that concerns us, does not come to replace the former, which we would call general, but rather to reinforce it, almost without cost to the workers, and which would be delivered to them together with the ordinary pension, which would mean an improvement in their current situation. The Chamber does not accept the thesis of the consulting parties, considering that the pension fund monies could only be administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as the institution constitutionally established to administer social insurance. The problem lies in considering the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) as a social insurance in the sense used by the Political Constitution, which, as has been sufficiently explained, does not occur with the analyzed Fund and its special nature. Thus, given the different nature of the pension contained in the consulted project and the social insurance administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in this case there is no constitutional conflict. It is also consulted whether there is a violation of the autonomy of will when the project establishes that the 1% of mandatory savings established for workers in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal would also be contributed to the complementary pension system. It is true that the Chamber has deemed the monies from the mandatory savings established in Article 5 of Ley N° 4351 of July 11, 1969, to be the property of the worker, since the mentioned law established the obligation to collect one percent from the workers' salary, which must be withheld by the employer and delivered to the Banco Popular, so that it administers the money for the term established in Article 8. This is established with the dual purpose of providing funds to the banking institution and that the worker benefits from them, both by being able to obtain credit and by enjoying their savings periodically, as these are partially returned after the period mentioned in Article 8 of the law. However, with the questioned reform, such monies do not cease to be the property of the worker, although they become part of the Capitalization Fund, since this fund also, through its own mechanisms, has the ultimate goal of benefiting the worker. Here we again find the principle of solidarity and contribution of all factors participating in the production process, as proclaimed by the Political Constitution. Hence, in the Chamber's opinion, the claimed unconstitutionality does not occur. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents regarding what is provided in the Project insofar as it removes the administration of the Capitalization Fund from the hands of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which violates Article 73 of the Constitution. </span></p><ol start=\"3\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 8 OF THE PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The consulting parties consider that said article of the project confuses the employer's contribution for severance pay with that of the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral), but as already explained in previous recitals, in the Chamber's opinion, such a conclusion cannot be reached. In effect, neither the provisions of Article 8, nor those of Article 30 of the project, can lead one to understand that there is an affectation of acquired rights. Solidarity associations (asociaciones solidaristas) and savings cooperatives retain their rights, although as of the law's entry into force, they will be governed by different rules, applying the regulations prospectively. Even, as the project clearly indicates, they can, by operation of law, constitute the so-called pension operators (operadoras de pensiones), participating under equal conditions as any other organizations of this type. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 40 BIS OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 41 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. In its Article 40 Bis, the project establishes in its third paragraph: " …In any case, the operators must be liable for the integrity of the workers' and contributors' contributions with their own assets and if such assets are not sufficient to cover the damage, once all legally established instances have been exhausted, the State shall provide the missing compensation for such contributions and shall proceed to liquidate the Operator, without prejudice to subsequent criminal and administrative actions." Regarding its content, the inclusion of this paragraph was made through motion No. 809 by Deputy Luis Fishmann, and it reproduces an effect of the State's protectionist principle, that is, notwithstanding that the respective operator is directly responsible for the monies administered by it, dealing with funds that would benefit workers and given the possibility that even having taken all legal precautions, some operator might not fulfill its obligations, the State, as a last resort, would assume a subsidiary obligation intended to compensate shortfalls, all with the aim of not harming the beneficiaries. It seems to the Chamber that, given the nature of the interests at stake, this type of liability may well be established through ordinary law. It is about granting confidence to the system, and only a deviated exercise could be challenged in the respective avenue, without the regulation as such being able to be attacked as illegitimate. ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 23, 24, 46 AND 56 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The aspects contemplated in the mentioned article, regarding the reform of several articles of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, concerning the obtaining of data from the Dirección General de Tributación Directa and the possibility of ordering the closure of businesses, are measures adopted to give the institution a greater possibility of obtaining the contributions that by law must be deposited in its coffers to maintain the different social insurance systems it administers by constitutional mandate, so from that perspective, with the provision of Article 73 of the Political Constitution being broad, there can be no unconstitutionality in the coordinated work of supplying vital information and the possibility of closing businesses, which appear to be included within the constitutional power granted to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social so that it can fulfill its mission. This has been recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, and in that sense, one can see the judgment of this Chamber number 6497, at 11:42 hours on December 2, one thousand nine hundred ninety-six, in which it was held that **"the invocation of Article 24 of the Constitution has a limit in the subjective rights of the workers, recognized in the cited Article 73, and solidarity – a value also constitutionally recognized – is a value and rights whose undeniable importance makes them, in this case, a priority. It is not compatible with the spirit of the Constitution that the company takes refuge in Article 24 to refuse to supply pertinent information to the Caja, without this infringing on the corresponding rights of the workers..."** Judgments numbers 200-96 and 4720-96 can also be seen in the same sense. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">It is placed on record, however, that it will be the exercise of those powers that may be reviewed through specific constitutional processes, but not the rule itself, which, as indicated, does not imply any constitutional harm. Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents and declares that the questioned rule would cause harm to Article 24 of the Constitution.</span></p><ol start=\"5\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 3, SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 183 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. What is provided in the consulted paragraph is nothing more than a development of what is already provided for in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, in the sense that the Contraloría General de la República is responsible for overseeing public finances and, according to the following Article 184, for approving or disapproving the budgets of the entities indicated by the Constitution. Thus, it does not violate any principle or higher norm if the Law provides that the Contraloría may disapprove when the budget proposal submitted to it does not include the stated provision. It should be noted that during the legislative discussion, an unconstitutionality that the project contained has been made to disappear, regarding regulating the Legislative Assembly in a similar manner, transferring the duty to include the corresponding budget items to the Ministerio de Hacienda. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The consulting parties consider that, regarding the voluntary complementary pension system, the law cannot establish 57 years as the minimum age to qualify for the pension, since it is a voluntary system, and therefore these aspects should be regulated by the parties. Indeed, it must be distinguished that the project establishes two types of complementary pensions, the first being the mandatory one that will be sustained with contributions established by Article 13 of the project. The other system is the voluntary one, to which only the worker contributes, if he or she so decides. We are, then, faced with a voluntary system in the strict sense of the term, so the worker will enter it, freely contracting if he or she considers that the established criteria are favorable to him or her, or will simply not contract. But, on the other hand, the Chamber cannot dispute the technical criteria used by the Legislative Assembly to estimate that, even in the case of a voluntary system, the age of fifty-seven years is the one that actuarially makes the system's existence viable. That question must be debated in another sphere, including the legislative one, for it to be refuted or confirmed, but in the abstract it is impossible for the Chamber to come to the conclusion that it is an unreasonable or disproportionate age. At least it does not appear so, in light of what the mandatory pension systems provide. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 73, FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The paragraph mentioned by the consulting parties indicates: "ARTICLE 73. Special authorization rules for creating operators …The Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Asociación Nacional de Educadores, the Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio, and the Sociedad de Seguros de Vida del Magisterio Nacional are authorized to jointly form a public limited company (sociedad anónima) for the sole purpose of constituting a pension operator, which shall be considered for the purposes of this law, as the only authorized operator of the national teaching profession (magisterio nacional)…" The consulted article does not establish what the consulting deputies argue, for it authorizes different institutions, such as the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, Infocoop, Japdeva, and the Universidad de Costa Rica to create an operator so that they can capture the monies of the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral), only that regarding the National Teaching Profession, because several organizations are involved, the project authorizes them for a single operator, but without it being indicated that all teachers are obligated to affiliate exclusively with this one. The above would contrast with what is provided in Article 11, also of the consulted project, which empowers workers to choose their operator, and only in cases where the worker does not decide, the contributions will be automatically transferred to the operator of the National Teaching Profession in the cases of workers affiliated with that guild's pension system, and those of the rest of the workers would be deposited in the operator of the Banco Popular. </span></li></ol><ol start=\"9\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">TRANSITORY V, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 182 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. Through this transitory provision, the application of the procedures of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) is excepted for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social for the acquisition of goods and services that the institution deems necessary to put into operation the Centralized Collection System (Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación) established in Article 31 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. In this sense, the transitory provision is related to the deadline that the same project establishes to bring the collection system into force, that is, six months. It must be cited that this Chamber, in judgment number 998-98, examined the Public Procurement Law in general terms, to point out that there are two main principles upon which the Constituent Power built the system: public bidding as the ideal means for the execution of State contracts, lato sensu, and control in the hands of the Contraloría General de la República. On that occasion, the different bidding modalities were examined, which was found congruent with the text of Article one hundred eighty-two of the Constitution. In light of that doctrine, and in reference to the specific case, whose special circumstances have been analyzed, the Chamber estimates that the exception regime contemplated in Transitory V is not contrary to it, since the guiding principles of the public procurement regime must be observed as much as possible, and the intervention of the Comptroller – a posteriori – is not eliminated, as a guarantee of the correctness of the actions of the authorized administration. The Chamber understands that the legislator has granted a precise deadline for this, which does not appear unreasonable, taking into account that an efficient and suitable collection system must be implemented for the purposes pursued by the system; hence, it is deemed that the claimed unconstitutionality does not exist. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">Magistrates Nombre12677 and Nombre3835 dissent regarding what is provided in this transitory provision of the Project, in that they consider that the temporary authorization granted to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social for the acquisition of materials, goods, and services, without applying the procedures established in the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), violates Article 182 of the Constitution. </span></p><ol start=\"10\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLES 77 AND 78 NEW OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW. In the first of the consulted articles, it is established that 15% of the profits of State public enterprises shall be allocated to strengthen the Disability, Old Age, and Death system (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. And in the second, that 10% of the profits of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros must be contributed to strengthen the Occupational Hazards System (Régimen de Riesgos del Trabajo). The consultation is regarding the term "profit," with the consulting parties considering that this cannot be used for the State. However, what the project establishes are contributions to be borne by public entities, which are not part of the central administration, to strengthen established special protection systems; hence, we are not dealing with funds budgeted by law for the service the State must provide, but rather it effectively concerns institutions that generate surpluses in their operation, and therefore the legislator has considered that these can be used to improve social security systems, which cannot be considered unconstitutional. As the consultation is solely regarding the substance, the indicated provision does not have a character of unconstitutionality. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT, FOR ALLEGED LEGISLATIVE EXCESS. The consulting parties indicate that Article 82 of the project reforms Article 44 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, indicating that although the spirit of the project leans towards regulating the situation of salaried workers, not that of independent workers, the discussed text still maintains references to this latter group of workers. In this sense, the Chamber does not find the inclination that the legislators indicate, neither in the statement of legislative intent (exposición de motivos), nor in the content of the project, but in any case, it is an aspect that in itself is not unconstitutional, and that by its nature is susceptible to being handled discretionarily by the legislator. On the other hand, the deputies consult that Article 82 of the project determines the strict liability of employers for the failure to make deductions to which they are obligated, without indicating that culpability is required for such liability to arise. This aspect cannot be defined in the abstract, and rather one must resort to criminal doctrine and even constitutional jurisprudence in the examination of cases that arise in particular. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT. This article reforms Article 74 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which obligates all employers and persons who carry out wholly or partially independent or salaried activities to be up to date with the payment of their obligations, as this constitutes a requirement, among others, for the admissibility processing of any administrative application for authorization, and for the registration of any document in the Public Commercial Registry (Registro Público Mercantil). The content of the consulted article cannot be unconstitutional, as the legislator is fully empowered to regulate circumstances of convenience and opportunity, such as the establishment of requirements for administrative and registry processing. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 85 OF THE CONSULTED LEGISLATIVE PROJECT. This article adds to Article 3 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, involving specific destinations for the funds of Ley N° 5662 (Law for Social Development and Family Allowances, Ley de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares), to make up the employer's contribution for independent workers. The content of the consulted article indicates: "… For the case of independent workers whose net income is lower than the legal minimum wage and who request their affiliation to the IVM of the CCSS, the State's contribution will be increased in order to partially compensate for the absence of the employer's contribution. For such purposes, a permanent special program will be created under the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares…". As the consulting parties indicate, what is established in the studied article is a destination for the family allowance funds, a situation that is not contrary to the legislator's power, since, as is clear from the content of Ley N° 5662 of December 23, 1974, in its Article 3, the legislator provided the destinations for those funds, without determining that it was a numerus clausus; hence, if the legislator, by modifying the mentioned law, now determines another – similar – destination that must be covered by the monies entering the family allowance fund, it cannot be considered an excessive or illegitimate action. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">Thus, the formulated consultation must be evacuted in the sense that, in what was consulted, the legislative project processed under file number No. 13.691 called "WORKER PROTECTION LAW (LEY DE PROTECCION AL TRABAJADOR)", is not unconstitutional.

Having made the delimitation referred to in the preceding recitals (considerandos), and based on the legal theses established by the Chamber, the possible unconstitutionalities that the consulting parties formulate with specific indications are analyzed below, in the same order in which they are presented to the Chamber, with the warning that the numbering of the articles included in this judgment corresponds to the wording and numbering of the copy of the bill dated December 13, 1999, provided in the case file and which is attached starting from folio 21.

1. ARTICLE 3 OF THE BILL FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 63, 72, 73, AND 74 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The consulting parties are incorrect in considering that the bill converts the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) into a right of the worker, because, as indicated, there is no modification to the current system, and the severance pay is maintained in its essence. Consequently, there is no violation of the provisions of numeral 63 of the Political Constitution. Nor is it possible to understand that the bill makes the transitory regime of severance pay permanent. What is maintained is that the severance pay would cease in the event that the unemployment insurance established by the fundamental charter is applied in the country, since, as has been indicated, if the latter exists, the severance pay would be substituted. It is also true, as already stated, that the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) is a "new" social charge (carga social) established at the expense of employers. Since this is a power of the Legislative Assembly, exercised in accordance with the Political Constitution, and furthermore, because the interested parties do not indicate in what sense it is unconstitutional, except that they accuse it based on their criterion—already stated to be unfounded—that it is a regulation of severance pay contrary to the provisions of Article 63, the Chamber must reject any unconstitutionality. Furthermore, the deputies who consult indicate that the bill violates the content of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which reaffirms the principle of solidarity. However, this does not prevent the legislator, in certain circumstances, due to its very nature, from establishing social charges on only one or some of the factors that concur in the production process. In labor law, the protective principle has been conceived as the need to protect the weaker party in the relationship, which is why, historically and based on this principle, workers have been protected with certain charges borne mainly by employers and the State itself.

2. ARTICLES 9, 10, 11, 12, AND 13 OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 28, 63, 73, AND 74 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. Regarding the complementary pension scheme established in the bill, the consulting parties consider that it would be sustained with funds originating from the severance pay, but on this topic, the consulting parties should be referred to what has been stated throughout this judgment, on which it is not appropriate to continue elaborating. Furthermore, it is indicated that the principle of party autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad) is violated, considering that the monies from the Capitalization Fund are the property of the workers and therefore could not be invested in aspects on which they had not given their opinion. The Chamber does not share this criterion, because it involves, as indicated, monies intended to benefit the workers, administered by authorized institutions and which can be freely chosen by the worker. Certainly, the withdrawal of the monies has been conditioned upon two future events clearly determined in the law, as the aim is to provide financial support for a complementary pension scheme and savings that can be used by the worker when they meet the legal requirements. Although the resources are to be managed in individual accounts, they do not enter the beneficiaries' assets until the parameters established by law are verified. The fact that it is mandatory can in no way be considered detrimental to the workers' interests, because the aim is to provide them with additional income via a pension for when they do not have ordinary salary income and have taken ordinary retirement. It is a future benefit that would not materialize if it were left to the worker's choice whether to join or not. And as the consulting parties indicate, if an ordinary pension scheme already exists, the establishment of another complementary one, such as the one at hand, must be understood as not replacing the former—which we would call general—but reinforcing it, almost at no cost to the workers, and which would be delivered together with the ordinary one, which would mean an improvement in their current situation. The Chamber does not accept the consulting parties' thesis, that the monies from the pension fund could only be administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as the institution constitutionally established to administer social insurances. The problem lies in considering the Labor Capitalization Fund as a social insurance in the sense used by the Political Constitution, which, as has been sufficiently explained, is not the case with the analyzed Fund and its special nature. Thus, given the different nature of the pension contained in the consulted bill and the social insurances administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, no constitutional conflict arises in this case. It is also consulted whether there is a violation of party autonomy when the bill establishes that the 1% mandatory savings established for workers in favor of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal would also be contributed to the complementary pension scheme. It is true that the Chamber has deemed the monies from the mandatory savings established in Article 5 of Ley N° 4351 of July 11, 1969, to be the worker's property, since the aforementioned law established the obligation to collect one percent from workers' salaries, which must be withheld by the employer and delivered to the Banco Popular, for the bank to administer the money for the term established in Article 8. This is established for the dual purpose of providing funds to the banking institution and ensuring that the worker benefits both by being able to obtain loans and by enjoying their savings periodically, as these are partially returned after the period mentioned in Article 8 of the law. However, with the questioned reform, such monies do not cease to be the worker's property, even though they become part of the Capitalization Fund, since the Fund also, through its own mechanisms, has the ultimate objective of benefiting the worker. Here we again find the principle of solidarity and contribution of all factors participating in the production process, as proclaimed by the Political Constitution. Hence, in the Chamber's opinion, the alleged unconstitutionality does not occur.

Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents from the vote regarding what is provided in the Bill insofar as it removes the administration of the Capitalization Fund from the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which violates Article 73 of the Constitution.

3. ARTICLE 8 OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The consulting parties consider that said article of the bill confuses the employer's contribution for severance pay with that of the Labor Capitalization Fund, but as already explained in previous recitals, in the Chamber's opinion, this conclusion cannot be reached. Indeed, neither the provisions of Article 8, nor those of Article 30 of the bill, can lead one to understand that there is an impairment of vested rights. Solidarity associations (asociaciones solidaristas) and savings cooperatives retain their rights, although starting from the law's entry into force, they will be governed by different rules, with the regulation being applied going forward. Indeed, as the bill clearly indicates, by operation of law they may constitute the so-called pension operators, participating under equal conditions as any other organizations of this type.

4. ARTICLE 40 BIS OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 41 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. In its Article 40 Bis the bill establishes in its third paragraph: "… In any case, the operators must be liable for the integrity of the workers' and contributors' contributions with their equity and, if it proves insufficient to cover the damage, once all legal remedies have been exhausted, the State shall provide the missing compensation for such contributions and shall proceed to liquidate the Operator, without prejudice to subsequent criminal and administrative actions." Regarding its content, the inclusion of this paragraph was made by motion No. 809 of Deputy Luis Fishmann, and it reproduces an effect of the State's protectionist principle, that is, even though the respective operator is directly responsible for the monies it administers, given that these are funds that benefit workers and the possibility that, even after taking all legal precautions, an operator might fail to meet its obligations, the State would ultimately assume a subsidiary obligation intended to compensate for shortfalls, all for the purpose of not harming the beneficiaries. It seems to the Chamber that, due to the nature of the interests at stake, this type of liability can well be established by ordinary law. The purpose is to give confidence to the system, and only a deviated exercise could be challenged in the respective forum, without the regulation as such being attackable as illegitimate.

ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 23, 24, 46, AND 56 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The aspects considered in the mentioned article, regarding the reform of several articles of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), with respect to obtaining data from the Tax Administration (Tributación Directa) and the possibility of ordering the closure of businesses, are measures adopted to give the institution a greater possibility of obtaining the contributions that by law must be deposited into its coffers to maintain the various social insurance schemes it administers by constitutional mandate. Thus, from that perspective, since the provision of Article 73 of the Political Constitution is broad, there can be no unconstitutionality in the coordinated work of providing vital information and the possibility of closing businesses, which appear to be included in the constitutional power granted to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund so that it can fulfill its purpose. This has been recognized by constitutional jurisprudence, and in that sense, one can see judgment number 6497 of this Chamber, issued at 11:42 a.m. on December 2, 1996, in which it was held that "the invocation of Article 24 of the Constitution has a limit in the subjective rights of workers, recognized in the cited Article 73, and it is a value—solidarity—also constitutionally recognized; a value and rights whose undeniable importance makes them, in this case, a priority. It is not compatible with the spirit of the Constitution for the company to take shelter in Article 24 to refuse to provide pertinent information to the Fund, without this infringing upon the corresponding rights of the workers..." Judgments numbers 200-96 and 4720-96 can also be seen in the same sense.

It is recorded, however, that it will be the exercise of those powers that may be reviewed through specific constitutional processes, but not the norm itself which, as indicated, does not imply any constitutional injury. Magistrate Nombre12677 dissents from the vote and declares that the questioned norm would produce an injury to Article 24 of the Constitution.

5. ARTICLE 3, SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 183 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The provisions of the consulted paragraph are nothing more than a development of what is already provided in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, in the sense that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is in charge of overseeing the public treasury (hacienda pública) and, according to the subsequent Article 184, of approving or objecting to the budgets of the entities indicated by the Constitution. Thus, it does not violate any principle or higher norm for the law to provide that the Comptroller's Office may object if the budget proposal submitted to it does not include the referenced provision. It should be noted that during the course of the legislative discussion, an unconstitutionality previously contained in the bill was eliminated, in the sense of regulating the Legislative Assembly in a similar manner, by transferring the duty to include the corresponding items to the Ministry of Finance.

6. ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSULTED BILL FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The consulting parties consider that regarding the voluntary complementary pension scheme, the law cannot establish 57 years as the minimum age to qualify for the pension, since it is a voluntary scheme, and therefore these aspects should be regulated by the parties.

Indeed, it must be distinguished that the project establishes two types of complementary pensions, the first being mandatory, which will be sustained by contributions established in Article 13 of the project. The other regime is voluntary, to which only the worker contributes, if they so decide. We are, therefore, facing a voluntary regime in the strict sense of the term, so the worker will enter it, freely contracting if they consider the established criteria to be favorable or simply not contracting. But, on the other hand, the Chamber cannot dispute the Legislative Assembly's technical criteria used to estimate that even in the case of a voluntary regime, the age of fifty-seven years is the one that makes the existence of the regime actuarially viable. That question must be debated in another forum, including the legislative one, so that it may be disproved or confirmed, but in the abstract it is impossible for the Chamber to come to estimate that it is an unreasonable or disproportionate age. At least it does not appear as such, in light of what the mandatory pension regimes provide. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 73, FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE PROJECT CONSULTED, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The paragraph mentioned by the consulting parties states: \" ARTICLE 73. Special authorization rules for creating operators …The Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Asociación Nacional de Educadores, the Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio, and the Sociedad de Seguros de Vida del Magisterio Nacional are authorized to jointly form a corporation (sociedad anónima) for the sole purpose of establishing a pension operator, which shall be considered, for the purposes of this law, as the sole authorized operator of the national teaching profession (magisterio nacional)…\" The consulted article does not establish what the consulting deputies argue, since it authorizes different institutions, such as the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, Infocoop, Japdeva, and the Universidad de Costa Rica to create an operator for the purpose of being able to capture the monies of the Fondo de Capitalización Laboral, only that regarding the Magisterio Nacional, because several organizations are involved, the project authorizes them a single operator, but without indicating the obligation of all teachers to affiliate solely with this one. The foregoing would contrast with the provisions of Article 11, also of the consulted project, which empowers workers to choose their operator and only in cases where the worker does not decide, the contributions will be automatically transferred to the operator of the Magisterio Nacional in the cases of workers affiliated with the pension system of that guild and those of the rest of the workers would be deposited in the operator of the Banco Popular. </span></li></ol><ol start=\"9\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">TRANSITORY V, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 182 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. Through this transitory provision, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is exempted from the application of the procedures of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa for the acquisition of goods and services that the institution deems necessary to put into operation the Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación established in Article 31 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. In this sense, the transitory provision is related to the deadline that the same project establishes to bring the collection system into force, that is, six months. It should be cited that this Chamber, in ruling number 998-98, examined the Ley de Contratación Administrativa in general terms, to point out that there are two main pillars upon which the Constituent built the system: public bidding (licitación) as the suitable means for the conclusion of State contracts, lato sensu, and control in the hands of the Contraloría General de la República. On that occasion, the different modalities of public bidding were examined, which was found consistent with the text of Article one hundred and eighty-two of the Constitution. In light of that doctrine, and in reference to the specific case, whose special circumstances have been analyzed, the Chamber considers that the exceptional regime contemplated in Transitory V is not contrary to it, since the guiding principles of the administrative contracting regime must be observed as much as possible and the intervention of the Comptroller's office –a posteriori– is not eliminated as a guarantee of the correctness of the authorized administration's actions. The Chamber understands that the legislator has granted a precise deadline for this, which does not appear unreasonable, taking into account that an efficient and suitable collection system must be put into practice for the purposes pursued by the system, hence it is considered that the claimed unconstitutionality does not exist. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">Magistrates Nombre12677 and Nombre3835 dissent regarding the provisions of this transitory provision of the Project, as they consider that the temporary authorization granted to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social for the acquisition of materials, goods, and services, without applying the procedures established in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, violates Article 182 of the Constitution. </span></p><ol start=\"10\" type=\"1\" style=\"margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt\"><li style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">NEW ARTICLES 77 AND 78 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW SYSTEM. The first of the consulted articles establishes that from the profits (utilidades) of the public enterprises of the State, 15% will be allocated to strengthen the Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte regime of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. And the second, that from the profits (utilidades) of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, a 10% contribution must be made for the strengthening of the Riesgos del Trabajo Regime. What is consulted is regarding the term \"profit\" (utilidad), the consulting parties considering that this cannot be used for the State. However, the project establishes contributions chargeable to public entities, which are not from the central administration, to strengthen special protection regimes already established, hence we are not dealing with funds budgeted by law for the service that the State must provide, but rather it effectively involves institutions that generate surpluses in their operation, for which reason the legislator has considered that these can be used to improve social security regimes, which cannot be considered unconstitutional. As it is only consulted regarding the substance, the indicated provision does not bear the character of unconstitutional. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT, FOR ALLEGED LEGISLATIVE EXCESS. The consulting parties indicate that Article 82 of the project reforms Article 44 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, indicating that despite the spirit of the project being inclined to regulate the situation of salaried workers, but not that of independent workers, the discussed text still maintains references to this latter group of workers. In this sense, the Chamber does not find the inclination that the legislators indicate, neither in the statement of motives, nor in the content of the project, but in any case, it is an aspect that in itself is not unconstitutional, and which by its nature is susceptible to being handled discretionarily by the legislator. On the other hand, the deputies consult that Article 82 of the project determines the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of employers for the failure to make deductions to which they are obliged, without indicating that fault is required for said liability to arise. This aspect cannot be defined in the abstract and rather one must resort to criminal doctrine and even constitutional jurisprudence in the examination of cases that arise in particular. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 82 OF THE CONSULTED PROJECT. This article reforms Article 74 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in which all employers and persons who totally or partially carry out independent or salaried activities are obligated, their duty to be up to date with the payment of their obligations since this constitutes a requirement, among others, for the admissibility process of any administrative authorization request, and for the registration of any document in the Registro Público Mercantil. The content of the consulted article cannot be unconstitutional, since the legislator is fully empowered to regulate circumstances of convenience and opportunity, such as the establishment of requirements for administrative and registry processing. </span></li><li style=\"margin-left:36pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-size:10pt\">ARTICLE 85 OF THE CONSULTED BILL. This article adds Article 3 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, involving specific allocations of funds from Ley N° 5662 (Ley de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares), to cover the employer contribution (cuota patronal) of independent workers. The content of the consulted article states: \"… For the case of independent workers whose net income is less than the legal minimum wage and who request their affiliation to the IVM of the CCSS, the State's contribution shall be increased, in order to partially cover the absence of the employer contribution (cuota patronal). For such purposes, a permanent special program charged to the Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares shall be created…\". As the consulting parties indicate, what is established in the article studied is an allocation of the family allowances funds, a situation that is not contrary to the legislator's power, since, as is evident from the content of Ley N° 5662 of December 23, 1974, in its Article three, the legislator provided the allocations of those funds, without it being determined that they are a numerus clausus, hence, if the legislator, through modification of the aforementioned law, now determines another – similar – allocation that must be covered by the monies entering the family allowances fund, it cannot be considered an excessive or illegitimate action. </span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'Roman 12cpi'\">Thus, the consultation formulated must be resolved in the sense that, in what was consulted, the bill processed under file number N° 13.691 named \"LEY DE PROTECCION AL TRABAJADOR\", is not unconstitutional. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>" }

Realizada la delimitación a que se refieren los considerandos anteriores, y partiendo de las tesis jurídicas sentadas por la Sala, de seguido se analizan las posibles inconstitucionalidades que con señalamientos específicos, formulan los consultantes, en el mismo orden en que se presentan a la Sala, con la advertencia de que la numeración de los artículos que incluirá esta sentencia corresponde a la redacción y numeración de la copia del proyecto fechada 13 de diciembre de 1999 aportada a los autos y que corre agregada a partir del folio 21.

ARTICULO 3 DEL PROYECTO POR VIOLACION A LOS ARTICULOS 63, 72, 73 Y 74 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. No llevan razón los consultantes al considerar que el proyecto de ley convierte la indemnización por cesantía en un derecho del trabajador, pues como se indicó no existe una modificación al sistema actual, manteniéndose la indemnización en su esencia. En consecuencia, no existe violación a lo preceptuado en el numeral 63 de la Constitución Política. Tampoco es posible entender que con el proyecto se deja permanente el régimen transitorio de la indemnización. Lo que se mantiene es que el auxilio de cesantía cedería en el eventual caso de que se aplique en el país el seguro de desempleo que establece la carta fundamental, pues como se ha indicado, al existir éste último, la indemnización sería sustituida. Es cierto además, como ya se dijo, que el Fondo de Capitalización Laboral es una carga social "nueva" que se establece a cargo de los patronos. Siendo una potestad de la Asamblea Legislativa, ejercida de conformidad con la Constitución Política y, además, como no señalan los interesados en qué sentido resulta inconstitucional, salvo que lo acusan partiendo de su criterio –ya se dijo que sin base- de que es una regulación del auxilio de cesantía en contra de lo dispuesto por el artículo 63, la Sala debe rechazar que haya inconstitucionalidad alguna. Además, indican los diputados que consultan, que el proyecto viola el contenido del artículo 74 de la Constitución Política, que reafirma el principio de solidaridad. Sin embargo, ello no obsta para que, en determinadas circunstancias, por su propia naturaleza, el legislador pueda establecer cargas sociales a solo uno o algunos de los factores que concurren en el proceso de producción. En derecho del trabajo, el principio protector, ha sido concebido como la necesidad de que se proteja a la parte más débil de la relación, razón por la que históricamente y fundado en este principio se haya protegido a los trabajadores con determinadas cargas que soportan mayormente los patronos y el Estado mismo.

ARTICULOS 9, 10, 11, 12 Y 13 DEL PROYECTO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION A LOS ARTICULOS 28, 63, 73 Y 74 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. En cuanto al régimen de pensiones complementarias establecido en el proyecto, consideran los consultantes que éste se sostendría con fondos provenientes de la indemnización por cesantía, pero sobre este tema debe remitirse a los consultantes a lo que se lleva dicho a lo largo de esta sentencia, sobre lo cual no resulta apropiado seguirse extendiendo. Además, se indica que se violenta el principio de autonomía de la voluntad, al considerar que los dineros del Fondo de capitalización son de propiedad de los trabajadores y por ello no se podrían invertir en aspectos de los que ellos no hubieran otorgado su opinión. No comparte la Sala este criterio, pues se trata, como se indicó, de dineros destinados a beneficiar a los trabajadores, administrados por instituciones autorizadas y que pueden ser libremente escogidas por el trabajador. Ciertamente, el retiro de los dineros se ha condicionado a dos hechos futuros determinados con claridad en la ley, pues se trata de darle soporte financiero a un régimen de pensiones complementarias y un ahorro que puede ser utilizado por el trabajador cuando cumpla con los requisitos de ley. Si bien los recursos han de ser manejados en cuentas individuales, no ingresan al patrimonio de los beneficiarios, sino hasta que se verifiquen los parámetros establecidos por la ley. El hecho de que sea obligatoria, en ningún momento se podría considerar como perjudicial a los intereses de los trabajadores, pues se trata de dotarlos de un ingreso adicional vía pensión para cuando no registren ingresos ordinarios por salarios y se hayan acogido a la jubilación ordinaria. Se trata de un beneficio a futuro, que no llegaría a plasmarse si quedara a elección del trabajador incorporarse o no. Y como lo indican los consultantes, si ya existe un régimen de pensión –ordinario-, debe entenderse que el establecimiento de otro complementario como el que nos ocupa. Éste, no viene a sustituir al anterior que llamaríamos general, sino a reforzarlo, casi sin costo para los trabajadores, y que le sería entregado junto al ordinario, lo que vendría a significar una mejora en su situación actual. La Sala no acepta la tesis de los consultantes, al considerar que los dineros del fondo de pensiones solo podrían ser administrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, como institución constitucionalmente establecida para administrar los seguros sociales. El problema estriba en considerar el Fondo de Capitalización Laboral como un seguro social en el sentido utilizado por la Constitución Política, lo que como se ha explicado suficientemente, no sucede con el Fondo analizado y su especial naturaleza. Así, dada la distinta naturaleza de la pensión que contiene el proyecto consultado y los seguros sociales administrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en la especie no se presenta ningún roce constitucional. También se consulta si existe violación a la autonomía de la voluntad cuando en el proyecto se establece que al régimen de pensiones complementarias le sería también aportado el 1% de ahorro obligatorio establecido a los trabajadores a favor del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. Cierto que la Sala ha reputado como propiedad del trabajador los dineros provenientes del ahorro obligatorio establecido en el artículo 5 de la ley N° 4351 de 11 de julio de 1969, toda vez que del salario de los trabajadores la ley mencionada estableció la obligación de captar un uno por ciento que debe ser retenido por el patrono y entregado al Banco Popular, para que éste administre el dinero por término establecido en el artículo 8. Así se establece, con el doble propósito de dotar de fondos a la institución bancaria y que de ellos se beneficie el trabajador tanto al poder obtener créditos, como por disfrutar de su ahorro periódicamente, al ser éstos devueltos parcialmente luego del periodo mencionado en el artículo 8 de la ley. Sin embargo, con la reforma cuestionada tales dineros no dejan de ser propiedad del trabajador, si bien pasan a formar parte del Fondo de Capitalización, ya que éste también, a través de sus propios mecanismos, tiene como objetivo final beneficiar al trabajador. Aquí nuevamente encontramos el principio de solidaridad y de contribución de todos los factores que participan en el proceso de producción, como lo proclama la Constitución Política. De allí que en criterio de la Sala no se da la inconstitucionalidad reclamada.

El Magistrado Nombre12677 salva el voto en relación con lo previsto en el Proyecto en cuanto sustrae la administración del Fondo de Capitalización de manos de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, lo que viola el artículo 73 de la Constitución.

ARTICULO 8 DEL PROYECTO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL ARTICULO 34 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. Los consultantes consideran que dicho artículo del proyecto confunde el aporte patronal para la cesantía con el del Fondo de Capitalización Laboral, pero como ya se explicó en considerandos anteriores, en criterio de la Sala no puede llegarse a dicha conclusión. En efecto, ni lo dispuesto en el artículo 8, ni tampoco lo del artículo 30 del proyecto, pueden llevar a entender que hay una afectación de derechos adquiridos. Las asociaciones solidaristas y las cooperativas de ahorro conservan sus derechos, aunque a partir de la vigencia de la ley se van a regir por reglas diferentes, aplicándoseles la normativa hacia el futuro. Incluso, como claramente lo indica el proyecto, de pleno derecho pueden constituir las llamadas operadoras de pensiones, participando en igualdad de condiciones que cualesquiera otras organizaciones de este tipo.

ARTICULO 40 BIS DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION A LOS ARTICULOS 9 Y 41 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. En su artículo 40 Bis el proyecto establece en su párrafo tercero: " …En todo caso, las operadoras deben responder por la integridad de los aportes de los trabajadores y cotizantes con su patrimonio y si el mismo no resultare suficien__te para cubrir el perjuicio, una vez agotadas todas las instancias establecidas por ley, el Estado realizará la compensación faltante de tales aportes y procederá a liquidar la Operadora, sin perjuicio de posteriores acciones penales y administrativas.". En cuanto a su contenido, la inclusión de éste párrafo se hizo mediante moción N° 809 del diputado Luis Fishmann, y se reproduce un efecto del principio proteccionista del Estado, sea que no obstante la respectiva operadora es la responsable directa de los dineros por ella administrados, en tratándose de fondos que beneficiarían a los trabajadores y ante la posibilidad de que aun tomadas todas las cautelas legales, alguna operadora no cumpliera con sus obligaciones, el Estado en última instancia asumiría una obligación subsidiaria destinada a compensar faltantes, todo con el fin de no perjudicar a los beneficiarios. A la Sala le parece que, por la naturaleza de los intereses que están en juego, este tipo de responsabilidad bien puede ser establecido mediante ley ordinaria. Se trata de otorgar confianza al sistema y solamente un ejercicio desviado podría ser atacado en la vía respectiva, sin que la normativa como tal, pueda atacarse de ilegítima. ARTICULO 82 DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION A LOS ARTICULOS 23, 24, 46 Y 56 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. Los aspectos contemplados en el artículo mencionado, respecto de la refor de varios artículos de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en lo que respecta a la obtención de datos de Tributación Directa y la posibilidad de ordenar el cierre de negocios, son medidas adoptadas para dar a la institución mayor posibilidad de obtener las cotizaciones que por ley deben ser depositadas en sus arcas para mantener los distintos regímenes de seguros sociales que administra por mandato constitucional, así que desde esa óptica, siendo amplia la disposición del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, no puede existir inconstitucionalidad en el trabajo coordinado de suministro de información vital y la posibilidad de clausurar negocios, los que parecen estar incluidos en la facultad constitucional otorgada a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para que pueda realizar su cometido.Así lo ha reconocido la jurisprudencia constitucional y en ese sentido puede verse la sentencia de esta Sala número 6497, de las 11:42 horas del día dos de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis, en la que se sostuvo que "la invocación del artículo 24 de la Constitución tiene un límite en los derechos subjetivos de los trabajadores, reconocidos en el citado artículo 73, y es un valor –la solidaridad- también constitucionalmente reconocido; valor y derechos cuya innegable importancia los hace en este caso prioritarios. No es compatible con el espíritu de la Constitución que la empresa se parapete en el artículo 24 para negarse a suministrar a la Caja información pertinente, sin que ello infrinja el correspondiente derecho de los trabajadores..." Pueden verse también, en el mismo sentido, sentencias números 200-96 y 4720-96.

Se deja constancia, eso sí, de que será el ejercicio de esas potestades, el que pueda ser revisado a través de procesos constitucionales específicos, pero no la norma en sí que, como se indicó, no implica ninguna lesión de carácter constitucional. El Magistrado Nombre12677 salva el voto y declara que la norma cuestionada produciría una lesión al artículo 24 constitucional.

ARTICULO 3 PARRAFO SEGUNDO DEL PROYECTO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL ARTICULO 183 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. Lo dispuesto en el párrafo consultado no es más que desarrollo de lo ya dispuesto en el artículo 183 de la Constitución Política, en el sentido de que la Contraloría General de la República es la encargada de vigilar la hacienda pública y, según el artículo 184 siguiente, de aprobar o improbar los presupuestos de los entes que indica la Constitución. De tal suerte, no atenta contra ningún principio o norma superior, el que la Ley disponga que la Contraloría puede improbar cuanto en el proyecto de presupuesto que se le somete, no vaya incluida la previsión de comentario. Debe notarse que en el transcurso de la discusión legislativa, se ha hecho desaparecer una inconstitucionalidad que contenía el proyecto, en el sentido de normar de modo parecido a la Asamblea Legislativa, trasladándose el deber de incluir las partidas correspondientes al Ministerio de Hacienda.

ARTICULO 21 DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL ARTICULO 24 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. Consideran los consultantes que en cuanto al régimen voluntario de pensiones complementarias, la ley no puede establecer como edad mínima para acogerse a la pensión los 57 años, pues se trata de un régimen voluntario, por lo que estos aspectos deben ser regulados por las partes. Efectivamente, se debe distinguir que en el proyecto se establecen dos tipos de pensiones complementarias, la primera la obligatoria que se sostendrá con aportes que establece el artículo 13 del proyecto. El otro régimen es el voluntario al cual únicamente cotiza el trabajador, si así lo decide. Estamos, pues, frente a un régimen voluntario en el estricto sentido del término, por lo que el trabajador ingresará a él, contratando libremente si considera que los criterios establecidas le son favorables o simplemente no contratará. Pero, por otra, la Sala no puede disputar a la Asamblea Legislativa los criterios técnicos que se han utilizado para estimar que aun en tratándose de un régimen voluntario, la edad de cincuenta y siete años sea la que actuarialmente haga viable la existencia del régimen. Esa cuestión debe ser debatida en otro ámbito, incluso el legislativo, para que se desvirtúe o confirme, pero en abstracto le resulta imposible a la Sala llegar a estimar que es una edad irrazonable o desproporcionada. Al menos no luce como tal, a la luz de lo que disponen los regímenes de pensión obligatorios.

ARTICULO 73 PARRAFO QUINTO DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL ARTICULO 33 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. El párrafo mencionado por los consultantes indica: " ARTICULO 73. Normas especiales de autorización para crear operadoras …Se autoriza a la Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Asociación Nacional de Educadores, a la Junta de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio y a la Sociedad de Seguros de Vida del Magisterio Nacional para que constituyan en forma conjunta una sociedad anónima con el único fin de constituir una operadora de pensiones, que será considerada para efectos de esta ley, como la única operadora autorizada del magisterio nacional…" En el artículo consultado no se establece lo que los diputados consultantes esgrimen, pues en éste se autorizan a diferentes instituciones, como lo son la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el Infocoop, Japdeva y la Universidad de Costa Rica para crear una operadora a los efectos de que puedan captar los dineros del Fondo de capitalización Laboral, solamente que en cuanto al Magisterio Nacional, por estar involucradas varias organizaciones, el proyecto les autoriza a una sola operadora, pero sin que se indique la obligación de todos los maestros de afiliarse a esta únicamente. Lo anterior contrastaría con lo dispuesto en el artículo 11 también del proyecto consultado, el que faculta a los trabajadores para escoger su operadora y solo en los casos en que éste no decida, los aportes de forma automática se trasladarán a la operadora del Magisterio Nacional en los casos de los trabajadores afiliados al sistema de pensiones de ese gremio y los del resto de trabajadores se depositaría en la operadora del Banco Popular.

TRANSITORIO V, POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL ARTICULO 182 DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA. Mediante este transitorio se exceptúa de la aplicación de los procedimientos de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para la adquisición de los bienes y servicios que la institución considere necesarios para poner en funcionamiento el Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación establecido en el artículo 31 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. En este sentido, la disposición transitoria está relacionada con el plazo que el mismo proyecto establece para poner en vigencia el sistema de recaudación, es decir, seis meses. Debe traerse a cita que esta Sala, en sentencia número 998-98, examinó en términos generales la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, para señalar que son dos los institutos principales sobre los que el Constituyente construyó el sistema: la licitación como medio idóneo para la celebración de los contratos del Estado, lato sensu y el control en manos de la Contraloría General de la República. En esa oportunidad se examinaron las distintas modalidades de licitación, lo que se encontró congruente con el texto del artículo ciento ochenta y dos Constitucional. A la luz de esa doctrina, y en referencia al caso concreto, cuyas especiales circunstancias se han analizado, estima la Sala que el régimen de excepción contemplado en el Transitorio V no resulta contrario a aquélla, puesto que han de observarse en lo posible los principios rectores del régimen de contratación administrativa y no se elimina la intervención contralora –a posteriori- como garantía de la corrección de las actuaciones de la administración autorizada. La Sala entiende que el legislador ha otorgado para ello un plazo preciso, que no luce irrazonable, tomando en cuenta que ha de ponerse en práctica un sistema de recaudación eficiente e idóneo para los fines que persigue el sistema, de allí que se estime que no existe inconstitucionalidad reclamada.

Los Magistrados Nombre12677 y Nombre3835 salvan el voto en relación con lo previsto en éste transitorio del Proyecto, en cuanto consideran que la autorización temporal que se otorga a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para la adquisición de materiales, bienes y servicios, sin que se apliquen los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, viola el artículo 182 de la Constitución.

ARTICULOS 77 Y 78 NUEVOS DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO, POR SUPUESTA VIOLACION AL SISTEMA DEMOCRATICO DE DERECHO. En el primero de los artículos consultados se establece que de las utilidades de las empresas públicas del Estado, se destinará un 15% para fortalecer el régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Y en el segundo, que de las utilidades del Instituto Nacional de Seguros debe darse una contribución del 10% para el fortalecimiento del Régimen de Riesgos del Trabajo. Lo consultado lo es en cuanto al vocablo "utilidad" considerando los consultantes que éste no puede ser utilizado para el Estado. Sin embargo, el proyecto lo que establece son contribuciones a cargo de entidades públicas, que no son de la administración central, para fortalecer regímenes especiales de protección ya establecidos, de allí que no estamos ante dineros presupuestados por ley para el servicio que debe prestar el Estado, sino que se trata efectivamente de instituciones que generan excedentes en su funcionamiento, por lo que el legislador ha considerado que éstos pueden ser utilizados para mejorar regímenes de seguridad social, lo cual no puede considerarse inconstitucional. Como únicamente se consulta en cuanto al fondo, la disposición señalada no reviste carácter de inconstitucional.

ARTICULO 82 DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO, POR SUPUESTO EXCESO LEGISLATIVO. Indican los consultantes que en el artículo 82 del proyecto se reforma el artículo 44 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, indicando que no obstante el espíritu del proyecto se inclina a regular la situación de los trabajadores asalariados, no así de los trabajadores independientes, en el texto discutido aun se mantienen referencias a este último grupo de trabajadores. En este sentido, la Sala no encuentra la inclinación que los legisladores indican, ni en la exposición de motivos, ni en el contenido del proyecto, pero de todas formas, se trata de un aspecto que por si mismo no es inconstitucional, y que por su naturaleza es susceptible de ser manejado discrecionalmente por el legislador. Por otra parte, consultan los diputados que en el artículo 82 del proyecto se determina la responsabilidad objetiva de los patronos por la no realización de deducciones a que están obligados, sin que se indique que para surgir dicha responsabilidad se requiere de culpa. Este aspecto no es posible definirlo en abstracto y más bien hay que recurrir a la doctrina penal e incluso a la jurisprudencia constitucional en el examen de los casos que se presenten en particular.

ARTICULO 82 DEL PROYECTO CONSULTADO. En este artículo se reforma el artículo 74 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en el que se obliga a los todos los patronos y personas que realicen total o parcialmente actividades independientes o asalariadas, su deber de estar al día con el pago de sus obligaciones ya que ello constituye requisito, entre otros, para el tramite de admisibilidad de cualquier solicitud administrativa de autorización, y para la inscripción de todo documento en el Registro Público Mercantil. El contenido del artículo consultado, no puede ser inconstitucional, pues el legislador está plenamente facultado para regular las circunstancias de conveniencia y oportunidad, como lo es el establecimiento de requisitos para la tramitación administrativa y registral.

ARTICULO 85 DEL PROYECTO DE LEY CONSULTADO. Este artículo adiciona el artículo 3 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, involucrando destinos específicos de los fondos de la Ley N° 5662 (Ley de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares", para subsanar la cuota patronal de los trabajadores independientes. El contenido del artículo consultado indica: "… Para el caso de los trabajadores independientes cuyo ingreso neto sea inferior al salario mínimo legal y que soliciten su afiliación al IVM de la CCSS, se incrementará la cuota del Estado, con el fin de subsanar parcialmente la ausencia de la cuota patronal. Para tales efectos, se creará un programa especial permanente a cargo del Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares…". Tal y como lo indican los consultantes, lo que en el artículo estudiado se establece es un destino de los fondos de asignaciones familiares, situación que no es contraria a la facultad del legislador, pues tal y como se desprende del contenido de la Ley N° 5662 de 23 de diciembre de 1974, en su artículo tercero el legislador dispuso los destinos de esos fondos, sin que se determinara que se trata de números clausus, de allí que, si el legislador, mediante modificación de la ley mencionada, determina ahora otro destino –similar- que deberá ser cubierto por los dineros que ingresan al fondo de asignaciones familiares, no puede considerarse como una actuación excesiva o ilegítima.

Así las cosas, la consulta formulada debe evacuarse en el sentido de que, en lo consultado, el proyecto de ley tramitado bajo el número de expediente N° 13.691 denominado "LEY DE PROTECCION AL TRABAJADOR", no resulta inconstitucional.