← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
Exp. 99-003942-0007-CO
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber ruled that the consultation was optional, not mandatory, and that the constitutional amendment bill contained defects of unconstitutionality by excluding amparo against acts of private parties, requiring correction by the Legislative Assembly.La Sala Constitucional dictaminó que la consulta era facultativa, no preceptiva, y que el proyecto de reforma constitucional contenía vicios de inconstitucionalidad al excluir el amparo contra actos de sujetos privados, debiendo ser corregido por la Asamblea Legislativa.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber issued a mandatory advisory opinion on a constitutional amendment bill (legislative file No. 13.754) that sought to introduce Article 48 bis into the Constitution. The amendment aimed to exclude certain matters from the amparo remedy, such as electoral matters, judicial acts (except for undue delay), and acts of private entities, with the possibility for the legislature to further develop these exclusions. The Chamber found that the bill violated the fundamental right of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution, and that excluding amparo against private acts was unconstitutional as it would empty the right of its content. However, it deemed the exclusion for electoral and judicial acts constitutional as long as it did not prevent protection against fundamental rights violations. The Chamber ultimately ruled that the consultation was optional rather than mandatory, and that the bill contained defects of unconstitutionality requiring correction by the Legislative Assembly.La Sala Constitucional emitió opinión consultiva preceptiva sobre el proyecto de reforma constitucional tramitado bajo el expediente legislativo No. 13.754, que introducía un artículo 48 bis a la Constitución Política. La reforma buscaba excluir del recurso de amparo ciertas materias, como la materia electoral, actos jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial, salvo por retardo de justicia, y los actos de sujetos de derecho privado, declarando que el legislador podría desarrollar estas exclusiones. La Sala determinó que el proyecto violaba el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia, garantizado por el artículo 48 constitucional, y que la exclusión del amparo contra actos de sujetos privados era inconstitucional por vaciar de contenido dicho derecho. Sin embargo, consideró que la exclusión respecto de actos electorales y jurisdiccionales era constitucional en tanto no impidiera lesiones a derechos fundamentales amparables. Concluyó que la consulta era facultativa y no preceptiva, y que el proyecto contenía vicios de inconstitucionalidad que debían ser corregidos por la Asamblea Legislativa.
Key excerptExtracto clave
III.- Nature of the consultation and procedure. There can be no doubt that the legal nature of the mandatory legislative consultation regulated by Article 96(a) is that of a prior constitutional review of constitutional amendment bills, which this Chamber accepted in Ruling No. 1764-95 of 11:30 a.m. on April 7, 1995. The prior constitutional review carried out through the mandatory legislative consultation, by its very nature, is an abstract, comprehensive, formal, and substantive review of the constitutionality of the consulted bill, which must be performed by comparing the bill's provisions with all constitutional provisions, including in light of constitutional principles and, above all, of the human and fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and international instruments. (...) This Chamber has repeatedly affirmed that constitutional amendments, whatever they may be, find their limit in constitutional principles, which give identity to the Constitution and the Costa Rican Rule of Law. Hence, in exercising prior constitutionality review of constitutional amendment bills, it must ensure that these principles are not harmed, because the Legislative Assembly, in exercising the amending power, does not enjoy unlimited authority to modify the Constitution, but is subject to the formal and substantive limits imposed by the Constitution itself. IV.- Regarding the scope of Article 48 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Chamber, from its inception, has maintained that the amparo remedy is the fundamental guarantee of fundamental rights, and that its protective scope extends to any act or omission by any public authority or private party that harms or threatens to harm a fundamental right. In this regard, the Chamber's jurisprudence has been emphatic in affirming that amparo against private parties is a manifestation of the principle of direct and immediate effect of fundamental rights in relations between private individuals (Drittwirkung), so that any attempt to exclude this possibility empties the content of the fundamental right of access to justice enshrined in Article 48 of the Constitution. V.- Analysis of the bill. In light of the foregoing, this Chamber finds that the exclusion of the amparo remedy against acts of private parties, as proposed in the bill, is unconstitutional because it harms the essential content of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 48 of the Political Constitution. In contrast, the exclusion of electoral matters and judicial acts of the Judiciary —except for undue delay— is not unconstitutional, provided that the legal system provides other equally effective means for protecting fundamental rights that might be affected in those areas, and as long as access to amparo is not prevented when there are direct injuries to fundamental rights that cannot be repaired through those means.III.- Naturaleza de la consulta y procedimiento. Ninguna duda puede caber respecto a que la naturaleza jurídica de la consulta legislativa preceptiva que regula el artículo 96 inciso a), es la de un control previo de constitucionalidad de los proyectos de reforma constitucional, que esta Sala aceptó al disponerlo así en el Voto No. 1764-95 de las 11:30 horas del 7 de abril de 1995. El control previo de constitucionalidad que se realiza por medio de la consulta legislativa preceptiva, por su propia naturaleza, es un control abstracto, integral, formal y material de la constitucionalidad del proyecto consultado, que debe hacerse mediante la comparación de las normas del proyecto con todas las disposiciones constitucionales, incluso a la luz de los principios constitucionales y, sobre todo, de los derechos humanos y fundamentales reconocidos en la Constitución y en los instrumentos internacionales. (...) Esta Sala reiteradamente ha manifestado que la reforma constitucional, cualquiera que ella sea, encuentra su límite en los principios constitucionales, los cuales le dan identidad a la Constitución y al Estado de Derecho costarricense. De ahí que, en el ejercicio del control de constitucionalidad previo de los proyectos de reforma a la Constitución, debe velar porque no se lesionen esos principios, pues la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio del poder reformador, no goza de una potestad ilimitada para modificar la Constitución, sino que se encuentra sujeta a los límites formales y materiales que la propia Constitución impone. IV.- Sobre el alcance del artículo 48 constitucional. La Sala Constitucional, desde sus inicios, ha sostenido que el recurso de amparo es la garantía fundamental de los derechos fundamentales, y que su ámbito de protección se extiende a todo acto u omisión de cualquier autoridad pública o de sujetos de derecho privado que lesione o amenace con lesionar un derecho fundamental. En este sentido, la jurisprudencia de la Sala ha sido contundente en afirmar que el amparo contra sujetos de derecho privado es una manifestación del principio de eficacia directa e inmediata de los derechos fundamentales en las relaciones entre particulares (Drittwirkung), de manera que, cualquier intento de excluir esta posibilidad vacía de contenido el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia consagrado en el artículo 48 constitucional. V.- Análisis del proyecto. A la luz de lo anterior, esta Sala considera que la exclusión del recurso de amparo contra actos de sujetos de derecho privado, tal y como lo plantea el proyecto, resulta inconstitucional por cuanto lesiona el contenido esencial del derecho fundamental consagrado en el artículo 48 de la Constitución Política. En cambio, la exclusión de la materia electoral y de los actos jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial —salvo por retardo de justicia— no resulta inconstitucional, en el tanto en cuanto el ordenamiento jurídico prevea otras vías igualmente eficaces para la tutela de los derechos fundamentales que pudieran verse afectados en esos ámbitos, y siempre que no se impida el acceso al amparo cuando se trate de lesiones directas a derechos fundamentales no reparables por esas vías.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El control previo de constitucionalidad que se realiza por medio de la consulta legislativa preceptiva, por su propia naturaleza, es un control abstracto, integral, formal y material de la constitucionalidad del proyecto consultado, que debe hacerse mediante la comparación de las normas del proyecto con todas las disposiciones constitucionales, incluso a la luz de los principios constitucionales y, sobre todo, de los derechos humanos y fundamentales reconocidos en la Constitución y en los instrumentos internacionales."
"The prior constitutional review carried out through the mandatory legislative consultation, by its very nature, is an abstract, comprehensive, formal, and substantive review of the constitutionality of the consulted bill, which must be performed by comparing the bill's provisions with all constitutional provisions, including in light of constitutional principles and, above all, of the human and fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and international instruments."
Considerando III
"El control previo de constitucionalidad que se realiza por medio de la consulta legislativa preceptiva, por su propia naturaleza, es un control abstracto, integral, formal y material de la constitucionalidad del proyecto consultado, que debe hacerse mediante la comparación de las normas del proyecto con todas las disposiciones constitucionales, incluso a la luz de los principios constitucionales y, sobre todo, de los derechos humanos y fundamentales reconocidos en la Constitución y en los instrumentos internacionales."
Considerando III
"Esta Sala reiteradamente ha manifestado que la reforma constitucional, cualquiera que ella sea, encuentra su límite en los principios constitucionales, los cuales le dan identidad a la Constitución y al Estado de Derecho costarricense."
"This Chamber has repeatedly affirmed that constitutional amendments, whatever they may be, find their limit in constitutional principles, which give identity to the Constitution and the Costa Rican Rule of Law."
Considerando III
"Esta Sala reiteradamente ha manifestado que la reforma constitucional, cualquiera que ella sea, encuentra su límite en los principios constitucionales, los cuales le dan identidad a la Constitución y al Estado de Derecho costarricense."
Considerando III
"La Sala Constitucional, desde sus inicios, ha sostenido que el recurso de amparo es la garantía fundamental de los derechos fundamentales, y que su ámbito de protección se extiende a todo acto u omisión de cualquier autoridad pública o de sujetos de derecho privado que lesione o amenace con lesionar un derecho fundamental."
"The Constitutional Chamber, from its inception, has maintained that the amparo remedy is the fundamental guarantee of fundamental rights, and that its protective scope extends to any act or omission by any public authority or private party that harms or threatens to harm a fundamental right."
Considerando IV
"La Sala Constitucional, desde sus inicios, ha sostenido que el recurso de amparo es la garantía fundamental de los derechos fundamentales, y que su ámbito de protección se extiende a todo acto u omisión de cualquier autoridad pública o de sujetos de derecho privado que lesione o amenace con lesionar un derecho fundamental."
Considerando IV
"Cualquier intento de excluir esta posibilidad vacía de contenido el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia consagrado en el artículo 48 constitucional."
"Any attempt to exclude this possibility empties the content of the fundamental right of access to justice enshrined in Article 48 of the Constitution."
Considerando IV
"Cualquier intento de excluir esta posibilidad vacía de contenido el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia consagrado en el artículo 48 constitucional."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
**Expediente:** 99-003942-0007-CO **Resolution Date:** 03/30/2001 **Plaintiff:** Felipe Moya Lutz **Issuing Body:** Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice **Summary by the Processing Center** **Descriptors:** - Principle of reasonableness - Duty of the Public Administration - Sustainability - Municipal autonomy - Groundwater - Protected area - Spring (*naciente*) - Water easement (*servidumbre*) **Text of the summary:** An action of unconstitutionality is brought against the "daytime protection area of springs" established in Article 33 of the Forestry Law. It is alleged that it is an excessive and rigid strip of land that violates property rights and municipal autonomy, arguing that it should be the Municipality that sets the regulation for the water easement (*servidumbre*) and the protection regime for the body of water, in accordance with the Urban Planning Law. It is argued that the land is totally flat with no forest, the spring (*naciente*) is insignificant, and the strip is disproportionate to the end pursued.
The Chamber analyzes the purpose of the Forestry Law, which declares forests to be of public interest and the protection area regime established therein, a legislative power derived from Article 89 of the Political Constitution, which is to ensure the conservation and rational use of forest heritage, integrated by the soil, water, and biodiversity. It is concluded that the purpose of the norm is reasonable, as it seeks to protect the water resource, with respect to trees and forests that affect the spring (*naciente*). The Chamber indicates that the Forestry Law, in its Article 33, seeks to guarantee water easements (*servidumbres*), protecting the interest of the water and the aquifer itself, for which it establishes a daytime protection area that must be maintained with forest cover (*cobertura boscosa*) to ensure the sustainability of the water resource.
Therefore, the Chamber dismisses the action, understanding that a protection area of springs (*nacientes*) with a radius of 100 meters in flat terrain does not violate reasonableness. If the legislator chose to protect the spring (*naciente*) by means of a forested area precisely at the point where the water emerges, the purpose is to protect the water itself, so that any intervention that could contaminate it, or any factor external to the spring (*naciente*) of other types (such as those indicated by the plaintiff regarding domestic animals, pesticides, etc.), is limited by the fact that a forest exists that serves as a barrier. It is a reasonable measure to safeguard water and forest resources in the face of urban development.
**Expediente:** 99-003942-0007-CO **Resolution Date:** 03/30/2001 **Plaintiff:** Felipe Moya Lutz **Issuing Body:** Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice **Summary by the Processing Center** **Descriptors:** - Principle of reasonableness - Duty of the Public Administration - Sustainability - Municipal autonomy - Groundwater - Protected area - Spring (*naciente*) - Water easement (*servidumbre*) **Text of the summary:** An action of unconstitutionality is brought against the "daytime protection area of springs" established in Article 33 of the Forestry Law. It is alleged that it is an excessive and rigid strip of land that violates property rights and municipal autonomy, arguing that it should be the Municipality that sets the regulation for the water easement (*servidumbre*) and the protection regime for the body of water, in accordance with the Urban Planning Law. It is argued that the land is totally flat with no forest, the spring (*naciente*) is insignificant, and the strip is disproportionate to the end pursued.
The Chamber analyzes the purpose of the Forestry Law, which declares forests to be of public interest and the protection area regime established therein, a legislative power derived from Article 89 of the Political Constitution, which is to ensure the conservation and rational use of forest heritage, integrated by the soil, water, and biodiversity. It is concluded that the purpose of the norm is reasonable, as it seeks to protect the water resource, with respect to trees and forests that affect the spring (*naciente*). The Chamber indicates that the Forestry Law, in its Article 33, seeks to guarantee water easements (*servidumbres*), protecting the interest of the water and the aquifer itself, for which it establishes a daytime protection area that must be maintained with forest cover (*cobertura boscosa*) to ensure the sustainability of the water resource.
Therefore, the Chamber dismisses the action, understanding that a protection area of springs (*nacientes*) with a radius of 100 meters in flat terrain does not violate reasonableness. If the legislator chose to protect the spring (*naciente*) by means of a forested area precisely at the point where the water emerges, the purpose is to protect the water itself, so that any intervention that could contaminate it, or any factor external to the spring (*naciente*) of other types (such as those indicated by the plaintiff regarding domestic animals, pesticides, etc.), is limited by the fact that a forest exists that serves as a barrier. It is a reasonable measure to safeguard water and forest resources in the face of urban development.
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.