Criminal and civil conciliation: effects of breach of conditions in the agreementConciliación penal y civil: efectos del incumplimiento de condiciones en el acuerdo

III.[…] From a reading of the arguments presented, it is clear that there is a contradiction between the appealed judgment and the precedents of the Third Chamber and the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of Cartago, and in this case the previously unified criterion must be reiterated, according to which, for the granting of a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) in application of conciliation, compliance with the conditions established in the reparatory plan is essential. In order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the difference between the effects of criminal conciliation and civil conciliation, the precedents invoked in the appeal, and the situation presented in the specific case. I) Effects of conciliation. As a first necessary aspect for the resolution of the appeal, which will later be relevant when determining the existence of factual and legal identity between the invoked precedents and the appealed judgment, it is necessary to consider that in criminal proceedings, civil aspects can be the subject of a conciliation agreement independently of any disagreement regarding criminal aspects. This conclusion, which admits the possibility of entering into civil and criminal agreements in the criminal process independently, finds support in national doctrine, where it has been recognized: “It is even advisable for the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office during the investigation stage, and for criminal judges at the preliminary hearing, to point out to the conflicting parties the possibility of resolving the civil conflict, raised in the criminal process, through conciliation, warning that if the agreement is approved, it will have the character of a judgment and will produce res judicata (art. 51.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure)” (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. Reparación civil en el proceso penal. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., first edition, 2019, p. 712). From this perspective, when civil conciliation agreements are entered into independently of criminal ones, the consequences arising from non-compliance must be differentiated. In this sense, non-compliance with the criminal agreement leads to the resumption of the procedure according to the provisions of Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states: “If the accused fails to comply, without just cause, with the obligations agreed upon in the conciliation, the procedure shall continue as if conciliation had not taken place.” However, the same does not occur with non-compliance with a civil pact that has been agreed upon within the criminal process but independently of the criminal aspects. The foregoing, because once the civil agreement is approved (homologado), it has the status of res judicata and, consequently, is enforceable. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to consider that according to Article 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) is a civil lawsuit processed within the criminal process, for the purpose of being able to claim in this manner the damages derived from the punishable act. On the other hand, Article 109 of the Criminal Code establishes a referral to the civil procedural rules that must be applied subsidiarily and mutatis mutandi, by providing that: “The obligations corresponding to civil liability (reparación civil) are extinguished by the means and in the manner determined in the Civil Code, and the rules for fixing damages, as well as the determination of subsidiary or joint and several civil liability, shall be established in the Code of Civil Procedure.” Under this logic, the effects of the conciliation agreement in relation to civil aspects are clearly derived from Article 51.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: “The conciliation agreement must be examined by the court to determine whether it is according to law and does not violate public policy norms or affect non-disposable or non-waivable rights. Once duly approved, it shall terminate the proceeding if it encompasses all the claims. If it is partial, the proceeding shall continue with respect to what has not been resolved, unless there is an express agreement of the parties. Said agreement shall produce the effects of material res judicata, except when the law provides otherwise due to the nature of the controversy. When it does not encompass all aspects of the claim, it shall produce the partial effects of res judicata” (underlining not in the original). In relation to the effects of conciliation regarding civil aspects, national doctrine has indicated: “The conciliation reached by the parties, duly approved by the judge, produces three effects: that of res judicata (art. 51.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure); it grants the conciliation agreement the character of an enforceable title and, furthermore, it implies the extraordinary conclusion of the process” (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. Reparación civil en el proceso penal. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., first edition, 2019, p. 716, underlining not in the original). From this perspective, by granting res judicata effects to the approval of the civil agreement and granting it the character of an enforceable title, the payment must be processed through executive proceedings and, therefore, non-compliance cannot generate a revocation of the conciliation. Despite the foregoing, it is possible that in the exercise of party autonomy, the victim may include, as a condition of the criminal agreement, the need to receive a retribution or monetary compensation in their favor or in favor of a third party, even though such aspects are of a purely civil nature. Therefore, in each specific case, it is necessary to meticulously verify the conditions of the pact, in order to establish what the conditions of the criminal agreement were and what the conditions of the civil agreement were, since, as seen supra, non-compliance produces distinct legal consequences.[…] In the specific case, it is necessary to note that the audio of the hearing held at the Criminal Court of Cartago, at 2:10 p.m., on June 3, 2014, is not in the record (see folio 159-160); however, from the minutes of the oral and public trial where the conciliation agreement was approved, it is evident that the conciliation was agreed upon under the following terms: “The defense attorney states that the parties conciliated extrajudicially previously and that said agreement consisted of the payment of the victim's dental treatment. He also states that his client is willing to pay the sum of one hundred thousand colones as attorney's fees for the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim. The accused and the victim agree with the terms of the conciliation. Said mechanism consists of the following terms: The accused undertakes to pay monthly, in favor of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim as attorney's fees, the sum of one hundred thousand colones payable in monthly installments of twenty-five thousand colones starting from July 1, two thousand fourteen, and until October 1, two thousand fourteen, to Banco de Costa Rica account number 207434-6. Furthermore, he offers the appropriate apologies to the victim, which she accepts. The accused is warned of the consequences of failing to comply with said agreement and is informed that what is agreed herein will be noted in his judgment record” (folio 98-99). From this perspective, it can be concluded with crystal clarity that the conciliation agreement on the criminal aspect included the payment of one hundred thousand colones that had to be delivered to a third party, specifically the Victim Assistance Office (Oficina de Atención a la Víctima) of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the only condition that was pending fulfillment at the time of the issuance of the resolution transcribed supra, given that the dental treatment mentioned in the minutes had already been paid for and the requested apologies were given ipso facto. Subsequently, according to the certificate visible on folio 100, dated June 9, 2015, the defendant breached the conciliation agreement: “The undersigned judicial technician certifies that I communicated with the Civil Defense of the Victim in order to find out if the Accused Carlos Brenes complied with the corresponding payment; I am informed that Mr. Brenes paid nothing.” Subsequently, by means of resolution 153-2018 of the Criminal Court of Cartago, at 10:30 a.m., on February 8, 2018, the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) of the case was ordered based on the application of conciliation, assessing in relation to the non-payment that there is no losing party and, given that the economic solvency of the victim was not proven, neither party must pay the services of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, and also that the deadline had already expired and there was no complaint from said office (folio 101-107). This resolution was challenged by the representative of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim through an appeal, which was declared without merit in resolution 2019-000133 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, at 11:18 a.m., on April 10, 2018 – now the subject of this cassation appeal – endorsing that in the absence of a losing party and the absence of proof of the economic solvency of the defendant or the victim, each party must bear its own costs, warning that: “Furthermore, it must be remembered that Article 35 of the Law mentioned above conditions the collection of fees on it being procedurally appropriate, and the appropriateness thereof is governed by the aforementioned Article 34. In adherence to the principle of legality, the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim had to ascertain the economic capacity of the victim in order to be legitimized to charge her fees, and only from that point could the victim agree on this matter in the conciliation agreement” (folio 112). From this perspective, it is observed that the payment agreed upon in favor of a third party, in this case the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, formed part of the criminal agreement and not of a civil agreement entered into in the criminal process, nor was it a collection of fees extraneous to the conciliation agreement. Therefore, it is verified that there is factual and legal identity between the judgment being appealed in cassation and the precedent invoked as contradictory by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal. Consequently, the cassation appeal filed by Mariela Rivera Volio, representative of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim of the Public Prosecutor's Office, is granted. The jurisprudential criterion is unified in the same sense as set forth in resolution 2015-000248 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of Cartago, at 2:00 p.m., on April 24, 2014, concluding that in the absence of compliance with one of the conditions provided for in the criminal agreement, including payment to a third party, the issuance of the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) of the case is not appropriate.

"III. […] From reading the arguments presented, it is clear that a contradiction exists between the appealed judgment and the precedents of the Third Chamber and the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of Cartago, thus making it necessary in this case to reiterate the previously unified criterion according to which, for a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) to proceed pursuant to a conciliation (conciliación), compliance with the conditions established in the reparatory plan is indispensable. In order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the difference between the effects of criminal conciliation and civil conciliation, the precedents invoked in the appeal, and the situation presented in the specific case. **I) Effects of conciliation.** As a first aspect necessary for resolving the appeal, and which will later be relevant when determining the existence of factual and legal identity between the invoked precedents and the appealed judgment, it is necessary to consider that in the criminal process, civil aspects may be the subject of a conciliation agreement independently of any disagreement regarding the criminal aspects. This conclusion, which admits the possibility of entering into civil and criminal agreements in the criminal process independently, finds support in national doctrine, where it has been recognized: *“ It is even advisable for representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office during the investigation stage, and criminal judges, during the preliminary hearing, to point out to the conflicting parties the possibility of settling the civil conflict raised in the criminal process through conciliation, warning that if the agreement is approved (homologado), it will have the character of a judgment and will produce res judicata (cosa juzgada) (art. 51.3 of the Civil Procedure Code)”* (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. **Reparación civil en el proceso penal**. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., first edition, 2019, p. 712). From this perspective, when civil conciliation agreements are entered into independently of criminal ones, the consequences arising from non-compliance must be differentiated. In this sense, non-compliance with the criminal agreement results in the resumption of the procedure pursuant to Article 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states: *“ If the accused fails to fulfill, without just cause, the obligations agreed upon in the conciliation, the procedure shall continue as if no conciliation had been reached”*. However, the same does not occur with non-compliance with a civil agreement that has been reached within the criminal process but independently of the criminal aspects. This is because, once the civil agreement is approved, it has the character of res judicata and, consequently, is enforceable. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to consider that according to Article 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) is a civil claim processed within the criminal process, for the purpose of claiming in this venue the damages arising from the punishable act. On the other hand, Article 109 of the Penal Code establishes a referral to the civil procedural rules that must be applied subsidiarily *mutatis mutandi*, by providing that: *“The obligations corresponding to civil reparation are extinguished by the means and in the manner determined in the Civil Code, and the rules for establishing damages, as well as the determination of subsidiary or joint and several civil reparation, shall be established in the Code of Civil Procedure”*. Under this logic, the effects of the conciliation agreement regarding civil aspects are clearly derived from Article 51.3 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides: *“ The conciliation agreement must be examined by the court to determine if it is in accordance with the law and does not violate public order rules or affect non-disposable or non-waivable rights. Once duly approved, it shall terminate the process if it encompassed all claims. If it was partial, the procedure shall continue with respect to that which has not been resolved, unless there is an express agreement by the parties. **<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Said agreement shall produce the effects of material res judicata</span>**, except when the law provides otherwise due to the nature of the dispute. When it does not encompass all aspects of the claim, it shall partially produce the effects of res judicata” * (underlining not in the original). Regarding the effects of conciliation concerning civil aspects, national doctrine has indicated: *“The conciliation reached by the parties, duly approved by the judge, produces three effects: **the effect of res judicata** (art. 51.3 of the Civil Procedure Code); **grants the conciliation agreement the character of an enforceable title** and, furthermore, implies the extraordinary conclusion of the process”* (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. **Reparación civil en el proceso penal**. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., first edition, 2019, p. 716, underlining not in the original). From this perspective, by granting res judicata effects to the approval of the civil agreement and conferring upon it the character of an enforceable title, payment must be pursued in the executive venue and, therefore, non-compliance cannot generate a revocation of the conciliation. Despite the foregoing, it is possible that, using the autonomy of will, the victim includes as a condition of the criminal agreement the necessity of receiving a retribution or monetary compensation for themselves or a third party, even though such aspects are of a strictly civil nature; therefore, in each specific case, it is necessary to meticulously verify the conditions of the agreement in order to establish which were the conditions of the criminal agreement and which were the conditions of the civil agreement, since, as seen *supra*, non-compliance produces distinct legal consequences. […] In the specific case, it is necessary to note that the audio of the hearing held before the Criminal Court of Cartago, at 2:10 p.m. on June 3, 2014 (see folio 159-160), is not available; however, from the record of the oral and public trial where the conciliation agreement was approved, it follows that the conciliation was agreed upon in the following terms: *“The defense attorney states that the parties conciliated extrajudicially beforehand and that said agreement consisted of the payment of the dental treatment for the victim. He further states that his client is willing to pay the sum of one hundred thousand colones for attorney's fees (honorarios de abogado) for the Victim's Civil Defense Office. The accused and the victim agree with the terms of the conciliation. Said arrangement consists of the following terms: **The accused commits to pay monthly, to the Office of the Victim's Civil Defense for attorney's fees, the sum of one hundred thousand colones payable in monthly installments of twenty-five thousand colones beginning July 1, two thousand fourteen, and continuing until October 1, two thousand fourteen, to Banco de Costa Rica account number 207434-6.** Furthermore, he offers the victim the corresponding apologies and the same accepts them. The accused is warned about the consequences of failing to comply with said agreement and is informed that what has been agreed herein shall be noted in his judgment sheet”* (folio 98-99). From this perspective, one can conclude with crystal clarity that the criminal conciliation agreement included the payment of one hundred thousand colones that were to be delivered to a third party, specifically the Victim's Assistance Office of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the only condition that was pending compliance at the time of the issuance of the resolution transcribed *supra*, since the dental treatment mentioned in the record had already been paid and the requested apologies were given *ipso facto*. Subsequently, according to the certification visible on folio 100, dated June 9, 2015, the accused failed to comply with the conciliation agreement: *“The undersigned judicial technician hereby certifies that I communicated with the Civil Defense of the Victim's office to find out if the accused Carlos Brenes complied with the corresponding payment; I am informed that Mr. Brenes paid nothing”*. Next, by resolution 153-2018 of the Criminal Court of Cartago, at 10:30 a.m. on February 8, 2018, the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) of the case was ordered based on the application of conciliation, assessing, in relation to the non-compliance with the payment, that there is no losing party, and since the economic solvency of the victim was not demonstrated, neither party must pay for the services of the Victim's Civil Defense Office; furthermore, the deadline had already expired and no complaint existed from said office (folio 101-107). Said resolution was challenged by the representative of the Victim's Civil Defense Office through an appeal, which was declared without merit in resolution 2019-000133 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, at 11:18 a.m. on April 10, 2018 – now the subject of the cassation appeal –, endorsing that in the absence of a losing party and the absence of proof of the economic solvency of the accused or the victim, each party must bear their own costs, warning that: *“ Furthermore, it must be recalled that Article 35 of the Law mentioned above conditions the collection of fees on it being appropriate, and the appropriateness thereof is governed by Article 34 already referred to. In adherence to the principle of legality, the Victim's Civil Defense Office should have ascertained the economic capacity of the victim in order to be legitimized to charge her fees, and only from that point could the victim agree on this matter in the conciliation agreement” * (folio 112). From this perspective, it is observed that the payment agreed upon in favor of a third party, in this case the Victim's Civil Defense Office, formed part of the criminal agreement and not of a civil agreement entered into in the criminal process, nor was it a collection of fees unrelated to the conciliation agreement; therefore, it is verified that factual and legal identity exists between the appealed judgment and the precedent invoked as contradictory from the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal. Consequently, the cassation appeal filed by Mariela Rivera Volio, representative of the Victim's Civil Defense Office of the Public Prosecutor's Office, is declared with merit, the jurisprudential criterion is unified in an identical sense to that provided in resolution 2015-000248 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of Cartago, at 2:00 p.m. on April 24, 2014, concluding that in the absence of compliance with one of the conditions provided for in the criminal agreement, including payment to a third party, the issuance of a definitive dismissal of the case does not proceed.

"III.[…] De la lectura de los argumentos planteados, se desprende que existe una contradicción entre la sentencia recurrida y los precedentes de la Sala Tercera y el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, debiendo en este caso reiterarse el criterio previamente unificado según el cual, para la procedencia del sobreseimiento definitivo en aplicación de la conciliación, es indispensable el cumplimiento de las condiciones establecidas en el plan reparador. A efectos de poder arribar a dicha conclusión, es necesario considerar la diferencia que existen entre los efectos de la conciliación penal y la conciliación civil, los precedentes invocados en el recurso y la situación presentada en el caso concreto. I) Efectos de la conciliación. Como un primer aspecto necesario para la resolución del recurso y que posteriormente tendrá relevancia a la hora determinar la existencia de identidad fáctica y jurídica entre los precedentes invocados y la sentencia recurrida, es necesario considerar que en el proceso penal los aspectos civiles pueden ser objeto de un acuerdo conciliatorio con independencia del desacuerdo en relación con los aspectos penales. Dicha conclusión que admite la posibilidad de suscribir acuerdos civiles y penales en el proceso penal de forma independiente, encuentra respaldo en la doctrina nacional, donde se ha reconocido: “ Incluso, es recomendable que los representantes del Ministerio Público en la etapa de investigación, y los jueces penales, en la audiencia preliminar, señalen a las partes en conflicto, la posibilidad de dirimir el conflicto civil, planteado en el proceso penal, por medio de la conciliación, advirtiendo que de homologarse el acuerdo, tendrá el cará cter de una sentencia, y producirá cosa juzgada (art. 51.3 del Código Procesal Civil)” (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. Reparación civil en el proceso penal. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., primera edición, 2019, pág. 712). Desde esta óptica, cuando se suscriben acuerdos conciliatorios civiles independientes de los penales, se deben diferenciar las consecuencias que acarrea el incumplimiento. En este sentido, el incumplimiento del acuerdo en lo penal, produce la reanudación del procedimiento según lo dispuesto en el artículo 36 del Código Procesal Penal, donde se refiere que: “ Si el imputado no cumpliera, sin justa causa, las obligaciones pactadas en la conciliación, el procedimiento continuará, como si no se hubiera conciliado”. Sin embargo, no ocurre lo mismo con el incumplimiento del pacto civil que ha sido acordado dentro del proceso penal pero de forma independiente a los aspectos penales. Lo anterior, porque una vez homologado el acuerdo civil, este tiene carácter de cosa juzgada y en consecuencia, es ejecutable. Para arribar a dicha conclusión, es necesario considerar que según el artículo 41 del Código Procesal Penal, la acción civil resarcitoria es una demanda civil tramitada dentro del proceso penal, con el fin de poder reclamar en esta vía los daños derivados del hecho punible. Por otra parte, el ordinal 109 del Código Penal establece una remisión a la normativa procesal civil que debe ser aplicada de forma subsidiaria mutatis mutandi , al disponer que: “Las obligaciones correspondientes a la reparación civil se extinguen por los medios y en la forma determinada en el Código Civil y las reglas para fijar los da ños y perjuicios, lo mismo que la determinación de la reparación civil subsidiaria o solidaria, serán establecidas en el Código de Procedimientos Civiles”. Bajo esta lógica, los efectos del acuerdo conciliatorio en relación con los aspectos civiles se desprenden con claridad del artículo 51.3 del Código Procesal Civil, donde se dispone: “ El acuerdo conciliatorio debe ser examinado por el tribunal para determinar si está a derecho y no quebranta normas de orden público o alcanza derechos indisponibles o irrenunciables. Debidamente homologado dará por terminado el proceso si comprendiera todas las pretensiones. Si fuera parcial, el procedimiento continuará respecto de lo que no haya sido solucionado, salvo convenio expreso de las partes. Dicho acuerdo producirá efectos de cosa juzgada material, excepto cuando la ley disponga lo contrario por la naturaleza de la controversia. Cuando no comprenda todos los aspectos de la pretensión, producirá parcialmente los efectos de la cosa juzgada” (subrayado no corresponde al original). En relación con los efectos de la conciliación en cuanto a los aspectos civiles, la doctrina nacional ha indicado: “La conciliación alcanzada por las partes, debidamente homologada por el juzgador, produce tres efectos: el de cosa juzgada (art. 51.3 del Código Procesal Civil); otorga al acuerdo conciliatorio el carácter de título ejecutorio y, además, implica la conclusión extraordinaria del proceso” (SANABRIA ROJAS, Rafael. Reparación civil en el proceso penal. Editorial Jurídico Continental, San José, C.R., primera edición, 2019, pág. 716, subrayado no corresponde al original). Desde esta perspectiva, al otorgársele efectos de cosa juzgada a la homologaci ón del acuerdo civil y concederle el carácter de título ejecutivo, el pago debe ventilarse en la vía ejecutiva y por ende el incumplimiento, no puede generar una revocatoria de la conciliación. A pesar de lo anterior, es posible que en el uso de la autonomía de la voluntad, la víctima incluya como condición del acuerdo en lo penal, la necesidad de percibir una retribución o una compensación monetaria en su favor o de un tercero, a pesar que dichos aspectos son de carácter propiamente civil, por lo que en cada caso concreto, es necesario verificar de forma minuciosa las condiciones del pacto, a fin de establecer cuales fueron las condiciones del acuerdo penal y cuales son las condiciones del acuerdo civil, ya que como se vio supra, el incumplimiento produce consecuencias jurídicas distintas.[…] En el caso concreto, es necesario advertir que no consta el audio de la audiencia celebrada en el Tribunal Penal de Cartago, de las 14:10 horas, del 3 de junio de 2014 (ver folio 159-160), sin embargo, del acta del debate oral y público donde se homologó el acuerdo conciliatorio, se desprende que la conciliación fue acordada en los siguientes términos: “El abogado defensor expone que las partes conciliaron extrajudicialmente con anterioridad y que dicho acuerdo consistió en el pago del tratamiento dental de la ofendida. Manifiesta además que su representado se encuentra anuente a cancelar la suma de cien mil colones por concepto de honorarios de abogado de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Ví ctima. El acusado y la ofendida se encuentran de acuerdo con los términos de la conciliación. Dicho instituto consiste en los siguientes términos: El acusado se compromete a cancelar mensualmente y a favor de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Ví ctima por concepto de honorarios de abogado la suma de cien mil colones pagaderos en tractos mensuales de veinticinco mil colones a partir del primero de julio de dos mil catorce y hasta el primero de octubre de dos mil catorce a la cuenta del Banco de Costa Rica nú mero 207434-6. Además, le ofrece disculpas del caso a la ofendida y la misma las acepta. Se le advierte al acusado sobre las consecuencias de incumplir con dicho acuerdo y se le informa que en su hoja de juzgamiento se anotará lo aquí pactado” (f olio 98-99). Desde esta óptica, se puede concluir con meridana claridad que el acuerdo conciliatorio en lo penal, incluyó el pago de cien mil colones que debían ser entregados a un tercero, específicamente la Oficina de Atención a la Víctima del Ministerio Público, única condición que se encontraba pendiente de cumplimiento al momento de la emisión de la resolución transcrita supra, toda vez que el tratamiento dental mencionado en el acta ya había sido cancelado y las disculpas solicitadas, fueron dadas en el ipso facto . Posteriormente, según constancia visible a folio 100, con fecha de 9 de junio de 2015, el encartado incumplió con el acuerdo conciliatorio: “El suscrito t écnico judicial hago constar que me comuniqué con la defensa (sic) Civil de la Víctima con el fin de saber si el Imputado Carlos Brenes cumplió con el pago correspondiente, me informa que el señ or Brenes no pago nada”. De seguido, mediante resolución 153-2018 del Tribunal Penal de Cartago, de las 10:30 horas, del 8 de febrero de 2018, se ordenó el sobreseimiento definitivo de la causa con base en la aplicación de la conciliación, valorando en relación con el incumplimiento del pago que no existe parte vencida y al no haberse demostrado la solvencia económica de la ofendida, ninguna de las partes debe cancelar los servicios de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, además que ya había vencido el plazo y no existió queja de dicha oficina (folio 101-107). Dicha resolución fue impugnada por la representante de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima mediante el recurso de apelación, el cual fue declarado sin lugar en la resolución 2019-000133 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, de las 11:18 horas, del 10 abril de 2018 -ahora objeto del recurso de casación-, avalando que ante la ausencia de parte vencida y la ausencia de constancia de la solvencia económica del encartado o la ofendida, cada parte debe asumir sus costas, advirtiendo que: “ Ademá s, debe recordarse que el artículo 35 de la Ley mencionada líneas atrás, condiciona el cobro de honorarios a que el mismo sea procedente y la procedencia de éste es la reglada en el artículo 34 ya referido. En apego al principio de legalidad, debía la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima cerciorarse de la capacidad económica de la ofendida, para estar legitimada para cobrarle a ella honorarios y sólo a partir de allí, podía la ofendida pactar al respecto en el acuerdo conciliatorio” (folio 112). Desde esta óptica, se observa que el pago acordado a favor de un tercero, en este caso la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima formó parte del acuerdo penal y no de acuerdo civil suscrito en el proceso penal, ni se trató de un cobro de honorarios ajeno al acuerdo conciliatorio, por ende, se verifica que existe identidad fáctica y jurídica entre la sentencia casada y el precedente invocado como contradictorio del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal. En consecuencia, se declara con lugar el recurso de casación presentado por la representante de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público Mariela Rivera Volio, se unifica el criterio jurisprudencial en idéntico sentido al dispuesto en la resolución 2015-000248 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, de las 14:00 horas, del 24 de abril de 2014, concluyendo que ante la ausencia de cumplimiento de una de las condiciones previstas en el acuerdo penal, incluidas el pago a un tercero, no procede el dictado del sobreseimiento definitivo de la causa.